Jin - Qo'shiq urushlari - Jin–Song Wars

Jin - Qo'shiq urushlari
1141 yilda Xitoyning xaritasi Jinni sulolasi shimolni va Janubiy Song sulolasi janubni nazorat qiladi
Jin sulolasi (ko'k) va Song sulolasi (to'q sariq) 1141 yilda
Sana1125 yil noyabr - 1234 yil 9-fevral
Manzil
Xitoy
Natija
  • Yurxenlar Shimoliy Xitoyni zabt etishadi
  • Qo'shiq sudi janubga qarab harakatlanadi Lin'an
  • Janubiy Song sulolasi davri boshlanadi
  • Urushayotganlar

    Jin sulolasi


    Jin qo'g'irchoq davlatlar

    Hamjangohlar
    G'arbiy Xia (1225–27)

    Sharqiy Sya (1233)

    Qo'shiqlar sulolasi
    Mo'g'ul imperiyasi (1233–34)


    Hamjangohlar
    Kitanlar

    Mo'g'ul imperiyasi (1211–33)

    Jin - Qo'shiq urushlari
    An'anaviy xitoy宋金 戰爭
    Soddalashtirilgan xitoy tili宋金 战争
    Song-Jurchen Jin urushlari ko'rsatilgan xarita

    The Jin - Qo'shiq urushlari o'rtasidagi bir qator ziddiyatlar bo'lgan Yurxen Szinlar sulolasi (1115–1234) va Xan xitoylari Qo'shiqlar sulolasi (960–1279). 1115 yilda Yurxen qabilalari o'z hukmdorlariga qarshi isyon ko'tarishdi Kidan Liao sulolasi (907–1125) va Jin tashkil topganligini e'lon qildi. Qo'shiq bilan ittifoq qilish ularning umumiy dushmanlariga qarshi Liao sulolasi, Jin Song the Song-ga qaytishga va'da berdi O'n oltita prefektura 938 yildan buyon Liao nazorati ostiga o'tgan edi. Xitoyliklar bunga rozi bo'lishdi, ammo yurxenlarning Liaoni tezda mag'lub etishlari Song harbiy muvaffaqiyatsizliklari bilan birga Jinni o'z hududini berishni istamadi. Ikki tomonni ham g'azablantirgan bir qator muzokaralardan so'ng, Jurxenlar 1125 yilda Songga hujum qilib, bitta qo'shinni jo'natdilar. Taiyuan ikkinchisi Bianjinga (zamonaviy) Kaifeng ), Qo'shiq poytaxti.

    Istilo haqidagi yangilikdan hayratda qolgan, Qo'shiq general Tong Guan qurshovida bo'lgan va keyinchalik qo'lga kiritilgan Taiyuandan orqaga chekindi. Ikkinchi Jin armiyasi poytaxt Song imperatoriga yaqinlashganda Huizong taxtdan voz kechdi va janubga qochib ketdi. Qinzong, uning katta o'g'li taxtga o'tirdi. Yurxenlar 1126 yilda Kayfengni qamal qildilar, ammo Qinzong poytaxtdan chekinish to'g'risida muzokaralar olib bordi. tovon puli. Qinzong kelishuvdan qaytdi va Song kuchlariga himoya qilishni buyurdi prefekturalar poytaxtni mustahkamlash o'rniga. Jinlar yana urushni boshladilar va 1127 yilda yana Kayfenni qamal qildilar. Ular Tsinzongni qo'lga olishdi. imperator oilasi sifatida tanilgan tadbirda Song imperatorlik sudining yuqori mansabdor shaxslari Jingkang voqeasi. Bu ajratildi shimoliy va janubiy Xitoy Jin va Song o'rtasida. Song imperatorlik oilasining qoldiqlari Xitoyning janubiga chekinishdi va bir necha vaqtinchalik poytaxtlarda qisqa turgandan so'ng, oxir-oqibat Lin'anga (zamonaviy Xanchjou ). Chekinish sulolani ikkita alohida davrga ajratdi, Shimoliy qo'shiq va Janubiy qo'shiq.

    Xurxenlar 1130-yillarda janubiy Xitoyni zabt etishga urinishgan, ammo shimolda Songni qo'llab-quvvatlovchi qo'zg'olon va Song generallarining qarshi hujumi, shu jumladan Yue Fey va Xan Shizhon. Song generallari ba'zi hududlarni qaytarib olishdi, ammo Janubiy Song imperatorining buyrug'iga binoan chekinishdi Gaozong, urushni tinch yo'l bilan hal qilishni qo'llab-quvvatlagan. The Shaoxing shartnomasi (1142) tomonidan ikki imperiyaning chegarasi o'rnatildi Xuay daryosi, ammo ikki sulola o'rtasidagi ziddiyatlar 1234 yilda Jin qulagunga qadar davom etdi. 4-Jin imperatori tomonidan boshlangan Songga qarshi urush, Vanyan Liang, muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi. U yutqazdi Kayshi jangi (1161) va keyinchalik o'zining norozi zobitlari tomonidan o'ldirilgan. Song tomonidan qo'zg'atilgan Jin hududiga bostirib kirish revanshizm (1206-1208) ham muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi. O'n yil o'tgach, Jin 1217 yilda Songga qarshi abortli harbiy kampaniyani boshladi, ular yo'qotgan hududlarini almashtirish uchun mo'g'ullarni bosib olish. Song 1233 yilda mo'g'ullar bilan ittifoq qildi va keyingi yilda birgalikda Kayzhou qo'lga olindi, Jin imperatorining so'nggi panohi. O'sha yili Jinlar sulolasi qulab tushdi. Jin o'limidan so'ng, Song a mo'g'ullarning maqsadi va 1279 yilda qulab tushdi.

    Urushlar Xitoyda tezkor texnologik, madaniy va demografik o'zgarishlar davrini keltirib chiqardi. Song va Jin o'rtasidagi janglar turli xillarning kiritilishiga olib keldi porox qurollari. The De'anni qamal qilish 1132 yilda birinchi qayd qilingan yong'in nayzasi, ning erta ajdodi qurol. Yong'in haqida xabarlar ham bor edi huopao yoki portlash tiehuopao, yondiruvchi o'qlar va boshqa tegishli qurollar. Shimoliy Xitoyda Jurxenlar asosan Songning sobiq sub'ektlari yashagan imperiyaning hukmron ozchiliklari edi. Yurxen muhojirlari bosib olingan hududlarga joylashdilar va mahalliy madaniyat bilan singib ketishdi. Jin, a fath sulolasi, avvalgi Xitoy sulolalari asosida o'zlarining qonuniyligiga asoslanib, markazlashgan imperatorlik byurokratiyasini yaratdi Konfutsiylik falsafasi. Janubiy Xitoyga ko'chirilgan shimoldan kelgan qo'shiq qochoqlari. Shimol Xitoyning madaniy markazi edi va uning Jin tomonidan zabt etilishi Song sulolasining mintaqaviy mavqeini pasaytirdi. Biroq, Janubiy qo'shiq tezda iqtisodiy farovonlikka qaytdi va o'nlab yillar davom etgan urushlarga qaramay, Jin bilan savdo-sotiq foydali bo'ldi. Janubiy Song Song poytaxti Lin'an savdo uchun katta shaharga aylandi.

    Mo'rt qo'shiq - Jin ittifoqi

    Kidanlik ovchilar burgut ushlagan bitta chavandoz bilan otda
    Song va Jin Kitan Liaoga qarshi ittifoqchilar edi. Kidan ovchilarining rasmlari, dan Milliy saroy muzeyi

    The Jurxenlar edi a Tungus tilida so'zlashuvchi hozirgi vaqtda shimoliy-sharqiy Osiyo hududlarida yashovchi yarim agrar qabilalar guruhi Shimoliy-sharqiy Xitoy. Yurxen qabilalarining aksariyati vassallar edi Liao sulolasi (907–1125), ko'chmanchilar tomonidan boshqarilgan imperiya Kitanlar zamonaviylarning aksariyatini o'z ichiga olgan Mo'g'uliston, ning bir qismi Shimoliy Xitoy, Shimoliy-sharqiy Xitoy, shimoliy Koreya va qismlari Rossiya Uzoq Sharq.[1] Liaoning janubida Xan xitoylari Qo'shiq imperiyasi (960–1276).[2] Song va Liao tinch edi, ammo o'shandan beri 1005 yilda Liaoga qarshi harbiy mag'lubiyat, Song shimoliy qo'shnisiga har yili 200,000 bolt ipak va 100,000 tovon puli to'laydi untsiya kumush.[3] Jurxenlar Kitanni ag'darishdan oldin, turmushga chiqqan Jurchen ayollari va Jurchen qizlari Liao Kitan elchilari tomonidan odatlanib, Zurxenlarning Kitandan noroziligini keltirib chiqargan.[4] Qo'shiq malikalari zo'rlashdan qochish uchun o'z joniga qasd qildilar yoki Jin tomonidan zo'rlashga qarshilik ko'rsatgani uchun o'ldirildilar.[5]

    1114 yilda,[6] boshliq Vanyan Aguda (1068-1123) xilma-xil Yurxen qabilalarini birlashtirdi va Liaoga qarshi qo'zg'olonga rahbarlik qildi. 1115 yilda u o'zini imperator deb atagan Jin "oltin" sulolasi (1115–1234).[7] Lyao defektori Yurxen qo'zg'oloni muvaffaqiyati to'g'risida Song imperatoridan xabar olgan Huizong (r. 1100-1127) va uning eng yuqori harbiy qo'mondoni xizmatkor Tong Guan Liao zaifligini tiklash uchun imkoniyat sifatida ko'rdi O'n oltita prefektura, Liao qo'shib olgan mustahkam shahar va dovonlar chizig'i Shatuo turk Keyinchalik Jin 938 yilda va Qo'shiq bir necha bor takrorlangan, ammo muvaffaqiyatsiz qayta topishga harakat qilgan.[8] Shu tariqa Qo'shiq Djin bilan o'zlarining umumiy dushmani Liaoga qarshi ittifoq tuzishga intildi.[9]

    Yurxen boshlig'i Vanyan Aguda 1115 yilda u birinchi imperatorga aylandi Jin sulolasi

    Song va Tszin o'rtasidagi quruqlik yo'llari Liao tomonidan nazorat qilinganligi sababli, diplomatik almashinuvlar bo'ylab sayohat qilish orqali sodir bo'lishi kerak edi Bohay dengizi.[10] Ittifoq uchun muzokaralar Song Song Kitanlardan otlarni sotib olmoqchi degan bahona bilan yashirincha boshlandi. Qo'shiq diplomatlari 1118 yilda Aguda bilan uchrashish uchun Jin sudiga borgan, Jurchen elchilari Song poytaxtiga kelishgan Kaifeng keyingi yil.[9] Dastlab, ikkala tomon Liao hududini jangda egallab oladigan har qanday joyda saqlashga kelishib oldilar.[9] 1120 yilda Aguda o'n oltita prefekturani yillik Jinga topshirish evaziga qo'shiqqa berishga rozi bo'ldi. irmoq to'lovlari Song Liao-ga bergan edi.[11] Ammo 1120 yil oxiriga kelib, yurxenlar Liao oliy poytaxtini egallab oldilar va Songga faqat o'n oltita prefekturaning ayrim qismlarini taklif qildilar.[11] Boshqa narsalar qatori, Jin Liao G'arbiy poytaxtini saqlab qoladi Datong o'n oltita prefekturaning g'arbiy qismida.[11] Ikki tomon Jin endi Liao markaziy poytaxtiga hujum qiladi, Song esa shaharni egallab oladi, deb kelishib oldilar Liao janubiy poytaxti, Yanjing (zamonaviy Pekin).

