Chosin suv omboridagi jang - Battle of Chosin Reservoir

Koordinatalar: 40 ° 29′N 127 ° 12′E / 40.483 ° N 127.200 ° E / 40.483; 127.200 (Jangjin suv ombori)

Chosin suv omboridagi jang
Qismi Koreya urushi
Men advancing through the snow with a Tank
Ning ustuni AQSh 1-dengiz diviziyasi Chosin suv omboridan chiqish paytida xitoylik chiziqlar bo'ylab harakatlanadi
Sana1950 yil 27 noyabr - 13 dekabr
Manzil
Xosin suv ombori, hozirgi kunda Changjin Okrug, Janubiy Hamgyong viloyati, Shimoliy Koreya
NatijaQarang Natijada Bo'lim
Hududiy
o'zgarishlar		Xitoy kuchlari Shimoliy Koreyaning shimoli-sharqini tiklaydilar; BMT kuchlari chiqib ketadi.
Urushayotganlar

 Birlashgan Millatlar (UNC )

 Xitoy
 Shimoliy Koreya
Qo'mondonlar va rahbarlar
Birlashgan Millatlar Duglas Makartur
Qo'shma Shtatlar Edvard Almond
Qo'shma Shtatlar Oliver P. Smit		Xitoy Peng Dexuay
Xitoy Song Shilun
Jalb qilingan birliklar
qarang Chosin suv ombori jangi jang tartibiQarang Chosin suv ombori jangi jang tartibi
Kuch
Nominal: 103,520[1]:37
Qabul qilingan: ~30,000[1]:24		Nominal: 150,000[2]
Qabul qilingan: ~120,000[3]
Yo'qotishlar va yo'qotishlar
AQSh manbalari:
1029 kishi halok bo'ldi
4.894 kishi bedarak yo'qolgan
4582 kishi yaralangan
Urushdan tashqari 7,338 kishi[1]:345–7[a]
15 tank yo'qotilishi[1]:348
Jami 17 843 ta
Xitoy taxminlari:
13,900[4]		Xitoy manbalari:
19.202 jangovar talofatlar
28.954 jangovar bo'lmagan yo'qotish
Jami 48,156[4]
Norasmiy taxminlar: ~60,000[5][b]
BMTning taxminlari:
29,800 jangovar talofatlar
20,000+ jangovar bo'lmagan qurbonlar[1]:352

The Chosin suv omboridagi jang, deb ham tanilgan Chosin suv ombori kampaniyasi yoki Jangjin ko'li jangi (Koreys : 장진호 전투; Xanja : 長 津 湖 戰 鬪; RR : Jangjinho jeontu; JANOB : Changjinyo chŏnt'u), muhim jang bo'ldi Koreya urushi.[c] "Chosin" nomi yaponcha talaffuzdan kelib chiqqan "Cheshin", Koreyscha talaffuz o'rniga.[6]

Rasmiy Xitoy manbalari ushbu jangni sharqiy qismi deb atashadi Ikkinchi bosqich aksiyasi (yoki haqoratli) (Xitoy : 第二 次 战役 东线; pinyin : Dì'èrcì Zhànyì Dōngxiàn). Ikkinchi bosqich kampaniyasining g'arbiy yarmi Xitoyning g'alabasiga olib keldi Chongchon daryosidagi jang.

Jang taxminan bir oy o'tgach sodir bo'ldi Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi mojaroga kirib, yubordi Xalq ko'ngillilar armiyasi (PVA) 9-armiya[d] shimoliy-sharqiy qismiga kirib borish uchun Shimoliy Koreya. 1950 yil 27-noyabrda Xitoy kuchlari AQShni hayratda qoldirdi X korpus general-mayor buyurgan Edvard Almond Chosin suv ombori hududida. Tez orada sovuq havoda 17 kunlik shafqatsiz jang boshlandi. 27-noyabrdan 13-dekabrgacha 30,000[1]:24 Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti qo'mondonligi general-mayor dala qo'mondonligi ostidagi qo'shinlar (keyinchalik "Chosin ozlari" laqabini olganlar) Oliver P. Smit 120 mingga yaqin odamlar tomonidan o'ralgan va hujumga uchragan[3] Qo'mondonligidagi Xitoy qo'shinlari Song Shilun kim tomonidan buyurtma qilingan Mao Szedun BMT kuchlarini yo'q qilish. Birlashgan Millatlar kuchlari baribir qurshovdan chiqib, portni jangovar olib chiqib ketishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi. Hungnam, xitoyliklarga katta talofatlar etkazmoqda. AQSh dengiz kuchlari bo'linmalarini AQSh armiyasi chiqarishda qo'llab-quvvatladi Ishchi guruhning ishonchi og'ir talofatlar va Xitoy hujumining to'liq yukini ko'rgan ularning sharqida. AQShning chekinishi Sakkizinchi armiya Ch'ongch'on daryosi va undan keyingi urush natijasida Shimoliy Koreyadan evakuatsiya Shimoliy Koreyadagi Xungnam portidan X korpusining Shimoliy Koreyadan BMT qo'shinlari to'liq chiqib ketishini ko'rsatdi.

Fon

A map showing the Peninsula with US forces moving from the south to the north
BMTning rivojlanish yo'nalishlari xaritasi Yalu daryosi.
Shuningdek qarang: BMTning Shimoliy Koreyaga hujumi § Chosin suv omboridagi 1-dengiz bo'limi (29 oktyabr-25 noyabr)

Muvaffaqiyatli bo'lganidan so'ng, 1950 yil oktyabr oyining o'rtalariga kelib Inchonga qo'nish AQSh tomonidan X korpus, Sakkizinchi armiya Pusan ​​perimetridan chiqib ketish va keyingi ta'qib qilish va yo'q qilish ning Koreya Xalq armiyasi (KPA), Koreya urushi oxirigacha ko'rinib turdi.[7] Birlashgan Millatlar (BMT) kuchlari tez rivojlandi ichiga Shimoliy Koreya 1950 yil oxirigacha Shimoliy va Janubiy Koreyani birlashtirish niyatida.[8] Shimoliy Koreyani markaz orqali o'tib bo'lmaydiganlar ajratib turadi Taebek tog'lari, bu BMT kuchlarini ikki guruhga ajratgan.[1]:3 AQSh Sakkizinchi armiya Koreya yarim orolining g'arbiy qirg'og'i orqali shimolga, Koreya Respublikasi esa (Koreya) Men korpus va AQSh X korpusi sharqiy sohilda shimolga ilgarilab ketdi.[1]:3

Shu bilan birga Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotiga bir nechta ogohlantirishlarni berganidan keyin mojaroga kirishdi.[5]:101–7 1950 yil 19 oktyabrda Xitoy qo'shinlarining katta birlashmalari, deb nomlangan Xalq ko'ngillilar armiyasi (PVA), yashirincha chegarani kesib o'tgan va Shimoliy Koreyaga o'tgan.[5]:145–9 Chosin suv ombori hududiga etib kelgan birinchi Xitoy birliklaridan biri PVA edi 42-korpus BMTning sharqiy yutuqlarini to'xtatish vazifasi qo'yildi.[9] 25 oktyabrda rivojlanayotgan ROK I Corps xitoyliklar bilan aloqa o'rnatdi va Funchilin dovonida to'xtadi (40 ° 12′14 ″ N 127 ° 18′00 ″ E / 40.204 ° N 127.3 ° E / 40.204; 127.3), Chosin suv omboridan janubda joylashgan.[1]:5 Uchishdan keyin Vonsan, AQSh 1-dengiz bo'limi X korpusining mudofaasi PVA bilan shug'ullangan 124-divizion 2 noyabrda va undan keyingi jang xitoyliklar orasida katta talafotlarga sabab bo'ldi.[1]:7 6-noyabr kuni PVA 42-korpusi BMT kuchlarini Chosin suv omboriga jalb qilish niyatida shimolga chekinishni buyurdi.[9]:47 24-noyabrga kelib, 1-dengiz bo'limi ikkalasini ham egallab oldi Sinxung-ni [e] (40 ° 33′25 ″ N. 127 ° 16′12 ″ E / 40.557 ° N 127.27 ° E / 40.557; 127.27) suv omborining sharqiy tomonida va Yudami-ni (40 ° 28′48 ″ N. 127 ° 06′43 ″ E / 40.48 ° N 127.112 ° E / 40.48; 127.112) suv omborining g'arbiy qismida.[1]:8

