Pokiston Sharqiy qo'mondonligi rejasining evolyutsiyasi - Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan

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Pokiston Sharqiy qo'mondonligi
Pokiston armiyasining bayrog'i
Faol	23 avgust 1969–16 dekabr 1971 yil
Mamlakat	Pokiston
Sharqiy qo'mondonlik shtabi	Dakka qamoqxonasi, Dakka, Sharqiy Pokiston
Qo'mondonlar
Sharq qo'mondoni qo'mondoni	General-leytenant A. A. K. Niyoziy
Xodimlar boshlig'i	Brig. Boqir Siddiqiy
E'tiborli qo'mondonlar	General-leytenant Sahabzada Yoqub Xon

The Sharqiy qo'mondonligi Pokiston armiyasi edi a korpuslar - Sharq qo'mondonligi qo'mondoni etib tayinlangan general-leytenant boshchiligidagi harbiy qism. Keyin Hindistonning bo'linishi tomonidan Birlashgan Qirollik, Pokiston Islom Respublikasi (mustaqillikdan oldin) 1000 mil (1600 km) bilan ajratilgan ikkita hududga bo'lingan Bangladesh 1971 yilda). Pokiston qurolli kuchlarining aksariyat mollari G'arbiy Pokistonda joylashgan; Pokiston qurolli kuchlarining roli Sharqiy Pokiston Pokiston qo'shinlari g'arbda Hindistonni mag'lubiyatga uchratmaguncha (urush bo'lsa) mamlakatning o'sha qismini ushlab turishi kerak edi.^[1] Pokiston armiyasi Sharq qo'mondonligini yaratdi, qo'mondonlikka general-leytenant unvonidagi bitta qo'mondon javob berdi. Qurolli kuchlar (xususan Pokiston armiyasi) mudofaa rejasini tuzgan edi Dakka o'zlarining barcha kuchlarini Dakka Bowl (daryolar bilan o'ralgan maydon) bo'ylab to'plash orqali Jamuna, Padma va Meghna ).^[2]

Pokiston ishga tushirilgandan so'ng Searchlight operatsiyasi va Barisal operatsiyasi jilovlash Avami ligasi - 1971 yil mart oyida boshlangan siyosiy harakat (yaratilishiga olib keladi Mukti Bahini va butun Bangladeshdagi qo'zg'olon), general-leytenant A. A. K. Niyazi (Sharqiy qo'mondonlikning so'nggi qo'mondoni) Pokiston armiyasiga binoan mavjud rejani qayta ko'rib chiqdi. Bosh shtab (GHQ) ko'rsatma (unda Mukti Bahini viloyatning biron bir hududini egallashiga yo'l qo'ymaslik va har bir qarich hudud uchun kurashish zarurligi ta'kidlangan).^[3][4] Bosh shtab hindularning viloyatning katta hududini egallashini, u erdagi Mukti Bahini va Bengaliyalik qochqinlarni ko'chirishini va Bangladesh hukumatini surgunda tan olishini, isyonni xalqaro diplomatik masalaga aylantirishini kutgan edi.^[5] General-leytenant Niyoziy 10 ta shaharni (Jessor, Jenayda, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Komilla va Chittagong ) yirik aloqa markazlarida "qal'alar shaharlari" deb nomlangan va qo'shinlarining asosiy qismini Hindiston chegarasi yaqinida joylashtirgan.^[6][7] Yakuniy rejada qurolli kuchlar hindlarning chegaradagi hujumlarini kechiktirib, so'ngra asta-sekin qal'a shaharlariga qaytib borishlari kerak edi.^[8] Qal'alardan tirik qolgan kuchlarning bir qismi Dakka yaqinidagi pozitsiyalarni egallab, g'arbda Hindiston mag'lub bo'lguncha ushlab turishi kerak edi; Pokiston kuchlari qal'a shaharlarida hind kuchlarining asosiy qismini kechiktirib, ularning Dakka shahrida to'planishiga yo'l qo'ymasliklari kerak edi.

Fon

The Pokiston armiyasi 1947 yilda mustaqillikdan so'ng oltita piyoda diviziyasi va zirhli brigadani meros qilib oldi Britaniya hind armiyasi,^[9] qurolli aktivlarining katta qismini joylashtirish G'arbiy Pokiston. Sharqiy Pokiston 1948 yilda bitta piyoda brigadasi bo'lgan, u ikkita piyodadan tashkil topgan batalyonlar, 1-chi Sharqiy Bengal polki va 1/14 (1-batalyon 14-Panjob polki ) yoki 3 /8-Panjob polki (3-batalyon). Ularning o'rtasida ikkita batalon beshta miltiq rota bilan maqtanishdi (odatda batalyonda beshta rota bor edi).^[10] Bu zaif brigada - qo'mondonligi ostida Brigadir Ayub Xon (vaqtincha general-mayor vazifasini bajargan - tayinlash: GOC, 14-piyoda diviziyasi) - va bir qator Sharqiy Pokiston miltiqlari (EPR) qanotlariga Sharqiy Pokistonni himoya qilish vazifasi qo'yildi 1947 yilgi Kashmir urushi.^[11] The Pokiston havo kuchlari (PAF) va Pokiston dengiz kuchlari o'sha paytda Sharqiy Pokistonda ozgina bor edi. Qurolli qudratning 90 foizidan ko'prog'ini G'arbiy Pokistonga joylashtirish sabablari:

• G'arbiy Pokiston chegaralari Kashmir (Pokiston hukumati hal qilish uchun qurolli kuch ishlatmaslik masalasida): Pokiston ikkala qanotda etarli kuchlarni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun iqtisodiy bazaga ega emas edi va G'arbiy Pokiston Sharqiy Pokistonga qaraganda ko'proq strategik ahamiyatga ega edi.^[12]
• Hukumat amaldorlarining aksariyati G'arbiy Pokistondan yoki benqaliyalik bo'lmagan. Iqtisodiy rivojlanishning aksariyati G'arbiy Pokistonda bo'lib o'tdi va qurolli kuchlarning asosiy qismi uning elektr bazasini xavfsiz saqlash uchun joylashtirildi. Pokiston harbiylari xodimlar rejalashtiruvchilari ushbu joylashishni asoslash uchun quyidagi doktrinani taklif qildilar: "Sharqning himoyasi G'arbda".^[13] Keng ma'noda, bu sharqda sodir bo'lgan voqealardan qat'i nazar (hindlarning Sharqiy Pokistonni bosib olishidan) qat'iy nazar, g'arbda Hindistonni mag'lub etgan Pokistonga tarjima qilingan.^[14] chunki G'arbiy Pokistonning taxmin qilingan muvaffaqiyati Hindistonni ijobiy kelishuv to'g'risida muzokaralar olib borishga majbur qiladi.^[15] Pokiston xodimlari ham ishongan jang poygasi nazariya; Pokistonlik bir askar to'rtdan o'ntagacha hindu / hind askariga teng, degan fikr keng tarqalgan edi.^[16][17] va Hindiston qurolli kuchlarining son jihatdan ustunligini oz sonli Pokiston askarlari rad etishi mumkin.^[18]

1949–1965

Pokiston Qurolli Kuchlari 1949 va 1965 yillardagi urushlar oralig'ida muttasil o'sib bordi. Piyoda bo'linmalari soni 6 dan 13 gacha sakrab tushdi; 1965 yilgacha ikkita zirhli diviziya va bir nechta mustaqil piyoda va zirhli brigadalar bilan maqtandi.^[19] Ushbu birikmalarning barchasiga kerakli artilleriya, komando, muhandis va transport birliklari biriktirilgan edi. Harbiy infratuzilmaning o'sishi Sharqiy Pokistonda sekinroq edi; bitta bo'linma (14-piyoda bo'limi) HQed Dakka hozirda 53-brigada joylashgan ikkita piyoda askarlar brigadasi mavjud edi Komilla va joylashtirilgan 107-brigada Jessor 1963 yilga kelib.^[20] 1964 yilda Dakada 23-brigada tashkil etildi. Ushbu kuchsiz bo'linma uchta piyoda brigadasini o'z ichiga olgan, qurol-yarog'i yo'q va 10 ta EPR qanotlari bilan qo'llab-quvvatlangan, 12 F-86 Saber samolyotlari va uchta qurolli qayiq^[21] sharqda 1965 yilgi urushga otlandi. Havo kuchlari bir-birlarining bazalarini yuqori qismida paydo bo'lgan PAF bilan bombardimon qilishgan edi Chegara xavfsizligi kuchlari (BSF) va EPR chegara bo'ylab to'qnashgan; Hindistonda Sharqiy Pokiston yaqinida bitta piyoda diviziyasi va bitta zirhli brigada joylashtirilgan bo'lsa-da, qo'shinlar sharqda hech qachon to'qnashmagan.

Yahyo Xon islohotlari

Qachon Yahyo Xon bo'ldi Pokiston armiyasining bosh qo'mondoni 1966 yilda u Pokiston armiyasining jangovar qobiliyatini tiklash uchun bir qator islohotlarni boshladi. Sharqiy Pokistonda korpusning shtab-kvartirasi tashkil etilishi kerak edi (dastlab keyinchalik III korpus sifatida tanilgan va keyinchalik Sharqiy qo'mondonlik deb nomlangan)^[22] ammo 14-piyoda diviziyasidan tashqari Dakkada yangi bo'linma paydo bo'lmadi (garchi Dakkada 57-piyoda brigadasi tashkil etilgan bo'lsa-da, 23-piyoda brigadasi yuborilgan Rangpur ).^[23] 1970 yilda Rangpurga 29-otliq qo'shin joylashtirildi Ravalpindi, ammo Sharqiy Pokistonga korpus artilleriyasi yoki zirhli birliklar berilmagan.