    Liaoga qarshi birgalikda hujum 1121 yilga rejalashtirilgan edi, ammo u 1122 yilga ko'chirildi. O'sha yilning 23 fevralida Jin Liaoning markaziy poytaxtini va'da qilgani kabi egallab oldi.[12] Qo'shiq ularning urushga kirishini kechiktirdi, chunki u resurslarni urushga qarshi yo'naltirdi G'arbiy Xia shimoli-g'arbda va boshchiligidagi yirik xalq qo'zg'olonini bostirish Fang La janubda.[13] Tong Guan qo'mondonligidagi Song qo'shini 1122 yil may oyida Yanjinga hujum qilganida, kuchsizlanib qolgan Liaoning kichikroq kuchlari bosqinchilarni osonlikcha qaytarib berishdi.[14] Kuzda yana bir hujum muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi.[14] Ikkala safar ham Tong Kaifengga qaytib ketishga majbur bo'ldi.[15] Birinchi hujumdan so'ng Aguda kelishuv shartlarini o'zgartirdi va faqat Yanjing va oltita prefekturani Songga va'da qildi.[16] 1123 yil boshida Lyuo janubiy poytaxtini osongina egallab olgan Yurxen kuchlari edi. Ular uni ishdan bo'shatib, aholisini qul qilib olishdi.[16]

    Liaoning tez qulashi Song va Tszin o'rtasida ko'proq muzokaralarga olib keldi. Yurxen harbiylarining muvaffaqiyati va o'n oltita prefekturani samarali boshqarish ularga ko'proq imkoniyat yaratdi.[16] Aguda ularning harbiy muvaffaqiyatsizliklariga qaramay, Song hali ham prefekturalarning aksariyat qismini egallab olish niyatida ekanligini anglab, tobora ko'proq xafa bo'ldi.[17] 1123 yilning bahorida ikki tomon nihoyat birinchi Song-Jin shartnomasining shartlarini o'rnatdilar.[18] Faqat ettita prefektura (Yanjingni ham qo'shiqqa) qaytarib berar edi va Song har yili 300.000 paket ipak va 200.000 tovon to'laydi. poyabzal Jinga kumush, shuningdek, Jurxenlarga prefekturalarni qaytarib bermagan taqdirda olgan soliq tushumini qoplash uchun bir million mis mis tangalarni bir martalik to'lash.[19] 1123 yil may oyida Tong Guan va Song qo'shinlari talon-taroj qilingan Yanjinga kirishdi.[16]

    Shimoliy qo'shiqqa qarshi urush

    Qurol ushlagan ot ustidagi Jin imperatori Taysonning zamonaviy haykali
    Zamonaviy haykali Jin imperatori Taizong Jinning birinchi poytaxti muzeyida. Taizong 1127 yilda shimoliy Songning qulashiga olib kelgan harbiy yurishlarni buyurdi.

    Song-Jin ittifoqining qulashi

    Qo'shiq Yanjingni tiklaganidan bir oy o'tgach, Chjan Jue (張 覺), Liao prefekturasining harbiy gubernatori bo'lib xizmat qilgan Pingzhou Yanjingdan taxminan 200 kilometr sharqda, Jin shahridagi asosiy amaldorni o'ldirdi va uni Songga topshirdi.[20] Jurxenlar bir necha oydan keyin uning qo'shinlarini mag'lubiyatga uchratdilar va Chjan Yanjingda panoh topdi. Song 1123 yil oxirida uni qatl qilishga rozi bo'lgan bo'lsa ham, bu hodisa ikki davlat o'rtasida ziddiyatni keltirib chiqardi, chunki 1123 yilgi shartnomada ikkala tomonga ham qochib ketuvchilarni yashirishga aniq taqiq qo'yilgan edi.[21] 1124 yilda Song amaldorlari yana to'qqiz chegara prefekturasidan voz kechishni so'rab, Jinni yanada g'azablantirdilar.[21] Yangi Jin imperatori Taizong (1123–1135 yy.), Agudaning ukasi va vorisi, ikkilanib turdi, ammo jangchi knyazlar Vanyan Zonghan va Vanyan Zongvan (完颜 宗 望) ularga boshqa hudud berishni qat'iyan rad etdi. Taizong oxir-oqibat ikkita prefekturani berdi, ammo o'sha paytgacha Tszin rahbarlari janubiy qo'shnisiga hujum qilishga tayyor edilar.[22]

    Jurxenlar Songga bostirib kirishdan oldin, g'arbiy qo'shnilari bilan tinchlik kelishuviga erishdilar Tangut G'arbiy Xia 1124 yilda. Keyingi yil Ordos cho‘li, ular qo'lga olindi Tianzuo, Liaoning oxirgi imperatori, Liao sulolasiga yaxshilik uchun chek qo'ydi.[23] Song bilan o'z ittifoqlarini tugatishga tayyor bo'lgan Jurxenlar bosqinga tayyorgarlik ko'rishni boshladilar.[24]

    Birinchi aksiya

    1125 yil noyabrda Taizong qo'shinlariga Songga hujum qilishni buyurdi.[23] Ikki yil oldin Zhang Jue-dan voz kechish bu vazifani bajargan casus belli.[21] Songning yirik shaharlarini egallash uchun ikkita qo'shin yuborildi.[22]

    Taiyuanni qamal qilish

    Vanyan Zongxan boshchiligidagi g'arbiy qo'shin Datongdan chiqib, tomon yo'l oldi Taiyuan tog'lari orqali Shanxi, Song g'arbiy poytaxtiga borishda Luoyang.[25] Song qo'shinlari bosqinni kutmagan edilar va hibsga olingan edilar. Xitoy generali Tong Guanga harbiy ekspeditsiya to'g'risida ikki prefektura tsessiyasini olish uchun Djinga yuborgan elchisi xabar bergan. Qaytib kelgan elchi, agar Song agar nazoratni topshirsa, yurxanlar bosqindan voz kechishga tayyor ekanliklarini xabar qilishdi Xebey va Shanxi Jinga.[26] Tong Guan Tayyuandan chekinib, o'z qo'shinlarini qo'mondonligini Vang Bingga topshirdi.[27] Jin qo'shinlari shaharni 1126 yil yanvar oyining o'rtalarida qamal qildilar.[28] Vang Bing buyrug'i bilan Tayuan Yurxen qo'shinlarini Luoyangga borishini to'xtatish uchun etarlicha ushlab turdi.[27]

    Kayfengni birinchi qamal qilish

    Songning Jin bosqinlari, 1125-1126
    Uning taxtida o'tirgan imperator Xuitsong
    Imperator Huizong chap Kaifeng 1126 yil 28-yanvarda Yurxen armiyasi shaharga yaqinlashganda.

    Shu bilan birga, Vanyan Zongvan boshqargan sharqiy qo'shin Yanjing (zamonaviy Pekin) va oxir-oqibat Song poytaxti Kayfengga jo'natildi. Bu juda ko'p qurolli qarshiliklarga duch kelmadi. Zongwang Yanjingni osongina olib ketdi, u erda Song general va Liao sobiq gubernatori Guo Yaoshi (郭 藥師) Jinga sodiqligini o'zgartirdi.[27] Qo'shiq qaytarib olishga harakat qilganda O'n oltita prefektura, ular xan xitoyliklarning qattiq qarshiligiga duch kelishgan edi, ammo yurxenlar bu hududga bostirib kirganlarida xan xitoylari ularga umuman qarshilik ko'rsatmadilar.[29] 1125 yil dekabr oyining oxiriga kelib Jin armiyasi ikkita prefektura ustidan nazoratni qo'lga kiritdi va o'n oltita prefektura ustidan Jurxen hokimiyatini tikladi.[26] 1126 yil boshida sharqiy qo'shin Kayfengga yaqinlashdi.[27]

    Yaqinlashayotgan Jin armiyasidan qo'rqib, Song imperatori Xuitsong janubga chekinishni rejalashtirgan. Poytaxtni tashlab ketgan imperator kapitulyatsiya harakati sifatida qaralishi mumkin edi, shuning uchun sud amaldorlari uni taxtdan voz kechishga ishontirishdi.[27] E'tirozlar kam edi. Inqirozga uchragan imperiyani vayronagarchilikdan qutqarish imperatorlik merosining marosimlarini saqlashdan ko'ra muhimroq edi. 1126 yil yanvarda, bir necha kun oldin Yangi yil, Huizong o'g'lining foydasiga taxtdan voz kechdi va tantanali rolga tushirildi Iste'fodagi imperator.[30] Yurxen kuchlari Sariq daryo 1126 yil 27-yanvarda, Yangi yildan ikki kun o'tgach.[23] Xuytsong janubdan qochib, yangi taxtga o'tirgan imperatorni qoldirib, Keyfenga ertasi kuni qochib ketdi Qinzong (r. 1126-1127) poytaxt uchun mas'ul.[23]

    Kayfeng 1126 yil 31 yanvarda qamal qilingan.[31] Yurxen armiyasining qo'mondoni, agar Song Jinga vassal sifatida bo'ysunsa, shaharni tejashga va'da berdi; mahbus sifatida bosh vazir va imperator shahzodasidan mahrum bo'ldi; ning Xitoy prefekturalarini topshirdi Hejian, Taiyuan va Chjunshan; va 50 million tola kumush, 5 million tola oltin, 1 million paket ipak, 1 million paket atlas, 10 000 ot, 10 000 xachir, 10 000 qoramol va 1000 tuya tovon puli to'lashni taklif qildi.[32] Ushbu tovon, Songning Jinga 1123 yildan beri to'lab kelgan yillik soliqlaridan 180 yilga teng edi.[33]