Sakkizinchi armiya sektorida Xitoy kuchlarining to'satdan hujumlariga duch kelgan general Duglas Makartur Sakkizinchi armiyaga uchirishni buyurdi Uyga-Rojdestvoga qarshi tajovuzkor.[1]:24,33 Hujumni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun Makartur X korpusga Chosin suv omboridan g'arbga hujum qilishni va Manpojin-Kanggye-Xuyxon ta'minot tarmog'ini kesib o'tishni buyurdi.[10][1]:11 Bunga javoban, general-mayor Edvard M. Almond, AQSh X korpusi qo'mondoni, 21-noyabr kuni reja tuzdi. Unda AQSh 1-dengiz bo'linmasi Yudami-ni orqali g'arbga, AQSh esa yurishga chaqirilgan 7-piyoda diviziyasi ta'minlashi mumkin polk jangovar jamoasi Sinxung-ni o'ng qanotini himoya qilish. AQSh 3-piyoda diviziyasi orqa sohada xavfsizlikni ta'minlashda chap qanotni himoya qiladi.[1]:14 O'sha vaqtga qadar X korpusi 400 millik old tomonga ingichka qilib cho'zilgan edi.[1]:8

Vonsanga dengiz qo'nishidan hayratda qoldim,[11] Xitoy Kommunistik partiyasi rais Mao Szedun ROKni zudlik bilan yo'q qilishga chaqirdi Kapital bo'limi, ROK 3-piyoda diviziyasi, AQSh 1-dengiz diviziyasi va AQShning 7-piyoda diviziyasi qo'mondonga telegrafda[f] Song Shilun 31 oktyabrda PVA 9-armiyasining.[9]:47–8 Maoning shoshilinch buyrug'iga binoan 9-armiya 10-noyabr kuni Shimoliy Koreyaga zudlik bilan olib kirildi.[1]:21 BMT razvedkasi tomonidan aniqlanmagan,[1]:35 9-armiya tinchlik bilan 17-noyabr kuni Chosin suv ombori hududiga kirib keldi 20-korpus Yudami-ni yaqinidagi 42-korpusni ozod qiladigan 9-armiya.[9]:47

Prelude

Joylashuvi, relyefi va ob-havosi

Chosin suv ombori - Koreya yarim orolining shimoli-sharqida joylashgan texnogen ko'l.[12] Chosin nomi koreys yer nomining yaponcha talaffuzidir Changjin va bu nom BMT kuchlari tomonidan ishlatilgan eskirgan yapon xaritalari tufayli tiqilib qoldi.[13] Jangning asosiy yo'nalishi birlashadigan 78 millik (126 km) uzunlikdagi yo'l atrofida edi Hungnam va Chosin suv ombori,[1]:32 bu BMT kuchlari uchun yagona chekinish yo'li bo'lib xizmat qildi.[1]:29 Ushbu yo'llar orqali Yudami-ni va Sinxung-ni,[e] suv omborining g'arbiy va sharqiy qismida joylashgan bo'lib, Xagaru-ri (hozirgi Changjin-ŭp) bilan bog'langan (40 ° 23′02 ″ N 127 ° 14′56 ″ E / 40.3838 ° N 127.249 ° E / 40.3838; 127.249). U erdan yo'l Koto-ri orqali o'tadi (40 ° 17′02 ″ N 127 ° 18′00 ″ E / 40.284 ° N 127.3 ° E / 40.284; 127.3) va oxir-oqibat Hungnam portiga olib boradi.[1]:28–31 Chosin suv ombori atrofida aholi kam edi.[1]:25

Jang Koreya urushi paytida eng og'ir qishki ob-havo sharoitida eng qo'pol erlar atrofida sodir bo'ldi.[1]:24 Yo'l Koreyaning tog'li erlarini kesib o'tib, tik ko'tarilish va tomchilar bilan yaratilgan. Funchilin dovoni va To'qtong dovoni kabi dominant cho'qqilar (40 ° 23′38 ″ N 127 ° 09′40 ″ E / 40.3938 ° N 127.161 ° E / 40.3938; 127.161), yo'lning butun uzunligini e'tiborsiz qoldiring. Yo'lning sifati yomon edi, ba'zi joylarda u bitta chiziqli shag'al iziga aylantirildi.[1]:28–31 1950 yil 14-noyabrda sovuq jabha Sibir Chosin suv ombori ustiga tushdi va harorat, taxminlarga ko'ra -36 ° F (-38 ° C) darajagacha tushdi.[1]:xi Sovuq ob-havo muzlagan er bilan birga keldi va bu katta xavf tug'dirdi muzlash qurbonlar, muzli yo'llar va qurollarning noto'g'ri ishlashi. Tibbiy buyumlar muzlab qoldi; morfinli siretlarni ukol qilishdan oldin tibbiyot vositasining og'zida muzdan tushirish kerak edi; muzlatilgan qon plazmasi jang maydonida foydasiz edi. Hatto yara xavfini tug'diradigan gangrena va sovuqni davolash uchun kiyimni ham kesib tashlash. Jiplar va radiolar uchun ishlatiladigan batareyalar haroratda to'g'ri ishlamadi va tezda tugab qoldi.[14] Qurollardagi soqol jelleşdi va ularni jangda foydasiz qildi. Xuddi shu tarzda, otash pinalaridagi buloqlar dumaloqni otish uchun qattiq urilmasdi yoki tiqilib qolmasdi.[15]

Kuchlar va strategiyalar

Qo'shimcha ma'lumotlar: Chosin suv ombori jangi jang tartibi
Ko'l atrofidagi kuchlarning o'zgarishini ko'rsatadigan xarita
Changjin (Chosin) suv ombori jangi xaritasi.[e]
A photo of Caucasian man sitting at a desk
A headshot of a Caucasian man
General-mayor Edvard Almond (o'tirgan), AQSh X korpusi qo'mondoni va general-mayor Oliver P. Smit, AQSh 1-dengiz bo'limi qo'mondoni.

1-dengiz diviziyasi Vonsanga AQShning X X korpusi, Bodom va general-mayor tarkibida tushgan bo'lsa ham. Oliver P. Smit 1-dengiz bo'linmasining bir-birlariga nisbatan nafratlanishini o'rtoqlashdi.[16] qachondir Almond amfibiya qo'nish osonlikcha sodir bo'lganligi haqida gapirgan bo'lsa-da, u hech qachon qatnashmagan.[17] Smit Shimoliy Koreyada yuqori shtab-kvartiraga ega bo'lishiga qaramay, ko'plab Xitoy kuchlari borligiga ishongan Tokio aks holda aytilgan,[17]:428 ammo Bodom Smitni o'ta ehtiyotkor ekanligini his qildi.[17]:434 Qo'mondonlarning o'zaro ishonchsizligi Smitning Almond ko'rsatmalariga xilof ravishda 1-dengiz piyoda diviziyasining Chosin suv ombori tomon siljishini sekinlashtirdi.[17]:429 Smit yo'l davomida Xagaru-ri va Koto-rida ta'minot punktlari va aerodromlarni tashkil etdi.[17]:433–4

AQSh X korpusi suv ombori tomon siljiganida, xitoyliklar o'zlarining strategiyalarini tajribalar asosida ishlab chiqdilar Xitoy fuqarolar urushi.[9]:52 Suv omborida faqat BMTning engil ishtiroki bo'ladi degan taxmindan kelib chiqqan holda, Xitoyning 9-armiyasi avval BMTning Yudami-ni va Sinxun-ni garnizonlarini yo'q qildi, so'ngra Xagaru-ri tomon surildi.[9]:52 AQSh X korpusining asosiy qismi vayron qilingan qismlarni qutqarish uchun harakat qilishiga ishongan holda, 9-armiya Xagaru-ri va Hungnam o'rtasidagi yo'lda BMTning asosiy kuchlarini to'sib qo'ydi.[9]:52 Dastlab 9-armiya sakkiztasini amalga oshirdi[18] jang uchun bo'linmalar,[5]:436 kuchlarning aksariyati Yudami-ni va Sinxung-ni-da to'plangan.[9]:52

