Tokioning bombalanishi (1945 yil 10 mart) - Bombing of Tokyo (10 March 1945)

Tokioning bombalanishi
Qismi Tokioning bombalanishi va Yaponiyaga havo hujumlari davomida Ikkinchi jahon urushi
Vayron qilingan binolarning katta maydonidan o'tib, yo'l bo'ylab ketayotgan odamlarning oq-qora fotosurati
1945 yil 10 martda vayron bo'lgan Tokioning bir qismi orqali o'tadigan yo'l, havo hujumi
Sana1945 yil 9-mart
Manzil
Tokio, Yaponiya
NatijaAmerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining g'alabasi
Urushayotganlar
 Qo'shma Shtatlar Yaponiya
Qo'mondonlar va rahbarlar
Kertis LeMay
Tomas S. Quvvat		Shizuichi Tanaka
Jalb qilingan birliklar
XXI bombardimonchi qo'mondoni1-zenit bo'limi
10-havo bo'limi
Kuch
325 bombardimonchi
(279 bombardimonchi nishonga olingan)		Taxminan 638 ta zenit qurollari
90 ta qiruvchi samolyot
Professional va oddiy o't o'chiruvchilar
Yo'qotishlar va yo'qotishlar
14 ta samolyot yo'q qilindi
96 ekipaj halok bo'lgan yoki bedarak yo'qolgan		90,000 dan 100,000 o'ldirilgan (eng keng tarqalgan taxminlar)
Bir milliondan ortiq uysizlar
267 171 ta bino vayron qilingan

1945 yil 9/10-martga o'tar kechasi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasining havo kuchlari (USAAF) halokatli o'tkazdi o't o'chirish reyd Tokio, Yaponiya poytaxti. Ushbu hujum kod nomi bilan atalgan Uchrashuv uyi USAAF tomonidan va sifatida tanilgan Buyuk Tokio havo reydi Yaponiyada.[1] Bomba 279 dan tushdi Boeing B-29 Superfortress og'ir bombardimonchilar Tokioning sharqiy qismida yoqib yuborildi. 90 mingdan ziyod va ehtimol 100 mingdan ortiq yaponiyaliklar o'ldirildi, aksariyati tinch aholi va bir million kishi uysiz qoldi, bu uni eng halokatli singlga aylantirdi havo hujumi insoniyat tarixida. Yaponiya havo va fuqaro muhofazasi asosan etarli emasligini isbotladi; 14 ta Amerika samolyoti va 96 ta aviatsiya xodimi halok bo'ldi.

Tokioga qarshi hujum kuchaygan edi Yaponiyaga havo hujumlari 1944 yil iyun oyida boshlangan. Ushbu operatsiyadan oldin USAAF asosiy e'tiborni a aniq bombardimon qilish Yaponiya sanoat ob'ektlariga qarshi kampaniya. Ushbu hujumlar umuman muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi, bu esa otashin bombalashga o'tishga qaror qildi. 10 martning dastlabki soatlarida o'tkazilgan operatsiya Yaponiyaning bir shahriga qarshi birinchi yirik otashin hujumi edi va USAAF bo'linmalari aniq reydlarda qo'llanilgan taktikalardan ancha farqli taktikalarni qo'lladilar, shu jumladan past balandlikda uchayotgan samolyot bilan tunda bombardimon qilishdi. Bosqin natijasida vujudga kelgan keng qirg'inlar ushbu taktikalarning urush oxirigacha USAAF B-29 samolyotlari uchun standart bo'lishiga olib keldi.

10-mart kuni Tokioning o't o'chirish bombasi axloqi to'g'risida uzoq davom etgan munozaralar bo'lib o'tdi. Bosqin ko'pincha ittifoqchilarni tanqid qilishda asosiy misol sifatida keltiriladi strategik bombardimon kampaniyalari, ko'plab tarixchilar va sharhlovchilarning ta'kidlashicha, USAAF tomonidan tinch aholini qasddan nishonga olish maqsadga muvofiq emasligi va boshqa tarixchilarning ta'kidlashicha, aniq bombardimon kampaniyasi muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchraganligi sababli USAAF hududni bombardimon qilish taktikasiga o'tishdan boshqa chorasi yo'q. Odatda Tokioga qarshi va shu kabi keyingi reydlarda qo'llanilgan taktikalar harbiy jihatdan muvaffaqiyatli bo'lganligi tan olinadi. Hujum ikki rasmiy yodgorlikda, bir nechta mahalla yodgorliklarida va xususiy ravishda boshqariladigan muzeyda eslanadi.

Fon

Shuningdek qarang: Yaponiyaga havo hujumlari va Tokioning bombalanishi

Urushgacha bo'lgan USAAF doktrinasi asosiy sanoat ob'ektlarini aniq bombardimon qilishni ta'kidladi hududni bombardimon qilish shaharlar. Amerikaning dastlabki strategik bombardimi Germaniyaga qarshi hujumlar bombardimonchilar ekipaji o'z maqsadlarini vizual ravishda aniqlashga intilib, aniq taktikalardan foydalangan. Bunga amalda erishish qiyin bo'ldi. Evropada urushning so'nggi 20 oyi davomida vizual bo'lmagan hujumlar Amerikaning Germaniyaga qarshi strategik bombardimon kampaniyasining taxminan yarmini tashkil etdi. Ular orasida hududni bombardimon qilish bo'yicha yirik reydlar ham bor edi Berlin va Drezden, shuningdek, bir nechta shahar va shaharlarga hujumlar Klarion operatsiyasi.[2] Amerikaning Germaniyaga hujumlari asosan ishlatilgan yuqori portlovchi bomba, bilan olovli bomba tashlanganlarning atigi 14 foizini tashkil qiladi Sakkizinchi havo kuchlari.[3] Inglizlar Bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi 1942 yil boshidan urush oxirigacha Germaniya shaharlarini vayron qilishga qaratilgan edi va otashinlar uning samolyotlari tashlagan bomba tonnasining 21 foizini tashkil qildi.[4] Germaniya shaharlarini Ittifoq kuchlari tomonidan bombardimon qilish yuz minglab tinch aholining o'limiga va shu kabi shaharlarda katta yong'in bo'ronlariga olib keldi. Gamburg va Drezden.[5]

Ikkinchi jahon urushi davrida bomba chiqarayotgan bombardimonchi samolyotining oq-qora fotosurati. Bomba tarqoq tarzda tushmoqda.
Yaponiya ustidan odatdagi bombalarni tashlagan B-29. Bomba shamol tomonidan tarqalmoqda, bu odatiy hodisa bo'lib, aniq bombardimon qilishni qiyinlashtirdi.

