Afrika harbiy tizimlari (1800–1900) - African military systems (1800–1900)

1800 yildan keyin sodir bo'lgan o'zgarishlar Afrika harbiy tizimlarida sezilarli rivojlanishni keltirib chiqarishi kerak edi. Qurollar jang maydonida ustunroq joyni egallab olishdi, ammo Zuluning harbiy tizimi qurolni g'ayratli nayzachi foydasiga tortib oldi. Ikkala yondashuv ham muhim ta'sir ko'rsatishi kerak edi.

Afrika harbiy tizimlari (1800–1900) Afrika qit'asidagi mahalliy davlatlar va xalqlarning roliga e'tibor qaratib, 1800 yildan keyin Afrika qit'asidagi harbiy tizimlarning evolyutsiyasini nazarda tutadi. Bu erda faqat yirik harbiy tizimlar yoki yangiliklar va ularning 1800 yildan keyingi rivojlanishi yoritilgan. 1800 yilgacha bo'lgan voqealar uchun qarang Afrika harbiy tizimlari 1800 yilgacha. 20-asr va undan keyingi davrni qamrab olish 1900 yildan keyin Afrika harbiy tizimlari. Afrikaning harbiy tarixini mintaqalar bo'yicha umumiy ko'rinish uchun qarang Afrikaning harbiy tarixi. 1800 yildan keyingi faoliyat haqida batafsil ma'lumot olish uchun individual janglar, imperiyalar va rahbarlarni ko'ring.

Afrika harbiy tizimlari va 19-asr

Leytenantlar tasvirlangan C. E. Frippning surati Melvill va Kogill Isandlvana jangida zulu askarlari bilan jangda.

Muhim ta'sir

19-asrning boshlarida harbiy tizimlar evolyutsiyasiga katta ta'sir ko'rsatadigan bir qancha omillar ko'rildi. Bunday omillar XIX asrni qit'adagi kuchli o'zgarish davri deb belgilaydigan Afrikadagi standart tarixlarda keltirilgan.^[1] Ulardan ba'zilari:

• Shaka davrida Zulu qirolligining paydo bo'lishi, bu muhim o'zgarishlarni yaratdi - materikning janubiy qismidan Sharqiy va Markaziy Afrikaga qadar.
• The Fula jihodlari G'arbiy Afrikadan, bu mintaqada Sudan shtatlari kamariga sezilarli darajada o'zgarishni keltirib chiqaradi
• Qit'aga etkazib beriladigan qurollarning tobora ko'payib borayotgani
• Afrika va dunyoning boshqa qismlari o'rtasida savdoning o'sishi, shu jumladan qul savdosini bostirish va boshqa tijorat bilan almashtirish
• Evropaning Afrikaga bo'lgan qiziqishi portlashi, qit'aning turli qismlarida mustamlakachilik imperiyalarini bosib olish va egallash bilan yakunlandi.

Bu omillarning barchasi qisman oldingi tendentsiyalarni davom ettirdi, ammo 19-asr qit'ada harbiy evolyutsiya sur'atlarining tezlashishini ko'rish edi. O'tgan asrlarning atrof-muhit o'zgaruvchilari ko'plab sohalarda ham davom etdi. Ulardan ba'zilari quyidagilarni o'z ichiga oladi:

• Jangovar kuchlarni kamaytiradigan aholi zichligi nisbatan past
• Yomon tuproqlar (ayniqsa, tropik o'rmon zonalarida) va ekinlarning unumdorligi past
• Ko'p mintaqalarda otliqlar va piyoda qo'shinlarning kuchsizlanishi kabi qurol tizimlarini joylashtirishga to'sqinlik qiladigan kasallik tashuvchisi.
• Yaxshi qirg'oq portlari va suzib yuriladigan daryolarning etishmasligi - keng ko'lamli logistikaga to'sqinlik qilmoqda

Ushbu o'zgaruvchilar harbiy tizimlarning rivojlanishiga ta'sir ko'rsatdi. Masalan, aholining zichligi pastligi, katta kuchlarni uzoq vaqt davomida ko'tarib va ​​saqlab bo'lmasligini anglatadi. Zulular bir misol sifatida mintaqaviy standartlar bo'yicha ta'sirchan 50,000 jangchilarini maydonga tushirishi mumkin. Ammo bu millatning butun qurolli kuchi edi, holbuki 19-asr Napoleon urushlari paytida ko'p sonli Evropa davlatlari bu odamlarni muntazam ravishda bitta jang.^[2] Siyosiy parchalanish katta qo'shinlarning ko'payishiga ham to'sqinlik qildi va afrikalik qabilalar ajnabiy bosqinchilar tomonidan bo'linib, alohida-alohida mag'lubiyatga uchrashi mumkin edi, xuddi Rim antik davrda ko'plab qabila raqiblari bilan bo'lgani kabi. Shunga qaramay, bunday chegaralarga qaramay, Afrika davlatlarining ichki birlashishi va o'sishi harbiy o'zgarishlarda muhim rol o'ynadi. Masalan, Zulu tizimi chet el otlariga, qurollariga yoki kemalariga ishonmagan. Shunday qilib, Afrika harbiy tizimlarining evolyutsiyasi tashqi ta'sirlar haqidagi oddiy ertak emas, balki tashqi texnologiyalarga moslashgan, shakllangan va ba'zan rad etilgan mahalliy rivojlanishning murakkab tarmog'idir.^[3]

Qurol

Otashin qurollarni kiritish juda muhim edi, ammo Afrikadagi jang maydonlarida qurol ko'pincha befarq sifatga ega edi va an'anaviy qurollar va taktikalar ba'zan ular bilan yaxshi taqqoslandi. Darhaqiqat, afrikaliklar savdo mushaklarining kamchiliklarini yaxshi bilar edilar va ko'pincha taklif qilinganidan ko'ra yaxshiroq sifatni talab qilishdi. Evropadan olib kelingan qurollarning ko'pi ishlab chiqaruvchi tomonidan teshik va buzilishdagi kamchiliklarni tekshirish uchun sinovdan o'tkazilmagan, ammo bu qo'lda yasalgan bochkalar davrida juda zarur edi. Tasdiqlangan qurollarda isbot belgilari bor edi va soxta narsalar Afrika savdosida rivojlandi. Shunday qilib, qurollar er yuzidagi aralash sumka edi va Madinaskoda yoki Zuludagi Merina singari mahalliy kuchlarni birlashtirishda o'q otish qurollaridan ko'ra ko'proq mahalliy tashkilot, rahbariyat va taktikadagi o'zgarishlar sabab bo'ldi.^[4] O'nlab yillar davom etar ekan, qurollarni takomillashtirish va kasalliklarga qarshi kurash kabi boshqa texnologiyalar (masalan, bezgakni bostirish uchun cinchona po'stlog'i) va paroxodlar evropaliklarga qit'ada hal qiluvchi harbiy qirralarni berishi kerak edi.

Dengiz taraqqiyoti

Taxminan 1830-yillarda Nigeriyadan Igbo urush kanoesi mahalliy va import qilingan texnologiyalarning aralashmasini namoyish etadi. Qurilish bitta jurnaldan iborat. Rulni kamon va qattiq ikki eshkak eshuvchi odam ta'minlaydi. Mushketslar markazdagi jang maydonida tayyor turishadi va qo'lga kiritilgan dushman bayroqlari va sovrinlari tepada uchib yurishadi. Ba'zan qaytib qurollar va kichik to'plar o'rnatildi.

Dengiz urushi naqshlari 18-asrning davomiyligini ko'rsatdi. Chet eldan olingan dizaynlar dovlar qatnovchi Sharqiy Afrika suvlari, qaroqchilar Barbariya sohillari yaqinida ish olib borishgan va qayiqlardan okean savdosi va baliq ovida ham foydalanilgan. Ammo mahalliy jangovar kemalar odatda quruqlikda yoki uyga juda yaqin joyda qolishgan. Harbiy kemalarni "avtomat" qilishga urinishlarga qaramay, qurollanish nisbatan zaiflashishda davom etdi. Xabarlarga ko'ra, 18-asrning oxirida G'arbiy sohilda birinchi marta Braziliyadan bo'lgan bepul negr Antonio Vaz Koelho tomonidan qurol-yarog 'to'pi paydo bo'lgan. Ushbu amaliyot XIX asrda tezlashdi. Masalan, Lagos shahar-shtati aylanuvchi zambarak bilan qurollangan 25 kishigacha bo'lgan o'rtacha qayiqlarni joylashtirdi. Bortdagi askarlar o't o'chirish uchun ikkala mushk va aylanuvchi qurollardan foydalangan holda qo'nish uchun majburan harakat qildilar. Ushbu qurollar bilan dengiz taktikasi ba'zan "olov va chekinish" uslubiga amal qilgan. Qayiqlar qayiqda o'q otish kuchini etkazib berish uchun yaqin qirg'oq bo'ylab harakat qilishdi, so'ngra tsiklni takrorlashdan oldin tezda qayta yuklash uchun ochiq suvga qaytib ketishdi.^[5]

Umuman olganda, to'plar kamonga yoki orqaga joylashtirilgan bo'lib, qayiq qurolning orqaga tortilishini o'zlashtirmoqda. Salvolarni etkazib berish uchun butun idishni burish kerak edi. Evropada dengiz qurollaridan foydalanish bilan taqqoslaganda, bunday artilleriya kemalarda kemalarni jalb qilish yoki qirg'oqni bombardimon qilish uchun cheklangan foydalanishni ko'rgan. Biroq, qo'shinlarning qo'nishini yoki reyd missiyalarini qamrab oladigan qurol-yarog 'sifatida, ular piyodalarga qarshi xizmatga yaroqli qiymatga ega edilar, ayniqsa mushaklar bilan birlashganda.^[5] Nigeriyada katta urush kanolari xabar qilinmoqda, ba'zilari besh-olti metr oraliqda o'zaro faoliyat nurlarga yigirma juft aylanuvchi qurollarni o'rnatmoqda. 1841 yilda Abo hukmdori 300 ga yaqin kano to'plaganligi haqida xabar berilgan edi, ularning ko'pchiligi mushaklar va kamonli qurollar bilan qurollangan. Ba'zi kanoe flotlari, ammo an'anaviy qurollarga ishonishgan. 19-asrning boshlarida Chad ko'lida qaroqchi Buduna qurollanish uchun nayza va qalqonlardan foydalangan holda 1000 ga yaqin qamish kanoeleridan iborat flotini maydonga tushirdi va Sharqiy Afrikada ba'zan mahalliy shohliklar mintaqaning buyuk ko'llarida ko'p sonli kanoatlar bilan ustunlikka intilishdi.

Kattaroq urush kanoeti taktikasi jangovar erkaklarni eshkak eshish mutaxassislaridan ajratib qo'ydi, xoh mushaklar bo'lsin, xoh an'anaviy nayzalar.