Xitoy rejasidagi nuqson BMT kuchlari to'g'risida aniq ma'lumotlarning etishmasligi edi.[5]:296 AQSh X korpusi shimoliy-sharqiy Koreyada yupqa cho'zilgan bo'lsa ham, dengiz piyoda sekin yurishi AQSh 1-dengiz diviziyasining asosiy qismini, shu jumladan 5-chi, 7-chi va 11-dengiz piyodalari, Yudami-ni-da to'planishi kerak.[17]:435[1]:42 Bundan tashqari, strategik ahamiyatga ega Hagaru-ri, bu erda a FZR 47 - imkoniyatga ega aerodrom qurilgan va etkazib berish joyi bo'lgan,[1]:158–62 tomonidan engil himoya qilinishiga qaramay, xitoyliklar uchun ustuvor vazifa emas edi 1-chi va 7-dengiz piyodalari.[1]:158–9 Faqat 31-sonli polk AQShning 7-piyoda diviziyasining kuchsizligi va shoshilinch ravishda tuzilgan polk jangovar jamoasi (RCT-31) suv omborining sharqiy qirg'og'i bo'ylab ingichka tarzda tarqaldi.[1]:75 Keyinchalik bu bo'linmalar xitoyliklarning hujumlarini engib chiqadilar. BMT kuchlariga kelsak, 1-dengiz bo'limi jang boshlanganda 25473 kishidan iborat samarali kuchga ega edi,[1]:24, 37 va u Britaniya qirollik dengiz piyoda bo'linmasi tomonidan yanada mustahkamlandi 41 (mustaqil) qo'mondon va 3-chi va 7-chi armiya piyoda diviziyalaridan ikkita polkga teng.[1]:24 Jang paytida Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining kuchlari taxminan 30 ming kishidan iborat edi.[1]:24 Xosindagi BMT kuchlari, shuningdek, Koreya urushi paytida havo kuchlarining eng katta kontsentratsiyasidan biri tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi,[1]:250 beri 1-dengiz samolyotlari qanoti joylashgan Yonpo aerodromi va AQSh dengiz kuchlarining beshta samolyot tashuvchisi Ishchi guruh 77 230 ni ishga tushirishga muvaffaq bo'ldi navbatlar har kuni ta'minlash uchun yaqin havo qo'llab-quvvatlashi jang paytida,[1]:250 AQSh havo kuchlari esa Uzoq Sharqdagi jangovar yuklarni boshqarish qo'mondonligi Yaponiyada tuzoqqa tushib qolgan BMT kuchlarini to'ldirish uchun kuniga 250 tonna mahsulot etkazib berish imkoniyatiga ega bo'ldi.[1]:182

Garchi 9-armiya sobiq faxriylardan tashkil topgan Xitoyning elita tuzilmalaridan biri bo'lgan Asirlar dan Huayxay kampaniyasi,[9]:52 jang paytida uning qobiliyatiga bir nechta kamchiliklar xalaqit berdi. Dastlab 9-armiya jihozlangan bo'lishi kerak edi Manchuriya Noyabr oyi davomida, lekin Mao to'satdan buni amalga oshirishdan oldin Koreyaga buyurdi.[19] Natijada, 9-armiyada qattiq Koreya qishlari uchun deyarli qishki kiyim yo'q edi.[20] Xuddi shunday, kambag'al logistika 9-armiyani og'ir artilleriyadan voz kechishga majbur qildi,[2][1]:36 ozgina oziq-ovqat va o'q-dorilar bilan ishlash paytida.[20] Oziq-ovqat tanqisligi 9-armiyani dastlab kuchining uchdan bir qismini zaxiradagi Chosin suv omboridan uzoqda turishga majbur qildi,[21] xitoylik birliklar orasida ochlik va ta'sirlanish boshlandi, chunki aholi kam bo'lgan hududda ovqatlanish mumkin emas edi.[20] Jang oxiriga kelib, jangovar va havo hujumlaridan ko'ra ko'proq Xitoy qo'shinlari sovuqdan vafot etdi.[22]

Xitoy kuchi odatda 120 mingga baholanadi[3] jang uchun qo'shinlar,[23] chunki 9-armiya 12 ta diviziyadan iborat bo'lib, bir divizionga 10000 kishidan iborat.[24] Koreyaga kelishdan oldin 9-armiya ham kuchaytirildi. Uning uchta korpusining har birida endi odatdagi uchtasi o'rniga to'rtta bo'linma mavjud edi. Ilgari ikkitadan piyoda qo'shin ozod qilingan (taslim bo'ldi) Millatchilik bo'linishlari singib ketdi[25] har bir piyoda qo'shinlarini kuchga keltirish. Ba'zi kompaniyalarda taxminan 150 kishi bor edi,[26] ammo boshqa kompaniyalar 200 dan ortiq odam bilan mustahkamlandi.[27] Biroq, BMTning havo reydlari, moddiy-texnik ta'minotning yomonligi va sovuq ob-havo tufayli eskirganligi, 9-armiyani jang maydoniga etib borishga urinishida ham katta zarar ko'rdi. Masalan, 9-armiya Koreyaga kirib kelgan kuni, sovuq 700 kishining hayotiga zomin bo'lgan, uning transport vositalarining aksariyati BMTning havo hujumi natijasida yo'q qilingan.[2] Darhaqiqat, jang paytida xitoylik harbiy asirlar 9-armiyaning ko'pgina diviziyalari kuchga kirganligi haqida xabar berishdi, ular bir diviziyada 6500-7000 kishidan iborat edi.[1]:17 Ushbu omillar, shuningdek, g'arbiy manbalarda Xitoyning urush tartibi bo'yicha noaniqliklar,[g] Shuningdek, ba'zi tarixchilar jang paytida Xitoy kuchini 60 mingga qadar qayta ko'rib chiqishga majbur qilishgan.[1]:24

Oxir-oqibat, 9-armiyaning barcha 12 ta Xitoy bo'linmalari joylashtirildi, ammo 78-chi va 88-bo'lim PVA ning 26-korpus jang paytida BMT kuchlari bilan aloqa o'rnatmagan.[1]:353 PVA sakkizta bo'linmasi 20 va 27-korpus asosiy hujum kuchi sifatida xizmat qilgan.[18] Dastlab PVA 26-korpusining to'rtta bo'linmasi zaxirada ushlab turilgan va 20 va 27 korpuslaridan so'ng barcha kuchlarini sarflagan.[28]

Jang

Three Asian man standing in a snowy field
Song Shilun (o'rtada), Chosin suv omboridagi Xalq ko'ngilli armiyasining 9-armiyasi qo'mondoni

27-noyabrga o'tar kechasi PVA 9-armiyaning 20-chi va 27-chi korpusi Chosin suv ombori va Kot'o-ri o'rtasidagi yo'l bo'ylab ko'plab hujumlar va pistirmalar uyushtirdi. Yudam-ni-da 5, 7 va 11 dengiz piyodalari PVA tomonidan o'ralgan va hujumga uchragan 79-chi va 89-bo'lim, bilan 59-divizion aloqani uzish uchun Yudam-ni va Xagaru-ri o'rtasidagi yo'lga hujum qilmoqda. Xuddi shunday, RCT-31 izolyatsiya qilingan va PVA tomonidan Sinxung-ni pistirmada bo'lgan 80-chi va 81-bo'lim. Xagaru-rida 1-dengiz piyoda bo'linmasi qo'mondonligi shtab-kvartirasi PVA tomonidan nishonga olingan 58-divizion. Va nihoyat, PVA 60-divizion shimoldan Kot'o-ri atrofidagi 1-dengiz piyodalari bilan o'ralgan elementlar.[9]:52 To'liq ajablanib, BMT kuchlari 28-noyabrga qadar Yudam-ni, Sinxung-ni, Xagaru-ri va Kot'o-ri bilan aloqani uzdilar.[1]:72

Yudam-ni-dagi harakatlar

A group of soldiers climbing up a snow-covered hill
Xitoy 79-diviziyasining askarlari Yudam-ni dengiz piyodalarini jalb qilish uchun harakat qilmoqdalar
Xitoylar AQSh / AQSh pozitsiyasida oldinga siljiydi. "Ommabop e'tiqoddan farqli o'laroq, xitoyliklar bunga hujum qilmadi "inson to'lqinlari", ammo 50 dan 100 kishigacha bo'lgan ixcham jangovar guruhlarda "[29]

Almondning ko'rsatmasi asosida harakat qilgan Smit 5-dengiz piyodalariga 27-noyabr kuni g'arbiy Mupyong-ni tomon hujum qilishni buyurdi.[1]:52 Hujum ko'p o'tmay PVA 89-diviziyasi tomonidan to'xtatildi va dengiz piyodalarini Yudam-ni atrofidagi tizmalarda qazishga majbur qildi.[5]:301[1]:56 Kech kirishi bilan 79-diviziyaning uchta xitoy polklari bir zarbada garnizonni yo'q qilishga umid qilib, Yudam-ni shimoliy va shimoli-g'arbiy qismidagi tizmalarga hujum qilishdi.[9]:68 Tez orada hujumchilar dengiz pozitsiyalariga kirib borishi bilan yaqin masofadagi janglar rivojlandi,[1]:64–8 ammo 5 va 7 dengiz piyoda askarlari xitoyliklarga katta talafot etkazayotganda safni ushlab turishdi.[9]:68–71[1]:74 28-noyabr kuni kun boshlanganda xitoyliklar va amerikaliklar Yudam-ni perimetri atrofida tang ahvolga tushib qolishdi.[9]:71