Yaponiya kuchlari hududni portlatishdi Xitoy shaharlariga hujumlar urush davomida.[6] Sanoat ob'ektlarini nishonga olishga bir necha bor urinishlar qilindi, bu kampaniya maqsadi tinch aholini qo'rqitish va Xitoy kuchlarini ta'minot manbalaridan uzib qo'yish edi. Chonging, Xitoyning vaqtinchalik poytaxti edi tez-tez hujum qilishadi yoqish va yuqori portlovchi bomba ishlatadigan samolyotlar tomonidan. Ushbu reydlar shaharning katta qismini vayron qildi.[7]

Amerika Doolittle reydi 1942 yil 18-aprelda birinchi bo'ldi Tokioga havo hujumi, ammo shaharga ozgina zarar etkazdi.[8] 1944 yil iyun oyida USAAF XX bombardimonchi qo'mondoni B-29 Superfortress bombardimonchilaridan foydalangan holda Yaponiyaga qarshi kampaniyani boshladi Xitoyda aerodromlardan uchib. Tokio Xitoyda ishlaydigan Superfortresses doirasidan tashqarida edi va unga hujum qilinmadi.[9] Bu 1944 yil oktyabrda, B-29 samolyotlari bo'lganida o'zgargan XXI bombardimonchi qo'mondoni aerodromlarga ko'chishni boshladi Mariana orollari. Ushbu orollar Yaponiyaga B-29 samolyotlari Tokioga va Yaponiyaning boshqa ko'plab shaharlariga qarshi doimiy bombardimon kampaniyasini o'tkazish uchun etarlicha yaqin edi.[9] The birinchi Superfortress parvozi Tokio orqali 1 kuni bo'lib o'tdi Noyabr, razvedka samolyoti shaharning g'arbiy tumanlaridagi sanoat ob'ektlari va shahar joylarini suratga olganida.[10][11] Tokioning qolgan qismi keyingi razvedka parvozlarida suratga olingan va bu tasvirlar 10 martdagi reyd va shahar joylariga qilingan boshqa hujumlarni rejalashtirish uchun ishlatilgan.[12]

Yaponiyaga qarshi strategik bombardimon kampaniyasining umumiy rejasida u muhim sanoat ob'ektlariga qarshi aniq bombardimon reydlari bilan boshlanishi va keyinchalik shaharlarga otashin bombardimon qilinishini o'z ichiga olgan.[13] Uning birinchi bo'limi tomonidan bombardimonchilarning XXI qo'mondonligiga berilgan birinchi maqsadli ko'rsatma Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari, 1944 yil 11-noyabrda asosiy maqsad Yaponiya samolyotlari va aviatsiya dvigatellari zavodlari ekanligi aniqlandi. Ushbu nishonlarga aniq bombardimon qilish kerak edi. Yaponiya shaharlari ikkinchi darajali maqsad sifatida ko'rsatilgan hududni bombardimon qilish ulardan foydalanishga ruxsat berilgan. Shuningdek, yo'riqnomada ushbu taktikaning samaradorligini sinab ko'rish uchun shaharlarga qarshi otishma reydlari buyurilishi mumkinligi ko'rsatilgan.[14] Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari g'ayrioddiy qo'mondonlik tuzilmasiga ega edi, chunki uni shaxsan general boshqargan Genri X. Arnold, USAAF qo'mondoni.[15]

Tokioga B-29 reydlari 24 noyabrda boshlangan. Birinchi reyd shahar chetidagi samolyot dvigatellari ishlab chiqaradigan zavodni nishonga oldi va ozgina zarar etkazdi.[9] XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining Tokio va boshqa shaharlarga keyingi reydlari asosan aniq bombardimon taktikasi va yuqori portlovchi bomba ishlatilgan va ob-havo sharoiti va B-29 samolyotlariga ta'sir ko'rsatadigan bir qator mexanik muammolar tufayli asosan muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lgan.[9] Ushbu muvaffaqiyatsizliklar qo'mondonlik boshlig'ining 1945 yil yanvar oyida bo'shatilishiga olib keldi. General-mayor Kertis LeMay, uning o'rnini XX bomba qo'mondoni qo'mondoni egalladi.[9] Arnold va Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari shtab-kvartirasi o'sha paytgacha Yaponiyaga qarshi olib borilgan kampaniyani muvaffaqiyatsiz deb hisoblashdi va LeMay, agar u natija berolmasa, u ham yengil tortishini tushundi. LeMay, diqqatni aniq bombardimon qilishdan hududni bombardimon qilishgacha o'zgartirish, XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi faoliyatini o'zgartirish uchun eng istiqbolli variant deb hisobladi.[16]

Tayyorgarlik

Yaponiyaga erta yoqish reydlari

USAAF rejalashtiruvchilari 1943 yilda Yaponiya shaharlariga qarshi otishma kampaniyasining maqsadga muvofiqligini baholashni boshladilar. Yaponiyaning asosiy sanoat ob'ektlari bunday hujumlarga moyil edi, chunki ular bir nechta yirik shaharlarda to'plangan va ishlab chiqarishning katta qismi uylarda va kichik fabrikalarda sodir bo'lgan. shahar hududlari. Rejalashtiruvchilar Yaponiyaning oltita eng yirik shaharlarida yoqib yuborilgan bomba hujumlari sanoat korxonalarining deyarli 40 foiziga jismoniy zarar etkazishi va 7,6 million oylik ishchi kuchini yo'qotishiga olib kelishi mumkinligini taxmin qilishdi. Shuningdek, ushbu hujumlar 500 mingdan ortiq odamni o'ldirishi, 7,75 millionga yaqin uysiz qolishi va deyarli 3,5 millionni evakuatsiya qilishga majbur qilishi taxmin qilingan.[17][18] 1943 yilda ishlab chiqarilgan Yaponiyaga qarshi strategik bombardimon qilish rejalari, bu 1945 yil mart oyida bo'lishi kutilgan kampaniyaning yarmida sanoat maqsadlarini aniq bombardimon qilishdan maydonni bombardimon qilishga o'tishini belgilab qo'ydi.[19]

Muzey qutisidagi ikkita zanglagan naychaning rangli fotosurati
Da namoyish etilgan ikkita M69 yondirgich Niigata prefekturasi tarix muzeyi

Yaponiyaga qarshi otishma reydlariga tayyorgarlik 1945 yil mart oyidan ancha oldin boshlangan edi. 1943 yilda USAAF tutashgan joyda yondiruvchi bomba samaradorligini sinovdan o'tkazdi. Nemis va Yapon - uy sharoitida qurilish komplekslari Dugway isbotlanadigan zamin.[20][21] Ushbu sinovlar buni ko'rsatdi M69 yoqish vositalari boshqarib bo'lmaydigan yong'inlarni boshlashda ayniqsa samarali bo'lgan. Ushbu qurollar B-29 samolyotlaridan tashlab yuborilgan klasterlar va ishlatilgan napalm ularning yondiruvchi to'ldiruvchisi sifatida. Bomba erga urilgandan so'ng, sug'urta birinchi bo'lib quroldan napalm sepib, keyin uni yoqib yubordi.[22] 1945 yil martgacha Mariana orollarida yoqib yuboradigan bomba zaxiralari qurilgan edi. Bular Bombardimonchilarning XXI qo'mondonligi rejalari asosida to'plangan bo'lib, unda B-29 samolyotlari har biri o'zlarining oylik turlarining 40 foizidan 4 ta qisqa tonna (3,6 tonna) qurol olib yurishlari kerakligi ko'rsatilgan edi.[23] Arnold va Havo Xodimlari Yaponiyaning shahar mudofaasini engib o'tish uchun keng miqyosli otashin bombasi dasturi o'rnatilgunga qadar yondirgichlardan foydalanishni kutmoqchi edilar.[24]

Yaponiya shaharlariga qarshi otishma bomba samaradorligini tekshirish uchun bir necha reydlar o'tkazildi. 1944 yil 29/30-noyabrga o'tar kechasi Tokioga qarshi kichik olovli hujum uyushtirildi, ammo ozgina zarar etkazdi. Yondirgichlar, shuningdek, boshqa bir qator reydlarning bir qismi sifatida ishlatilgan.[25] 18-dekabr 84-kunida XX-Bomber qo'mondonligi B-29s Xitoyning shahariga o't ochdi Xankou katta zarar etkazgan.[26] O'sha kuni, Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligini 100 ta B-29 samolyotlarini jo'natishga yo'naltirdi yong'inga qarshi bomba qarshi Nagoya. Dastlabki hujum 22-dekabr kuni bo'lib o'tdi, u aviatsiya zavodiga qaratilgan va aniq bombardimon taktikasidan foydalangan holda 78 bombardimonchi ishtirok etgan. Yondirgichlardan bir nechtasi maqsad qilingan maydonga tushdi.[25] 3 kuni Yanvar oyida Nagoyaga 97 ta superfortresslar yuborildi. Ushbu hujum ba'zi yong'inlarni boshladi, ular tez orada o't o'chiruvchilar tomonidan nazoratga olindi. Bosqinga qarshi kurashdagi muvaffaqiyat Yaponiya hukumatini shaharlarni yoqib yuboruvchi hujumlardan himoya qilish qobiliyatiga haddan tashqari ishonch hosil qilishga undadi.[27] Keyingi yong'inga qarshi bomba hujumi qarshi qaratilgan Kobe 4 kuni Fevral oyida 69 ta B-29 samolyotidan otilgan bombalar yong'inlarni boshladi, ular 1039 ta binolarni yo'q qildi yoki buzdi.[28]

