Eronning yadro dasturi - Nuclear program of Iran

Ushbu maqolada bir nechta muammolar mavjud. Iltimos yordam bering uni yaxshilang yoki ushbu masalalarni muhokama qiling munozara sahifasi. (Ushbu shablon xabarlarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) Ushbu maqolaning ayrim qismlari (2013-15 yillardagi jiddiy o'zgarishlar to'g'risida ma'lumotlarning etishmasligi bilan yakunlangan Birgalikdagi Harakat Rejasi ) bo'lishi kerak yangilangan. Iltimos, ushbu maqolani so'nggi voqealarni yoki yangi mavjud ma'lumotlarni aks ettirish uchun yangilang. (2015 yil iyul) Bu maqola balki juda uzoq qulay o'qish va navigatsiya qilish. The o'qiladigan nasr hajmi 121 kilobaytni tashkil qiladi. Iltimos, ko'rib chiqing bo'linish tarkibni kichik maqolalarga, kondensatsiya uni qo'shish yoki qo'shish pastki sarlavhalar. (2014 yil may) Bu maqola Vikipediyaga muvofiq qayta tashkil etilishi kerak bo'lishi mumkin joylashish bo'yicha ko'rsatmalar. Iltimos, yordam bering maqolani tahrirlash umumiy tuzilishni yaxshilash uchun. (2017 yil noyabr) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) Bu maqola faqat ma'lum bir auditoriyani qiziqtirishi mumkin bo'lgan juda ko'p miqdordagi murakkab tafsilotlarni o'z ichiga olishi mumkin. Iltimos, yordam bering aylanmoq yoki boshqa joyga ko'chirish tegishli har qanday ma'lumot va qarshi bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan ortiqcha tafsilotlarni olib tashlash Vikipediyaning qo'shilish siyosati. (2017 yil noyabr) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling)

Qismi bir qator ustida
Eronning yadro dasturi
Xronologiya
Imkoniyatlar
Arak Bushehr Darxovin Fordov
Tashkilotlar
Eron atom energiyasi tashkiloti Oghab 2 Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi P5 + 1
Xalqaro shartnomalar
Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma Qo'shimcha protokol 2013 yilgi muvaqqat kelishuv, Jeneva 2015 yil oldingi kelishuv, Lozanna 2015 yil yakuniy kelishuvi, Vena Reaksiyalar Natijada Muzokaralar Qo'shma Shtatlarning chiqib ketishi
Ichki qonunlar
Yadro yutuqlari to'g'risidagi qonun JCPOA-ni amalga oshiradigan Eron harakati Majlis komissiyasi AQSh Kongressining sharhi
Jismoniy shaxslar
Eron yadroviy muzokarachilari Ruhani Laricani Jalili Zarif Abbasi Agazadeh El-Baradey Faxrizoda Salehi
Bog'liq
Yadro olimlarini o'ldirish AMAD loyihasi Eron va WMD Ali Xomanaiyning fatvosi yadro qurollariga qarshi Ishlab chiqarilgan inqiroz 1979 yildan keyin Eron va AQSh munosabatlari Eronga qarshi sanktsiyalar BMT qarorlari Qurolsiz hudud Eron yadro dasturiga qarashlar

The Eronning yadro dasturi bir nechta tadqiqot saytlarini o'z ichiga olgan, ikkitasi uran konlari, a tadqiqot reaktori va uchta ma'lum bo'lgan uranni qayta ishlash korxonalari uranni boyitish zavodlari.^[1] 1970 yilda Eron Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma (NPT),^[2] yadroviy dasturini IAEA tekshirish.

Eronning yadro dasturi 1950-yillarda uning bir qismi sifatida AQShning yordami bilan boshlangan Tinchlik uchun atomlar dastur.^[3] AQSh va G'arbiy Evropa hukumatlarining Eron yadro dasturidagi ishtiroki 1979 yilgacha davom etdi Eron inqilobi bu oxirgisi quladi Shoh Eron.^[4] 1979 yilgi inqilobdan so'ng Eron bilan xalqaro yadroviy hamkorlikning katta qismi to'xtatildi. 1981 yilda Eron rasmiylari mamlakat yadroviy rivojlanishini davom ettirish kerak degan xulosaga kelishdi. 1980-yillarning oxirlarida Frantsiya va 1990-yillarning boshlarida Argentina bilan muzokaralar olib borildi va kelishuvlarga erishildi. 1990-yillarda Rossiya Eron bilan qo'shma tadqiqot tashkiloti tuzdi va Eronga rossiyalik yadro mutaxassislari va texnik ma'lumotlarni taqdim etdi.

2000-yillarda Eronning yashirin ravishda uranni boyitish dasturining oshkor etilishi tinchlikparvar bo'lmagan maqsadlar uchun mo'ljallangan bo'lishi mumkin degan xavotirlarni kuchaytirdi. IAEA 2003 yilda Eronning dissident guruhi Eron tomonidan amalga oshirilgan e'lon qilinmagan yadroviy faoliyatni fosh qilganidan keyin tergovni boshladi.^[5][6] 2006 yilda Eron NPT majburiyatlarini bajarmaganligi sababli Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashi Erondan boyitish dasturlarini to'xtatishni talab qildi. 2007 yilda Qo'shma Shtatlar Milliy razvedka taxminlari (NIE) Eron 2003 yil kuzida faol yadroviy qurol dasturini to'xtatganligini aytdi.^[7] 2011 yil noyabr oyida IAEA Eron 2003 yilgacha yadro bombasini loyihalashga qaratilgan tajribalarni o'tkazganligi va shu vaqtdan keyin tadqiqotlar kichik hajmda davom etishi mumkinligi to'g'risida ishonchli dalillarni xabar qildi.^[8][9] 2018 yil 1-mayda IAEA 2015 yildagi hisobotini takrorladi va 2009 yildan keyin Eronda yadro quroli faoliyati to'g'risida ishonchli dalil topmaganligini aytdi.^[10][11][12]

Eronning birinchi atom elektr stantsiyasi Bushehr I reaktori, Rossiya hukumat agentligining katta yordami bilan yakunlandi Rosatom va rasmiy ravishda 2011 yil 12 sentyabrda ochilgan.^[13] Rossiya muhandislik pudratchisi Atomenergoprom Bushehr atom elektr stantsiyasi 2012 yil oxiriga qadar to'liq quvvatga ega bo'lishini aytdi.^[14] Eron, shuningdek, yangi 360-ni ishlab chiqayotganini e'lon qildi megavatt Darxovin atom stansiyasi va kelajakda u ko'proq o'rta atom elektr stantsiyalari va uran konlarini qidirishga intilishi kerak.^[15]

2015 yilga kelib, Eron yadro dasturi 100 milliard dollarga tushgan neft daromadlaridan mahrum bo'ldi va yo'qotildi to'g'ridan-to'g'ri xorijiy investitsiyalar sababli xalqaro sanktsiyalar (Boshqa imkoniyat xarajatlarini hisobga olganda 500 milliard dollar).^[16][17]

2019 yil fevral oyidan boshlab, IAEA Eron xalqaro hamjamiyatga bo'ysunishini tasdiqladi Birgalikdagi Harakat Rejasi 2015 yil,^[18] Biroq, 2019 yil iyul oyida IAEA Eron kelishuvni buzganligini aytdi.^[19] O'shandan beri Eron Qo'shma Harakat Harakat Rejasini yana buzdi.^[20]

Tarix

Eron gazetasining 1968 yildagi klipida shunday deyilgan: "Eron yadro energetikasi sohasidagi olimlarining to'rtdan bir qismi ayollardir". Fotosuratda bir necha ayol eronlik doktorlar oldida turishgan Tehron tadqiqot reaktori.

1950 va 1960 yillar

Uchun asoslar Eron yadroviy dasturi 1957 yil 5 martda, Eyzenxauer homiyligida "atom energiyasidan tinch maqsadlarda foydalanish bo'yicha tadqiqotlarda hamkorlik qilish uchun taklif qilingan kelishuv" e'lon qilinganida tashkil etilgan. Tinchlik uchun atomlar dasturi.^[21]

1967 yilda Tehron yadro tadqiqotlari markazi Tomonidan boshqariladigan (TNRC) tashkil etilgan Eron atom energiyasi tashkiloti (AEOI). TNRC AQSh tomonidan etkazib beriladigan 5 megavattli yadro bilan jihozlangan tadqiqot reaktori tomonidan yoqilgan yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran.^[22][23]

Eron imzoladi Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi Shartnoma (NPT) 1968 yilda va 1970 yilda uni ratifikatsiya qildi va Eron yadro dasturini IAEA tomonidan tekshirishga majbur qildi.

A Markaziy Shartnoma Tashkiloti yadro fanlari instituti^[24] Iroq CENTO ni tark etgandan keyin Bag'doddan Tehronga ko'chirilgan.

1970-yillar

Shoh 2000 yilgacha 23 tagacha atom elektr stantsiyasini qurish rejalarini ma'qulladi.^[25]1974 yil mart oyida Shoh dunyoda neft zaxirasi tugashini tasavvur qildi va shunday dedi: "Neft - bu yoqimli material, yoqish uchun juda qimmat ... Biz imkon qadar tezroq 23 ming megavatt elektr energiyasini ishlab chiqarishni tasavvur qilamiz. atom zavodlari. "^[26]

Eron yadro dasturidan marketing usuli sifatida foydalangan Amerikaning atom energetikasi kompaniyalari tomonidan 1970 yillarga oid reklama

AQSh va Evropa kompaniyalari Eronda biznes yuritishga intilishdi.^[27] Bushehr, birinchi zavod, shaharni energiya bilan ta'minlaydi Shiraz. 1975 yilda Erlangen /Frankfurt qat'iy Kraftwerk Union AG, qo'shma korxonasi Siemens AG va AEG, 4 dollarlik shartnoma imzoladi 6 milliard dollar qurish bosimli suv reaktori atom elektr stantsiyasi. Ikkalasining qurilishi 1.196 MWe va 1981 yilda qurilishi kerak edi.

1975 yilda Shvetsiyaning 10 foiz ulushi Eurodif Eronga ketdi. Frantsiya hukumatining sho'ba kompaniyasi Kogema va Eron hukumati Sofidifni (Société franco-iranienne pour l'enrichissement de l'uranium par diffusion gazeuse) mos ravishda 60 va 40 foiz aksiyalarga ega korxona. O'z navbatida, Sofidif Eurodifning 25 foiz ulushini sotib oldi va bu Eronga 10 foiz ulushini berdi. Muhammad Rizo Shoh Pahlaviy qarz bergan 1 mlrd dollar (va boshqa) 180 million dollar (1977 yilda) Eurodif fabrikasi qurilishi uchun sayt ishlab chiqarishining 10 foizini sotib olish huquqiga ega bo'lish uchun.

"Prezident Jerald Ford 1976 yilda taklif bo'yicha imzolangan Tehron qazib olish uchun AQShda qurilgan qayta ishlash inshootini sotib olish va ishlatish imkoniyati plutonyum yadro reaktori yoqilg'isidan. Shartnoma to'liq "yadro yoqilg'isi tsikli" ga tegishli edi. "^[28]Ford strategik maqolasida "atom energetikasini joriy qilish ham Eron iqtisodiyotining o'sib borayotgan ehtiyojlarini, ham eksport qilish yoki neft-kimyo mahsulotlariga aylantirish uchun qolgan neft zaxiralarini ta'minlaydi" deb aytilgan.

1974 yilda Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining tarqalishini baholashda "Agar [Shoh] 1980-yillarning o'rtalarida tirik bo'lsa ... va boshqa mamlakatlar (xususan Hindiston) qurol ishlab chiqarishni davom ettirgan bo'lsa, biz shubhasiz Eron ham unga ergashadi."^[29]

Inqilobdan keyingi, 1979–1989 yillar

Keyingi 1979 yilgi inqilob, Eron bilan xalqaro yadroviy hamkorlikning ko'p qismi to'xtatildi. 1979 yil yanvar oyida Kraftverk ittifoqi Bushehr yadro loyihasida ishlashni to'xtatdi, bitta reaktor 50 foizga, boshqa reaktor 85 foizga qurib bitkazildi va ular 1979 yil iyulda loyihadan butunlay chiqib ketishdi. Kompaniya o'z harakatlarini Eronga asoslanishini aytdi to'lamaslik 450 million dollar muddati o'tgan to'lovlarda,^[30] boshqa manbalar esa qurilish AQSh bosimi ostida to'xtatilgan deb da'vo qilmoqda.^[31][32] Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari yuqori boyitilgan uran (HEU) yoqilg'isini etkazib berishni to'xtatdi Tehron yadro tadqiqotlari markazi, bu esa reaktorni bir necha yil davomida o'chirishga majbur qildi. Frantsuzlar Eurodif xalqaro boyitish zavodi Eronga ham boyitilgan uran etkazib berishni to'xtatdi.^[31][33] Keyinchalik Eron ushbu tajribalar xorijiy inshootlar va xorijiy yoqilg'i ta'minoti yadroviy yoqilg'isi bilan ta'minlashning ishonchsiz manbai ekanligidan dalolat beradi.^[31][34]

1981 yilda Eron hukumati rasmiylari mamlakatning yadro rivojlanishini davom ettirish kerak degan xulosaga kelishdi. IAEA-ga berilgan hisobotlarga ko'ra, Esfaxon yadro texnologiyalari markazidagi (ENTEC) sayt "yadroviy texnologiyalarni uzatish va rivojlantirish markazi sifatida ishlaydi, shuningdek, juda katta dasturni amalga oshirish uchun zarur bo'lgan mahalliy tajriba va ishchi kuchini shakllantirishga hissa qo'shadi". atom energetikasi reaktori texnologiyasi va yoqilg'i aylanish texnologiyasi sohasida. " IAEA, shuningdek, Entec kompaniyasining materiallarni sinovdan o'tkazadigan eng katta bo'limi haqida ma'lumot oldi UO
₂ pellet yoqilg'isini ishlab chiqarish va maqsadi konvertatsiya qilish bo'lgan kimyoviy bo'lim U
₃O
₈ yadro darajasiga UO
₂.^[35]

1983 yilda IAEA rasmiylari Eronga reaktor yoqilg'isi ishlab chiqarishning kimyoviy jihatlari, uran konversiyasini ishlab chiqarish bo'yicha tajriba zavodlarining kimyoviy muhandisligi va dizayn jihatlari, yadroviy materiallarning korroziyasi, yoqilg'i ishlab chiqarish va yadro sinfini ishlab chiqarish bo'yicha tajriba zavodini rivojlantirishda yordam berishni xohlashdi. UO
₂.^[35] Biroq, AQSh hukumati "to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aralashib" Eronning ishlab chiqarishidagi IAEA yordamini to'xtatdi UO
₂ va UF
₆.^[36] AQShning sobiq amaldorlaridan biri "biz buni o'z yo'lida to'xtatdik" dedi. Keyinchalik Eron Xitoy bilan yonilg'i aylanishiga oid masalalar bo'yicha ikki tomonlama hamkorlikni yo'lga qo'ydi, ammo Xitoy Eron bilan eng mashhur yadroviy tijoratni, shu jumladan, Xitoyning qurilishini to'xtatishga rozi bo'ldi. UF
₆ AQSh bosimi tufayli o'simlik.^[35]

1984 yil aprelda G'arbiy Germaniya razvedkasi Eron ikki yil ichida Pokiston uranidan atom bombasiga ega bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida xabar berdi. Nemislar bu yangilikni G'arb razvedkasining Eronda inqilobdan keyingi yadroviy qurol dasturining birinchi ommaviy hisobotida tarqatdilar.^[37] O'sha yili, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining ozchilik qamchi Senat Alan Krenston Eron Islom Respublikasi o'zining yadro qurolini yaratishga yetti yil qolganligini ta'kidladi.^[38]

Davomida Eron-Iroq urushi, Ikki Bushehr reaktori Iroqning ko'plab havo hujumlari natijasida zarar ko'rdi va yadroviy dastur bo'yicha ishlar to'xtab qoldi. Eron portlashlar to'g'risida Xalqaro Atom Energiyasi Agentligini xabardor qildi va xalqaro harakatsizlik va hujumda Frantsiya tomonidan ishlab chiqarilgan raketalarning ishlatilishidan shikoyat qildi.^[39][40] 2015 yil oxirida, Akbar Xoshimiy Rafsanjoniy Eron Iroqqa qarshi urush paytida ommaviy qirg'in qurollarini qidirishni o'ylaganini aniqladi.^[41]

1985 yilda Eron Eurodif sarmoyasidan qarzini undirish va boyitilgan uranni etkazib berish uchun Frantsiyaga bosim o'tkaza boshladi. Frantsuz garovga olinganlar Livanda 1985 yil bahoridan boshlab asirga olingan; 1986 yilda Parijda va Eurodif menejerida teraktlar uyushtirildi Jorj Bess suiqasd qilingan. Ularning tergovida La République atomique, Frantsiya-Eron le pacte nucléaire, Devid Karr-Braun va Dominik Lorents Eron razvedka xizmatlarining javobgarligiga ishora qildi. Keyinchalik, qotillikni chap qanot terror guruhi sodir etganligi aniqlandi Harakat yo'nalishi. 1988 yil 6-mayda Frantsiya bosh vaziri Jak Shirak Eron bilan shartnoma imzoladi: Frantsiya Eronni Evrodifning aktsiyadorlik maqomiga qaytarib olishga va unga boyitilgan uranni «cheklovlarsiz» etkazib berishga rozi bo'ldi.

1987–88 yillarda Argentina "s Atom energiyasi bo'yicha milliy komissiya reaktorni konvertatsiya qilishda yordam berish uchun Eron bilan shartnoma imzoladi yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran yoqilg'i 19,75 foizgacha kam boyitilgan uran va Eronga kam boyitilgan uran etkazib berish.^[42] 2006 yilgi Argentina adliya hisobotiga ko'ra, 1980-yillarning oxiri va 90-yillarning boshlarida AQSh Argentinani Eron bilan yadroviy hamkorligini to'xtatish uchun bosim o'tkazgan va 1992 yil boshidan 1994 yilgacha Argentina va Eron o'rtasida muzokaralar qayta tiklash maqsadida bo'lib o'tgan. 1987–88 yillarda tuzilgan uchta kelishuv.^[43] Ba'zilar, kabi hujumlarni bog'lashgan Buenos-Ayresdagi Isroil elchixonasiga 1992 yil hujum va AMIA portlashi Argentinani shartnomalarni hurmat qilishiga bosim o'tkazish uchun Eron kampaniyasining bir qismi sifatida.^[44][45] Uran 1993 yilda etkazib berildi.^[46]

1990–2002

1990-yillarning boshidan boshlab, Rossiya deb nomlangan Eron bilan qo'shma tadqiqot tashkiloti tuzdi Persepolis Eronga Rossiyaning yadroviy mutaxassislari va texnik ma'lumotlarini taqdim etgan. Rossiyaning beshta muassasasi, shu jumladan Rossiya Federal kosmik agentligi Tehronga raketalarini takomillashtirishda yordam berdi. Eron bilan texnik ma'lumotlar almashinuvi shaxsan tomonidan tasdiqlangan SVR rejissyor Trubnikov.^[47] Prezident Boris Yeltsin Eronga tijorat yadroviy texnologiyalarini taklif qiluvchi va Vashington bilan muammolarni muhokama qiladigan "ikki yo'l siyosati" bo'lgan.^[48]

1991 yilda Frantsiya ko'proq pulni qaytarib berdi 1,6 mlrd dollar, Eron esa Eurodif aktsiyadori bo'lib qoldi Sofidif. Biroq, Eron ishlab chiqarilgan uranni so'rashdan tiyildi.^[49][50]

1992 yilda Eron IAEA inspektorlarini ular so'ragan barcha joylar va ob'ektlarni ko'rishga taklif qildi. Bosh direktor Blixning ta'kidlashicha, o'tkazilgan barcha tadbirlar atom energiyasidan tinch maqsadlarda foydalanishga mos keladi.^[51][52] IAEA tashriflari doirasida e'lon qilinmagan ob'ektlar va Saganddagi uran qazib olish bo'yicha yangi loyiha mavjud. O'sha yili Argentina rasmiylari o'z mamlakatlari Eronga fuqarolik yadro uskunalarini sotishni bekor qilganligini oshkor qilishdi 18 million dollar, AQSh bosimi ostida.^[53]

1995 yilda Eron Rossiyaning Atom energiyasi vazirligi bilan qisman to'liq qurilgan Bushehrdagi zavodni qayta tiklash uchun shartnoma imzoladi,^[54] mavjud Bushehr I binosiga o'rnatish 915MWe VVER -1000 bosimli suv reaktori, qurilishi 2009 yilda kutilmoqda.