Pokiston Sharqiy qo'mondonligi shtab-kvartirasi ochildi Dakka qamoqxonasi, 1969 yil 23 avgustda Dakka va general-leytenant. Sahabzada Yoqub Xon qo'mondon etib tayinlandi; 1969 yil 1 sentyabrda Bosh harbiy ma'mur mamlakatning generali Yahyo Xon yubordi Vitse-admiral Seyid Muhammad Ahsan kabi Harbiy holat bo'yicha ma'mur Sharqiy Pokiston.^[24] Sayid Muhammad Ahsan, Pokiston dengiz flotining bosh qo'mondoni, Sharqiy Pokistonda dengiz kuchlarini tashkil etganida; mintaqada G'arbiy Pokistondan ko'proq zobitlar joylashtirilgan holda Sharqiy Pokistonda dengiz kuchlari uch baravar ko'paydi. Avvalroq, GHQ Bosh shtabi boshlig'i, Ravalpindi, general-mayor Sahabzada Yoqub Xon, 1967 yilda viloyat uchun yaxlit jang rejasini tuzish uchun Sharqiy Pokistonda bir qator mashg'ulotlar o'tkazishga qaror qildi. "X-Sunderbans-1" operatsiyasi (polkovnik) tomonidan boshqarildi. Rao Farman Ali general-mayor qo'mondonligi ostida Muzaffaruddin (GOC 14-bo'lim); ushbu mashqning xulosalari 1971 yilda Pokistonning operatsion rejasi uchun asos bo'ldi.

X-Sundarbans-1 operatsiyasi

Pokistonning Sharqiy qo'mondonligining 1967 yildan 1971 yilgacha Sharqiy Pokistonni mudofaa qilish rejasi (umumiy vakolatxonasi - ayrim qismlarning joylashuvi ko'rsatilmagan

Pokistonlik rejalashtiruvchilar Hindistonning asosiy hujumi Sharqiy Pokistonning g'arbiy chegarasida sodir bo'ladi va Sharqiy Pokistondagi armiya viloyatning har bir qarichini himoya qila olmaydi deb taxmin qilishgan. Pokiston shtatining rejalashtiruvchilari mudofaa rejasini tuzishda quyidagi xususiyatlarni aniqladilar:^[25]

• Musson yomg'irlar asosan tekis mamlakatni harakatga to'sqinlik qiladigan morassaga aylantiradi; an'anaviy urush uchun eng yaxshi vaqt noyabr va mart oylari orasida bo'lib, quruqlik oson mexanizatsiyalashgan harakat va zirhli urushga imkon beradi.
• Infrastruktura yomon; suzib yuruvchi perchinlar yo'llar bo'ylab kesib tashlanadi va ko'p joylarga faqat tuproq yo'llari orqali etib borish mumkin. Bu erda 300 ta katta kanallar (yoz davomida suzib yurish mumkin), bu to'sqinlik qilishi yoki jang rejasiga yordam berishi mumkin. Havo va daryolarni nazorat qilish ichki chiziqlar bo'ylab to'siqsiz harakatlanish uchun zarurdir va yo'l sharoitlari harakat tezligi va yo'nalishini belgilaydi.
• Sharqiy Pokiston a taniqli Hindiston hududiga kirib, hujumlarni hindistonliklarga qarshi bo'lgan kuchlardan kuchliroq bo'lgan taqdirdagina amalga oshirish mumkin edi. Shuningdek, viloyatga hindistonlik salyantlar ham bo'lgan.

Har bir dyuym erni himoya qilish o'rniga, qurolli kuchlarning omon qolishiga ustuvor ahamiyat berildi va Dakani himoya qilish asosiy maqsad edi.^[26] 2600 mil (4200 km) uzunlikdagi Hindiston chegarasi bo'ylab joylashtirish o'rniga, uchta yo'nalish tanlandi:^[27]

• Oldinga yo'nalish: qo'pol ravishda yarim doira hosil qilib Xulna – Jessor – Jenayda – Rajshaxi – Xili – Dinajpur – Rangpur – Jamalpur. Mymensingh – Sylhet - Komilla – Chittagong. Pokiston armiyasida ushbu qatorni himoya qilish uchun raqamlar yo'q edi.
• Ikkilamchi chiziq: Bu bo'ylab boshlandi Madhumati Daryo, shimol tomonga qarab yugurdi Padma Daryo Padma bo'ylab g'arbdan Rajshaxiga, so'ng shimoldan Xiliga, so'ngra yugurdi Bogra, Jamalpur, Mymensingh dan Bayrabga, keyin janubdan Komilaga va orqaga Faridpur Megna daryosi bo'ylab. Khulna, Jessore, Jhenida va Dinajpur-Rangpurni kuch bilan himoya qilish kerak emas edi; Silhet va Chittagong mustaqil mudofaa zonalari bo'lishi kerak edi.
• Ichki yo'nalish: Dakka kosasi (Jamuna, Padma, Megna va Eski Braxmaputra daryolari oralig'i). Pokiston Hindistonni g'arbda mag'lub qilguncha (ayniqsa Dakka shahri) himoya qilinishi kerak.

Pokistonlik rejalashtiruvchilar, Bengaliya aholisi orasida mudofaa salohiyatini maksimal darajaga ko'tarish va yaxshi muvofiqlashtirishga erishish uchun oldinga yo'nalishlarni tark etish va qo'shinni Dakka kosasi atrofida to'plash kabi salbiy siyosiy oqibatlarni bilar edilar; ammo, muqobil echim topa olmadi. Rejalashtiruvchilar infratuzilmaning yomon ahvoli va tabiiy to'siqlardan maksimal darajada foydalanishni tavsiya qildilar.

Qisqacha aytganda, reja quyidagicha edi:

• Pokistonning Rangpurdagi qo'shinlari janubga qarab harakat qiladilar, Xili - Bogra atroflarini himoya qiladilar va Dakka Bowlga qaytib boradilar, Rajshaxi qo'shinlari (Hardinge ko'prigini himoya qilgandan keyin) Dakka Bowlga chekinishdi.
• Qo'shinlar Jessor ga qaytadi Madhumati daryo va orasidagi hududni himoya qilish Magura va Faridpur.
• Dakkadagi qo'shinlar (agar kerak bo'lsa) Jamalpur-Mymensingh-Bayrab hududini himoya qilish uchun shimolga qarab harakat qilishadi. Dakka shimolidagi hudud harbiy harakatlar uchun xavfli deb topilgan va Pokiston rejalashtiruvchilari chegaraning shimolidagi tepalik mamlakat hind armiyasining faoliyatiga to'sqinlik qiladi deb o'ylashgan.^[28]
• Qo'shinlar Komilla g'arbga siljiydi va Chandpur, Bayrab va Daudkandi orasidagi hududni himoya qiladi.

Pokiston kuchlari joylashtirilgan Sylhet (uch tomondan Hindiston hududi bilan o'ralgan, uni himoya qilish juda qiyin bo'ladi) va Chittagong o'z ishlariga qarashadi. Rejalashtiruvchilar Sharqiy Pokiston kuchlari o'zini o'zi ta'minlaydigan, mustaqil harakatga qarshi kurashadigan va viloyatni o'zi himoya qiladigan rejani ishlab chiqmaganlar.^[29]

"Titu Mir" operatsiyasi

Sharq qo'mondonligi tomonidan 1970 yilda "Titu Mir" kodi bilan nomlangan bir qator mashqlar; ikkinchisi yanvar oyida sahnalashtirilgan. Hulosalar quyidagilar edi:^[30]

• Hindiston Sharqiy Pokistonga g'arbdan Jamuna daryosigacha bo'lgan hududni egallashga qaratilgan asosiy hujumni boshladi. Silhet va Chittagongga yo'naltirilgan ikkinchi darajali harakatlar sharqda amalga oshiriladi.
• Faqatgina Dakka qulashi bilan viloyat kapitulyatsiyasi tugallanadi.
• Oddiy hindlarning hujumiga qarshi 3: 1 ustunligi va havo va dengiz dushmanlarining ustunligi, Sharqiy Pokiston qurolli kuchlari kontingenti bitta piyoda diviziyasidan iborat (tanklar polki, 17 ta EPR qanotlari va boshqa harbiylashtirilgan kuchlar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlangan, G'arbiy Pokiston tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanmagan samolyotlar va to'rtta qurolli qayiqlar) ko'pi bilan uch hafta davom etishi mumkin edi.^[31]

Xulosalar Ravalpindidagi GHQga topshirildi, ammo hozirgi vaqtda dastlabki rejada jiddiy o'zgarishlar ro'y bermadi.