19 fevralda Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi uchun yangi yo'naltirilgan ko'rsatma chiqardi. Yaponiya aviatsiyasi sanoati asosiy maqsad bo'lib qolsa-da, yo'riqnoma Yaponiya shaharlariga qarshi otishma reydlariga kuchliroq e'tibor qaratdi.[29] Shuningdek, yo'riqnoma iloji boricha tezroq keng miqyosli sud qo'zg'atuvchisi reydini o'tkazishni talab qildi.[30] Ushbu hujum Tokioga qarshi 25 fevralda qilingan. Jami 231 ta B-29 jo'natildi, ulardan 172 tasi shahar ustidan etib keldi; bu XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining o'sha paytgacha eng katta reydi edi. Hujum kunduzi amalga oshirildi, bombardimonchilar yuqori balandliklarda shakllanib uchishdi. Bu katta zarar etkazdi, deyarli 28000 bino vayron bo'ldi. Bu Yaponiyaga qarshi olib borilgan eng vayronkor reyd edi va LeMay va Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari keng miqyosli otashin bombardimonining samarali taktika ekanligini namoyish qildi, deb qaror qildilar.[31][32]

4-da Tokiodagi aviatsiya zavodiga aniq bombardimon hujumining muvaffaqiyatsizligi Mart oyida bombardimonchilarning XXI qo'mondonligi birinchi navbatda bunday reydlarni o'tkazgan davr tugadi.[33] Ushbu operatsiyalar paytida tinch aholining talofati nisbatan past bo'lgan; Masalan, 10 martgacha Tokioga qarshi o'tkazilgan barcha reydlar shaharda 1292 kishining o'limiga sabab bo'lgan.[34][35]

Tokioga hujum qilishga tayyorgarlik

Mart oyining boshlarida LeMay, Yaponiyaning sanoat maqsadlarini yanada aniq bombardimon qilish mamlakat bo'ylab hukm surayotgan ob-havo sharoiti tufayli muvaffaqiyatli bo'lishi mumkin emas deb qaror qildi. Har oy o'rtacha 7 kunlik osmon va shiddatli havo bor edi reaktiv oqim yuqori balandlikdan bombalarni nishonga olishni qiyinlashtirdi. Ushbu cheklovlar tufayli LeMay XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining hujumlarini Yaponiya shaharlariga qaratishga qaror qildi.[36] U ushbu qarorni o'z tashabbusi bilan qabul qilgan bo'lsa-da, LeMay-ga berilgan umumiy ko'rsatmalar bunday operatsiyalarga ruxsat berdi.[37] 5-kuni XXI mart bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining shaxsiy tarkibiga 9-ga qadar boshqa yirik hujumlar rejalashtirilmasligi tavsiya qilindi Mart. Ushbu davrda LeMay xodimlari Tokioga hujum rejalarini yakunladilar.[38] 7-dagi uchrashuvda Mart oyida LeMay orolda nishonlarga qarshi juda ko'p reydlar o'tkazishga rozi bo'ldi Xonsyu 9 orasida va 22 mart kunlari uchun tayyorgarlik doirasida Okinavani bosib olish 1-da Aprel.[39]

LeMay ushbu kampaniya uchun tubdan boshqacha taktikalarni qo'llashga qaror qildi. XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi xodimlari tomonidan 25 fevral reydining tahlili shuni xulosaga keltirdiki, yondiruvchi bombalar juda balanddan tashlangan va quyi darajalarda hujum qilish aniqlikni yaxshilaydi va B-29 samolyotlariga ko'proq bomba tashiydi.[Izoh 1] Bu ularni Yaponiyaning havo hujumidan himoya qilishiga olib keladi, ammo LeMay Yaponiyaning yong'in nazorati taktikasi qo'shimcha xavf mo''tadilligini anglatishini aytdi.[41] Kechasi va Yaponiyada ob-havo sharoiti qulayroq bo'lganligi sababli LORAN navigatsiyada ishlatiladigan B-29 tizimlari kech tushgandan keyin samaraliroq edi, hujumni tunda ham amalga oshirishga qaror qilindi.[42] Bu B-29 samolyotlarini tunda ushlab turishning iloji bo'lmaganligi sababli samolyotni birlashmalarga emas, balki alohida hujumga yo'naltirish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilishga olib keldi. Shaxsiy uchish, shuningdek, yoqilg'i sarfini kamaytirishga olib keladi, chunki uchuvchilar dvigatellarini doimiy ravishda shakllantirishga majbur qilishlari shart emas. Ushbu yoqilg'ini tejash Superfortresses-ga odatdagi bomba yukidan ikki barobar ko'proq yuk ko'tarishga imkon berdi.[43] USAAF razvedkasi yaponlarda atigi ikkitasi borligini aniqlagan tungi jangchi birliklarni tashkil etdi va ular ozgina xavf tug'dirmaydi. Natijada, LeMay samolyotning og'irligini kamaytirish va ular ko'taradigan bomba og'irligini yanada oshirish uchun samolyotning orqa qismidagi qurollardan boshqa barcha B-29 qurollarini olib tashlashga qaror qildi.[42][44][45] LeMay yangi taktikani qabul qilish to'g'risida yakuniy qarorga kelganida, u o'zining rejasida ko'plab ofitserlar tomonidan ilgari surilgan g'oyalarni birlashtirganini tan oldi.[46] 7-kuni Mart oyida, B-29 ekipajlarining ba'zilari past balandlikdagi nishonga o'tish va hujum qilish uchun radar yordamida mashq qilishgan mashqlarni bajarishdi. Ushbu mashg'ulotning maqsadi aviatsiya xodimlariga aytilmagan.[47]

XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining uchta uchishini boshqargan zobitlar qanotlar yangi taktika bilan kelishib oldilar, ammo ular katta talofatlarga olib kelishi mumkin degan xavotirlar mavjud edi.[42] Ushbu xavotirlarni LeMayning ba'zi xodimlari baham ko'rishdi. XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining razvedka xizmati xodimlari bombardimonchilarning 70 foizini yo'q qilish mumkinligini taxmin qilishdi.[48] LeMay Arnoldning shtab boshlig'i Brigada generali bilan maslahatlashdi Lauris Norstad yangi taktika haqida, lekin rasmiy ravishda ularni qabul qilish uchun rozilik izlamadi. Keyinchalik u ushbu harakatni Arnoldni aybdan himoya qilmoqchi bo'lganligi sababli hujum muvaffaqiyatsiz tugaganligi sababli oqladi.[44] LeMay Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari shtab-kvartirasini 8-kuni mo'ljallangan taktikasi to'g'risida xabardor qildi Mart, Arnold va Norstad yo'q bo'lishini bilgan kun. LeMay, Yigirmanchi havo kuchlari tinch aholi punktlarini bombardimon qilishga qarshi chiqadi deb kutganligi haqida hech qanday dalil yo'q, ammo u yangi taktika juda xavfli deb qaror qilganidan xavotirda bo'lishi mumkin edi.[49]