Urush Yudam-ni-da davom etayotganida, PVA 59-diviziyasi 7-dengiz piyodalarining himoyalanayotgan Charli va Fox kompaniyalariga hujum qilib, Yudam-ni va Xagaru-ri o'rtasidagi yo'lni to'sib qo'ydi.[1]:227 Muvaffaqiyatli hujum Charlie kompaniyasini Yudam-ni ichiga chekinishga majbur qildi, bu kapitan tomonidan boshqariladigan Fox Company-ni tark etdi Uilyam E. Barber yo'lni boshqaradigan hayotiy o'tish yo'li bo'lgan To'qtong dovoniga qaragan tepalikda izolyatsiya qilingan.[1]:73 29-noyabrda, 7-dengiz piyodalari tomonidan qilingan bir necha harakatlar, xitoyliklarga katta yo'qotishlarga qaramay, Fox kompaniyasini qutqara olmadi.[1]:178 Xagaru-ri va Dengiz piyodalaridan artilleriya yordam berdi Corsair jangchilari, Fox Company PVA 59-diviziyasining doimiy hujumlariga dosh berib, besh kunni ushlab turishga muvaffaq bo'ldi.[1]:226

Yudam-ni shahridagi PVA 79-diviziyasi tomonidan katta yo'qotishlarga uchraganidan so'ng, 9-armiya shtab-kvartirasi 1-dengiz bo'linmasining asosiy qismi Yudam-ni-da joylashganligini angladilar, garnizon kuchi dastlabki taxmindan ikki baravar ko'p edi.[5]:329 Har qanday boshqa hujumlar befoyda bo'lishiga ishongan Song Shilun 9-armiyaga asosiy hujumlarini Sinxung-ni va Xagaru-ri tomon yo'naltirishni buyurdi,[5]:329 28-30 noyabr kunlari Yudam-ni yolg'iz qoldirish.[1]:213 Shu bilan birga, AQShning Koreyaning g'arbiy jabhasidagi sakkizinchi armiyasi to'liq chekinishga majbur bo'ldi Chongchon daryosidagi jang va Makartur Almondga AQSh X korpusini Hungnam portiga olib chiqishni buyurdi.[1]:120–1 Podpolkovnik Almond va Smitning ko'rsatmalariga binoan harakat qilish Raymond L. Murray va polkovnik Gomer L. Litzenberg, mos ravishda 5 va 7 dengiz piyoda qo'mondonlari 30 noyabrda Yudam-ni-dan Xagaru-riga chiqish to'g'risida qo'shma buyruq chiqardi.[1]:215 Blokirovka qilinayotgan Xitoy bo'linmalari va chekinayotgan dengiz piyoda askarlari o'rtasidagi qattiq kurashga duch kelgan Smit: "Chekining, jahannam! Biz orqaga chekinmayapmiz, shunchaki boshqa yo'nalishda harakat qilamiz" dedi.[30]

Buzilish uchun dengiz piyoda askarlari konvoyga aylandi M4A3 Sherman tanki etakchi sifatida. Reja bo'lishi kerak edi 3-batalyon, 5-dengiz piyodalari (3/5) uchta batalyon bilan orqa tomonni qoplagan holda kolonna avangardi sifatida. Xuddi shu paytni o'zida, 1-batalyon, 7-dengiz piyodalari (1/7) To'xtong dovonida yo'lni ochish uchun Fox Company tomon hujum qilar edi.[1]:215–6 Buzilishni boshlash uchun, 3-batalyon, 7-dengiz piyodalari (3/7) Xitoyning hujumlaridan yo'lni qoplash uchun avval janubga hujum qilib, 1542 va 1419-tepaliklarni egallashi kerak edi.[1]:218 Sinov 1-dengiz havo qanotining havo qopqog'i ostida amalga oshirildi.[1]:214

A line of soldiers on a hill engaged in a battle
Xitoyliklarni jalb qiladigan dengiz piyodalari

1-dekabr kuni ertalab 3/7 dengiz piyodalari 1542-tepalikdagi 59-diviziyaning PVA 175-polkini jalb qilishdi (40 ° 26′06 ″ N. 127 ° 06′25 ″ E / 40.435 ° N 127.107 ° E / 40.435; 127.107) va 1419 (40 ° 25′41 ″ N. 127 ° 08′06 ″ E / 40.428 ° N 127.135 ° E / 40.428; 127.135). Tez orada xitoylik himoyachilar dengiz piyodalarini yo'l va cho'qqilar orasidagi qiyaliklarda qazishga majbur qilishdi[1]:220 tushdan keyin konvoy 3/7 pozitsiyasidan o'tganida.[1]:218 Hagaru-ri hanuzgacha qo'lga olinmaganligi sababli, PVA Oliy qo'mondonligi 79-diviziyani Yudam-ni-ga qarshi hujumlarni davom ettirishga urinib ko'rdi, 89-diviziya janubga Kot'o-ri tomon yugurdi.[9]:88 Xitoyliklar tunda zarba berishdi va janglarning shafqatsizligi orqa qoplama kuchlarini chaqirishga majbur qildi tungi jangchilar hujumlarni bostirish uchun.[1]:223 Janglar 2-dekabr kuni ertalabgacha barcha dengiz piyodalari Yudam-ni tark etishga ulgurmaguncha davom etdi.[1]:223

Shu bilan birga, 1/7 dengiz piyoda askarlari 1-dekabr kuni 1419-tepalikdagi Xitoy blokadasini buzishga harakat qilishdi. Jangovarlik, ochlik va muzlash tufayli juda ozayganiga qaramay, PVA 59-diviziyasi so'nggi beshta vzvodini yubordi va taslim bo'lishni rad etdi.[9]:86 Kechga yaqinlashganda, 1/7 nihoyat cho'qqini egallab oldi va yo'lning sharqiy qismida tepaliklar bo'ylab yurishni boshladi.[1]:233 Ajablanish elementiga tayanib, ular yo'l bo'ylab bir nechta xitoylik pozitsiyalarni yo'q qilishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi.[1]:234 2-dekabr kuni ertalab Fox Company va 1/7 qo'shma hujumi To'qtong dovoni xavfsizligini ta'minladi va shu tariqa Yudam-ni va Xagaru-ri o'rtasida yo'l ochildi.[1]:235

Yudam-ni va Xagaru-ri o'rtasida yo'l ochilgan bo'lsa-da, konvoy hali ham yo'lga qaragan tepaliklarda ko'plab xitoylik pozitsiyalar orqali kurashishga majbur bo'ldi. Chekinishning birinchi kechasida xitoyliklar kolonnani kuch bilan urib, dengiz piyodalarining 3/5 qismiga katta talofatlar etkazishdi.[1]:221–3 Garchi kuchli havo qoplamasi yurish davomida Xitoy kuchlarining aksariyatini bostirgan bo'lsa-da, sovuq ob-havo, olovni ta'qib qilish, partiyalarni bosib olish va yo'l to'siqlari chekinishni sekinlashtirdi, shu bilan birga ko'plab talofatlar keltirdi.[1]:224–5 Ushbu qiyinchiliklarga qaramay, kolonna Xagaru-riga tartibli ravishda 3-dekabr kuni tushdan keyin etib keldi, 4-dekabr kuni olib chiqib ketish ishlari yakunlandi.[1]:239–43

Suv omboridan sharqda

Asosiy maqola: Ishchi guruhning ishonchi
Harbiy kiyimdagi jigarrang sochli Kavkaz odam
Podpolkovnik Don Karlos Feyt, kichik RCT-31, keyinchalik uning rahbarligi tufayli "Tezkor guruhning ishonchi" nomi bilan tanilgan.