    Uzoqdan yordam kutish imkoniyati kam bo'lgan paytda, Song sudida Jin taklifini qo'llab-quvvatlagan amaldorlar va unga qarshi bo'lganlar o'rtasida nizo kelib chiqdi.[30] Shartnomaning muxoliflari yoqadi Li Gang (李剛; 1083–1140) qo'shimcha kuchlar kelguniga qadar va Yurxen zaxiralari tugamaguncha mudofaa pozitsiyalarida qolish taklifi atrofida to'plandi. Ular tunda amalga oshirilgan Jinlarga qarshi pistirma uyushtirishdi va ularning o'rnini tinchlik muzokaralarini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi rasmiylar egallashdi.[34] Muvaffaqiyatsiz hujum Qinzongni Yurxen talablarini qondirishga undadi va uning rasmiylari uni kelishuvga erishishga ishontirdilar.[35] Qo'shiq Jinning uchta prefektura ustidan nazoratini tan oldi.[36] Yurxen armiyasi 33 kundan keyin mart oyida qamalni tugatdi.[31]

    Ikkinchi aksiya

    Deyarli Jin qo'shinlari Kayfengni tark etishi bilanoq, imperator Tsinzong kelishuvdan qaytdi va Tayuanga hujum qilayotgan yurish qo'shinlarini qaytarish va Chjunshan va Xejian mudofaasini kuchaytirish uchun ikkita qo'shin jo'natdi. 90 ming askardan va yana 60 ming kishidan iborat armiya iyunga qadar Jin kuchlari tomonidan mag'lubiyatga uchradi. Taiyuanni qutqarish bo'yicha ikkinchi ekspeditsiya ham muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi.[31]

    Song qo'shinini shartnomani buzganlikda va Songning kuchsizligini anglaganlikda ayblab, Jin generallari ikkinchi jazo kampaniyasini boshlashdi va yana o'z qo'shinlarini ikki armiyaga bo'lishdi.[37] Kayfeng kelishuvidan keyin Tayyandan chiqib ketgan va qamalni boshqarish uchun ozgina kuchni tark etgan Vanyan Zongxan g'arbiy qo'shinlari bilan qaytib keldi. Cho'chib ketgan Taiyuan 260 kunlik qamaldan so'ng 1126 yil sentyabr oyida qulab tushdi.[38] Song Song sudi Tayuanning qulashi haqidagi xabarni olganida, imperiyani harbiy yo'l bilan himoya qilishni qo'llab-quvvatlagan amaldorlar yana foydadan tushib, ularning o'rnini tinchlantirishni ma'qullaydigan maslahatchilar egalladilar.[39] Dekabr oyi o'rtalarida Yurxenning ikkita qo'shini Kayfengga o'sha yili ikkinchi marta qo'shilishdi.[31]

    Kayfengni ikkinchi qamal qilish

    Shimolda bir nechta Song qo'shinlari mag'lubiyatga uchraganidan so'ng, imperator Qinzong Jin bilan sulh tuzish to'g'risida muzokara olib borishni xohladi, ammo u qolgan qo'shinlariga Kayfeng o'rniga prefektura shaharlarini himoya qilishni buyurganida katta strategik xatoga yo'l qo'ydi. Poytaxtning ahamiyatiga e'tibor bermasdan, u Kaifengni 100 mingdan kam askar bilan himoya qildi. Song qo'shinlari butun shahar bo'ylab tarqalib ketdi, shaharning ikkinchi Jurchen qamalini to'xtatish uchun kuchsiz edi.[31]

    Jinlarga qarshi hujum 1126 yil dekabr oyining o'rtalarida boshlandi. Urushlar davom etayotgan bo'lsa ham, Tsinzong tinchlik uchun sud jarayonini davom ettirdi, ammo Tszinning hududga bo'lgan talablari juda katta edi: ular Sariq daryoning shimolidagi barcha viloyatlarni xohlashdi.[40] Yigirma kundan ortiq qamalda bo'lgan kuchlarga qarshi og'ir janglardan so'ng, Song himoya kuchlari yo'q qilindi va Song askarlarining ruhiy holati pasayib ketdi.[41] 1127 yil 9-yanvarda yurxenlar bostirib kirib, bosib olingan shaharni talon-taroj qilishni boshladilar. Imperator Qinzong poytaxtning qolgan boyligini taklif qilib, g'oliblarni tinchlantirishga urindi. Qirollik xazinasi bo'shatildi va shahar aholisining narsalari tortib olindi.[42] Qo'shiq imperatori bir necha kundan keyin so'zsiz taslim bo'lishni taklif qildi.[43]

    Tsigong, sobiq imperator Xuyzong va Song sudi a'zolari yurxenlar tomonidan garovga olingan.[33] Ularni shimolga olib borishdi Xuining (zamonaviy Harbin ), bu erda ular qirollik imtiyozlaridan mahrum qilingan va oddiy odamlarga aylangan.[44] Sobiq imperatorlar ularni asir olganlar tomonidan xo'rlangan. Ular "Muddled Fazilat" va "Ikki Muddled" kabi kamsituvchi unvonlari bilan masxara qilindi. 1128 yilda Jin ularni harbiy jinoyatchilar uchun marosim o'tkazishga majbur qildi.[45] 1135 yilda Xuitsong vafotidan keyin Song qirolligiga nisbatan qo'pol muomala yumshadi. Unvonlari vafot etgan monarxga berildi va uning o'g'li Qinzong Dyukga ko'tarilib, maoshi bo'lgan lavozimga tayinlandi.[46]

    Qo'shiqning ishlamay qolishining sabablari

    Soqolli xitoylik zitda o'ynayotgani, tosh ustida o'tirgan boshqa bir kishi musiqa tinglayotgani tasviri
    Imperator Huizong tomonidan surat. Huizongning san'atga haddan tashqari qiziqishi shimoliy Songning qulashida rol o'ynagan bo'lishi mumkin.

    Songning takroriy harbiy xatolarida va keyinchalik Shimoliy Xitoyni yurxenlarga boy berishida ko'plab omillar ta'sir ko'rsatdi. Qo'shiq tarixidagi an'anaviy yozuvlar suitsloning tanazzulga uchrashi uchun Huizong imperatorlik sudining davriyligini ta'minlagan.[47] Ushbu rivoyatlar Huizong va uning amaldorlarini axloqiy muvaffaqiyatsizliklari uchun qoraladi.[48] Dastlabki qo'shiq imperatorlari siyosiy islohotlarni amalga oshirishga va uning axloqiy asoslarini tiklashga intilishgan Konfutsiylik, ammo islohotlarga bo'lgan ishtiyoq islohotchidan keyin asta-sekin o'ldi Vang Anshi kabi chiqarib yuborish kantsler 1076 yilda.[49] Hukmdorga qaraganda rassomlik mahoratiga ega bo'lgan Xuitsongning hukmronligi davrida korruptsiya buzildi. Xuyzong o'zining dabdababozligi bilan tanilgan va qimmatbaho bog'lar va ibodatxonalar qurilishini moliyalashtirgan, isyonlar esa davlatning hokimiyat tepaligiga tahdid solgan.[50]

    Ari Daniel Levinning zamonaviy tahlili ko'proq aybni harbiy va byurokratik rahbariyatdagi kamchiliklarga qo'yadi. Shimoliy Xitoyni yo'qotish muqarrar emas edi.[47] Harbiylar o'zlarining harbiy qudratiga ishongan hukumat tomonidan haddan tashqari ko'paytirildi. Xuitsun davlat resurslarini G'arbiy Siyaga qarshi muvaffaqiyatsiz urushlarga yo'naltirdi. Liao hududining ko'proq ulushiga ega bo'lish to'g'risidagi qo'shiq faqatgina Jin ittifoqchilarini qo'zg'atishga muvaffaq bo'ldi.[51] Song diplomatik nazorat Jinni kamsitdi va Jurchen harbiy kuchining to'siqsiz ko'tarilishiga yo'l qo'ydi.[52] Davlatda otlar bundan mustasno, mo'l-ko'l resurslar mavjud edi, ammo janglar paytida o'z mol-mulkini yomon boshqargan.[53] Kenglikdan farqli o'laroq Xon va Tang Qo'shiqdan oldin bo'lgan imperiyalar, Qo'shiqda muhim o'rin yo'q edi Markaziy Osiyo bu erda uning otlarining katta qismini etishtirish yoki sotib olish mumkin edi.[54] Song general Li Gang ta'kidlaganidek, izchil otlarsiz sulola Yurxenga qarshi juda yomon ahvolga tushib qolgan otliqlar: "Jin foydalanganliklari uchungina g'alaba qozondi temirdan himoyalangan otliqlar, Biz ularga piyoda askarlar bilan qarshi bo'lganmiz. Faqatgina [bizning askarlarimiz] tarqab ketishdi va tarqalishdi ».[55]

    Janubiy qo'shiq bilan urushlar

    Songning Jin bosqinlari, 1126–1130

    Song sudining janubiy chekinishi

    Imperator Gaozongning taxtga o'tirishi

    Jin rahbariyati Song sulolasining qulashini kutmagan yoki xohlamagan edi. Ularning maqsadi ko'proq o'lpon talab qilish uchun Qo'shiqni zaiflashtirish edi va ular g'alabalarining kattaligiga tayyor emas edilar.[56] Yurxenlar bir paytlar Liao tomonidan nazorat qilingan hududlar ustidan o'z hukmronligini kuchaytirish bilan mashg'ul bo'lishgan. O'zlarining sonidan ko'p bo'lgan qo'shinlari bo'lgan imperiya Songga bostirib kirishni davom ettirish o'rniga, ular "xitoyliklarni boshqarish uchun xitoyliklardan foydalanish" strategiyasini qabul qildilar.[57] Jin, proksi-davlat Shimoliy Xitoyni boshqarishi va Jinga qarshi qo'zg'olonlarni bostirish uchun Yurxenlarning aralashuvini talab qilmasdan har yili tovon puli undirish imkoniyatiga ega bo'lishiga umid qildi.[56] 1127 yilda Jurxenlar Songning sobiq rasmiysini o'rnatdilar, Chjan Bangchang (張邦昌; 1081-1127), yangi tashkil etilgan qo'g'irchoq imperator sifatida "Da Chu "(Buyuk Chu) sulolasi.[58] Qo'g'irchoq hukumat Xitoyning shimoliy qismidagi qarshilikni to'xtata olmadi, ammo qo'zg'olonchilar jurxenlarning talon-taroj qilinishiga g'azablanishlari bilan, tajribasiz Song sudiga sadoqat tuyg'usidan kelib chiqdilar.[56] Shimoliy Xitoy bo'ylab tarqalgan shaharlarda joylashgan bir qancha Qo'shiq qo'mondonlari Qo'shiqqa sodiqligini saqlab qolishdi va qurolli ko'ngillilar uyushtirishdi. militsiyalar Yurxen harbiylarining mavjudligiga qarshi. Qo'zg'olon Jinlarning shimol ustidan nazoratni amalga oshirish qobiliyatiga to'sqinlik qildi.[59]