"Searchlight" va "Barisal" operatsiyalari

1971 yil davomida Pokiston g'arbiy va g'arbiy harbiy diktaturaga qarshi tartibsizliklar va fuqarolik itoatsizligini boshdan kechirdi. The Harbiy holat bo'yicha ma'mur Sharqiy Pokiston, vitse-admiral S.M. Ahsan Sharqiy Pokistonning gubernatori ham bo'lgan. Ning pozitsiyalari Pokiston qurolli kuchlari Admiral Ahsan davrida Hindiston razvedkasining harakatlarini kuzatish uchun o'zgartirildi va chegaralarga joylashtirildi. Kuch kattaligi ham oshirildi va Admiral Ahsan buyrug'i bilan logistika ishlari yaxshilandi. Uning ikki yillik boshqaruvida barqarorlik va viloyat hukumat nazorati yaxshilangan; ammo, harbiy kuchlarni joylashtirish koeffitsienti oshdi. 1971 yil mart oyida general Yahyo Xon buzg'unchilikni buzish uchun Dakka shahriga tashrif buyurdi Mujib -Butto o'lik. General-leytenant Tikka Xonning Sharqiy qo'mondonlik shtabidagi shtabi birinchi bo'lib, fuqaro Yahyo Xonga va unga hamroh bo'lgan armiya va havo kuchlarining yuqori lavozimli mulozimlariga fuqarolik va harbiy vaziyatga bergan baholarini taqdim etdi va vitse-admiral Ahsan general Yahyo Xonni yig'ilishda ishontirdi. . Ushbu uchrashuv davomida Admiral Ahsan qisqacha G'arbiy Pokiston vakillari va davlat xizmatchilarining quritilgan echimlariga qarshi chiqdi. Pokiston havo kuchlari Air Commodore Mitti Masud (AOC, PAF Base Dacca) harbiy harakatlar o'rniga siyosiy echimning muhimligini ta'kidladi. Havo qo'mondoni Masud Admiral Ahsanni qo'llab-quvvatladi, chunki u Hindiston aralashishga qaror qilsa, harbiy mag'lubiyat aniqligidan avtonom Sharqiy Pokiston afzal deb hisoblagan. General Yahyo Xon Masudning dalillarini rad etdi.

Harbiy operatsiyalar boshlanishidan oldin Bosh shtab-kvartirada (GHQ) yuqori darajadagi yakuniy uchrashuv bo'lib o'tdi (rais general Yahyo Xon), unda ishtirokchilar bir ovozdan harbiy amaliyotni qo'llab-quvvatladilar (Admiral Ahsan va Air Commodore chaqiriqlariga qaramay) Masud siyosiy kelishuv uchun). O'zgarish asoslaridan biri Admiral Ahsanning iste'foga chiqishi edi; u Sharqiy Pokistondagi har qanday harbiy harakatlarga qarshi chiqdi va harbiy emas, balki siyosiy echimlarni topishga qat'iy qaror qildi. Armiya va havo kuchlaridagi GHQ generallari (va dengiz admirallari) siyosiy harakatni zo'ravonlik va harbiy kuch bilan jilovlashga qat'iy qaror qilishdi. Admiral Ahsan Sharqiy Pokistonga ketdi, keyinchalik G'arbiy Pokistonga qaytib keldi. General Yoqub Xon Admiral Ahsan o'rnida vaqtincha viloyat boshqaruvini o'z zimmasiga oldi; tinch aholiga qarshi harbiy harakatlarni qo'llab-quvvatlamaganligi sababli uning o'rnini general-leytenant Tikka Xon egalladi. "Projektor operatsiyasi" va "Barisal" operatsiyasi boshlangandan so'ng, Admiral Ahsan harbiy vaziyat ma'muri va Sharqiy Pokiston gubernatori lavozimidan iste'foga chiqdi va norozilik sifatida dengiz flotidan iste'foga chiqdi.^[32] Uning o'rniga kontr-admiral Muhammad Sharif Sharqiy Pokiston dengiz qo'mondoni (Sharqiy dengiz qo'mondonligining bayroqdor xodimi). Air Commodore Mitti Masud shuningdek, tajribasiz ofitser Air Commodore bilan almashtirildi Inamul Haque Xon. Ma'sud "Searchlight" va "Barisal" operatsiyalariga aniq qarshilik ko'rsatgani sababli havo kuchlaridan iste'foga chiqdi. General-leytenant Tikka Xon (Gubernator, Harbiy holat bo'yicha bosh ma'mur va Sharq qo'mondonligi qo'mondoni, shakllantirish va amalga oshirishni buyurdi Searchlight operatsiyasi GHQ, Ravalpindi tomonidan tasdiqlanganidan keyin.

General-mayor Xadim Xussayn Raja (GOC 14-piyoda diviziyasi) va general-mayor Rao Farman Ali 1971 yil mart oyida "Projektor" operatsiyasi sxemasini ishlab chiqdilar ( Avami ligasi - harbiy harakatlar orqali hamkorlik qilmaslik harakati) sxemani ishga tushirgandan so'ng 10 kun ichida.^[33] Kont-admiral Muhammad Sharif Mintaqadagi Pokiston dengiz kuchlari qo'mondoni, qo'zg'olonga hissa qo'shgan zo'ravon dengiz operatsiyalarini olib bordi. Pokiston qurolli kuchlari kutilmagan hodisalarni kutib olish uchun zaxiraga ega emas edi,^[34] va muvaffaqiyat G'arbiy Pokistonning yordamchilariga juda bog'liq edi. Hindistonning biron bir harbiy harakati uchun favqulodda vaziyat rejasi yo'q edi - generallar Yoqub, Xadim va Farman operatsiyani boshlashga qarshi chiqishining asosiy sababi.^[35] Pokiston qo'shinlari Bangladeshni egallab olishdi va 1971 yil 11 apreldan general Niyoziyga muxlislik qilmagan Pokiston armiyasining Bosh shtabi boshlig'i general Gul Xasan.^[36] - vaziyatdan mamnunligini bildirdi.^[37]

1971 yil Oliy qo'mondonlik rejasi

Pokistonning 1971 yil may oyida, "Sharqiy qo'mondonlik" operatsiyasidan keyin Sharqiy qo'mondonlik kuchlari qayta tashkil etilgandan so'ng joylashtirilishi (umumiy vakolatxonalar - ba'zi birliklarning joylashuvi ko'rsatilmagan

Pokistonning Sharqiy Pokistondagi jangovar kuchlarining soni va joylashuvi Searchlight operatsiyasi davomida o'zgargan. 14-diviziya 9-chi (27, 313 va 117-brigadalardan tashkil topgan) va 16-chi (34 va 205-brigadalarni o'z ichiga olgan) diviziyalar (ularning og'ir texnikalari va yordamchi qismlarining ko'pini olib tashlagan holda) - hammasi bo'lib o'n besh piyoda qo'shin bilan kuchaytirildi. 1971 yil may oyigacha bitta qo'mondon bataloni va ikkita og'ir minomyot batareyasi.^[38] 1971 yil oxirigacha general Yahyo Xon hukumati Sharqiy Pokistondagi fuqarolar urushi kuchayib borishi bilan Admiral Axsonga teng keladigan faol harbiy ma'mur topa olmadi. Katta general zobitlar va admirallar Sharqiy Pokistonga qadar qo'mondonlikni o'z zimmasiga olishga tayyor emas edilar General-leytenant Amir Niyoziy ushbu topshiriq uchun ixtiyoriy ravishda qatnashdi. General-leytenant Niyoziy Pokiston Sharqiy qo'mondonligining qo'mondoni etib tayinlandi (general-leytenant Tikka Xan o'rnini egalladi, u 1971 yil sentyabrgacha harbiy holat bo'yicha bosh ma'mur va gubernator lavozimida qoldi). Kontr-admiral Muhammad Sharif Sharq qo'mondonligining ikkinchi qo'mondoni etib tayinlandi.

1971 yil may oyida armiyani qayta joylashtirish

Qo'mondon o'zgarganidan so'ng, 14-bo'lim dastlab o'z brigadalarini 1971 yil martidan oldin Komilya (53-chi), Dakka (57-chi), Rangpur (23-chi) va Jessorda (107-chi) joylashtirdilar. Operatsion paytida 57-chi va 107-chi Jessorga ko'chib o'tdilar, 53-chi esa Chittagongga ko'chib ketgan edi. Sharqiy qo'mondonlik bu bo'linma ostida 107-chi (CO brigadasi Maxdum Hayat, shtab-kvartirasi Jessor) va 57-chisini (CO brigadasi Jahanzab Arbab, shtab-kvartirasi Jhenida) qo'yib, 9-bo'linma shtab-kvartirasini (general-mayor Shavkat Riza) Jessorga ko'chirdi.^[39] 16-bo'lim (CO general-mayor Nazar Husayn Shoh) shtab-kvartirasi Bograga ko'chib o'tdi, uning tarkibiga 23-chi (CO brigadasi Abdulla Malik, shtab Rangpur), 205-chi (shtab Bogra) va 34-chi (shtab Nator) brigadalari kirdi.^[40] 14-bo'lim (general-mayor Rahim) shtab-kvartirasi Dakada qoldi, uning brigadalari Mymensinghda (27-chi), Silxetda (313-chi) va Komilda (117-chi). Chittagongda 97-mustaqil brigada tuzilgan, 53-brigada esa qo'mondonlik zaxirasi sifatida Dakaga ko'chirilgan.^[41]

Titu Mirga o'zgartirishlar

Pokistonni joylashtirish va mudofaa rejasi 1971 yil avgustida Sharqiy qo'mondonlik tomonidan "Searchlight" operatsiyasidan keyin Sharqiy qo'mondonlik bahosidan so'ng (umumiy vakolatxonasi - ba'zi birliklarning joylashuvi ko'rsatilmagan)

Brig. General Niyazi shtabining rahbari G'ulom Jilani (keyinchalik DG ISI) 1971 yil iyun oyida mavjud Sharqiy Pokiston mudofaa rejasini ko'rib chiqdi.^[42] mavjud bo'lgan vaziyatlarni hisobga olgan holda va rejani asosan o'zgarishsiz qoldirdi. Rejani qayta ko'rib chiqishda quyidagi taxminlar mavjud edi:^[43]

• Hindistonning asosiy yo'nalishi avvalgi rejada taxmin qilinganidek g'arbdan emas, sharqdan keladi. Hindiston armiyasi Silhet va Chandpur orasidagi hududni nazorat qilish uchun hujum qilar edi, ikkinchi darajali hujum esa Rangpur - Bogra va Mymensingh. Hujumni kamida beshta hind piyoda bo'linmasi (zirhli brigada qo'llab-quvvatlaydi) boshlashi kerak edi.
• Isyonchilarning ahvoli yaxshilanib, Sharqiy qo'mondonlik ichki va tashqi tahdidlarga tayyor bo'lar edi. Agar yo'q bo'lsa, isyonni cheklash uchun ichki xavfsizlik choralarini ko'rish kerak.
• Qo'shinlarning harakatlanishini engillashtirish uchun barcha aloqa aloqalari to'liq ishlab va hukumat nazorati ostida bo'lar edi.