1996 yilda AQSh Xitoy Xalq Respublikasini uran konversion zavodi qurish bo'yicha shartnomani bekor qilishga ishontirdi. Shu bilan birga, xitoyliklar Eronga dastur uchun ishlashni davom ettirishni maslahat bergan Eronliklarga ushbu ob'ekt uchun rejalarni taqdim etishdi va IAEA direktori Muhammad al-Baradey hatto qurilish maydoniga tashrif buyurgan.^[55]

2002–2013

Umumiy nuqtai

IR-40 inshoot Arak

2003 yilda Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi (IAEA) birinchi bo'lib Eronning boyitish va qayta ishlash bo'yicha sezgir faoliyatni e'lon qilmaganligini xabar qildi.^[6] Boyitish yordamida uran reaktor yoqilg'isi uchun yoki (boyitishning yuqori darajasida) qurol uchun ishlab chiqarilishi mumkin.^[56] Eron yadroviy dasturi tinchlikparvar,^[57] va uranni 5 foizdan kamrog'iga boyitgan, bu fuqarolik atom elektr stantsiyasining yoqilg'isiga mos keladi.^[58] Eron, shuningdek, AQShning tazyiqlari natijasida uning tashqi hukumatlar bilan tuzilgan bir qator yadroviy shartnomalari buzilganidan so'ng, maxfiylikka murojaat qilishga majbur bo'lganligini da'vo qilmoqda.^[59] IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi Eronning xavfsizlik kafolatlari to'g'risidagi kelishuvga rioya qilmasligi to'g'risida BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga xabar berganidan so'ng, Kengash Erondan o'z faoliyatini to'xtatishni talab qildi yadroviy boyitish tadbirlar^[60] Eron Prezidenti Mahmud Ahmadinajod esa sanktsiyalarni "g'ururli kuchlar" tomonidan "noqonuniy" deb e'tirof etgan bo'lsa-da, Eron o'zini o'zi ta'riflagan tinchlikparvar yadroviy dasturini "tegishli qonuniy yo'l" orqali kuzatishni davom ettirishga qaror qilgan Xalqaro atom Energiya agentligi.^[61]

Eronning ilgari e'lon qilinmagan yadroviy faoliyati to'g'risidagi jamoatchilik ayblovlaridan so'ng, IAEA 2003 yil noyabr oyida Eron ushbu harakatlar to'g'risida MAQATEga xabar berish to'g'risidagi NPT xavfsizlik kafolatlari to'g'risidagi kelishuviga binoan o'z majburiyatlarini muntazam ravishda bajarmadi degan xulosaga kelgan tergovni boshladi, garchi u hech qanday aloqasi yo'qligini xabar qilmagan yadro quroli dasturiga. MAQATE Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi talablarga javob bermaslik to'g'risidagi rasmiy xulosani 2005 yil sentyabrgacha kechiktirdi va 2006 yil fevral oyida BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga rioya qilmaslik to'g'risida xabar berdi. IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi Eron o'zining xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi kelishuviga rioya qilmasligi to'g'risida Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizligiga xabar berganidan keyin Kengash, Kengash Erondan boyitish dasturlarini to'xtatishni talab qildi. Kengash Eron buni rad etganidan keyin sanktsiyalarni joriy qildi. 2009 yil may oyida bo'lib o'tgan AQSh Kongressining hisobotida "Qo'shma Shtatlar, keyinroq esa evropaliklar Eronning aldovi uning boyish huquqidan mahrum bo'lishini anglatishini, Eron bilan muzokaralarda muzokaralar olib borishi mumkin degan fikrni ilgari surishdi" deb ta'kidladilar.^[62]

Boyitish dasturini to'xtatib qo'yish evaziga Eronga "Eron bilan o'zaro hurmatga asoslangan munosabatlarni va hamkorlikni rivojlantirish va Eronning yadro dasturining faqat tinchlikparvar tabiatiga xalqaro ishonchni o'rnatish uchun imkon beradigan uzoq muddatli keng qamrovli kelishuv taklif qilindi. . "^[63] Biroq, Eron boyitish dasturidan doimiy ravishda voz kechib, ushbu dastur o'zining energiya xavfsizligi uchun zarurligini, bunday "uzoq muddatli kelishuvlar" o'z-o'zidan ishonchsizligini va tinchliksevar yadro texnologiyasiga bo'lgan ajralmas huquqidan mahrum bo'lishini ta'kidlab keladi. 2009 yil iyun oyida, darhol tortishuvlardan keyin Eronda prezidentlik saylovi, Eron dastlab tibbiy tadqiqotlar reaktori uchun yoqilg'i evaziga kam boyitilgan uran zaxirasidan voz kechish to'g'risidagi bitimga rozi bo'lgan, ammo keyin bitimdan qaytgan.^[64] Hozirgi vaqtda o'n uchta davlat operatsion boyitish yoki qayta ishlash imkoniyatlariga ega,^[65] va yana bir qancha odamlar mahalliy boyitish dasturlarini ishlab chiqishga qiziqish bildirishdi.^[66] Eronning pozitsiyasi Qo'shilmaslik harakati, bu yadro yoqilg'isi ishlab chiqarishni potentsial monopollashtirishdan xavotir bildirdi.^[67]

Uni boyitish dasturi tinch maqsadlarga yo'naltirilishi mumkinligi haqidagi xavotirlarni bartaraf etish uchun,^[68] Eron o'z boyitish dasturiga qo'shimcha cheklovlar kiritishni taklif qildi, masalan, Xalqaro Atom Energiyasi Agentligi tomonidan Natanzdagi uranni boyitish inshootini xorijiy vakillar ishtirokida ko'p millatli yoqilg'i markazi sifatida ishlatishi uchun qo'shimcha protokolni ratifikatsiya qilish. , plutonyumni qayta ishlashdan voz kechish va zudlik bilan barcha boyitilgan uranni reaktor yoqilg'isi tayoqchalarida tayyorlash.^[69] Eronning uranni boyitish dasturini xorijiy xususiy va jamoatchilik ishtiroki uchun ochish taklifi, yoqilg'i aylanishining sezgir faoliyati milliy yadroviy qurol salohiyatiga hissa qo'shishi mumkin bo'lgan xavfni kamaytirish usullarini o'rganish uchun tuzilgan IAEA ekspertlar qo'mitasining takliflarini aks ettiradi.^[70] Ba'zi nodavlat AQSh ekspertlari ushbu yondashuvni ma'qullashdi.^[71][72] Qo'shma Shtatlar Eron BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining boyitish dasturini to'xtatish to'g'risidagi talablarini bajarishi kerakligini ta'kidladi.^{[iqtibos kerak ]}IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi yashirin ravishda boyitish yoki qayta ishlash bilan bog'liq kafolatlar talablariga rioya qilmaslik to'g'risidagi qarorni qabul qilgan boshqa har qanday holatda, qaror (Iroq ishlarida) ishtirok etdi.^[73] va Liviya^[74][75][76]) yoki jalb qilinishi kutilmoqda (Shimoliy Koreya misolida^[77][78]) yoqilg'i aylanishining minimal tugaydigan sezgir faoliyatida. Ga binoan Per Goldschmidt, BAAning sobiq bosh direktori o'rinbosari va kafolatlar bo'limi boshlig'i va Genri D. Sokolski, Ijroiya direktori Qurolni tarqatmaslik siyosati bo'yicha ta'lim markazi, IAEA Kotibiyati (Janubiy Koreya, Misr) tomonidan bildirilgan kafolatlar talablariga rioya qilmaslikning ba'zi boshqa holatlari hech qachon Xavfsizlik Kengashiga xabar qilinmagan, chunki IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi hech qachon rasmiy ravishda buzilishlar to'g'risida rasmiy xulosa chiqarmagan.^[79][80] Janubiy Koreyaning ishi uranni qurol darajasiga yaqin darajada boyitishni o'z ichiga olgan bo'lsa-da,^[81] mamlakat o'zi ixtiyoriy ravishda izolyatsiya qilingan faoliyat to'g'risida xabar berdi^[82] va Goldschmidt "siyosiy qarashlar ham kengash qarorida ustun rol o'ynadi", deb nomuvofiqlik to'g'risida rasmiy xulosa chiqarmaslik kerak.^[83]

Eronning qurolni yoqilg'i bilan ta'minlash uchun etarli miqdordagi yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran ishlab chiqarganligi bilan belgilanadigan yadroviy "buzilish" qobiliyatiga qachon erishish mumkinligini taxmin qilish - agar u uchun ishchi dizayn mavjud bo'lsa va uni yig'ish bo'yicha siyosiy qaror qabul qilingan bo'lsa - bu noaniq. Da fiziklar tomonidan batafsil tahlil qilingan Amerika olimlari federatsiyasi bunday taxmin umumiy son va umumiy samaradorlikka bog'liq degan xulosaga keladi santrifüjlar Eron ishlab turibdi va u oz miqdorda boyitilgan uran miqdorini yuqori boyitish dasturi uchun "xom ashyo" vazifasini o'tash uchun yig'di.^[84] 2012 yil 23 mart AQSh Kongressining tadqiqot xizmati Ma'lumotlarga ko'ra, 2012 yil 24 fevralda MAQATE hisobotida Eron 240 foizli 20 foizga boyitilgan uranni zaxiralashgani - bu tibbiy maqsadlar uchun zarur bo'lgan boyitish darajasi - bu ularning yuqori darajalarga boyitish imkoniyatlaridan dalolatdir.^[85] Eronning avtoritar siyosiy madaniyati ko'plab texnik mutaxassislarning hamkorligini talab qiladigan ilmiy dasturga qo'shimcha muammolarni tug'dirishi mumkin.^[86] Ba'zi ekspertlarning ta'kidlashicha, Eron yadro dasturiga jiddiy e'tibor Islom Respublikasi bilan kengroq diplomatik aloqalarni o'rnatish zaruratini kamaytiradi.^[87][88] AQSh razvedka agentligi bilan suhbatlashgan rasmiylar The New York Times 2012 yil mart oyida ular Eron qurollanish dasturini 2007 yilda qayta boshlamaganligini baholashda davom etishgan Milliy razvedka taxminlari Eron 2003 yilda o'z faoliyatini to'xtatganini aytdi, garchi ular qurollanish bilan bog'liq ba'zi harakatlar davom etganligini isbotlagan bo'lsa. Isroil Mossad xabarlarga ko'ra ushbu e'tiqod bilan o'rtoqlashdi.^[89]

2002–2006

Eron-Evropa Ittifoqi-3 birinchi uchrashuv, Sa'dabad saroyi, Tehron, 2003 yil 21 oktyabr. Evropa Ittifoqi-3 vazirlari va Eronning yuqori darajadagi muzokarachisi Hasan Ruhoniy

2002 yil 14-avgustda, Alireza Jafarzadeh, Eronlik dissident guruhining vakili Eronning qarshilik ko'rsatish milliy kengashi, qurilayotgan ikkita yadro maydonchasi borligini ochiqchasiga oshkor qildi: yilda uranni boyitish inshooti Natanz (uning bir qismi yer osti) va a og'ir suv inshoot Arak. Maxfiy xizmatlar ushbu ob'ektlar to'g'risida allaqachon bilgan, ammo hisobotlar maxfiy deb e'lon qilingan.^[5]

IAEA zudlik bilan ushbu inshootlarga kirish huquqini va Erondan yadro dasturi bo'yicha qo'shimcha ma'lumot va hamkorlikni izladi.^[90] Eronning IAEA bilan xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi shartnomasini amalga oshirish uchun o'sha paytdagi amaldagi kelishuvlarga binoan,^[91] Eronga yadroviy material ushbu inshootga yadro moddasi kiritilgunga qadar olti oy oldin IAEA tomonidan yangi yadro inshootini tekshirishga ruxsat berish talab qilinmagan. O'sha paytda Erondan hatto ushbu ob'ekt mavjudligi to'g'risida IAEAga xabar berish talab qilinmagan. Ushbu "olti oylik" bandi IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi qaroriga binoan, 1992 yilgacha MAGATE kafolatlari to'g'risidagi barcha kelishuvlarni amalga oshirish uchun standart bo'lib, ob'ektlar rejalashtirish bosqichida, hatto qurilish boshlanishidan oldin ham xabar berilishi kerak edi. Eron ushbu qarorni qabul qilgan so'nggi mamlakat bo'lib, faqatgina 2003 yil 26 fevralda, IAEA tekshiruvi boshlangandan so'ng qabul qildi.^[6]

2003 yil may oyida, ko'p o'tmay AQShning Iroqqa bostirib kirishi, Eron hukumatining elementlari Muhammad Xotamiy Shveytsariya diplomatik kanallari orqali "Buyuk savdolashish" bo'yicha maxfiy taklif bilan chiqdi. U Eronning yadro dasturining to'liq shaffofligini va AQShdan xavfsizlik kafolatlari va diplomatik munosabatlarni normallashtirish evaziga XAMAS va Hizbullohni qo'llab-quvvatlashni bekor qilishni taklif qildi. Bush ma'muriyati bu taklifga javob bermadi, chunki AQShning yuqori lavozimli rasmiylari uning haqiqiyligiga shubha qilishdi. Xabarlarga ko'ra, ushbu taklif Eron hukumati tomonidan keng baraka topgan, shu jumladan Oliy Rahbar Oyatulloh Xomanaiy.^[92][93][94]

2003 yil 21 oktyabrda Tehron deklaratsiyasi, o'ngdan chapga: Joschka Fischer, Hasan Ruhoniy, Dominik de Villepin va Jek Straw.

Frantsiya, Germaniya va Buyuk Britaniya (the Evropa Ittifoqi-3 ) Eron bilan yadroviy dasturi to'g'risidagi savollarni hal qilish uchun diplomatik tashabbus ko'rsatdi. 2003 yil 21 oktyabrda Tehronda Eron hukumati va Evropa Ittifoqi-3 tashqi ishlar vazirlari Tehron deklaratsiyasi deb nomlangan bayonot berishdi^[95] bunda Eron IAEA bilan hamkorlik qilishga, ixtiyoriy, ishonchni mustahkamlash choralari sifatida Qo'shimcha Protokolni imzolashga va amalga oshirishga va muzokaralar davomida uni boyitish va qayta ishlash faoliyatini to'xtatishga rozi bo'ldi. Evropa Ittifoqi-3 o'z navbatida Eronning yadroviy huquqlarini tan olishga va Eronning atom energetikasi dasturiga nisbatan "qoniqarli kafolatlar" berish yo'llarini muhokama qilishga, so'ngra Eron zamonaviy texnologiyalardan foydalanishga qulayroq bo'lishiga aniq rozi bo'ldi. Eron 2003 yil 18-dekabrda Qo'shimcha protokolni imzoladi va protokol kuchga kirgandek harakat qilib, IAEA-ga kerakli hisobotlarni taqdim etdi va EEA-ning qo'shimcha protokolini tasdiqlashini kutib, IAEA inspektorlari tomonidan zarur kirish huquqiga ega bo'ldi.

IAEA 2003 yil 10-noyabrda xabar berdi,^[96] "Eron yadro materiallari va uni qayta ishlash va ulardan foydalanish to'g'risidagi hisobot, shuningdek, ob'ektlar deklaratsiyasiga oid xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi shartnomasi bo'yicha o'z majburiyatlarini uzoq vaqt davomida uzoq vaqt davomida bajarmaganligi aniq. bunday material qayta ishlangan va saqlangan. " Eron IAEAni Xitoydan uranni olib kirishi va keyinchalik ushbu materialdan uran konversiyasi va boyitish faoliyatida foydalanishi to'g'risida xabardor qilishi shart edi. Bundan tashqari, IAEAga plutonyumni ajratish bo'yicha o'tkazilgan tajribalar to'g'risida xabar berish majburiy edi. Biroq, Islom Respublikasi IAEA-ga o'zlarining tekshiruvlarini o'tkazishga ruxsat berish to'g'risidagi va'dasidan qaytdi va 2005 yil oktyabr oyida yuqorida ko'rsatilgan qo'shimcha protokol kelishuvini to'xtatdi.^[97]

Bu erda ISNA kadrlar G'ulom Rizo Agazoda va AEOI namunasi bo'lgan mansabdor shaxslar Sariq pishiriq 2006 yil 11 aprelda ommaviy e'lon paytida, yilda Mashad Eron o'zi yoqilg'i aylanish jarayonini muvaffaqiyatli yakunlagan.

IAEA "yashirish naqshining" bir qismi deb ta'riflagan Eronning IAEA kafolatlari to'g'risidagi shartnomasini o'ziga xos "buzilishi" ning to'liq ro'yxati bilan IAEAning Eron yadro dasturi bo'yicha 2004 yil 15 noyabrdagi hisobotida tanishish mumkin.^[98] Eron AQShning obstruktsionizmga oid ba'zi sotib olish va harakatlar to'g'risida hisobot bermaganligi bilan bog'liq, bu xabarlarga ko'ra, 1983 yilda Eronning uran konvertatsiya qilish dasturiga texnik yordam ko'rsatishni to'xtatish uchun IAEAga bosim o'tkazgan.^[59][99] Eronning yashirin yadro quroli dasturiga egami yoki yo'qmi degan savolga, MAQATEning 2003 yil noyabrdagi hisobotida ilgari e'lon qilinmagan faoliyatlarning yadroviy qurol dasturi bilan bog'liqligi to'g'risida "hech qanday dalil" topilmagani, shuningdek, Eronning yadro quroli dasturi to'g'risida xulosa chiqarishga qodir emasligi ta'kidlangan. dastur faqat tinch edi.