Yaponiya mudofaasi

Yaponiya harbiylari USAAF Tokio mintaqasiga katta tunda hujumlar uyushtirishini kutishgan. 1944 yil dekabr va 1945 yil yanvar oylari davomida mintaqada bir necha bor tungi reydlar o'tkazilgandan so'ng Yaponiya imperatorlik armiyasi harbiy havo kuchlari 10-havo bo'limi, hujumlarni to'xtatish uchun mas'ul bo'lgan Kantu viloyati, uchuvchilarni tunda ishlashga o'rgatishga ko'proq e'tibor qaratdi. Divizionlardan biri polklar (53-havo polki) shuningdek, maxsus tungi qiruvchi qismga aylantirildi.[50] 3-martdan 4-martga o'tar kechasi Yaponiya harbiylari Amerikaning radio signallarini tutib oldilar, bu esa XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi tunda uchish bo'yicha katta mashqlar o'tkazayotganligini ko'rsatdi. Bu kuchning Yaponiyaga tungi reydlarni boshlashga tayyorgarlik ko'rayotganligini anglatgan.[51] Biroq, yaponlar amerikaliklarning past balandlikdagi bombardimon taktikasiga o'tishini kutmagan edilar.[52]

Tokioni himoya qilish uchun tayinlangan harbiy kuchlar katta reydni to'xtatish uchun etarli emas edi. The Sharqiy okrug armiyasi Kanto havo mudofaasi sektori Tokio mintaqasining havo hujumidan mudofaasi uchun mas'ul bo'lgan va samolyotlar uchun eng ustuvor vazifaga ega bo'lgan. zenit qurollari.[53][Izoh 2] The 1-zenit bo'limi markaziy Xonsyu hududida joylashgan zenit qurollarini, shu jumladan Tokioni boshqargan. U jami 780 ta zenit qurollari bo'lgan sakkizta polkdan, shuningdek, jihozlangan polkdan iborat edi. qidiruv yoritgichlari.[55] Amerika harbiy razvedkasi reyd paytida Tokioning mudofaasiga 331 ta og'ir va 307 ta engil zenit qurollari ajratilgan deb taxmin qildi.[56] Tarmoq piketli qayiqlar, radar stantsiyalar va kuzatuv postlari kiruvchi reydlarni aniqlash uchun javobgardilar.[57] Yaponiyalik zenitchilar radar va boshqa yong'inni boshqarish vositalarining etishmasligi tufayli tunda ishlaydigan samolyotlarni nishonga olishda qiynalishdi.[58] Radar stantsiyalari qisqa masofaga ega edi va zenit batareyalari uchun yong'inni boshqarish uskunalari sodda edi.[59] 1945 yil mart oyidan boshlab 10-havo diviziyasining 210 ta jangovar samolyotlarining aksariyati kunduzgi jangchilar bo'lib, 53-havo polkida 25 yoki 26 tungi jangchilar faoliyat ko'rsatgan.[60] Polk tungi jangovar rolga o'tishda qiyinchiliklarga duch keldi, bu uchuvchilarni charchatadigan o'ta intensiv o'quv dasturini o'z ichiga olgan.[61]

Tokioning fuqarolik himoyasi ham etishmayotgan edi. Shaharning yong'in xavfsizligi bo'limi 287 ta o't o'chirish punktlari orasida tarqalgan 8000 ga yaqin o't o'chiruvchilarni o'z ichiga olgan, ammo ularda zamonaviy o't o'chirish uskunalari kam bo'lgan.[62] Yong'in bo'limi tomonidan ishlatilgan yong'inni o'chirish taktikasi yoqish bombalariga qarshi samarasiz edi.[63] Fuqarolar nominal kuchi 2,75 million kishini tashkil etuvchi 140 mingdan ziyod mahalla yong'in o'chirish birlashmalariga uyushgan, ammo ular ham jihozlanmagan.[64] Yong'in o'chirish birlashmalariga berilgan asosiy jihozlar M69-lar tomonidan boshlangan yong'inlarni o'chirishga qodir emas edi.[63] Kam havo hujumi boshpanalari qurilgan edi, ammo aksariyat uy xo'jaliklari xom qazishgan tulki teshiklari uylari yaqinida boshpana qilish.[65] Yong'in buzilishlari olov tarqalishini to'xtatish maqsadida shahar bo'ylab yaratilgan; Ushbu harakatlar doirasida 200 mingdan ortiq uylar vayron qilingan. Yong'in chiqindilaridan ko'pincha xarobalar tozalanmagan, bu esa yoqilg'i manbai bo'lgan. Yaponiya hukumati, shuningdek, bolalarni va oddiy ish bilan band bo'lgan fuqarolarni rag'batlantirdi Tokioni evakuatsiya qilish, va 1,7 million 1945 yil martigacha ketgan edi.[66] Shu bilan birga, ko'plab boshqa fuqarolar shu davrda qashshoq qishloqlardan Tokioga ko'chib kelishgan.[67]

Hujum

Tokioning qora va oq xaritasi shaharning turli havo hujumlarida vayron bo'lgan joylari bilan soyalangan
Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida vayron qilingan Tokio hududlarini aks ettiruvchi xarita. 9/10-mart kuni o'tkazilgan reyd paytida yonib ketgan maydon qora rang bilan belgilangan.

Chiqish

8 mart kuni LeMay ertasi kuni kechasi Tokioga yirik yong'in bombasi hujumi uchun buyruq chiqardi.[68] Bosqin Tokioning shimoli-sharqidagi USAAF tomonidan I zonasini belgilangan to'rtburchaklar shaklidagi maydonni nishonga olishi kerak edi, u taxminan 6,4 km (4,8 km) masofani 4 milya (4,8 km) ga teng edi. Ushbu maydon Sumida daryosi va ko'pchiligini o'z ichiga olgan Asakusa, Honjo va Fukagava Palatalar.[69] Ushbu palatalar norasmiy ravishda belgilangan qismning bir qismini tashkil etdi Shitamachi asosan ishchilar va hunarmandlar yashaydigan Tokioning tumani.[70] Aholisi 1,1 million atrofida bo'lib, u dunyodagi eng zich joylashgan shaharlardan biri edi.[71] I zonada bir nechta harbiy ahamiyatga ega bo'lgan sanoat ob'ektlari mavjud edi, ammo Yaponiyaning urush sanoatini ta'minlaydigan ko'plab kichik fabrikalar mavjud edi. Hudud yong'inga qarshi bomba ta'sirida juda zaif edi, chunki binolarning aksariyati yog'och va bambukdan qurilgan va ular bir-biriga yaqin joylashgan.[52] Ushbu zaiflik tufayli u katta zarar ko'rdi va yong'inlardan katta yo'qotishlarga duch keldi 1923 yil Kantoning zilzilasi. Qo'shma Shtatlarning razvedka xizmatlari mintaqaning o'qqa tutilishi qanchalik zaifligidan xabardor edi Strategik xizmatlar idorasi uni Tokioning eng yonuvchan tumanlarini o'z ichiga olgan deb baholang.[72]

Hujumning B-29 ekipajlariga berilgan buyruqlarida, hujumning asosiy maqsadi maqsad qilingan hududda joylashgan ko'plab kichik zavodlarni yo'q qilish ekanligi ta'kidlangan, shuningdek, bu ishlab chiqarishni to'xtatish vositasi sifatida fuqarolarning qurbon bo'lishiga sabab bo'lganligi ta'kidlangan. yirik sanoat ob'ektlarida.[73] XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining har uch qanotidan portlash uchun balandligi 1500 metrdan (1500 m) va 7000 fut (2100 m) gacha bo'lgan masofada ajratilgan. Ushbu balandliklar Yaponiyaning engil zenit qurollariga etib borish uchun juda baland deb hisoblangan va og'ir zenit qurollarining samarali ta'sir doirasidan pastroq.[56]