General Niyazi rejaga quyidagilarni qo'shdi:^[44]

• Pokiston armiyasi tomon hujumlar uyushtiradi Tripura, Kalkutta yoki Shiliguri agar kerak bo'lsa koridor.
• Imkoniyat tug'ilganda Hindiston hududini iloji boricha ko'proq egallab oling

Yangi yo'riqnomalarni yoki ushbu maqsadlarga erishish uchun ishlab chiqilgan aniq rejalarni hisobga olish uchun hech qanday urush o'yinlari o'tkazilmadi. Qayta ko'rib chiqilgan reja Ravalpindiga yuborilgan va 1971 yil avgustda tasdiqlangan. Iyun va iyul oylarida Mukti Bahini hindlarning yordami bilan chegara bo'ylab qayta to'plandi. Jackpot operatsiyasi va chegaradan 2000-5000 partizan yubordi (muvaffaqiyatsiz "Musson hujumi").^[45][46][47]

Sharqiy hujum taklifi

1971 yil iyulga kelib Pokiston armiyasi kuzatib borish uchun razvedka tarmog'ini yaratdi Mukti Bahini Hindiston bilan chegaradosh 2700 kilometr (1700 mil) bo'ylab pistirma, artilleriya o'qlari va minalar maydonlari orqali kirib borish va unga qarshi kurashish.^[48] General Niyoziy iyun oyida qilgan tashrifi davomida general Hamidga (Pokiston armiyasining COS) quyidagi choralarni taklif qilganini da'vo qildi:^[49]

• 1971 yil iyul oyida Hindiston ichkarisidagi Mukti Bahini o'quv lagerlariga hujum qiling
• Yordam berish orqali Hindistonda tartibsizliklarni yarating Mizo, Naga va Naksal isyonchilar, shu tariqa hind armiyasini Bangladeshdan uzoqlashtirmoqdalar
• BSF bo'linmalarini chegara hududlaridan uzoqlashtirish, Farrakka to'nini buzish, qarshi hujum namoyishlarini boshlash. Inglizcha Bazar va Balurghat va bomba Kalkutta.
• Boshqa bir harbiy samolyotlar eskadrilyasi va qo'shimcha piyoda brigadasi tomonidan kuchaytirilgan va Sharqiy Pokistondagi mavjud piyoda bo'linmalarini zarur bo'lgan artilleriya va zirh bilan mustahkamlab, zenitlarga qarshi mudofaa bilan bir qatorda Assam va G'arbiy Bengalning bir qismini egallab olish va betartiblik yaratish mumkin. Kalkuttada.
• Agar yana ikkita bo'linma bilan kuchaytirilsa (mavjud bo'lgan kuchlarni zarur artilleriya va zirh bilan to'ldirganda), urushni hind tuprog'iga olib borish mumkin. Pokiston kuchlarini mag'lub etish uchun Hindiston sharqda kamida 15 ta diviziyani joylashtirganda, uning g'arbdagi kuchlari Pokiston armiyasi tomonidan mag'lub bo'lishi mumkin.

Bu vaqtda hind harbiylari zaif bo'lib, uning asosiy tarkiblari Sharqiy Pokiston chegarasidan uzoqda joylashgan edi.^[50] Polkovnik Z.A. Xon (. Qo'mondoni Maxsus xizmatlar guruhi (Sharqiy Pokistonda) ham hindlarning tanlangan maqsadlariga qarshi agressiv harakatlarni qo'llab-quvvatladi. General Hamid Sharq qo'mondonligining asosiy maqsadi: qo'zg'olonni nazorat ostida ushlab turish va viloyat ichkarisida Bangladesh hukumati tuzilishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun hindlarning qasosiga sabab bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan har qanday provokatsiyani rad etdi.^[51] General Niyoziy uning rejasi Hindistonni shartlarni tan olishga majbur qilishiga amin edi.^[52] ammo hech bo'lmaganda bitta pokistonlik manba uning taklifini "bema'ni" deb yozadi.^[53]

Asosiy reja 1971 yil sentyabrgacha o'zgarmay qoldi: Pokiston bo'linmalari Daka Bowlni himoya qilish uchun safarbarlik qilishdan oldin bir qator mudofaa janglarini olib borishi kerak edi, ammo viloyatning har bir qarichi himoya qilinmaydi. Pokiston armiyasi barcha shaharlarni egallab oldi va 90 ta shaharni mustahkamladi^[54] 370 BoP dan (BoPlarning yarmi 1971 yil iyul oyida Mukti Bahini infiltratsiyasini engillashtirish uchun Hindiston snaryadlari tomonidan yo'q qilingan)^[55] va Mukti Bahini faoliyatini to'xtatish uchun chegaraga yaqin joylashtirilgan.

G'arbiy qo'mondonlik strategiyasi

Pokiston oliy qo'mondonligi Bangladeshdagi qo'zg'olon avgust oyidan keyin avj ola boshlagach, barcha masalalarni hal qilish uchun Hindiston bilan keng miqyosli urush haqida o'ylashni boshladi;^[56] Mukti Bahini faoliyati yanada tajovuzkor va samaraliroq,^[57] Pokiston kuchlari tartibsizlikda edilar.^[58] Bunda ular g'arb va sharqda jang qilish va davom etayotgan qo'zg'olon haqida o'ylashlari kerak edi. Sharqiy Pokiston mudofaasi g'arbda Pokistonning katta muvaffaqiyatlariga tayanganligi sababli (natijada Hindiston sharqda o'z kuchlarini olib chiqib ketmoqda),^[59][60] har qanday rasmiy urush ham G'arbiy Pokistondagi Pokiston kuchlari zarba berishga tayyor bo'lganda boshlanishi mumkin edi. 1970 yilning yozida g'arbiy operatsion rejasi qayta ko'rib chiqildi. Quyidagi xulosalar chiqarildi:^[61]

• Pokiston hindlarning hujumi uchun qasos sifatida qarshi hujumga o'tishi mumkin yoki
• GHQ tomonidan tasdiqlanganidan keyin Hindiston tuprog'ida profilaktika ish tashlashlarini boshlang.
• Formatsiyalarni kuchaytirish yoki hal qiluvchi zarba berish uchun zaxira kuchi zarur.

Zaxiralarning bir qismini Ravi daryosining shimolida va bir qismini janubda saqlashga qaror qilindi. Rejaga ko'ra, chegara yaqinidagi qo'shinlar qulay yashash joylarini egallab olish, armiyaning asosiy hujumini ekranga chiqarish uchun chaqirilgan. 1971 yil sentyabr oyida reja quyidagilarni o'z ichiga olgan yangilandi:^[62]

• G'arbiy Pokiston hindular Sharqiy Pokistonda hujum boshlaganidan keyin darhol qasos olardi. Pokiston tuzilmalari mudofaa qobiliyatini kengaytirmasdan chegara hududlarini egallab olishadi; g'oya G'arbiy Pokiston butun chegara bo'ylab keng ko'lamli hujumni boshlaganligi haqida taassurot qoldirish edi.
• Ravining janubidan bitta zirhli va ikkita piyoda diviziyasining zaxira kuchlari keng ko'lamli hujumni boshlashadi va agar muvaffaqiyatli bo'lsa, shimoliy zaxira kuchlari hujumga qo'shilishadi.

G'arbiy jang rejasi

G'arbiy frontga kuchlarni joylashtirish, 1971 yil dekabr (umumiy taqdimot, miqyosga emas; barcha geografik xususiyatlar ko'rsatilmagan)

Pokiston armiyasi 1971 yilda G'arbiy Pokistonda o'n uchta piyoda askar va ikkita zirhli diviziyaga ega edi (bir nechta mustaqil brigada guruhlaridan tashqari). 9 va 16 diviziyalarni ("Xitoy diviziyalari" nomi bilan tanilganligi sababli, bu tarkibga yangi xitoylik uskunalar berilganligi sababli) Sharqqa topshirgandan keyin. Pokiston, ular hind armiyasi bilan piyoda askarlar bilan qo'pol tenglik va zirh bilan engil chekkaga ega edilar. Ammo, ular ajablanib o'ta muhim bo'lgan tanlangan maydonlarda 3: 1 hisobida ustunlik bilan hujum qilishni umid qilishlari mumkin edi. Pokiston 33-piyoda diviziyasini ko'targan va Bangladeshga yuborilganlarning o'rniga 35 va 37-diviziyalarni ko'tarishni boshlagan; ushbu tuzilmalar faol bo'lgan, ammo 1971 yil noyabr oyigacha to'liq ishlamagan. Pokiston armiyasi Hindiston armiyasining G'arbiy va Janubiy buyruqlar)^[63] quyidagicha:^[64]