2004 yil iyun oyida qurilish boshlandi IR-40, 40 MVt og'ir suv reaktori.

Parij kelishuvi shartlariga ko'ra,^[100] 2004 yil 14 noyabrda Eronning yadroviy muzokarachisi Buyuk Britaniya, Frantsiya va Germaniyaning bosimidan so'ng, uranni boyitish dasturining ixtiyoriy ravishda va vaqtincha to'xtatilishini (boyitish NPTni buzish emas) va Qo'shimcha bayonnomani ixtiyoriy ravishda amalga oshirilishini e'lon qildi. nomidan harakat qilish Yevropa Ittifoqi (Evropa Ittifoqi, ushbu kontekstda Evropa Ittifoqi-3 ). O'sha paytda ushbu choralar Evropa Ittifoqi-3 bilan muzokaralar davom etar ekan, ixtiyoriy, ishonchni mustahkamlash choralari bo'lib, ba'zi bir oqilona vaqtgacha davom etishi (olti oy davomida ma'lumotnoma sifatida tilga olinadi) deb aytilgan edi. 24-noyabr kuni Eron Evropa Ittifoqi bilan tuzilgan bitim shartlariga o'zgartirish kiritib, tadqiqot ishlarini olib borish uchun ushbu uskunadan bir nechta uskunani chiqarib tashladi. To'rt kundan keyin bu talab bekor qilindi. Parij kelishuvi muzokaralarida qatnashgan Eron vakillaridan biri Seyyid Xusseyn Musaviyanning so'zlariga ko'ra, eronliklar evropalik hamkasblariga Eron uranni boyitishni doimiy ravishda tugatish to'g'risida o'ylamasligini aniq ko'rsatib berishdi:

Parijdagi [Shartnoma] matni imzolanishidan oldin doktor Rohani ... endi to'xtash haqida gapirmaslik va hatto o'ylamaslikka majbur bo'lishlari kerakligini ta'kidladi. Elchilar uning xabarini Parijda kelishilgan matn imzolanishi oldidan tashqi ishlar vazirlariga etkazishdi ... Eronliklar o'zlarining evropalik hamkasblariga, agar ikkinchisi Eronning yadro yoqilg'isi aylanish jarayonini to'liq to'xtatishga intilsa, bunday bo'lmaydi muzokaralar. Evropaliklar bunday to'xtashga intilayotgani yo'q, faqat Eron yadro dasturining harbiy maqsadlarga yo'naltirilmasligi to'g'risida ishonch bildirishdi.^[101]

2005 yil fevral oyida Eron muzokaralarni tezlashtirish uchun Evropa Ittifoqi-3 ga bosim o'tkazdi, Evropa Ittifoqi-3 buni rad etdi.^[102] Ikki tomonning turlicha pozitsiyalari tufayli muzokaralar biroz rivojlandi.^[103] AQShning bosimi ostida evropalik muzokarachilar Eron tuprog'ida boyitishga ruxsat berishga kelisha olmadilar. Garchi eronliklar boyitish hajmi va mahsulotiga ixtiyoriy cheklovlarni o'z ichiga olgan taklifni taqdim etishgan bo'lsa ham, u rad etildi. EI-3 Eronning atom energiyasidan tinch maqsadlarda foydalanish huquqini tan olish to'g'risidagi majburiyatini buzdi.^[104]

2005 yil avgust oyining boshida, iyun oyidan keyin Mahmud Ahmadinajodning saylanishi Eron prezidenti sifatida Eron uranni boyitish uskunasidagi muhrlarni olib tashladi Isfahon,^[105] Buyuk Britaniya rasmiylari "Parij kelishuvini buzish" deb atashdi^[106] Evropa Ittifoqi Parij kelishuvi shartlarini buzganligi sababli Erondan yadro boyitishni rad etishni talab qilganligi to'g'risida ish qo'zg'atilishi mumkin.^[107] Bir necha kundan so'ng, Evropa Ittifoqi-3 Eronga boyitishni doimiy ravishda to'xtatish evaziga paketni taklif qildi. Xabar qilinishicha, u siyosiy, savdo va yadroviy sohalardagi imtiyozlarni, shuningdek, yadroviy materiallarni uzoq muddatli etkazib berishni va Evropa Ittifoqi (lekin AQSh emas) tomonidan tajovuz qilmaslik kafolatlarini o'z ichiga olgan.^[106] Eron atom energetikasi tashkiloti rahbarining o'rinbosari Muhammad Saedi bu taklifni "juda haqoratli va kamsituvchi" deb rad etib, rad etdi.^[106] va boshqa mustaqil tahlilchilar Evropa Ittifoqi taklifini "bo'sh quti" sifatida tavsifladilar.^[108] Eronning boyitishni qayta boshlashi haqidagi e'lon Eron Prezidenti Ahmadinejod saylanishidan bir necha oy oldin bo'lgan. Dasturni qayta boshlashning kechikishi IAEA-ga monitoring uskunalarini qayta o'rnatishga imkon berish edi. Dasturning amalda qayta tiklanishi Prezident Mahmud Ahmedinejadning saylanishi va tayinlanishiga to'g'ri keldi Ali Laricani bosh Eron yadro muzokarachisi sifatida.^[109]

2005 yil atrofida Germaniya boshqa yadro uskunalarini eksport qilishdan yoki 1980-yillarda Eron tomonidan ushbu uskunalar uchun to'langan pulni qaytarishdan bosh tortdi.^[30] (Qarang Evropa reaktsiyalari 1979-89.)

2005 yil avgustda Pokiston ko'magi bilan^[110] AQSh hukumati ekspertlari va xalqaro olimlar guruhi Erondan topilgan bomba darajasidagi uran izlari Pokistonning ifloslangan uskunalaridan topilgan va Eronda yashirin yadroviy qurol dasturining dalili emas degan xulosaga kelishdi.^[111] 2005 yil sentyabr oyida IAEA bosh direktori Muhammad al-Baradey Eronda agentlik inspektorlari tomonidan topilgan "eng" yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran izlari import qilingan santrifüj tarkibiy qismlaridan kelib chiqqanligi haqida xabar berdi va Eronning izlar ifloslanganligi haqidagi da'volarini tasdiqladi. Xabarlarga ko'ra, Vena va Davlat departamenti barcha amaliy maqsadlar uchun OTM masalasi hal qilingan.^[112]

2005 yil 17 sentyabrda Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotidagi nutqida Prezident Mahmud Ahmadinajod Eronni boyitishni xalqaro konsortsium boshqarishi va Eron boshqa davlatlar bilan egalik huquqini qo'lga kiritishi mumkin degan fikrni ilgari surdi. Ushbu taklif Evropa Ittifoqi va AQSh tomonidan qo'ldan chiqarildi.^[104]

IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi 2003 yildan keyin Eronning yadroviy ishi bo'yicha rasmiy qarorni ikki yilga qoldirdi, Eron esa Evropa Ittifoqi-3 bilan hamkorlikni davom ettirdi. 2005 yil 24 sentyabrda, Eron Parij kelishuvidan voz kechgandan so'ng, kengash Eron o'zining xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi kelishuviga rioya qilmaganligini aniqladi, asosan 2003 yil noyabrida xabar qilingan faktlarga asoslanib.^[113]

2006 yil 4 fevralda MAGATEning 35 a'zosi bo'lgan Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi 27-3 (beshta betaraf ovoz bilan) ovoz berdi. Jazoir, Belorussiya, Indoneziya, Liviya va Janubiy Afrika) Eronni BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga xabar berish. Ushbu tadbir Buyuk Britaniya, Frantsiya va Germaniya tomonidan homiylik qilingan va uni AQSh qo'llab-quvvatlagan. Ikki doimiy kengash a'zolari, Rossiya va Xitoy, faqat mart oyigacha kengash hech qanday choralar ko'rmaslik sharti bilan murojaat qilishga rozi bo'lishdi. Yo'llanishga qarshi ovoz bergan uchta a'zo Venesuela, Suriya va Kuba.^[114][115] Bunga javoban, 2006 yil 6 fevralda Eron qo'shimcha xavfsizlik protokoli va IAEA bilan boshqa barcha ixtiyoriy va qonuniy majburiy bo'lmagan hamkorlikni o'z xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi kelishuv talabidan tashqari to'xtatdi.^[116]

2006 yil fevral oyi oxirida MAGATE direktori Muhammad al-Baradey Eron sanoat miqyosida boyitishni rad etish va o'rniga o'z dasturini kichik ko'lamli uchuvchi inshoot bilan cheklash va Rossiyadan yadro yoqilg'isini olib kirishga rozilik berish to'g'risida bitim taklifini ilgari surdi ( qarang yadro yoqilg'isi banki ). Eronliklar, boyitish huquqidan printsipial ravishda voz kechishga tayyor bo'lmasalar-da, bunga tayyor ekanliklarini ta'kidladilar^[117] kelishuv echimini ko'rib chiqing. Biroq, 2006 yil mart oyida Bush ma'muriyati Eronda hech qanday boyitishni umuman qabul qilmasliklarini aniq aytdi.^[118]

IAEA Boshqaruvchilar kengashi rasmiy hisobotni Eronning BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga taqdim etilishini keyinga qoldirdi (bunday hisobot IAEA Nizomining XII.C moddasida talab qilinadi),^[119] 2006 yil 27 fevralgacha.^[120] Kengash odatda qarorlarni konsensus asosida qabul qiladi, ammo kamdan-kam uchraydigan qarorda u ushbu qarorni ovoz berishda qabul qildi, 12 betaraf qoldi.^[121][122]

2006 yil 11 aprelda Eron Prezidenti Mahmud Ahmadinajod buni e'lon qildi Eron uranni muvaffaqiyatli boyitgan edi. Prezident Ahmadinejad bu haqda shimoliy-sharqiy shahridan televizion murojaatida aytib o'tdi Mashhad, u erda "Men Eronni yadro texnologiyasiga ega bo'lgan mamlakatlar qatoriga qo'shilganligini rasman e'lon qilaman" dedi. Uran yuzdan ortiq santrifüj yordamida 3,5 foizgacha boyitilgan.

2006 yil 13 aprelda, AQSh davlat kotibidan keyin Kondoliza Rays (2006 yil 12 aprelda) Xavfsizlik Kengashi Tehronni yadroviy ambitsiyasining yo'nalishini o'zgartirishga undash uchun "kuchli qadamlar" ni ko'rib chiqishi kerak; Prezident Ahmadinejad Eron uranni boyitishdan qaytmasligiga va dunyo Eronga yadro kuchi sifatida munosabatda bo'lishi kerakligiga va'da berib: "Eronning to'liq yadro yoqilg'isi aylanishiga erishganidan g'azablanganlarga bizning javobimiz faqat bitta ibora. Biz aytamiz: Bo'ling bizga g'azablanib, bu g'azabdan o'ling ", chunki" biz Eron millatining uranni boyitish huquqi to'g'risida hech kim bilan muzokara o'tkazmaymiz ".^[123]

2006 yil 14 aprelda The Ilmiy va xalqaro xavfsizlik instituti (IShID) Eronning Natanz va Esfaxondagi atom inshootlarining sun'iy yo'ldosh orqali olingan suratlarini nashr etdi.^[124] Featured in these images is a new tunnel entrance near the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site. In addition, a series of images dating back to 2002 shows the underground enrichment buildings and its subsequent covering by soil, concrete, and other materials. Both facilities were already subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.

On 28 July 2006, the BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi approved a resolution to give Eron until the end of August to suspend uranni boyitish or face the threat of sanktsiyalar.^[125]

Iran responded to the demand to stop enrichment of uranium 24 August 2006, offering to return to the negotiation table but refusing to end enrichment.^[126]

Qolam Ali Hadad-adel, speaker of Iran's parliament, said on 30 August 2006, that Iran had the right to "peaceful application of nuclear technology and all other officials agree with this decision," according to the semi-official Iranian Students News Agency. "Iran opened the door to negotiations for Europe and hopes that the answer which was given to the nuclear package would bring them to the table."^[126]

In Resolution 1696 of 31 July 2006, the Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Xavfsizlik Kengashi demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing related activities.^[127]

Yilda BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining 1737-sonli qarori of 26 December 2006, the Council imposed a series of sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with the earlier Security Council resolution deciding that Iran suspend enrichment-related activities without delay.^[128] These sanctions were primarily targeted against the transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies^[129] and, in response to concerns of China and Russia, were lighter than that sought by the United States.^[130] This resolution followed a report from the IAEA that Iran had permitted inspections under its safeguards agreement but had not suspended its enrichment-related activities.^[131]

2007–2013

BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi

The BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi has passed eight qarorlar on Iran:

• Qaror 1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities,
• Qaror 1737 (23 December 2006) imposed sanktsiyalar after Iran refused to suspend its enrichment activities, required Iran to cooperate with IAEA,
• Resolution 1747 (24 March 2007) expanded the list of sanctioned Iranian entities,
• Resolution 1803 (3 March 2008) extended those sanctions to additional persons and entities,
• Resolution 1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed the preceding four resolutions,
• Qaror 1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a complete arms embargo on Iran, banned Iran from any activities related to ballistic missiles, authorized the inspection and seizure of shipments violating these restrictions, and extended the asset freeze to the Eron inqilobiy gvardiyasi korpusi (IRGC) and the Eron Islom Respublikasi yuk tashish liniyalari (IRISL), established Panel of Experts (whose mandate was extended three times by Resolution 1984 (8 June 2011), Resolution 2049 (7 June 2012), and Resolution 2105 (5 June 2013)).

Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi

The IAEA has consistently stated it is unable to conclude that Iran's nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Such a conclusion would normally be drawn only for countries that have an Qo'shimcha protokol in force. Iran ceased its implementation of the Additional Protocol in 2006, and also ceased all other cooperation with the IAEA beyond what Iran acknowledged it was required to provide under its safeguards agreement, after the IAEA Board of Governors decided, in February 2006, to report Iran's safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council.^[116] The UN Security Council, invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, then passed Resolution 1737, which obligated Iran to implement the Additional Protocol. Iran responded that its nuclear activities were peaceful and that Security Council involvement was malicious and unlawful.^[132] In August 2007, Iran and the IAEA entered into an agreement on the modalities for resolving remaining outstanding issues,^[133] and made progress in outstanding issues except for the question of "alleged studies" of weaponization by Iran.^[134] Iran said it did not address the alleged studies in the IAEA work plan because they were not included in the plan.^[135] The IAEA did not detect the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies and said it regrets it was unable to provide Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, but said the documentation was comprehensive and detailed, and therefore needed to be taken seriously. Iran said the allegations are based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that had not received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they were forged and fabricated.^[136][137]

In 2011, the IAEA began to voice growing concern over possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program, and has released a number of reports chastising Iran's nuclear program to that effect.^[138]

February 2007 Report

In February 2007, anonymous diplomats at the atomic energy agency reportedly complained that most US intelligence shared with the IAEA had proved inaccurate, and none had led to significant discoveries inside Iran.^[139]

On 10 May 2007, Iran and the IAEA vehemently denied reports that Iran had blocked IAEA inspectors when they sought access to Iran's enrichment facility. On 11 March 2007, Reuters quoted International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman Marc Vidricaire, "We have not been denied access at any time, including in the past few weeks. Normally we do not comment on such reports but this time we felt we had to clarify the matter ... If we had a problem like that we would have to report to the [35-nation IAEA governing] board ... That has not happened because this alleged event did not take place."^[140]

May 2007 Report

On 30 July 2007, inspectors from the IAEA spent five hours at the Arak complex, the first such visit since April. Visits to other plants in Iran were expected during the following days. It has been suggested that access may have been granted in an attempt to head off further sanctions.^[141]

August 2007 Report and Agreement between Iran and the IAEA

An IAEA report to the Board of Governors on 30 August 2007 stated that Iran's Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz was operating "well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design," and that 12 of the intended 18 centrifuge cascades at the plant were operating. The report stated that the IAEA had "been able to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran," and that longstanding issues regarding plutonium experiments and HEU contamination on spent fuel containers were considered "resolved." However, the report added that the Agency remained unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program.

The report also outlined a work plan agreed by Iran and the IAEA on 21 August 2007. The work plan reflected agreement on "modalities for resolving the remaining safeguards implementation issues, including the long outstanding issues." According to the plan, these modalities covered all remaining issues regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities. The IAEA report described the work plan as "a significant step forward," but added "the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line defined therein and implements all the necessary safeguards and transparency measures, including the measures provided for in the Additional Protocol."^[142] Although the work plan did not include a commitment by Iran to implement the Additional Protocol, IAEA safeguards head Olli Xaynonen observed that measures in the work plan "for resolving our outstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol."^[143]

According to Reuters, the report was likely to blunt Washington's push for more severe sanctions against Iran. One senior UN official familiar said US efforts to escalate sanctions against Iran would provoke a nationalistic backlash by Iran that would set back the IAEA investigation in Iran.^[144] In late October 2007, chief IAEA inspector Olli Heinonen described Iranian cooperation with the IAEA as "good," although much remained to be done.^[145]

In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen "no evidence" of Iran developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaradei as saying "We have information that there has been maybe some studies about possible weaponization. That's why we have said that we cannot give Iran a pass right now, because there is still a lot of question marks. ... But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into a weapon? No. Have we seen an active weaponization program? No." The IHT report went on to say that "ElBaradei said he was worried about the growing rhetoric from the U.S., which he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said he would welcome seeing it."^[146]

November 2007 report

15 November 2007, IAEA report found that on nine outstanding issues listed in the August 2007 workplan, including experiments on the P-2 centrifuge and work with uranium metals, "Iran's statements are consistent with ... information available to the agency," but it warned that its knowledge of Tehran's present atomic work was shrinking due to Iran's refusal to continue voluntarily implementing the Additional Protocol, as it had done in the past under the October 2003 Tehran agreement and the November 2004 Paris agreement. The only remaining issues were traces of HEU found at one location, and allegations by US intelligence agencies based on a laptop computer allegedly stolen from Iran which reportedly contained nuclear weapons-related designs. The IAEA report also stated that Tehran continues to produce LEU. Iran has declared it has a right to peaceful nuclear technology under the NPT, despite Security Council demands that it cease its nuclear enrichment.^[147]

On 18 November 2007, President Ahmadinejad announced that he intended to consult with Arab nations on a plan, under the auspices of the Fors ko'rfazi hamkorlik kengashi, to enrich uranium in a neutral third country, such as Switzerland.^[148]

Israel criticised IAEA reports on Iran as well as the former IAEA-director ElBaradei. Israel's Minister of Strategic Affairs Avigdor Lieberman dismissed reports by the IAEA as being "unacceptable" and accused IAEA head ElBaradei of being "pro-Iranian."^[149]

February 2008 report

On 11 February 2008, news reports stated that the IAEA report on Iran's compliance with the August 2007 work plan would be delayed over internal disagreements over the report's expected conclusions that the major issues had been resolved.^[150] French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated that he would meet with IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei to convince him to "listen to the West" and remind him that the IAEA is merely in charge of the "technical side" rather than the "political side" of the issue.^[151] A senior IAEA official denied the reports of internal disagreements and accused Western powers of using the same "hype" tactics employed against Iraq before the 2003 US-led invasion to justify imposing further sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.^[152]

The IAEA issued its report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran on 22 February 2008.^[153]With respect to the report, IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei stated that "We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment programme" with the exception of a single issue, "and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past."^[154]

According to the report, the IAEA shared intelligence with Iran recently provided by the US regarding "alleged studies" on a nuclear weaponization program. The information was allegedly obtained from a laptop computer smuggled out of Iran and provided to the US in mid-2004.^[155] The laptop was reportedly received from a "longtime contact" in Iran who obtained it from someone else now believed to be dead.^[156] A senior European diplomat warned "I can fabricate that data," and argued that the documents look "beautiful, but is open to doubt."^[156] The United States has relied on the laptop to prove that Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons.^[156] 2007 yil noyabrda Qo'shma Shtatlar Milliy razvedka taxminlari (NIE) believed that Iran halted an alleged active nuclear weapons program in fall 2003.^[7] Iran has dismissed the laptop information as a fabrication, and other diplomats have dismissed the information as relatively insignificant and coming too late.^[157]

The February 2008 IAEA report states that the Agency has "not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard."^[153]

May 2008 report

On 26 May 2008, the IAEA issued another regular report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran.^[158]

According to the report, the IAEA has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and accountancy reports, as required by its safeguards agreement.