    Ayni paytda, Song shahzodalaridan biri Chjao Gou asirdan qochib qutulgan edi.[60] U hibsga olingan edi Cizhou diplomatik missiyada bo'lganida va uni hech qachon Kayfengga qaytarib bermagan. Shahar yurxenlar qo'liga o'tganida u poytaxtda bo'lmagan.[61] Kelajak Imperator Gaozong Yurxen qo'shinlarini Xebey bo'ylab sayohat qilib, bir viloyatdan ikkinchi viloyatiga o'tish orqali uni dumidan qochishga muvaffaq bo'ldi, Xenan va Shandun. Yurxenlar uni Kayfengga qaytarib olishga urinishdi, u erda uni qo'lga olish mumkin edi, ammo bu muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi.[62] Zhao Gou nihoyat Yingtianfudagi Song Janubiy poytaxtiga etib keldi (應 天府; zamonaviy Shangqiu ) 1127 yil iyun boshida.[61] Gaozong (mil. 1127–1162) uchun Yingtianfu vaqtinchalik poytaxtlar qatorida birinchi bo'lib xtszay 行在.[63] Tarixiy ahamiyati tufayli sud Yingtianfuga ko'chib o'tdi Qo'shiq imperatori Taizu, ilgari o'sha shaharda harbiy gubernator bo'lib ishlagan sulola asoschisi. Shaharning ramziy ma'nosi 12 iyun kuni u erda taxtga o'tirgan yangi imperatorning siyosiy qonuniyligini ta'minlashga qaratilgan edi.[64]

    Zang Bangchang deyarli bir oy hukmronlik qilgandan so'ng, Song tomonidan Buyuk Chu imperatori lavozimidan ketishga va Song imperatorlik chizig'ining qonuniyligini tan olishga ishontirildi.[61] Li Gang Gaozongga Jangni Songga xiyonat qilgani uchun qatl etilishini tazyiq qildi.[65] Imperator tavba qildi va Chjan o'z joniga qasd qilishga majbur bo'ldi.[58] Chjanning o'ldirilishi Songning Jinni qo'zg'atishga tayyorligini va Jin hali yangi bosib olingan hududlar ustidan o'z nazoratini kuchaytirmaganligini ko'rsatdi.[66] Chuga bo'ysunish va bekor qilish Kaifeng endi Song nazoratida bo'lganligini anglatardi. Zong Ze (宗澤; Kaifengni mustahkamlash uchun mas'ul bo'lgan Song Song general, Gaozongdan sudni shaharga qaytarishni iltimos qildi, ammo Gaozong rad etdi va janubga chekindi.[67] Janub tomon siljish Shimoliy qo'shiqning oxiri va Xitoy tarixining Janubiy qo'shiq davri boshlanishiga olib keldi.[1]

    Ning avlodi Konfutsiy da Qufu, Dyuk Yansheng Kong Duanyou qo'shiq imperatori bilan janubga, Quzhou shahriga, yangi tashkil etilgan paytda qochib ketdi Szinlar sulolasi (1115–1234) shimolda Kong Duanyou ukasi Kong Duancao etib tayinlandi, u Qufuda Dyuk Yansheng sifatida qoldi.[68] Chjan Xuan 張 選, nabirasi Chjan Zay, shuningdek, Gaozong bilan janubga qochib ketgan.

    Janubga siljish

    Jin va Janubiy qo'shiq xaritasi
    Janubiy qo'shiq (pushti) va Jin (sariq)
    Jurchen istilosidan oldin va keyin Song sulolasi

    Buyuk Chu qo'shig'ining tarqatib yuborilishi va Chjan Bangchangning qatl etilishi yurxenlarga zid bo'lgan va ikki tomon muzokara qilgan shartnomani buzgan. Jinlar Songga qarshi hujumlarini qayta tikladilar va tezda shimoliy Xitoyning ko'p qismini qaytarib olishdi.[65] 1127 yil oxirida Gaozong o'z sudini Yingtianfudan janub tomonga ko'chirdi Yangzhou, ning janubida Xuay daryosi va shimoliy Yangtsi daryosi, pastga suzib Katta kanal.[69] Sud shaharda bir yildan ko'proq vaqt o'tkazdi.[70] Yurxenlar Xuay daryosiga borganlarida, sud qisman evakuatsiya qilingan Xanchjou 1129 yilda.[67] Bir necha kundan so'ng, Gaozong ozgina yurib, Yurxen avangard qo'shinlaridan bir necha soat oldinda qochib qutuldi.[70] Keyin to'ntarish Xanchjouda uni deyarli taxtdan tushirgan, 1129 yil may oyida u o'z poytaxtini yana shimolga o'tib, Tsziankangga ko'chirgan (zamonaviy Nankin ) Yangtszening janubiy sohilida.[71] Bir oy o'tgach, Zong Ze o'rnini egalladi Du Chong (杜 充) kuchlarini Kayfendan bo'shatib, Jiankangni hujumga duchor qildi. Imperator sentyabr oyida yana Xanchjouga ko'chib o'tdi va Tsziankangni Du Chong qo'liga topshirdi.[72] Jin oxir-oqibat Kayfengni 1130 yil boshida qo'lga oldi.[73]

    1127 yildan 1129 yilgacha Song Songga o'n uchta elchixonasini tinchlik shartlarini muhokama qilish va Gaozongning onasi va Xuyzongni ozod qilish bo'yicha muzokaralar olib borish uchun yuborgan, ammo Jin sudi ularni e'tiborsiz qoldirgan.[74] 1129 yil dekabrda Jin yangi harbiy hujumni boshladi, sharq va g'arbda Xuay daryosi bo'ylab ikkita qo'shinni jo'natdi. G'arbiy frontda qo'shin bostirib kirdi Tszansi, Qo'shiq bo'lgan maydon imperator imperator yashab, Xongchjouni qo'lga kiritdi (洪州, Bugungi kun Nanchang ).[72] Bir necha oydan keyin sharqiy qo'shin chekingach, ularga chekinishga buyruq berildi.[73]

    Ayni paytda, sharqiy frontda, Vuju asosiy Jin qo'shiniga qo'mondonlik qildi. U Tszyankangning janubi-g'arbidagi Yangtszeydan o'tib, Du Chong taslim bo'lganda o'sha shaharni egallab oldi.[72] Vuju Tsziankangdan yo'l oldi va Gaozongni qo'lga kiritishga harakat qilish uchun tez yurdi.[75] Jinlar Xanchjouni (1130 yil 22-yanvar) va undan keyin egallab olishdi Shaoxing yanada janubda (4 fevral), lekin umumiy Chjan Jun (1086–1154) yaqinidagi Vuju bilan jang Ningbo Gaozongga qochish uchun vaqt berdi.[76] Vuju ta'qib qilishni davom ettirganda, Song sudi kemalarda qochib ketayotgan edi orollar sohillari yaqinida Chjetszyan, keyin esa janubga qarab Wenzhou.[75] Jin Gaosongni ta'qib qilish uchun kemalarni yubordi, ammo uni ushlay olmadi. Ular ta'qibdan voz kechishdi va yurxenlar shimolga chekinishdi.[76] Ular himoyalanmagan Xanchjou va Suzhou, nihoyat ular boshchiligidagi Song qo'shinlarining qarshiliklariga duch kelishdi Yue Fey va Xan Shizhon.[76] Ikkinchisi hatto etkazilgan Yurxen kuchlariga katta mag'lubiyat va Vuju Yangtszening shimoliy qirg'og'iga o'tishiga yo'l qo'ymaslikka harakat qildi. Jin armiyasining kichik qayiqlari Xan Shizhon dengiz kemalari parkidan ustun keldi. Nihoyat Vuju daryodan o'tishga muvaffaq bo'ldi, chunki uning qo'shinlari Xanning kemalarini yelkanlarini yoqib zararsizlantirish uchun qo'zg'atuvchi o'qlarni ishlatishdi. Vuju qo'shinlari Yangtszening janubida oxirgi marta Tsziankangga qaytib kelib, uni talon-taroj qildilar va shimol tomon yo'l oldilar. Shunga qaramay Jin Tsin Song flotining kuchi bilan hibsga olingan edi va Vuju hech qachon Yangtsi daryosidan o'tishga intilmadi.[76] 1131 yil boshida Xuay va Yantszey o'rtasidagi Jin qo'shinlari Songga sodiq qaroqchilar tomonidan qaytarib berildi. Chjan Rong (張榮), qaroqchilar etakchisiga Jinga qarshi g'alaba uchun hukumat lavozimi berildi.[73]

    Gaozongni deyarli qo'lga kiritgan Jin hujumidan so'ng, suveren buyruq beruvchi tinchlantirish bo'yicha komissar Chjan Jun Mas'ul bo'lgan (1097–1164) Shensi va Sichuan uzoq g'arbda, sudga bosimni yumshatish uchun u erda Jinga hujum qilish. Chjan katta qo'shin yig'di, ammo Vuju yaqinida mag'lub bo'ldi Sian 1130 yil oxirlarida Vuju g'arbga qarab ilgarilab ketdi Gansu va Jyejjouga qadar janubga (階 州, zamonaviy Wudu ).[77] 1131 va 1132 yillarda Jin va Song o'rtasidagi eng muhim janglar Shensi, Gansu va Sichuan shaharlarida bo'lib o'tdi. Jin 1131 yilda Xeshang Yuanda ikkita jangda mag'lub bo'ldi. Sichuanga kira olmaganidan keyin Vuju Yanjinga chekindi. U 1132 yildan 1134 yilgacha yana g'arbiy frontga qaytib keldi. Jin hujum qildi Xubey 1132 yilda Shaanxi. Vuju Xesang Yuanni 1133 yilda egallab oldi, ammo uning oldinga ko'tarilishi Sianren dovonidagi mag'lubiyat bilan to'xtatildi. U Sichuanni qabul qilishdan voz kechdi va o'n yil davomida Jin va Song o'rtasida boshqa jiddiy janglar bo'lmagan.[77]