• 12-chi (general-mayor Akbar Xon: oltita piyoda brigadasi va chegara korpusidan oltita qanot) va 23-chi (general-mayor Eftixarxon Janjua: beshta piyoda brigadasi, mustaqil zirhli brigada va zirhli polk) piyoda diviziyalari. joylashtirilgan Ozod Kashmir. 12-chi hujumga o'tishi kerak edi Poonch sektori, 23-chi esa dastlab Chhamb sektoriga hujum qilib, keyin oldinga siljiydi.
• In Sialkot sektori 6-zirhli diviziya (general-mayor M. Iskanderul Karim: ikkita zirhli brigada va ikkita piyoda bataloni) 8-o'rin bilan birga joylashtirildi (CO general-mayor Abdul Ali Malik: uchta brigada va ikkita zirhli polk), 15-chi (CO general-general Obid Ali Zohid: to'rtta brigada va sakkizta mustaqil zirhli brigada) va 17-chi (general-general R.D. Shamim: beshta piyoda brigadasi) I korpus (CO general-leytenant general Irshad Ahmed Xon) qoshidagi piyoda bo'linmalari. 8-chi Sakkargarh yaqinida, hind zaxiralarini tortib olish uchun hujum qilishi kerak edi. Keyinchalik ushbu tuzilmalar Kashmirni Hindistonning qolgan qismidan uzib olishga harakat qiladilar.^[65] 6-zirhli va 17-diviziyalar "Zaxira shimol" deb nomlandi.
• 10-chi (CO general-general S.A.Z Naqvi: to'rtta piyoda brigadasi) va 11-chi (oltita piyoda brigadasi) piyoda diviziyalari, 3-mustaqil zirhli brigada bilan birga Lahor IV korpusga qarashli sektor (CO general-leytenanti Bahodir Shoh). Ushbu tuzilmalar chegara bo'ylab diversion hujumlar uyushtirishi va Panjobning markaziy qismini himoya qilishi kerak edi.
• 1-zirhli diviziya (ikkita zirhli brigada va bitta piyoda batalyoni) va 7-chi (general-mayor I.A. Akram: uchta piyoda brigadasi) va 33-chi (general-mayor Ch. Nessar Ahmed: uchta piyoda brigadasi) piyoda diviziyalari. Ravi daryosining janubida joylashgan; keyinchalik ularga II korpus (general-leytenant Tikka Xon) boshchiligidagi mustaqil piyoda brigadasi qo'shildi. Multon. Ushbu kuch "Janubiy zaxira" deb nomlangan. 7-piyoda diviziyasi (dastlab Peshovarda joylashgan) sharqqa burilish sifatida 12 va 23-bo'linmalarni qo'llab-quvvatlashi mumkin bo'lgan joylarga ko'chib o'tishi kerak edi, so'ngra harakatlanib Sutlejdan janubdagi II korpusning qolgan qismi bilan tuzilishi kerak edi.
• 18-piyoda diviziyasi (CO general-mayor B.M.Mustafa: uchta piyoda brigadasi) va ikkita zirhli polk Gidrobod yaqinidagi Sind shahrida joylashtirildi.

Ushbu tuzilmalardan tashqari, Pokiston chegarada ikkita mustaqil artilleriya va ikkita piyoda brigadasi guruhlarini joylashtirgan. Pokistonning dastlabki rejasi butun Hindiston chegarasi bo'ylab diversion hujumlar uyushtirish edi^[66] hind zaxira kuchlarini asosiy nishon joylaridan uzoqroq tutish, so'ngra Ponch va Chhamb sektorlariga hujum qilish va hind kuchlarini orqaga qaytarish paytida piyoda brigadasi (zirhli polk tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanmoqda) Rajastan Ramgarh tomon. Hindiston o'z zaxiralarini topshirgandan so'ng, II Korpus Sutlejning janubida (Bahavalpur yaqinida) yig'ilib, sharqiy sharqda Bhatinda va Lyudiana tomon siljib Hindistonga qarab harakatlanardi. Keyin IV korpus Hindistonning Panjob shtati tomon suriladi. Hindiston kuchlarida ozgina ustunlikka ega ekanligini hisobga olib, Pokiston zirhli bo'linmalari va Pokiston havo kuchlari ushbu rejani amalga oshirish uchun tezda ustunlikni qo'lga kiritishlari kerak edi.

Pokistonning quruqlikdagi hujumining asosiy maqsadi Hindiston bilan qulay savdolashuv pozitsiyasini ta'minlash uchun (Pokiston Sharqiy qo'mondonligi Hindistonning Bangladeshga qilingan hujumini qaytarib berolmasa) va Hindistonni o'z kuchlarini qo'shib olishga majbur qilish uchun g'arbda etarlicha Hindiston hududini egallash edi. g'arbda va hind kuchlarining sharqdan chiqarilishiga sabab bo'ldi. 1971 yil oktyabrdan boshlab Pokiston bo'linmalari chegara bo'ylab pozitsiyalarni egallay boshladilar.

Havo hujumlarining ahamiyati

Hindlarning piyoda qo'shinlarda ustunligini inkor etish uchun (Pokiston chegarasida joylashgan 13 ta bo'linmadan tashqari, agar kerak bo'lsa, asosiy zaxira kuchini chaqirishi mumkin),^[67] Pokiston havo kuchlari (OC) Havo marshali A. Rahim Xon) g'arbiy jabhada havo ustunligiga erishish uchun zarur edi. 1971 yilda uning tarkibida 17 ta eskadronlar bor edi^[68] 26 hind front-eskadroniga qarshi (havo shtabi boshlig'i, Havo bosh marshali Pratap C. Lal, AOC-in-C, G'arbiy havo qo'mondonligi, havo marshali MM muhandisi), Hindiston esa 12 ta eskadronni (AOC-in-C, Sharqiy havo qo'mondonligi, aviamarshal XS Devan) sharqda (bitta PAF eskadroniga qarshi) joylashtirdi. - CO havo qo'mondoni Inamul Haque Xon ) va boshqa ettita otryadni boshqa joyga joylashtirgan. PAF rejalashtiruvchilari Hindiston Sharqiy Pokistondagi yagona PAF eskadronini zararsizlantirgandan so'ng, Xitoyning har qanday harakatlarini inkor etish uchun qismlarni joylashtirgandan so'ng, g'arbda ko'proq samolyotlarni to'plash bepul bo'lishidan xabardor edilar. PAF o'ylab topdi Chengiz Xon operatsiyasi IAFga qarshi zarbalar berish va urush boshlanganda uning ustunligini zararsizlantirish.

Dengiz roli

Pokiston dengiz kuchlari, dengiz kuchlarini kuchaytirish bo'yicha murojaatlarga qaramay, Hindiston tahdidiga qarshi turishga qodir emas edi. Bosh qo'mondonlik ostidagi Pokiston dengiz kuchlari Vitse-admiral Muzaffar Hasan (Filo CO: Kontr-admiral MAK Lodhi), biri bilan kreyser, uch fregatlar, besh yo'q qiluvchilar, to'rtta dengiz osti kemasi va bir nechta qurolli qayiqlar, Hindistonning G'arbiy flotiga duch keldi (OC Admiral SM Nanda; Fleet CO: Rear Admiral EC "Chandy" Kuruvila), bitta kreyser, sakkizta fregat, bitta esminets, ikkita suv osti kemasi va bir nechta patrul va raketa kemalaridan iborat. .^[69] Pokiston harbiy-dengiz kuchlarining yuborishdan boshqa agressiv rejalari yo'q edi G'ozi hind samolyot kemasini cho'ktirish uchun Bengal ko'rfaziga INS Vikrant. Sharqiy jabhada faqat bitta esminets etti qurolli qayiq bilan faol harakat qildi; shuning uchun Bengaliyaning chuqur ko'rfazida operatsiyalarni o'tkazish imkonsiz edi.

Sharqiy Pokiston harbiylaridagi muammolar

Pokiston Sharqiy qo'mondonligi shtabi sentyabr oyidan boshlab operatsion rejani quyidagi taxminlar asosida qayta ko'rib chiqishni boshladi:^[70]

• Hindiston Sharqiy Pokistonda odatiy hujum uyushtirib, katta hududni ozod qilish, Mukti Bahini va qochqinlarni ozod qilingan hududga ko'chirish hamda Bangladesh hukumati surgunda tan olinishini va shu tariqa BMTni mojaroga jalb qilishni maqsad qilgan.
• Mukti Bahini faoliyati (odatdagi hujum sodir bo'lganda, uni zararsizlantirish kerak edi, eski rejaga binoan), nazorat ostida bo'lish o'rniga, avjiga chiqqan edi.
• Armiya GHQ Mukti Bahiniga "Bangladesh" deb e'lon qilish uchun Sharqiy Pokistondagi har qanday hudud rad etilishini buyurgan edi. Viloyatning har bir dyuymini Bangladesh kuchlaridan himoya qilish kerak edi.
• Qo'shinlar harakati va logistika uchun muhim bo'lgan aloqa tarmoqlarini boshqarish^[71] ko'priklar, paromlar va temir yo'l liniyalari buzilishi tufayli qulab tushgan.^[72]

Yuqoridagilardan tashqari, rejalashtiruvchilar Pokistondagi kuchlarning viloyatdagi maqomi, ularning joylashuvi va aloqa holati bilan bog'liq bo'lgan moddiy-texnik muammolarni hisobga olishlari kerak edi.