Iran had installed several new centrifuges, including more advanced models, and environmental samples showed the centrifuges "continued to operate as declared", making low-enriched uranium. The report also noted that other elements of Iran's nuclear program continued to be subject to IAEA monitoring and safeguards as well, including the construction of the heavy water facility in Arak, the construction and use of hot cells associated with the Tehran Research Reactor, the uranium conversion efforts, and the Russian nuclear fuel delivered for the Bushehr reactor.

The report stated that the IAEA had requested, as a voluntary "transparency measure", to be allowed access to centrifuge manufacturing sites, but that Iran had refused the request. The IAEA report stated that Iran had also submitted replies to questions regarding "possible military dimensions" to its nuclear program, which include "alleged studies" on a so-called Green Salt Project, high-explosive testing and missile re-entry vehicles. According to the report, Iran's answers were still under review by the IAEA at the time the report was published. However, as part of its earlier "overall assessment" of the allegations, Iran had responded that the documents making the allegations were forged, not authentic, or referred to conventional applications.

The report stated that Iran may have more information on the alleged studies, which "remain a matter of serious concern", but that the IAEA itself had not detected evidence of actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear weapons or components. The IAEA also stated that it was not itself in possession of certain documents containing the allegations against Iran, and so was not able to share the documents with Iran.

September 2008 report

According to 15 September 2008 IAEA report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran,^[159] Iran continued to provide the IAEA with access to declared nuclear material and activities, which continued to be operated under safeguards and with no evidence of any diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful uses. Nevertheless, the report reiterated that the IAEA would not be able to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program unless Iran adopted "transparency measures" which exceeded its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, since the IAEA does not verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in any country unless the Additional Protocol is in force.

With respect to the report, IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei stated that, "We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment programme" with the exception of a single issue, "and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past."^[160]

According to the report, Iran had increased the number of operating centrifuges at its Fuel Enrichment Plant in Isfahan, and continued to enrich uranium. Contrary to some media reports which claimed that Iran had diverted uran geksaflorid (UF₆) for a renewed nuclear weapons program,^[161] the IAEA emphasized that all of the uran geksaflorid was under IAEA safeguards. This was re-iterated by IAEA spokesman Melissa Fleming, who characterized the report of missing nuclear material in Iran as being "fictitious."^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Iran was also asked to clarify information about foreign assistance it may have received in connection with a high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device. Iran stated that there had been no such activities in Iran.^[159]

The IAEA also reported that it had held a series of meetings with Iranian officials to resolve the outstanding issues including the "alleged studies" into nuclear weaponization which were listed in the May 2008 IAEA report. During the course of these meetings, the Iranians filed a series of written responses including a 117-page presentation which confirmed the partial veracity of some of the allegations, but which asserted that the allegations as a whole were based on "forged" documents and "fabricated" data, and that Iran had not actually received the documentation substantiating the allegations. According to the August 2007 "Modalities Agreement" between Iran and the IAEA, Iran had agreed to review and assess the "alleged studies" claims, as good faith gesture, "upon receiving all related documents."^[162]

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, accused the United States of preventing the IAEA from delivering the documents about the alleged studies to Iran as required by the Modalities Agreement, and stated that Iran had done its best to respond to the allegations but would not accept "any request beyond our legal obligation and particularly beyond the Work Plan, which we have already implemented."^{[iqtibos kerak ]}

While once again expressing "regret" that the IAEA was not able to provide Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, the report also urged Iran to provide the IAEA with "substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals" regarding the alleged studies, as a "matter of transparency".^[159] The IAEA submitted a number of proposals to Iran to help resolve the allegations and expressed a willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation were not nuclear-related, as Iran asserted, while protecting sensitive information related to its conventional military activities. The report does not indicate whether Iran accepted or rejected these proposals.^[159]

The report also reiterated that IAEA inspectors had found "no evidence on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies ... Nor has the Agency detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies" but insisted that the IAEA would not be able to formally verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program unless Iran had agreed to adopt the requested "transparency measures."^[159]

February 2009 report

In a 19 February 2009, report to the Board of Governors,^[163] IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported that Iran continued to enrich uranium contrary to the decisions of the Security Council and had produced over a ton of low enriched uranium. Results of environmental samples taken by the Agency at the FEP and PFEP5 indicated that the plants have been operating at levels declared by Tehran, "within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with enrichment plants of a similar throughput." The Agency was also able to confirm there was no ongoing reprocessing related activities at Iran's Tehran Research Reactor and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility.

According to the report, Iran also continued to refuse to provide design information or access to verify design information for its IR-40 heavy water research reactor. Iran and the IAEA in February 2003 agreed to modify a provision in the Subsidiary Arrangement to its safeguards agreement (Code 3.1) to require such access.^[164] Iran told the Agency in March 2007 that it "suspended" the implementation of the modified Code 3.1, which had been "accepted in 2003, but not yet ratified by the parliament", and that it would "revert" to the implementation of the 1976 version of Code 3.1.^[165] The subsidiary arrangement may only be modified by mutual agreement.^[166] Iran says that since the reactor is not in a position to receive nuclear material the IAEA's request for access was not justified, and requested that the IAEA not schedule an inspection to verify design information.^[163] The Agency says its right to verify design information provided to it is a "continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility."^[165]

Regarding the "alleged studies" into nuclear weaponization, the Agency said that "as a result of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with the remaining issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme, the Agency has not made any substantive progress on these issues." The Agency called on member states which had provided information about the alleged programs to allow the information to be shared with Iran. The Agency said Iran's continued refusal to implement the Additional Protocol was contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the Security Council. The Agency was able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran.^[167] Iran says that for the six years the Agency has been considering its case, the IAEA has not found any evidence to prove that Tehran is seeking a nuclear weapon.^[168]

Regarding the IAEA report, several news reports suggested that Iran had failed to properly report the amount of low-enriched uranium it possessed because Iranian estimates did not match the IAEA inspector's findings, and that Iran now had enough uranium to make a nuclear bomb.^[169][170] The reporting was widely criticized as unjustifiably provocative and hyped.^{[171][172][173]} In response to the controversy, IAEA spokesman Melissa Fleming asserted that the IAEA had no reason at all to believe that the estimates of low-enriched uranium produced by Iran were an intentional error, and that no nuclear material could be removed from the facility for further enrichment to make nuclear weapons without the agency's knowledge since the facility is subject to video surveillance and the nuclear material is kept under seal.^[174]

Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, Iran's Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said the February report failed to "provide any new insight into Iran's nuclear program."^[175] He asserted the report was written in a way which clearly causes misunderstanding in public opinion. He suggested the reports should be written to have a section about whether Iran has fulfilled its NPT obligations and a separate section for whether "fulfillment of Additional Protocol or sub-arrangements 1 and 3 are beyond the commitment or not."^[176]

In a February 2009 press interview, IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei said Iran has low enriched uranium, but "that doesn't mean that they are going tomorrow to have nuclear weapons, because as long as they are under IAEA verification, as long as they are not weaponizing, you know." ElBaradei continued that there is a confidence deficit with Iran, but that the concern should not be hyped and that "many other countries are enriching uranium without the world making any fuss about it."^[177]

In February 2009 IAEA Director General reportedly said that he believed the possibility of a military attack on Iran's nuclear installations had been ruled out. "Force can only be used as a last option ... when all other political possibilities have been exhausted," he told Radio France International.^[168][178] Former Director General Hans Blix criticized Western governments for the years lost by their "ineffective approaches" to Iran's nuclear program. Blix suggested the West offer "guarantees against attacks from the outside and subversive activities inside" and also suggested US involvement in regional diplomacy "would offer Iran a greater incentive to reach a nuclear agreement than the Bush team's statements that 'Iran must behave itself'."^[179]

August 2009 Report

In July 2009, Yukiya Amano, the incoming head of the IAEA said: "I don't see any evidence in IAEA official documents" that Iran is trying to gain the ability to develop nuclear arms.^[180]

In September 2009, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei that Iran had broken the law by not disclosing its second uranium enrichment site near Qum sooner. Nevertheless, he said, the United Nations did not have credible evidence that Iran had an operational nuclear program.^[181]

November 2009 Report

In November 2009, the IAEA's 35-nation Boshqaruvchilar kengashi overwhelmingly backed a demand of the US, Russia, China, and three other powers that Iran immediately stop building its newly revealed nuclear facility and freeze uranium enrichment. Iranian officials shrugged off approval of the resolution by 25 members of the Board, but the US and its allies hinted at new UN sanctions if Iran remained defiant.^[182]

February 2010 Report

In February 2010, the IAEA issued a report scolding Iran for failing to explain purchases of sensitive technology as well as secret tests of high-precision detonators and modified designs of missile cones to accommodate larger payloads. Such experiments are closely associated with atomic warheads.^[183]

May 2010 Report

In May 2010, the IAEA issued a report that Iran had declared production of over 2.5 metric tons of low-enriched uranium, which would be enough if further enriched to make two nuclear weapons, and that Iran has refused to answer inspectors’ questions on a variety of activities, including what the agency called the "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program.^[184][185]

In July 2010, Iran barred two IAEA inspectors from entering the country. The IAEA rejected Iran's reasons for the ban and said it fully supported the inspectors, which Tehran has accused of reporting wrongly that some nuclear equipment was missing.^[186]

In August 2010, the IAEA said Iran has started using a second set of 164 centrifuges linked in a cascade, or string of machines, to enrich uranium to up to 20 per cent at its Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plan.^[187]

November 2011 Report

In November 2011 the IAEA released a report^[188] stating inspectors had found credible evidence that Iran had been conducting experiments aimed at designing a nuclear bomb until 2003, and that research may have continued on a smaller scale after that time.^[189] IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said evidence gathered by the agency "indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device."^[190] A number of Western nuclear experts stated there was very little new in the report,^[191] and that media reports had exaggerated its significance.^[192] Iran charged that the report was unprofessional and unbalanced, and had been prepared with undue political influence primarily by the United States.^[193]

In November 2011, IAEA officials identified a "large explosive containment vessel" inside Parchin.^[194] The IAEA later assessed that Iran has been conducting experiments to develop nuclear weapons capability.^[195]

The IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution^[196] by a vote of 32–2 that expressed "deep and increasing concern" over the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program and calling it "essential" that Iran provide additional information and access to the IAEA.^[9][197] The United States welcomed the resolution and said it would step up sanctions to press Iran to change course.^[198] In response to the IAEA resolution, Iran threatened to reduce its cooperation with the IAEA, though Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Solihiy played down talk of withdrawal from the NPT or the IAEA.^[199]

February 2012 report

On 24 February 2012, IAEA Director General Amano reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that high-level IAEA delegations had met twice with Iranian officials to intensify efforts to resolve outstanding issues, but that major differences remained and Iran did not grant IAEA requests for access to the Parchin site, where the IAEA believes high-explosives research pertinent to nuclear weapons may have taken place. Iran dismissed the IAEA's report on the possible military dimensions to its nuclear program as based on "unfounded allegations." Amano called on Iran to agree to a structure approach, based on IAEA verification practices, to resolve outstanding issues.^[200] In March 2012, Iran said it would allow another inspection at Parchin "when an agreement is made on a modality plan."^[201][202] Not long after, it was reported that Iran might not consent to unfettered access.^[203] An ISIS study of satellite imagery claimed to have identified an explosive site at Parchin.^[204]

The February IAEA report also described progress in Iran's enrichment and fuel fabrication efforts, including a tripling of the number of cascades enriching uranium to nearly 20 per cent and testing of fuel elements for the Tehron tadqiqot reaktori and the still incomplete IR-40 heavy water research reactor.^[200] Though Iran was continuing to install thousands of additional centrifuges, these were based on an erratic and outdated design, both in its main enrichment plant at Natanz and in a smaller facility at Fordow buried deep underground. "It appears that they are still struggling with the advanced centrifuges," said Olli Heinonen, a former chief nuclear inspector for the Vienna-based U.N. agency, while nuclear expert Mark Fitzpatrick pointed out that Iran had been working on "second-generation models for over ten years now and still can't put them into large-scale operation".^[205] Peter Crail and Daryl G. Kimball of the Arms Control Organisation commented that the report "does not identify any breakthroughs" and "confirms initial impressions that Iran's announcements last week on a series of 'nuclear advances' were hyped."^[206]

May 2012 report

In May 2012, the IAEA reported that Iran had increased its rate of production of low-enriched uranium enriched to 3.5 per cent and to expand its stockpile of uranium enriched to 19.75 per cent, but was having difficulty with more advanced centrifuges.^[207] The IAEA also reported detecting particles of uranium enriched to 27 per cent at the Fordu enrichment facility. However, a diplomat in Vienna cautioned that the spike in uranium purity found by inspectors could turn out to be accidental.^[208] This change drastically moved Iran's uranium toward bomb-grade material. Until now, the highest level of purity that had been found in Iran was 20 per cent.^[209]

August 2012 report

In late August, the IAEA set up an Iran Task Force to deal with inspections and other issues related to Iran's nuclear program, in an attempt to focus and streamline the IAEA's handling of Iran's nuclear program by concentrating experts and other resources into one dedicated team.^[210]

On 30 August, the IAEA released a report showing a major expansion of Iranian enrichment activities. The report said that Iran has more than doubled the number of centrifuges at the underground facility at Fordow, from 1,064 centrifuges in May to 2,140 centrifuges in August, though the number of operating centrifuges had not increased. The report said that since 2010 Iran had produced about 190 kg of 20-per-cent-enriched uranium, up from 145 kg in May. The report also noted that Iran had converted some of the 20-per-cent-enriched uranium to an oxide form and fabricated into fuel for use in research reactors, and that once this conversion and fabrication have taken place, the fuel cannot be readily enriched to weapon-grade purity.^[211][212]

The report also expressed concerns over Parchin, which the IAEA has sought to inspect for evidence of nuclear weapons development. Since the IAEA requested access, "significant ground scraping and landscaping have been undertaken over an extensive area at and around the location," five buildings had been demolished, while power lines, fences, and paved roads were removed, all of which would hamper the IAEA investigation if it were granted access.^[213]

In a briefing to the Board of Governors on this report in early September 2012, IAEA Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts and Assistant Director General Rafael Grossi displayed satellite images for its member states which allegedly demonstrate Iranian efforts to remove incriminating evidence from its facility at Parchin, or a "nuclear clean-up." These images showed a building at Parchin covered in what appeared to be a pink tarpaulin, as well as demolition of building and removal of earth that the IAEA said would "significantly hamper" its investigation. A senior Western diplomat described the presentation as "pretty compelling." The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said that the purpose of the pink tarpaulin could be to hide further "clean-up work" from satellites. However, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's envoy to the IAEA, denied the contents of the presentation, saying that "merely having a photo from up there, a satellite imagery ... this is not the way the agency should do its professional job."^[214]

According to the Associated Press, the IAEA received "new and significant intelligence" by September 2012, which four diplomats confirmed was the basis for a passage in the August 2012 IAEA report that "the agency has obtained more information which further corroborates" suspicions. The intelligence reportedly indicates that Iran had advanced work on computer modeling of the performance of a nuclear warhead, work David Albright of IShID said was "critical to the development of a nuclear weapon." The intelligence would also boost fears by the IAEA that Iran has advanced its weapons research on multiple fronts, as computer modeling is usually accompanied by physical tests of the components which would enter a nuclear weapon.^[215]

In response to this report, the IAEA Board of Governors on 13 September passed a resolution that rebuked Iran for defying UN Security Council resolutions to suspend uranium enrichment and called on Iran to allow inspections of evidence that it is pursuing weapons technology.^[216] The resolution, which passed by a vote of 31–1 with 3 abstentions, also expressed "serious concerns" about Iran's nuclear program while desiring a peaceful resolution. Senior United States diplomat Robert Wood blamed Iran for "systematically demolishing" a facility at the Parchin military base, which IAEA inspectors have attempted to visit in the past, but were not granted access, saying "Iran has been taking measures that appear consistent with an effort to remove evidence of its past activities at Parchin."^[217] The resolution was introduced jointly by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.^[218]

November 2012 report

On 16 November, the IAEA released a report showing continued expansion in Iranian uranium enrichment capabilities. At Fordow, all 2,784 IR-1 centrifuges (16 cascades of 174 each) have been installed, though only 4 cascades are operating and another 4 are fully equipped, vacuum-tested, and ready to begin operating.^[219] Iran has produced approximately 233 kg of near-20 per cent enriched uranium, an increase of 43 kg since the August 2012 IAEA report.^[220]

The IAEA August 2012 report stated that Iran had begun to use 96 kg of its near-20 per cent enriched uranium to fabricate fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which makes it more difficult to further enrich that uranium to weapons grade, since it would first need to be converted back to uranium hexafluoride gas.^[221] Though more of this uranium has been fabricated into fuel, no additional uranium has been sent to the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant at Isfahon.^[219]

The November report noted that Iran has continued to deny the IAEA access to the military site at Parchin. Citing evidence from satellite imagery that "Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments" relevant to nuclear weapons development, the report expresses concern that changes taking place at the Parchin military site might eliminate evidence of past nuclear activities, noting that there had been virtually no activity at that location between February 2005 and the time the IAEA requested access. Those changes include:

• Frequent presence of equipment, trucks and personnel.
• Large amounts of liquid run-off.
• Removal of external pipework.
• Razing and removal of five other buildings or structures and the site perimeter fence.
• Reconfiguration of electrical and water supply.
• Shrouding of the containment vessel building.
• Scraping and removal of large quantities of earth and the depositing of new earth in its place.^[219][222]

Iran said that the IR-40 heavy water-moderated research reactor at Arak was expected begin to operate in the first quarter of 2014. During on-site inspections of the IR-40 design, IAEA inspectors observed that the installation of cooling and moderator circuit piping was continuing.^[222]