    Song sudi 1133 yilda Xanchjouga qaytib keldi va shahar Lin'an deb o'zgartirildi.[78] O'sha yili imperatorlik ajdodlari ibodatxonasi Lin'anda qurilgan edi, bu sud amalda rasmiy e'lon qilmasdan Lin'anni Song Song poytaxti sifatida o'rnatganligining belgisi.[79] Bunga vaqtinchalik poytaxt sifatida qarashgan.[80] 1130 va 1137 yillar oralig'ida sud vaqti-vaqti bilan Tsziankangga va Lin'anga qaytadi. Jiankangni yangi poytaxtga aylantirish bo'yicha takliflar bo'lgan, ammo sud uni xavfsizroq shahar deb hisoblaganligi sababli Lin'an g'alaba qozongan.[81] Lin'anni o'rab turgan tabiiy to'siqlar, shu jumladan ko'llar va guruchzorlar, yurxen otliqlariga uning istehkomlarini buzishni qiyinlashtirdi.[82] Dengizga kirish shahardan chekinishni osonlashtirdi.[83] 1138 yilda Gaozong rasmiy ravishda Lin'anni sulola poytaxti deb e'lon qildi, ammo vaqtinchalik kapital yorlig'i hanuzgacha o'z joyida bo'ladi.[84] Lin'an keyingi 150 yil ichida Janubiy Songning poytaxti bo'lib qoladi va yirik savdo va madaniy markazga aylanadi.[85]

    Da Qi Songni bosib oladi

    Qin Xuy, Song sudining amaldori, mojaroni tinch yo'l bilan hal qilishni 1130 yilda tavsiya qilib, "Agar boshqa nizolar bo'lmasligi ma'qul bo'lsa osmon ostida, janubliklar janubda va shimolliklar shimolda qolishlari kerak. "[86] O'zini shimoliy deb hisoblagan Gaozong dastlab bu taklifni rad etdi. 1132 yilda Jin qamoqdagi Song diplomatini ozod qilganida va 1133 yilda Song Jin vassaliga aylanishni taklif qilganida tinchlik tomon imo-ishoralar bo'lgan, ammo bu shartnoma hech qachon amalga oshmagan.[87] Jinlarning ikkala davlat o'rtasidagi chegarani Xuay daryosidan janubga Yangtszeyga ko'chirishni talab qilishi, tomonlar kelishuvga erishish uchun juda katta to'siq edi.[88]

    Xitoyning shimolida jinlarga qarshi kuchlarning davom etayotgan isyoni Yantszening janubidagi yurxanlar yurishlariga to'sqinlik qildi. Urush davom etishiga yo'l qo'yishni istamagan Jin yaratishga qaror qildi Da Qi ("Buyuk Qi"), ularning Shimoliy Xitoydagi qo'g'irchoqlar davlatiga bo'lgan ikkinchi urinishlari.[59] Yurxenlar nomidan xitoylik kelib chiqishi xitoylik bo'lgan biron kishi tomonidan boshqariladigan ushbu davlat isyonchilarning norozi a'zolari sadoqatini jalb qila olishiga ishonishgan. Yurxenlar ham malakali ishchi kuchi etishmasligidan aziyat chekishdi va butun Shimoliy Xitoyni nazorat qilish ma'muriy jihatdan amalga oshirilmadi.[59] 1129 yilning so'nggi oylarida, Liu Yu (劉豫; 1073–1143) Tszin imperatori Taysongning foydasiga sazovor bo'ldi.[59] Lyu Xebeydan kelgan prefekt bo'lgan Song mansabdor shaxsi edi Jinan 1128 yilda Jinga o'tishdan oldin Shandongda.[59] Da Qi 1130 yil oxirida tashkil topgan va Tszin Lyu imperatori sifatida taxtga o'tirgan.[73] Zarar Xebeyda Qi Shimoliy Songning sobiq poytaxti Kayfengga ko'chib o'tishdan oldin birinchi poytaxti bo'lgan.[89] Qi hukumati harbiylarni o'rnatdi muddatli harbiy xizmatga chaqirish, byurokratiyani isloh qilishga urinib ko'rdi va yuqori soliqlarni yig'ishni majburlovchi qonunlarni chiqardi.[45] Shuningdek, u yaratilganidan keyingi etti yil ichida Song bilan kurashgan qo'shinlarning katta qismini etkazib berish uchun javobgardir.[74]

    Jinni to'xtatgan generallar tasvirlangan Janubiy qo'shiq surati janubiy Xitoyga yurish. Yue Fey (1103–1142) chapdan ikkinchi, general Chjan Jun (1086–1154) to'rtinchi va Xan Shizhon (1089–1151) beshinchi.

    Jin Tsining birinchi qo'g'irchoq hukumatiga qaraganda Tsiga ko'proq avtonomiya berdi, ammo Lyu Yu yurxen generallarining buyrug'iga bo'ysunishga majbur edi.[74] Tsinning ko'magi bilan Da Qi 1133 yil noyabrda Qo'shiqqa bostirib kirdi. Tsiyga qo'shilgan qo'shiq burilish mashinasi Li Cheng kampaniyani olib bordi. Syangyan va yaqin atrofdagi prefekturalar uning armiyasiga o'tdi. Syanyanning qo'lga olinishi Xan daryosi Yurxenlarga Yantszi daryosining markaziy vodiysiga o'tish joyini berdi.[88] Ularning janubga tomon surilishi general Yue Fey tomonidan to'xtatildi.[45] 1134 yilda Yue Fei Li ni mag'lubiyatga uchratdi va Syanyan va uning atrofidagi prefekturalarni qayta tikladi. Biroq, o'sha yilning oxirida Qi va Jin Xuay daryosi bo'ylab sharqqa yangi hujumni boshlashdi. Gaozong birinchi marta Da Tsini rasman qoralagan farmon chiqardi.[88] Tsi va Djin qo'shinlari Xuay vodiysida bir qator g'alabalarni qo'lga kiritdilar, ammo Yangzhou yaqinidagi Xan Shizhong va Lyujouda Yue Fey (廬州, zamonaviy Xefey ).[90] 1135 yilda Jin imperatori Taizongning o'limiga javoban ularning to'satdan chiqib ketishlari Songga qayta guruhlanish uchun vaqt berdi.[90] Urush 1136 yil oxirida Da Tsi hujum qilganida boshlandi Xuaynan davrlar Qo'shiq. Qi Outangdagi jangda mag'lub bo'ldi (藕塘), zamonaviy Anxuiy boshchiligidagi Song qo'shiniga qarshi Yang Qizhong (楊 沂 中; 1102–1166). G'alaba Songning ruhiyatini ko'tardi va harbiy komissar Chjan Jun (1097–1164) Gaozongni qarshi hujum rejalarini boshlashga ishontirdi. Gaozong birinchi bo'lib rozi bo'ldi, ammo u Li Tsiong ismli ofitserga qarshi hujumni tark etdi (酈 瓊) o'zining yuqori lavozimli amaldorini o'ldirdi va o'n minglab askarlar bilan Jin tomonga o'tdi.[91] Ayni paytda, Imperator Xizong (1135–1150 yy.) Tszin taxtini Tayzongdan meros qilib oldi va tinchlikka intildi.[92] U va uning generallari Lyu Yuning harbiy muvaffaqiyatsizliklaridan hafsalasi pir bo'lgan va Lyu Yue Fey bilan yashirincha fitna uyushtirgan deb hisoblashgan.[92] 1137 yil oxirida Jinlar Liu Yu ning knyazlik unvonini pasaytirdi va Tsi davlatini bekor qildi.[45] Jin va Song tinchlik yo'lidagi muzokaralarni yangilashdi.[92]

    Qo'shiq qarshi hujum va tinchlik jarayoni

    Gaozong 1138 yilda Tsin Xuini lavozimiga ko'targan va uni Jin bilan muhokama qilish uchun mas'ul qilgan.[92] Yue Fei, Xan Shizhong va sudning ko'plab rasmiylari tinchlik yo'llarini tanqid qildilar.[93] Uning boshqaruvi yordam beradi Tsenzura, Qin dushmanlarini tozalab, muzokaralarni davom ettirdi. In 1138 the Jin and Song agreed to a treaty that designated the Yellow River as border between the two states and recognized Gaozong as a "subject" of the Jin. But because there remained opposition to the treaty in both the courts of the Jin and Song, the treaty never came into effect.[94] A Jurchen army led by Vuju invaded in early 1140.[94] The Song counteroffensive that followed achieved large territorial gains.[95] Song general Lyu Tsi (劉錡) won a battle against Wuzhu at Shunchang (modern Fuyang in Anhui).[94] Yue Fei was assigned to head the Song forces defending the Huainan region. Instead of advancing to Huainan, however, Wuzhu retreated to Kaifeng and Yue's army followed him into Jin territory, disobeying an order by Gaozong that forbade Yue from going on the offensive. Yue captured Chjenchjou and sent soldiers across the Sariq daryo to stir up a peasant rebellion against the Jin. On July 8, 1140, at the Yancheng jangi, Wuzhu launched a surprise attack on Song forces with an army of 100,000 infantry and 15,000 horsemen. Yue Fei directed his cavalry to attack the Jurchen soldiers and won a decisive victory. He continued on to Henan, where he recaptured Zhengzhou and Luoyang. Later in 1140, Yue was forced to withdraw after the emperor ordered him to return to the Song court.[96]

    Yue Feyning devor qog'ozi Song va Jin qo'shinlari o'rtasidagi jangda
    Mural Yozgi saroy of Yue Fei, a general who led his forces against the Jin dynasty

    Emperor Gaozong supported settling a peace treaty with the Jurchens and sought to rein in the assertiveness of the military. The military expeditions of Yue Fei and other generals were an obstacle to peace negotiations.[97] The government weakened the military by rewarding Yue Fei, Han Shizhong, and Zhang Jun (1086–1154) with titles that relieved them of their command over the Song armies.[94] Han Shizhong, a critic of the treaty, retired.[98] Yue Fei also announced his resignation as an act of protest.[97] In 1141 Qin Hui had him imprisoned for insubordination. Charged with treason, Yue Fei was poisoned in jail on Qin's orders in early 1142. Jurchen diplomatic pressure during the peace talks may have played a role, but Qin Hui's alleged collusion with the Jin has never been proven.[99]