RCT-31, keyinchalik "Tezkor guruhning ishonchi" nomi bilan tanilgan, 7-piyoda diviziyasining shoshilinch ravishda tuzilgan polk jangovar jamoasi bo'lib, dengiz piyodalarining Mupyong-ni tomon o'ng tomonini himoya qilgan. Jang oldidan RCT-31 yupqa yoyilgan bo'lib, uning asosiy elementlari Sinxun-ni shimolidagi tepaliklarda, Sinxun-ni g'arbidagi Pyungnyuri kirish qismida va Xudon-ni shaharchasida ajratilgan (40 ° 26′N 127 ° 17′E / 40.43 ° N 127.28 ° E / 40.43; 127.28) Sinxun-ni janubida.[1]:85 Garchi xitoyliklar RCT-31ni kuchaytirilgan deb hisoblashgan polk,[5]:329 ishchi guruhi aslida kuchsiz edi batalyon bedarak yo'qolgan, 7-piyoda diviziyasining asosiy qismi Koreyaning shimoli-sharqiga tarqalib ketganligi sababli.[1]:85

27-noyabrga o'tar kechasi 80-diviziyaning uchta polki shimoliy tepaliklarga hujum qildi (40 ° 29′20 ″ N 127 ° 15′32 ″ E / 40.489 ° N 127.259 ° E / 40.489; 127.259) va kirish joyi,[9]:53–4 himoyachilarni butunlay ajablantirmoqda.[1]:89 Keyingi jang 1-batalyonga katta talafot etkazdi, 32-piyoda askar Sinhung-ni shimolida,[1]:93 57-dala artilleriya batalyoni va 3-batalyon esa 31-piyoda askarlar, Pyungnyuri kirish qismida deyarli to'lib toshgan.[1]:97 Shuningdek, xitoyliklar 81-diviziyaning 242-polkini 1221-tepalik tomon jo'natdilar (40 ° 26′56 ″ N. 127 ° 16′05 ″ E / 40.449 ° N 127.268 ° E / 40.449; 127.268),[9]:55 Sinxun-ni va Xudon-ni o'rtasidagi yo'lni boshqaradigan himoyalanmagan tepalik.[1]:98 Kecha janglari tugashi bilan RCT-31 uchta elementga bo'lindi.[5]:310

Himoyachilar kirish joyida butunlay yo'q qilinganiga ishongan xitoyliklar hujumlarini to'xtatib, AQSh pozitsiyalarini oziq-ovqat va kiyim-kechak uchun talon-taroj qilishga kirishdilar.[9]:58 28-noyabr kuni ertalab kelganida, 3/31-chi piyoda askarlar PVA 239-polkiga kirish joyida qarshi hujum qilishdi va hayratga tushgan xitoyliklarni to'liq yo'l bilan qaytarib yuborishdi.[9]:58[1]:96 Kunning ikkinchi yarmida Almond RCT-31 ning shimolga hujumini boshlashga va Xitoy kuchlarining yo'lida bo'lgan har qanday "qoldiqlari" bilan kurashishga etarlicha kuchli ekanligiga ishonch hosil qilib, RCT-31 ning Sinxung-ni perimetriga uchib ketdi. Almond RCT-31 qo'mondoni polkovnik Allan D. Maklinga shimolga hujumni davom ettirishni davom ettirishni buyurdi. Kumush yulduzlar Macleanning uch zobitiga. Jirkanchlik bilan podpolkovnik Don C. Faith, Jr., 1/32 piyoda askarlari qo'mondoni medalini qorga tashladi.[1]:102–3

Soldiers charging into thick smoke
Xitoy qo'shinlari Sinhung-ni-dagi Faoliyat guruhining pozitsiyasiga hujum qilmoqda.

28-noyabrga o'tar kechasi PVA 80-diviziya yana to'rtta polk bilan hujum qildi.[9]:59 Kirish joyida aloqa buzilganligi sababli xitoyliklarning hujumi falokatga aylandi, shu bilan birga olov yoqib yuborildi M16 va M19 57-dala artilleriya batalyoniga biriktirilgan zenit (AA) qurollari Xitoy saflarini supurib tashladi.[9]:59–60[1]:107[h] Jangdan so'ng, PVA 238 va 239-polk birgalikda 600 dan kam askarga ega edi.[9]:61 Boshqa tomondan, PVA 240-polkining hujumlari Maklenni shimoliy tepaliklardan Sinxun-ni tomon chekinishga buyruq berishga majbur qildi.[1]:110 29-noyabr kuni 1-batalyon xitoylar blokadasini yorib o'tib, Sinxun-ni atrofiga etib bordi, ammo Maklin ba'zi xitoylik askarlarni amerikalik deb adashtirganda adashib qoldi.[1]:114[men] Xitoyliklar 29-noyabrga o'tar kechasi yangi kuchlarni kutib, hujumlarini to'xtatishdi.[9]:62

RCT-31 qamalda bo'lganida, Almond nihoyat 1-dengiz bo'linmasiga RCT-31ni Yudam-ni orqali qutqarishni buyurdi, bu Smitning amalga oshirishi mumkin bo'lmagan buyrug'i.[1]:183 Faqat 31-tank kompaniyasi Hudong-ni shahridan 1221-tepalikka hujum qilib, RCT-31ni qutqarishga urindi,[1]:103 ammo piyodalar qo'llab-quvvatlamasdan, 28 va 29-noyabr kunlari bo'lib o'tgan ikkita zirhli hujumlar sirpanchiq yo'llar, qo'pol erlar va piyodalarga yaqin hujumlar tufayli to'xtab qoldi.[1]:103–5, 118–9 30-noyabrga kelib, AQSh kuchlari Xagaru-rini himoya qilish uchun Xudon-ni evakuatsiya qilishdi va RCT-31ning qolgan qismi butunlay qolishdi.[1]:126

30-noyabr kuni general-mayor Devid G. Barr, 7-piyoda diviziyasi qo'mondoni Sinxun-ni ichiga uchib ketdi va shu kunga qadar RCT-31 qo'mondonligini olgan imon bilan uchrashdi. Imon buzilish uchun qiyinchiliklarni, xususan RCT-31 olib kelishi kerak bo'lgan 500 yaradorni ifoda etdi.[1]:124 Xuddi shu kuni PVA qismlari 94-divizion[j] va 81-divizionning qolgan qismi[31]80-divizionga qo'shimcha sifatida kelgan.[9]:62 Yarim tunga qadar, olti[32] Xitoy polklari hujumlarini yangiladilar va 80-diviziya qo'mondoni Chjan Danan RCT-31ni tong otguncha to'liq yo'q qilishni buyurdi.[9]:63 Shunga qaramay, 57-batalyonning AA qurollari xitoyliklarni ushlab turdi,[1]:129–30 ammo qobiq zaxiralari juda past edi.[1]:134 1 dekabr kuni, imon nihoyat RCT-31 ni Sinxung-ni tark etib, Xagaru-riga ketishni buyurdi.[1]:134

Soldiers watch a hill in front of them as aircraft drop bombs on it
Dengiz piyodalari soatlari F4U korsalari Xitoyda Koreyadagi pozitsiyalariga napalm tushirish (1950)

Havo 1-Dengiz samolyotlari qanotiga 1-dekabr kuni havo qopqog'ini etkazib berishga imkon berishi bilanoq buzilish boshlandi.[1]:132–5 Askarlar konvoy tuzib, Sudong-ni perimetridan chiqib ketmoqchi bo'lganlarida, PVA 241 polk darhol Amerika kuchlari ustidan to'ntarildi,[1]:137 yopilgan yana uchta polk bilan.[9]:64 Boshqa ilojsiz qoldirilgan samolyot qulab tushdi napalm RCT-31 oldida, Xitoy va AQSh qo'shinlari orasida talafotlarga sabab bo'ldi.[1]:137–138 Olingan yong'in bo'roni to'sib qo'ygan Xitoy kompaniyasini yo'q qildi,[9]:64 kolonnaning oldinga yurishiga imkon berish.[1]:138 RCT-31 old tomoni oldinga qarab borar ekan, og'ir qurollardan o'q otilishi, orqa qo'riqchilarning ko'pchiligini yuk mashinalarini himoya qilish o'rniga yo'l ostidan boshpana izlashga majbur qildi.[1]:138 Xitoy yong'inida yuk mashinalarida bo'lganlar ham, haydovchilar ham bu ishni o'z joniga qasd qilishning bir turi deb bilganlar uchun o'ldirilgan yoki yaralangan.[1]:139 Sekin-asta avtoulov tushdan keyin 1221-tepalik ostidagi yo'l to'sig'iga yaqinlashdi.[1]:140 Bir nechta partiyalar 1221-chi tepalikni tozalashga urinishdi, ammo tepalikning bir qismini egallab olgandan so'ng, etakchisiz askarlar ustunga qaytish o'rniga muzlatilgan suv omborida davom etishdi.[1]:144 Imon yo'l to'sig'iga hujum qilib, uni xitoy granatasi urdi va keyinchalik olgan jarohati tufayli vafot etdi.[1]:146 Karvon birinchi to'siqdan o'tib ketishga muvaffaq bo'ldi, ammo Xudon-ni ikkinchisiga etib borganida, RCT-31 Xitoy hujumlari ostida parchalanib ketdi.[1]:150 Dastlabki 2500 askarning taxminan 1050 nafari Xagaru-riga etib bordi va omon qolgan 385 kishi mehnatga layoqatli deb topildi.[8]:339 RCT-31 qoldiqlari qolgan jang davomida vaqtinchalik armiya bataloniga aylantirildi.[1]:249

Xagaru-ridagi harakatlar

A group of tents surrounded by grass
A Havoni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri qo'llab-quvvatlash markazi Xagaru-rida.