February 2013 report

On 21 February, the IAEA released a report showing continued expansion in Iranian uranium enrichment capabilities. As of 19 February, 12,699 IR-1 centrifuges have been installed at Natanz. This includes the installation of 2,255 centrifuges since the previous IAEA report in November.^[223]

Fordow, the nuclear facility near Qom, contains 16 cascades, equally divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2, with a total of 2,710 centrifuges. Iran is continuing to operate the four cascades of 174 IR-1 centrifuges each in two tandem sets to produce 19.75 per cent LEU in a total of 696 enriching centrifuges, the same number of centrifuges enriching as was reported in November 2012.^[224]

Eron taxminan 280 kg boyitilgan 20 kg uran ishlab chiqardi, 2012 yil noyabr oyida MAQATE hisobotidan beri 47 kg ga oshdi va LEU ning 3,5 foiz ishlab chiqarilishi 8271 kg ni tashkil etdi (o'tgan chorakda 7,611 kg).^[223]

IAEA-ning 2013 yil fevraldagi hisobotida aytilishicha, Eron Tehron tadqiqot reaktori uchun yoqilg'i ishlab chiqarish uchun 20 foizga yaqin boyitilgan uranni oksid shaklida qayta tiklashni davom ettirmoqda, bu esa ushbu uranni yanada boyitishni qiyinlashtirmoqda. qurol darajasi, chunki uni avval uran geksaflorid gaziga qaytarish kerak bo'ladi.^[225]

Fevral oyidagi hisobotda ta'kidlanishicha, Eron MAGATE harbiy bazasiga kirish huquqini rad etishda davom etmoqda Parchin. Sun'iy yo'ldosh tasviridan olingan ma'lumotlarga asoslanib, "Eron gidrodinamik tajribalar o'tkazadigan katta portlovchi moddalarni saqlaydigan kema qurdi". Bunday o'rnatish yadro qurolini ishlab chiqish ko'rsatkichi bo'lishi mumkin. Hisobotda Parchin harbiy uchastkasida yuz berayotgan o'zgarishlar o'tgan yadroviy faoliyatga oid dalillarni yo'q qilishi mumkinligi haqida xavotir bildirilib, 2005 yilning fevralidan va IAEA kirish so'ragan paytgacha bu joyda deyarli hech qanday faoliyat bo'lmagan. Ushbu o'zgarishlarga quyidagilar kiradi:

• Kamera binosining ba'zi xususiyatlarini tiklash, masalan, devor panellari va egzoz quvurlari.
• Kamera binosi va boshqa katta bino tomlarining o'zgarishi.
• Boshqa katta binoga qo'shimcha qurilmani demontaj qilish va rekonstruktsiya qilish.
• Ilgari o'xshash o'lchamdagi bino buzilgan joyda bitta kichkina binoning qurilishi.
• Katta maydon bo'ylab boshqa material qatlamini yoyish, tekislash va ixchamlashtirish.
• Joyni ikkita maydonga ajratadigan panjara o'rnatish. Ushbu tadbirlarning aksariyati, shuningdek, IShID tomonidan 2012 yil 29 noyabr, 2012 yil 12 dekabr va 2013 yil 25 yanvardagi sun'iy yo'ldosh tasvirlari hisobotlarida qayd etilgan.^[224][225]

Eronning ta'kidlashicha, Arakdagi IR-40 og'ir suv bilan ishlaydigan tadqiqot reaktori 2014 yilning birinchi choragida ishlay boshlaydi. IR-40 konstruktsiyasini joyida tekshirish paytida IAEA inspektorlari avval xabar qilingan sovutish va moderator davri quvurlari deyarli yakunlandi. MAQATEning xabar berishicha, Eron IRR-40 reaktori uchun yoqilg'ini sinovdan o'tkazishda TRR dan foydalanadi, bu reaktor BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi Erondan qurilishni to'xtatishni talab qildi, chunki u yadro quroli uchun plutonyum ishlab chiqarishda ishlatilishi mumkin. IAEA hisobotida aytilishicha, "2012 yil 26 noyabrda Agentlik IRR-40 tabiiy uran yoqilg'isi yig'ilishining prototipini nurlanish sinovlari uchun TRRga o'tkazilishidan oldin tasdiqladi".^[225] 2011 yil 17 avgustdagi so'nggi tashrifidan buyon Agentlikka ushbu zavodga qo'shimcha kirish imkoni berilmagan, shuning uchun zavod holatini kuzatib borish uchun sun'iy yo'ldosh tasvirlariga asoslanadi.^[225]

2015 yil mart oyi hisoboti

2015 yil mart oyida MAQATE Bosh direktori Amano Eron yadro dasturining mumkin bo'lgan harbiy o'lchovlari bilan bog'liq o'nlab masalalarni hal qilish uchun etarli kirish yoki ma'lumot bermaganligini va bu masalalardan faqat bittasi haqida juda cheklangan ma'lumot berganligini xabar qildi.^[226]

2015 yil dekabr oyi hisoboti

2015 yil dekabr oyida MAQATE quyidagi xulosani e'lon qildi:^[227]

Agentlikning baholashicha, 2003 yil oxirigacha Eronda yadroviy portlovchi moslamani ishlab chiqarishga tegishli bo'lgan bir qator tadbirlar muvofiqlashtirilgan sa'y-harakatlar sifatida amalga oshirilgan va ayrim tadbirlar 2003 yildan keyin amalga oshirilgan. Agentlik ushbu faoliyat ilgari surilmaganligini ham baholamoqda. fizibilite va ilmiy tadqiqotlar, shuningdek, tegishli texnik vakolat va qobiliyatlarni egallashdan tashqari. Agentlik Eronda 2009 yildan keyin yadro portlovchi moslamasini yaratish bilan bog'liq faoliyatning ishonchli ko'rsatkichlariga ega emas.

Ushbu hisobotdan so'ng, IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi rezolyutsiya qabul qildi va hisobotdagi masalalarni ko'rib chiqishni yakunladi va Eron haqidagi avvalgi qarorlarni bekor qildi.^[228]

Eron

Intervyu va so'rovnomalar shuni ko'rsatadiki, barcha guruhlardagi eronliklarning aksariyati o'z mamlakatlarining yadro dasturini yoqlashadi.^{[229][230][231]} 2008 yildagi so'rovnomalar shuni ko'rsatdiki, eronliklarning katta qismi o'z mamlakatlaridan atom energetikasini rivojlantirishni xohlashadi va Eronliklarning 90 foizi Eron uchun "to'liq yoqilg'i tsikli yadro dasturiga ega bo'lish" muhim (shu jumladan 81 foiz juda muhim).^[232] Eronliklar arab bo'lmaganiga qaramay, oltita mamlakatdagi arab jamoatchiligi ham Eron yadro dasturiga haqli va bu dasturni to'xtatish uchun bosim o'tkazmaslik kerak, deb hisoblashadi.^[233] Xalqaro Tinchlik Instituti tomonidan o'tkazilgan 2010 yil sentyabr oyida o'tkazilgan so'rov natijalariga ko'ra Eronliklarning 71 foizi yadro qurolini ishlab chiqarishni ma'qullashdi, bu xuddi shu agentlikning oldingi so'rovlariga nisbatan keskin o'sish.^[234] Biroq, 2012 yil iyul oyida Eronning davlat ommaviy axborot vositalarida o'tkazilgan so'rov natijalariga ko'ra Eronning 2/3 qismi sanksiyalarni bosqichma-bosqich yumshatish evaziga uranni boyitishni to'xtatishni qo'llab-quvvatlamoqda.^{[235][236][237][238]} Yaqin Sharqdagi iqtisodiy va siyosiy tahlil kompaniyasining Eronda tug'ilgan sharhlovchisi Meir Javedanfarning ta'kidlashicha, eronliklar atom energiyasini istashlari mumkin bo'lsa-da, ular buni hukumat to'lashga tayyor bo'lgan narxda istamaydilar.^[239]

Nega boyitish dasturini IAEAga e'lon qilmasdan qoldirganini izohlar ekan, Eron so'nggi yigirma to'rt yil ichida "tinchliksevar yadro texnologiyasi uchun material va texnologiyalarga nisbatan eng qattiq sanktsiyalar va eksport cheklovlariga duch kelganini" aytdi. uning dasturining ba'zi elementlari ehtiyotkorlik bilan bajarilishi kerak edi. Eronning ta'kidlashicha, AQShning maqsadi Eronning boyitish texnologiyasining "yakuniy va abadiy" ajralmas huquqidan "bu mahrum etishdan boshqa narsa emas" va Qo'shma Shtatlar Isroilning yadroviy boyitish va qurol-yarog 'dasturiga umuman jim.^[240] Eron o'zining yadroviy tadqiqotlarini 1975 yilda, Frantsiya Eron bilan hamkorlikda Esfaxon Yadro Texnologiyalari Markazini (ENTC) tashkil etganda, yadro yoqilg'isi aylanishining muayyan qobiliyatlarini rivojlantirish uchun kadrlar tayyorlashni tayyorlashda boshladi.^[241][242] Eron yadro dasturining boshqa elementlarini yashirmadi. Masalan, uranni qazib olish va konvertatsiya qilish bo'yicha harakatlari milliy radioda e'lon qilindi,^[243][244] va Eron shuningdek 1990-yillar davomida Agentlik va a'zo davlatlar bilan maslahatlashib, faqat tinch maqsadlarda yoqilg'ini boyitish texnologiyasini sotib olish rejalarini ta'kidlaganini aytmoqda.^[240] Eronning yadro reaktorlarini olish bo'yicha boshqa davlatlar bilan tuzgan shartnomalari ham IAEAga ma'lum bo'lgan, ammo "AQSh maxsus razvedkasining taxminiga ko'ra" Eronning ko'pchilik tomonidan e'lon qilingan atom energiyasi niyatlari to'liq rejalashtirish bosqichida "deb e'lon qilganidan keyin shartnomalarni qo'llab-quvvatlash bekor qilindi. Shohning ambitsiyalari Eronni yadro qurolini qo'lga kiritishiga olib kelishi mumkin, ayniqsa, 1974 yil may oyida Hindistonning muvaffaqiyatli yadro sinovini o'tkazgan. "^[245] 2003 yilda MAGATE Eron o'zining xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi kelishuv talabiga binoan Eronning 1985 yilda boshlangan ba'zi boyitish faoliyati to'g'risida MAGATEga xabar berish majburiyatlarini bajarmaganligini xabar qildi. IAEA qo'shimcha ravishda Eron agentlikni tekshirish uchun kerakli ma'lumotlarni taqdim etish majburiyatini olganligini va "hamkorlik va to'liq shaffoflik siyosatini amalga oshirishni" tuzatuvchi harakatlar sifatida qabul qilganligini xabar qildi.^[96]

Eron hukumati ushbu dasturni qurol ishlab chiqarishga yashirincha yo'naltirilmasligini ta'minlash uchun yadro dasturiga Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma va Qo'shimcha protokol qonuniy ravishda Eron talab qilgandan tashqari qat'iy cheklovlar qo'yish bo'yicha bir necha bor murosa takliflarini bildirdi.^[246] Ushbu takliflar qatoriga Eron yadro dasturini xalqaro konsortsium sifatida, xorijiy hukumatlar to'liq ishtirok etgan holda ishlatish kiradi. Eronliklarning ushbu taklifi atom bombalari ishlab chiqarishda fuqarolik yadro texnologiyalaridan foydalanish xavfini tekshiruvchi IAEA ekspertlar qo'mitasi tomonidan taklif qilingan echimga mos keldi.^[70] Eron shuningdek, plutonyum qazib olish texnologiyasidan voz kechishni taklif qildi va shu bilan uning Arakdagi og'ir suvli reaktoridan bomba tayyorlash uchun ham foydalanib bo'lmasligini ta'minladi.^[247] Yaqinda, eronliklar, shuningdek, agar ular uranni fuqarolik maqsadlari uchun zarur bo'lgan miqdordan ko'proq boyitishda foydalanilsa, avtomatik ravishda o'z-o'zini yo'q qiladigan uran santrifugalarini ishlatishni taklif qilishgan.^[248] Biroq, BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining besh doimiy a'zosi va Germaniyaning yadroviy hamkorlik bo'yicha takliflariga qaramay, Eron kengash talab qilganidek boyitish dasturini to'xtatib qo'ydi.^[249] Eron vakili Xavfsizlik Kengashida ushbu masala bilan shug'ullanish asossiz va hech qanday qonuniy asos yoki amaliy yordamga ega emas, chunki uning tinchlikparvar yadro dasturi xalqaro tinchlik va xavfsizlikka tahdid solmasligini va bu aksariyat mamlakatlarning fikrlariga zid ekanligini ta'kidladi. Kengash vakillik qilishga majbur bo'lgan Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining a'zo davlatlari.

"Ular Eron millati bosimga berilmasligini va uning huquqlari oyoq osti qilinishiga yo'l qo'ymasligini bilishlari kerak" dedi Eron prezidenti Mahmud Ahmadinajod 2006 yil 31 avgustda Eronning shimoli-g'arbiy qismida televizion nutqida olomonga gapirdi Orumiyeh. Eron rahbari o'zining viloyat kuch bazalaridan birida o'zining eng kuchli tarafdorlari oldida Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining "qo'rqitish" deb atagan hujumiga hujum qildi va u Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari rahbarligini aytdi. Ahmadinejad Oq Uyning prezident Bush bilan teledebat uchun taklifiga rad javobini tanqid qildi. "Ular dialogni va erkin axborot oqimini qo'llab-quvvatlashlarini aytishadi", dedi u. "Ammo bahs-munozara taklif qilinganida, ular qochishdi va qarshi chiqdilar." Eronning IRNA axborot agentligi xabariga ko'ra Ahmadinejodning ta'kidlashicha, sanktsiyalar "eronliklarni taraqqiyotga erishish qaroridan qaytara olmaydi". "Aksincha, bizning ko'plab yutuqlarimiz, jumladan, yadro yoqilg'isi aylanishiga kirish va og'ir suv ishlab chiqarish sanktsiyalar ostida qo'lga kiritildi."

Eron boyitish faoliyati tinch maqsadlar uchun mo'ljallanganligini ta'kidlamoqda, ammo G'arbning aksariyat qismi, shu jumladan AQSh, Eron yadro quroli yoki yadroviy qurol "qobiliyati" ga intilayotganini da'vo qilmoqda. 2006 yil 31-avgust, Eronni BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining 1696-sonli qaroriga rioya qilishi va boyitishga oid faoliyatini to'xtatishi yoki aks holda iqtisodiy sanktsiyalarni qo'lga kiritishi shart edi. Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari kengashi yuqori darajadagi vazirlar sentyabr oyining o'rtalarida qayta yig'ilganda sanksiyalarni amalga oshirishga rozi bo'ladi, deb hisoblaydi AQSh Davlat kotibi muovini Nikolas Berns dedi. "Biz ushbu sanktsiyalarga qarshi katta kuch va qat'iyat bilan ish olib boramiz, chunki bu javobsiz qolishi mumkin emas", dedi Berns. "Eronliklar, shubhasiz, o'zlarining yadroviy tadqiqotlarini davom ettirmoqdalar; ular Xalqaro Atom Energiyasi Agentligi ularni istamagan ishlarni qilyapti, Xavfsizlik Kengashi buni qilishni xohlamayapti. Xalqaro javob bo'lishi kerak va biz ishonamiz bitta bo'ladi. "^[126]

Eron Eronning Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti Xavfsizlik Kengashiga murojaat qilishida qonuniy asos yo'q, chunki IAEA ilgari e'lon qilinmagan faoliyatlarning qurol-yarog 'dasturi bilan aloqasi borligini isbotlamagan va Erondagi barcha yadroviy materiallar (shu jumladan bo'lmasligi mumkin bo'lgan materiallar ham) e'lon qilingan) hisobga olingan va harbiy maqsadlarga yo'naltirilmagan. IAEA Nizomining XII.C moddasi^[250] har qanday kafolatlar talablariga rioya qilmaslik uchun BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga hisobot berishni talab qiladi.^[251] IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi, 12 ta betaraflik bilan kamdan-kam uchraydigan konsensus qarorida,^[121] MAGATE tomonidan 2003 yil noyabr oyida xabar qilinganidek, "Eronning NPT xavfsizlik choralarini ko'rish to'g'risidagi kelishuviga rioya qilish bo'yicha ko'plab muvaffaqiyatsizliklar va majburiyatlarini buzganligi" MAGATE Nizomining XII.C moddasi shartlariga binoan "mos kelmaslik" hisoblanadi.^[113]

Eron, shuningdek, IAEA-ning Eron yadro dasturining faqat tinchlik mohiyatini tekshira olmasligining ahamiyatini minimallashtiradi, chunki IAEA Qo'shimcha Protokolni ratifikatsiya qilgan va amalga oshirgan davlatlarning bir qismida faqatgina shunday xulosalar qilgan. IAEA Eronda e'lon qilingan yadroviy materialning boshqa tomonga yo'naltirilmaganligini tekshirishga muvaffaq bo'ldi,^[252] ammo e'lon qilinmagan tadbirlarning yo'qligi emas. IAEA ning 2007 yildagi xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi bayonotiga binoan, ikkala NPT xavfsizligi va qo'shimcha protokol amalga oshirilgan 82 ta davlatdan, IAEA 47 ta davlatda e'lon qilinmagan yadroviy faollik ko'rsatkichini topmadi, ammo 35 ta davlatda e'lon qilinishi mumkin bo'lgan yadroviy faoliyatni baholash davom etmoqda. .^[253] MAGATE Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi 2006 yil fevral oyida BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashiga o'zining xavfsizlik choralari buzilganligi to'g'risida xabar berish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilganidan keyin Eron Qo'shimcha Protokolni amalga oshirishni va IAEA bilan uning xavfsizlik kafolatlari to'g'risidagi kelishuviga binoan talab qilinganidan tashqari boshqa barcha hamkorlikni to'xtatdi.^[116] Eron bunday hamkorlik "ixtiyoriy" ekanligini ta'kidladi, ammo 2006 yil 26 dekabrda BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi 1737-sonli qarorni qabul qildi,^[254] boshqa narsalar qatori Eronning IAEA bilan to'liq hamkorlik qilishni talab qiladigan BMT Xartiyasining VII bobini, "xavfsizlik choralari to'g'risidagi kelishuv va qo'shimcha protokolning rasmiy talablaridan tashqari". IAEA 2008 yil 19-noyabrda "Eronda e'lon qilingan yadroviy materialning boshqa tomonga yo'naltirilmasligini tekshirishni davom ettirishga qodir bo'lsa-da", qolgan "jiddiy tashvish uyg'otadigan" muhim masalalar bo'yicha "jiddiy yutuqlarga" erisha olmaganligini xabar qildi. "Eron tomonidan" hamkorlikning etishmasligi "sababli.^[134] Eron Xavfsizlik Kengashining "Eron Islom Respublikasining tinchlikparvar yadroviy faoliyati masalasida" ishtirok etishi noqonuniy va zararli ekanligini ta'kidladi.^[255] Eron, shuningdek, BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining boyitishni to'xtatishni talab qilgan rezolyutsiyalari Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi Shartnomaning IV moddasini buzganlik, deb da'vo qilmoqda, unda imzolangan davlatlarning yadro texnologiyalariga "tinchlik uchun" ajralmas huquqi tan olinadi.^[256][257]