Ishchi kuchining etishmasligi

Sharqiy Pokiston garnizoni 1971 yil aprel oyida tartibni tiklash va qo'zg'olonchilarga qarshi kurashish uchun ikkita piyoda diviziyasi bilan kuchaytirildi. An'anaviy urushga qarshi kurashish uchun zarur bo'lgan barcha divizion og'ir uskunalar g'arbda qoldirildi.^[73][74] A comparison of the deployed units between March and November shows:^{[75][76][77][78][79][80]}

According to one estimate, the Eastern Command needed at least 250,000 personnel; it barely had 150,000 (50,000 regular soldiers) by November 1971.^[81] To fill the manpower gap, the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) (17 planes and approximately 23,000 personnel)^[82] va Razakarlar (40,000 members, against a target of 100,0000)^[83] were raised after June 1971. The armed police (11,000 members)^[84] was also reorganised and bolstered with 5,000 West Pakistani personnel.^[85] Therefore, the undermanned army was only fit for "Police action".^[86]According to General Niazi, he had requested the following from GHQ in June 1971:

• Three medium- and one light-tank regiments were allocated for East Pakistan, out of which only the regiment already in the province was provided.^[87] Also, two heavy- and one medium-artillery regiments were supposed to be sent but never arrived.^[88]
• A squadron of fighter planes to back up the PAF unit in East Pakistan.^[89] The PAF had plans to deploy a squadron of Shenyang F-6 planes in East Pakistan in 1971, but these were withdrawn because the PAF infrastructure in the province lacked the operational capacity to support housing two active squadrons.^[90]
• Bringing the 9th and 16th Divisions up to strength by sending the artillery and engineering units left behind in West Pakistan and allocating corps artillery and armour for the Eastern Command (none of which was sent).^[91]

The Pakistan GHQ had to weigh every request to resupply, reequip and reinforce the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan against the need of the West Pakistani forces, and did not have enough reserves of manpower and equipment for a long conflict.^[92] The Eastern Command only deemed one of the three divisions fit for conventional warfare. Seven West Pakistan Ranger wings, five Mujahid battalions and a wing of Khyber Rifles, Tochi and Thal Scouts were sent to East Pakistan by November 1971.^[93] Five infantry battalions were sent from West Pakistan in November. Al Badr and Al Shams units contributed another 5,000 men each.

Vaqtinchalik birliklar

The lack of regular units also forced the Eastern Command to improvise in two ways: creating maxsus formations to mimic regular army formations and mixing regular troops with paramilitary units. When Pakistani planners assumed India would launch its main attack in the east along the Axaura – Braxmanbariya axis, it had no brigades available to cover this area. The 27th brigade from Mymensingh was moved to Akhaura, while two battalions from the brigade were detached to form the 93rd Brigade in Mymensingh.^[94] Similarly, the 313th Brigade was moved from Sylhet to Maulavi Bazar and a battalion from the 313th was kept at Sylhet to form the nucleus of the 202nd maxsus Brigada. The 14th Division (which covered both the Dhaka Bowl and the Eastern Sector except Chittagong) was given responsibility for the Eastern Sector only, and the 36th maxsus Division (containing only the 93rd Brigade) was created to defend the Dhaka Bowl. Similarly, the 314th (for Xulna ) and the Rajshahi maxsus Brigades were created and deployed in September.^[95] In mid-November, the 39th maxsus Division was created to defend the Comilla and Noxali districts from the 14th Division units deployed in those areas; the 14th was tasked to defend the Sylhet and Brahmanbaria areas only. 91-chi maxsus Brigade was created to defend the Ramgarh area north of Chittagong as part of the 39th Division in November. The maxsus formations lacked the staff and equipment of regular formations.

Yolg'on

General Niazi hoped that by creating five divisional HQs and simulating the signal traffic of numerous brigades, he would deceive the Indian Eastern Command into committing at least 15 infantry divisions and other assorted supporting forces in the east; this would mean India would have less to deploy in the west after retaining forces to use against any possible Chinese attacks from the north^[96] (or at least deter the Indians from aggressive action).^[97] While India did not deploy 15 divisions in the east, the measures deceived the Indian Eastern Command to some extent.^[98]

Subtraction by addition

All paramilitary units (EPCAF/Razakar/Mujahid) were not up to army standards in terms of equipment and effectiveness, and the Eastern Command began to mix them with regular units to bolster their efficiency. Pakistani battalions were given two-thirds-companies of paramilitary units, while a company from some battalions was split into platoons and deployed at the BoPs or other places. Paramilitary personnel were attached to the platoons to bring these units up to company strength.^[99] The army members were to stiffen these mixed units, but often the paramilitary members proved to be the weakest link.^[100][101] Thus, some of the regular army units lost cohesion and effectiveness when their regular companies were detached from them.

Logistical woes

The underdeveloped state of the Bangladeshi communication infrastructures and the river system cutting through the plains was a formidable challenge to the movement of troops and supplies. General Niazi had ordered the Pakistan army to live off the land because of logistical difficulties,^[102] and Maj. General A.O. Mittha (Quartermaster General, Pakistan Army) had recommended setting up river-transport battalions, cargo and tanker flotillas and increasing the number of vertolyotlar in the province (none of which happened).^[103] Buning o'rniga FZR 130 planes (which had played a crucial role during Operation Searchlight) were withdrawn from the province,^[104] diminishing the airlift capacity of the Pakistani forces further. The Mukti Bahini had sabotaged 231 bridges and 122 rail lines^[105] by November 1971 (thus diminishing transport capacity to 10 percent of normal), and complicated the delivery of the daily minimum 600 tons of supplies to the army units.^[106]

The Eastern Command staff kept the plan unchanged after the review; Pakistani troop deployments were not altered after the July appraisal. Pakistani units were kept at the border with the intention to withdraw them towards Dhaka after a series of defensive battles. The Eastern Command completed a final revision of the plan in October 1971, after both generals (Gul Hassan and Hamid) had visited the province.

Final plan: October 1971

General Niazi (along with General Jamshed (GOC EPCAF), General Rahim (2IC Eastern Command), Brig. Bakir (COS Eastern Command), Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore Inamul Haque Xon ) reviewed the existing plan and updated it to factor in the manpower shortage, logistical difficulties, and the directive of the GHQ to defend every inch of East Pakistan.^[107] The initial assumptions were:^[108]

• The Indian Army Eastern Command would use 12 infantry/mountain divisions and an armoured brigade for the invasion under three corps commands, supported by Mukti Bahini and BSF units.
• The Mukti Bahini would step up its activities and try to occupy border areas, (if possible) occupying a large area of the province adjacent to the border.
• The PAF in East Pakistan would last only 24 hours against the IAF Eastern Contingent.^[109]
• The main Indian assault would come from the west (opposite the Jessor sector), with a subsidiary attack from the east (opposite the Komilla sector).
• The naval detachment would move into the harbours once hostilities commenced.^[110]
• The Indian strategic objective was to occupy as much of the province as quickly as possible to set up the Bangladesh government and the Mukti Bahini in the liberated area. Full occupation of the province was not the Indian goal.

Defensive considerations

The review committee analysed four strategic concepts when formulating the revised plan:^[111]

• Deploying all available forces to defend the Dhaka Bowl along the Meghna, Jamuna and Padma Rivers. The Pakistan Army could use interior lines to switch forces as needed, and build up a strategic reserve while fighting on a narrower front. The disadvantage was that large tracts of areas outside the bowl would be lost without much effort from the invaders; India could set up the Bangladesh government easily inside the province. Also, it gave the Indians the opportunity to divert some of their forces to the west (thus threatening the balance of forces there) where a near-parity in forces was needed for a decisive result.
• Deploying in depth along the border, gradually moving towards the Dhaka Bowl. There were three problems with this concept:
  • The state of the transport network and the transport capacity of the army
  • Expected Indian air supremacy
  • Mukti Bahini activity; all could combine to hinder movements.
• "Mobile Warfare" (positional defence): While the planners agreed that this was best possible course of action (given the terrain of the province), they also noted the chance of being chased and cornered by both the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army was also greater. Indian air dominance would also pose a threat to mobility, and might unhinge the strategy. Also, a large uncommitted reserve force was needed to execute this strategy properly; the Eastern Command had no such reserves, and could not create one unless reinfiorced by West Pakistan or by abandoning the "defending every inch of the province" concept.
• The "fortress" concept: Principal towns (especially those situated at communication hubs or an expected enemy thrust axis) would be converted into fortresses and defended to the last. This concept had two advantages: it did not call for the voluntary surrender of territory, concentrated forces and required limited mobility. Also, the planners felt India would have to neutralise the fortresses by capturing them through direct assaults or keeping sufficient forces back before pushing inland; they might not have sufficient forces to threaten the Dhaka Bowl if they bypassed the fortresses.