Niger deltasida yirikroq Itekiri jangovar kanoeti bir nechta to'p va aylanalarni o'rnatgan va 40 eshkak eshuvchi va 100 jangchini olib yurgan, qullar eshkak eshish vazifalarini ko'pini bajarishgan. Shuningdek, qullarga kanoeda erkaklar uchun oziq-ovqat etkazib berish vazifasi yuklangan.^[6] Savdo ba'zan urush qilish bilan chambarchas bog'liq edi. Itsekiri savdogarlari o'zlarining jangovar kemalarini boshqarganlar va Buyuk Britaniya dengiz floti ko'pincha bu tez yuradigan jangchi-savdogarlarni to'xtata olmagan, chunki ular Deltaning irmoqlari, lagunalari va suv yo'llari o'rtasida uchib yurishgan. Bir necha marta ular ingliz harbiy kemalarini tor daryolar va suv yo'llarini to'sib qo'yish orqali himoya qildilar va mustamlaka rejimi yoki evropalik savdogarlar bilan nizolarda Benin daryosidagi savdoni bir necha oyga to'xtatdilar.^[6] Qaroqchilar, shuningdek, tezkor kanoedan foydalanib, tijorat va mahalliy fuqarolarni qiynashdi. Urush-kanoe portlari ko'pincha keng stadionlar va bir nechta xandaq chiziqlari bilan mustahkamlanib turar edi, ularning ortida qurolli va boshqa jangchilar guruhlari mudofaa uchun ajratilgan edi.^[5][6] Ba'zi evropalik qul savdogarlari va ularning ittifoqchilari ham o'zlarining ishlarida katta qayiqlardan foydalanib, mushketyorlar bilan qo'llab-quvvatlangan va kichik to'p bilan qurollangan og'ir kemalarda suv yo'llarini bosib o'tdilar, chunki ular o'zlarining yuklarini Amerikaga olib borish uchun yig'ishdi.^[7]

Dengiz taraqqiyoti quruqlikdagi narsalarni aks ettiradi. Otashin qurollar kabi yangi texnologiya mavjud bo'lgan mahalliy siyosat, texnologiya va tashkil etish shakllariga moslashtirildi va shakllantirildi. Landshaft, shuningdek, uzoq davom etadigan oqimlar, aksincha oqimlar va yaxshi qirg'oq portlarining etishmasligi uchun daryolar bo'ylab uzoq muddatli suv harakatini ham cheklab qo'ydi. Kam tug'ma kuchlar suzib yurish intensiv texnologiyasini o'z ichiga olgan har qanday jiddiy yangilanishga harakat qildilar yoki Evropa, Polineziya yoki Xitoy usulida uzoq masofali kemalar bilan okeanlarga chiqishdi. Okeanni qamrab olgan mashhur Xitoy flotining admiraliga afrikalik tenglama yo'q Cheng Xo paydo bo'lishi kerak edi, garchi bir qator ichki kapitanlar mashhurlikka erishgan bo'lsa. Karfagen kunlari o'tib ketdi, Afrika dengiz kuchi asosan mahalliy hodisa bo'lib qoldi.^[5]

19-asrda quruqlikdagi urush

1800 yildan keyin Afrikada Evropaning kengayishi va bosib olinishi tezlashdi. Ushbu kengayish qarshiliksiz o'tmadi va bunday faoliyat qit'adagi yagona muhim harbiy rivojlanish emas edi. Barcha mintaqalardagi mahalliy davlatlar siyosiy tashkil etishning yangi shakllarini va harbiy tuzilmani mustaqil ravishda va Evropaning asosiy intermedidan oldin rivojlantirmoqdalar.

G'arbiy Afrikadagi otliqlar va piyoda askarlar

Ko'plab hududlarda piyoda kuchlar asosan yurak va asab ta'sir qiluvchi vositalardan foydalangan holda zaharlangan o'qlarga tayangan. Yong'inning tezkor hajmi ko'pincha jangda muvaffaqiyat qozonishning kaliti edi.

An'anaviy qurollar asrga qadar sezilarli darajada foydalanishni boshladilar va otliqlar, kamonchilar va nayzalar kabi qurol tizimlari ko'plab sohalarda to'qnashdi. Masalan, Liberiya ichki qismidagi Mandingo chavandozlari qo'rqinchli yoki qochib ketayotgan piyoda raqiblarini ikkita yo'l bilan chaqirishlari aytilgan: "Siz turing va siz qulsiz; yuguring va siz murdasiz ".^[3] O'rnatilgan qo'shinlar mag'lub bo'lmaydigan darajada uzoq edi. Bowmen ko'plab sohalarda piyoda kuchlarining asosiy qismini tashkil qilgan va zaharlangan o'qlardan foydalanish va tez olov miqdori kamon kuchi va ochilmagan o'qlarning zaif tomonlarini qisman qoplaydi. Kamonchilar va nayzachilarning aniq joylashtirilgan va joylashtirilgan birikmalariga qarshi otliqlar mag'lub bo'lishi mumkin edi. Aynan shunday stsenariy 1804 yilda, Fulani guruhlari bugungi Shimoliy Nigeriyada otliq Gobir og'ir davlatiga qarshi jihod e'lon qilganida sodir bo'ldi. Diniy islohotchi va o'qituvchi Usmon Dan Fodio boshchiligidagi Fulani tezkor Gobir otliqlariga qarshi, xususan, Tsuntua jangi 2000 ga yaqin erkak yo'qolgan.

Fulani piyoda taktikasi

Gobirning otliq askarlari, ularning etakchisi Yunfa boshchiligida, Fulani otlardan samarali foydalana olmasliklarini masxara qilishdi, ammo Fulani o'zlarining karnaylari bilan o'q otib, javob berishdi. Tabkin Kvotto jangi.^[3] Odatda, bunday yong'inni Gobir chevaliers tomonidan tez zaryadga olinadigan, bo'shashgan shaklda tarqalgan kamonchilar etkazib berishlari mumkin edi. Biroq, ushbu maxsus jangda Fulani qo'shinlarining bir qanotini ko'lda yotgan holda, ularning shakllanishini ancha o'rmonli maydonga o'rnatgan. Garchi Gobir otliqlari o'z raqiblaridan ustun kelgan bo'lsa-da, Fulani formasiyasining markazi bu kuchli pozitsiyani egallab turgan. Fulani kamonchilari odatdagi ochiq otishma tartibida joylashishdan ko'ra, o'zlarining kamonchilarini ixcham blokda birlashtirgan va zaharlangan o'qlarining otish kuchini jamlagan holda maydonni qabul qilishdi. Bu qurol-yarog'iga qaramay, Gobir shakllanishining orqa qismini sindirib tashladi.^[3]

Vaqt o'tishi bilan Fulani taktikasi doimiy ravishda takomillashib bordi, chunki ular ko'proq g'alabalarni qo'lga kiritishdi va o'zlarining otliq qo'llari uchun ko'plab otlarni sotib olishni boshladilar. Dan Fodio jihod kampaniyasi boshlanganda o'z kuchlari tomonidan qo'llaniladigan taktikalar haqida shunday yozgan edi: piyoda askarlar o'zlarini katta qalqonlar bilan qurollantirdilar (diraq) va uzun nayza va nayza olib yurgan. Qatorlarga birlashtirilgan nayzachi dumaloq qalqonini oldida ushlab, chap tizzasida tiz cho'kdi. Nayzalar safi orqasida kamonchilar tayyor turdilar. Ularga dushman otiga va odamlarga zanjirli pochta orqali otishni buyurdilar (duru). Dushmanning otliq qo'shinlari piyoda qo'shinlari nayzalarini uloqtirar va kamonchilar o'q uzishda davom etar edi. Agar dushman chayqalgan bo'lsa, piyoda qo'shin chap va o'ng tomonga ajralib ketar edi, shunda ularning otliqlari ta'qibga chiqarildi. Dan Fodioning taktikaga oid yozuvlari ko'plab harbiy qo'mondonlar tomonidan ma'qullanadigan fikrni takrorlaydi: "G'alabada birinchi narsa kontsentratsiya: mag'lubiyatning boshlanishi - tarqoqlik."^[8]

Otliq-piyoda qo'shinlari

Otliqlar hali ham 19-asrda dolzarb bo'lib qolaverdi. Sokoto xalifaligi, bu davrda G'arbiy Afrikaning eng yirik yagona davlati bo'lgan va mintaqadagi ko'plab musulmon jihodlarida o'z genezisiga ega bo'lgan. Sokotoning asosiy zarba kuchi otliqlar edi, garchi uning qo'shinlarining asosiy qismi kamonchilar va nayzachilardan iborat edi. Savannalar tekisligida bu kombinatsiya mahalliy raqiblarga nisbatan nisbatan yaxshi natija berdi, garchi o'rmonli hududlarda joylashtirilgan bo'lsa va istehkomlarga qarshi operatsiyalar avvalgi davrlarning muammolaridan aziyat chekardi. Piyoda askarlar va ularning mushklari, o'nlab yillar o'tishi bilan savannaning ba'zi joylarida tobora muhimroq va ustun mavqega ega bo'ldi.^[3] Sokoto va Gobir singari boshqa bir qator otliq elita imperiyalari an'anaviy qurol va jang uslublariga ishonishda davom etishdi. Sokotoning bu "eski uslublari" yondashuvini 1826 yilda Gobir davlati bilan to'qnashuvda ko'rish mumkin, bu erda zirhli Sokoto otliq qo'shinlarining ayrim elit birliklari, xuddi Evropaning o'rta asr ritsarlari singari otlariga ko'tarilishi kerak edi. Otliq elita o'zlarining muvaffaqiyati uchun juda katta hurmatga sazovor bo'lmagan piyoda qo'shinlar bilan hamkorlik qilishga bog'liq edilar, ular hujum qilish imkoniyatlarini ochishda, dushmanni noqulay holatga keltirishda yoki zaharlangan o'qlar bilan halokatli qarshi kurashni bostirishda juda muhim edi. Ushbu uslubdagi konservatizm 20-asrda, Sokoto mezbonlari Britaniya imperiyasining zamonaviy qurollari bilan to'qnashganda davom etishi kerak edi.^[9]

Ashanti harbiy tizimi

Tashkilot, jihozlar va taktikalar

Safarbarlik, yollash va logistika

Taxminan 1700 dan 1820 yilgacha G'arbiy Afrikaning Oltin sohilida (hozirgi Gana mintaqasi) hech bir xalq Ashanti-ni harbiy tashkiloti va faoliyati miqyosida ustun ko'rmagan. Fath urushlari ularni mintaqadagi asosiy kuchga aylantirdi va ular 19-asrning ikkinchi qismida mag'lubiyatga uchramasdan oldin inglizlarga qarshi kurashdilar va bir necha yirik to'qnashuvlarda g'alaba qozondilar. Kasbiy jangchilarning kichik bir qismi ittifoqdosh yoki irmoq qabilalaridan dehqon yig'imlari, ko'ngillilar va kontingentlar bilan to'ldirildi. Osei Tutu va Opoku Ware kabi vakolatli qo'mondonlar ostida birlashtirilgan bunday xostlar 18-asrda Ashanti imperiyasini 19-asrga qadar kengaytira boshladilar va chuqur ichki chuqurlikdan Atlantika qirg'oqlariga o'tdilar. 1820 yildagi ingliz manbalaridan biri Ashanti potentsial 80 ming qo'shinni jalb qilishi mumkin deb taxmin qilgan va ularning 40 mingtasi nazariy jihatdan mushket yoki qo'pol xatolar bilan jihozlangan bo'lishi mumkin.^[10]