    After his execution, Yue Fei's reputation for defending the Southern Song grew to that of a national folk hero.[100] Qin Hui was denigrated by later historians, who accused him of betraying the Song.[101] The real Yue Fei differed from the later myths based on his exploits.[102] Contrary to traditional legends, Yue was only one of many generals who fought against the Jin in northern China.[103] Traditional accounts have also blamed Gaozong for Yue Fei's execution and submitting to the Jin.[104] Qin Hui, in a reply to Gaozong's gratitude for the success of the peace negotiations, told the emperor that "the decision to make peace was entirely Your Majesty's. Your servant only carried it out; what achievement was there in this for me?"[105]

    Shaoxing shartnomasi

    Imperator Gaozongning portreti
    Emperor Gaozong supported negotiating a peace treaty with the Jurchens, the Shaoxing shartnomasi, ratified on October 11, 1142

    On October 11, 1142, after about a year of negotiations, the Shaoxing shartnomasi was ratified, ending the conflict between the Jin and the Song.[106] By the terms of the treaty, the Xuay daryosi, north of the Yangtze, was designated as the boundary between the two states. The Song agreed to pay a yearly tribute of 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 packs of silk to the Jin.[107]

    The treaty reduced the Southern Song Dynasty status to that of a Jin vassal. The document designated the Song as the "insignificant state", while the Jin was recognized as the "superior state". The text of the treaty has not survived in Chinese records, a clear sign of its humiliating reputation. The contents of the agreement were recovered from a Jurchen biography. Once the treaty had been settled, the Jurchens retreated north and trade resumed between the two empires.[108] The peace ensured by the Shaoxing shartnomasi lasted for the next 70 years, but was interrupted twice. One military campaign was initiated by the Song and the other by the Jin.[109]

    Keyingi kampaniyalar

    Wanyan Liang's war

    Vanyan Liang led a coup against Emperor Xizong and became fourth emperor of the Jin dynasty in 1150.[110] Wanyan Liang presented himself as a Chinese emperor, and planned to unite China by conquering the Song. In 1158, Wanyan Liang provided a casus belli by announcing that the Song had broken the 1142 peace treaty by acquiring horses.[111] He instituted an unpopular draft that was the source of widespread unrest in the empire. Anti-Jin revolts erupted among the Khitans and in Jin provinces bordering the Song. Wanyan Liang did not allow dissent, and opposition to the war was severely punished.[112] The Song had been notified beforehand of Wanyan Liang's plan. They prepared by securing their defenses along the border, mainly near the Yangtze River, but were hampered by Emperor Gaozong's indecisiveness.[113] Gaozong's desire for peace made him averse to provoking the Jin.[114] Wanyan Liang began the invasion in 1161 without formally declaring war.[115] Jurchen armies personally led by Wanyan Liang left Kaifeng on October 15, reached the Huai River border on October 28, and marched in the direction of the Yangtze. The Song lost the Huai to the Jurchens but captured a few Jin prefectures in the west, slowing the Jurchen advance.[115] A group of Jurchen generals were sent to cross the Yangtze near the city of Caishi (south of Ma'anshan in modern Anhui) while Wanyan Liang established a base near Yangzhou.[116]

    Song dynasty river ship armed with a trebuchet catapult on its top deck, from the Vujing Zongyao

    Qo'shiq rasmiy Yu Yunven was in command of the army defending the river.[117] The Jurchen army was defeated while attacking Caishi between November 26 and 27 during the Kayshi jangi.[116] The belkurakli kemalar ning Song navy bilan qurollangan trebuxetlar u ishdan bo'shatildi porox bombs, overwhelmed the light ships of the Jin fleet.[118] Jin ships were unable to compete because they were smaller and hastily constructed.[117] The bombs launched by the Song contained mixtures of gunpowder, lime, scraps of iron, and a poison that was likely mishyak.[119] Traditional Chinese accounts consider this the turning point of the war, characterizing it as a military upset that secured southern China from the northern invaders. The significance of the battle is said to have rivaled a similarly revered victory at the Fey daryosi jangi IV asrda. Contemporaneous Song accounts claimed that the 18,000 Song soldiers commanded by Yu Yunwen and tasked with defending Caishi were able to defeat the invading Jurchen army of 400,000 soldiers. Modern historians are more skeptical and consider the Jurchen numbers an exaggeration. Song historians may have confused the number of Jurchen soldiers at the Battle of Caishi with the total number of soldiers under the command of Wanyan Liang. The conflict was not the one-sided battle that traditional accounts imply, and the Song had numerous advantages over the Jin. The Song fleet was larger than the Jin's, and the Jin were unable to use their greatest asset, cavalry, in a naval battle.[116]

    A modern analysis of the battlefield has shown that it was a minor battle, although the victory did boost Song morale. The Jin lost, but only suffered about 4,000 casualties and the battle was not fatal to the Jurchen war effort.[116] It was Wanyan Liang's poor relationships with the Jurchen generals, who despised him, that doomed the chances of a Jin victory. On December 15, Wanyan Liang was assassinated in his military camp by disaffected officers. Uning o'rnini egalladi Imperator Shizong (r. 1161–1189). Shizong was pressured into ending the unpopular war with the Song, and ordered the withdrawal of Jin forces in 1162.[120] Emperor Gaozong retired from the throne that same year. His mishandling of the war with Wanyan Liang was one of many reasons for his abdication.[121] Skirmishes between the Song and Jin continued along the border, but subsided in 1165 after the negotiation of a peace treaty. There were no major territorial changes. The treaty dictated that the Song still had to pay the annual indemnity, but the indemnity was renamed from "tribute", which had implied a subordinate relationship, to "payment".[122]

    Song revanchism

    Yurchen jangchisi kamon ko'tarib turibdi
    Jurchen warrior with a bow on an early 17th-century woodblock print

    The Jin were weakened by the pressure of the rising Mongols to the north, a series of floods culminating in a Yellow River flood in 1194 that devastated Hebei and Shandong in northern China, and the droughts and swarming locusts that plagued the south near the Huai.[123] The Song were informed of the Jurchen predicament by their ambassadors, who traveled twice a year to the Jin capital, and started provoking their northern neighbor. The hostilities were instigated by chancellor Xan Tuozhou.[124] Qo `shiq Imperator Ningzong (r. 1194–1224) took little interest in the war effort.[125] Under Han Tuozhou's supervision, preparations for the war proceeded gradually and cautiously.[126] The court venerated the irredentist hero Yue Fei and Han orchestrated the publishing of historical records that justified war with the Jin.[126] From 1204 onwards, Chinese armed groups raided Jurchen settlements.[124] Han Tuozhou was designated the head of national security in 1205. The Song funded insurgents in the north that professed loyalist sympathies.[126] These early clashes continued to escalate, partly abetted by revanchist Song officials, and war against the Jin was officially declared on June 14, 1206.[124] The document that announced the war claimed the Jin lost the Osmon mandati, a sign that they were unfit to rule, and called for an insurrection of Han Chinese against the Jin state.[127]

    Song armies led by general Bi Zaiyu (畢再遇; d. 1217) captured the barely defended border city of Sizhou 泗州 (on the north bank of the Huai River across from modern Xuyi okrugi ) but suffered large losses against the Jurchens in Hebei.[128] The Jin repelled the Song and moved south to besiege the Song town of Chuzhou 楚州 on the Grand Canal just south of the Huai River. Bi defended the town, and the Jurchens withdrew from the siege after three months.[129] By the fall of 1206, however, the Jurchens had captured multiple towns and military bases.[130] The Jin initiated an offensive against Song prefectures in the central front of the war, capturing Zaoyang and Guanghua (光化; ustida Xan daryosi zamonaviyga yaqin Laohekou ).[131] By the fall of 1206, the Song offensive had already failed disastrously.[132] Soldier morale sank as weather conditions worsened, supplies ran out, and hunger spread, forcing many to desert. The massive defections of Han Chinese in northern China that the Song had expected never materialized.[130]

    A notable betrayal did occur on the Song side, however: Vu Si (吳曦; d. 1207), the governor-general of Sichuan, defected to the Jin in December 1206.[130] The Song had depended on Wu's success in the west to divert Jin soldiers away from the eastern front.[133] He had attacked Jin positions earlier in 1206, but his army of about 50,000 men had been repelled.[134] Wu's defection could have meant the loss of the entire western front of the war, but Song loyalists assassinated Wu on March 29, 1207, before Jin troops could take control of the surrendered territories.[135] An Bing (安丙; d. 1221) was given Wu Xi's position, but the cohesion of Song forces in the west fell apart after Wu's demise and commanders turned on each other in the ensuing infighting.[136]

    Fighting continued in 1207, but by the end of that year the war was at a stalemate. The Song was now on the defensive, while the Jin failed to make gains in Song territory.[132] The failure of Han Tuozhou's aggressive policies led to his demise. On December 15, 1207, Han was beaten to death by the Imperial Palace Guards. His accomplice Su Shidan (蘇師旦) was executed, and other officials connected to Han were dismissed or exiled.[137] Since neither combatant was eager to continue the war, they returned to negotiations. A peace treaty was signed on November 2, 1208, and the Song tribute to the Jin was reinstated. The Song annual indemnity increased by 50,000 taels of silver and 50,000 packs of fabric.[138] The treaty also stipulated that the Song had to present to the Jin the head of Han Tuozhou, who the Jin held responsible for starting the war.[138] The heads of Han and Su were severed from their exhumed corpses, exhibited to the public, then delivered to the Jin.[139]

    Jin–Song war during the rise of the Mongols

    Jin otliqlari mo'g'ul otliqlariga qarshi kurash olib borishmoqda
    Battle between the Jin and Mongols in 1211, from the Jomiy al-tavorix