LeMay reydni shaxsan o'zi boshqarolmadi, chunki uning rivojlanishi haqida ma'lumot berilgandan so'ng uni qo'lga olish mumkin bo'lgan vaziyatga tushirish taqiqlangan edi. atom bombalari.[44] Buning o'rniga hujumni 314-bombardimon qanoti qo'mondon, brigada generali Tomas S. Quvvat.[74] LeMay Pauerni qanot qo'mondonlarining eng yaxshisi deb bilgan.[75] Operatsiyada qo'llanilishi kerak bo'lgan yangi taktikalar ko'plab havo kuchlari tomonidan yaxshi qabul qilinmadi, chunki ular balandlikdan bombardimon qilish xavfsizroq deb hisobladilar va mudofaa qurollarini saqlashni afzal ko'rishdi.[45] Keraksiz qurolchilarni ortda qoldirish ham ko'plab samolyot xodimlarini bezovta qildi, chunki bombardimonchilar ekipajlari odatda juda yaqin munosabatlarga ega edilar.[76]

Hujumga tayyorgarlik jarayonida XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining texnik xizmat ko'rsatuvchi xodimlari 36 soat davomida intensiv ravishda iloji boricha ko'proq samolyotlarni tayyorladilar. Ushbu harakat muvaffaqiyatli bo'ldi va B-29 samolyotlarining 83 foizi o'rtacha xizmat ko'rsatish darajasi 60 foizga nisbatan harakatga tayyor edi. Boshqa quruqlik ekipaji samolyotga bomba va yoqilg'i yuklagan.[77] Jami 346 ta B-29 samolyoti tayyorlandi. The 73-bombardimon qanoti 169 ta B-29 va 313-bombardimon qanoti 121; ikkala birlik ham asoslangan edi Saypan. Bosqin paytida 314-bombardimon qanoti etib kelayotgan edi Guam Marianalarda va faqat 56 ta B-29 samolyotini taqdim etishga qodir.[44] Avval Tokio ustidan etib kelishi kerak bo'lgan otryad tarkibidagi B-29 samolyotlari qurollangan M47 bombalari; Ushbu qurollar napalmdan foydalangan va yong'inlarni boshlashga qodir bo'lgan, bu esa boshqarishni mexanizatsiyalashgan o't o'chirish uskunalarini talab qiladi. Boshqa bo'linmalardagi bombardimonchilar M69 klasterlari bilan to'ldirilgan.[68] 73 va 313-bombalar qanotlarining superfortresslari har biriga 7 ta qisqa tonna (6,4 tonna) bomba yuklangan. 314-bombardimon qanotining B-29 samolyotlari uzoqroq masofani bosib o'tishlari kerak bo'lganligi sababli, ularning har biri 5 ta qisqa tonna (4,5 tonna) bomba tashishgan.[56]

Hujum kuchlari 9-kuni mahalliy vaqt bilan soat 17:35 da o'z bazalarini tark etishni boshladi Mart. Uchish uchun jo'natilgan 325 ta B-29 samolyotining uchi uch va uch soat davom etdi.[52][56] Turbulans Yaponiyaga parvoz paytida uchratilgan, ammo Tokio ustidan ob-havo yaxshi edi. Kichkina bulutli bulut bor edi va ko'rinadigan joy bombardimonchilarning birinchi ekipajlari uchun Tokio ustidan etib kelgan; ular 16 km masofani aniq ko'rish imkoniyatiga ega bo'lishdi.[52] Erdagi sharoitlar sovuq va shamolli bo'lib, shaharning shamollari soatiga 72 km / soat tezlikda va janubi-sharqdan soatiga 67 mil (108 km / soat) gacha bo'lgan.[78][79]

Tokio ustidagi birinchi B-29 samolyotlari boshqalarni boshqarish uchun to'rtta samolyotdan iborat edi. Ushbu superfortresslar 9-chi yarim tundan oldin shahar ustidan etib kelishdi. Mart. Ular bomba o'rniga qo'shimcha yoqilg'i, qo'shimcha radiostantsiyalar va XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining eng yaxshi radio operatorlarini olib yurishgan va reyd davomida 25000 fut (7600 m) balandlikda Tokioni aylanib chiqishgan. Ushbu taktika muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi va keyinchalik keraksiz deb topildi.[80]

Tokio orqali

Tokioga hujum 10 mart kuni mahalliy vaqt bilan soat 12: 08da boshlangan.[81] Pathfinder bombardimonchilari bir vaqtning o'zida manzil maydoniga yaqinlashdilar to'g'ri burchaklar bir-biriga. Ushbu bombardimonchilarni 73-va 313-bombardimon qanotlarining eng yaxshi ekipajlari boshqargan.[3] Ularning M47 bombalari tezda yong'inlarni boshladilar X kuchning qolgan qismida hujumlarni yo'naltirish uchun ishlatilgan shakli. XXI bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining har bir qanoti va ularga bo'ysunuvchi guruhlar ichida turli hududlarga hujum qilish haqida ma'lumot berilgan edi X reyd keng zarar etkazishini ta'minlash uchun shakl.[82] Yong'inlar kengayib borar ekan, Amerika bombardimonchilari maqsadli hududning ta'sirlanmagan qismlariga hujum qilish uchun tarqaldi.[52] Power-ning B-29 kompaniyasi Tokio atrofida 90 daqiqa aylanib chiqdi kartograflar yong'inlarning tarqalishini xaritalash uchun unga tayinlanganlar.[83]

Shaharning qora va oq havo fotosurati. Suratning pastki qismida joylashgan shaharning bir qismi butunlay vayron qilingan.
1945 yil 10 martda olingan Tokioning USAAF razvedka fotosurati. Bosqin natijasida vayron bo'lgan hududning bir qismi tasvirning pastki qismida ko'rinadi.

Reyd taxminan ikki soat qirq daqiqa davom etdi.[84] Bosqin paytida Tokio ustidan ko'rinadigan joy shahar bo'ylab keng tutun tufayli kamaydi. Bu ba'zi bir Amerika samolyotlari Tokioning ayrim qismlarini maqsad qilingan hududdan tashqarida bombardimon qilishlariga olib keldi. Yong'inlarning issiqligi, shuningdek, samolyotlarning so'nggi to'lqinlarida og'ir turbulentlikni boshdan kechirdi.[56] Ba'zi amerikalik aviachilar ham foydalanishlari kerak edi kislorodli niqoblar yonayotgan go'sht hidi ularning samolyotlariga kirganda.[85] Jami 279 ta B-29 samolyoti Tokioga hujum qilib, 1665 qisqa tonna (1,510 tonna) bomba tashladi. Tokioga etib borolmagan yana 19 ta superfortresslar urishdi imkoniyat maqsadlari yoki oxirgi chora maqsadlari.[86] Ushbu samolyotlar mexanik muammolar yoki uchuvchilar halok bo'lishidan qo'rqib, asosiy vazifani bekor qilishga qaror qilganliklari sababli erta qaytib ketishdi.[87]