Qurol va uskunalar

Ashanti 18-asrda o'qotar qurollar bilan tanishdi va 19-asrga kelib ularning eng yaxshi qo'shinlarining asosiy qismi turli xil qurollar bilan qurollandi, masalan, 6 metr uzunlikdagi Evropaning savdo mushketi, "Uzoq Dane" deb nomlangan. ". Long Dane va yillar davomida xizmatga kelgan Afrikaning boshqa takomillashtirilgan modellari mahalliy sharoitda xizmatga yaroqli qurol edi, ammo birinchi darajadagi Evropa qurollariga nisbatan eskirgan. Bu keyingi urushlarda kuchli ingliz kuchlariga qarshi muammolarni keltirib chiqarishi kerak edi. Ashanti armiyasining umumiy kengashi rahbari general Nkvanta 1872–73 yillarda yangi Evropaning qurol-yarog 'qurollarini batafsil baholaganligi va taqqoslaganda Ashanti mushaklarining eskirganligi tufayli tashvishga tushgani xabar qilingan. Bir necha marta otishdan keyin mushketlarning bir qismi yorilib, yaxshi sifatli kukun va otish kam bo'lib qoldi. Bundan tashqari, qabila qurolli shaxslarining aksariyati kukunni bochkalarga siqib olish uchun paxtadan foydalanmadilar, balki shunchaki uni tashladilar, so'ngra turli xil qo'rg'oshin shlaklari, mixlar, metall parchalari yoki hatto toshlarni qo'shdilar. Bu juda ta'sirli pirotexnika namoyish qildi, ammo agar raqiblar juda yaqin masofada bo'lmasalar, mushklar samarasiz edi. Mushklarning katta portlashi va tepishi ham erkaklar sonidan o'q otishni afzal ko'rganliklarini, natijada ular noaniq natijalarga erishganliklarini ko'rsatdi.^[11]

Biroq, mavjud qurollar qadrlangan va har bir jangchi olib borgan o'q-dorilar sumkalari kabi, charm yoki leopard teri qoplamalari bilan ehtiyotkorlik bilan himoyalangan. Askarlar o'ttizdan qirqgacha porox zaryadini tez qayta yuklash uchun alohida-alohida kichik yog'och qutilarga qadoqlangan holda olib borishdi. Yaxshi o'qlar kam edi, qurolbardorlar tosh, metall buyumlar va qo'rg'oshin parchalari kabi almashtirish vositalarini ishlatishga majbur bo'ldilar. Evropa dushmanlari bilan taqqoslaganda, ularning keyingi tarixlarida Ashanti qurollari kambag'al edi. Ashanti jangovar odam ham turli uzunlikdagi bir nechta pichoqlarni ko'tarib, bukri kamarini taqib yurgan. Kamarda, shuningdek, butani kesib o'tish uchun machete yoki qo'l jangi.^[12]

Tantanali Ashanti qilichi

Ashanti qo'shinlarini tashkil etish

Ashanti milliy armiyasi 6 qismga bo'linib, har biri turli xil bo'linmalardan iborat bo'lib, mushtlar asta-sekin asosiy qurol sifatida kamon va o'qlarni almashtirdi. Bunday tashkilot birinchi navbatda Evropadagi shakllarning nusxalari emas, balki mahalliy mavjud tuzilmalarga asoslangan edi va uni Akan markazidagi markazlashtirilgan Akan o'rmon shohliklaridan biri bo'lgan tarixda ko'rish mumkin.^[13] Qurollar ushbu oltita qismga quyidagicha qo'shilgan va moslashtirilgan:

1. Skautlar (akwansrafo),
2. Oldindan qo'riqchi (twafo)
3. Asosiy korpus (adonten),
4. Shaxsiy qo'riqchi (gyase)
5. Orqa qo'riqchi (kidom)
6. Ikki qanot chapda (benkum) va o'ng (nifa). Har bir qanot ikkita shaklga ega: o'ng va o'ng yarim (nifa nnaase), chap va chap yarim (benkum nnaase)

Harakat paytida armiya ushbu umumiy buzilishdan foydalangan - old qo'riqchi, asosiy tanasi, orqa qo'riqchisi va o'ng va chap qanotlari. Ushbu batafsil tashkilot Ashanti generallariga o'z kuchlarini egiluvchanlik bilan boshqarishga imkon beradigan bir nechta afzalliklarga ega edi. Skautlar qayta rekonstruksiya qilishdi va ta'qib operatsiyalarini bajarishdi. Old qo'riqchi dastlabki bo'ron qo'shinlari yoki o'lja qo'shinlari sifatida xizmat qilishi mumkin edi, chunki u o'z pozitsiyasini va kuchini ochish uchun dushmanga ega bo'ladi. Asosiy qism armiyaning zarba beradigan qudratining asosiy qismini qo'llagan. Shaxsiy qo'riqchi bu sohada qirolni yoki yuqori darajadagi zodagonlarni yoki generallarni himoya qildi. Orqa qo'riqchi ta'qib qilishda yoki zaxira eshelon sifatida ishlashi mumkin. Ikki qanot qarama-qarshi kuchni o'rab olishga yoki hatto orqaga zarba berishga urinishi mumkin.^[14]

Shaxsga xos jasoratli harakatlar rag'batlantirildi, masalan, yarador yoki o'lgan dushmanlarning boshlarini kesib tashlash uchun ochiq joyga chiqib ketish. Ushbu sovrinlarning bir qismi topshiriq tugagandan so'ng qo'mondon generalga taqdim etildi.^[12] Ashanti qo'shinlarida qattiq intizom hukmronlik qildi. Tinib-tinchimagan askarlar "qilich ko'taruvchilar" - "ijrochi" qo'shinlarining maxsus kontingentlari olib yurgan og'ir qilichlar bilan kaltaklangan yoki o'ldirilgan. Ashanti askarlari quyidagi so'zlarni yod olishlari kerak edi: "Agar oldinga borsam, o'laman, qochsam, o'laman. Yaxshisi oldinga borib, jang og'zida o'lsam." Odatda "ijrochilar" skautlar va asosiy kuch o'rtasida, oldinga joylashtirilgan. Jang charchagan va sustkashlikni yaxshiroq kuzatish va qo'rqitish uchun boshlanganda ular tinchlanishdi.^[15] Afrikalik qo'shinlar orasida kamdan-kam uchraydigan xususiyatga ko'ra, Ashanti shuningdek, yaradorlarga g'amxo'rlik qilish va o'liklarni olib tashlash vazifasi yuklangan asosiy kuchlar ortida tibbiyot xodimlarining bo'linmalarini joylashtirdi.^[16]

Ashanti taktikasi

Ashanti taktik tizimining moslashuvchanligi G'arbiy Afrikaning qalin o'rmon sharoitida muhim ahamiyatga ega bo'lgan markazsizlashtirishni talab qildi. Ushbu og'ir o'rmon o'sishi ko'pincha Zulu yoki Ndebele kabi xalqlar orasida kuzatilganidek minglab erkaklar ishtirokidagi keng miqyosli to'qnashuvlarga to'sqinlik qildi. Shunday qilib, Ashanti usullari kichik taktik kichik bo'linmalar, pistirmalar, doimiy harakat va ko'proq tarqalgan zarbalar va qarshi zarbalarni o'z ichiga olgan. Ammo 1741 yilda sodir bo'lgan g'ayrioddiy voqealardan birida Asante va Akkem qo'shinlari jangni "rejalashtirishga" kelishib oldilar va birgalikda 10 mingga yaqin odamga daraxtlarni kesishni buyurdilar. Ushbu uchrashuvda Asante g'alaba qozondi.^[17]

Ashanti taktikasi bo'yicha 1844 inglizlarning sharhlaridan biri, ular dushman kuchiga yaqinlashish va ularni o'rab olish uchun cho'tkada bir qator piyoda yo'llarini kesib, operatsiyalarni boshladilar. Dastlabki sakrab tushish nuqtasiga etib borgach, Ashanti qo'shinlari navbatda tuzilib, hujumga o'tdilar. Boshqa hisoblarda Ashanti yurish tartibini chumolilarnikiga taqqoslaganda, jangdan oldin bitta umumiy zarba beruvchi kuchga qo'shilgan bir nechta parallel ustunlar ishlatilgan. Bunday "yaqinlashib kelayotgan ustunlar" yondashuvi inglizlarning o'zlari tomonidan Ashanti bilan kurashda istehzo bilan ishlatilgan va bu Napoleon boshchiligidagi Evropaning jang maydonlarida paydo bo'lgan taktika,^[16] "yurish bo'linib, birgalikda kurash" sifatida asl rais d'etre bo'lgan bo'linish. Ushbu standartlashtirilgan taktika ko'pincha Ashanti g'alabasini qo'lga kiritdi. Skautlar o'zlarining ustunlarida yurish paytida qo'shinni ekranga oldi, keyin dushman yaqinlashganda orqaga qaytdi. Jang boshlangandan so'ng, qo'riqchi 2 yoki 3 qatorda ko'tarilib, mushklarini bo'shatdi va qayta yuklash uchun to'xtab qoldi. Ikkinchi chiziq o't o'chirishga va qayta yuklashga, uchinchi orqa chiziq esa avansni takrorlaydi - o't o'chirish tsikli. Ushbu "dumaloq olov" taktikasi avans to'xtaguncha takrorlandi. Yong'in va manevr modelining bir qismi sifatida yonma-yon bo'linmalar yuboriladi.