    The Mo'g'ullar, a nomadic confederation, had unified in the middle of the twelfth century. They and other steppe nomads occasionally raided the Jin empire from the northwest. The Jin shied away from punitive expeditions and was content with appeasement, similar to the practices of the Song.[109] The Mongols, formerly a Jin tributary, ended their Jurchen vassalage in 1210 and attacked the Jin in 1211.[140] In light of this event, the Song court debated ending tributary payments to the weakened Jin, but they again chose to avoid antagonizing the Jin.[141] They refused Western Xia's offers of allying against the Jin in 1214 and willingly complied when in 1215 the Jin rejected a request to lower the annual indemnity.[142] Meanwhile, in 1214, the Jin retreated from the besieged capital of Zhongdu to Kaifeng, which became the new capital of the dynasty.[143] As the Mongols expanded, the Jin suffered territorial losses and attacked the Song in 1217 to compensate for their shrinking territory.[144] Periodic Song raids against the Jin were the official justification for the war. Another likely motive was that the conquest of the Song would have given the Jin a place to escape should the Mongols succeed in taking control of the north.[145] Shi Miyuan (史彌遠; 1164–1233), the chancellor of Song Imperator Lizong (r. 1224–1264), was hesitant to fight the Jin and delayed the declaration of war for two months. Song generals were largely autonomous, allowing Shi to evade blame for their military blunders.[145] The Jin advanced across the border from the center and western fronts.[145] Jurchen military successes were limited, and the Jin faced repeated raids from the neighboring state of Western Xia.[144] In 1217, the Song generals Meng Zongzheng (孟宗政) and Hu Zaixing (扈再興) defeated the Jin and prevented them from capturing Zaoyang and Suizhou.[146]

    A second Jin campaign in late 1217 did marginally better than the first.[147] In the east, the Jin made little headway in the Huai River valley, but in the west they captured Xihezhou and Dasan Pass (大散關; modern Shaanxi) in late 1217.[148] The Jin tried to captured Suizhou in Jingxi South circuit again in 1218 and 1219, but failed.[149] A Song counteroffensive in early 1218 captured Sizhou and in 1219 the Jin cities of Dengjou va Tangzhou were pillaged twice by a Song army commanded by Zhao Fang (趙方; d. 1221).[150] In the west, command of the Song forces in Sichuan was given to An Bing, who had previously been dismissed from this position. He successfully defended the western front, but was unable to advance further because of local uprisings in the area.[151] The Jin tried to extort an indemnity from the Song but never received it.[144] In the last of the three campaigns, in early 1221, the Jin captured the city of Qizhou (蘄州; in Huainan West) deep in Song territory. Song armies led by Hu Zaixing and Li Quan (李全; d. 1231) defeated the Jin, who then withdrew.[152] In 1224 both sides agreed on a peace treaty that ended the annual tributes to the Jin. Diplomatic missions between the Jin and Song were also cut off.[153]

    Mongol–Song alliance

    Mongol–Song conquest of Jurchen Jin

    In February 1233, the Mongols took Kaifeng after a siege of more than 10 months and the Jin court retreated to the town of Kaychjou.[154] 1233 yilda Imperator Aizong (r. 1224–1234) of the Jin dispatched diplomats to implore the Song for supplies. Jin envoys reported to the Song that the Mongols would invade the Song after they were done with the Jin—a forecast that would later be proven true—but the Song ignored the warning and rebuffed the request.[155] They instead formed an alliance with the Mongols against the Jin.[154] The Song provided supplies to the Mongols in return for parts of Henan.[154] The Jin dynasty collapsed when Mongol and Song troops defeated the Jurchens da Kayzhou shahrini qamal qilish 1234 yilda.[156] Umumiy Meng Gong (孟珙) led the Song army against Caizhou.[154] The penultimate emperor of the Jin, Emperor Aizong, took his own life.[157] His short-lived successor, Emperor Mo, was killed in the town a few days later.[155] The Mongols later turned their sights towards the Song. After decades of war, the Song dynasty also yiqildi in 1279, when the remaining Song loyalists lost to the Mongols in a naval battle near Guandun.[158]

    Tarixiy ahamiyati

    Cultural and demographic changes

    Jurchen migrants from the northeastern reaches of Jin territory settled in the Jin-controlled lands of northern China. Constituting less than ten percent of the total population, the two to three million ruling Jurchens were a minority in a region that was still dominated by 30 million Han Chinese.[1] The southward expansion of the Jurchens caused the Jin to transition their decentralized government of semi-agrarian tribes to a bureaucratic Chinese-style dynasty.[109]

    Yurxen yozuvi bilan yozilgan medalyon
    A medallion with writing in the Yurxen yozuvi, one of the Jin empire's three working languages

    The Jin government initially promoted an independent Jurchen culture alongside their adoption of the centralized Chinese imperial bureaucracy, but the empire was gradually siniklangan vaqt o'tishi bilan. The Jurchens became fluent in the Chinese language, and the philosophy of Konfutsiylik was used to legitimize the ruling government.[1] Confucian state rituals were adopted during the reign of Emperor Xizong (1135–1150).[159] The Jin implemented imperatorlik imtihonlari ustida Konfutsiy klassiklari, first regionally and then for the entire empire.[160] The Classics and other works of Xitoy adabiyoti were translated into Jurchen and studied by Jin intellectuals, but very few Jurchens actively contributed to the classical literature of the Jin.[161] The Kidan yozuvi, dan Xitoy ssenariylar oilasi, formed the basis of a national writing system for the empire, the Yurxen yozuvi. All three scripts were ishlaydigan tillar hukumatning.[162] Jurchen clans adopted Chinese personal names with their Jurchen names.[163] Wanyan Liang (Prince of Hailing; r. 1150–1161) was an enthusiastic proponent of Jurchen sinicization and enacted policies to encourage it. Wanyan Liang had been acculturated by Song diplomats from childhood, and his emulation of Song practices earned him the Jurchen nickname of "aping the Chinese". U o'qidi Xitoy klassiklari, ichdi choy va o'ynadi Xitoy shaxmat dam olish uchun. Under his reign, the administrative core of the Jin state was moved south from Huining. He instated Pekin as the Jin main capital in 1153. Palaces were erected in Beijing and Kaifeng, while the original, more northerly residences of Jurchen chieftains were demolished.[164]

    The emperor's political reforms were connected with his desire to conquer all of China and to legitimize himself as a Chinese emperor.[111] The prospect of conquering southern China was cut short by Wanyan Liang's assassination.[120] Wanyan Liang's successor, Emperor Shizong, was less enthusiastic about sinicization and reversed several of Wanyan Liang's edicts. He sanctioned new policies with the intent to slow the assimilation of the Jurchens.[122] Shizong's prohibitions were abandoned by Imperator Zhangzong (r. 1189–1208), who promoted reforms that transformed the political structure of the dynasty closer to that of the Song and Tang dynasties.[165] Despite cultural and demographic changes, military hostilities between the Jin and the Song persisted until the fall of the Jin.[1]

    In the south, the retreat of the Song dynasty led to major demographic changes. The population of refugees from the north that resettled in Lin'an and Jiankang (modern Hangzhou and Nanjing) eventually grew greater than the population of original residents, whose numbers had dwindled from repeated Jurchen raids.[166] The government encouraged the resettlement of peasant migrants from the southern provinces of the Song to the underpopulated territories between the Yangtze and the Huai rivers.[166]

    The new capital Lin'an grew into a major commercial and cultural center. It rose from a middling city of no special importance to one of the world's largest and most prosperous. During his stay in Lin'an in the Yuan sulolasi (1260–1368), when the city was not as wealthy as it had been under the Song, Marko Polo remarked that "this city is greater than any in the world".[167] Once retaking northern China became less plausible and Lin'an grew into a significant trading city, the government buildings were extended and renovated to better befit its status as an imperial capital. The modestly sized imperial palace was expanded in 1133 with new roofed alleyways and in 1148 with an extension of the palace walls.[168]

    The loss of northern China, the cultural center of Chinese civilization, diminished the regional status of the Song dynasty. After the Jurchen conquest of the north, Koreya recognized the Jin, not the Song, as the legitimate dynasty of China. The Song's military failures reduced it to a subordinate of the Jin, turning it into a "China among equals".[169] The Song economy, however, recovered quickly after the move south. Government revenues earned from taxing foreign trade nearly doubled between the closing of the Northern Song era in 1127 and the final years of Gaozong's reign in the early 1160s.[170] The recovery was not uniform, and areas like Huainan and Hubei that had been directly affected by the war took decades to return to their pre-war levels.[171] In spite of multiple wars, the Jin remained one of the main trading partners of the Song. Song demand for foreign products like fur and horses went unabated. Tarixchi Shiba Yoshinobu (斯波義信, b. 1930) believes that Song commerce with the north was profitable enough that it compensated for the silver delivered annually as an indemnity to the Jin.[172]

    The Jin–Song Wars were one of several wars in northern China along with the Besh barbarning qo'zg'oloni, Lushan qo'zg'oloni, Xuang Chao Rebellion and the wars of the Besh sulola va o'n qirollik bu xan xitoylarining shimoliy Xitoydan janubiy Xitoyga 衣冠 南渡 (yì guān nán dù) deb nomlangan ommaviy ko'chishini keltirib chiqardi.[173][174][175][176][177][178][179][180][181] In 1126–1127 over half a million fled from northern China to southern China including Li Tszjao.[182][183] One section of the Confucius family led by Dyuk Yansheng Kong Duanyou moved south to Quzhou with Southern Song emperor Gaozong while his brother Kong Duancao remained behind in Qufu and became the Duke Yansheng for the Jin dynasty. Ning bir qismi Zengzi family also moved south with the Southern Song while the other part of the Zengzi family stayed in the north.