Tokioning himoyachilari hujumni kutishgan, ammo shahar ustiga etib kelguniga qadar Amerika kuchini aniqlashmagan. Kanto tekisligi hududidagi havo hujumidan mudofaa bo'linmalari shay holatga keltirilgan edi, ammo tungi qiruvchi bo'linmalarga kiruvchi reyd aniqlanguniga qadar biron bir samolyotni turkum qilmaslik buyurilgan.[88] Piket qayiqlari hujum kuchini ko'rgan paytda, radio qabul qilishning yomonligi ularning hisobotlarining aksariyati olinmaganligini anglatardi. Himoya buyruqlaridagi tartibsizliklar tufayli qayiqlardan kelgan tarqoq xabarlarga nisbatan ozgina harakat qilindi.[78] 9-da yarim tunda Mart yaqinida oz sonli B-29 samolyotlari aniqlandi Katsuura, ammo razvedka parvozlarini amalga oshirmoqda deb o'ylashdi. Keyinchalik past darajalarda uchayotgan B-29 samolyotlarini ko'rish jiddiy qabul qilinmadi va Yaponiya radiolokatsiya stantsiyalari odatdagi balandliklarida ishlaydigan Amerika samolyotlarini qidirishga e'tibor qaratdilar.[89] Hujum davom etayotgani haqida birinchi signal soat 12:15 da, B-29 samolyotlari Tokioga bomba tashlay boshlagandan so'ng e'lon qilindi.[81] 10-havo bo'linmasi mavjud bo'lgan barcha tungi tutqichlarni saraladi va 1-chi zenitlar bo'linmasining qidiruv chiroqlari va zenitlari harakatga kirishdi.[89]

LeMay kutganidek, Tokioning himoyasi samarali bo'lmadi. Ko'pgina amerika bo'linmalari zenitlarga qarshi katta yong'inlarga duch kelishdi, ammo ular odatda bombardimonchilarning tepasida yoki pastida balandliklarga qaratilgan va vaqt o'tishi bilan qurolning pozitsiyalari yong'inlarga duchor bo'lganligi sababli zichligi pasaygan.[90] Shunga qaramay, yapon qurolli qurollari 12 ta B-29 samolyotini urib tushirishdi. Yana 42 tasi shikastlangan, ulardan ikkitasini hisobdan chiqarish kerak edi.[91] Yapon jangchilari samarasiz edi; ularning uchuvchilari radiolokatsion stansiyalardan ko'rsatma olmadilar va zenitchilar va qiruvchi bo'linmalarning harakatlari muvofiqlashtirilmadi.[92] Hech qanday B-29 samolyoti jangchilar tomonidan urib tushirilmagan va amerika aviatsiyasi reyd davomida faqat 76 yapon qiruvchisi ko'rganligi va ularning 40 ta hujumi bo'lganligi haqida xabar berishgan.[90] Bir necha yapon uchuvchisi samolyotlarida yoqilg'i tugamagani va halokatga uchraganligi sababli halok bo'lgan.[93] Yiqilgan B-29 samolyotlaridan beshtasi bunga muvaffaq bo'ldi xandaq dengizda va ularning ekipajlari tomonidan qutqarildi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari dengiz kuchlari dengiz osti kemalari.[90] Amerikaliklar halok bo'lgan yoki yo'qolgan 96 nafar harbiy xizmatchi va 6 kishi yarador yoki yaralangan.[94]

Tirik qolgan B-29 samolyotlari 10-mart kuni mahalliy vaqt bilan soat 6: 10dan 11: 27gacha Mariana orollaridagi bazalariga qaytib kelishdi.[86] Bombardimonchilarning ko'pchiligida ekipajlari olib kelgan yong'inlardan kul sochilgan.[85]

Yerda

Vayron bo'lgan shahar hududining qora va oq havo fotosurati
Xarobalari Nakamise-dōri reyddan keyin Asakusada

Shimoliy-sharqiy Tokio bo'ylab keng tarqalgan yong'inlar tez rivojlandi. Reyd boshlangandan 30 daqiqa o'tgach, vaziyat yong'in xavfsizligi bo'limining nazorati ostida emas edi.[95] Bir soat o'tgach, o't o'chiruvchilar yong'inni to'xtatish uchun harakatlarini tark etishdi.[62] Buning o'rniga o't o'chiruvchilar odamlarni xavfsizlikka yo'naltirish va yonayotgan binolarda qamalib qolganlarni qutqarishga e'tibor qaratishdi.[96] Ularga yordam berish uchun tayinlangan 125 dan ortiq o't o'chiruvchilar va 500 nafar fuqarolar qo'riqchilari halok bo'ldi, 96 kishi o't o'chirish mashinalari vayron qilingan.[62]

Kuchli shamol qo'zg'atgan holda, Amerika otashinlari tomonidan boshlangan ko'plab kichik yong'inlar tezda kuchli alanga bilan birlashdi. Ushbu yong'in bo'ronlari tezda shimoli-g'arbiy yo'nalishda harakatlanib, yo'lidagi deyarli barcha binolarni yo'q qildi yoki buzdi.[97][98] Olovdan omon qolgan yagona bino toshdan qurilgan.[99] Hujum boshlanganidan bir soat o'tgach, sharqiy Tokio aksariyati vayron bo'lgan yoki yong'in ta'sirida bo'lgan.[100]

Uylarida qolgan yoki yong'in bilan kurashmoqchi bo'lgan tinch aholining tirik qolish imkoniyati deyarli yo'q edi. Tarixchi Richard B. Frank yozishicha, "tirik qolish kaliti bu vaziyat umidsiz bo'lganini tezda anglash va qochish edi".[97] Reydning boshlanishidan ko'p o'tmay, teleradiokompaniyalar tinch aholini imkon qadar tezroq evakuatsiya qilishni maslahat berishni boshladilar, ammo barchasi darhol buni amalga oshirmadilar.[101] Ko'pgina uylar yaqinida qazilgan tulkiklar yong'in bo'ronidan himoya qila olmadi va ularda boshpana bergan tinch aholi kuyib o'ldi yoki bo'g'ilib o'ldi.[63]

Kuygan inson tanasining qora va oq fotosurati
Bosqindan keyin yapon fuqarolarining charred qoldiqlari

Minglab evakuatsiya qilinayotgan tinch aholi halok bo'ldi. Oilalar ko'pincha o'zlarining mahalliy mahalla uyushmalarida qolishga intilishadi, ammo sharoitda ajralib qolish oson edi.[102] Bir necha oila butun tun davomida birga bo'lishga muvaffaq bo'ldi.[103] Qochish tez-tez imkonsiz bo'lib chiqdi, chunki tutun ko'rish masofasini atigi bir necha metrga qisqartirdi va yong'in tufayli yo'llar tezda kesildi.[99][102] Odamlarning olomonlari tez-tez vahimaga tushishdi, ular kanallarning xavfsizligi to'g'risida yugurishdi, yiqilib tushganlar esa o'limga duchor bo'ldilar.[104] Reydda o'ldirilganlarning aksariyati evakuatsiya qilinayotganda vafot etgan.[105] Ko'p hollarda butun oilalar o'ldirilgan.[97] B-29 samolyotining to'liq bomba yuklari Sumida daryosi orqali Ko'kotoy ko'prigidan o'tib ketayotgan tinch aholiga tushib, yuzlab odamlarning yonib ketishiga olib kelganida, eng xavfli voqealardan biri yuz berdi.[106]

Belgilangan hududda ozgina joy xavfsizlikni ta'minladi. 1923 yilgi Buyuk Kantu zilzilasidan keyin yong'inlarga qarshi pana joy sifatida yaratilgan katta bog'larga ko'chib o'tishga harakat qilganlarning aksariyati bu ochiq joylarda harakatlanib yong'in sodir bo'lganda o'ldirilgan.[107] Xuddi shunday, maydonda to'plangan minglab odamlar Sensu-ji Asakusadagi ma'bad vafot etdi.[108] Boshqalari maktablar yoki teatrlar kabi qattiq binolarda va kanallarda boshpana berdilar.[107] Bular yong'in bo'roniga qarshi isbot bo'lmadi, chunki tutun va issiqlik tufayli maktablarda ko'plab odamlar halok bo'ldi.[109] Kanallarda boshpana berishga uringan odamlarning aksariyati tutundan yoki o'tib ketayotgan o't bo'roni hududdan kislorodni so'rib olganida o'lgan.[84] Biroq, ushbu suv havzalari minglab odamlarning xavfsizligini ta'minladi.[95] Yong'in nihoyat 10 mart kuni ertalab o'rtasida o'zini yoqib yubordi va katta ochiq joylarga etib kelganida to'xtadi Nakagava kanali.[90][110] Keyingi kunlarda reyd natijasida yaralangan minglab odamlar vafot etdi.[111]