Ashanti inglizlarga qarshi

Inglizlarga qarshi kurashda Ashanti an'anaviy taktikasini sezilarli darajada o'zgartirmadi. Dastlab ular ingliz bosqinchiligiga duch kelishdan oldin mintaqaviy kampaniyada Prah daryosidan o'tib ketishgan. Jiddiy logistika muammolari, chechak va dizenteriya bilan birga ular daryodan o'tib ketishdi. Shunga qaramay, ularning jangovar rejasi ilgari ishlagan edi. Ashanti inglizlarni o'z hududiga chuqur jalb qilmoqchi bo'lib, shahar markazida joylashgan mudofaa qudratiga qarshi harakat qildi Amoaful. Bu erda inglizlar bog'lab qo'yilgan bo'lar edi, manevr qanot elementlari orqa tomonga aylanib, ularni ushladi va kesib tashladi. Ba'zi tarixchilar (Farwell 2001) buni "bolg'a va anvil "yondashuv an'anaviy Ashanti jang strategiyasi edi va boshqa Afrika armiyalarida ham keng tarqalgan edi. Afrikaning boshqa kuchlariga qarshi Ashanti xizmatini ko'rsatgan va bundan oldin Syerra-Leone gubernatori Charlz Makkarti rahbarligidagi inglizlarni mag'lub etgan.^[18] 1824 yilda M'Karti afrikalik va mustamlakachilik militsiyasining oz sonli kuchi bilan ilgarilab ketdi va qishloqda 10000 Ashanti bilan uchrashdi. Essamako. Ehtimol, ichki ruhiy holatni saqlab qolish va / yoki qarama-qarshi mahalliy aholini engib o'tish umidida Makkarti guruhga buyruq berdi. Qirollik Afrika korpusi "Shohni Xudo qutqarsin" o'ynash. Ashanti do'mbira va karnaylarni ko'tarib, o'z navbatida o'zlarining musiqalarini chalishdi. Inglizlar tezda tor-mor etildi va M'Karti qo'lga olindi va boshi kesildi, keyinchalik uning bosh suyagi ichimlik kosasi sifatida xizmat qildi.^[19]

Amoaful qishlog'ida Ashantislar o'zlarining raqiblarini rejaga binoan oldinga tortib olishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi va ularni yonma-yon harakatlar bilan bir necha bor tahdid qilishdi. Ashanti qurol-yarog ', qizil paltolar tomonidan qo'llaniladigan zamonaviy qurollarga qaraganda yomon edi, bu Britaniya yozuvlarida qayd etilgan va bu kabi ustun qurollar Ashanti qurshovlarini qaytarishda inglizlarga yaxshi xizmat qilgan:^[14] "Ashanteylar hayratda qoldirishdi va men hozirgacha bo'lgan eng og'ir yong'inlardan birini saqlab qolishdi. Bizning hujumimizga zudlik bilan ustun raqamlar bilan qarshi turishganda, ular chap tomonimizni doimiy ravishda yaxshi yo'naltirilgan qanot hujumlari bilan o'rab olishdi".^[20] Dushman qo'mondoni general Garnet Vulsi Ashanti taktikasini oldindan bilgan va ingliz qanotlarini eng yaxshi bo'linmalar va kuchliroq otashin kuch bilan mustahkamlagan. Afrika qirolligining oldingi yutuqlari shu tariqa takrorlanmadi.^[18]

Keyinchalik inglizlarga qarshi urushlar paytida Ashanti-ning yana bir taktikasi - bu Angliya yutuqlarini to'xtatish uchun muhim nuqtalarda kuchli log stoklarini yaratish edi. Ushbu istehkomlarning ba'zilari yuz metrdan oshiqroq edi, ba'zida esa artilleriya otishmalarida vayron bo'lishga qodir bo'lmagan og'ir parallel daraxt daraxtlari bo'lgan. Ushbu stoklar ortida ko'plab jangchilar dushman harakatini tekshirish uchun safarbar qilingan. Qurilishda dahshatli bo'lsa-da, Ashanti qurollari, poroxlari va o'qlari kambag'al bo'lganligi va mudofaada kamdan-kam o'ldirish kuchini ta'minlaganligi sababli, ushbu kuchli nuqtalarning aksariyati muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi. Vaqti-vaqti bilan ingliz qo'shinlari o't o'chirgandan so'ng, eskirgan süngü zaryadlarini o'rnatish orqali stoklarni engib o'tdilar yoki chetlab o'tdilar. Ashanti nayza singari an'anaviy qurollardan samarali foydalanishni tashlagan va piyoda zaryadining sovuq quroliga unchalik ta'sirsiz javob bergan, ammo eskirgan yoki noto'g'ri ishlash mushketlar. Bush pichoqlar kabi qo'shimcha qurollar ushbu taktik vaziyatlarda evropalik askarlarga nisbatan beparvolik ko'rsatdi. Afrikalik dushmanlarning mavjudligi, shuningdek, odatiy qabila qurollari bilan inglizlar bilan kurashayotgani ham Ashanti musibatiga qo'shildi. Bu holda ilgari surilgan ilg'or texnologiyalar, qurol, istehzo bilan mahalliy kuchlar uchun nogiron bo'lib qoldi.^[21] Aksincha, zulular o'zlarining an'anaviy nayzalaridan samarali foydalanishni saqlab qolishdi, odatda inglizlarni qurol va artilleriya bilan himoyalangan mudofaa tuzilmalarida yoki mustahkam mustahkam nuqtalarda qolishga majbur qilishdi.^[18]

Ashanti samaradorligi

Ba'zi ingliz sharhlari Ashanti jangovar fazilatlari bilan bosqinchilarning ko'rinadigan ittifoqchilari bo'lgan qirg'oq qabilalarining tebranishi va ishonchsizligi o'rtasida keskin farq qiladi. Amoafulda o'ldirilganidan keyin bitta jang Ashanti qo'mondoniga hurmat bajo keltiradi: "O'ldirilganlar orasida buyuk bosh Amanquatia ham bor edi. Amanquatia tomonidan tanlangan pozitsiyada hayratga soladigan mahorat ko'rsatildi va u mudofaada ko'rsatgan qat'iyat va umumiylik uning qobiliyatli taktik va jabbor askar sifatida katta obro'sini to'liq chiqarib tashladi".^[20]

Raqamlar va qurol-yarog 'zamonaviy Evropaning ommaviy qo'shinlari va sanoat mahsuloti bilan taqqoslanmagan bo'lsa-da, Ashanti kuchli mintaqaviy kuch edi, bu 19-ning ikkinchi yarmida yirik jahon davlatining eng ilg'or texnologiyasi bilan to'qnashgunga qadar nisbatan yaxshi natijalarga erishdi. asr. Bir G'arb tarixchisi kuzatganidek:

"1807 yildan 1900 yilgacha Asante qo'shinlari inglizlarga qarshi ko'plab kichik va katta janglarni olib bordilar. Shularning bir nechtasida ular yaqqol g'olib bo'lishdi. G'arbiy Afrikaning yagona qo'shini bir nechta janglarda mag'lubiyatga uchragan."^[16]

Mustamlaka ekspansiyasiga qarshilik: Samori va Abd al-Kader

Mali va Gvineyaning Samori Ture va Jazoirlik Abd al-Kader siyosatlari Afrika davlatlari chet el bosqinlariga qarshi kurash olib borgan holda, qanday qilib ichki miqyosda kengayib borayotganini ko'rsatadi. Ushbu vazifalarni bajarishda ikkalasi ham zamonaviy qurollarga moslashgan.

Jazoirdagi Abd-el Kader

Zamonaviy artilleriya va miltiqlar bilan qurollangan ko'chma frantsuz ustunlari mahalliy qarshilikni barbod qilish uchun shafqatsiz "kuygan yer" siyosatini olib bordi. 1844 yilga kelib, Frantsiya armiyasining uchdan bir qismi, Jazoirdagi janglarda qariyb 108 ming kishi bog'lab qo'yilgan.

Qit'aning ko'p qismlaridan farqli o'laroq, Abd el-Kaderning Jazoirdagi operatsiyalari mustamlakachilik hukmronligiga qarshi bo'lgan boshqa urush usulini anglatadi. Kichik miqyosdagi reydlar, to'qnashuvlar va qo'zg'olonlar doimo mavjud bo'lganida, 19-asrdagi Jazoirning frantsuzlarga qarshi urushi o'nlab yillar davomida katta mojaro sifatida davom etdi va mahalliy armiyalar uni ta'qib qilish uchun zamonaviy qurollardan foydalanishdi. Frantsiyaning Jazoirni bosib olishi 1834 yilda Usmonli rejimini quvib chiqarib, Jazoirni bosib olish bilan boshlandi. Mintaqadagi qabilalar qo'zg'olon ko'tarib, shafqatsiz urush boshlandi. 1832 yilda mahalliy kuchlarning yangi etakchisi, taniqli qarshilikni dushmanga qarshi umumiy frontga olib chiqishga muvaffaq bo'lgan amir Abd-El Kader mashhurlikka erishdi. El-Kader tezkor reydlar va pistirmalarga tayanib miltiq bilan qurollangan askarlarga tayanib, partizan taktikasini qo'llagan. Bir qator shartnomalar faqat vaqtinchalik tinchlikni keltirib chiqardi va kurash davom etdi. Ed-kader 10 mingga yaqin miltiqchilarning asosiy kuchini tashkil etdi va ularni vaqtincha qabilaviy qoidabuzarliklar bilan to'ldirdi. Artilleriya nisbatan kuchsiz edi, ulardan samarali foydalanish uchun oz miqdordagi to'plar mavjud edi. Asosiy kuchni tayyorlash va tashkil etishga yordam berish uchun Marokash, Tunis va Evropadan o'qituvchilar taklif qilindi. Ushbu markaziy armiyani moliyalashtirish va jihozlash uchun Marokash Sultonining ko'magi juda muhim edi. Qurol etishmovchiligi har doim dolzarb muammo bo'lib kelgan va moliyalashtirish usullari favqulodda soliqlardan tortib, davlat monopoliyalari va dushman qabilalarga qilingan bosqinlardan tortib olingan o'ljalar. Qarshilik armiyasi, shuningdek, operatsion hududida bir qator qal'alarni quradi.^[22]

Qarshilikni engish uchun frantsuz sarmoyalari juda katta edi. 1839 yilga kelib ular Jazoirda 70 mingga yaqin erkakni to'plashdi. 1844 yilga kelib frantsuz armiyasining uchdan bir qismi Jazoirda jang qilmoqda - taxminan 108000 qo'shin - Afrikaning aksariyat qismini bosib olgan odatda kichik Evropa yoki Evropa boshchiligidagi kuchlardan keskin va g'ayrioddiy farq.^[23] Frantsuzlarning taktikasi mahalliy qarshilikning tezkor partizan hujumlariga qarshi kurashish uchun o'zgargan. Og'ir shakllanishlar harakatlanuvchi ustunlarga bo'linib, vayronagarchilik, talon-taroj va vayronagarchilik shafqatsiz "kuydirilgan yer" siyosati amalga oshirildi - uning tabiiy bazasini yo'q qilish orqali mahalliy qarshilikni sindirish. Quduqlar zaharlangan, chorva mollari otilgan, dalalar, uylar va qishloqlar yoqib yuborilgan, aholi qishloqqa haydalgan yoki yo'q qilingan. Qishloqning vayronagarchiliklari, amirning harbiy harakatlariga jiddiy zarar etkazdi, shuningdek, ko'chma ustunlar tomonidan uning qal'alarini egallab oldi. 1844 yilga kelib El-Kader Jazoirdan Marokashga chiqib ketishga majbur bo'ldi. Keyingi o'zgarishlar uning frantsuzlar tomonidan qo'lga olinishi va qamoqqa tashlanishiga olib keldi, u frantsuzlarni joylashtirish uchun juda ko'p miqdordagi ona yurtlarini musodara qildi. ikki nuqta yoki ko'chmanchilar. Bu bir asrdan keyin bir xil qonli qarshilik urushiga zamin yaratdi.^[22]

Abd al-Kader.

Muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lsa-da, Abd al-Kader ishi Afrikadagi urushlarda zamonaviy miltiqlar, artilleriya va keyingi yillarda avtomat qurollar bilan qurollangan kichik Evropa yoki Evropa boshchiligidagi kuchlarga qarshi ommaviy "inson to'lqini" hujumlariga alternativ bo'lgan muhim naqshni namoyish etadi. (Geytlinglar va Maksimlar). El-Kader kuchlari Evropaning o't o'chirish kuchi bilan yo'q qilinishi mumkin bo'lgan joyda qulay joyda to'planish o'rniga, ko'chma partizanlar urushi olib borishdi. Uning qo'shinlari, shuningdek, importga bog'liq bo'lsa-da, yaxshi miltiq bilan yaxshi qurollangan edi. El-Kader qurollanishni davom ettirish va o'z kuchlarini etkazib bera olmasligi ham uning oxir-oqibat mag'lub bo'lishiga olib keldi va uning ishchi kuchi nisbatan cheklangan edi. Shunga qaramay, frantsuz qo'shinlarining ko'pligi, uning asosiy kuchidan 10 dan 1 gacha ko'pligini talab qildi va ularning qattiq "kuydirilgan yer" siyosati ustun keldi.^[22]

Samori in Guinea and Ivory Coast

Internal conquests of Samori. The armies and operations of African leader Samori Ture offer another illustration of the diversity, strengths and weaknesses of indigenous African military systems, both prior to and after clashes with expanding European colonial powers. Samori's resistance campaign is similar to that of the tribes of Algeria, both in the enemy he fought, and chronic shortages of modern weapons. There is however contrast with Abd el-Kader. Samori's main forces were infantry as compared to horsemen, and he pursued a "scorched earth" approach before the French to deny them resources, the reverse of the pattern under El-Kader. Samori was also a conqueror in his own right even before the coming of the French.^[24]

The gun-armed divan infantrymen were the main striking force of Samori's army. Operating on several fronts, one part defended against the French colonial armies, while another marched east, conquering and organizing new territories and peoples.

He first rose to prominence in 1867, when he began carving out his own state in the Guinea Highlands bordering the Niger River. He understood the power of firearms early on and built up a disciplined force of musketeers. His search for reliable sources of supply was constant. Years of conquest continued and by 1878, he proclaimed himself faama (military leader) of his own Wassoulou Empire, that at its height was to include parts of today's Guinea, Mali, Sierra Leone and the northern Côte d'Ivoire. Alliances were struck with a number of African polities in this area, particularly the Fulbe (Fula) jihad state of Fouta Djallon, who were facing pressure from the expanding French to submit to a protectorate.^[24]

The aggressive expansion of the French brought them into conflict with Samori's empire. The Samorian army was also constantly on the move, fighting on multiple fronts. Faced with French pressure in the west, Samori moved east, conquering areas in the Ivory Coast and Liberia as he maneuvered for combat and logistics space. A large number of civilians moved with the army. The discussion below is drawn from studies such as Legassick's "Firearms, Horses and Samorian Army Organization (1966).^[24]

Structure of the Samorian army. Primarily infantry with cavalry as a smaller arm, the army structure consisted of 4 parts: the regulars (primarily slaves and captives), a mixed, less standardized conscripted reserve, detachments sent by allied or tributary chiefs, and a cavalry force. The basic rank of a regular infantryman was the divan. The basic unit was a squad of ten, progressing to a company-sized unit of 200–300 men, and thence to larger groupings, typically of approximately 1,000 men. Squad and company leaders were generally mounted. Estimated numbers of fighting men are a source of debate, but the highest places an operational army at around 20,000 men. Of these about 5,000 were "regular" forces. This small permanent army of sofa-kun, directed and stiffened a larger mass of reservists. In the late years of Samoir's empire, more emphasis was placed on smaller detachments.^[24]

Weapons and logistics. The Samorian army did manage to acquire a large number of repeating rifles. Replacement and resupply however including ammunition, was a continuing problem. Freetown, under British rule in Sierra Leone, was an important source of supply. The French tried incessantly to cut this pipeline, and finally did in collaboration with the British. An attempt was made to manufacture guns indigenously, but quality was poor, although the African gunsmiths did succeed in rendering a workable breech mechanism, and in various repairs. Ammunition was also manufactured, and was so precious that after each battle, empty cartridge cases and even bullets were collected.^[24]

Tactics of the Samorian army. Samorian armies showed the capability of maneuvering against both indigenous and foreign forces. In one of his earliest clashes with the French for example, he executed a sweeping pincer movement to recapture the gold-producing center of Bure, a gambit that threatened to cut off the French rear, and forced them to withdraw. Additional victories were won at Nfadji and Dadadugu. Flexibility was also seen in Samori's organization, from the use of Konya warrior bands, to the traditional militia call-ups centered on a force of regulars, to his later use of riflemen organized in smaller European-style units. However, although Samori inflicted heavy casualties on the French in several encounters during the 1890s, growing French resources, mobility and firepower placed his regime in ultimate jeopardy.^[25] Lacking good firearms and ammunition, major battles against the French were fought by means of carefully arranged fixed lines, to maximize available firepower. Once these were disrupted however, they were difficult to reconstitute. The main forces however turned in excellent performances based on the accounts of French opponents, who were amazed at the marksmanship, discipline and maneuverability of Samori's forces. Acquisition of new breech-loading guns, enabling a soldier to both reload and fire from a concealed position, improved performance. Samori thus reduced his striking forces in the field as the war against the French progressed, cutting them into smaller detachments armed with better firearms.^[24]

Samori Ture

Infantry snipers and cavalry skirmishers began to be used more extensively and European deserters and renegades were hired to conduct troop training. Guerrilla tactics and harassment of French detachments and lines of supply received more emphasis. Infantry engagements became staggered. Rather than one fighting line persisting throughout a day, Samori's troops used multiple lines, withdrawing in more systematic fashion to form another for defense. The old call-up system was replaced by a more permanent force. Samori's army used larger formations as it fought against indigenous opponents in its southward drive towards the Ivory Coast and Guinea. Smaller numbers were deployed against the French.^[24]

Samori's armies had to remain mobile, conquering new territory on one front, harassing the French on another, and doubling back to reoccupy old areas. The south-eastern front into Ivory Coast and Guinea took up most of Samori's attention after 1891, while his "burn and retire" tactics held off the Europeans in the West.

In 1898 Samori began an epic march towards Boribana, moving an estimated 120,000 civilians along with the army. The French commander Lartigue comments on this move as being carried out successfully with credible precision and speed. French pressure continued relentlessly however, and Samori's force grew more constricted. He was captured by a small French striking force that burst into his camp from an unexpected direction in September 1898. His long struggle and disciplined organization however illustrates the capacity of indigenous systems to create new forms of organization, modify existing tribal ones, and adapt to new or improved technology.^[24]

From innovation to conservatism: the Zulu military system

Military reforms of Shaka

The Zulu are a significant case in African military innovation and change. Their system of war transformed large portions of the continent and their methods spanned both the pre-gunpowder and gunpowder eras.^[26] Several innovations appeared as part of the existing indigenous cultural mix, and their adaptation by burgeoning kingdoms and chieftains to shifting opportunities and changes as the 19th century dawned. The best known leader to emerge from this flux was the ruthless chieftain Shaka, who adapted a number of tribal practices that transformed the Zulu from a small, obscure tribe to a major regional power in Southern Africa.

Antecedents of Shaka. Some scholars caution against giving Shaka unlimited or sole credit for the military developments that appeared among the tribes of the region. Modern research suggest kingdoms or chieftainships already long in place that could mobilize substantial numbers of troops, and did not have to wait for a Shaka in the 19th century to suddenly appear.^[27] Reports from one group of shipwrecked Portuguese in 1552 for example, show that they were forcibly disarmed of their muskets by a powerful local ruler heading a large fighting force. Another group of survivors of a Dutch shipwreck in 1686 could not prevent a local chieftain from breaking up the wreck and taking its iron because the commander appeared on the beach with around 1,000 disciplined warriors.^[28] Various other shipwreck survivor accounts report substantial battles between opposing forces armed with large shields and spears.^[28] Other data indicates that the Shakan reforms were not necessarily continued in all respects. Rather than rigidly using his short spear only, the Zulu soldier in the Anglo-Zulu clash of 1879 typically carried a "kit" of throwing spears that were flung first, rather like the Roman piluuwm to "soften up" and occupy the enemy, followed by a quick advance and close quarters work with a hand-held stabbing spear. The tactical advantages of a combined missile-shock "kit" for these later troops, outweighed Shaka's earlier "hand-to-hand spear only" dictum.^[28]

Adaptations of Shaka. Age-grade groupings, the advantages of an aggressive charge or encircling an enemy, etc., are all known in tribal warfare of the period. Elements of a regimental system for example had been put in place under Shaka's predecessor Dingiswayo. What was different were much more ruthless combinations and systematic uses of all these elements to produce the distinctive Zulu system. Shaka borrowed and adapted the surrounding cultural elements to implement his own aggressive vision, seeking to bring combat to a swift and bloody decision, as opposed to ritualistic displays or duels of individual champions, scattered raids, or skirmishes where casualties were comparatively light. Such a brutal focus demanded changes in weapons, organization and tactics.^[26]

New weapons and new organisation

Military innovations such as the assegay, the age-grade regimental system and encirclement tactics helped make the Zulu one of the most powerful nations in southern and south-eastern Africa.

New spear and shield. Shaka is credited with introducing a new variant of the traditional weapon, discarding the long, spindly throwing weapon and instituting a heavy, shorter stabbing spear, the iKlwa. The spear was wielded underhand, on the manner of the Roman sword. He is also said to have introduced a larger, heavier cowhide shield, and trained his forces to use them both in closing quickly with the enemy in more effective hand-to-hand combat.^[29] Local skirmishers used to tossing their spears and pulling back would be confronted by an aggressive force closing for the kill. None of these weapons changes are spectacular in the local context, but mated to an aggressive mobility and tactical organisation, they were to make a devastating impact.^[26]

Logistika. The fast moving host lived off the land primarily, but were also aided with a supply system provided by young boys, who were attached to a force and carried rations, cooking pots, sleeping mats, extra weapons, rations, and other material. Cattle were sometimes driven on the hoof as a movable larder. Again, such arrangements in the local context were probably nothing unusual. What was different was the systematisation and organisation, a pattern yielding major benefits when the Zulu were dispatched on military missions. Shaka's general ratio of logistic personnel was one herdboy to three men.^[29]

Age-grade regimental system. Age-grade groupings of various sorts were common in the Bantu tribal culture of the day. Shaka manipulated this system, transferring the loyalty of the traditional clan groupings to himself, thus strengthening his personal hegemony. Such groupings on the basis of age, did not constitute a permanent, paid military in the modern Western sense, nevertheless they did provide a stable basis for sustained armed mobilisation, much more so than ad hoc tribal levies or war parties. Shaka organised the various age grades into regiments, and quartered them in special military kraals, with each regiment having its own distinctive names and insignia.

Mobility and training. Shaka discarded sandals to enable his warriors to run faster. Initially the move was unpopular, but those who objected were simply killed, a practice that quickly concentrated the minds of available personnel. Shaka drilled his troops frequently, implementing forced marches that could cover more than fifty miles a day. He also drilled the troops to carry out encirclement tactics (see below). Such mobility gave the Zulu a significant impact in their local region and beyond.