    However, there was also a reverse migration when the war was over of Han Chinese from the Southern Song towards Jin ruled northern China leading southern China's population to shrink and northern China's population to grow.[184]

    Porox urushi

    Yong'in nayzasi otish pelletlari
    The fire lance, an early firearm first recorded at the siege of De'an in 1132, shown in the Ming dynasty Huolongjing firing pellets as projectiles[185]

    The battles between the Song and the Jin spurred the invention and use of gunpowder weapons. There are reports that the yong'in nayzasi, eng qadimgi biri ancestors of the firearm, was used by the Song against the Jurchens besieging De'an (德安; zamonaviy Anlu in eastern Hubei) in 1132, during the Jin invasion of Hubei and Shaanxi.[186] The weapon consisted of a spear attached with a flamethrower capable of firing projectiles from a barrel constructed of bamboo or paper.[187] They were built by soldiers under the command of Chen Gui (陳規), who led the Song army defending De'an.[188] The fire lances with which Song soldiers were equipped at De'an were built for destroying the wooden qamal dvigatellari of the Jin and not for combat against the Jin infantry.[189] Song soldiers compensated for the limited range and mobility of the weapon by timing their attacks on the Jin siege engines, waiting until they were within range of the fire lances.[190] Later fire lances used metal barrels, fired projectiles farther and with greater force, and could be used against infantry.[187]

    The pili huoqiu bombs at Caishi contained mixtures of lime and gunpowder. Bu huoqiu is from the earlier Vujing Zongyao

    Early rudimentary bombs like the huopao fire bomb (火礮) va huopao (火砲) bombs propelled by trebuchet were also in use as incendiary weapons. The defending Song army used huopao (火礮) during the first Jin siege of Kaifeng in 1126.[191] On the opposing side, the Jin launched incendiary bombs from qamal minoralari down onto the city below.[192] In 1127, huopao (火礮) were employed by the Song troops defending De'an and by the Jin soldiers besieging the city. The government official Lin Zhiping (林之平) proposed to make incendiary bombs and arrows mandatory for all warships in the Song navy. At the battle of Caishi in 1161, Song ships fired pili huoqiu (霹靂火球) deb nomlangan pili huopao bombs (霹靂火砲), from trebuchets against the ships of the Jin fleet commanded by Wanyan Liang.[193] The gunpowder mixture of the bomb contained powdered Laym, which produced blinding smoke once the casing of the bomb shattered.[194] The Song also deployed incendiary weapons at the battle of Tangdao o'sha yil davomida.[195]

    Gunpowder was also applied to o'qlar in 1206 by a Song army stationed in Xiangyang. The arrows were most likely an incendiary weapon, but its function may also have resembled that of an early rocket.[196] At the Jin siege of Qizhou (蘄州) in 1221, the Jurchens fought the Song with gunpowder bombs and arrows. The Jin tiehuopao (鐵火砲, "iron huopao"), which had quyma temir casings, are the first known hard casing bombs. The bomb needed to be capable of detonating in order to penetrate the iron casing. The Song army had a large supply of incendiary bombs, but there are no reports of them having a weapon similar to the Jin's detonating bombs.[197] A participant in the siege recounted in the Xinsi Qi Qi Lu (辛巳泣蘄錄) that the Song army at Qizhou had an arsenal of 3000 huopao (火礮), 7000 incendiary gunpowder arrows for crossbows and 10000 for bows, as well as 20000 pidapao (皮大礮), probably leather bags filled with gunpowder.[197]

    Shuningdek qarang

    Adabiyotlar

    Iqtiboslar

    1. ^ a b v d e Holcombe 2011, p. 129.
    2. ^ Ebrey 2010 yil, p. 136.
    3. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 116.
    4. ^ Tillman, Xoyt Klivlend (1995). Tillman, Xoyt Klivlend; G'arbiy, Stiven H. (tahrir). Xitoy Jurxen hukmronligi ostida: Chinning intellektual va madaniy tarixiga oid insholar (tasvirlangan tahrir). SUNY Press. p. 27. ISBN  0791422739.
    5. ^ Ebrey, Patricia Buckley (2014). Imperator Huizong (rasmli, qayta nashr etilgan.). Garvard universiteti matbuoti. p. 468. ISBN  978-0674726420.
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    8. ^ Mote 1999 yil, pp. 64–65, 195, and 208.
    9. ^ a b v Levine 2009 yil, p. 628.
    10. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 208.
    11. ^ a b v Levine 2009 yil, p. 629.
    12. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 209.
    13. ^ Levine 2009 yil, pp. 628–630; Mote 1999 yil, p. 209.
    14. ^ a b Levine 2009 yil, p. 630.
    15. ^ Twitchett & Tietze 1994, p. 149.
    16. ^ a b v d Levine 2009 yil, p. 632.
    17. ^ Mote 1999 yil, pp. 209–210; Levine 2009 yil, p. 632.
    18. ^ Mote 1999 yil, 209-210 betlar.
    19. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 225; Levine 2009 yil, p. 632.
    20. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 633; Franke 1994 yil, p. 227; Tan 1982, pp. 10–11 (location).
    21. ^ a b v Levine 2009 yil, p. 633.
    22. ^ a b Levine 2009 yil, p. 634.
    23. ^ a b v d Mote 1999 yil, p. 196.
    24. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 210.
    25. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 196; Levine 2009 yil, p. 636.
    26. ^ a b Lorge 2005 yil, p. 52.
    27. ^ a b v d e Levine 2009 yil, p. 636.
    28. ^ Lorge 2005 yil; Levine 2009 yil, p. 636.
    29. ^ Franke va Twitchett 1994 yil, p. 39.
    30. ^ a b Levine 2009 yil, p. 637.
    31. ^ a b v d e Lorge 2005 yil, p. 53.
    32. ^ Lorge 2005 yil, 52-53 betlar.
    33. ^ a b Franke 1994 yil, p. 229.
    34. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 638.
    35. ^ Lorge 2005 yil, p. 53 (failed attack); Levine 2009 yil, p. 639 (officials).
    36. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 639.
    37. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 640; Franke 1994 yil, p. 229.
    38. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 640.
    39. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 641.
    40. ^ Levine 2009 yil, pp. 641–642.
    41. ^ Lorge 2005 yil, p. 53; Levine 2009 yil, p. 642.
    42. ^ Lorge 2005 yil, 53-54 betlar.
    43. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 229; Levine 2009 yil, p. 642.
    44. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 197.
    45. ^ a b v d Franke 1994 yil, p. 232.
    46. ^ Franke 1994 yil, 232–233 betlar.
    47. ^ a b Levine 2009 yil, p. 614.
    48. ^ Levine 2009 yil, 556-557 betlar.
    49. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 207.
    50. ^ Mote 1999 yil, 207–208 betlar.
    51. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 615.
    52. ^ Levine 2009 yil, p. 615; Mote 1999 yil, p. 208.
    53. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 208; Ropp 2010, p. 71.
    54. ^ Ropp 2010, p. 71.
    55. ^ Smit 1991 yil, p. 16.
    56. ^ a b v Lorge 2005 yil, p. 54.
    57. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 646.
    58. ^ a b Franke 1994 yil, 229-230 betlar.
    59. ^ a b v d e Franke 1994 yil, p. 230.
    60. ^ Lorge 2005 yil, p. 54; Gernet 1962 yil, p. 22.
    61. ^ a b v Tao 2009 yil, p. 647.
    62. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 291.
    63. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 230; Mote 1999 yil, p. 197.
    64. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 292.
    65. ^ a b Tao 2009 yil, p. 649.
    66. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 649 (willing to provoke); Franke 1994 yil, pp. 229–230 (Jin control not solidified).
    67. ^ a b Tao 2009 yil, p. 650.
    68. ^ Murray 2010 yil, p. 3; Uilson 1996 yil, 571-572 betlar.
    69. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 293; Tao 2009 yil, p. 650.
    70. ^ a b Mote 1999 yil, p. 293.
    71. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 652.
    72. ^ a b v Tao 2009 yil, p. 654.
    73. ^ a b v d Tao 2009 yil, p. 657.
    74. ^ a b v Tao 2009 yil, p. 658.
    75. ^ a b Mote 1999 yil, p. 298.
    76. ^ a b v d Tao 2009 yil, p. 655.
    77. ^ a b Tao 2009 yil, p. 660.
    78. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 298 (date of return to Hangzhou); Tao 2009 yil, p. 696 (renamed Lin'an).
    79. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 696.
    80. ^ Gernet 1962 yil, 23-25 ​​betlar.
    81. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 697.
    82. ^ Gernet 1962 yil, 22-23 betlar.
    83. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 661.
    84. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 662.
    85. ^ Mote 1999 yil, pp. 197 (150 years) and 461 (major Song city).
    86. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 673.
    87. ^ Tao 2009 yil, 673–674-betlar.
    88. ^ a b v Tao 2009 yil, p. 674.
    89. ^ Franke 1994 yil, 230-232 betlar.
    90. ^ a b Tao 2009 yil, p. 675.
    91. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 676.
    92. ^ a b v d Tao 2009 yil, p. 677.
    93. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 679.
    94. ^ a b v d Tao 2009 yil, p. 682.
    95. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 303.
    96. ^ Mote 1999 yil; Tong 2012.
    97. ^ a b Lorge 2005 yil, p. 56.
    98. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 684.
    99. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 303 (Jurchen pressure); Tao 2009 yil, p. 687 (collusion never proven).
    100. ^ Tao 2009 yil; Mote 1999 yil.
    101. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 686.
    102. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 299.
    103. ^ Mote 1999 yil, p. 301.
    104. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 687.
    105. ^ Tao 2009 yil, pp. 688–689.
    106. ^ Hymes 2000, p. 34.
    107. ^ Bekvit 2009 yil, p. 175.
    108. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 234.
    109. ^ a b v Franke 1994 yil, p. 235.
    110. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 239.
    111. ^ a b Franke 1994 yil, p. 240.
    112. ^ Franke 1994 yil, 240-241 betlar.
    113. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 241 (chegaralarni ta'minlash); Tao 2009 yil, p. 704 (noaniqlik).
    114. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 709.
    115. ^ a b Franke 1994 yil, p. 241.
    116. ^ a b v d Franke 1994 yil, p. 242.
    117. ^ a b Tao 2009 yil, p. 707.
    118. ^ Tao 2009 yil, p. 706; Needham 1987 yil, p. 166; Turnbull 2002 yil, p. 46.
    119. ^ Needham 1987 yil, p. 166; Turnbull 2002 yil, p. 46.
    120. ^ a b Franke 1994 yil, p. 243.
    121. ^ Tao 2009 yil, 708-709 betlar.
    122. ^ a b Franke 1994 yil, p. 244.
    123. ^ Franke 1994 yil, 245-247 betlar.
    124. ^ a b v Franke 1994 yil, p. 247.
    125. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 791.
    126. ^ a b v Devis 2009 yil, p. 793.
    127. ^ Franke 1994 yil, 247-248 betlar.
    128. ^ Franke 1994 yil; Devis 2009 yil.
    129. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 799.
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    131. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 796; Tan 1982 yil, 52-53 betlar.
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    133. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 796.
    134. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 800.
    135. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 248; Devis 2009 yil, p. 805.
    136. ^ Devis 2009 yil, 803-804-betlar.
    137. ^ Devis 2009 yil, 808-811-betlar.
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    139. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 812.
    140. ^ Franke 1994 yil, 251-252 betlar.
    141. ^ Devis 2009 yil, 819-821-betlar.
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    151. ^ Devis 2009 yil, 828–829-betlar.
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    153. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 261.
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    156. ^ Lorge 2005 yil, p. 73.
    157. ^ Devis 2009 yil, p. 858.
    158. ^ Hymes 2000, p. 36.
    159. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 306.
    160. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 271.
    161. ^ Franke 1994 yil, p. 310.
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