Eron Qo'shimcha Protokolni 2003 yil oktyabrdagi Tehron kelishuvi va uning o'rnini bosuvchi 2004 yil noyabrdagi Parij bitimi shartlari asosida amalga oshirishga rozi bo'ldi va buni ikki yil davomida 2006 yil boshida Evropa Ittifoqi bilan muzokaralar to'xtatilgandan so'ng Parij kelishuvidan chiqishda davom etdi. 3. O'shandan beri Eron nafaqat Qo'shimcha Protokolni ratifikatsiya qilishni, balki uning boyitish dasturini boshqarish huquqini tan olgan taqdirda, Qo'shimcha Protokoldan oshib ketadigan yadro dasturi bo'yicha oshkoralik choralarini amalga oshirishni taklif qilmoqda. Biroq, BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi Eronning boyitishga oid va qayta ishlash bo'yicha barcha tadbirlarni to'xtatishi kerakligini ta'kidlamoqda va Qo'shma Shtatlar Eronga o'zlarining yadro yoqilg'isini ishlab chiqarishga imkon berishini, hatto xalqaro miqyosdagi qattiq tekshiruv ostida bo'lsa ham, aniq rad etdi.^[258]

2007 yil 9 aprelda Eron uranni, ehtimol Natanz boyitish maydonida, 3000 sentrifugalar bilan boyitishni boshlaganligini e'lon qildi. "Men buyuk sharaf bilan shuni aytamanki, bugungi kunga kelib aziz mamlakatimiz xalqlarning yadro klubiga qo'shildi va sanoat miqyosida yadro yoqilg'isi ishlab chiqarishi mumkin", dedi Ahmadinajod.^[259]

2007 yil 22 aprelda Eron tashqi ishlar vazirligi vakili Muhammad Ali Xusseyniy uning mamlakati Evropa Ittifoqining tashqi siyosat bo'yicha rahbari bilan muzokaralar oldidan boyitishni to'xtatib qo'yishini istisno qiladi Xaver Solana 2007 yil 25 aprelda.^[260]

2009 yil mart oyida Eron o'zlarining tinchliksevar niyatlarini ta'kidlash uchun turizm uchun Bushehr atom elektrostansiyasini ochish rejalarini e'lon qildi.^{[iqtibos kerak ]}

2009 yil noyabr oyida MAGATE Boshqaruvchilar Kengashining Erondan yangi ochilgan yadro inshootini qurishni darhol to'xtatishi va uranni boyitishni muzlatishini talab qilgan qaroriga javoban, Tashqi ishlar vazirligi vakili Ramin Mehmanparast rezolyutsiyani "namoyish ... befoyda bo'ladigan Eronga bosim o'tkazishga qaratilgan" deb ta'rifladi.^[182] Keyinchalik Eron hukumati mamlakatdagi Atom Energiyasi Tashkilotiga mamlakatdagi elektr energiyasini ishlab chiqarishni ko'paytirish uchun yana o'nta uranni boyitadigan zavod qurishni boshlashga vakolat berdi.^[261]

Eron Prezidenti Mahmud Ahmadinejod 1-dekabr kuni g'arbiy davlatlarning bunday harakati Eronning yadro dasturiga to'sqinlik qilmasligini aytib, mamlakatining yadro dasturi bo'yicha BMT tomonidan taklif qilingan bitimni qabul qilmagani uchun BMTning sanktsiyalar tahdidini chetga surdi. Ahmadinejad davlat televideniyesiga bergan intervyusida, o'z davlatining yadro dasturi bo'yicha jahon kuchlari bilan qo'shimcha muzokaralar olib borish kerak emas deb hisoblar ekan, G'arb davlatlarining Eron BMT tomonidan taklif qilingan kelishuvni qabul qilmasa, uni yakkalab qo'yishi to'g'risida ogohlantirganini aytdi.^[261]

Eron va Rossiyaning yuqori martabali amaldorlari tomonidan kuzatilgan Eron yonilg'i quyishni boshladi Bushehr I 2010 yil 21 avgustda mamlakatning ommaviy axborot vositalari atom energiyasi ishlab chiqaradigan elektr energiyasini yaratishga yordam berish maqsadida xabar berishdi. Davlat ommaviy axborot vositalari reaktor elektr energiyasini ishlab chiqarishni boshlashi uchun taxminan ikki oy vaqt ketishi kerakligi haqida xabar bergan bo'lsa-da, Rossiyaning yadroviy agentligi buning uchun ko'proq vaqt kerakligini aytmoqda. Oyatulloh Ali Xomanaiy, Eronning oliy rahbari, yaqinda Eronning atom zavodlarini tashkil etish huquqini tasdiqladi.^[262]

2012 yil 17 sentyabrda Eron yadroviy boshqarmasi boshlig'i Fereydun Abbasi IAEA Bosh konferentsiyasida so'zga chiqib, "terrorchilar va sabotajchilar" Eronning yadro dasturini bekor qilish uchun IAEAga kirib ketgan deb aytdi. Abbosining ta'kidlashicha, 2012 yil 17 avgustda er osti boyitish zavodi sabotaj qilingan va ko'p o'tmay IAEA inspektorlari uni tekshirish uchun Eronga kelishgan.^[263] The Associated Press uning sharhlari Eronda yadro dasturiga nisbatan xalqaro bosimga qarshi turishni davom ettirishga qaratilgan qat'iyatni aks ettirganini ta'kidladi.^[264] Mark Fitspatrik ning Xalqaro strategik tadqiqotlar instituti Eronning MAQATEga nisbatan ayblovlari "bu eng past ko'rsatkich. Ular tobora burchak ostida, ular vahshiyona gapirishmoqda".^[265] Ba'zi G'arb ekspertlari Abassining da'volarini Eronning IAEA bilan hamkorlik darajasini rasmiy ravishda pasaytirishi uchun mumkin bo'lgan bahona sifatida baholashdi.^[266] Abbasi, shuningdek, IAEA Bosh direktori Amano bilan alohida uchrashdi, shundan so'ng IAEA Eronni yadro dasturidagi muammolarni hal qilish uchun bosim o'tkazdi va IAEA tez orada muzokaralarga tayyorligini aytdi. MAQATE Abbasi tomonidan "terrorchilar va diversantlar" ga oid bayonotlarga izoh bermadi, ammo Eron yadro dasturi bilan bog'liq shubhalarni aniqlash uchun IAEA inspektorlari bilan hamkorlik qilishi juda muhimligini aytdi.^[267][268] IAEA Bosh konferentsiyasi yonidagi intervyusida. Abbasi so'zlariga ko'ra, Eron g'arb razvedkasini yo'ldan ozdirish uchun o'z yadro dasturi to'g'risida qasddan yolg'on ma'lumot bergan. 2010 yilda suiqasd nishoniga aylangan Abbasi, Eron go'yoki bo'rttirib, ba'zida esa o'z taraqqiyotini past ko'rsatmoqda, dedi.^[269][270]

Eron o'z yadroviy eksportini namoyish qilishni rejalashtirgan Atomekspo 2013.^[271]

O'rtasidagi muzokaralar Ahmadinejod hukumati va P5 + 1 guruhi Eronning uranni boyitishni to'xtatmaslik borasidagi qat'iy pozitsiyasi tufayli nizoni tugatmadi. Shu bilan birga, Tehrondagi yuqori martabali ruhoniylar Ahmadinajodning G'arbga qarshi qat'iy pozitsiyasi ularning rejimini beqarorlashtirishi mumkinligini his qilishdi. Ahmadinejodda ruhoniylarning teokratik boshqaruvidan chetga chiqqan Eron millatchiligiga nisbatan bir oz moyilligi bor edi. Shuning uchun ular unga aloqador fraktsiyani "deviant oqim "Ahmadinajod ikkinchi muddatining so'nggi yilida (2012-2013) cho'loq o'rdak prezidenti bo'lganida, ulamolar uni va Majillar va AQSh rasmiylari bilan yashirincha muzokara olib borishga harakat qildi. Ular Oq uy bilan orqa kanal orqali yadroviy bitim bo'yicha muzokaralar olib borish uchun Maskatga alohida guruh yuborishdi. Ummon "s Sulton Qobus bin Said ikki hukumat o'rtasida vositachilik vazifasini bajargan.^[272]

2013 yil sentyabr oyida Vashington Post, Eronning yangi saylangan Prezidenti Hasan Ruhoniy yadroviy masalani "yillar emas, balki oylar" ichida hal qilishni istashini aytdi. Ruhanining aytishicha, u yadro masalasini AQSh-Eron munosabatlari uchun "boshlang'ich nuqta" deb bilgan.^[273]

Qo'shma Shtatlar

Prezident Jorj V.Bush 2006 yil 31 avgustda Eronning boyitishni to'xtatish talablariga bo'ysunmasligi uchun "oqibatlar bo'lishi kerak" deb turib oldi uran. U "dunyo endi Erondagi radikal rejim tomonidan katta tahdidga duch kelmoqda. Eron rejimi qurol-yarog ', mablag' va maslahat beradi Hizbulloh."^[274] MAQATE Eron uranni boyitish faoliyatini to'xtatmaganligi to'g'risida hisobot chiqardi, dedi Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti rasmiysi. Ushbu hisobot BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining Eronga qarshi sanktsiyalariga yo'l ochdi. Uranni boyitish faoliyatini to'xtatish uchun Xavfsizlik Kengashining belgilangan muddatiga duch kelganda, Eron G'arbga bo'ysunishiga va yadro dasturini davom ettirishiga shubha qilmaydi.^[126]

Kongressning 2006 yil 23 avgustda e'lon qilingan hisobotida Eron yadroviy dasturining hujjatli tarixi sarhisob qilingan, ammo MAGATEga qarshi da'volar qilingan. MAQATE bunga javoban AQSh Vakillar Palatasining Razvedka qo'mitasi raisiga qattiq bayon etilgan maktub bilan murojaat qildi Piter Xekstra hisobotda "g'azablangan va insofsiz" deb topilgan hisobotda IAEA inspektori Eron to'g'risida "butun haqiqatni aytishga" qarshi taxmin qilingan IAEA siyosatini buzgani uchun ishdan bo'shatilganligi to'g'risidagi da'vo va boshqa haqiqiy xatolarga, masalan, Eron "qurollarni boyitgan" degan da'voga ishora qilmoqda. - uran.^[275]

Jon Bolton 2006 yil 31 avgustda AQShning Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotidagi elchisi, sanksiyalarni joriy etish muddati tugagandan so'ng darhol boshlanishini, yaqin kunlarda yuqori darajadagi rasmiylarning uchrashuvlari, so'ngra sanktsiyalar tili bo'yicha muzokaralar boshlanishini kutganini aytdi. qaror. Boltonning aytishicha, belgilangan muddat tugagach, "biroz bayroq ko'tariladi". "Keyinchalik nima bo'lishini nazarda tutadigan bo'lsak, o'sha paytda, agar ular uranni boyitish bo'yicha barcha tadbirlarni to'xtatmagan bo'lsa, ular rezolyutsiyaga mos kelmaydi", dedi u. "Va o'sha paytda tashqi ishlar vazirlari ilgari kelishib olgan qadamlar ... biz ushbu qadamlarni qanday amalga oshirish haqida gaplasha boshlaymiz." Xavfsizlik Kengashining beshta doimiy a'zosi, bundan tashqari Germaniya ilgari Eronga mamlakatni muzokaralarni qayta boshlashiga qaratilgan imtiyozlar paketini taklif qilgan edi, ammo Eron birinchi navbatda yadroviy faoliyatini to'xtatishni rad etdi. Bu kabi guruhlarda qatnashish orqali Eronning xalqaro iqtisodiyotga kirishini yaxshilash bo'yicha takliflar kiritilgan Jahon savdo tashkiloti va uning telekommunikatsiya sanoatini modernizatsiya qilish. Rag'batlantirishlar, shuningdek, Eronga fuqarolik samolyotlarini eksport qilishni istagan AQSh va Evropa ishlab chiqaruvchilariga qo'yilgan cheklovlarni bekor qilish imkoniyatini ham eslatib o'tdi. Va imtiyozlar bilan birga taklif qilingan uzoq muddatli kelishuv "muzokaralarda yangi boshlanish" ni taklif qildi.^[126]

2007 yilgi Milliy razvedka smetasida Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari razvedka hamjamiyati Eron 2003 yilda barcha "yadro qurollarini loyihalash va qurollantirish ishlarini" tugatgan deb baholadi.^[276]

IAEA rasmiylari 2007 yilda AQSh razvedkasining aksariyati shu kunga qadar Eronning yadro dasturi to'g'risida baham ko'rganligi noto'g'ri ekanligi va shu vaqtgacha ularning hech biri Eron ichida muhim kashfiyotlarga olib kelmaganidan shikoyat qilgan.^[277]

2008 yilgacha Qo'shma Shtatlar bir necha bor Eronga qarshi hujumda yadro qurolidan foydalanishni rad etdi. 2002 yilda AQShning "Yadroviy holatni qayta ko'rib chiqish" jurnalida jamoatchilikka e'lon qilinganida, birinchi navbatda, hatto yadro quroli bo'lmagan davlatlarga qarshi ham birinchi zarba berish asosida yadro qurolidan foydalanish nazarda tutilgan edi.^[278] Tergov muxbiri Seymur Xershning xabar berishicha, harbiy amaldorlarning so'zlariga ko'ra, Bush ma'muriyati "Eronning er osti yadro inshootlariga" qarshi yadroviy qurol ishlatishni rejalashtirgan.^[279] Eronga qarshi yadro qurolidan foydalanish ehtimoli to'g'risida maxsus savol berilganda, Prezident Bush "barcha variantlar stolda edi" deb da'vo qildi. Ga ko'ra Atom olimlari byulleteni, Bush "to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Eronni oldindan yadro zarbasi bilan tahdid qildi. Uning javobini boshqa yo'l bilan o'qish qiyin."^[280] Eron hukumati doimiy ravishda Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlariga to'sqinlik qiluvchi narsa sifatida yadro qurolini izlamayotganliklarini va aksincha Yaqin Sharqda yadro qurolidan xoli hudud yaratilishini ta'kidlagan.^[281] Yadro qurolini yadroviy bo'lmagan muxoliflarga qarshi birinchi zarba asosida ishlatish siyosati buzilishi hisoblanadi AQShning xavfsizligini salbiy ta'minlash Eron singari yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi Shartnomaning (NPT) yadroviy bo'lmagan a'zolariga qarshi yadro qurolini ishlatmaslikka va'da berish. Boshqa davlatga qarshi yadro qurolidan foydalanish tahdidlari buzilishini anglatadi Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkiloti Xavfsizlik Kengashining 984-sonli qarori va Xalqaro Adliya sudining yadro qurolidan foydalanish tahdidi yoki undan foydalanish qonuniyligi to'g'risida maslahat xulosasi.

2008 yil dekabrda saylangan prezident Barak Obama yakshanba kuni "Matbuot bilan tanishish" dasturida mezbon bilan intervyu berdi Tom Brokaw uning so'zlariga ko'ra, Qo'shma Shtatlar "Eron bilan qattiq, ammo to'g'ridan-to'g'ri diplomatiyani kuchaytirishi kerak". Uning fikricha, Qo'shma Shtatlar eronliklarga ularning "Hamas va Hizbulloh" singari tashkilotlarni moliyalashtirayotgani va ularni moliyalashtirayotgani va Isroilga qarshi tahdidlar "qabul qilinishi mumkin emasligini" tushuntirishi kerak.^[282] Obama Eron bilan diplomatiyani "Eronga o'zlarining noqonuniy yadro dasturlarini to'xtatish uchun bosim o'tkazish uchun" hech qanday shartlarsiz qo'llab-quvvatlaydi.^[283] Muhammad al-Baradey Eron bilan gaplashish uchun yangi pozitsiyani "uzoq vaqtdan beri kutib olindi" deb qabul qildi. Eronning ta'kidlashicha, Obama bu uchun kechirim so'rashi kerak AQSh Xirosima va Nagasakini bombardimon qildi Ikkinchi Jahon urushida va uning ma'muriyati dunyo bilan gaplashishni to'xtatishi va "boshqalar aytayotgan narsalarga quloq solishi" kerak.^[284] Prezident sifatida ilk matbuotga bergan intervyusida Obama "Al Arabiya" ga "agar Eron singari mamlakatlar mushtini ochishga tayyor bo'lsa, ular bizdan cho'zilgan qo'lni topadilar" dedi.^[285]

2009 yil mart oyida AQSh Milliy razvedka direktori Dennis C. Bler va Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi Direktor general-leytenant Maykl D. Maples aytdi a Qo'shma Shtatlar Senatining Qurolli xizmatlar qo'mitasi Eronda faqat kam boyitilgan uran borligini eshitish, u erda u hali tozalanayotgani haqida hech qanday ma'lumot yo'q edi. Isroil generali tomonidan ilgari aytilgan ularning izohlari qarshi chiqdi va Maples, Qo'shma Shtatlar bir xil faktlardan turli xulosalarga kelayotganini aytdi.^[286]

2009 yil 7 aprelda Manxetten okrugi advokati moliyachiga Evropa va Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari orqali Xitoy va Eron o'rtasida pul o'tkazish uchun ishlatilgan Manxetten banklaridan suiiste'mol qilinganlikda aybladi.^[287] Ko'rib chiqilayotgan materiallar qurol-yarog 'uchun ham, fuqarolik maqsadlarida ham ishlatilishi mumkin, ammo materialning bir qismi potentsial ravishda uranni atomik yoqilg'iga boyitishi mumkin bo'lgan olovli harorat va santrifüjlarga bardosh beradigan dvigatel nozullarini tayyorlashda ishlatilishi mumkin. Ayblovlar beshinchi darajali fitna uchun maksimal bir yilgacha va ishbilarmonlik yozuvlarini soxtalashtirish uchun to'rt yilga ozodlikdan mahrum qilinishi kerak.^[288] Prokuratura jarayoniga yordam bergan yadro quroli bo'yicha mutaxassis Devid Olbraytning aytishicha, Eron sotib olgan xom ashyoni qanday ishlatgan yoki ishlatishi mumkinligi haqida gapirish mumkin emas.^[289]

AQSh Davlat departamentining razvedka va tadqiqotlar byurosi tomonidan 2009 yil avgust oyida e'lon qilingan hujjatda Eronning HEU ishlab chiqarish uchun texnik imkoniyatga ega bo'lishi ehtimoldan yiroq emasligi baholandi (yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran ) 2013 yilgacha va AQSh razvedka hamjamiyati Eronning hali boyitilgan uran ishlab chiqarish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilgani to'g'risida hech qanday dalillarga ega emas edi.^[290] 2009 yilda AQSh razvedkasi Eronning niyatlari noma'lum deb baholagan.^[291][292]