Encirclement tactics. The Zulu typically took the offensive, deploying in the well known "buffalo horns" formation. The attack layout was composed of three elements:

1. the "horns" or flanking right and left wing elements to encircle and pin the enemy. Generally the "horns" were made up of younger, greener troops.
2. the "chest" or central main force which delivered the coup de grace. The prime fighters made up the composition of the main force.
3. the "loins" or reserves used to exploit success or reinforce elsewhere. Often these were older veterans, sometimes positioned with their backs to the battle so as not to get unduly excited.

Organisation of the Zulu forces. The Zulu forces were generally grouped into 3 levels: regiments, corps of several regiments, and "armies" or bigger formations, although the Zulu did not use these terms in the modern sense. Size distinctions were taken account of, any grouping of men on a mission could collectively be called an impi, whether a raiding party of 100 or horde of 10,000. Numbers were not uniform, but dependent on a variety of factors including assignments by the king, or the manpower mustered by various clan chiefs or localities. A regiment might be 400 or 4000 men. These were grouped into Corps that took their name from the military kraals where they were mustered, or sometimes the dominant regiment of that locality.^[30] While the modest Zulu population could not turn out the hundreds of thousand available to major world or continental powers like France, Britain, or Russia, the Zulu "nation in arms" approach could mobilize substantial forces in local context for short campaigns, and maneuver them in the Western equivalent of divisional strength. The victory won by Zulu king Cetawasyo at Ndondakusuka, for example, two decades before the British invasion of 1879, involved a battlefield deployment of 30,000 troops.^[31]

Higher command and unit leadership. An inDuna guided each regiment, and he in turn answered to senior izinduna who controlled the corps grouping. Overall guidance of the host was furnished by elder izinduna usually with many years of experience. One or more of these elder chiefs might accompany a big force on an important mission. Coordination of tactical movements was supplied by the indunas who used hand signals and messengers. Generally before deploying for battle, the regiments were made to cho'ktirish in a semicircle while these commanders made final assignments and adjustments. Lower level regimental izinduna, like the NCOs of today's armies, and yesterday's Roman centurions, were extremely important to morale and discipline. Prior to the clash at Isandhlwana for example, they imposed order on the frenzied rush of warriors eager to get at the British, and steadied those faltering under withering enemy fire during the battle.^[32]

The Zulu in the gunpowder era

At Isandhlawana, the Zulu impis scored their greatest victory, liquidating a significant part of the British invasion force. More British officers were killed at Isandhlawana by the Zulu, than Napoleon killed at Waterloo.^[33]

Victories. The Zulu system spanned both the spear and gunpowder eras and exemplified the typical outcome in Africa when native armies were confronted by European forces armed with modern weapons. Unlike many other native armies however, the Zulu scored one of the biggest African victories over colonial forces, annihilating a British column at Isandhlawana and almost over-running a detachment at Rorke's Drift. Proceeding at a more leisurely pace than their reputed 50 miles per day, a large impi approached the British camp almost undetected, in dispersed units that hid its full strength. The total force was concentrated and positioned in a deep ravine near the enemy position, waiting until the omens were good for an assault. Discovered by a British cavalry patrol, the entire impi sprang up as one man, and launched their attack from some 4 miles away, in their classic "buffalo horns" formation.

Morris (1965)^[34] holds that in the fluid situation, the commanding Zulu generals struggled to shape the battle and position their forces in the proper order as the warriors streamed forward, but only succeeded in holding back one corps (the Undi), and one regiment (the uDloko) which had been located a mile behind the main body. McBride (1976) maintains that the Zulu commanders were already well informed by their scouts (izinhloli) of British dispositions and their preliminary positioning and the classic 'buffalo horns' deployment would shape the resulting battle despite the early running start, with the right horn circling the mountain to attack from the rear, the felt horn pinning the redcoats in place and cutting them off, the chest delivering the main blow, and the "loins" held back in reserve from the initial rush. These "tail end" reserves, who had been held in check by their unit commanders, were to later pursue fugitives and clash with the stalwart British defenders of Rorke's Drift.^[35] Whatever the final adjustments made, both writers show that the Zulu force, for all its eagerness, was no wild horde, but a disciplined formation, moving into combat according to its training.

The attack was met by withering British rifle, rocket and artillery fire that made part of the advance falter. The British however had divided their forces- part of it being away on a search for the main Zulu Army. That army materialized behind their backs at Isandlwana, and moved quickly to exploit the situation. Poor positioning and deployment of troops, (failure to base the camp on a strong central wagon or laager fortification for example^[36] also contributed to fatal weaknesses in the British defences, and the fiery exhortations of the regimental indunas encouraged the host of warriors to continue attacking. When pressure by the maneuvering Zulu formations caused the crumbling of the redcoat line, the Zulu prongs surged through and around the gaps, annihilating the camp's defenders.^[37] Some recent historians hold that much play was given to the relatively small Rorke's Drift battle to divert attention from the disaster at Isandhlwana where the Zulu clearly outmaneuvered the British, and lured the redcoats into splitting their strength through diversionary actions around Magogo Hills and Mangeni Falls. These gambits saw Chelmsford leading a substantial detachment out in search of the elusive Zulu "main impi" leaving half his army behind at the Isandhlwana camp.

It was at Isandhlwana that the main force materialized undetected to liquidate their enemies. They also hold that the main Zulu force was not a startled horde that simply charged when discovered, but had already been generally pre-positioned by their commanders for the great surge forward.^[38] The liquidation of almost 1,000 European troops with modern arms by the African spearmen sparked disbelief and uproar in Britain. Aside from the losses of British regulars, and the supporting native levies, the Zulu impi killed more British officers at Isandhlawana, than Napoleon killed at Waterloo.^[33] Tarixchi Jon Laband also maintains that the Zulu approach march to the battle was an excellent one, that screened their final movement across the face of the opposition force, and took advantage of Chelmsford's fatal spitting of British fighting strength:

"Meanwhile, the joint Zulu commanders, who had indeed been considering a flank march to Chelmsford's east to join with Matshana and cut the British column off from Natal, decided instead to take advantage of the general's division of forces. They detached men to reinforce Matshana, but on the same evening of 21 January and during the next they transferred the main army across the British front to the deep shelter of the Ngwebeni valley. This was truly a masterful manoeuvre. The amabutho moved rapidly in small units, mainly concealed from the Isandlwana camp nine miles away by the Nyoni Heights. The British mounted patrols that sighted some of the apparently isolated Zulu units had no inkling an entire army was on the move."^[39]

Mag'lubiyat. Long term Zulu success against a major world power however was a questionable proposition. Even in the victory at Isandhlwana the Zulu had taken heavy losses,^[40] and the efficacy of spears and a few untrained gunmen against modern rifles, machine guns and artillery of a major nation was ultimately limited. In his earlier encounters with European visitors to his kingdom, the Zulu King Shaka had dismissed firearms as ineffective against the massed charge of the regiments. At Isandhlawana, the monarch's boast held true, and it was not an unreasonable one, given the slow-firing, sometimes malfunctioning, obsolete trade muskets the Europeans demonstrated.^[41] But as the Zulu War went on, massed rifle and artillery fire repeatedly broke the back of Zulu attacks, as they persisted in assaulting heavily fortified positions and failed to use captured firearms effectively.^[37] Despite earlier defeats by the Boers using guns, 4 decades earlier, the Zulu had not sufficiently adapted to the realities of firepower on the battlefield,. They also failed to effectively cut the vulnerable supply lines of their enemies- leaving the Natal rear area virtually untouched for example.^[37]

Contrary to popular belief many African armies did not have vast supplies of fighting personnel (see "Significant Influences" above). The war put tremendous pressure on the Zulus relatively limited manpower resources, a pattern repeated throughout Africa where comparatively small kingdoms clashed with European states like Britain or France. At Isandhlwana for example, the Zulu main force had marched for three days straight, without eating on the last two. As the regiments deployed for attack they had a four-mile run to reach the British camp, before entering into the immediate battle. The reserve force of the impi, the uDokolo regiment, had another twelve mile run to make immediately after, where they attacked the fortified British position for ten hours straight. Such intensity could not be sustained with available manpower and logistics. Finalda Ulundi jangi, the depleted Zulu formations made a relatively weak attack before being scattered.^[42] Some historians hold that the victory at Ulindi was a token one, driven by the need for Lord Chelmsford to salvage some success after Isandhlwana, and the British withdrew quickly followed by Chelmsford's resignation as commanded of the British forces. The end of the war saw the Zulu retaining their lands.

"Seen in terms of the political ends for which the war was fought, the battle of Ulundi, like the campaign in Zululand itself, was a failure. The effectiveness of Zulu resistance had destroyed the policy which brought about the war, and discredited the men responsible. The only point on which all whites agreed was that some form of face-saving military victory was required in Zululand. Ulundi was that token military victory. It did not end the war in Zululand—peace was attained by Sir Garnet Wolseley who, as Chelmsford scurried out of the country, entered Zululand proclaiming that if the Zulu returned to their homes they would be left in full possession of their land and their property. By July 1879 both sides desired an end to hostilities. For reasons of economy, because of military requirements elsewhere and the political capital being made out of the war, the British government wanted an end to this embarrassing demonstration of imperial ineptitude. Any chance of an easy military conquest of the entire territory seemed slight: the army was tied to its inadequate supply lines, and conquest would have necessitated a change in strategy and tactics which presupposed a change in military leadership. It was easier and cheaper to elevate Ulundi to the rank of a crushing military victory and abandon plans to subjugate the Zulu people than to create the force of mobile righting units which would have been required to conquer the Zulu completely." ^[41]

Influence of the Zulu system

The Zulu military system was to transform large swathes of the continent, from south east Africa, into parts of East and Central Africa through the disruptive warfare that broke out during the reign of Zulu king Shaka.^[43] The disruption, known as the Mfecane had several causes, but it was to create several powerful nations in its wake, such as the Swazi, the Nebebele, the Shangaan and others. Many of these new powers copied Zulu methods, weapons and tactics, and saw a measure of success against both indigenous and foreign opponents. The Shangaan for example, founded by war-leader Soshangane, were to migrate into what is now Mozambique and force the Portuguese into paying them tribute.^[44]

Horses, guns and indigenous adaptation in Southern Africa

Guns, wagons and horses gave the Boer commandos important tactical advantages over their foes. These weapons were later acquired by some groups like the Griqua and the Basotho.