Bosqindan so'ng, Tokio bo'ylab tinch aholi qochqinlarga yordam taklif qildi.[34] Yong'inchilar, politsiya zobitlari va askarlar qulab tushgan binolar ostida qolgan tirik qolganlarni qutqarishga harakat qilishdi.[112] Ilgari kambag'allarda yashagan ko'plab qochqinlar shaharning obod qismlariga joylashtirilgan. Ushbu qochqinlarning ba'zilari hayot sharoitidagi farqlardan norozi bo'lib, tartibsizliklar va talon-tarojlarni keltirib chiqardilar.[113] Parklarda va boshqa ochiq joylarda ham qochqinlar markazlari tashkil etildi.[114] Keyingi haftalarda milliondan ortiq odam shaharni tark etdi, ularning 90 foizdan ortig'i yaqin atrofda joylashgan prefekturalar.[34] Zarar darajasi va Tokioning ko'chib ketishi tufayli shaharning katta qismlariga xizmatni tiklashga urinish bo'lmagan.[105]

Natijada

Zarar ko'rgan narsalar

Ikki kuygan inson tanasining qora va oq fotosurati
Bolani orqasiga ko'targan ayolning kuygan tanasi
Parkda yotgan fuqarolik kiyimidagi ko'plab jasadlarning qora va oq fotosurati
Bomba qurbonlarining jasadlari Ueno bog'i
Suzuvchi jismlar Sumida daryosi

10 mart kuni Tokiodagi bombardimonda halok bo'lganlar soni bo'yicha taxminlar turlicha. Reyddan so'ng 79 466 jasad topilib, qayd etildi. Boshqa ko'plab jasadlar topilmadi va shahar sog'liqni saqlash direktori 83600 kishi halok bo'lganini va yana 40918 kishi yaralanganini taxmin qildi.[34][95] Tokioning o't o'chiruvchilar bo'limi 97000 kishini o'ldirgan va 125000 kishini yarador qilgan Tokio Metropolitan politsiya boshqarmasi 124,711 kishi o'lgan yoki yaralangan deb ishongan. Urushdan keyin Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining strategik bombardimon tadqiqotlari qurbonlarni 87 793 kishi halok bo'lgan va 40 918 kishi yaralangan deb taxmin qilmoqda. So'rov natijalariga ko'ra, qurbonlarning aksariyati ayollar, bolalar va qariyalar bo'lgan.[98] Frank wrote in 1999 that historians generally believe that there were between 90,000 and 100,000 fatalities, but some argue that the number was much higher.[34] Masalan; misol uchun, Edvin P. Xoyt stated in 1987 that 200,000 people had been killed and in 2009 Mark Selden wrote that the number of deaths may have been several times the estimate of 100,000 used by the Japanese and United States Governments.[112][115] The large population movements out of and into Tokyo in the period before the raid, deaths of entire communities and destruction of records mean that it is not possible to know exactly how many died.[34]

Most of the bodies which were recovered were buried in ommaviy qabrlar without being identified.[34][116][117] Many bodies of people who had died while attempting to shelter in rivers were swept into the sea and never recovered.[118] Attempts to collect bodies ceased 25 days after the raid.[105]

The raid also caused widespread destruction. Police records show that 267,171 buildings were destroyed, which represented a quarter of all buildings in Tokyo at the time. This destruction rendered 1,008,005 survivors homeless.[95] Most buildings in the Asakusa, Fukagawa, Honjo, Jōtō va Shitaya wards were destroyed, and seven other districts of the city experienced the loss of around half their buildings. Parts of another 14 wards suffered damage. Overall, 15.8 square miles (41 km2) of Tokyo was burned out.[119] The number of people killed and area destroyed was the largest of any single air raid of World War II, including the Xirosima va Nagasakining atom bombalari,[95] when each raid is considered by itself. The casualties and damage caused by the raid and devamsızlık by workers in Tokyo considerably disrupted the Japanese war economy.[120][121]

Reaksiyalar

LeMay and Arnold considered the operation to have been a significant success on the basis of reports made by the airmen involved and the extensive damage shown in photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft on 10 March.[94][122] Arnold sent LeMay a congratulatory message which stated that "this mission shows your crews have the guts for anything".[111] The aircrew who conducted the attack were also pleased with its results.[123] A post-strike assessment by XXI Bomber Command attributed the scale of damage to the firebombing being concentrated on a specific area, with the bombers attacking within a short timeframe, and the strong winds present over Tokyo.[124]

Few concerns were raised in the United States during the war about the morality of the 10 March attack on Tokyo or the firebombing of other Japanese cities.[125] These tactics were supported by the majority of decision-makers and American civilians. Tarixchi Maykl Xovard has observed that these attitudes reflected the limited options to end the war which were available at the time.[126] For instance, both Arnold and LeMay regarded the 10 March raid and subsequent firebombing operations as being necessary to save American lives by bringing the war to a rapid conclusion.[127] Prezident Franklin D. Ruzvelt probably also held this view.[128] While Secretary of War Genri L. Stimson was aware of LeMay's tactics and troubled by the lack of public reaction in the United States to the firebombing of Tokyo, he permitted these operations to continue until the end of the war.[129]

The raid was followed by similar attacks against Nagoya on the night of 11/12 March, Osaka in the early hours of 14 March, Kobe on 17/18 March and Nagoya again on 18/19 March.[130] An unsuccessful night precision raid was also conducted against an aircraft engine factory in Nagoya on 23/24 March. The firebombing attacks ended only because XXI Bomber Command's stocks of incendiaries were exhausted.[131] The attacks on Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe during March burned out over 31 square miles (80 km2) of the cities.[130] The number of people killed in Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe were much lower than those in 10 March attack on Tokyo with fewer than 10,000 fatalities in each operation. The lower casualties were, in part, the result of better preparations by the Japanese authorities which had resulted from a realization that they had greatly under-estimated the threat posed by firebombing.[132]

The Japanese government initially attempted to suppress news of the extent of the 10 March raid, but later used it for propaganda purposes. A communique issued by the Imperial Headquarters on 10 March stated that only "various places within the city were set afire".[133] However, rumors of the devastation rapidly spread across the country.[134] In a break from the usual practice of downplaying the damage caused by air attacks, the Japanese Government encouraged the media to emphasize the extensive scale of the destruction in an attempt to motivate anger against the United States.[135] Stories about the attack were on the front page of all Japanese newspapers on 11 March. Reporting focused on the perceived immorality of the attack and the number of B-29s which had been destroyed.[136] Subsequent newspaper reports made little reference to the scale of casualties, and the few photos which were published showed little physical damage.[137] When the Japanese Government's official broadcaster Tokio radiosi reported the attack it was labeled "slaughter bombing".[95] Other radio broadcasts focused on B-29 losses and the claimed desire of Japanese civilians to continue the war.[138] American newspaper reports focused on the physical damage to Tokyo, made little reference to casualties and did not include estimates of the death toll. This resulted from the content of USAAF communiques and reports rather than tsenzura.[139]

The attack considerably damaged the morale of Japanese civilians, with it and the other firebombing raids in March convincing most that the war situation was worse than their government had admitted. The Japanese Government responded with a combination of repression, including heavy penalties for people accused of disloyalty or spreading rumors, and a propaganda campaign focused on restoring confidence in the country's air and civil defense measures. These measures were generally unsuccessful.[140]