Mupyong-ni tomon dengiz hujumini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun Xagaru-ri qurilayotgan aerodrom bilan ta'minotning muhim joyiga aylandi. Smit va 1-dengiz bo'linmasi shtab-kvartirasi ham Xagaru-rida joylashgan edi.[1]:72 Yudam-ni-da to'plangan 1-dengiz bo'linmasining asosiy qismi bilan Xagaru-ri 1-chi va 7-dengiz piyodalaridan ikkita batalon tomonidan engil himoya qilindi, qolgan garnizon armiya va dengiz piyodalari muhandislari va orqa qo'llab-quvvatlash qismlaridan iborat edi. Korpus.[8]:322

Xitoyning dastlabki rejasida 58-diviziya 27-noyabrga o'tar kechasi Xagaru-riga hujum qilishi kerak edi, ammo bo'linma ishlatilgan eskirgan yapon xaritalari tufayli qishloq joylarida yo'qolib qoldi.[9]:74 Faqat 28-noyabr tongida 58-divizion Xagaru-riga etib keldi.[9]:74 Shu orada, o'tgan kecha sodir bo'lgan janglar va pistirmalardan Xagaru-ridagi garnizon atrofdagi xitoylik kuchlarni payqadi. Podpolkovnik Tomas L. Ridj, qo'mondoni 3-batalyon, 1-dengiz piyodalari (3/1), Xitoy hujumi 28 noyabrga o'tar kechasi sodir bo'lishini bashorat qilgan.[1]:162 Ish kuchining etishmasligi sababli deyarli har bir kishi, shu jumladan jangovar tayyorgarligi kam bo'lgan orqa qismlar, oldingi chiziqda xizmatga majbur bo'ldilar,[1]:174 soat 21:30 ga qadar butun perimetr to'liq shay holatga keltirildi.[1]:163

Ko'p o'tmay, PVA 173-polk g'arbiy va janubiy perimetrga hujum qildi, 172-polk esa shimoliy perimetrdagi tepaliklarga zarba berdi.[5]:317 Tayyorgarlikka qaramay, kuchsiz garnizonni bosib olishdi, xitoylar mudofaada bir nechta bo'shliqlarni ochib, orqa tomonlarga etib borishdi.[1]:165 Natijada yuzaga kelgan tartibsizlik Xitoy askarlari o'rtasida intizomning buzilishiga olib keldi, ular vaziyatdan foydalanish o'rniga oziq-ovqat va kiyim-kechaklarni talon-taroj qilishni boshladilar.[8]:324 Himoyalanayotgan amerikaliklar Xitoy hujumlarini qarshi hujumlarda yo'q qilishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi, xitoy polklari o'rtasidagi aloqa buzilishi esa bo'shliqlarni yopishga imkon berdi.[1]:174 Urush to'xtaganda, xitoylar faqat Sharqiy tepalikka ega bo'lishdi (40 ° 23′13 ″ N 127 ° 15′32 ″ E / 40.387 ° N 127.259 ° E / 40.387; 127.259) shimoliy perimetrda.[1]:174 29-noyabrga o'tar kechasi yana bir hujum rejalashtirilgan edi, ammo havo hujumlari VMF-542 amalga oshirilishidan oldin xitoy formasiyalarini buzib tashladi.[1]:195

A wounded man is carried by soldiers onto a helicopter
Yarador dengiz piyodalari evakuatsiya qilinmoqda HO3S-1 vertolyot VMO-6

Xagaru-ridagi ishchi kuchi tanqisligini hisobga olib, 29-noyabr kuni Smit polkovnikka buyruq berdi Lyuis "Chesty" Puller ning Birinchi dengiz polki Xagaru-rining janubidagi yo'lni ochish uchun Kot'o-ridan shimolga yuboriladigan tezkor guruhni yig'ish.[1]:186[33] 921 qo'shin bilan maxsus guruh tuzildi 41 qirol dengiz piyoda qo'mondoni, 1-dengiz piyodalarining G kompaniyasi va 31-piyoda askarlarning B kompaniyasi.[1]:187[34] Uning komandiri, podpolkovnik Duglas B. Drisdeyl nomi bilan, shuningdek 41 ta qo'mondonlikni boshqarganidan so'ng, "Drysdale ishchi guruhi" deb nomlangan.[1]:187 29-noyabr kuni tushdan keyin Drysdale tezkor guruhi PVA 60-diviziyasining doimiy hujumi ostida Koto-ridan shimolga surildi.[9]:78[1]:189 Keyinchalik, tezkor guruhning jirkanch tajribasi yo'lga "Jahannam otash vodiysi" laqabini oldi.[1]:193 Xitoy hujumlari davom etar ekan, ishchi guruh tartibsiz bo'lib qoldi,[1]:191 va kolonnada vayron qilingan yuk mashinasi keyinchalik tezkor guruhni ikki segmentga ajratdi.[1]:192 Garchi etakchi segment 29 noyabrga o'tar kechasi Xagaru-riga kirib borgan bo'lsa-da, orqa qism yo'q qilindi.[8]:327 162 kishi halok bo'lgan va bedarak yo'qolgan va 159 kishi yaralanganiga qaramay, tezkor guruh Xagaru-rida mudofaa uchun juda zarur bo'lgan 300 piyoda askarni olib kelishga muvaffaq bo'ldi.[34][1]:201

Xudon-ni 30-noyabr kuni qo'shimcha kuchlar kelganida,[1]:204 garnizonlar Sharqiy tepalikni qaytarib olishga urinishdi. Xitoy kompaniyasi yo'q qilinishiga qaramay, barcha harakatlar muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi.[9]:80[1]:203 Qorong'i tushganda, PVA 58-diviziyasi Xagaru-rini qo'lga kiritishga urinishda qolgan 1500 askarini yig'di.[9]:81 Kuchli himoyachilar hujum kuchlarining aksariyatini yo'q qildilar, faqat Sharqiy Tepalik atrofidagi himoyalar yo'l berdi.[1]:205 Xitoyliklar Sharqiy tepalikdan oldinga o'tmoqchi bo'lganlarida, ularni 31-tank kompaniyasi kesib tashladi.[1]:206

1 dekabrga qadar PVA 58-bo'lim deyarli yo'q qilindi,[5]:340 qolgan qismi 9-armiyaning 26-korpusidan qo'shimcha kuchlarni kutish bilan.[9]:97[1]:251 Song Shilunning hafsalasi pir bo'lganligi sababli, 26-korpus dengiz piyodalari Yudam-ni chiqishidan oldin kelmagan.[4] 1-dekabr kuni aerodrom transport harakati uchun ochildi, bu BMT kuchlariga qo'shimcha kuchlarni jalb qilish va o'lganlar va yaradorlarni evakuatsiya qilishga imkon berdi.[1]:208 Yudam-ni dengiz piyoda askarlari 4 dekabrda chiqib ketishni tugatgandan so'ng, tuzoqqa tushib qolgan BMT kuchlari Xungnam portiga qarab chiqib ketishni boshlashlari mumkin edi.