The powerful horse and gun system of the Boers. While not indigenous to the continent, the horse and gun system of the Boers, and their defensive wagon laager, was to have profound effects on military developments in the southern portion of Africa. Mounted warfare enabled them to beat or fight a wide variety of African enemies to a standstill, although they suffered their share of defeats over the decades. Skilled horsemen, and excellent shots, the Boers acquitted themselves well in a variety of tactical situations, against both African enemies and imperial forces. Several groups arose that emulated the horse and gun system. Ular orasida taniqli bo'lganlar eskirganlar, the half-caste or mixed race product of Dutch and African interaction, and/or alliances with other dispossessed tribal elements- peoples like the Griqua, Bergnaars, Koranna va Basters. Acquiring weapons and mounts over the course of time, they too began to carve out their own sphere of influence in the region, alternately battling Boer, Bantu and Briton at various times in their history.^[43]

Rise of the Basotho system. Several tribal kingdoms such as the Tlokoa, Pedi va Basoto took up horse and gun, despite collaboration between the Boers and the British to prevent such transfers, particularly of firearms. The Basotho, a small tribal grouping threatened by the Zulu, Ndebele, as well as the Europeans, adapted to both weapons systems, and carried out a complex mix of warfare and diplomacy to fend off their enemies. They became avid horsemen, and in time, developed the tough, durable breed, that was to be known as the Basuto pony. The Basotho equipped their mounted fighters with guns, although the traditional spear, battle-axe, and knobkerrie (club) continued in use. Most of the firearms were low quality flintlocks, and ammunition and gunpowder were usually in short supply. Marksmanship according to contemporary European observers was not as good as that of the Boers. The tribal warriors also relied heavily on fortifications in their mountainous country, the most famous of which was Thaba Boisu, fortress capital of their king Moshoeshoe.^[45]

Battles against English and Boer forces. The Basotho clashed with several enemies to maintain their fragile independence. In the 1840s they fought against the Tlokwa, who were also mounted, and against the Zulu-influenced Nedebele, who were primarily infantry. In 1851, a British colonial force invaded Sotho country and was soundly defeated at the battle of Kononyaba (or Viervoet). Against the British, who deployed an artillery piece, the spear and battle-axe proved more useful than guns when the Sotho hemmed in the invaders on a mountaintop. Victory was gained by close hand-to-hand fighting. This incident provided a significant check to British power in the area. The following year another British force tried its luck, and was also defeated. This encounter saw the widespread deployment of Sotho cavalry. At one point in the battle, some 6,000 Basotho horsemen mounted a charge against the British formation. They were repulsed by rifle and artillery fire. Nevertheless, the tribal regiments controlled the field at the end of the day, and the British withdrew.^[45]

Basotho cavalry relied on open order deployment rather than the standardized formations of many contemporary US or European forces. Against one British force in 1852 some 6,000 Basotho horsemen charged the enemy line.

Facing a British ban against arms sales to Africans in the 1850s, the Basotho desperately tried to manufacture their own cartridges and gunpowder with assistance from European deserters. The results were poor and of little value when a Boer invasion from the Orange Free State threatened in 1858. The Boer force was armed with modern breech-loading rifles and several pieces of artillery, and their firepower took a heavy toll against the tribal warriors. The Basotho however withdrew to their mountain strongholds, particularly Thaba Boisiu, and a siege commenced. Counterattacks from the fortress saw some success, with one foray killing 30 enemy troops, and the siege became a stalemate. Eventually the Boers were forced to withdraw when the Basotho dispatched horsemen to raid homesteads and fields behind their lines.^[45]

Another Boer invasion in 1867 was more dangerous for the Basotho. The Europeans had upgraded their rifles, obtained more powerful artillery, and augmented their numbers with white volunteers from across South Africa. Once again they converged on Thaba Boisu, liquidating local strongholds on the way. A first assault against the fortress ended in failure. A second drove the Basotho back from their advanced defence lines, but also became bogged down. A third also stalled when a Boer leader was shot dead. The conflict dragged on for 6 months as the Boers ravaged Basotho territory, seizing cattle, people and burning crops to bring their opponents to heel. In early 1868 however Moshoeshoe persuaded the British to intervene and placed his kingdom under crown protection. This ended the Boer siege although a subsequent treaty transferred yet more Basotho land to their enemies.^[45]

The 'gun war' – defeat of colonial forces. The Basotho continued to use their horse-gun system under the new colonial regime to maintain their independence. In the 1880s, their territory was annexed by Cape Colony and a jazo ekspeditsiyasi of 800 white troops and 1500 African allies was dispatched to crush the opposition of one Moorosi, a dissenting Sotho chieftain. Moorosi gathered some 300 gunmen in a strong mountaintop position and fought off the colonial forces for over 8 months. After three major assaults, and continuous shelling by artillery, the position was overrun, Moroosi was killed and his lands seized. As the struggle with Moorosi raged, colonial authorities reserved part of Basutoland for white settlement and demanded that all natives surrender their firearms. This demand was rejected and another British expedition was dispatched to liquidate resistance, sparking the so-called "Gun War." The Sotho horsemen however used a flexible mix of tactics: defensive positions on fortified hills, attacks against administrative centers of the colonial regime, and frequent use of guerrilla strikes and ambushes against lumbering colonial columns, most notably a column of British lancers at Qalabani. The combination of mobility, firepower, ambushes, and hit and run strikes was sufficient to stalemate or defeat the Basotho's enemies for almost a year. Stymied, the colonial army, and the disarmanent demand was withdrawn.^[45]

Rejecting colonial demands to give up their guns, mounted Basotho fighters repulsed British attacks during the "Gun War", 1880–81.

End of the regional balance of power. While other African groups adapted to horses and guns, the Basotho state successfully maintained a measure of independence from the many enemies that sought to destroy it. The Basotho case again demonstrates the complexity of African military systems, often conceived mainly in terms of hordes of attacking, spear-wielding infantry. A fuller picture must include the cavalry tradition, both in the south and in western Africa, and must take into account the alternative, tactical defensive style of peoples like the Shona and Basotho. The case of the Basotho, Zulu, Xhosa and others also shows that indigenous militaries could learn and adapt, and could achieve credible performances even in the 19th century. Some historians note that a rough balance of power prevailed in the region, with native military systems generally holding their own against settler forces and local colonial levies. The heavier intervention of British power however choked off the free market in firearms, and/or deployed regular imperial troops with modern repeating rifles, artillery and machine guns.^[46] Such imperial troops in turn, were also to crush Boer power during the Boer War, circa 1899–1902.

Adapting to modern arms: the Ethiopians at Adowa

Proficiency in handling modern rifles and artillery aided the Ethiopians in the historic defeat of the Italians at Adowa. Ethiopian artillery for example outgunned Italian batteries at one point in the encounter.

The Ethiopian victory at Adova demonstrates the increasing ability of African forces to handle modern arms as gunpowder weapons began to dominate the field. Painful lessons in the killing efficiency of rifled firepower had been dealt the Ethiopian forces in earlier encounters with European armies. At the battle of Aroge for example, British volleys from breechloading rifles crushed the Emperor Tewodros' troops, and the British campaign was to end in his death and the destruction of his capital.

Adaptations to modern arms. Others learned however. Tewodros's successor, Yohannes IV had been backed by the British and received 500,000 pounds (sterling) worth of military equipment. This was put to good use against a variety of other enemies, including the Mahdi's dervish forces from the Sudan, and in inflicting a crushing defeat on an Italian force at the Battle of Dogali in 1887. In 1875 and 1876, Yohannes' troops also defeated substantial Egyptian armies trained and officered by European mercenaries and US Civil War veterans. The Egyptians had been equipped with Remington rifles, Krupp artillery, Gatling guns and rocket tubes. This hardware was transferred to the victorious Ethiopian forces, and captured Egyptian gunners were pressed into service, training the Ethiopians to use the big guns.^[47] Yohannes' successor Menelik continued the armed buildup, and by the 1890s the Ethiopians were a tough fighting force on their own ground, capable of mobilizing massive numbers of infantry.

Military and diplomatic links with other nations such as Imperial Russia (chief military mission in the war-time Nikolay Leontiev ) tashkil etildi.^[48] AN assortment of foreign military personnel advised the Ethiopians during their modernization and build up phases. Special role for this purpose was played by the Russian military advisers and volunteers of Menylik's army.^[49] So Little Leontiev's command of the Russian volunteers and advisers could be the direct participants of battle near Adwa in composition the Ethiopian army (less than fifty).^{[50][51][52][53]} In accordance with the order of emperor of Ethiopia, Directly Nikolay Leontiev organized the first battalion of the regular Ethiopian army, it was represented to Menelik II, in February, 1899. Leontiev formed a first regular battalion, the kernel of which became the company of volunteers from the former Senegal shooters (disappointed or unreliable for colonial authorities), which he chose and invited from Western Africa, with training of the Russian and French officers. The first Ethiopian military orchestra was organized at the same time.^[54][55]

Historian Bruce Vandervort in Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914, notes that around 100,000 Ethiopian soldiers fought at Adowa, with about 70,000 of them carrying modern repeating rifles. The bulk of these were infantry. The remaining 30,000 men fought with traditional weapons- spear, sword and buffalo-hide shield.^[56] The Ethiopians also deployed a number of machine guns, and were the only Africans to employ artillery to any extent during the colonial wars. Some of their gunners were foreign, but many were indigenous artillerymen, who took over the batteries captured from the Egyptians. The performance of the artillery arm proved a key factor in the Ethiopian victory. Ularning "quick- firing Hotchkiss artillery forced the surrender of an Italian fort in the run-up to the battle of Adowa, and actually outgunned an Italian battery at a crucial point during the battle itself.".^[56] In many ways the Ethiopian army at Adowa was a traditional one that lacked the industrial base and elaborated military establishment of the typical European force. Proficiency however had been gained through long years of campaigning, as the various emperors consolidated power over internal and external foes.

"Taken all together, the Ethiopian Army was formidable by any standards. Its tough fighting men were masters of both skirmish, or ambush warfare and shock action. A rare combination by African standards, and one that often caused unpleasant surprises for Ethiopia's enemies."^[56]

At Adowa, victorious Ethiopian forces inflicted the most casualties of any major 19th Century battle, a rate exceeding 50%, more than that inflicted on the French at Eylau or Waterloo.^[57]

Such proficiency however masked many internal weaknesses, including poor logistics, and lack of advanced standardization in organization. Before the battle for example, the Emperor was considering leaving the field because of low supplies. Such deficiencies would count heavily against the indigenous forces in later years when faced with a new Italian invasion under Mussolini in the 1930s. Nevertheless, on the day of Adowa, the Ethiopians were supremely ready for the struggle before them.