Few steps were taken to improve Tokyo's defenses after the raid. The majority of the 10th Air Division's senior officers were sacked or reassigned as punishment for the unit's failure on 10 March.[141] Only 20 aircraft were sent to Tokyo to reinforce the 10th Air Division, and these were transferred elsewhere two weeks later when no further attacks were made against the capital.[93] From April, the Japanese reduced their attempts to intercept Allied air raids to preserve aircraft to contest the expected invasion of Japan. The 1st Antiaircraft Division remained active until the end of the war in August 1945.[142] The Japanese military never developed adequate defenses against night air raids, with the night fighter force remaining ineffective and many cities not being protected by antiaircraft guns.[143]

Between April and mid-May XXI Bomber Command mainly focused on attacking airfields in southern Japan in support of the invasion of Okinawa. From 11 May until the end of the war the B-29s conducted day precision bombing attacks when weather conditions were favorable, and night firebombing raids against cities at all other times.[144] Further incendiary attacks were conducted against Tokyo, with the final taking place on the night of 25/26 May.[145] By this time, 50.8 percent of the city had been destroyed and more than 4 million people left homeless. Further heavy bomber raids against Tokyo were judged to not be worthwhile, and it was removed from XXI Bomber Command's target list.[116][146] By the end of the war, 75 percent of the sorties conducted by XXI Bomber Command had been part of firebombing operations.[145]

Xotira

O'simliklar bilan qoplangan tosh tuzilishining rangli fotosurati
The Dwelling of Remembrance memorial in Yokoamicho Park

Following the war the bodies which had been buried in ommaviy qabrlar were exhumed and kuydirilgan. The ashes were interred in a charnel uyi located in Sumida's Yokoamicho bog'i which had originally been established to hold the remains of 58,000 victims of the 1923 earthquake. A Buddhist service has been conducted to mark the anniversary of the raid on 10 March each year since 1951. A number of small neighborhood memorials were also established across the affected area in the years after the raid.[147] 10 March was designated Tokyo Peace Day by the Tokio Metropolitan Assambleyasi 1990 yilda.[148]

Few other memorials were erected to commemorate the attack in the decades after the war.[149] Efforts began in the 1970s to construct an official Tokyo Peace Museum to mark the raid, but the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly canceled the project in 1999.[150] Instead, the Dwelling of Remembrance memorial to civilians killed in the raid was built in Yokoamicho Park. This memorial was dedicated in March 2001.[151] The citizens who had been most active in campaigning for the Tokyo Peace Museum established the privately funded Tokio reydlari va urushga etkazilgan zarar markazi, 2002 yilda ochilgan.[150][152] As of 2015, this center was the main repository of information in Japan about the firebombing raids.[153] Ning kichik qismi Edo-Tokio muzeyi also covers the air raids on Tokyo.[154] The academic Cary Karacas has stated that a reason for the low-profile official commemoration of the attack in Japan is that the government does not want to acknowledge "that it was Japan who initiated the first-ever air raids on Asia’s cities". Karacas argues that the Japanese Government prefers to focus on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as commemoration of these attacks "reinforces the Japanese-as-victim stereotype".[154]

In 2007 a group of survivors of the 10 March raid and bereaved families launched a lawsuit seeking compensation and an apology for the Japanese Government's actions regarding the attack. As part of the case, it was argued that the raid had been a harbiy jinoyatlar and the Japanese Government had acted wrongly by agreeing to elements of the 1951 San-Frantsisko shartnomasi which waived the right to seek compensation for such actions from the US Government. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Japanese Government had violated the post-war constitution by compensating the military victims of the raid and their families, but not civilians. The Japanese Government argued that it did not have an obligation to compensate the victims of air raids. 2009 yilda Tokyo District Court found in favor of the government.[155] Since that time, a public campaign has advocated for the Japanese Government to pass legislation to provide compensation to civilian survivors of the raid.[154]

Tarixnoma

Many historians have stated that the 10 March raid on Tokyo was a military success for the United States, and marked the start of the most effective period of air raids on Japan. For instance, the USAAF official history judged that the attack fully met LeMay's objectives, and it and the subsequent firebombing raids shortened the war.[156] More recently, Tami Davis Biddle noted in The Cambridge History of the Second World War that "the Tokyo raid marked a dramatic turn in the American air campaign in the Far East; following on the heels of many months of frustration, it loosed the full weight of American industrial might on the faltering Japanese".[157] Mark Lardas has written that 10 March operation was only the second genuinely successful raid on Japan (after an attack against an aircraft factory on 19 January), and "LeMay's decision to switch from precision bombardment to area incendiary missions and to conduct the incendiary missions from low altitudes" was the most important factor in the eventual success of the strategic bombing campaign.[158]

Uch qavatli qizil qirralarning binosining rangli fotosurati
The Center of the Tokyo Raids and War Damage

Historians have also discussed the significance of the raid in the USAAF's transition from an emphasis on precision bombing to area bombing. Conrad C. Crane has observed that "the resort to fire raids marked another stage in the escalation towards total war and represented the culmination of trends begun in the air war against Germany".[159] Kenneth P. Werrell noted that the firebombing of Japanese cities and the atomic bomb attacks "have come to epitomize the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. All else, some say, is a prelude or tangential".[160] Historians such as Biddle, William W. Ralph and Barrett Tillman have argued that the decision to change to firebombing tactics was motivated by Arnold and LeMay's desire to prove that the B-29s were effective, and that a strategic bombing force could be a war-winning military arm.[161][162][163] Britaniya tarixchisi Maks Xastings shares this view, and has written that the circumstances in which XXI Bomber Command shifted to area attacks in 1945 mirrored those which led Bomber Command to do the same from 1942.[164]

Kabi Drezdenni bombardimon qilish, the bombing of Tokyo on 10 March 1945 is used as an example by historians and commentators who criticize the ethics and practices of the Allied strategic bombing campaigns.[165] Concerns initially raised regarding these two raids in the years after World War II have over time evolved into widely-held doubts over the morality and effectiveness of the campaigns.[166] For instance, Selden argues that the attack on Tokyo marked the beginning of an American "approach to warfare that targets entire populations for annihilation".[167] As part of his general critique of Allied area bombing raids on German and Japanese cities, the philosopher A. C. Grayling judged that the 10 March raid was "unnecessary and disproportionate".[168] Some commentators believe that racism motivated the decision to use firebombing tactics, in contrast to the USAAF's greater emphasis on precision bombing in its air campaign against Germany.[169] Werrell has written that while racism may have influenced this, "many other factors were involved, which, I would submit, were more significant".[76] Frank has reached similar conclusions. He also argues that the USAAF would have used firebombing tactics in Europe had German cities been as vulnerable to fire as Japanese cities were and intelligence on the German war economy been as lacking as it was on the Japanese war production facilities.[170] Tillman has written that area bombing was the only viable tactic available to the USAAF at the time given the failure of the precision bombing campaign.[171]

After the bombing, Emperor Xirohito toured the destroyed portions on 18 March.[172] Historians' views of the effects of this experience on him differ. F.J. Bradley states that the visit convinced Hirohito that Japan had lost the war.[172] Tillman has written that the raid had no effect on the Emperor, and Frank argues that Hirohito supported continuing the war until mid-1945.[173][174]

Adabiyotlar

Izohlar

  1. ^ As the B-29's engines experienced less strain when flying at low altitudes, they required less fuel. The resultant weight savings allowed them to carry a larger bomb load.[40]
  2. ^ Umumiy Shizuichi Tanaka was the commander of the Eastern District Army.[54]

Iqtiboslar

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Qo'shimcha o'qish

Koordinatalar: 35 ° 41′N 139 ° 46′E / 35.683°N 139.767°E / 35.683; 139.767