Qutilib chiqishga urinmoq; tarqamoq

A map showing the withdrawal of a military force south along a river
Changjin (Chosin) suv omboridan chekinish xaritasi

Qisqa dam olishdan so'ng, tanaffus 6-dekabrda boshlanib, 7-dengiz piyoda askarlari chekinish ustunining avangardi bo'lib, 5-dengiz piyoda askarlari orqa tomonni qopladilar.[1]:247 Shu bilan birga, juda kechiktirilgan PVA 26-korpusi Xagaru-riga uning o'zi bilan keldi 76-chi va 77-bo'lim 58-chi va 60-chi divizionlarni engillashtirish uchun.[5]:379 7-dengiz piyodalari Xagaru-rining janubidagi PVA 76-diviziyasini chetga surib qo'yganida, 5-dengiz piyodalari Xagaru-ri perimetrini egallab olishdi va Sharqiy tepalikni 76-bo'limdan qaytarib olishdi.[5]:382[1]:260 Buzilishni to'xtatish uchun so'nggi harakatlarda,[5]:382 Xitoyning odatiy tungi hujumi boshlandi, 76 va 77-diviziya Xagaru-ri perimetrini har tomondan urib yubordi.[9]:97 Dengiz piyoda askarlari katta talofatlarga olib kelgan hujumlarni qaytarishdi.[1]:262

Ayni paytda, 7-dengiz piyodalari Xagaru-ri va Koto-ri o'rtasida yo'lni o'rab turgan baland joyni egallab olish yo'li bilan yo'l ochdilar. Ammo dengiz piyodalari chiqib ketishi bilanoq, 77-diviziya cho'qqilarga qaytdi va kolonnaga hujum qildi.[5]:382–3[1]:257 Xaotik janglar boshlanib, chekinish sekinlashdi.[1]:257–9 Dengiz piyoda jangchilari, ammo Xitoy kuchlarini bo'ysundirish uchun qaytib kelishdi,[1]:257 va to'sib qo'yadigan qo'shinlarning ko'pi yo'q qilindi.[5]:383 On 7 December, the rest of the column managed to reach Kot'o-ri with little difficulty, with the last elements reaching Kot'o-ri that night.[8]:361

After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA High Command ordered the 26th and 27th Corps to chase the escaping UN force, with the 20th Corps assigned to block the escape route.[5]:383[9]:103 But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Kot'o-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions.[5]:341 In desperation, Song Shilun ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass, while blowing up the vital treadway bridge (40 ° 13′55 ″ N 127°17′46″E / 40.232°N 127.296°E / 40.232; 127.296), hoping the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces.[4][5]:341 The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 (40°13′59″N 127°19′34″E / 40.233°N 127.326°E / 40.233; 127.326) blew up the original concrete bridge and two improvised replacements in succession, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable.[10]:137[1]:288–96 Bunga javoban 1-batalyon, 1-dengiz piyodalari (1/1) attacked Hill 1081 from the south, and the hill was captured on 9 December, though the defenders fought to the last man.[1]:300–1 At the same time, the 7th Marines and RCT-31 attacked the treadway bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders who were already frozen in their foxholes.[8]:364

A line of soldiers walking past a destroyed tank
A patrol from US 3rd Infantry Division's Task Force Dog moves into Funchilin Pass on 9 December

With the path to Hungnam blocked at Funchilin Pass, eight C-119 uchadigan vagonlar flown by the US 314th Troop Carrier Wing were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute.[1]:297[35] The bridge, consisting of eight separate 18 ft (5.5 m) long, 2,900 lb (1,300 kg) sections, was dropped one section at a time, using a 48 ft (15 m) parachute on each section.[1]:296 Four of these sections, together with additional wooden extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by Marine Corps combat engineers and the US Army 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company on 9 December, enabling UN forces to proceed.[1]:296–304 Outmaneuvered, the PVA 58th and 60th Divisions still tried to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two Chinese divisions combined had only 200 soldiers left.[9]:108 The last UN forces left Funchilin Pass by 11 December.[1]:314

One of the last engagements during the withdrawal was an ambush at Sudong (40°10′12″N 127°19′26″E / 40.17°N 127.324°E / 40.17; 127.324) by the pursuing PVA 89th Division,[9]:108 which Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty.[1]:307–10 The trapped UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 21:00 on 11 December.[1]:316

Evacuation at Hungnam

Asosiy maqola: Hungnam evacuation
A warship observes as a port explodes in the background
The yuqori tezlikda transport USSBegor observes the destruction of Hungnam's port facilities on 24 December.
The og'ir kreyser USSAziz Pol uni ishdan bo'shatadi 8 dyuym (203-mm) guns at Chinese troops threatening the evacuation.

By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, MacArthur had already ordered the evacuation of the US X Corps on 8 December in order to reinforce the US Eighth Army, which by then was badly depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38-parallel.[10]:158–9[1]:324 Following his orders, the ROK I Corps, the ROK 1st Marine Regiment and the US 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions had also set up defensive positions around the port.[1]:319–320 Some skirmishes broke out between the defending US 7-chi, 17-chi va 65-piyoda askarlari and the pursuing PVA 27th Corps,[1]:324–327 but against the strong naval gun fire support provided by US Navy Ishchi guruh 90, the badly mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter.[1]:324[5]:393–4

In what US historians called the "greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history",[1]:340 a 193-ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and roughly a third of the Korean refugees.[8]:367 Bittasi G'alaba kemasi, SSMeredith g'alaba, evacuated 14,000 refugees by herself, despite being designed to carry only 12 passengers. The last UN unit left at 14:36 on 24 December, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the Chinese.[1]:340 The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.[9]:113

Natijada

Zarar ko'rgan narsalar

The US X Corps and the ROK I Corps reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties: 4,385 US Marines, 3,163 US Army personnel, 2,812 South Koreans attached to American formations and 78 British Royal Marines.[1]:347 The 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the cold weather, adding up to a total of 17,833 casualties.[1]:345 Despite the losses, the US X Corps preserved much of its strength.[1]:356 About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan,[8]:367 and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. Commanding General Smith was credited for saving the US X Corps from destruction,[17]:430 while the 1st Marine Division, 41 Royal Marines Commando and RCT-31 were awarded the Prezident bo'limi ma'lumotnomasi for their tenacity during the battle.[36][37][38] Fourteen Marines, two other soldiers and one Navy pilot received the "Shuhrat" medali, and all of the UN troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname "The Chosin Few".[36][39] On 15 September 2010, the Veterans of the Korean War Chosin Reservoir Battle memorial was unveiled by the United States Marine Corps Commandant Umumiy Jeyms T. Konvey da Pendlton lageri.[40]

The PVA 9th Army suffered 19,202 combat casualties, and 28,954 non-combat casualties were attributed to the harsh Korean winter and lack of food. Total casualties thus amounted to 48,156 - about one third of its total strength.[4] Outside of official channels, the estimation of Chinese casualties has been described as high as 60,000 by Patrick C. Roe, the chairman of Chosin Few Historical Committee, citing the number of replacements requested by 9th Army in the aftermath of the battle.[5]:394 Regardless of the varying estimates, historian Yan Xue of PLA Milliy mudofaa universiteti noted that the 9th Army was put out of action for three months.[41] With the absence of 9th Army the Chinese order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions by December 31, 1950,[42] as opposed to the 30 infantry divisions present on November 16, 1950.[43]

"Shon-sharaf" operatsiyasi

The National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific where many of the UN war dead which were exchanged under Operation Glory are buried.

During the battle, UN dead were buried at temporary grave sites along the road. "Shon-sharaf" operatsiyasi took place from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 US soldiers were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner-of-war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.[44] After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the Tinch okeanining milliy yodgorlik qabristoni (the "Punchbowl Cemetery" in Honolulu, Hawaii). According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted from the Chinese and North Koreans during the operation, of which 858 proved to be correct.[45] The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns.[k] From 1990 to 1994, North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains, which possibly include 200 to 400 US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains.[46] From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the Chinese border between 1996 and 2006.[47][48]

Outcome assessment

Roy E. Appleman, the author of US Army official history South to Naktong, North to Yalu, writes that both sides could claim victory: the PVA 9th Army ultimately held the battlefield, while X Corps held off the PVA 9th Army in a series of battles that enabled it to withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit.[1]:355–6 Allan R. Millett qualifies a Chinese "geographic victory" that ejected X Corps from North Korea with the fact that the Chinese failed to achieve the objective of destroying the 1st Marine Division, adding that the campaign gave the UN confidence that it could withstand the superior numbers of the Chinese forces.[49] The official Chinese history, published by PLA Harbiy fan akademiyasi, states that despite the heavy casualties, the PVA 9th Army had earned its victory by successfully protecting the eastern flank of Chinese forces in Korea, while inflicting over 10,000 casualties to the UN forces.[50]