Jang. At Adowa, the Italian force, estimated at 18,000 were heavily outnumbered, but had good rifles and some 56 pieces of artillery, and was also stiffened by high quality, elite bersaglieri va alpini units that marched with some 15,000 European soldiers supported by a smaller number of 3,000 African askari.^[56] Prior to the encounter, their commander Bartieri dug into a strong fortified position, hoping to lure the Ethiopians into attacking him. They did not oblige, and a stalemate ensued. Urgings from Rome prompted Bartieri to advance against the Ethiopian concentration at Adowa. The Emperor was considering retreat as supplies ran low, but also hoped that by maneuver, he would draw out his opponents.^[56]

The Italian advance set the stage for battle. Their forward movement on Adowa was a confused affair and their columns became separated. Ethiopians troops positioned themselves to intercept, and covered by accurate artillery fire, launched a fierce attack that took advantage of this vulnerability, rolling up the Italian line with continuous pressure. They killed over 3,000 Italians and wounded hundreds. A smaller number of African soldiers in Italian service, about 2,000, were also killed, and over 1,000 wounded. A further 954 Italian troops were missing in action, and the army lost some 11,000 rifles, all of its 56 artillery pieces, and had to endure guerrilla attacks as it pulled back from the o'ldirish zonasi. Ethiopian losses were about 7,000 dead and 10,000 wounded. Thousands of European captives were taken, and the Italian government paid some 10 million lire in reparation money for the survivors after the defeat. Some 800 Tigrean askari troops who fought for the Italians met a more brutal fate. Considered traitors, they had their right hands and left feet cut off. Although the Ethiopians were to be less successful or prepared some 40 years later against Mussolini's troops, the victory at Adowa, which repeated the smaller triumph at Dogali some 9 years earlier, was to become a landmark in African military history.^[56]

Significance of the Adowa victory. News of the disaster caused the fall of the Crispi government in Italy and riots in urban areas. Adova shtatining shoklari Britaniyaning Isandxlvanadagi zarbasidan oshib ketdi, chunki har ikkala falokat ham mahalliy kuchlar ochiq maydonda zamonaviy Evropa muntazamlarini mag'lub etganini anglash bilan kuchaygan. Bir italiyalik tarixchi ta'kidlaganidek:

"Bu ularning" qora tanlilar "dan ustun ekanliklariga bo'lgan ishonchi illyuziya ekanligini anglash edi. Bir necha soat ichida minglab insonlar hayotini so'ndirgan askarlarning ko'zlari oldida butun qalbaki axloq .. fath qilish buzildi. mudofaa imkoniyati bo'lmagan g'alati va dushman yurt, ularning ko'zlarida yarim vahshiylarga aylangan, afrikalik armiya tomonidan kaltaklangan odamlarning oldida bo'ysundirilgan, jang arafasigacha uyushmagan, yomon qurollangan va qobiliyatsiz deb tasvirlangan. strategiyani shakllantirish. "^[58]

Adova siyosiy va afrikalik millatchi ma'noda katta e'tiborni jalb qilgan bo'lsa-da, G'arb harbiy tarixchilaridan biri bu jang Evropa armiyasi uchun kuchlar nisbatidagi yo'qotishlarga nisbatan ancha qimmat bo'lgan ish bo'lganligini ta'kidlamoqda - aslida bu eng mutanosib ravishda eng qimmat janglardan biri. 19-asr.

"Baratieri armiyasi o'n to'qqizinchi asrning boshqa har qanday yirik jangida qatnashganlarga qaraganda ancha yuqori 50 foiz yo'qotishlarga duch keldi. Napoleon davridagi eng katta qon to'kish Eylau, frantsuz armiyasida 33,8 foiz yo'qotishlarga va uning yo'qotilishlariga olib keldi. Vaterloo 30 foizdan ozroq edi. "Macello, karneficina, strage"(qassoblik, qassoblik, so'yish) - bu Adovadagi italiyalik jangchilarning xotiralarida takrorlanadigan so'zlar."^[58]

Afrika harbiy tizimlarining qisqacha mazmuni: 1800–1900

19-asr mahalliy mustamlakachilikni emas, balki mahalliy harbiy innovatsiyalar va rivojlanishning jadal jarayonini boshdan kechirdi.

XIX asrdagi qit'adagi harbiy tizimlar avvalgi davrlarning murakkabligini aks ettiradi, bunga Evropa mustamlakachiligining o'sib borayotgan sur'ati va og'irligi qo'shildi. Ushbu tizimlar mashhur ommaviy axborot vositalari va xayolotlarni osonlikcha turkumlash va tasvirlashga qarshi turadi - ko'pincha qit'aning uzoq vaqtdan buyon davom etib kelayotgan kamondan otish va otliq an'analarini e'tiborsiz qoldirgan holda, vahshiyona suruvlarni piyoda zaryad qilish stereotipi. Masalan, G'arb tarixchilaridan biri ta'kidlaganidek, son-sanoqsiz hujumkor nayzalar degan tushuncha afsonadir. Ishchi kuchi resurslari ko'pincha cheklangan edi. XIX asrda Prussiya singari Evropa davlatlari 300 ming kishini bitta kampaniyaga jalb qilishi mumkin edi. Faqatgina Adovadagi Efiopiyaliklar o'zlarining 100000 ta effektlari bilan ushbu safarbarlik darajasiga yaqinlashdilar - "afsonaviy jang maydonlarida kamdan-kam uchraydigan ommabop ilmlarning vahshiy guruhlari". ^[59] Ba'zida jang uchun mahalliy qo'shinlarning kontsentratsiyasi kichik Evropa shtatlaridagi yoki ba'zi Evropa jang maydonlarida mavjud bo'lgan raqamlar bilan solishtirganda ancha sezilarli bo'lishi mumkin.^[60] Masalan, G'arbiy Afrikadagi mustamlaka davrida bir qirollik uchun taxminan 12000 dan 13000 gacha bo'lgan otliq qo'shinlarning jangovar kuchlari, Napoleonning Vaterlooda joylashtiradigan raqamlari bilan taqqoslangan.^[9]

Mahalliy harbiy tashkilot, shuningdek, G'arbiy Afrikadagi zirhli chevalierlardan tortib, Shimoliy Afrikaning cho'l otliqlariga, janubiy yurishlarida Basotoning o'rnatilgan jangchilarigacha Afrikaning muhim otliq yoki o'rnatilgan an'analarini qamrab oladi. Qit'a suvlarida dengiz harakatlari nafaqat kanoeda tashish, balki zaharlangan o'qlar, o'qlar va to'plar bilan yopilgan jangovar kemalar, portlar va qo'shinlarning qo'nish joylarini hisobga olish kerak. Boshotoning sabr-toqatli mudofaasidan, Ashantining murakkab qo'shinlaridan, Zulu impi-sining shafqatsiz hujumkor shoxlaridan, shuningdek, cho'zilgan partizanlik uslublari va o'rmon xalqlarining kamondan tortishishidan tortib mahalliy tizimlar tomonidan turli xil urush uslublari va uyushtirilish usullari namoyish etiladi. Lobi yoki San (Bushmen) janubida. Tashkilot uslublariga kelsak, turli davrlarga nisbatan turli xil yondashuvlarni ko'rish mumkin. Masalan, 18-asr Kongo qirolliklari orasida birlik turlarining aralashmasi - kamon va nayzalar bilan qurollangan engil kontingentlar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan, masalan, kuchli qalqonli og'ir piyoda askarlar joylashtirildi. Elita qo'shinlari va soqchilarining maxsus bo'linmalari ham saqlanib qoldi. Qadimgi Rim legionlari kabi qayta tashkil etilgani kabi, keyinchalik Zulu tizimi ham bir xil jangovar tashkilot va usul foydasiga bunday farqlarni rad etdi. Bunday standartlashtirilgan usullar boshqa qabilalar tomonidan ko'chirilishi va 19-asr davomida Afrikaning janubiy qismida va undan tashqarida hukmronlik qilishi yoki ta'sir qilishi kerak edi. Bunday murakkablik yana bir bor Afrikaning harbiy tizimlarini statik, bir o'lchovli ma'noda tasavvur qilib bo'lmasligini ko'rsatmoqda.^[16][61]

O'qotar qurollarning kiritilishi ko'pgina mintaqalarda ularning aralash ta'siri va ishlatilishi sababli 19-asrning barcha voqealarini aytib bermaydi. Darhaqiqat, ba'zi tarixchilar shunchaki ilg'or texnologiyalar ko'pgina mustamlakachilarning istilolari natijasidagi hal qiluvchi omil emasligini ta'kidlaydilar. Eng muhimi, ko'plab kichik afrikalik siyosatlarning bo'linishi, bo'laklashishi, ularni dushmanlari tomonidan alohida-alohida mag'lub etishga imkon berdi.^[16] Bunday parchalanish faqat Afrikaga xos emas. Masalan, Germaniya 1815 yilda 30 dan ortiq alohida shtatlarga bo'lingan.^[60] Ushbu zaif tomonlarga qaramay, asrning ikkinchi qismiga qadar, ko'plab mahalliy kuchlar zamonaviy artilleriya, pulemyot va miltiq paydo bo'lguncha o'zlarini ushlab turdilar.^[16][46]

Duala urush-kanoeri, Kamerun, 1884 yil

XIX asrni ba'zi tarixchilar ta'kidlaganidek, shunchaki Evropa rejalari yoki sxemalari nuqtai nazaridan ko'rib bo'lmaydi. Buning o'rniga, Afrika davlatlari o'zlari uchun zarur bo'lgan ichki omillarga asoslanib, o'zlarining kun tartiblarini bajarishgan. Bunday ichki omillar va aktyorlar (masalan, Shaka) qit'ada bir qator muhim ziddiyatlarni keltirib chiqardi. Evropa qudratli davlatlari ba'zida oldindan aniq rejalashtirilgan sxemalarni amalga oshirish o'rniga, ushbu ichki voqealarga munosabat bildirishlari kerak edi. Shunday qilib, Angliya dastlab Sudanga unchalik qiziqish bildirmadi, ammo Mehdiyning keng qamrovli zabt etilishi uni qisman Misrdagi mavqeini va imperiyaning boshqa qismlariga Qizil dengiz yo'lidagi strategik yo'lini himoya qilish uchun choralar ko'rishga majbur qildi.^[62] Zulu urushi misolida ba'zi tarixchilar buni "geosiyosiy strategiya sababli amalga oshirilgan ruxsatsiz tajovuz" deb atashadi va Britaniyaning asosiy manfaati Yaxshi umid burnini strategik asos va Hindistonga boradigan yo'l sifatida himoya qilish edi. Bu mintaqaning portlarini - Keyptaun, Simonstaun va Durbanni nazorat qilishni va Zulu qirolligi kabi ichki qismdan kelib chiqadigan potentsial tahdidlarni yo'q qilishni anglatardi.^[63] Zulular inglizlarning majburlashiga bo'ysunishdan ko'ra kurashishni tanlaganlarida, ushbu strategiya qisman o'z samarasini berdi. Xulosa qilib aytganda, mahalliy harbiy tizimlarning nazoratchilari mustamlakachilikni kutayotgan shunchaki passiv aktyor bo'lishdan ko'ra, yangi tashkil etish shakllarini rivojlantirib, mavjudlarini takomillashtirib yoki eskilarini o'zgaruvchan imkoniyatlar va ilg'or texnologiyalarga moslashtirmoqdalar.^[62] Ularning yutuqlari, muvaffaqiyatsizliklari, usullari va uslublari qit'adagi harbiy san'atning murakkab naqshining bir qismidir.

Shuningdek qarang

Adabiyotlar

Bibliografiya

• Morris, Donald The Nayzalarni yuvish, Touchstone, 1965 yil
• Vandervort, Bryus Afrikadagi imperatorlik istilosi urushlari: 1830-1914, Indiana universiteti matbuoti: 1998 yil ISBN  0253211786