2009 yil 26 iyulda Davlat kotibi Hillari Klinton Obama ma'muriyati Eronga o'z xalqaro yadroviy yoqilg'isini ishlab chiqarishga ruxsat berishini, hatto xalqaro miqyosdagi qattiq tekshiruv ostida bo'lsa ham, aniq rad etdi.^[258]

2009 yil noyabr oyida IAEA Boshqaruvchilar Kengashi Erondan yangi ochilgan yadro inshootini qurishni zudlik bilan to'xtatishni va uranni boyitishni muzlatib qo'yishni talab qiladigan qaroridan so'ng, oq uy vakili Robert Gibbs sanktsiyalarni eslatib o'tishdan saqlanishdi, ammo Eron murosaga kelmasa, yanada qattiqroq choralar ko'rish mumkin edi: "Agar Eron o'z majburiyatlarini bajarishdan bosh tortsa, u o'zining kuchayib borayotgan izolyatsiyasi va oqibatlari uchun javobgar bo'ladi". AQShning MAGATEdagi bosh delegati Glin Devis jurnalistlarga shunday dedi: "Olti davlat ... birinchi marta birlashdilar ... [va] biz ushbu qarorni barchamiz kelishib oldik. Bu muhim voqea."^[182]

2009 yil AQSh Kongressining tadqiqotlari qog'oz buni aytdi AQSh razvedkasi Eron 2003 yilda "yadro qurolini loyihalash va qurollantirish ishlari" ni tugatganiga ishongan.^[293] Obama ma'muriyatidagi ba'zi maslahatchilar razvedka xulosalarini tasdiqladilar,^[294] Obama ma'muriyatidagi boshqa "eng yaxshi maslahatchilar" esa ushbu topilmaning asosiy topilmasiga "endi ishonmaymiz" deyishmoqda 2007 yilgi Milliy razvedka smetasi.^[295] Tomas Fingar, 2008 yil dekabrgacha Milliy razvedka kengashining sobiq raisi, 2007 yilgi Eron bo'yicha Milliy razvedka smetasi "qisman tortishuvlarga sabab bo'ldi, chunki Oq Uy razvedka jamoatchiligiga hisobotning asosiy hukmlarining tasniflanmagan versiyasini chiqarishni buyurdi, ammo rad etdi uni chiqarishni buyurish uchun javobgarlikni o'z zimmangizga oling. "^[296] National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) - Markaziy razvedka direktori tomonidan tayyorlangan milliy xavfsizlik masalalari bo'yicha eng vakolatli yozma qaror.^[297]

Yaqinlashib kelayotgan ochilishi Bushehr I 2010 yil oxirida zavod oq uy nima uchun Eron uranni o'z chegaralarida boyitishni davom ettirayotgani to'g'risida savol berish. "Rossiya yoqilg'ini etkazib beradi va yonilg'ini qaytarib olib chiqadi", dedi Oq uy vakili Robert Gibbs avgust oyida aytilgan. "Bu, aniqki, menimcha, Eron tinchlikparvar yadro dasturi tarafdori bo'lsa, uning boyitish qobiliyatiga muhtoj emasligini ta'kidlaydi", - dedi u.^[262]

2012 yil 8 yanvarda AQSh Mudofaa vaziri Leon Panetta dedi Xalq bilan yuzlash Eron yadro quroli yaratmoqchi emas, balki yadro qobiliyatini rivojlantirishga intilmoqda.^[298] Shuningdek, u Isroilni Eron yadro inshootlariga bir tomonlama zarba berishdan ko'ra, birgalikda ishlashga chaqirdi.^[299] 2012 yil 1 avgustda AQSh Mudofaa vaziri Leon Panetta Isroilda bo'lganida, agar diplomatiya muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan bo'lsa, Qo'shma Shtatlarda Eronning yadroviy qurolga ega bo'lishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun "variantlar", shu jumladan harbiy variantlar mavjud.^[300] 2012 yilda AQShning o'n oltita razvedka agentligi, shu jumladan Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi, Eron yadro qurolini ishlab chiqarishga imkon beradigan tadqiqotlarni olib borayotgani haqida xabar bergan, ammo bunga harakat qilmagan.^[301] Amerikaning barcha yirik razvedka agentliklarining yuqori lavozimli mulozimlari Eronning 2003 yildan beri yadro quroli ishlab chiqarishga urinish qilgani to'g'risida aniq dalil yo'qligini ta'kidladilar.^[302]

2013 yil 14-yanvar kuni Ilmiy va xalqaro xavfsizlik instituti (AQShning tahliliy markazi) beshta amerikalik mutaxassisning "O'zgaruvchan Yaqin Sharq uchun AQShning yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik strategiyasi" deb nomlangan 154 betlik hisobotini e'lon qildi, unda Eron 2014 yil o'rtalarida bir yoki bir nechta yadroviy bomba uchun etarlicha qurol darajasidagi uran ishlab chiqarishi mumkinligi aytilgan. Shuning uchun, hisobotda AQSh Eronga qurol darajasida uran ishlab chiqarish qobiliyatini cheklash uchun unga nisbatan sanktsiyalarni kuchaytirishni tavsiya qildi. Bundan tashqari, hisobotda aytilishicha: "Prezident Eron bomba ishlab chiqarish yo'lida qo'shimcha qat'iyatli qadamlar qo'ysa, Eron yadro dasturini yo'q qilish uchun harbiy kuch ishlatishini aniq e'lon qilishi kerak."^[303]

2013 yil 2 fevralda Myunxen xavfsizlik anjumani, AQSh vitse-prezidenti Jozef Baydenning ta'kidlashicha, Obama ma'muriyati "Eron rahbariyati bilan ikki tomonlama uchrashuv o'tkazishga tayyor bo'ladi. Biz buni qilganligimizni yashirmaymiz. Agar ushbu vaziyat o'zini namoyon qilsa, sheriklarimizga xabar beramiz. Ushbu taklif Bu haqiqatan ham aniq va aniq bo'lishi kerak, va ular gaplashishga tayyor bo'lgan kun tartibi bo'lishi kerak. Biz buni mashq qilish uchun bajarishga tayyor emasmiz. "^[304] Bir necha kundan keyin Eronning oliy rahbari Oyatulloh Ali Xomanaiy bu taklifni rad etdi va noaniqlik bilan qo'shib qo'ydi: "AQShning Yaqin Sharqdagi siyosati muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi va amerikaliklar g'alaba qozonishga muhtoj. Bu Eronni muzokaralar stoliga olib chiqmoqda".^[305] 4 fevral kuni Italiyaning "Agenzia Nova" telekanali "Tehrondagi manbalar" ga asoslanib "yil boshidan (Eron) parlamentining spikeri Ali Laricani AQShga yashirincha ikki marta sayohat qilgani" ni xabar qildi. Obama ma'muriyati bilan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri muzokaralar. Italiya agentligi AQSh diplomatiyasi Eronda Prezident saylovini kutayotganini, ehtimol Eronning yondashuvida keskin o'zgarish bo'lishini tushuntirdi.^[306][307] 17 iyun kuni Eronning yangi saylangan prezidenti Hasan Ruhoniy shartlar bilan Vashington bilan ikki tomonlama muzokaralarga tayyorligini bildirdi.^[308]

2015 yil 2 aprelda P5 + 1 va Eron o'rtasida keng qamrovli kelishuv parametrlari to'g'risida kelishuvni olqishlagan holda, Prezident Obama "Bugun Qo'shma Shtatlar bizning ittifoqchilarimiz va sheriklarimiz bilan birgalikda Eron bilan tarixiy tushunishga erishdi. amalga oshirildi, uning yadro qurolini olishiga to'sqinlik qiladi. "^[309]

2018 yil aprel oyida, Mayk Pompeo, O'sha paytda AQSh davlat kotibi nomzodi, u Eron yadroviy qurol ishlab chiqarish uchun "poyga" qilmaganligiga ishonishini aytdi Eron bitimi va agar bitim ochilsa, bunday bo'lmaydi, garchi u bitimni "tuzatishni" ma'qul ko'rgan bo'lsa ham.^[310]

Eron va P5 + 1 o'rtasida muzokaralar

Iran has held a series of meetings with a group of six countries: China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, United States. These six are known as the P5+1 (the permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) or alternatively as the E3+3. These meetings are intended to resolve concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

2009 yil oktyabr oyida Jeneva muzokaralari

Ushbu bo'lim bo'sh. Siz yordam berishingiz mumkin unga qo'shilish. (2015 yil iyul)

2011 yil yanvar oyida Istanbul yig'ilishi

Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were resumed on 21 January 2011 in Istanbul after about a 14-month break. The two-day meetings were led by EU High Representative Ketrin Eshton and Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Said Jalili. The talks deadlocked after Iran imposed two preconditions: recognition of Iran's right to enrich uranium and dropping the United Nations economic sanctions on Tehran.^[311][312]

2012 yil aprel Istanbul uchrashuvi

The first session of fresh negotiations in April went well, with delegates praising the constructive dialogue and Iran's positive attitude.^[313] Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said, however, that Iran had been given a "freebie",^[314] a charge that was sharply rebutted by Barack Obama.^[315] In the lead up to the second round of negotiations in May, and in what may foreshadow a significant concession, an unnamed senior US official hinted the United States might accept Iran enriching uranium to five per cent so long as the Iranians agreed to tough international oversight of the process. The US shift was reportedly made for the pragmatic reason that unconditional demands for zero enrichment would make it impossible to reach a negotiated deal.^[316] Netanyahu had insisted a few days before that he would tolerate no enrichment, not even to the three per cent required for nuclear power.^[317] In a shift on the Iranian side, April saw members of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps urging Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to maintain a policy of keeping uranium enrichment at or below 20 per cent.^[318] The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs Ketrin Eshton felt compelled to make a special visit to Netanyahu, partly to keep him from again voicing his negativity and opposition to the negotiations.^[319] At the meeting, which included Avigdor Liberman, Ehud Barak va Shoul Mofaz, the Israelis demanded a guaranteed timetable for cessation of all uranium enrichment by Iran, the removal of all enriched uranium, and the dismantlement of the underground facility at Fordo. Otherwise, they said, Iran would use the talks to buy time.^[320][321]

2012 yil may oyida Bag'dod muzokaralari

Ushbu bo'lim bo'sh. Siz yordam berishingiz mumkin unga qo'shilish. (2015 yil iyul)

Ikkinchi boyitish zavodi

On 21 September 2009, Iran informed the IAEA^[322] that it was constructing a second enrichment facility. The following day (22 September) IAEA Director General ElBaradei informed the United States, and two days later (24 September) the United States, United Kingdom and France briefed the IAEA on an enrichment facility under construction at an underground location at Fordu, 42 kilometres (26 mi) north of Qum. On 25 September, at the G-20 Summit, the three countries criticized Iran for once again concealing a nuclear facility from the IAEA. The United States said that the facility, which was still months from completion, was too small to be useful for a civil program but could produce enough high-enriched uranium for one bomb per year.^[323] Iran said the plant was for peaceful purposes and would take between a year and a half to two years to complete, and that the notice Iran had given had exceeded the 180 days before insertion of nuclear materials the IAEA safeguards agreement that Iran was following required. Iran agreed to allow IAEA inspections.^[324] Iran's nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, said the site was built for maximum protection from aerial attack: carved into a mountain and near a military compound of the powerful Revolutionary Guard.^[325]

Also in October, the United States, France and Russia proposed a UN-drafted deal to Iran regarding its nuclear program, in an effort to find a compromise between Iran's stated need for a nuclear reactor and international concerns that Iran harbors a secret intent on developing a nuclear weapon. After some delay in responding, on 29 October, Ahmadinejad voiced an openness towards cooperation with other world powers. "Biz yoqilg'i almashinuvi, yadroviy hamkorlik, elektr stantsiyalari va reaktorlar qurilishini mamnuniyat bilan qabul qilamiz va hamkorlik qilishga tayyormiz" dedi u davlat televideniyesidagi jonli efirda.^[326] However, he added that Iran would not retreat "one iota" on its right to a sovereign nuclear program.^[327]

In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution that criticized Iran for defying a UN Security Council ban on uranium enrichment, censured Iran for secretly building a uranium enrichment facility and demanded that it immediately suspend further construction. It noted the IAEA chief Mohammed El-Baradei cannot confirm that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively geared toward peaceful uses, and expressed "serious concern" that Iran's stonewalling of an IAEA probe means "the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program" cannot be excluded.^[182]

Venesuela bilan hamkorlik

2009 yil oktyabrda Ugo Chaves announced that Iran was helping Venezuela in uranium exploration. He said that "We're working with several countries, with Iran, with Russia. We're responsible for what we're doing, we're in control".^[328] A number of reports suggested that Venezuela was helping Iran to obtain uranium and evade international sanctions.^[329][330]

Boyitish

On 9 February 2010 the Iranian government announced that it would produce uranium boyitilgan to up to 20 per cent to produce fuel for a tadqiqot reaktori used to produce tibbiy radioizotoplar, processing its existing stocks of 3.5 per cent enriched uranium.^[331][332] Two days later during the celebrations in Tehran for the 31st anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, the Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinajod announced that Iran was now a "nuclear state."^[332] IAEA officials confirmed it has enriched uranium "up to 19.8%".^[333]Responding to criticism, President Ahmadinejad said, "Why do they think that 20 per cent is such a big deal? Right now in Natanz we have the capability to enrich at over 20 per cent and at over 80 per cent, but because we don't need it, we won't do it." He added "If we wanted to manufacture a bomb, we would announce it."^[332][334] On the same day as the President's announcement, Ali Akbar Solihiy, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, told Reuters that their 20 per cent enrichment production, was going "very well," adding "There is no limit on enrichment. We can enrich up to 100% ... But we never had the intention and we do not have the intention to do so, unless we need (to)." He maintained that the 20 per cent production was for a Tehran medical reactor, and as such would be limited to around 1.5 kg per month.^[331]

Iran has reportedly breached its nuclear pact with world powers by surging its enriched uranium stock and further refining its purity beyond allowed standards, the UN atomic agency, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said.^[335]

Diplomats closely monitoring the work of International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) in Iran have said that investigators found traces of uranium at a secret atomic facility based in Tehran.^[336][337]

Tehron yadroviy deklaratsiyasi

US President Obama reportedly sent a letter dated 20 April 2010 to Prezident Lula of Brazil, in which he outlined a proposal of fuel swap. While expressing skepticism that the Iranians would now be willing to accept such a deal, having provided "no credible explanation" for the previous deal's rejection,^[338] President Obama wrote "For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile."^[339] Turkiya bosh vaziri Rajab Toyyib Erdo'g'an received a similar letter. A senior US official told Washington Post that the letter was a response to Iran's desire to ship out its uranium piecemeal, rather than in a single batch, and that during "multiple conversations" US officials made clear that Iran should also cease 20 per cent enrichment; however, the official stated "there was no president-to-president letter laying out those broader concerns".^[340]

On 17 May 2010 Iran, Brazil, and Turkey issued a joint declaration "in which Iran agreed to send low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for enriched fuel for a research reactor."^[341][342] Iran reported the joint declaration to the IAEA on 24 May 2010, asking it to inform the "Vienna Group" (the United States, Russia, France, and the IAEA), in order to conclude a written agreement and make contingent arrangements between Iran and the Vienna Group.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} The proposal was welcomed by Arab leaders^{[343][344][345]} va Xitoy.^[346][347] France's Prime Minister called the agreement a "positive step" toward resolving the Iran nuclear program dispute, if Iran were to cease uranium enrichment altogether.^[348] EU foreign policy chief Ketrin Eshton played down the agreement, saying it was a step in the right direction but did not go far enough and left questions unanswered.^[349] US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the proposal had "a number of deficiencies," including Iran's intention to continue enriching uranium to high levels.^[350]

Meanwhile, the United States was also pursuing other action to address the situation in Iran, in the case that the more diplomatic method not produce a satisfactory deal, and on 18 May 2010, announced a "draft accord" among UN permanent Security Council members for additional sanctions on Iran, designed to pressure it to end its nuclear enrichment program.^[351] Turkey and Brazil criticized the sanctions proposal.^[351] Davutoglu said that the swap agreement showed Iran's "clear political will" toward engagement on the nuclear issue.^[352] Brazil's Foreign Minister also expressed frustration with the US stance, saying of Brazil's vote against the sanctions resolution: "We could not have voted in any different way except against."^[353]

Early analysis from the BBC stated the swap deal could have been an "effort by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to deflect pressure for fresh sanctions" and that "Iran watchers are already criticising Washington for moving the goal posts".^[354] Iran's atomic energy chief said the agreement left world powers no reason to continue to pressure Iran regarding its nuclear program.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Iran also described the agreement as a major boost to trilateral relations with Brazil and Turkey, and Eronning oliy rahbari Oyatulloh Ali Xomanaiy criticized the continuing call for sanctions, stating that the "domineering powers headed by America are unhappy with cooperation between independent countries."^[355]

Mohamed ElBaradei, former director general of the Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi, wrote that "the only way to resolve the Iranian issue is to build trust. Moving 1200, half, or at least more than half of the Iranian nuclear material out of Iran is a confidence-building measure would defuse the crisis and enable the US and the West [to gain] the space to negotiate. I hope that it would be perceived as a win-win situation. If we see what I have been observing in the last couple of days that it is an "empty dressing", I think it is a wrong approach...we lost six years of failed policy frankly vis-à-vis Iran. And it's about time now to understand that the Iranian issue is not going to be resolved except, until and unless we sit with the Iranians and try to find a fair and equitable solution."^[356] "If this deal is followed up with a broader engagement of the IAEA and the international community, it can be a positive step to a negotiated settlement," UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon said.^[357]

President Hassan Rouhani declared that Iran's nuclear program would be “limitless” while the country launches the third phase of quitting from the 2015 nuclear deal.^[358]

Mumkin bo'lgan josuslik va suiqasdlar

Several Iranian nuclear scientists died in alleged assassination attacks between 2010 and 2012.^[359] According to Iran, and privately confirmed by unnamed US government officials, the attacks on the nuclear scientists and facilities are being carried out by an Iranian dissident group called the Eron xalq mujohidlari. According to US officials, the group is financed, trained, and armed by Mossad.^[360]

According to former Iranian chief of staff Hassan Firouzabadi, the West used tourists and environmentalists to spy on Iran: "In their possessions were a variety of reptile desert species like lizards, chameleons… We found out that their skin attracts atomic waves and that they were nuclear spies who wanted to find out where inside the Islamic Republic of Iran we have uranium mines and where we are engaged in atomic activities.", however these plots were foiled by Iran.^{[361][362][363]}

2013 yil - hozirgi kunga qadar

Ushbu bo'lim kengayishga muhtoj. Siz yordam berishingiz mumkin unga qo'shilish. (2019 yil may)

2013 yil fevral va aprel oylarida Olmaotada bo'lib o'tgan muzokaralar

Ushbu bo'lim bo'sh. Siz yordam berishingiz mumkin unga qo'shilish. (2015 yil iyul)

2013 yil sentyabr. Vazirlar yig'ilishi

Foreign Ministers of the P5+1 met in September 2013 on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, and were joined by Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif.^{[iqtibos kerak ]}