Eliot A. Koen writes that the retreat from Chosin was a UN victory which inflicted such heavy losses on the PVA 9th Army that it was put out of action until March 1951.[51] Paul M. Edwards, founder of the Center for the Study of the Korean War,[52] draws parallels between the battle at Chosin and the Dunkirkni evakuatsiya qilish. He writes that the retreat from Chosin following a "massive strategic victory" by the Chinese has been represented as "a moment of heroic history" for the UN forces.[53] Appleman, on the other hand, questioned the necessity of a sea-borne evacuation to preserve the UN forces, asserting that X Corps had the strength to break out of the Chinese encirclement at Hungnam at the end of the battle.[1]:371–2 Chinese historian Li Xiaobing acknowledges X Corps' successful withdrawal from North Korea, and writes that the Battle of Chosin "has become a part of Marine lore, but it was still a retreat, not a victory."[54] Bryus Cumings simply refers to the battle as a "terrible defeat" for the Americans.[55]

Patrick C. Roe, who served as an intelligence officer with the 7th Marine Regiment at Chosin,[56] asserts that X Corps directly allowed the Eighth Army to hold the south[l] and quoted MacArthur in corroborating his view.[m] Yu Bin, a historian and a former member of the Xitoy Xalq ozodlik armiyasi, states that while the destruction of Task Force Faith[n] was viewed as the single greatest Chinese victory of the war, ultimately the PVA 9th Army had become "a giant hospital" while failing to destroy the numerically inferior UN forces at Chosin as planned.[57] Chjan Renchu, whose 26th Corps was blamed for allowing the X Corps to escape,[4] had threatened suicide over the outcome, while Song Shilun offered to resign his post.[58]

The battle exacerbated inter-service hostility, the Marines blaming the US Army and its leadership for the failure.[59][60] The collapse of the army units fighting on the east of the reservoir was regarded as shameful, and for many years afterwards their role in the battle was largely ignored. Later studies concluded that Task Force MacLean/Faith had held off for five days a significantly larger force than previously thought and that their stand was a significant factor in the Marines' survival. This was eventually recognized in September 1999 when, for its actions at Chosin, Task Force Faith was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, an award that General Smith blocked when it was first proposed in 1952.[61][62]

The Marines evacuated from North Korea spent January and most of February 1951 rebuilding in the relatively secure South Korea, where they destroyed the well-respected but already weakened North Korean 10-bo'lim yilda qarshi partizan davomida operatsiyalar Second Battle of Wonju.[10]:227[63] The Marines returned to regular and heavy action on February 21 in Qotil operatsiyasi.[64]

Wider effect on the war

The battle ended the UN force's expectation of total victory, including the capture of North Korea and the reunification of the peninsula.[65] By the end of 1950, PVA/KPA forces had recaptured North Korea and pushed UN forces back south of the 38th parallel. Serious consideration was given to the evacuation of all US forces from the Korean peninsula and US military leaders made secret contingency plans to do so.[66] The disregard by Uzoq Sharq qo'mondonligi under MacArthur of the initial warnings and diplomatic hints by the PVA almost led the entire UN army to disaster at Ch'ongch'on River and Chosin Reservoir and only after the formation and stabilization of a coherent UN defensive line under Lieutenant General Metyu Ridgvey did the "period of headlong retreats from an attacking, unsuspected foe" cease.[65]

On the other hand, the battle affected the PVA in two ways, both of which had the result of helping the UN Command to secure its position in South Korea, while losing North Korea. First, according to historian Shu Guang Zhang, PVA commanders were persuaded by their victories at Chosin and Ch'ongch'on that they could "defeat American armed forces", and this led to "unrealistic expectations that the CPV [PVA] would work miracles."[67][17]:624–5 Second, the heavy casualties caused by sub-zero temperatures and combat, plus poor logistical support weakened the PVA's eight elite divisions of the 20th and 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two were forced to disband,[9]:114 With the absence of 12 out of 30 of Chinese divisions in Korea in early 1951, Roe says that the heavy Chinese losses at Chosin enabled the UN forces to maintain a foothold in Korea.[5]:412

Meros

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir is regarded by some historians as the most brutal in modern warfare by zo'ravonlik, casualty rate, weather conditions, and endurance.[68] Over the course of fourteen days, 17 Medals of Honor (Army and Navy) and 78 Service Cross Medals (Army and Navy) were awarded, the second most as of 2020 after the Bulge jangi (20MOHs / 83SCMs).[69][70]

Veterans of the battle are colloquially referred to as the "Chosin Few" and symbolized by the "Star of Koto-ri".[70]

Ismlar va yodgorliklar

Movies and documentaries

Shuningdek qarang

Izohlar

Izohlar

  1. ^ The 1st Marine Division reported 604 killed, 114 dead of wounds, 192 missing, 3,485 wounded and 7,338 non-battle casualties. However, US X Corps disputed the number by only recording 393 killed, 2,152 wounded and 76 missing for the 1st Marine Division. This number is calculated by inserting the 1st Marine Division's casualty data into the X Corps' total casualty report. Qarang Appleman 1990, pp. 345–347 va Montross & Canzona 1992, 381-382 betlar.
  2. ^ This number is the total number of replacements requested by the 9th Army to reconstitute itself, which includes units that were not involved the fighting. Qarang Roe 2000, p. 394.
  3. ^ "The difference between a very serious reverse and a total disaster was a near thing. The most crucial battle was in the northeast, at Chosin." Qarang Roe 2000, p. 411
  4. ^ In Chinese military nomenclature, the term "army" (军) means korpuslar, while the term "army group" (集团军) means armiya.
  5. ^ a b v The town of Sinhung-ni referred to in this article should not be confused with another identically named town located at south of Yudami-ni on the west side of Chosin Reservoir. Qarang Appleman 1990, pp. 30, 32, 221, 376.
  6. ^ The Chinese military did not have harbiy unvonlar 1950 yillar davomida.
  7. ^ "The third uncommitted division of the IX Army Group was the 90th, of the 27th Army. It may have been had in reserve somewhere in the Chosin area but never committed, or if elements of it were committed, they were never identified." See Appleman 1987, p. 353
  8. ^ RCT-31's anti-aircraft guns were from D Battery, 15th Antiaircraft Battalion, which was attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion during the entire battle. Qarang Appleman 1990, p. 82.
  9. ^ Maclean's final fate is disputed between Chinese and US sources. Although both sides agreed that Maclean was shot numerous times while running towards the Chinese soldiers, Chinese sources claim that Maclean was shot dead on the spot, while UN POWs stated that Maclean later died from his wounds while being moved to a Chinese POW camp. Qarang Guang 2007, p. 60 and Appleman 1990, p. 114.
  10. ^ Misidentified as the 90th Division by UN intelligence. Qarang Guang 2007, p. 118.
  11. ^ 176 were identified and of the remaining 10 cases, four were non-Americans of Asiatic descent; one was British; three were identified and two cases unconfirmed. Qarang "DPMO White Paper, Punch Bowl 239". Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense. Retrieved 2009-08-27.
  12. ^ "Loss of the 1st Marine Division would have resulted in the loss of a substantial portion of X Corps. Instead, X Corps was withdrawn intact, while inflicting such damage upon the twelve divisions of the 9th Army that they were out of action until the last days of March. With the reinforcement by X Corps, and with the absence of nearly 40% of total Chinese strength, the Eighth Army was able to hold the south." Qarang Roe 2000, pp. 411–2
  13. ^ "General MacArthur agreed that this was the decisive battle. In commenting on a study by the Marine Corps Board, he wrote: "The Marine Corps Board of Study rightfully points out that the campaign of the 1st Marine Division with attached Army elements in North Korea was 'largely responsible for preventing reinforcement of CCF forces on Eighth Army front by 12 divisions during a period when such reinforcement might have meant to Eighth Army the difference between maintaining a foothold in Korea or forced evacuation therefrom.'...""See Roe 2000, p. 412
  14. ^ Yu Bin states that it was the 32nd Regiment of the 7th Infantry Division that was destroyed, reflecting the Chinese mis-identification of the composition of Task Force Faith.[5]:329

Iqtiboslar

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  54. ^ Xiaobing Li (2014), China's Battle for Korea: The 1951 Spring Offensive,, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, p. 52
  55. ^ Cumings p. 280
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Adabiyotlar

  • Alexander, Bevin R. (1986), Koreya: Biz yo'qotgan birinchi urush, New York, New York: Hippocrene Books, ISBN  978-0-87052-135-5
  • Appleman, Roy (1989), Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur, 11, College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Military History Series, ISBN  978-1-60344-128-5
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