The fortress concept was adopted; the planners decided on a single defensive deployment of troops on the border, which went against the troop deployments advocated by earlier plans. This was done to stick to the GHQ order of not surrendering any territory to the Mukti Bahini. When devising troop deployments, the planners mixed political considerations with strategic ones and envisioned a forward-leaning defence in depth:^{[112][113][114][115]}

• BoPs: East Pakistan had 370 border outposts along the Indian border, of which 90 had been occupied by Pakistani forces in an attempt to stop Mukti Bahini infiltration. Some of them had been fortified to withstand conventional assaults and airstrikes. EPCAF or regular soldiers were to man the outposts and offer initial resistance to enemy activity. Forward positions were to have supplies to last 7–15 days, and stockpiles for another 15–30 days in rear areas.^[116]
• Strong points: These positions were to be chosen by the area division commanders according to the area terrain. Each strong point was to delay the enemy advance after troops have retreated from the BoPs and regular army units had concentrated around these positions. Flanking areas and communications would be guarded by paramilitary troops. Strong points stored munitions and supplies for up to 15 days.^[117]
• Fortresses: These were major cities located on communications-network hubs. After delaying the enemy at the strong points, Pakistani units were to fall back on the fortresses and fight till the last. The fortresses were to contain rations to last 45 days, munitions for 60 days and be fortified like Tobruk Ikkinchi jahon urushida.^[118]

Defensive lines

Once the fortress defence was chosen, General Niazi and his staff designated the following cities as fortresses: Jessore, Jhenida, Bogra, Rangpur, Comilla and Bayrab Bozor (these were located on communication hubs), Jamalpur and Mymensingh (defending the northern perimeter of the Dhaka bowl), and Sylhet and Chittagong (independent defence areas). There were four lines of defence:

• The troops deployed on the border were the forward line. This was in front of the forward line envisioned in the X-Sundarbans exercise of 1967, which had deemed the whole border impossible to defend against a conventional attack.^[119] The BoPs were all located on this line.
• Fortresses: All the fortresses were located on this line except Chittagong and Sylhet, which were to be independent defensive areas. This was the forward line of the 1967 X-Sundarbans plan; it was also deemed indefensible in its entirety in that exercise.
• Dhaka Outer Defense Line: Troops from the fortresses were to retreat to this line, which ran from Pabna in the west, to Bera and Sirajganj to the north and then to Mymensingh. From Mymensingh the line went south to Bhairab Bazar; from Bhairab it ran southwest along the Meghna to Daudkandi and Chandpur, then ran northwest along the Padma to the Madhumati, along the Madhumati back to Pabna. The fortresses of Bhairab and Mymensingh were part of this line. Pabna, Bera, Chandpur, Daudkandi and Faridpur would be turned into fortresses, while Kamarkhali, Goalanda, Nagarbari and Narshindi would be strong points. Faridpur and Narshindi were turned into strong points in December; the other sites were not built up.
• Dhaka Inner Defense Line: This ran from Manikganj in the west to Kaliakair, on to Tongi, then to Naryanganj and from Naryanganj back to Manikganj. This area was to have a fortress (Naryanganj) and strong points at Kalaikair and Tongi. None were developed by December 1971.

Having chosen the defence concept and defensive lines, the Pakistan Eastern Command outlined its course of action:

• Troops deployed on the border would hold on until ordered to retreat by the GOC. Later, Gen. Niazi forbade any retreat unless units had a casualty rate of 75 percent.
• Troops would "trade space for time" and fight a delaying action, while falling back to the nearest fortress.
• The fortress would be defended to the last (which was understood as the amount of time needed for Pakistan to deliver the knockout blow in the west).
• Troop formations would fall back to the Dhaka outer line to defend Dhaka as needed.

The divisional commanders were authorised to make plans for limited counterattacks in Indian territory to aid in their defensive objectives (one of which was to maintain control of the main roads leading into the territory).

Pakistani Eastern Command assumed Indian army probable axis of advance in occupied Bangladesh, October 1971 (generic representation—not all unit locations shown

Planned Pakistani deployments

Pakistani planners assumed (based on intelligence estimates) that an Indian force of 8 to 12 infantry divisions, an armoured brigade and the Mukti Bahini would launch the invasion of East Pakistan during the winter. The Pakistani army had divided the country into four sectors:^{[120][121][122]}

Shimoliy sektor: This area is to the north of the Padma and west of the Jamuna River, encompassing the Rajhshahi, Pabna, Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur tumanlar. Pakistani planners were undecided on whether the Indian attack would come from the Siliguri Corridor south towards Bogra or on the Hili–Chilimari axis (from southwest to northeast) to cut the area in two. The division was deployed to counter both possibilities.^[123]

The 16th Infantry Division (CO Maj. Gen. Nazar Hussain Shah, HQ Bogra, then Nator) defended this area. It had the 29th Cavalry, two artillery regiments and a heavy mortar battery (the 117th Independent Mortar Battery), in addition to three infantry brigades: the 23rd (CO Brig. S.A. Ansari, HQ Rangpur), the 205th (CO Brig. Tajammul Hosain Malik, HQ Bogra) and the 34th (Brig. Mir Abdul Nayeem, HQ Nator). The general plan of defence was:

• The 23rd Brigade (8th, 25th, 48th Punjab and 26th Frontier Force Battalions) was to defend the area north of the Hili–Chilmari axis. The troops were to retreat to Dinajpur, Saidpur and Rangpur from the border areas, while Dinajpur, Saidpur, T-Junction and Thakurgaon were turned into strong points. The 48th Field regiment and one tank squadron (deployed near Thakurgaon) was also attached to this brigade. Three EPCAF wings, the 34th Punjab and a Mujahid battalion (the 86th) were also deployed in the brigade operational area. Dan shimoliy hudud Teesta daryosi was a separate defence area where the 25th Punjab, 86th Mujahid, one-wing EPCAF and the independent heavy mortar battery were located.
• The 205th Brigade (the 4th and 13th Frontier Forces and the 3rd Baloch) would defend the area between Hili (a strong point) and Naogaon, then fall back to Bogra (a fortress) and hold out. Palashbari, Phulchari and Joyporhut were turned into strong points. A squadron of tanks (deployed near Naogaon, then Hili) along with the 80th Field Artillery Regiment and a mortar battery was also attached to this brigade.
• The 34th Brigade (the 32nd Punjab and 32nd Baloch) would look after the area between Rajshahi and Naogaon, and if needed would fall back to the Outer Dhaka defence line and defend from Pabna and Bera (both proposed fortresses). Three EPCAF wings supported this brigade. A squadron of tanks was deployed near Pakshi to guard the Hardinge bridge. Sentyabr oyida, an maxsus brigade was formed in Rajshahi to block the Padma from river operations.^[124]

G'arbiy sektor: This area (south of the Padma and east of the Meghna) contained the Khulna, Jessore, Kushtia, Faridpur, Barisal va Patuaxali districts and was defended by the 9th Division (CO Maj. Gen. Ansari) made up of two infantry brigades: the 107th (CO Brig. Makhdum Hayat, HQ Jessore), covering the border from Jibannagar to the Sunderbans to the south, and the 57th (CO Brig. Manzoor Ahmed, HQ Jhenida), which covered the border from Jibannagar to the Padma in the north. Two artillery regiments, a heavy mortar battery (the 211th) and a squadron of tanks were also part of the division. Pakistani planners assumed three likely axes of advance from the Indian army:^[125][126]

• The main attack would come in the Calcutta – Banapol – Jessore axis.
• Another thrust would be made, either using the Krishnanagar – Darshana – Chuadanga axis or the Murshidabad – Rajapur – Kushtia axis.

The 107th Brigade (the 12th Punjab, the 15th and 22nd FF Battalions) was tasked with guarding the Benapol axis. This brigade was reinforced with the 38th FF in November, while the Third Independent Tank Squadron was destroyed at Garibpur 22-noyabr kuni. In addition, the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and the heavy mortar battery was attached to the brigade and the 12th and 21st Punjab Battalions were deployed near its operational area.

The 57th Brigade (the 18th Punjab and 29th Baloch) was deployed to cover the Darshana and Meherpur areas. The 49th Field Artillery regiment was attached to this brigade, and the 50th Punjab reinforced the unit in November. To defend the Hardinge Bridge, a tank squadron was placed under the Eastern Command control near Kushtia.In September an maxsus brigade – the 314th^[127] (CO Col. Fazle Hamid, one Mujahib battalion and five companies each from EPCAF and Razakars) was created to defend the city of Khulna.^[128] The 57th and 107th Brigades were to defend the border, then fall back to Jhenida and Jessore and prevent the Indians from crossing the Jessore–Jhenida road (which runs almost parallel to the border). The brigades also had the option to fall back across the Madhumati River (which formed part of the Dhaka outer defence line) and defend the area between Faridpur, Kamarkhali and Golanda.

Dhaka Bowl: Pakistani planners anticipated a brigade size attack on the Kamalpur – Sherpur – Jamalpur axis, and another along the Haluaghat – Mymensingh axis.^[129] They deemed this area impassable because of the hilly terrain on the Indian side and the Modhupur Jungle and Braxmaputra River to the north of Dhaka. The 27th Brigade initially was posted at Mymensingh, and the 53rd was in Dhaka. However, when the 27th Brigade was sent to Brahmanbaria, the 93rd Brigade (CO Brig. Abdul Qadir Khan, HQ Mymensingh) was created from units of the 27th Brigade, and the 36th maxsus Division (CO Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed Khan, HQ Dhaka) was created to replace the 14th Division. The order of battle of the 36th maxsus Division was:

• The 93rd Brigade (the 33rd Punjab and 31st Baloch, plus the 70th and 71st West Pakistan Ranger wings), supported by the two EPCAF wings and the 83rd Independent Mortar Battery was responsible for the border area between the Jamuna river and Sunamganj. It developed strong points at Kamalpur, Haluaghat and Durgapur, while Jamalpur and Mymensingh were turned into fortresses. The course of the Brahmaputra River was designated the "line of no penetration".
• The 53rd Brigade (CO Brig. Aslam Niazi, the 15th and 39th Baloch Battalions) was posted in Dhaka as command reserves and was responsible for the Dhaka inner defence line. Dhaka also had Razakar, EPCAF and other units that could be deployed for defence of the city. In November, Pakistani forces carried out a cleansing operation inside the Dhaka Bowl, but it had little effect in curbing Mukti Bahini activity.^[130]

Sharqiy sektor: This sector included the Chittagong, Noakhali, Comilla and Sylhet districts. The anticipated lines of advance were:

• The Agartala – Akhaura – Bhairab Bazar axis would be the main thrust, with another attack coming towards Maulavi Bazar – Shamshernagar and a third near Comilla.
• The 14th Division (CO: Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan, then Maj. Gen Abdul Majid Kazi) was initially HQed at Dhaka until the creation of the 36th maxsus Division to cover the Dhaka Bowl, when its HQ moved to Brahmanbaria. The 14th Division initially had four brigades: the 27th (CO Brig. Saadullah Khan, HQ Mymensingh), the 313th (Brig Iftikar Rana, HQ Sylhet), the 117th (Brig. Mansoor H. Atif, HQ Comilla) and the 53rd (Brig. Aslam Niazi, HQ Dhaka). After the review of September, it was decided to make the 14th responsible for the eastern sector encompassing the Sylhet, Comilla and Noakhali districts only. Chittagong was designated as an independent defence zone under control of the 97th Independent Brigade. Bundan tashqari, ikkitasi maxsus brigades were created: the 202nd and the 93rd, out of the units of the 14th Division. The division order of battle after September was:
• 202-chi maxsus Brigade (CO Brig. Salimullah, HQ Sylhet) was created by detaching the 31st Punjab from the 313th Brigade and incorporating elements of the 91st Mujahid and 12th Azad Kashmir Battalions. A wing each of Tochi and Thal Scouts and Khyber Rifles were also attached to the brigade, along with a battery from the 31st Field Regiment and the 88th Independent Mortar Battery. Sylhet was made a fortress, while this brigade was responsible for the border stretching from Sunamganj to the northwest of Sylhet, to Latu, to the east of that city.
• The 313th Brigade (CO Brig. Rana, 30th FF and 22nd Baloch Battalions plus elements of the 91st Mujahid Battalion) moved to Maulavi Bazar (which was developed as a strong point), and the unit was responsible for the border between Latu and Kamalganj. After resisting the expected thrust along the Maulavi Bazar – Shamshernagar front, the brigade was to move south and link up with the 27th Brigade near Brahmanbaria. Gen Niazi also envisioned this brigade launching an assault inside Tripura, if possible.
• The 27th Brigade (33rd Baloch and 12th FF Battalions) was responsible for covering the border between Kamalganj and Kasba (just north of Comilla), and would block the expected main Indian axis of advance with strong points at Akhaura and Braxmanbariya. The Eighth Independent Armored Squadron (four tanks), 10 field guns from the 31st Field Regiment, a mortar battery along with an EPCAF wing, a Mujahid battalion, units from the 21st Azak Kashmir and 48th Punjab were also part of this brigade. Brig. Saadullah anticipated a three-pronged assault on his area around Akhaura, and planned to ultimately fall back to Bhairab (which was the nearest fortress, and part of the Dhaka outer-defense line).
• The 117th Brigade (the 23rd and 30th Punjab, 25th FF Battalions and 12th Azad Kashmir, minus elements) was HQed at Mainamati (north of Comilla), which was turned into a fortress. The 53rd Field Regiment and the 117th Independent Mortar Battery were attached to this brigade, along with three EPCAF wings and a troop of tanks. This brigade was responsible for the border between Kasba (to the north of Comilla) to Belonia in Noakhali. It was to concentrate near Comilla in the event of an Indian advance, then fall back to Daudkandi and Chandpur (which were part of the Dhaka outer-defense line and designated fortresses).

Chittagong: Independent defence zone

The 97th independent Infantry Brigade (CO Brig. Ata Md. Khan Malik, HQ Chittagonng) was to cover the Chittagong fortress and hill tracks. The 24th FF Battalion (along with two EPCAF wings and a Marine battalion) guarded Chittagong itself. The Second SSG was at Kaptai while the 60th and 61st Ranger Wings were posted at Ramgarh and Koks bozori navbati bilan.

Distribution of artillery and armour

The Eastern Command could not attach an artillery regiment to each of the infantry brigades, so only the 23rd, 205th, 57th, 107th, and 117th brigades were given an artillery regiment each. An artillery regiment (the 31st) was split between the 202nd maxsus and the 27th Brigades, while elements of three other artillery regiments (the 25th, 32nd and 56th)^[131] were proportionately distributed among the other brigades as required.^[132] The 29th Cavalry was split into three independent squadrons among the 16th Division troops, while two other tank squadrons (one with the 107th Brigade and the other with the 117th Brigade) and two tank troops (one with the 36th maxsus Division and the other with the 27th Brigade) were deployed.

Pakistani deployment and final plan of defence after 19 November 1971, incorporating Pakistan Army GHQ suggestions (generic representation—some unit locations not shown

Last-minute changes: November 1971

As events unfolded in Bangladesh and the Pakistani Army began to face ever-increasing difficulties, some officers at GHQ began to have second thoughts about the existing operational plan to defend East Pakistan. General Abdul Hamid, COS of the Pakistani Army, approved of the existing deployment of troops close to the border^[133] but Lt. General Gul Hassan, CGS, had little faith in the plan Lt. Gen. Niazi had outlined to him in June.^[134] Gen. Hassan supposedly tried to get the plan revised several times and insisted on abandoning the concept of defending every inch of the province, wanted the Eastern Command to redeploy regular units away from the border, fight for the BoPs and strong points on a limited scale and ensure Dhaka Bowl had enough reserves instead of the gradual withdrawal of forces to Dhaka outlined in the existing plan.^[135] However, GHQ Rawalpindi approved in October 1971 only with the following adjustments:^[136]

• Pakistani units to launch offensive action against English Bazar in West Bengal, if possible
• Commando action to destroy Farakka barrage should be considered
• Defense of Chittagong should be formed around one infantry battalion
• Dhaka to be defended at all costs

These suggestions were incorporated in the plan without change. From September onwards Pakistani forces had begun to fortify positions with concrete bunkers, anti-tank ditches, land mines and barbed wires. Spiked bamboo was also used, and some areas were flooded to hinder enemy movements.^[137] Engineering battalions were sent to construct fortified positions, although some of the strong points and fortresses (especially those inside the Dhaka outer-defense line) remained incomplete.

Final reinforcements and directives

In November, Gen. Niazi sent Maj. Gen Jamshed and Brig. Bakir Siddiqi to Rawalpindi to request two more divisions as reinforcements (as well as all the heavy equipment left behind by the 9th and 16th Divisions for East Pakistan). The GHQ promised to send 8 infantry battalions and an engineer battalion;^[138] only five battalions were sent to East Pakistan because the GHQ probably could not spare anything else.^[139][140] The first two units (the 38th FF and 50th Punjab) were given to the 9th Division. The next three battalions were split up and sent as reinforcements to various areas, as needed.^[141] The last three battalions were to replace the 53rd Brigade as command reserves in Dhaka, but never arrived from West Pakistan. At the meeting, the Eastern Command was told to continue its "political mission" (i.e. prevent territory from falling into Mukti Bahini hands), although by this time 5,000 square miles (13,000 km²) of territory had fallen into their hands. Gen Niazi claims this order was never withdrawn,^[142] and Gen. Hassan suggested that Gen. Hamid never altered the plan Gen. Niazi had submitted in October (including the deployment of troops near the border).^[143] The GHQ never commented on the deployment plan,^[144] while others claim the Eastern Command failed to readjust its deployments despite advice from GHQ.^[145]

39th ad-hoc Division

In November 1971, Rawalpindi GHQ warned the Eastern Command that the Indian army would launch the main attack from the east. Gen. Niazi and Gen. Rahim identified the axis of the main attack as:^[146]

• South of Comilla, towards Mudafarganj and Chandpur
• East of Belonia, from Ramgarh janub tomon Chittagong

Gen Niazi split the 14th Division and transferred the 117th Brigade to the newly created 39th maxsus Division (CO Maj. Gen. Rahim, HQ Chandpur), which also included the 53rd (CO Brig. Aslam Niazi, HQ Feni ) and the 91st maxsus Brigade (CO Brig. Mian Taskeen Uddin, HQ Chittagong). The deployment of the troops was:

• The 117th Brigade was to cover the area from Kasba to the north of Comilla to Chauddagram in the south. After fighting at the border, the force was to redeploy around the Mainamati fortress and then fall back to defend Daudkandi (which was on the Dhaka outer-defense line).
• The 53rd Brigade (the 15th and 39th Baloch, plus elements of the 21st Azad Kashmir Battalion) was transferred from the command reserve to guard the border from Chaddagram to Beloniya. This brigade was to fall back to Chandpur, a fortress located on the Dhaka outer-defense line after its initial defence of Feni and Laksham.
• 91-chi maxsus Brigade (the 24th FF battalion, one Ranger and one Mujahid battalion and elements of the 21st Azad Kashmir) was to guard the Belonia – Ramgarh maydon. It was to fall back to Chittagong after defending the area. The 48th Baloch was sent to the 97th Brigade in Chittagong after the 24th FF was given to the 91st Brigade.

Xulosa

The final plan was created to meet both political and strategic objectives, and its success depended on two crucial factors: predicting the possible Indian axis of advance correctly, and the ability of the Pakistani troops to fall back to their designated areas in the face of Indian air superiority and Mukti Bahini activity. The Pakistani Eastern Command was fighting a holding action cut off from reinforcements and without any reserves to counter unforeseen developments, and its ultimate success lay in Pakistan defeating India in the west. If any of the factors deviated from the assumed norm of the plan, the Eastern Command was without the resources to win on its own. The Pakistani army had been fighting the insurgency nonstop for eight months and was severely fatigued^[147] and short of supplies; in addition, the deployment near the border had robbed them of the manoeuvrability needed for a flexible defence.^[148]

Shuningdek qarang

• Mitro Bahini jang tartibi
• Pokiston armiyasining jang tartibi, 1971 yil dekabr
• Bangladeshni ozod qilish urushining harbiy rejalari
• Bangladeshni ozod qilish urushi xronologiyasi
• Hind-Pokiston urushlari va mojarolari

Adabiyotlar

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Qo'shimcha o'qish

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