2013 yil oktyabr-noyabr oylari muzokaralari

Catherine Ashton, P5+1 and Iran foreign ministers in Geneva negotiations

Lead negotiators for the P5+1 and Iran met in Geneva 15–16 October to discuss elements of a possible framework for resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program. Experts from the P5+1 and Iran met in Vienna 30–31 October to exchange detailed information on those elements. Lead negotiators met again 7–8 November to negotiate that framework, joined at the end by Foreign Ministers from the P5+1, but despite extending the talks past midnight 9 November were unable to agree on that framework and agreed instead to meet again 20 November.^[364]

On 24 November, the foreign ministers of Iran and the P5+1 agreed to a six-month interim deal that involves the freezing of key parts of the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for a decrease in sanctions, to provide time to negotiate a permanent agreement. Iran will stop enriching uranium beyond five per cent, and will stop development of their Arak plant. The UN will be granted greater access for inspections. In exchange, Iran will receive relief from sanctions of approximately US$7 billion (£4.3 billion) and no additional sanctions will be imposed.^{[365][366][367]} President Obama called the agreement an "important first step."^[368] Following further negotiation of implementation details, a summary of which was released by the White House on 16 January 2014, implementation began 20 January 2014.^[369]

Amalga oshirish

On 20 February 2014 the IAEA reported that Iran was implementing its commitments to the P5+1 and its commitments to the IAEA under the Joint Statement of 11 November 2013.^[370]

2014 yil fevral-iyul muzokaralari

During February to July 2014 the P5+1 and Iran have held high-level negotiations on a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program in Vienna, Austria. After six rounds of talks the parties missed the deadline for reaching a deal and agreed to extend the negotiations through 24 November. Additionally, it was agreed that the US will unblock $2.8 billion in frozen Iranian funds, in exchange for Iran continuing to convert its stocks of 20 per cent enriched uranium into fuel.^[371]

The Evropa Ittifoqi Adliya sudi annulled a freeze of the Iranian Sharif University's assets since the EU could not provide sufficient dalil of the university's links to the nuclear program of Iran.^[372]

2015 yil iyul oyida bo'lib o'tgan muzokaralar

Ushbu bo'lim bo'sh. Siz yordam berishingiz mumkin unga qo'shilish. (2015 yil iyul)

2016 yil - hozirgi kunga qadar

In January 2016, it was announced that Iran had dismantled major parts of its nuclear program, paving the way for sanctions to be lifted.^{[373][374][375]}

In 2018 the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, is reported to have stolen nuclear secrets from a secure warehouse in Iran. According to reports, the thieves came in a truck semitrailer at midnight, cut into dozens of safes with "high intensity torches", and carted out "50,000 pages and 163 compact discs of memos, videos and plans" before leaving in time to make their escape when the guards came for the morning shift at 7 am.^[376][377] According to a US intelligence official an "enormous" Iranian "dragnet operation" was unsuccessful in recovering the documents which escaped through Azerbaijan.^[376] According to the Israelis, the documents and files (which it shared with European countries and the United States),^[378] demonstrated that the Iranian AMAD loyihasi aimed to develop yadro qurollari,^[379] that Iran had a nuclear program when it claimed to have "largely suspended it", and that there were two nuclear sites in Iran that had been hidden from inspectors.^[376] Iran claims "the whole thing was a hoax".^[376]

In February 2019, the IAEA certified that Iran was still abiding by the international Birgalikdagi Harakat Rejasi 2015 yil.^[18]

On 8 May 2019, Iran announced it would suspend implementation of some parts of the Birgalikdagi Harakat Rejasi, threatening further action in 60 days unless it received protection from US sanctions.^[380] In July 2019, the IAEA confirmed that Iran has breached both the 300 kg enriched uranium stockpile limit and the 3.67 per cent refinement limit.^[381] On 5 November 2019, Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Solihiy announced that Iran will enrich uranium to 5 per cent at the Fordov yoqilg'isini boyitish zavodi, adding the country had the capability to enrich uranium to 20 per cent if needed.^[382] Also In November Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, stated that Iran can enrich up to 60% if needed.^[383]

In January 2020, following the killing of Iranian Quds Force qo'mondon Qasem Soleymani, Iran stated that it would no longer abide by the JCPOA's restrictions on its enrichment program.^[384]

In March 2020, the IAEA said that Iran had nearly tripled its stockpile of enriched uranium since early November 2019.^[385]

In June 2020, following reports by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in March and June describing the IAEA's efforts to resolve questions about the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on Iran to cooperate fully in implementing its safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol and to grant access to two suspected former nuclear sites and address doubts regarding undeclared nuclear material. Iran denounced the resolution.^[386][387]

2020 yil sentyabr oyida Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi reported that Iran had accumulated ten times as much enriched uranium as permitted by the JCPOA.^[388]

In November 2020, the IAEA reported that Iran had started feeding uran geksaflorid into a newly installed underground cascade of 174 advanced IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz, which the JCPOA did not permit.^[389]

Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Moxsen Faxrizoda, was assassinated in Tehron, Iran on November 27, 2020. Fakhrizadeh was believed to be the primary force behind Iran’s covert nuclear program for many decades. The Nyu-York Tayms reported that Israel’s Mossad was behind that attack and that Mik Myulroy, the former Deputy Defense Secretary for the Middle East said the death of Fakhirizadeh was “a setback to Iran’s nuclear program and he was also a senior officer in the Islom inqilobi soqchilari korpusi, and that “will magnify Iran’s desire to respond by force.” ^[390]

Yadro qurolidagi tadqiqotlar va rivojlanish

The continuing controversy over Iran's nuclear program revolves in part around allegations of nuclear studies by Iran with possible military applications until 2003, when, according to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the program was ended. The allegations, which include claims that Iran had engaged in high-explosives testing, sought to manufacture "green salt" (UF
₄) and to design a nuclear-capable missile warhead, were based on information obtained from a laptop computer which was allegedly retrieved from Iran in 2004.^[391] The US presented some of the alleged contents of the laptop in 2005 to an audience of international diplomats, though the laptop and the full documents contained in it have yet to be given to the IAEA for independent verification. Ga ko'ra Nyu-York Tayms:

Nonetheless, doubts about the intelligence persist among some foreign analysts. In part, that is because American officials, citing the need to protect their source, have largely refused to provide details of the origins of the laptop computer beyond saying that they obtained it in mid-2004 from a longtime contact in Iran. Moreover, this chapter in the confrontation with Iran is infused with the memory of the faulty intelligence on Iraq's unconventional arms. In this atmosphere, though few countries are willing to believe Iran's denials about nuclear arms, few are willing to accept the United States' weapons intelligence without question. "I can fabricate that data," a senior European diplomat said of the documents. "It looks beautiful, but is open to doubt.^[392]

Negotiations about Iranian Nuclear Program, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Other Officials of the P5+1 and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and EU in Lausanne

On 21 August 2007, Iran and the IAEA finalized an agreement, titled "Understandings of The Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," that listed outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear program and set out a timetable to resolve each issue in order. These unresolved issues included the status of Iran's uranium mine at Gchine, allegations of experiments with plutonium and uranium metal, and the use of Polonium 210.^[393] Specifically regarding the "Alleged Studies", the Modalities agreement asserted that while Iran considers the documents to be fabricated, Iran would nevertheless address the allegations "upon receiving all related documents" as a goodwill gesture. The Modalities Agreement specifically said that aside from the issues identified in the document, there were "no other remaining issues and ambiguities regarding Iran's past nuclear program and activities."

The United States was opposed to the Modalities Agreement between Iran and the IAEA, and vehemently objected to it, accusing Iran of "manipulating" IAEA.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Olli Heinonen, the IAEA Deputy Director General for safeguards underlined the importance of the Iran-IAEA agreement as a working arrangement on how to resolve the outstanding issues that triggered Security Council resolutions:

All these measures which you see there for resolving our outstanding issues go beyond the requirements of the Additional Protocol ... If the answers are not satisfactory, we are making new questions until we are satisfied with the answers and we can conclude technically that the matter is resolved—it is for us to judge when we think we have enough information. Once the matter is resolved, then the file is closed.^[394]

Following the implementation of the Modalities Agreement, the IAEA issued another report on the status of Iran's nuclear program on 22 February 2008. According to this report, the IAEA had no evidence of a current, undeclared nuclear program in Iran, and all of the remaining issues listed in the Modalities Agreement regarding past undeclared nuclear activities had been resolved, with the exception of the "Alleged Studies" issue. Regarding this report, IAEA director ElBaradei specifically stated:

[W]e have made quite good progress in clarifying the outstanding issues that had to do with Iran's past nuclear activities, with the exception of one issue, and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past. We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran's enrichment programme.^[395]

The US had made some of the "Alleged Studies" documentation available to the IAEA just a week prior to the issuance of the IAEA's February 2008 report on Iran's nuclear program. According to the IAEA report itself, the IAEA had "not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard." Some diplomats reportedly dismissed the new allegations as being "of doubtful value ... relatively insignificant and coming too late."^[396]

It was reported on 3 March 2008, that Olli Heinonen, the IAEA Deputy Director general of safeguards, had briefed diplomats about the contents of the "Alleged Studies" documents a week earlier. Reportedly, Heinonen added that the IAEA had obtained corroborating information from the intelligence agencies of several countries, that pointed to sophisticated research into some key technologies needed to build and deliver a nuclear bomb.^[397]

In April 2008, Iran reportedly agreed to address the sole outstanding issue of the "Alleged Studies"^[398] However, according to the subsequent May 2008 IAEA report, the IAEA was not able to actually provide these same "Alleged Studies" documents to Iran, because the IAEA did not have the documents itself or was not allowed to share them with Iran. For example, in paragraph 21, the IAEA report states: "Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran." Also, in paragraph 16, the IAEA report states: "The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran." The IAEA has requested that it be allowed to share the documents with Iran. Nevertheless, according to the report, Iran may have more information on the alleged studies which "remain a matter of serious concern" but the IAEA itself had not detected evidence of actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear weapons or components.

Iran's refusal to respond to the IAEA's questions unless it is given access to the original documents has caused a standoff. 2008 yil fevral oyida, The New York Times reported that the US refusal to provide access to those documents was a source of friction between the Bush Administration and then Director General ElBaradei.^[399] ElBaradei later noted that these documents could not be shared because of the need to protect sources and methods, but noted that this allowed Iran to question their authenticity.^[400] According to Iran's envoy to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, "The government of the United States has not handed over original documents to the agency since it does not in fact have any authenticated document and all it has are forged documents."^[401]

The IAEA has requested that third parties^{[noaniq ]} allow it to share the documents on the alleged studies with Iran. The IAEA has further stated that though it has not provided full documents containing the alleged studies, information from other countries has corroborated some of the allegations, which appear to the IAEA to be consistent and credible, and that Iran should therefore address the alleged studies even without obtaining the full documents. However, questions about the authenticity of the documents persist, with claims that the documents were obtained either from Israel or the Eron xalq mujohidlari, an Iranian dissident group based on Islamic and Socialist ideology officially considered to be a terroristik tashkilot by the United States, and that investigations into the alleged studies are intended to reveal intelligence about Iran's conventional weapons programs.^{[402][403][404][405]} Some IAEA officials have requested a clear statement be made by the agency that it could not affirm the documents' authenticity. They cite that as a key document in the study had since been proven to have been fraudulently altered, it put in doubt the entire collection.^[406]

On 30 April 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyaxu revealed thousands of files he said were copied from a "highly secret location" in Teheran which show an Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons between 1999 and 2003.^[407] Many analysts said there was little new information in Netanyahu's presentation, which they speculated was designed to influence President Trump's decision on the Iran deal.^[408][409] The IAEA reiterated its 2015 report, saying it had found no credible evidence of nuclear weapons activity in Iran after 2009.^[10][11][12] Ga binoan Devid Olbrayt, ning Ilmiy va xalqaro xavfsizlik instituti, the archive revealed that Iran's weapon program was more advanced than believed previously in the West and that should Iran pull out of the JCPOA it would be able to produce weapons swiftly, possibly within a few months.^[410]

Yadro energetikasi siyosiy masala sifatida

Eron yadro dasturi va NPT

Iran says that its program is solely for peaceful purposes and consistent with the NPT.^[411] The IAEA Board of Governors has found Iran in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, concluding in a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions,^[412] that Iran's past safeguards "breaches" and "failures" constituted "non-compliance" with its Safeguards Agreement^[113][413] In the decision, the IAEA Board of Governors also concluded that the concerns raised fell within the competence of the UN Security Council.^[113]

Most experts recognize that non-compliance with an NPT safeguards agreement is not equivalent to a violation of the NPT or does not automatically constitute a violation of the NPT itself.^[414][415] The IAEA does not make determinations regarding compliance with the NPT,^[416] and the UN Security Council does not have a responsibility to adjudicate treaty violations.^[417] Dr. James Acton, an associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has said the 2010 NPT Review Conference could recognize that non-compliance with safeguards agreements would violate article III of the NPT.^[418] Director of the Australian Nonproliferation and Safeguards Organization and then Chairman of IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation^[419] John Carlson wrote in considering the case of Iran that "formally IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) decisions concern compliance with safeguards agreements, rather than the NPT as such, but in practical terms non-compliance with a safeguards agreement constitutes non-compliance with the NPT."^[420]

A September 2009 Kongress tadqiqot xizmati paper said "whether Iran has violated the NPT is unclear."^[421] A 2005 US State Department report on compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements concluded, based on its analysis of the facts and the relevant international laws, that Iran's extensive failures to make required reports to the IAEA made "clear that Iran has violated Article III of the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement."^[416] Testimony presented to the Foreign Select Committee of the British Parliament drew the opposite conclusion:

The enforcement of Article III of the NPT obligations is carried out through the IAEA's monitoring and verification that is designed to ensure that declared nuclear facilities are operated according to safeguard agreement with Iran, which Iran signed with the IAEA in 1974. In the past four years that Iran's nuclear programme has been under close investigation by the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, as early as November 2003 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons programme." ... Although Iran has been found in non-compliance with some aspects of its IAEA safeguards obligations, Iran has not been in breach of its obligations under the terms of the NPT.^[422]

The 2005 US State Department compliance report also concluded that "Iran is pursuing an effort to manufacture nuclear weapons, and has sought and received assistance in this effort in violation of Article II of the NPT".^[416] The November 2007 United States Milliy razvedka taxminlari (NIE) asserted that Tehron halted a nuclear weapons program in fall 2003, but that Iran "at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapon".^[7] Russian analyst Alexei Arbatov, said "no hard facts on violation of the NPT o'z-o'zidan have been discovered" and also wrote that "all this is not enough to accuse Iran of a formal breach of the letter of the NPT" and "giving Iran the benefit of the doubt, there is no hard evidence of its full-steam development of a military nuclear program."^[423]

NPT Article IV recognizes the right of states to research, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but only in conformity with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations under Articles I and II of the NPT.

The BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashi has demanded that Iran suspend its yadroviy boyitish activities in multiple resolutions.^[60][424] The United States has said the "central bargain of the NPT is that if non-nuclear-weapon states renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and comply fully with this commitment, they may gain assistance under Article IV of the Treaty to develop peaceful nuclear programs". The US has written that Paragraph 1 of Article IV makes clear that access to peaceful nuclear cooperation must be "in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty" and also by extension Article III of the NPT.^[425] Rahman Bonad, Director of Arms Control Studies at the Center for Strategic Research at Tehran, has argued that demands to cease enrichment run counter to "all negotiations and discussions that led to the adoption of the NPT in the 1960s and the fundamental logic of striking a balance between the rights and obligations stipulated in the NPT."^[426] In February 2006 Iran's foreign minister insisted that "Iran rejects all forms of scientific and nuclear apartheid by any world power," and asserted that this "scientific and nuclear apartheid" was "an immoral and discriminatory treatment of signatories to the Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma,"^[427] and that Iran has "the right to a peaceful use of nuclear energy and we cannot accept nuclear apartheid."^[428]

Russia has said it believes Iran has a right to enrich uranium on its soil. Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested that there could be work toward an international yadro yoqilg'isi banki instead of indigenous Iranian enrichment,^[429] esa Richard Xass, Prezidenti Xalqaro aloqalar bo'yicha kengash, has said "the United States should be willing to discuss what Iran describes as its 'right to enrich' ... provided that Iran accepts both limits on its enrichment program (no HEU) and enhanced safeguards".^[430] Officials of the Iranian government and members of the Iranian public believe Iran should be developing its peaceful nuclear industry.^[431][432] A March 2008 poll of 30 nations found moderate support for allowing Iran to produce nuclear fuel for electricity alongside a full program of UN inspections.^[433]

Eronning yadroviy tiyilish to'g'risidagi bayonotlari

The Iranian authorities deny seeking a nuclear weapons capacity for deterrence or retaliation since Iran's level of technological progress cannot match that of existing nuclear weapons states, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons would only spark an arms race in the Middle East. According to Ambassador Javad Zarif:

It is true that Iran has neighbors with abundant nuclear weapons, but this does not mean that Iran must follow suit. In fact, the predominant view among Iranian decision-makers is that development, acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons would only undermine Iranian security. Viable security for Iran can be attained only through inclusion and regional and global engagement.^[434]

Iran's President Ahmadinejad, during an interview with NBC anchor Brian Williams in July 2008, also dismissed the utility of nuclear weapons as a source of security and stated:

Again, did nuclear arms help the Soviet Union from falling and disintegrating? For that matter, did a nuclear bomb help the U.S. to prevail inside Iraq or Afghanistan, for that matter? Nuclear bombs belong to the 20th century. We are living in a new century ... Nuclear energy must not be equaled to a nuclear bomb. This is a disservice to the society of man.^[435]

According to Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization:

In matters of national security we are not timid. We will assert our intentions. If nuclear weapons would have brought security, we would have announced to the world that we would go after them ... We do not think a nuclear Iran would be stronger ... If we have weapons of mass destruction we are not going to use them – we cannot. We did not use chemical weapons against Iraq. Secondly, we do not feel any real threat from our neighbours. Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, we have no particular problems with them, nor with Afghanistan. The only powerful country is Russia in the north, and no matter how many nuclear weapons we had we could not match Russia. Israel, our next neighbour, we do not consider an entity by itself but as part of the US. Facing Israel means facing the US. We cannot match the US. We do not have strategic differences with our neighbours, including Turkey.^[436]

Yaqin Sharqdagi yadro qurolidan xoli hudud

Historically, until its own nuclear program began development, Iran had consistently supported the creation of a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Middle East. In 1974, as concerns in the region grew over Israel's nuclear weapon program, Iran formally proposed the concept of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East in a joint resolution in the UN General Assembly.^[437]

Eron atom energetikasi dasturiga qarashlar

Shuningdek qarang

Adabiyotlar

Tashqi havolalar

• Eronning atom energetikasi dasturi haqida ingliz tilidagi birinchi veb-sayt
• Iran's Atomic Energy Organization
• In Focus: IAEA and Iran, IAEA
• Eron yadro dasturi da to'plangan yangiliklar va sharhlar The New York Times
• Iran Nuclear Resources, parstimes.com
• Annotated bibliography for the Iranian nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues