Soren Kierkegaard falsafasi - Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard - Wikipedia
Syoren Kierkegaard falsafasi rivojlanishiga katta ta'sir ko'rsatdi 20-asr falsafasi, ayniqsa ekzistensializm va postmodernizm. Syoren Kierkegaard ko'pchilik tomonidan "Ekzistensializmning otasi" deb nomlangan 19-asrdagi daniyalik faylasuf edi.[1]Biroq, bu sohada uni ekzistensialist deb belgilashda shubha bildiradiganlar bor. Uning falsafasi ham rivojlanishiga ta'sir ko'rsatdi ekzistensial psixologiya.[2]
Kierkegaard kabi falsafachilar tomonidan olib kelingan falsafiy tizimlarning jihatlarini tanqid qildi Jorj Vilgelm Fridrix Hegel uning oldida va daniyalikning oldida Hegelliklar. Unga falsafa ham bilvosita ta'sir ko'rsatgan Immanuil Kant.[3] U o'zini o'zi topgan falsafa modeli bilan o'lchadi Suqrot, bu o'z e'tiborini tushuntirish tizimlariga emas, balki uning mavjudligi masalasiga qaratishga qaratilgan.[4]
Kierkegaardning takrorlanadigan mavzularidan biri bu sub'ektivlikning ahamiyati, bu odamlar o'zlarining (ob'ektiv) haqiqatlar bilan aloqasi bilan bog'liq. Yilda Falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy asoslangan bo'lmagan xat yozish, u "sub'ektivlik haqiqat" va "haqiqat subyektivlik" deb ta'kidlaydi. Kierkegaard haqiqatan ham haqiqat faqat ob'ektiv faktlarni aniqlash bilan bog'liq emasligini aytadi. Ob'ektiv faktlar muhim bo'lsa-da, haqiqatning ikkinchi va hal qiluvchi elementi mavjud bo'lib, u o'zini o'zi ushbu faktlar bilan qanday bog'lashini o'z ichiga oladi. Axloqiy nuqtai nazardan qaraganda, qanday qilib harakat qilish har qanday haqiqatdan ham muhimroq ekan, haqiqatni ob'ektivlikdan ko'ra sub'ektivlikda topish kerak.[5]
Taxalluslar haqida eslatma
Kierkegaardning 1843 yildan 1846 yilgacha yozgan ko'plab asarlari taxallus bilan yozilgan. Taxallussiz Muallif sifatida mening ishimga nuqtai nazar, u taxallusli asarlar uning o'ziga xos bo'lmagan nuqtai nazardan yozilganligini tushuntirdi: Kierkegaardning o'zi diniy muallif bo'lgan bo'lsa, taxallusli mualliflar estetik yoki spekulyativ nuqtai nazardan yozgan. Buning istisnolaridan biri Iqlimga qarshi, taxallusli muallif yozilgandan keyin ishlab chiqilgan Ko'rish nuqtasi: Anti-Klimak - bu masihiylar nuqtai nazaridan juda ideal tarzda yozadigan diniy muallif, Kierkegaard uni o'ziga tegishli bo'lishini xohlamagan.[6]
Taxallusli mualliflar Kierkegaardga tegishli bo'lmagan nuqtai nazardan yozganliklari sababli, ushbu maqolada keltirilgan ba'zi falsafa Kierkegaardning o'z e'tiqodlarini aks ettirmasligi mumkin. Boshqa faylasuflar o'zlarining insholarida ularni muhokama qilish va tanqid qilish uchun o'z nuqtai nazarlarini keltirganidek, Kierkegaard ma'lum bir nuqtai nazarni chuqur o'rganish uchun taxalluslarni tayinlaydi, bu ba'zi holatlarda butun bir yoki ikkita kitobni, Kierkegaard yoki boshqa taxallusni tanqid qiladi pozitsiya. Masalan, muallif, Yoxannes Klimak nasroniy emas va u nasroniy bo'lmagan nuqtai nazardan bahs yuritadi. Iqlimga qarshi, ilgari aytib o'tganimizdek, yuqori darajadagi nasroniy va u dindor nasroniylar nuqtai nazaridan bahs yuritadi. Kierkegaard o'z e'tiqodlarini ushbu ikki muallif o'rtasida joylashtiradi.[6]
Keyinchalik Kierkegaardning 1846 yildan 1855 yilgacha bo'lgan falsafiy va diniy yozuvlarining aksariyati o'zi yozgan va muallifi bo'lgan va u bu asarlarga hech qanday taxallus bermagan. Keyinchalik, ushbu asarlar aksariyat olimlar tomonidan Kierkeardning o'z e'tiqodlarini aks ettirish uchun ko'rib chiqilgan.[7] Agar kerak bo'lsa, ushbu maqolada tegishli muallif, taxallus yoki yo'qligi haqida so'z boradi.
Uning falsafasidagi mavzular
Chet ellik
Chet ellik bu faylasuflarning atamasi turli xil hodisalarga, shu jumladan, jamiyatdan ajralib qolish va unga norozilik hissi bilan bog'liq; jamiyatda axloqiy buzilish mavjudligini his qilish; ijtimoiy institutlarning mustahkamligi oldida kuchsizlik hissi; keng ko'lamli va byurokratik ijtimoiy tashkilotlarning shaxssiz, insoniylashtirilmagan tabiati.[8] Kierkegaard begonalashtirish tushunchasini tan oladi va qabul qiladi, garchi u buni iboralar bilan ifodalasa va o'ziga xos o'ziga xos so'zlar bilan tushunsa ham. Kierkegaard uchun hozirgi zamon aks etuvchi asrdir - ob'ektivlikni va harakatni o'ylashni, harakatga emas, balki ideallarga lab bilan xizmat qilishni, amaldagi munozarani, haqiqat ustidan reklama va reklama va real dunyo haqidagi xayolni qadrlaydi. Kierkegaard uchun qadriyatlarning mazmuni hech qanday haqiqiy va qonuniy hokimiyat topilmasligi tufayli hayotdan olib tashlandi. Har qanday da'vo qilingan hokimiyatga, har qanday "so'zma-so'z" muqaddas kitobga yoki boshqa har qanday buyuk va doimiy ovozga tushib qolish o'rniga, o'zlarini anglaydigan odamlar mavjud bo'lgan noaniqlikka duch kelishlari kerak.
Insoniyat ma'nosini yo'qotdi, chunki haqiqat va haqiqatning qabul qilingan mezoni noaniq va sub'ektiv fikrdir - buni isbotlab bo'lmaydi mantiq, tarixiy tadqiqotlar yoki ilmiy tahlil. Odamlar hayotdagi tanlovni o'ylay olmaydilar, biz ularni yashashimiz kerak; va hatto hayotning o'zi rasmga kirgandan so'ng, biz ko'pincha o'ylaydigan tanlovlar boshqacha bo'lib qoladi. Kierkegaard uchun olim yoki tarixchi foydalanishi mumkin bo'lgan ob'ektivlik turi bu narsani e'tiborsiz qoldiradi - odamlar g'ayratli emas va sof ob'ektivlik orqali hayot mazmunini topa olmaydi. Buning o'rniga, ular buni ehtiros, xohish va axloqiy va diniy sadoqat orqali topadilar. Ushbu hodisalar ob'ektiv ravishda isbotlanmaydi - tashqi dunyoni tahlil qilishning har qanday shakli orqali ham bo'lmaydi; ular bir va tashqi dunyo o'rtasidagi to'g'ridan-to'g'ri munosabatlar orqali yuzaga keladi. Bu erda Kierkegaard tahlilga emas, balki munosabatlarga ahamiyat beradi. Ushbu munosabatlar ob'ektiv tekshiruvdan qochib, o'z hayotiga qarashning bir usuli hisoblanadi.
Kierkegaardning hozirgi zamonni tahlil qilishda Hegel va bilan to'liq mos kelmaydigan atamalardan foydalaniladi Marksning begonalashtirish nazariyasi. Biroq, Kierkegaard odamlarni Xudodan begonalashganligini anglatadi, chunki ular dunyoda juda ko'p yashaydilar. Shaxslar kerak ularning jonlarini qozonish dunyodan, chunki u aslida Xudoga tegishli. Kierkegaard tashqi janglarga qiziqish bildirmaydi Karl Marks qiladi. Uning tashvishi imon uchun ichki kurash haqida.
Keling, istak haqida va shu bilan azob-uqubatlar haqida ko'proq gaplashaylik. Azob-uqubatlarni muhokama qilish har doim ham foydali bo'lishi mumkin, agar u nafaqat qayg'uning o'zboshimchalikiga, balki iloji bo'lsa, qayg'u chekayotgan kishiga uning ko'nglini ko'tarish uchun murojaat qilsa. Azob chekayotgan odam o'zining azob-uqubatlarini tan olmaydigan yuzaki muhokamamizdan sabr qilmasligi uchun, azob-uqubat haqida to'g'ri o'ylash qonuniy va xushyoqarlikdir, shuning uchun u sabrsizlik bilan tasalli chekkasini chetga surib, ikki tomonlama fikrda mustahkamlanib qolmasligi uchun. Istalgan narsa amal va vazifaga aylanganda, hayotga istak bilan chiqish, albatta, bitta narsa; bu istakdan uzoq hayotga chiqish boshqa narsa.
Ibrohim ajdodlar uyidan ajnabiy millatga hijrat qilishni tark etishi kerak edi, u erda hech narsa unga sevgan narsasini eslatmasdi - haqiqatan ham, ba'zida hech kim unutishni istagan narsani yodga solmasligi taskin emas, lekin bu achinarli tasalli sog'inchga to'lgan odam. Shunday qilib, inson o'zi uchun hamma narsani o'z ichiga oladigan istakka ega bo'lishi mumkin, shuning uchun ajralish soatida, haj boshlanganda, xuddi qarama-qarshilikdan boshqa hech narsa eslatmaydigan chet elga hijrat qilayotgandek, yo'qotish bilan , u xohlagan narsadan; u go'yo u chet elga hijrat qilganday tuyulishi mumkin, hattoki o'sha uyda bo'lsa ham - xuddi begonalar singari istagini yo'qotib, istakni tark etish unga yanada qiyin va muhimroq bo'lib tuyuladi. uning hislarini tark etishdan ko'ra.
Ushbu istakdan tashqari, hatto u hali ham joydan ko'chib ketmasa ham, uning hayotidagi mashaqqatli yo'l befoyda azoblarga sarflangan bo'lishi mumkin, chunki biz azob chekayotganlar haqida emas, balki azob chekayotganlar haqida gapiryapmiz. boshqalarning manfaati uchun yaxshi ishning foydasi. Bu shunday bo'lishi shart edi - chet elga sayohat uzoq bo'lmagan; bir zumda u o'sha erda edi, o'sha g'alati mamlakatda azob chekayotganlar uchrashadi, lekin qayg'u chekishni to'xtatganlar ham, ko'z yoshlari abadiy o'chira olmaydiganlar ham emas, chunki qadimgi bag'ishlangan kitob sifatida juda sodda va harakatchan: "Qanday qilib agar siz yig'lamagan bo'lsangiz, keyingi dunyoda Xudo ko'z yoshlaringizni quritishi mumkinmi? " Ehtimol, boshqasi boshqacha yo'l bilan keladi, lekin o'sha joyga.
— Turli xil ruhlarda dalda beruvchi nutqlar, Hong 1993, 102-103 betlar
Albert Kamyu dunyoda begona bo'lish g'oyasi haqida yozgan, ammo Kierkeardning ma'nosini o'zgartirgan. A begona chunki Kamyu dunyoda yashaydigan, xristianlik tarzida yashashga majbur bo'lgan kishi edi, garchi u xristian bo'lishni xohlamasa ham. Ammo Kierkegaard nasroniylikni tark etgan dunyoda xristian bo'lishni xohlaydigan nasroniyni muhokama qilar edi. Kamyu va Kierkegaard ikkalasi ham xristianlik demokratiyasida bir xilda yomon qarashga ega edilar, bu erda hamma xristianlikda ijobiy ishtirok etishga majbur, chunki tanlov erkinligi etishmasligi mumkin va xristian bo'lmagan demokratiyada hech kimga xristianlikda faol ishtirok etishi mumkin emas. . Kierkegaard nasroniylik to'g'risida ovoz berishga qarshi edi, chunki uning uchun yagona hokimiyat Masih edi. Kamyu "ekzistensial munosabat falsafiy o'z joniga qasd qilish" deb nomlagan. U buni qanday qilib qo'ydi Sizif va boshqa asarlar haqidagi afsona:
Endi absurd umidning aksi ekanligi tan olindi, ko'rinib turibdiki, Chestov uchun ekzistensial fikr [[[Lev Shestov]], 1866-1938] absurdni taxmin qiladi, ammo uni faqat uni yo'q qilish uchun isbotlaydi. Fikrning bunday nozikligi sehrgarning hissiy hiyla-nayrangidir. Chestov boshqa bir joyda hozirgi axloq va aqlga qarshi o'z absurdligini qo'yganida, u buni haqiqat va qutqarish deb ataydi. Demak, ushbu ta'rifda asosan Chestov bergan bema'ni aprobatsiya mavjud. Leo Chestovda seziladigan narsa, ehtimol Kierkeardda bundan ham ko'proq bo'lishi mumkin. Ishonchim komilki, shunchalik qiyin bo'lgan yozuvchida aniq takliflarni bayon qilish qiyin. Ammo, aftidan qarama-qarshi bo'lgan yozuvlarga qaramay, taxalluslardan tashqari, hiyla-nayranglar va tabassumlar, oxir-oqibat paydo bo'lgan haqiqatning taqdimoti (qo'rqish bilan bir vaqtda) go'yo butun asar davomida sezilishi mumkin. ishlaydi: Kierkegaard ham xuddi shunday sakrashni amalga oshiradi. Kierkegaardning umidsizlikka tushish haqiqat emas, balki holat: gunohning o'zi. Gunoh Xudodan uzoqlashtiradigan narsadir. Inson ongining metafizik holati bo'lgan absurd Xudoga olib bormaydi. Ehtimol, agar men ushbu dahshatli bayonotga xavf tug'dirsam, bu tushuncha yanada aniqroq bo'ladi: bema'ni narsa Xudosiz gunohdir. Gap shundaki, bema'ni holatda yashash kerak. Men bu erda erkinlikni ekzistensial munosabatni falsafiy o'z joniga qasd qilish deb atayman. Ammo bu hukmni anglatmaydi. Bu fikr o'zini inkor etadigan va o'z inkorida o'zini chetlab o'tishga intiladigan harakatni ko'rsatishning qulay usuli. Chunki mavjud bo'lgan inkor ularning Xudosi. Aniqroq aytganda, bu xudo faqat inson aqlini inkor etish orqali saqlanib qoladi. (Yana tasdiqlashimga ijozat bering: bu erda Xudoning tasdig'i emas, aksincha ushbu tasdiqga olib keladigan mantiq so'raladi.)
— Albert Kamyu, Sizif haqidagi afsona va boshqa insholar p. 26–32 Amp kitoblar 1955 yil Alfred A Knopf
Kierkegaard buni shunday qildi Uchta tahrirlash nutqi 1843 va Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript (1846):
Ehtimollik va sheriklik va sherik aktsionerlar asosida ko'pchilik ovozini olish va Xudo bilan bo'lgan munosabatlar spekulyativ korxonaga aylanishi ob'ektiv bo'lish uchun birinchi qadamdir.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, Hong p. 66.
Ko'plab gunohlarni qoplaydigan sevgi, hech qachon aldanmaydi. Yurak ochko'zlik qilganda, bir ko'z bilan va etti ko'z bilan berib, nima evaziga nima olishini bilganida, odam osongina ko'plab gunohlarni ochib beradi. Ammo yurak muhabbatga to'lganida, ko'z hech qachon aldanmaydi; chunki muhabbat berganida, sovg'ani sinchkovlik bilan tekshirmaydi, balki uning ko'zi Rabbiyga qaraydi. Qachonki yurak hasadga to'lib ketgan bo'lsa, demak, ko'z toza holda ham nopoklikni chaqirishga qodir; Ammo muhabbat qalbda yashaganda, ko'z nopokning yaxshiliklarini tarbiyalashga qodir; ammo bu ko'z yomonlikni emas, balki poklikni ko'radi, uni sevadi va uni sevib rag'batlantiradi. Shubhasiz bu dunyoda o'z so'zlari bilan yaxshilikni yomonlikka aylantiradigan, yuqoridagi yovuzlikni yaxshilikka aylantiradigan kuch bor; bu kuch ko'plab gunohlarni qoplaydigan muhabbatdir, agar nafrat qalbda yashasa, gunoh insonning eshigi oldida yotadi va uning turli xil istaklari unda mavjud bo'ladi; Ammo muhabbat qalbda yashaganda, gunoh uzoqqa qochadi va u endi buni ko'rmaydi. Agar tortishuvlar, g'azab, g'azab, kelishmovchiliklar, guruhlar qalbni to'ldirsa, gunohning ko'p qirraliligini kashf qilish uchun odam uzoqqa borishi kerakmi yoki erkak bu narsalarni o'zidan tashqarida ishlab chiqarish uchun juda uzoq vaqt sevishi kerakmi! Ammo qalbda quvonch, tinchlik, sabr-toqat, yumshoqlik, ezgulik, imon, muloyimlik va mo''tadillik yashaganda, ajablanarli narsa shundaki, odam, hatto ko'plab gunohlar bilan o'ralgan bo'lsa ham, u musofir, musofir bo'lib qoladi. mamlakatning urf-odatlari haqida juda oz narsani tushunadi, hatto unga tushuntirilgan bo'lsa ham? Shunday ekan, bu gunohlarning ko'pligini qoplash emasmi?
— Uchta tahrirlash nutqi 1843, Swenson tarjimasi 1943 p. 69
Sevgi o'zini o'zi qidirmaydi. Sevgi o'ziniki izlamaydi, chunki sevgida meniki va seniki yo'q. Ammo "meniki" va "sizniki" faqatgina "o'z" ning o'ziga xos xususiyatidir; Shunday qilib, agar meniki va sizniki bo'lmasa, "o'ziniki" ham yo'q. Ammo umuman "o'zniki" yo'q bo'lsa, demak, o'ziniki izlash mumkin emas. Adolat, o'z navbatida o'zini o'zi talab qilgani singari, har kimga o'z-o'zini berishi bilan belgilanadi. Bu shuni anglatadiki, adolat o'z ishiga da'vogarlik qiladi, ajratadi va belgilaydi, har kim qonuniy ravishda o'zi nima deb atash mumkinligini belgilaydi, sudyalar va agar kimdir meniki va sizning o'rtangizda farq qilmaslikdan bosh tortsa, jazolaydi. Shaxs bu munozarali va shu bilan birga qonuniy huquqga ega bo'lgan meniki bilan xohlaganicha huquqiga ega; va agar u o'zini o'zi adolat yo'l qo'yadigan narsadan boshqa yo'l bilan izlasa, adolat uni tanbeh qiladigan narsaga ega emas va uni biron bir narsadan himoya qilishga haqqi yo'q. Kimdir o'zidan aldanib qolishi bilan yoki kimdir boshqasidan aldanishi bilanoq, adolat aralashadi, chunki bu har kim o'z huquqiga ega bo'lgan umumiy xavfsizlikni himoya qiladi, lekin ba'zida o'zgarish buziladi, a inqilob, urush, zilzila yoki shunga o'xshash dahshatli baxtsizlik va hamma narsa chalkashib ketgan. Adolat har bir inson uchun o'ziga tegishli bo'lgan narsani ta'minlash uchun behuda harakat qiladi; u meniki bilan siznikining farqini saqlab qololmaydi; chalkashlikda u muvozanatni saqlay olmaydi va shuning uchun tarozini tashlaydi - umidsizlikka uchraydi! Dahshatli tomosha! Shunday bo'lsa-da, ma'lum ma'noda sevmaslik, hatto eng baxtli tarzda bo'lsa ham, bir xil chalkashliklarni keltirib chiqarmaydimi? Ammo muhabbat, bu ham voqea, hammasidan buyuk, shu bilan birga eng baxtlidir. Sevgi bu o'zgarish, hammasidan ham hayratlanarli narsa, lekin eng kerakli narsa - aslida biz sevgi bilan ushlangan odam o'zgaradi yoki o'zgaradi deb juda yaxshi ma'noda aytamiz. Sevgi - bu inqilob, eng chuqur, ammo eng muborak!
— Sevgi asarlari, 1847, Hong 1995 bet 264-265
Abstraktsiya
Kierkegaardning ijtimoiy-siyosiy faoliyatida zamonaviylikni tanqid qilish elementi, Ikki asr, zikr qilingan pul - u kimni chaqiradi mavhumlik.[9][10] Abstraktlik - bu faqat o'zida haqiqatga ega bo'lgan narsadir ersatz haqiqat. Bu moddiy emas va faqat sun'iy kontekstda ma'noga ega, bu oxir-oqibat hiyla va aldamchi maqsadlarga xizmat qiladi. Bu "yo'q" bo'lgan fikrning bir qismidir beton haqiqat, na hozir va na kelajakda.
Pul qanday abstraktsiya? Pul, amalga oshirilgan ish bilan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aloqasi borligi haqida xayolotni beradi. Ya'ni, qilgan ishi shunchalik qimmat, shuncha pulga teng. Haqiqatda esa, amalga oshirilgan ish, kimning shaxs sifatida namoyon bo'lishidir; u kishining hayotdagi maqsadlarini va u bilan bog'liq ma'noni ifodalaydi. Shaxs sifatida, u bajaradigan ish, o'zgalar va dunyo bilan bo'lgan munosabatini tashqi amalga oshirishi kerak. Bu dunyoni o'zi va boshqalar uchun yaxshi joyga aylantirishning bir usuli. Ishni pul qiymatiga tushirishdan iborat bo'lgan narsa, odamning kundalik kurashlari konkret haqiqatini, uning shakli, shakli va ma'nosini berish bilan, mavhumlik bilan almashtirishdir. Kierkegaard "bugungi kunda yigit boshqasiga o'z imkoniyatlari yoki mahoratiga, go'zal qizning sevgisiga yoki uning shuhratiga hasad qilmaydi, yo'q, lekin u unga puliga hasad qiladi. Menga pul bering, yigit aytadi, men esa hammasi yaxshi. "[11] Ammo Kierkegaardning ta'kidlashicha, bu pulga bo'lgan e'tibor kambag'al va qashshoqlarga ruhiy in'omlarni inkor etishga olib keladi.
Yaxshilik qilishni va baham ko'rishni unutmang - Ibroniylarga 13.16 - Ammo dunyoviylik tomonidan xayrixohlik va xayrixohlik, saxovat va xayr-ehsonlar va sovg'alardagi sovg'alar haqida to'xtovsiz nutq deyarli shafqatsiz ekanligini unutmang. Eh, gazeta mualliflari va soliq yig'uvchilar va cherkov beadllari saxiylik haqida gapirishsin va sanab chiqinglar; lekin xristianlik asosan rahmdillik haqida gapirayotganini, xristianlik hech bo'lmaganda shafqatsizlikda aybdor bo'lishini hech qachon e'tibordan chetda qoldirmaylik, go'yo qashshoqlik va qashshoqlik nafaqat pulga muhtoj va hokazo, balki saxiy, xayrixoh bo'lishga qodir emas. , xayrixoh. Ammo odamlar saxiylik, xayrixohlik haqida cherkov-dunyoviy va dunyoviy-ruhoniylarga qarshi kurashadilar va mag'firat qiladilar-lekin xutbada ham rahm-shafqatni unutadilar. Va'z qilish haqiqatan ham faqat va faqat rahmdillik haqida bo'lishi kerak. Agar siz bu borada qanday qilib samarali gapirishni bilsangiz, unda saxovat o'zini o'zi kuzatib boradi va shunga yarasha shaxs o'zi bunga qodir. Ammo shuni yodda tutingki, agar biror kishi saxiylik haqida gapirib pul, pul va pul yig'gan bo'lsa, shuni yodda tutingki, rahm-shafqat haqida sukut saqlagan holda, u o'zi uchun yordamni taqdim etgan kambag'al va bechora odamga shafqatsiz munosabatda bo'ladi. boy saxiylikning pullari. Shuni yodda tutingki, agar qashshoqlik va qashshoqlik bizni ularning iltijolari bilan bezovta qilsa, biz ularga saxiylik ila yordam topishga qodirmiz. Muqaddas Yozuvda aytilganidek (1 Butrus 3: 7), biz qashshoqlik va qashshoqlikni "ibodatlarimizga xalaqit berishni" cheklasak, bu dahshatli bo'lar edi, chunki biz shafqatsizlarcha adolatsiz edik. rahm-shafqat ko'rsatishga qodir ekanliklarini aytmasdan qashshoqlik va qashshoqlik. Endi biz rahm-shafqat haqidagi ushbu nutqda ushbu nuqtaga rioya qilamiz va o'zimizni rahm-shafqatni tashqi sharoitlar bilan bog'liq bo'lgan narsalar bilan aralashtirishdan saqlaymiz, ya'ni bu kabi sevgida uning kuchi yo'q, ammo u haqiqatan ham o'z kuchida rahmdillikka ega. shubhasiz uning bag'rida yurak bor. Bundan kelib chiqadiki, odam qalbida yuragi bor, uning cho'ntagida pul bor, lekin birinchisi baribir muhimroq va rahm-shafqat masalasida hal qiluvchi ahamiyatga ega.
— Sevgi asarlari Hong 1995 bet 315-316
Quyida Kierkegaardning mavhumlik g'oyasiga oid uchta iqtibos keltirilgan bo'lib, ularni konkretlashtirish haqida o'ylamasdan o'ylab bo'lmaydi. U jahon tarixiy, umumiy, yakka individual, o'ziga xos xususiyatga o'tadi. Birinchisi estetdan, ikkinchisi esa etikistdan Yoxud va avvalgi barcha asarlarini tushuntirib bergan kitobdan uchinchisi; Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript.
Yuqorida ta'kidlab o'tilganidek, barchasi klassik ishlab chiqarishlar bir xil darajada baland turadi, chunki ularning har biri cheksiz baland turadi. Agar ushbu haqiqatga qaramay, klassik yurishga martabali tartibni kiritishga urinish bo'lsa, shubhasiz, bunday ajratish uchun asos sifatida muhim bo'lmagan narsani tanlash kerak bo'ladi; chunki agar asos muhim bo'lsa, farqning o'zi muhim farq bo'lib qoladi; shundan kelib chiqadiki, "klassik" so'zi umuman guruh uchun noto'g'ri predmet qilingan. Fikr qanchalik mavhum bo'lsa, ko'p sonli vakillik ehtimoli shunchalik kichik bo'ladi. Ammo qanday qilib bu g'oya aniq bo'ladi? Bilan singdirilib tarixiy ong. G'oya qanchalik aniq bo'lsa, ehtimollik shunchalik katta bo'ladi. Muhit qanchalik mavhum bo'lsa, ehtimollik shunchalik kichik bo'ladi; qanchalik aniq bo'lsa, shuncha katta bo'ladi. Ammo vositani til deb aytishdan tashqari, konkret deb aytish nimani anglatadi yoki tilga yaqinlikda ko'rinadi; chunki til barcha ommaviy axborot vositalarining eng aniqidir. Masalan, haykaltaroshlikda o'z ifodasini topgan g'oya butunlay mavhum bo'lib, tarixiylik bilan bog'liq emas; u orqali ifoda etilgan vosita ham mavhum, shuning uchun klassik asarlarning haykaltaroshlikni o'z ichiga olgan qismida faqat bir nechtasini o'z ichiga olish ehtimoli katta. Bu menda vaqt va tajribaning guvohligi bor. Agar men, aksincha, aniq g'oya va aniq vositani olsam, u holda boshqacha ko'rinadi. Gomer haqiqatan ham klassik shoir, lekin epik g'oya aniq g'oya bo'lgani uchun va vosita til bo'lgani uchun ham shunday bo'ladiki, eposni o'z ichiga olgan klassiklar bo'limida tasavvur qilish mumkin bo'lgan ko'plab eposlar mavjud bo'lib, ularning barchasi bir xil darajada klassik, chunki tarix doimo ta'minlab beradi. bizni yangi epik material bilan. Bunda ham menda tarix guvohligi va tajriba roziligi bor.
— Yoxud I qism, Swenson p. 49, 53
Bu erda ko'rib chiqilgan ikkita pozitsiyani axloqiy hayotiy qarashlarni amalga oshirishga urinishlar deb hisoblash mumkin. Muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lishining sababi shundaki, shaxs o'zini o'zi tanlab oldi yoki o'zini mavhum tanladi. Boshqacha qilib aytganda, shaxs o'zini tanlamagan axloqiy jihatdan. Shuning uchun u bilan hech qanday aloqasi yo'q dolzarblik va agar shunday bo'lsa, axloqiy hayot tarzini amalda qo'llash mumkin emas. Ammo o'zini axloqiy jihatdan tanlagan kishi o'ziga xos shaxs sifatida o'zini aniq tanlaydi va u ushbu konkretlikka erishadi, chunki bu tanlov xuddi shunday tavba, ratifikatsiya qiladigan tanlov. Ushbu o'ziga xos ijtimoiy muhit ta'sirida bo'lgan ushbu imkoniyatlarga, moyillikka, g'ayratlarga, ehtiroslarga ega bo'lgan shaxs, o'ziga xos mahsulotning o'ziga xos mahsuloti sifatida atrof-muhit. Ammo bularning barchasidan xabardor bo'lgach, u o'z zimmasiga oladi javobgarlik barchasi uchun. U bu narsani oladimi yoki yo'qmi, ikkilanmaydi, chunki agar u buni qilmasa, undan ham muhimroq narsa yo'qolishini biladi. Tanlash vaqtida u o'zini butunlay ajratib turadi, chunki u o'zining ijtimoiy muhitidan chiqib ketadi va shu bilan birga u o'zini muttasil davom ettiradi, chunki u o'zini mahsulot sifatida tanlaydi. Va bu tanlov erkinlikning shunday tanlovi, o'zini mahsulot sifatida tanlashda u o'zini o'zi ishlab chiqarishi mumkin deb aytsa ham bo'ladi. Tanlash vaqtida u tugash nuqtasida, chunki uning shaxsiyati o'zini to'ldiradi, va shu bilan birga u eng boshida, chunki u o'zini erkinligiga qarab tanlaydi.
— Yoxud II qism, Hong p. 251
Agar sof tafakkurda o'z-o'zidan aks ettirish va boshqalarni aks ettirishning zudlik bilan birligi va bu zudlik birligini bekor qilish haqida so'z yuritilsa, unda haqiqatan ham bevosita birlik elementlari o'rtasida biron narsa bo'lishi kerak. Bu nima? Ha, vaqt keldi. Ammo vaqtga toza fikrlash uchun joy ajratib bo'lmaydi. Xo'sh, bekor qilish va o'tish va yangi birlik nimani anglatadi? Agar biror narsa bo'lsa, aytilganlarning hammasi bekor qilinganligi sababli, uni har doim shunchaki namoyish qiladigan qilib o'ylash nimani anglatadi? Va odam shunday o'ylaydi, deb tan olmaslik, keyin doimiy ravishda uy tomlaridan ushbu sof fikrlashning ijobiy haqiqatini e'lon qilish nimani anglatadi? Mavjudlik tafakkurga va mavjudlikka qo'shilgani kabi, mavjud bo'lgan kishi tafakkur qiluvchi shaxs bo'lgani kabi, ikkita ommaviy axborot vositasi ham mavjud: mavhumlik muhiti va haqiqiylik muhiti. Ammo sof fikrlash hali uchinchi vosita, yaqinda ixtiro qilingan. Bu eng to'liq abstraktsiyadan keyin aytiladi. Sof fikrlash - nima deyishim kerak - mulohazakorlik bilan yoki o'ylamasdan bilmasdan, mavhumlik hali ham uni ajratib turadigan aloqaga aloqadorligini bilmayman. Mana shu sof fikrlashda har qanday shubha uchun dam olish mumkin; Bu erda abadiy ijobiy haqiqat va nima demoqchi bo'lsa, shuni aytadi. Bu shuni anglatadiki, sof fikrlash hayoldir. Agar Gegelian falsafasi barcha postulatlardan xoli bo'lsa, unda bitta aqldan ozgan postulat bilan erishgan: sof fikrlashning boshlanishi. Mavjud odam uchun mavjud bo'lgan narsa uning uchun eng yuqori qiziqish va uning mavjudligidagi qiziqishdir. Mavhumlik tilida qanday aktuallik mavjud emas. Haqiqiylik bu o'zaro bog'liqlik [mavjudlik o'rtasida] fikrlash va mavhumlikning faraziy birligida bo'lish. Abstraktsiya imkoniyat va dolzarblik bilan shug'ullanadi, ammo uning dolzarbligi haqidagi tushunchasi yolg'ondir, chunki vosita aktuallik emas, balki imkoniyatdir. Mavhumlikni faqat bekor qilish orqali mavhumlik anglashi mumkin, ammo uni bekor qilish uni imkoniyatga aylantirishdir. Abstraktlik ichida mavhumlik tilida aktuallik haqida aytilganlarning hammasi imkon doirasida aytiladi. Ya'ni, aktuallik tilida barcha mavhumlik mavhumlik va imkoniyat doirasidagi aktuallik bilan emas, balki imkoniyat sifatida aktuallik bilan bog'liq. Haqiqiylik, mavjudlik - bu trilogiyaning dialektik elementidir, uning boshi va oxiri mavjud bo'lgan odam uchun bo'lishi mumkin emas. qua mavjud dialektik element. Abstraktsiya trilogiyani birlashtiradi. Juda to'g'ri. Ammo buni qanday amalga oshiradi? Abstraktlik buni qiladigan narsa emasmi yoki bu abstraktning harakati emasmi? Ammo mavhum odam, oxir-oqibat, mavjud bo'lgan shaxsdir va mavjud shaxs sifatida u mavjud bo'lgan ekan, hech bo'lmaganda mutlaqo vositachilik qila olmaydi yoki birlashtira olmaydigan dialektik elementda bo'ladi. Agar u buni amalga oshirgan bo'lsa, demak, bu o'z-o'zidan mavjud bo'lish bilan bog'liqlik bilan bog'liq bo'lishi kerak. U qanday qilib bu borada borishini tushuntirishi kerak, ya'ni mavjud bo'lgan odam sifatida bu borada qanday harakat qilayotgani yoki u mavjud shaxs bo'lishni to'xtatadimi yoki mavjud bo'lgan kishi bunga haqli yoki yo'qligini tushuntirishi kerak. Bunday savollarni berishni boshlashimiz bilan, biz axloqiy savol beramiz va mavjud bo'lgan shaxsga nisbatan axloqiy da'voni qo'llab-quvvatlaymiz, bu uning mavjudlikdan mavhumlashi kerak, lekin u mavjud bo'lishi kerak, degani bo'lishi mumkin emas, bu ham mavjud bo'lgan odamning eng yuqori qiziqishi.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, 1-jild, 314–315-betlar, Hong tarjimasi
O'lim
O'lim muqarrar va vaqtincha oldindan aytib bo'lmaydi. Kierkegaard ishtiyoq bilan yashash uchun shaxslar chinakamiga va shu haqiqatning haqiqatini anglab etishlari kerak deb hisoblar edilar. Kierkegaard jamiyatni o'limni rad etishda ayblamoqda. Garchi odamlar atrofdagi o'limni ko'rib, hamma o'layotganini ob'ektiv haqiqat deb bilsalar ham, ozgina odamlar bir kun kelib vafot etishlarini, sub'ektiv va botiniy ravishda haqiqatan ham tushunadilar. Masalan, ichida Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, Kierkegaardning ta'kidlashicha, odamlar hech qachon: "Men sizning partiyangizda albatta qatnashaman, lekin tomning buzilishi va meni o'ldirishi mumkin bo'lgan holat uchun istisno qilishim kerak; chunki bunday holatda men u erda qatnay olmayman".[12] Kierkegaardning fikriga ko'ra, bu hazil. Ammo o'lim haqida o'ylashda jiddiylik ham bor. Kierkegaard o'lim haqida quyidagilarni aytdi Uchta ijobiy ma'ruza, 1844 yil:
Qaysi hayot yaxshi kurash bilan osonlikcha kurashishini hal qilmaymiz, ammo barchamiz birdammizki, har bir inson yaxshi kurashga qarshi kurashishi kerak, undan hech kim yopilmaydi, ammo bu shunchalik ulug'vorki, agar unga bir martagina berilsa o'tmishdagi avlod istisno sharoitda - ha, hasad va tushkunlik qanday ta'rif berishni biladi! Farq o'lim haqidagi fikr bilan bir xil. Inson tug'ilishi bilanoq u o'lishni boshlaydi. Ammo farq shundaki, o'lim haqidagi fikr tug'ilish bilan vujudga keladigan va ular uchun bolalikning osoyishtaligi va yoshlikning ko'tarilishida bo'lgan ba'zi odamlar bor; Holbuki, boshqalarda bu fikr mavjud bo'lmagan davr bor, yillar tugaguniga qadar, kuch va quvvat yillari, o'lim haqidagi fikr ularni yo'lida kutib olguncha. Endi, qaysi hayot osonroq bo'lganini kim hal qiladi, bu doimiy ravishda ma'lum bir zahirada yashaganlarning hayoti bo'ladimi, chunki o'lim haqidagi fikr ular uchun mavjud bo'lganmi yoki o'zlarini hayotga tashlab qo'yganlarning hayoti deyarli o'lim borligini unutdingizmi?
— O'n sakkizta ruhlantiruvchi nutq, Hong p. 280
Qo'rquv yoki tashvish
Kierkegaard muallifi uchun, Vigilius Haufniensis, tashvish /qo'rqish /angst (tarjima va kontekstga qarab) - bu qo'rquv. Haufniensis baland bino yoki jarlik chekkasida turgan odamning misolidan foydalanadi. Bu balandlikdan u hayotning barcha imkoniyatlarini ko'rishi mumkin. U o'zini o'zi tanlagan kuchga tashlagan taqdirda, u nima bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida o'ylaydi. U erda turar ekan, u hayotning chorrahasida turibdi, qaror qabul qila olmaydi va uning chegaralarida yashaydi. Biror narsa qilish imkoniyati va erkinligiga ega bo'lishning o'zi, hatto dahshatli imkoniyatlar ham ulkan qo'rquv tuyg'usini qo'zg'atadi. Haufniensis buni bizning "erkinlikning bosh aylanishi" deb atadi.
Xavotirni bosh aylanishi bilan taqqoslash mumkin. Ko'zi tasodifan esnayotgan narsaga qarasa tubsizlik bosh aylanadi Ammo buning sababi nimada? Bu xuddi uning ko'zida tubsiz tubida bo'lgani kabi, chunki u pastga qaramagan. Shuning uchun, tashvish ning bosh aylanishi erkinlik, bu ruh xohlagan paytda paydo bo'ladi pozit sintez va erkinlik o'z imkoniyatlarini ko'rib chiqadi, o'zini ta'minlash uchun cheklovni ushlab turadi. Erkinlik bosh aylanishiga bo'ysunadi. Bundan tashqari, psixologiya borolmaydi va ketmaydi. Aynan shu daqiqada hamma narsa o'zgaradi va erkinlik yana ko'tarilgach, uning aybdor ekanligini ko'radi. Ushbu ikki lahza orasida sakrash, buni hech bir fan tushuntirmagan va hech bir fan tushuntira olmaydi. Xavotirda aybdor bo'lgan kishi shunday bo'ladi noaniq mumkin bo'lganidek aybdor.
— Anksiyete tushunchasi, p. 61
Yilda Anksiyete tushunchasi, Haufniensis odam boshidan kechirgan birinchi xavotirga e'tibor qaratadi: Odam Xudoning taqiqlangan bilim daraxtidan eyishni tanlaysizmi yoki yo'qmi. Yaxshilik va yovuzlik tushunchalari Odam Atoning hozirgi nomini olgan mevani eyishdan oldin paydo bo'lmaganligi sababli asl gunoh, Odam Atoning yaxshilik va yomonlik tushunchasi yo'q edi va daraxtdan eyish yomonlik ekanligini bilmas edi. U bilgan narsa shundaki, Xudo unga daraxtdan ovqat yemaslikni buyurgan. Xavotirlik Xudoning taqiqlashining o'zi Odam Atoning ozodligini va u Xudoga itoat qilishni tanlay oladimi yoki yo'qmi degan ma'noni anglatadi. Odamato daraxtdan yeb bo'lgandan keyin gunoh tug'ildi. Shunday qilib, Kierkegaardning fikriga ko'ra, xavotir gunohdan oldinroq va Odam Atoni gunohga olib boradigan tashvish. Haufniensis tashvish irsiy gunoh uchun taxmindir, deb ta'kidlaydi.
Biroq, Xaufniensis tashvish insoniyat uchun ham qutulish usuli ekanligini ta'kidlaydi. Xavotir bizni tanlovimiz, o'zimizni anglashimiz va shaxsiy mas'uliyatimiz to'g'risida xabardor qiladi va bizni o'z-o'zini anglamaydigan zudlik holatidan o'zimizni anglash aksiga olib keladi. (Jan-Pol Sartr bu atamalarni prefleksiv ong va refleksiv ong deb ataydi.) Inson qo'rquv tajribasi orqali o'z imkoniyatlarini chinakam anglaydi. Shunday qilib, xavotir gunoh uchun ehtimol bo'lishi mumkin, lekin tashvish, shuningdek, shaxsning haqiqiy shaxsi va erkinligini tan olish yoki anglash bo'lishi mumkin.
Kim to'g'ri yo'l bilan tashvishlanishni o'rgangan bo'lsa, yakuniy natijani bilib oldi. … Xavotir erkinlikning imkoniyati, va faqat shu kabi xavotirlik imon orqali mutlaqo tarbiyalaydi, chunki u barcha cheklangan maqsadlarni iste'mol qiladi va ularning yolg'onchiligini topadi. Va yo'q Buyuk inkvizitor has such dreadful torments in readiness as anxiety has, and no secret agent knows as cunningly as anxiety to attack his suspect in his weakest moment or to make alluring the trap in which he will be caught, and no discerning judge understands how to interrogate and examine the accused as does anxiety, which never lets the accused escape, neither through amusement, nor by noise, nor during work, neither by day nor by night.
— Anksiyete tushunchasi, 155-156 betlar
Umidsizlik
Most emphatically in O'limgacha bo'lgan kasallik, Kierkegaard's author argues that the human self is a composition of various aspects that must be brought into conscious balance: the finite, the infinite, a consciousness of the "relationship of the two to itself," and a consciousness of "the power that posited" the self. The finite (limitations such as those imposed by one's body or one's concrete circumstances) and the infinite (those capacities that free us from limitations such as imagination) always exist in a state of tension. That tension between two aspects of the "self" that must be brought into balance. When the self is out of balance, i.e., has the wrong understanding of who it is because it conceives itself too much in terms of its own limiting circumstances (and thus fails to recognize its own freedom to determine what it will be) or too much in terms of what it would like to be, (thus ignoring its own circumstances), the person is in a state of despair. Notably, Anti-Climacus says one can be in despair even if one feels perfectly happy. Despair is not just an emotion, in a deeper sense it is the loss of self, i.e., it describes the state when one has the wrong conception of oneself.
Is despair a merit or a defect? Purely dialectically it is both. If one were to think of despair only in the abstract, without reference to some particular despairer, one would have to say it is an enormous merit. The possibility of this sickness is man's advantage over the beast, and it is an advantage which characterizes him quite otherwise than the upright posture, for it bespeaks the infinite erectness or loftiness of his being spirit. The possibility of this sickness is man's advantage over the beast; to be aware of this sickness is the Christian's advantage over natural man; to be cured of this sickness is the Christian's blessedness.
— O'limgacha bo'lgan kasallik, p. 45
Yilda Yoxud, A va Judge William each has one epistolyar roman ikki jildda. The A is an aesthete well aware that he can use the power of interpretation to define who he is and what he takes to be valuable. He knows he can shape and reshape his own self-identity. Nothing binds him to his relationships. Nothing binds him to his past actions. In the end though, he also knows he lacks a consistent understanding of who he is. He lacks a self that resists his own power of reinterpretation. His older friend Judge William, argues that a deeper concept of selfhood is discovered as one commits to one's actions, and takes ownership of the past and present. A concept of oneself, as this particular human being, begins to take form in one's own consciousness.
Another perspective, one in which an individual can find some measure of freedom from despair, is available for the person with religious "faith." This attunes the individual so that he or she can recognize what has always been there: a self to be realized within the circumstances it finds itself right now, i.e., this inner attunement brings about a sort of synthesis between the infinite and the finite.
Yilda Qo'rquv va titroq, Johannes de Silentio argues that the choice of Ibrohim to obey the private, unethical, commandment of God to sacrifice his son reveals what faith entails: he directs his consciousness absolutely toward "the absolute" rather than the merely ethical, i.e., he practices an inner spirituality that seeks to be "before god" rather than seeking to understand himself as an ethically upright person. His God requires more than being good, he demands that he seek out an inner commitment to him. If Abraham were to blithely obey, his actions would have no meaning. It is only when he acts with fear and trembling that he demonstrates a full awareness that murdering a son is absolutely wrong, ethically speaking.
Despair has several specific levels that a person can find themselves, each one further in despair than the last as laid out in O'limgacha bo'lgan kasallik.
The first level is "The despair that is ignorant of being despair or the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self." Essentially this level is one which has the wrong conception of what a self is, i.e., is ignorant of how to realize the self one already potentially is. In this sense, the person does not recognize his own despair because he often measures the success of his life based on whether he himself judges himself to be happy. Regardless of whether you know you are in despair or not, Kierkegaard asserts, you can still be in that state. He notes that this is the most common in the world.
The next level of despair is "The despair that is conscious of being despair and therefore is conscious of having a self in which there is something eternal and then either in despair does not will to be itself or in despair wills to be itself." This becomes further subdivided into three categories: the despair not to will or want to be oneself, the despair not to will to be a self, and lowest, the despair to wish for a new self. These three divisions are mostly the self-worth the person has and the amount to which they understand their own despair. The despair to not be oneself is pretty straightforward. A person sees themself as unworthy and as such does not see themself as worthy before something they do not understand. The despair not to be a self is deeper, because to not wish to be a self is to wish to not have a relation to God or at the very least see one's relation to God as unworthy, and thus shrink from it. The lowest form of this group, however, is the desire to be a new self. This is logically the deepest form as it assumes the deepest understanding of one's despair. Once in despair, without a complete relation to God one will always be in despair, so to be in this level one understands the permanence of the despair. The despair in this group arises from the nature of sensate things and physical desires. These three sub groups are also grouped under the heading "Despair over the earthly."
The second level of conscious despair under the heading "Despair over the eternal." Someone in this level views themself in light of their own weakness. Unlike in the upper level, this weakness is understood and as such, instead of turning to faith and humbling oneself before God, they despair in their own weakness and unworthiness. In this sense, they despair over the eternal and refuse to be comforted by the light of God.
The last and lowest form of despair is the desire "In despair to will to be oneself." This last form of despair is also referred to by Kierkegaard as "demonic despair" (Note that the term demonic is used in the Classical Greek Sense, not the modern sense). In this form of despair, the individual finds him or herself in despair, understands they are in despair, seeks some way to alleviate it, and yet no help is forthcoming. As a result, the self becomes hardened against any form of help and "Even if God in heaven and all the angels offered him aid, he would not want it." At this level of despair the individual revels in their own despair and sees their own pain as lifting them up above the base nature of other humans who do not find themselves in this state. This is the least common form of despair and Kierkegaard claims it is mostly found in true poets. This despair can also be called the despair of defiance, as it is the despair that strikes out against all that is eternal. One last note is that as one travels further down the forms of despair, the number of people in each group becomes fewer.
Axloq qoidalari
Many philosophers who initially read Kierkegaard, especially Kierkegaard's (written under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio) Qo'rquv va titroq, often come to the conclusion that Kierkegaard supports a divine command law of ethics. The divine command theory is a metaethical theory which claims moral values are whatever is commanded by a god or gods. However, Kierkegaard is not arguing that morality is created by Xudo; instead, he would argue that a divine command from God oshib ketadi axloq qoidalari. This distinction means that God does not necessarily create human morality: it is up to us as individuals to create our own morals and values. But any religious person must be prepared for the event of a divine command from God that would take precedence over all moral and rational obligations. Kierkegaard called this event the teleologik suspension of the ethical. Abraham, the knight of faith, chose to obey God unconditionally, and was rewarded with his son, his faith, and the title of Father of Faith. Abraham transcended ethics and leaped into faith.
But there is no valid logical argument one can make to claim that morality ought to be or can be suspended in any given circumstance, or ever. Thus, Silentio believes ethics and faith are separate stages of consciousness. The choice to obey God unconditionally is a true existential 'either/or' decision faced by the individual. Either one chooses to live in faith (the religious stage) or to live ethically (the ethical stage).
Yilda Yoxud, Kierkegaard insists that the single individual has ethical responsibility uning hayoti. However, everyone wants to enjoy themselves and ethics gets in the way of a person's enjoyment of life if taken to extremes. This results in a battle between those who want to live for pleasure and those who demand an ethical existence. But Kierkegaard always points toward the religious goal, an "eternal happiness", or the najot ning jon as the highest good. He says, be whatever you want, but remember that your soul belongs to God, not to the world.
By now you have easily seen that in his life the ethical individual goes through stages we previously set forth as separate stages. He is going to develop in his life the shaxsiy, fuqarolik, diniy virtues, and his life advances through his continually translating himself from one stage to another. As soon as a person thinks that one of these stages is adequate and that he dares to concentrate on it one-sidedly, he has not chosen himself ethically but has failed to see the significance of either isolation or continuity and above all has not grasped that the truth lies in the identity of the two. The person who has ethically chosen and found himself possess himself defined in his entire concretion. He then possesses himself as an individual who has these imkoniyatlar, bular passions, bular moyilliklar, bular odatlar, who is subject to these external influences, who is influenced in one direction thus and in another thus. Here he then possesses himself as a task in such a way that it is chiefly to order, shape, temper, inflame, control-in short, to produce an evenness in the soul, a harmony, which is the fruit of the personal virtues.
— Yoxud Part 2, Hong p. 262
Istefo qildi individual face or has seen to it that he face toward an eternal happiness as the choς ("end", "purpose", or "goal"). This τέλος is not an element among other elements. Thus the both-and of mediation is not much better, even though less naïve, than the previously described jovial chatter that includes everything. At the moment of resignation, of collecting oneself, of choice the individual is allowed to salute the absolute τέλος—but then, then comes the mediation. So, too, a dog can be taught to walk on two legs for a moment but then, then comes the mediation, and the dog walks on four legs—mediation also does that. Spiritually understood, a human being's upright walk is his absolute respect for the absolute τέλος, otherwise he walks on all fours. When it is a matter of relative elements mediation has its significance (that they are all equal before mediation), but when it is a matter of the absolute end or goal, mediation means that the absolute τέλος is reduced to a nisbiy τέλος. It is not true, either, that the absolute τέλος becomes concrete in the relative ends, because resignation's absolute distinction will at every moment safeguard the absolute τέλος against all fraternizing. It is true that the individual oriented toward the absolute τέλος, is in the relative ends, but he is not in them in such a way that the absolute τέλος is exhausted in them. It is true that before God and before the absolute τέλος we are all equal, but it is not true that God or the absolute τέλος is equal with everything else for me or for a particular individual. It may be very commendable for a particular individual to be a councilor of justice, a good worker in the office, no.1 lover in the society, almost a virtuoso on the flute, captain of the popinjay shooting club, superintendent of the orphanage, a noble and respected father-in short, a devil of a fellow who can both-and has time for everything. But let the councilor take care that he does not become too much a devil of a fellow and proceed to do both all this and have time to direct his life toward the absolute τέλος. Boshqacha qilib aytganda, bu both-and means that the absolute choς is on the same level with everything else. But the absolute τέλος has the remarkable quality of wanting to be the absolute τέλος at every moment. If, then, at the moment of resignation, of collecting oneself, of choice, an individual has understood this, it surely cannot mean that he is supposed to have forgotten it the next moment. Therefore, as I said before, resignation remains in the individual and the task is so far from getting the absolute τέλος vositachilik qilgan into all sorts of both-and that, on the contrary, it is to aim at the form of existence that permanently has the pathos of the great moment.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, Hong, pp. 400–401
Yilda Works of Love va Yurak pokligi, Kierkegaard skillfully examines Xristian axloqi and the maxim, Qo'shningni sev.[13][14] Kierkegaard stressed that it was Nasroniylik that "discovered the neighbor".[15]
Test it, place as the middle term between the lover and the beloved the neighbor, whom one shall love, place as a middle term between two friends the neighbor, whom one shall love, and you will immediately see jealousy. Yet the neighbor is self-denial's middle term that steps in between self-love's I and I, but also between erotic love's and friendship's I and the other I. .... Love for the neighbor is therefore the eternal equality in loving. Equality is simply not to make distinctions and eternal equality is unconditionally not to make the slightest distinction, unqualifiedly not to make the slightest distinction. The essential Christian is itself too weighty, in its movements too earnest to scurry about, dancing, in the frivolity of such facile talk about the higher, highest, and the supremely highest. Think of the most cultured person, one of whom we all admiringly say, "He is so cultured!" Then think of Christianity, which says to him, "You shall love the neighbor!" of course, a certain social courtesy, a politeness toward all people, a friendly condescension toward inferiors, a boldly confident attitude before the mighty, a beautifully controlled freedom of spirit, yes, this is culture—do you believe that it is also loving the neighbor? With the neighbor you have the equality of a human being before God. God is the middle term.
— Works of Love, 1847, Hong p. 44–61
Shaxsiylik
For Kierkegaard, true individuallik is called selfhood. Becoming aware of our true self is our true task and endeavor in life—it is an ethical imperative, as well as preparatory to a true religious understanding. Individuals can exist at a level that is less than true selfhood. We can live, for example, simply in terms of our pleasures —our immediate satisfaction of desires, propensities, or distractions. In this way, we glide through life without direction or purpose. To have a direction, we must have a purpose that defines for us the meaning of our lives. Kierkegaard puts it this way in Yoxud:
Here, then, I have your view of life, and, believe me, much of your life will become clear to you if you will consider it along with me as thought-despair. You are a hater of activity in life-quite appropriately, because if there is to be meaning in it life must have continuity, and this your life does not have. You keep busy with your studies, to be sure; you are even diligent; but it is only for your sake, and it is done with as little teleologiya iloji boricha. Moreover, you are unoccupied; like the laborers in the Gospel standing idle in the marketplace, you stick your hands in your pocket and contemplate hayot. Now you rest in despair. Nothing concerns you; you step aside for nothing; "If someone threw a roof tile down I would still not step aside." You are like a dying person. You die daily, not in the profound, earnest sense in which one usually understands these words, but life has lost its reality and you "Always count the days of your life from one termination-notice to the next." You let everything pass you by; nothing makes any impact. But then something suddenly comes along that grips you, an idea, a situation, a young girl's smile, and now you are "involved," for just on certain occasions you are not "involved," so at other times you are "at your service" in every way. Wherever there is something going on you join in. You behave in life as you usually do in a crowd. "You work yourself into the tightest group, see to it, if possible, to get yourself shoved up over the others so that you come to be above them, and as soon as you are up there you make yourself as comfortable as possible, and in this way you let yourself be carried through life." But when the crowd is gone, when the event is over, you again stand on the street corner and look at the world.
— Yoki yoki II qism p. 195–196, 272ff
Yilda O'limgacha kasallik specifically Kierkegaard deals with the self as a product of relations. In this sense, a human results from a relation between the Infinite (Noumena, spirit, eternal) and Finite (Phenomena, body, temporal). This does not create a true self, as a human can live without a "self" as he defines it. Instead, the Self or ability for the self to be created from a relation to the Absolute or God (the Self can only be realized through a relation to God) arises as a relation between the relation of the Finite and Infinite relating back to the human. This would be a positive relation.
An individual person, for Kierkegaard, is a particular that no abstract formula or definition can ever capture. Including the individual in "the public" (or "the crowd" or "the herd") or subsuming a human being as simply a member of a species is a reduction of the true meaning of life for individuals. What philosophy or politics try to do is to categorize and pigeonhole individuals by group characteristics, each with their own individual differences. Yilda To'rtta ruhlantiruvchi nutq, 1843 yil Kierkegaard says the differences aren't important, the likeness with God is what brings equality.
In the hallowed places, in every upbuilding view of life, the thought arises in a person's soul that help him to fight the good fight with flesh and blood, with principalities and powers, and in the fight to free himself for equality before God, whether this battle is more a war of aggression against the differences that want to encumber him with worldly favoritism or a defensive war against the differences that want to make him anxious in worldly perdition. Only in this way is equality the divine law, only in this way is the struggle the truth, only in this way does the victory have validity- only when the single individual fights for himself with himself within himself and does not unseasonably presume to help the whole world to obtain external equality, which is of very little benefit, all the less so because it never existed, if for no other reason than that everyone would come to thank him and become unequal before him, only in this way is equality the divine law.
— O'n sakkizta ruhlantiruvchi nutq, by Soren Kierkegaard Hong, p. 143
Kierkegaard's critique of the modern age, therefore, is about the loss of what it means to be an individual. Modern society contributes to this dissolution of what it means to be an individual. Through its production of the false idol of "the public", it diverts attention away from individuals to a mass public that loses itself in abstractions, communal dreams, and fantasies. It is helped in this task by the media and the mass production of products to keep it distracted. Even the fight for temporal equality is a distraction. Yilda Works of Love u yozadi:
To bring about similarity among people in the world, to apportion to people, if possible equally, the conditions of temporality, is indeed something that preoccupies worldliness to a high degree. But even what we may call the well-intentioned worldly effort in this regard never comes to an understanding with Christianity. Well-intentioned worldliness remains piously, if you will, convinced that there must be one temporal condition, one earthly dissimilarity—found by means of calculations and surveys or in whatever other way—that is tenglik.
— Works of Love, 1847, Hong 1995 pp. 71–72, see pp. 61–90
Although Kierkegaard attacked "the public", he is supportive of communities:
In community, the individual is, crucial as the prior condition for forming a community. … Every individual in the community guarantees the community; the public is a chimera, numerality is everything…
— Søren Kierkegaard, Journals[6]
Pathos (passion)
For Kierkegaard, in order to apprehend the absolute, the mind must radically empty itself of objective content. What supports this radical emptying, however, is the desire for the absolute. Kierkegaard names this desire Ehtiros.[16]
In line with this philosophy, some scholars have drawn similarities between the Stoika tushunchasi Apateya and Subjective Truth as the highest form of Wisdom. For the Stoics, Pathos (Passion) is a Perturbation which man has to overcome in a similar manner to Kierkegaard's concept of Objective Truth.[17]
According to Kierkegaard, the human self desires that which is beyond sabab. Desire itself appears to be a desire for the infinite, as Plato once wrote. Even the desire to propagate, according to Aflotun, is a kind of desire for o'lmaslik —that is, we wish to live on in time through our children and their children. Erotic love itself appears as an example of this desire for something beyond the purely finite. It is a taste of what could be, if only it could continue beyond the boundaries of vaqt va bo'sh joy. As the analogy implies, humans seek something beyond the here and now. The question remains, however, why is it that human pathos or passion is the most precious thing? In some ways, it might have to do with our status as existential beings. It is not thought that gets us through life—it is action; and what motivates and sustains action is passion, the desire to overcome hardships, pain, and suffering. It is also passion that enables us to die for ideals in the name of a higher reality. While a scientist might see this as plain emotion or simple animal desire, Kierkegaard sees it as that which binds to the source of life itself. For Kierkegaard all Christian action should have its ground in love, which is a passion.
If anyone is unwilling to learn from Christianity to love himself in the right way, he cannot love the neighbor either. He can perhaps hold together with another or a few other persons, "through thick and thin," as it is called, but this is by no means loving the neighbor. To love yourself in the right way and to love the neighbor correspond perfectly to one another, fundamentally they are one and the same thing. When the Law's o'zingiz kabi has wrested from you the self-love that Christianity sadly enough must taxmin qilish to be in every human being, then you actually have learned to love yourself. The Law is therefore: you shall love yourself in the same way as you love your neighbor when you love him as yourself.
Whoever has any bilim of people will certainly admit that just as he has often wished to be able to move them to relinquish self-love, he has also had to wish that it were possible to teach them to love themselves. When the bustler wastes his time and powers in the service of the futile, wikt:inconsequential:inconsequential pursuits, is that not because he has not o'rgangan rightly to love himself? When the light-minded person throws himself almost like a nomuvofiqlik into the folly of the moment and makes nothing of it, is this not because he does not know how to love himself rightly?
When the depressed person desires to be rid of life, indeed of himself, is this not because he is unwilling to learn earnestly and rigorously to love himself? When someone surrenders to despair because the world or another person has faithlessly left him betrayed, what then is his fault (his innocent suffering is not referred to here) except not loving himself in the right way? When someone self-tormentingly thinks to do God a service by torturing himself, what is his sin except not willing to love himself in the right way? And if, alas, a person presumptuously lays violent hands upon himself, is not his sin precisely this, that he does not rightly love himself in the sense in which a person ought to love himself?
Oh, there is a lot of talk in the world about treachery, and faithlessness, and, God help us, it is unfortunately all too true, but still let us never because of this forget that the most dangerous traitor of all is the one every person has within himself. This treachery whether it consists in selfishly loving oneself or consists in selfishly not willing to love oneself in the right way—this treachery is admittedly a secret. No cry is raised as it usually is in the case of treachery and faithlessness. But is it not therefore all the more important that Christianity's doctrine should be brought to mind again and again, that a person shall love his neighbor as himself, that is as he ought to love himself? … You shall love—this, then is the word of the royal Law.
— Works of Love, Hong p. 22-24
One can also look at this from the perspective of what the meaning of our existence is. Why suffer what humans have suffered, the pain and despair—what meaning can all of this have? For Kierkegaard, there is no meaning unless passion, the emotions and will of humans, has a divine source.
Passion is closely aligned with faith in Kierkegaard's thought. Iymon as a passion is what drives humans to seek reality and truth in a transcendent world, even though everything we can know intellectually speaks against it. To live and die for a belief, to stake everything one has and is in the belief in something that has a higher meaning than anything in the world—this is belief and passion at their highest.
Kierkegaard wrote of the subjective thinker's task in his Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript. Intellectual reason had been deified by Hegel in his theology and Kierkegaard felt this would lead to the objectification din.
There is an old proverb: oratio, tentatio, meditatio, faciunt theologum [prayer, trial, meditation, make a theologian]. Similarly, for a subjective thinker, tasavvur, tuyg'u and dialectics in impassioned existence-inwardness are required. But first and last, passion, because for an existing person it is impossible to think about existence without becoming passionate, inasmuch as existing is a prodigious contradiction from which the subjective thinker is not to abstract, for then it is easy, but in which he is to remain. In a world-historical dialectic, individuals fade away into humankind; in a dialectic such as that it is impossible to discover you and me, an individual existing human being, even if new magnifying glasses for the concrete are invented. The subjective thinker is a dialektik oriented to the mavjud bo'lgan; he has the intellectual passion to hold firm the qualitative disjunction. But, on the other hand, if the qualitative disjunction is used flatly and simply, if it is applied altogether abstractly to the individual inson bo'lish, then one can run the ludicrous risk of saying something infinitely decisive, and of being right in what one says, and still not say the least thing. Therefore, in the psychological sense it is really remarkable to see the absolute disjunction deceitfully used simply for evasion. When the death penalty is placed on every crime, the result is that no crimes at all are punished. It is the same with the absolute disjunction when applied flatly and simply; it is just like a silent letter-it cannot be pronounced or, if it can be pronounced, it says nothing. The sub'ektiv mutafakkir, therefore, has with intellectual ehtiros the absolute disjunction as belonging to existence, but he has it as the final decision that prevents everything from ending in a quantifying. Thus he has it readily available, but not in such a way that by abstractly recurring to it, he just frustrates mavjudlik. The subjective thinker, therefore, has also estetik passion and axloqiy passion, whereby concretion is gained. All existence-issues are passionate, because existence, if one becomes ongli of it, involves passion. To think about them so as to leave out passion is not to think about them at all, is to forget the point that one indeed is oneself and existing person. Yet the subjective thinker is not a poet even if he is also a poet, not an ethicist even if he is also an ethicist, but is also a dialectician and is himself essentially existing, whereas the poet's existence is inessential in relation to the poem, and likewise the ethicist's in relation to the teaching, and the dialectician's in relation to the thought. The subjective thinker is not a scientist-scholar; he is an artist. To exist is an art. The subjective thinker is esthetic enough for his life to have esthetic content, ethical enough to regulate it, dialectical enough in thinking to master it. The subjective thinker's task is to understand himself in existence.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, 350-351 betlar
Subyektivlik
Johannes Climacus, yilda Falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy asoslangan bo'lmagan xat yozish, writes the following cryptic line: "Subyektivlik is Truth". To understand Climacus's concept of the individual, it is important to look at what he says regarding subjectivity. What is subjectivity? In very rough terms, subjectivity refers to what is personal to the individual—what makes the individual who he is in distinction from others. Another way to interpret subjectivity is the noyob relationship between the subject and object.
Johann Fichte wrote similarly about subjectivity in his 1799 book Insonning kasbi:
I must, however, remind my reader that the "I" who speaks in the book is not the author himself, but it is his earnest wish that the reader should himself assume this character, and that he should not rest contented with a mere historical apprehension of what is here said, but really and truly, during reading, hold converse with himself, deliberate, draw conclusions, and form resolutions, like his representative in the book, and, by his own labour and reflection, developed out of his own soul, and build up within himself, that mode of thought the mere picture of which is laid before him in the work.
— Insonning kasbi, Muqaddima
Scientists and historians, for example, study the objective world, hoping to elicit the truth of nature—or perhaps the truth of tarix. In this way, they hope to predict how the future will unfold in accordance with these laws. In terms of history, by studying the past, the individual can perhaps elicit the laws that determine how events will unfold—in this way the individual can predict the future with more exactness and perhaps take control of events that in the past appeared to fall outside the control of humans.
In most respects, Climacus did not have problems with fan or the scientific endeavor. He would not disregard the importance of objective knowledge. Where the scientist or historian finds certainty, however, Climacus noted very accurately that results in science change as the tools of observation change. But Climacus's special interest was in history. His most vehement attacks came against those who believed that they had understood history and its laws—and by doing so could ascertain what a human's true self is. That is, the assumption is that by studying history someone can come to know who he really is as a person. Kierkegaard especially accused Hegel's philosophy of falling prey to this assumption. He explained this in Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript:
It is the existing ruh who asks about haqiqat, presumably because he wants to exist in it, but in any case the questioner is ongli of being an existing individual human being. In this way I believe I am able to make myself understandable to every Greek and to every oqilona odamzot. If a German philosopher follows his inclination to put on an act and first transforms himself into a superrational something, just as alchemists and sorcerers bedizen themselves fantastically, in order to answer the question about truth in an extremely satisfying way, this is of no more concern to me than his satisfying answer, which no doubt is extremely satisfying-if one is fantastically dressed up. But whether a German philosopher is or is not doing this can easily be ascertained by anyone who with enthusiasm concentrates his soul on willing to allow himself to be guided by a sage of that kind, and uncritically just uses his guidance compliantly by willing to form his mavjudlik according to it. When a person as a o'rganuvchi enthusiastically relates in this way to such a German professor, he accomplishes the most superb epigram upon him, because a speculator of that sort is anything but served by a learner's honest and enthusiastic zeal for expressing and accomplishing, for existentially appropriating his donolik, since this wisdom is something that the Herr Professor himself has tasavvur qilingan and has written books about but has never attempted himself. It has not even occurred to him that it should be done. Like the customers clerk who, in the belief that his business was merely to write, wrote what he himself could not read, so there are speculative thinkers who merely write, and write that which, if it is to be read with the aid of action, if I may put it that way, proves to be nonsense, unless it is perhaps intended only for fantastical beings.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, p. 191
Hegel wanted to philosophize about Christianity but had no intention to ever become a Christian. For Climacus, the individual comes to know who he is by an intensely personal and passionate pursuit of what will give meaning to his life. As an existing individual, who must come to terms with everyday life, overcome its obstacles and setbacks, who must live and die, the single individual has a life that no one else will ever live. In dealing with what life brings his way, the individual must encounter them with all his psycho-physical resources.
Subjectivity is that which the individual—and no one else—has. But what does it mean to have something like this? It cannot be understood in the same way as having a mashina or a bank account. It means to be someone who is becoming someone—it means being a person with a past, a present, and a future. No one can have an individual's past, present or future. Different people experience these in various ways—these experiences are unique, not anyone else's. Having a past, present, and future means that a person is an existing individual—that a person can find meaning in time and by existing. Individuals do not think themselves into existence, they are born. But once born and past a certain age, the individual begins to make choices in life; now those choices can be his, his parents', society's, etc. The important point is that to exist, the individual must make choices—the individual must decide what to do the next moment and on into the future. What the individual chooses and how he chooses will define who and what he is—to himself and to others. Kierkegaard put it this way in Works of Love, 1847:
We are truly reluctant to make a young person arrogant prematurely and teach him to get busy judging the world. God forbid that anything we say should be able to contribute to developing this malady in a person. Indeed, we think we ought to make his life so strenuously inwardly that from the very beginning he has something else to think about, because it no doubt is a morbid hatred of the world that, perhaps without having considered the enormous responsibility, wants to be persecuted. But on the other hand we are also truly reluctant to deceive a young person by suppressing the difficulty and by suppressing it at the very moment we endeavor to recommend Christianity, inasmuch as that is the very moment we speak. We put our confidence in boldly daring to praise Christianity, also with the addition that in the world its reward, to put it mildly, is ingratitude. We regard it as our duty continually to speak about it in advance, so that we do not sometimes praise Christianity with an omission of what is essentially difficult, and at other times, perhaps on the occasion of a particular text, hit upon a few grounds of comfort for the person tried and tested in life. No, just when Christianity is being praised most strongly, the difficulty must simultaneously be emphasized. (….) Christianly the world's opposition stands in an essential relationship to the inwardness of Christianity. Moreover, the person who chooses Christianity should at that very moment have an impression of its difficulty so that he can know what it is that he is choosing.
— Works of Love, Hong 1995, pp. 193–194
The goal of life, according to Suqrot, is to know thyself. Knowing oneself means being aware of who one is, what one can be and what one cannot be. Kierkegaard uses the same idea that Socrates used in his own writings. He asks the one who wants to be a single individual the following questions in his 1847 book, Turli xil ruhlarda dalda beruvchi nutqlar:
Everyone must make an accounting to God as an individual; the king must make an accounting to God as an individual, and the most wretched beggar must make an accounting to God as an individual—lest anyone be arrogant by being more than an individual, lest anyone despondently think that he is not an individual, perhaps because in the busyness of the world he does not even have a name but is designated only by a number. What else, indeed, is the accounting of eternity than that the voice of conscience is installed eternally in its eternal right to be the only voice!...Are you now living in such a way that you are aware of being a single individual and thereby aware of your eternal responsibility before God; are you living in such a way that this awareness can acquire the time and stillness and liberty to withdraw from life, from an honorable occupation, from a happy domestic life—on the contrary, that awareness will support and transfigure and illuminate your conduct in the relationships of life. You are not to withdraw and sit brooding over your eternal accounting, whereby you only take on a new responsibility. Siz o'zingizning vazifalaringiz va vazifalaringiz uchun ko'proq va ko'proq vaqt topasiz, abadiy mas'uliyatingiz haqida qayg'urish sizni band bo'lishdan va iloji boricha hamma narsada faol qatnashishdan saqlaydi - bu vaqtni behuda sarflash deb atash mumkin bo'lgan mashg'ulot ... o'zingizning ishingizni qanday bajarishni xohlayotganingiz haqida qaror qildingizmi yoki siz olomon bilan hamfikr bo'lishni istaganingiz uchun doimo ikki fikrdasizmi? Siz o'z taklifingizga qat'iyan emas, umidsizlikka emas, balki abadiy g'amxo'rlik qilasizmi; siz, o'zgarmagan holda, xuddi shu narsa bo'yicha taklifni davom ettiryapsizmi va shartlar turlicha o'zgartirilayotganda faqat o'sha narsani sotib olishni xohlaysizmi? ... Siz hali ham narsalar boshqacha bo'lishini istab, qalbingizda shubhali hech narsa yashirmayapsizmi? shunday qilib siz o'zingiz uchun mukofotni olishga qaroqchi kabi jur'at eta olasiz, uni parad qilishga jur'at etasiz, unga ishora qilishga jur'at etasiz; bu qiyinchiliklar mavjud bo'lmasligini xohlar edingiz, chunki u sizning ichingizda xudbinlikni cheklaydi, garchi bostirilgan bo'lsa-da, lekin omadingiz bo'lsa, gaplashishga arziydigan yaxshilik uchun biron bir narsa qilaman, deb sizni aldaydi. dindor donishmand boshiga tushganida hech qanday qiyinchilikka duchor bo'lmasligini unutishi, chunki bu uning o'zi uchun yaxshilik bo'lmasligini aniq bilmasligi mumkin, chunki dindor donishmand uni quvg'in qilgan qudratli istagan paytda o'zining eng go'zal g'alabasini qo'lga kiritishini unutishi kerak. , ular aytganidek, uni tejash uchun va donishmand javob beradi: Men buni so'zsiz xohlay olmayman, chunki ta'qiblar men uchun haqiqatan ham yaxshi bo'lmasligini aniq bilolmayman. Siz yaxshilikni faqat jazodan qo'rqqaningiz uchun qilyapsizmi, hatto yaxshilikni xohlasangiz ham kovlashingiz uchun, tunda tushlaringizda jazoni kechirishni va shu darajada yaxshilikni tilayman va tushingizda o'zingizni aldab qo'yasiz qullik aqli bilan yaxshilikka xizmat qilish mumkin deb o'ylaysizmi?
— Turli xil ruhlarda dalda beruvchi nutqlar, 1847, Hong pp. 127-140
Subyektivlik o'zimning ongim bilan birga, men kabi keladi. U shaxs tomonidan tug'ilgan hissiy va intellektual resurslarni qamrab oladi. Subyektivlik - bu shaxsning inson sifatida qanday bo'lishidir. Endi sub'ektivlik muammosi qanday tanlashni hal qilishda - shaxs to'g'ri tanlov qilish uchun qanday qoidalar yoki modellardan foydalanadi? To'g'ri tanlov qanday? Kim to'g'ri belgilaydi? Haqiqatan ham individual bo'lish, o'ziga sodiq bo'lish uchun uning xatti-harakatlari qaysidir ma'noda ifoda etilishi kerak, shunda ular o'zi va boshqalarga kim va nima ekanligini tasvirlashlari kerak. Kierkegaardning fikriga ko'ra muammo shundaki, biz sub'ektiv manfaatlarga asoslanib kim va nimaga asoslanishimizni tanlashimiz kerak - shaxs o'zi uchun borliqni his qilish, his qilish uchun nimanidir anglatadigan tanlovlarni amalga oshirishi kerak.
Kierkegaard qadam bosishga qaror qildi Yaxshilik va yomonlikni bilish daraxti o'zi uchun, almashtirish Odam va uni qiling tanlov Xudoning huzurida, u erda uni Yaratuvchisidan boshqa hech kim ayblamaydigan yoki hukm qilmaydigan edi. Bu Ibrohimning qilgan ishi Qo'rquv va titroq. Kierkegaard o'zini o'zi o'rganishni shunday o'ylagan. Bu erda yolg'iz odam nimani bilib oladi ayb va aybsizlik. Uning kitobi, Anksiyete tushunchasi, Odam Ato tanlaganida bilimga ega bo'lganligini va bu erkinlik haqidagi bilim ekanligini aniq ko'rsatib turibdi. Taqiqlash bor edi, lekin erkinlik ham bor edi va Momo Havo va Odam Ato undan foydalanishga qaror qilishdi.
Yilda Kierkegaard Buning ma'nosi, faqat diniy fikrlar sub'ektiv haqiqatlar va ularni fan tomonidan, ya'ni ob'ektiv bilim orqali tasdiqlash yoki bekor qilish mumkin emas.[18] Uning uchun kimdir ma'lum bir sub'ektiv haqiqatga qarshi yoki qarshi ekanligini tanlash - bu mutlaqo o'zboshimchalik bilan tanlovdir.[18] U ob'ektiv bilimdan diniy e'tiqodga o'tishni a imon sakrashi, chunki bu sub'ektiv ravishda oqilona asoslanmaydigan gaplarni qabul qilishni anglatadi.[18] Uning uchun xristianlik e'tiqodi bunday tanlovlar tomonidan boshlangan, mantiqiy asosga ega bo'lmagan va bo'la olmaydigan traektoriyaning natijasidir (demak, bu sabab bu kabi tanlovlarga qarshi emas yoki qarshi emas).[18] Ob'ektiv ravishda ko'rib chiqilgan, faqat diniy da'volar na to'g'ri, na yolg'ondir.[18]
Hayotning uch bosqichi
Dastlabki amerikalik Kierkegaardshunoslar Kierkegaard muallifligining murakkabligini kamaytirishga intilib, individual mavjudotning uchta darajasiga e'tibor qaratdilar, ular Kierkegaardning taxalluslaridan biri Yoxannes Klimak tomonidan yozilgan edi. Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript. Bosqichlar Kierkegaard fikrini talqin qilishning faqat bitta usulini ifodalasa ham, bu uning muallifligini tanishtirishning mashhur usuliga aylandi.[iqtibos kerak ] Evropa kontinental doiralarida sahna nazariyasi hech qachon bir xil tarzda ushlanib qolmagan. Bu Kierkegaardning yozuvchilik faoliyati davomida nima haqida gapirganligini aniqlaydi. "Dastlabki amerikalik olimlar" va "Evropa doiralari" uning asarlari yozuvlariga oid fikrlarni ajratib ko'rsatadilar. U "o'zini haqiqatdan aks ettirishga" va "ruh dunyosini" ajratishga qarshi edi, chunki ruh olamini ob'ektiv ravishda ajratib bo'lmaydi. Hegel kitobida o'zining bosqichlari haqida yozgan, Din falsafasi bo'yicha ma'ruzalar va Kierkegaard o'zining 1846-chi falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy bo'lmagan xabarlarida javob berdi:
Ushbu bosqichlarni insonning yoshi bilan taqqoslash mumkin. Bola hali ham irodaning tabiat bilan bevosita birligida, chunki u o'z tabiatini ham, uni o'rab turgan tabiatni ham anglatadi. Ikkinchi bosqich, o'spirinlik, individuallik mustaqil bo'lish jarayonida, bu tirik ma'naviyat, Ruhning hayotiy kuchidir, u hali oldiga chek qo'ymasdan, oldinga siljiydi, intilishlarga ega va har bir narsaga qiziqadi. yo'l. Uchinchisi - erkaklar yoshi; bu ma'lum bir maqsad uchun ish davri, unga inson o'zini bo'ysundiradi, unga kuchini bag'ishlaydi. Va nihoyat, keksalikni so'nggi bosqich deb hisoblash mumkin, u oldin Umuminsoniyni oxiriga etkazgan va shu maqsadni anglagan holda hayot va mehnatning o'ziga xos manfaatlaridan umumbashariy maqsadga, mutlaq yakuniy maqsadga qaytgan va go'yo, haqiqiy tashqi mavjudotning keng va ko'p qirrali manfaatlaridan kelib chiqib o'zini birlashtirdi va o'zining ichki hayotining cheksiz chuqurliklarida to'plandi. Tushunish mohiyatidan kelib chiqadigan mantiqiy asosda aniqlanadiganlar bu. Yaqinda ayon bo'ladiki, hatto asl zudlik ham zudlik sifatida mavjud emas, balki qo'yilgan narsadir. Bolaning o'zi tug'ilgan narsadir.
— Jorj Vilgelm Fridrix Hegel, Din falsafasi bo'yicha ma'ruzalar 1-jild Rev. E B Speiers tomonidan tarjima qilingan 1895 p. 266ff[19]
Ruh dunyosida har xil bosqichlar sayohatdagi shaharlarga o'xshamaydi, bu haqda sayohatchining to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aytishi juda to'g'ri, masalan: Biz Pekindan chiqib, Kantonga keldik va o'n to'rtinchi kuni Kantonda bo'ldik. Bunday sayohatchining o'zi emas, balki joylari o'zgaradi; va shuning uchun u o'zgarishni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri, o'zgarmas shaklda eslatib o'tishi va aytib berishi yaxshi. Ammo ruhiyat dunyosida joyni o'zgartirish, uni o'zgartirish kerak, va bu erga kelganim to'g'risida to'g'ridan-to'g'ri ishonch bor va la urinish mavjud Myunxauzen. Taqdimotning o'zi shuni ko'rsatadiki, ruh dunyosida u qadar uzoqqa borgan. ... The taxallusli muallif va men ular bilan birga edik sub'ektiv. Biznikilarga ma'lum bo'lishdan yaxshiroq narsani so'ramayman ob'ektiv marta ob'ektiv bo'lishga qodir bo'lmagan yagona shaxs sifatida. Bu sub'ektivlik, botiniylik haqiqatdir, mavjud bo'lgan hal qiluvchi omil, bu nasroniylikka olib boradigan yo'l edi, bu aynan botiniylikdir, lekin iltimos, har bir botiniy emas, iltimos, iltimos, dastlabki bosqichlarda albatta turib olish kerak edi - bu mening fikrim edi, men taxallusli yozuvlarda ham xuddi shunday harakatni topdim deb o'ylardim va ularni sharhlab berishni va ular bilan bog'liqligini aniq ko'rsatishga harakat qildim Parchalar.
— Syoren Kierkegaard, Falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy asoslangan bo'lmagan xat yozish, 1846, Hong tarjimasi 1992 yil
Sahna nazariyasining bir mashhur talqinida mavjudlik darajalari deb ataladigan har bir narsa uning ostidagilarni qamrab oladi: axloqiy shaxs hali ham estetik zavq olishga qodir, masalan, diniy shaxs hali ham estetik zavq va axloqiy burchga qodir. Ushbu yashash usullarining orasidagi farq tashqi emas, balki ichki xususiyatga ega va shuning uchun inson qanday darajada yashayotganligini aniqlash uchun hech qanday tashqi belgilar mavjud emas. Ushbu ichki va tashqi munosabatlar odatda shaxs tomonidan o'z harakatlarini o'lchash uchun boshqalarga qarab belgilanadi, Kierkegaard odam o'ziga qarash kerak deb hisoblagan va bu munosabatlar boshqalarga qarash o'rniga Masihga o'rnak bo'lishi kerak, chunki siz boshqalarga qanchalik ko'p qarasangiz o'zingizni kamroq ko'rasiz. Bu sizning qo'shningizni sevish o'rniga qo'shnilaringizni kamsitishni osonlashtiradi. Ammo ko'rishni istagan odamni ko'rmagan odamni sevish kerak. Yoki ko'rgan odamingizni u inson sifatida seving yoki u har qanday odamni sevish haqida gapirishni to'xtating.[20]
Orqaga Bosqichlar. Bu sezilarli darajada farq qiladi Yoxud tomonidan a uch qism. Uch bosqich bor, estetik, axloqiy, diniy, ammo yo'q mavhum zudlik bilan vositachilik sifatida, birlik, lekin rohat-halokat, harakat-g'alaba, azob-uqubat kabi mavjudlik kategoriyalarining aniqligi. Ammo bu uch qismga qaramay, kitob ham / yoki ham. Ya'ni axloqiy va diniy bosqichlar bir-biri bilan muhim aloqaga ega. Ning etishmovchiligi Yoxud ko'rsatilgandek, shunchaki ish axloqiy yakun topdi. Yilda Bosqichlar aniq qilingan va din o'z o'rnida saqlanib qolgan. .... Azob-uqubatlar haqida hikoya; azoblanish diniy toifadir. Yilda Bosqichlar estet endi B-ning yashash xonasida tez-tez uchrab turadigan aqlli odam emas - umidvor odam va boshqalar, chunki u bu faqat imkoniyatdir; yo'q, u mavjud [mavjud bo'lgan]. "Bu" Yoki "yoki" Or "bilan to'liq bir xil." Konstantin Konstantiy va Yigit eksperimentning Quidamiga joylashdilar. (Hazil rivojlangan.)
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, Xong, p. 294, Søren Kierkegaard jurnallari, VIB 41:10
Masihning Butrusga bo'lgan muhabbati shu tarzda cheksiz edi: Butrusni sevishda u ko'rgan odamni sevishga erishdi. U: "Butrus avval uni o'zgartirib, yana uni sevishimdan oldin boshqa odamga aylanishi kerak" demadi. Yo'q, u aynan teskarisini aytdi: "Butrus Butrus, men uni yaxshi ko'raman. Sevgim, agar unga boshqa odam bo'lishiga yordam beradigan narsa bo'lsa." Shuning uchun u Butrus boshqa odamga aylanganida, ehtimol uni qayta tiklash uchun do'stlikni buzmadi; yo'q, u do'stlikni o'zgarishsiz saqlab qoldi va shu bilan Butrusga boshqa odam bo'lishiga yordam berdi. Sizningcha, Masihning sodiq do'stligi bo'lmaganida, Butrus yana yutgan bo'larmidi? Ammo bu do'st bo'lish juda oson, chunki bu do'stdan, xususan, biron bir narsani talab qilishdan boshqa narsani anglatmaydi va agar do'st so'rovga javob bermasa, do'stlik to'xtashi kerak, agar u javob bersa yana boshlanadi. so'rovga. Bu do'stlik munosabatlarimi? Xatoga yo'l qo'yganga yordam berishga kim o'zini do'sti deb atagan odamdan ko'ra yaqinroq, hatto jinoyat do'stiga qarshi qilingan bo'lsa ham! Ammo do'st orqaga chekinadi va aytadi (chindan ham uchinchi odam gapirayotgandek): Agar u boshqa odamga aylangan bo'lsa, ehtimol u yana mening do'stimga aylanishi mumkin. Biz bunday xatti-harakatni maqtovli deb hisoblashdan uzoq emasmiz. Ammo haqiqatan ham biz bunday do'st haqida aytishdan uzoqmiz, chunki u sevganida ko'rgan odamini sevadi. Masihning sevgisi cheksiz edi, chunki bu amalga oshishi kerak bo'lsa: ko'rgan odamni sevishni sevishda. Buni idrok etish juda oson. Odam qanchalik ko'p o'zgargan bo'lsa ham, u baribir ko'rinmaydigan bo'lib qoladigan darajada o'zgartirilmaydi. Agar bunday imkonsiz narsa bo'lmasa, albatta, biz uni ko'rib turibmiz, burch esa ko'rgan odamni sevishdir. Oddiy odam yomon tomonga o'zgargan bo'lsa, u shunchalik o'zgarganki, biz uni sevishdan ozod bo'lamiz deb o'ylaymiz. Ammo nasroniylik shunday deb so'raydi: bu o'zgarish tufayli endi uni ko'rmayapsizmi? Bunga javob bo'lishi kerak: Men uni ko'rishim mumkin; U endi sevishga loyiq emasligini ko'raman. Ammo agar siz buni ko'rsangiz, demak siz uni haqiqatan ham ko'rmaysiz (buni siz boshqa ma'noda qilayotganingizni inkor etolmaysiz), siz faqatgina noloyiqlik va nomukammallikni ko'rasiz va shu bilan uni sevganingizda ko'rmaganligingizni tan olasiz. uni boshqa ma'noda, lekin shunchaki uning siz sevgan mukammalligi va mukammalligini ko'rgan.
— Sevgi asarlari (1847), Hong 1995, p. 172–173
Mumkin bo'lgan shaxs o'zini mumkin bo'lgan narsaning ikkilikiga teng bog'laganda, biz aytamiz: U kutmoqda. Kutish mumkin bo'lgan narsaning o'zida bir xil ikkilikni o'z ichiga oladi va kutish - bu mumkin bo'lgan narsalar bilan o'zini shunchaki va sodda tarzda bog'lashdir. Keyin munosabatlar kutayotgan odam tanlagan uslubiga qarab bo'linadi. O'zingizni umidvorlik bilan yaxshilik ehtimoli bilan bog'lash umid qilishdir, bu esa shu sababli vaqtinchalik kutish bo'lishi mumkin emas, balki abadiy umiddir. Yomonlik ehtimoli bilan kutish bilan bog'liq bo'lish qo'rqish demakdir. Ammo umidvor bo'lgan ham, qo'rqadigan ham kutmoqda. Biroq, tanlov amalga oshishi bilanoq, mumkin bo'lgan narsa o'zgaradi, chunki yaxshilik imkoniyati abadiydir. Faqatgina aloqa qilish vaqtida mumkin bo'lganlarning ikkilik darajasi tenglashadi; Shuning uchun umidni tanlash qaroriga ko'ra, u abadiy qaror bo'lgani uchun cheksiz ko'proq qaror qildi, chunki odamlar o'z hayotlarini ma'lum davrlarga va yoshlarga ajratishda katta tajriba bilan gaplashyapman deb o'ylashadi va keyin birinchi davrni umid yoshi yoki imkoniyat. Qanday bema'nilik! Shunday qilib, umid haqida gaplashganda ular abadiylikni butunlay tark etishadi, ammo umid haqida gapirishadi. Ammo bu qanday qilib mumkin, chunki umid yaxshilik imkoniyatiga va shu bilan abadiylikka tegishli! Boshqa tomondan, umid haqida qanday qilib ma'lum bir yoshga tayinlangan tarzda gapirish mumkin? Albatta abadiylik butun hayotni qamrab oladi va oxirigacha umid bor va bo'lishi kerak; unda umid yoshi bo'lgan davr yo'q, lekin insonning butun hayoti umid vaqti bo'lishi kerak! Va keyin ular abadiylikni bekor qilish orqali umid haqida katta tajriba bilan gaplashyapmiz deb o'ylashadi.
— Sevgi asarlari (1847), Hong 1995, p. 249–251
Birinchi bosqich: estetik
Kierkegaard qiziqish bildirgan estetika, va ba'zida ehtirosli murojaat qilganligi sababli "shoir-faylasuf" deb ham nomlanadi falsafa. Ammo u ko'pincha estetik darajada yashagan hayotning etishmovchiligini ko'rsatishga qiziqishi aytiladi. Estetik hayot Kierkegaard muallifligida turli xil yo'llar bilan, shu jumladan intellektual lazzatlanish, hissiy istak va o'zini "sahnadagidek" talqin qilishga moyillik bilan belgilanadi. Ushbu estetik mavjudotning ko'plab darajalari mavjud va shuning uchun bitta ta'rifni berish qiyin. Pastki qismida, aks etmaydigan hayot tarzini ko'rish mumkin. Yuqorida biz aks ettiruvchi, mustaqil, tanqidiy va ijtimoiy jihatdan befarq hayot kechiradigan hayotni topishimiz mumkin. Ammo Kierkegaardning ko'plab tarjimonlari ko'pchilik odamlar kundalik vazifalar va tashvishlar asosida hayoti va faoliyatlarini eng kam aks ettiradigan estetik bosqichda yashaydilar, deb hisoblashadi. Estetik jihatdan boshqariladigan odamlar kamroq. Bunday odamlar buni biladimi yoki yo'qmi, ularning hayoti muqarrar ravishda umidsizlikka olib keladi. Kierkegaard muallifi A estetik hayot kechirayotgan shaxsning namunasidir.
Siz tasodifni yaxshi ko'rasiz. Qiziqarli vaziyatdagi yoqimli qizning tabassumi, o'g'irlangan qarash, aynan shu narsa uchun ov qilyapsiz, bu sizning maqsadsiz xayolingiz uchun motivdir. Siz doimo kuzatuvchi ekanligingizdan faxrlanadigan siz, buning evaziga kuzatish ob'ekti bo'lishga toqat qilishingiz kerak. Eh, siz g'alati birodarsiz, bir lahzada bola, ikkinchisi qariya; bir lahzada siz eng muhim ilmiy muammolar, o'z hayotingizni ularga qanday bag'ishlashingiz haqida astoydil o'ylaysiz, keyingisi esa sevikli ahmoqsiz. Ammo siz nikohdan ancha uzoqsiz.
— Yoki yoki II qism p. 7-8
O'ylab ko'ring, hayotingiz o'tib ketmoqda; siz uchun ham, oxir-oqibat, hatto hayotingiz tugashi bilanoq, sizga hayotda boshqa imkoniyatlar paydo bo'lmay qolganda, faqat eslash qolganida, eslashingiz mumkin bo'lgan vaqt keladi, lekin siz sevgan ma'noda emas bu juda ko'p, bu fantastika va haqiqat aralashmasi, ammo vijdoningizni astoydil va sodiq eslash. Ehtiyot bo'ling, u sizning ro'yxatingizni ro'yxatdan o'tkazmaydi, ehtimol haqiqiy jinoyatlar haqida emas, balki bekor qilingan imkoniyatlar, namoyish qilish rasmlari sizni haydab yuborish uchun imkonsiz bo'ladi. The intellektual sizda mavjud bo'lgan chaqqonlik yoshlarga aylanmoqda va bir muncha vaqtgacha ko'zni boshqa tomonga yo'naltiradi. Qo'shimchalari shunchalik bo'shashganki, odamning yurishi va holatining barcha cheklovlari bekor qilingan masxarabozni ko'rib hayron qoldik. Siz intellektual ma'noda shundaysiz; siz xuddi oyoqlaringizdagidek boshingizda turishingiz mumkin. Hamma narsa mumkin Siz uchun va siz bu imkoniyat bilan o'zingizni va boshqalarni hayratda qoldirishingiz mumkin, ammo bu zararli emas, va o'zingizning xotirjamligingiz uchun sizdan iltimos qilaman, agar siz uchun afzallik bo'lgan narsa la'nat bo'lib qolsa. Ishonchga ega bo'lgan har qanday odam o'z rohatini topib, o'zini va hamma narsani shu tarzda o'zgartira olmaydi. Shuning uchun men sizni dunyodan emas, balki o'zingizdan va dunyoni sizga qarshi ogohlantiraman.
— Yoki yoki II, Hong p. 16
Ikkinchi bosqich: axloqiy
Mavjudlikning ikkinchi darajasi axloqiydir. Aynan mana shu erda shaxs hayotda haqiqiy yo'nalishni egallay boshlaydi, bundan xabardor va shaxsan javobgar bo'ladi yaxshi va yovuzlik va o'ziga va boshqalarga sadoqatni shakllantirish. Insonning mavjudlikning ushbu darajasidagi harakatlari, mavjudlikning oldingi sohalarida etishmagan izchillik va izchillikka ega. Kierkegaardning ko'plab o'quvchilari uchun axloqiy ahamiyatga ega. Bu har bir odamni o'z hayotini hisobga olishga va o'z xatti-harakatlarini mutlaqo javobgarlik nuqtai nazaridan sinchkovlik bilan tekshirishga chaqiradi, buni Kierkegaard chaqiradi tavba. Agar Kierkegaardning axloqiy g'oyasini Vedik hayotning to'rt maqsadli tizimi bilan taqqoslasak, bu axloqiy tizim, ehtimol, eng ko'p o'zaro bog'liqdir Dharma - u yoki bu dinga rioya qilish, qoidalar, qonunlar va hk. (Hindular har qanday dinni "dharma" deb atashadi, garchi dharma ham qonun ).
U o'zini Xudoga topguncha, o'z-o'ziga, oilasiga, irqiga qaytganiga tavba qiladi. Faqat shu shart bilan u o'zini tanlashi mumkin. Va bu u istagan yagona shart, chunki faqat shu tarzda u o'zini mutlaqo tanlashi mumkin. ... Men butun borliqdan tavba qilaman. Tavba, yovuzlik asosan menga tegishli ekanligini va shu bilan birga u menga tegishli emasligini bildiradi. Agar ichimdagi yovuzlik aslida menga tegishli bo'lmasa, men uni tanlay olmadim; agar menda mutlaqo tanlay olmaydigan biron bir narsa bo'lganida edi, men o'zimni mutlaqo tanlamagan bo'lar edim, demak men o'zim mutlaq emas, balki faqat mahsulot bo'lardim. ... Bu to'g'ri tarbiyalanganmi yoki yo'qmi deb ko'p o'ylamasdan kechirasiz deyishga moyilligi yaxshi tarbiya topgan bolaning belgisidir va bu ham yuksak fikrli va chuqur qalbning belgisidir. agar u tavba qilishga moyil bo'lsa, agar u Xudoni sudga bermasa, lekin tavba qilsa va tavbasida Xudoni sevsa. Bu holda uning hayoti hech narsa emas, faqat ko'pikka o'xshaydi. ... The Yoxud Men estetik va axloqiy hayot o'rtasida yashaganman, bu malakasiz dilemma emas, chunki bu aslida faqat bitta tanlovda. Ushbu tanlov orqali men aslida yaxshilik bilan yomonni tanlayman, lekin yaxshilikni tanlayman, tanlayman eo ipso yaxshilik va yomonlik o'rtasidagi tanlov. Har bir keyingi tanlovda asl tanlov abadiy mavjud.
— Yoxud II qism, Hong, p. 216–217, 224, 237–238, 219
"Sudya Vilgelm", taxallusli muallif Yoxud va axloqiy ongni belgilaydigan ovoz, o'z tanlovi uchun javobgarlikni o'z zimmasiga olish majburiyati individual ravishda amalga oshirilishi kerakligini ta'kidlaydi. Shaxs o'zi topadigan turli xil munosabatlar uchun javobgarlikni o'z zimmangizga olish har bir inson uchun ochiqdir, ammo har bir inson buni tabiiy ravishda tanlaydi. Vilgelm uchun inson hayotining mazmuni uning hozirgi va kelajakdagi tanlovi uchun qanday javobgarlikni o'z zimmasiga olishiga va u allaqachon qilingan tanlovlarga qanday egalik qilishiga bog'liq. Vilgelm uchun axloqiy jihatdan boshqariladigan kishi o'tmishdagi harakatlar uchun javobgarlikni o'z zimmasiga oladi, ba'zilari yaxshi va yomonlari, izchillikni izlaydi va ehtirosli va sadoqatli hayot kechirish majburiyatini oladi.
Masihiy Xudo ruh, nasroniylik ruhdir, tana va ruh o'rtasida ixtilof mavjud, ammo tana sezgir emas - bu xudbin. Shu ma'noda, hatto ma'naviy ham sezgir bo'lib qolishi mumkin, masalan, agar inson o'zining ma'naviy sovg'alarini behuda qabul qilsa, u holda tana go'shti bo'ladi. Va, albatta, men nasroniylar uchun Masih jismonan chiroyli bo'lishi shart emasligini bilaman; Va bu siz aytgan sababdan farqli o'laroq achinarli bo'lar edi, chunki agar go'zallik zarur bo'lsa, mo'min uni qanday ko'rishni xohlar edi; ammo bularning barchasi shundan kelib chiqadiki, xayrixohlik nasroniylikda yo'q qilinadi. Birinchi muhabbat o'zida go'zallik elementiga ega va uning beg'uborligi bilan hissiyotda bo'lgan quvonch va to'laqonlik nasroniylikda juda yaxshi ushlanishi mumkin. Keling, bir narsadan saqlanaylik, noto'g'ri yo'l, siz qochmoqchi bo'lganingizdan ko'ra xavfli; bizni juda ruhiy qilmaylik.
— Yoxud II qism p. 50
Savol, ya'ni shu: bu sevgini ro'yobga chiqarish mumkinmi? Hamma narsani shu vaqtgacha o'tkazib bo'lgandan so'ng, ehtimol siz shunday deyishingiz mumkin: Xo'sh, birinchi sevgini hayotga tatbiq etish kabi, turmush qurish ham qiyin. Bunga javob berishim kerak: Yo'q, chunki nikohda harakat qonuni mavjud. Birinchi sevgi haqiqiy emas bo'lib qoladi o'z-o'zidan u hech qachon ichki moddaga ega bo'lmaydi, chunki u faqat tashqi muhitda harakat qiladi. Axloqiy va diniy niyatda, nikoh muhabbati ichki tarixga ega bo'lishi mumkin va tarixiy bo'lmaganidan, birinchi sevgidan farq qiladi. Bu sevgi kuchli, butun dunyodan kuchliroqdir, lekin shubhalanadigan payt yo'q qilinadi; bu eng xavfli joylarni to'liq xavfsizligi bilan yura oladigan, ammo kimdir uning ismini aytganda pastga tushib ketadigan uyqusiga o'xshaydi. Oilaviy sevgi qurollangan, chunki bu maqsad nafaqat atrofdagi dunyoga, balki iroda o'ziga, ichki dunyoga qaratilgan.
— Yoxud II qism, p. 94
Shaxsning mazmuni uchun tanlovning o'zi hal qiluvchi ahamiyatga ega: tanlov orqali shaxs o'zi tanlanayotgan narsaga cho'kadi va tanlamaganida atrofiya bilan quriydi. ... Kema kapitanining yo'nalishni o'zgartirish kerak bo'lgan paytni tasavvur qiling; u holda u ayta olishi mumkin: Men buni ham, buni ham qila olaman. Ammo u vasat kapitan bo'lmasa, u shuni ham biladiki, bu vaqt ichida kema odatdagi tezligi bilan oldinga siljiydi va shu tariqa u buni qiladimi yoki qiladimi, ahamiyatsiz bo'lgan bir lahza bor. Shunday qilib, odam bilan ham - agar u tezlikni hisobga olishni unutib qo'ysa - oxir-oqibat u tanlaganligi uchun emas, balki undan tiyilganligi sababli, endi "Yoki" / "Yoki" masalasi bo'lmagan bir lahza keladi. so'zlari bilan ifodalanishi mumkin: Chunki boshqalar uni tanladilar yoki u o'zini yo'qotdi.
— Yoxud II qism, p. 163–164
Uchinchi bosqich: diniy
Axloqiy va diniy bir-biri bilan chambarchas bog'liq: inson diniy bo'lmasdan axloqiy jihatdan jiddiy bo'lishi mumkin, ammo diniy bosqich axloqiylikni o'z ichiga oladi. Holbuki axloqiy sohada yashash, ba'zilarga sodiqlikni o'z ichiga oladi axloqiy mutlaq diniy sohada yashash nasroniy Xudoga sodiqlik va munosabatlarni o'z ichiga oladi. Kierkegaard buni tushuntirdi Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript shunga o'xshash:
Yoxannes Jozibador bilan tugaydi tezis bu ayol - bu faqat bir lahza. Umumiy ma'noda bu muhim estetik tezisdir, chunki moment hamma narsa va shu darajada, o'z navbatida, aslida hech narsa emas, xuddi Sofistik hamma narsa haqiqat degan tezis, hech narsa haqiqat emas. Umuman olganda vaqt paradoksal ravishda vaqtni ta'kidlaydigan paradoksgacha bo'lgan har qanday nuqtai nazardan hal qiluvchi element. Vaqt qancha urg'u berilsa, xuddi shu darajada estetik, metafizik, uchun axloqiy, diniy va Nasroniy -diniy. Yoxannes Seducer qaerda tugaydi, Sudya boshlanadi: Ayolning go'zalligi yil sayin ortib boradi. Bu erda vaqt axloqiy ravishda ta'kidlangan, ammo hali ham eslashning chekinishini istisno qiladigan tarzda emas mavjudlik ichiga abadiy.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, p. 298-299
Agar Kant singari bir kishi, ilmiy ilm-fan cho'qqisida turgan bo'lsa, Xudoning mavjudligini namoyish qilish haqida aytganda: Xo'sh, men bu haqda otam menga aytganidan boshqa narsani bilmayman - bu kulgili va aslida namoyishlar haqida butun bir kitobdan ko'proq narsani aytadi, agar kitob buni unutsa.
— Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, p. 552-553
Sahna nazariyasi haqida gapiradigan Kierkegaard taxalluslari dinni insoniyat hayotidagi eng yuqori bosqich deb biladi. Diniy hayotning bir munozarasida Kierkegaardning taxalluslaridan biri Yoxannes Klimak ushbu bosqichda ikki turni ajratib ko'rsatdi. Dindorlik A va Dindorlik B.[21] Bitta turi. Bilan belgilanadi Yunon faylasufi Suqrot, haqiqat va shaxsiy vijdonni ehtiros bilan izlash uning jamiyati bilan ziddiyatga uchradi. Dindorlikning yana bir turi - bu shaxs ekanligini anglash bilan tavsiflanadi gunohkor va haqiqatning manbai. Vaqt o'tishi bilan, vahiy orqali va to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aloqada paradoks anavi Iso, inson o'zining abadiy najoti paradoksga asoslanganligini ko'rishni boshlaydi -Xudo, ustundir, odamlarni qutqarish uchun inson qiyofasida vaqtga kelish. Kierkegaard uchun bu sodir bo'lgan tushunchaning o'zi inson aqli uchun janjal edi - haqiqatan ham shunday bo'lishi kerak va agar u bo'lmasa, u holda odam haqiqatan ham tushunmaydi Inkarnatsiya na inson gunohkorligining ma'nosi. Kierkegaard uchun olamdagi transandantal kuchni anglashga intilish dinning o'zi. Din ijtimoiy va individual (nafaqat shaxsiy) o'lchovga ega. Ammo bu shaxs va uning gunohkorlikni anglashidan boshlanadi. Kierkegaardning gunoh tushunchasini muhokama qiladigan bir nechta takliflari.
Gunoh / imon muxolifati - bu barcha axloqiy tushunchalarni xristianlik yo'li bilan o'zgartiradigan va ulardan yana bir kaynatmani ajratib turadigan nasroniy. Qarama-qarshilikning negizida hal qiluvchi nasroniy spetsifikatsiyasi yotadi: Xudo oldida; va bu o'z navbatida hal qiluvchi nasroniylik xususiyatiga ega: absurd, paradoks, huquqbuzarlik ehtimoli. Bu xristianning har bir spetsifikatsiyasida namoyon bo'lishi juda muhimdir, chunki jinoyat - bu masihiylarning barcha spekulyativ falsafadan himoyasi. Xo'sh, bu erda huquqbuzarlik ehtimoli nimada? Inson o'z borlig'i haqiqati sifatida, aniq bir inson sifatida to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Xudo oldida bo'lishi kerak va shunga muvofiq, yana va shu asosda, inson gunohi Xudoga tegishli bo'lishi kerak. Xudo oldida yagona odam haqidagi bu tushuncha hech qachon spekulyativ fikrga kelmaydi; u faqat ma'lum bir insonni fantastik tarzda insoniyat avlodiga umumlashtirmoqda. Aynan shu sababli kufr keltirgan nasroniylik gunoh gunoh, u Xudoning huzurida bo'ladimi yoki yo'qmi, degan fikrni ilgari surdi. Boshqacha qilib aytganda, u "Xudo oldida" spetsifikatsiyasidan xalos bo'lishni istadi va shu maqsadda yangi donolikni ixtiro qildi, ammo shunga qaramay, qiziquvchanlik bilan, oliy donolik umuman qadimgi butparastlikdan kam emas va kam emas edi.
— O'limgacha bo'lgan kasallik, Hannay, 1989 p. 115
Qabul qilish faqat gunohning ongi orqali; boshqa yo'l bilan kirishni istash nasroniylikka qarshi xiyonatdir. … O'zini gunohkor deb o'zini kamtarlik bilan tan olgan sodda qalb, shaxsan o'zi (yolg'iz odam), oddiy yoki kamtar bo'lmaganida yuzaga keladigan barcha qiyinchiliklar haqida bilishga umuman hojat yo'q. … Xristianlik qanchalik dahshatli bo'lsa, unga qarshi ko'tarilib, o'zini aqldan ozish yoki dahshatga aylantiradi, chunki u xristianlikdan voz kechishni yoki ilmiy propedevtikadan, uzr so'rashdan va boshqa narsalardan boshqa narsalarni azob-uqubat bilan boshlamaguncha. vijdonning xuruji, barchasi uning ehtiyojiga mutanosib ravishda gunohning ongi orqali xristian diniga kirishni o'rganadi.
— Xristianlikda mashq qiling, Hong, 1991, p. 67-68
Kierkegaardning boshqa faylasuflar haqidagi fikrlari
Kierkegaard va Fichte
Kierkegaard ko'p narsa yozgan Yoxann Gottlib Fixe tezisida Irony tushunchasi[22] birinchi kitobida bo'lgani kabi De omnibus dubitandum est, Yoxannes Klimak taxallusi bilan yozilgan va uning Jurnallari. Kitobni Fixe yozgan Insonning kasbi (1800) inson hayotida shubhadan bilimga, so'ngra imonga o'tishga chaqirdi. De omnibus dubitandum est Dekartdan va hamma narsaga shubha qilish kerakligini anglatadi. Kierkegaard ham, Fichte ham sub'ektivlik bilan bir qatorda shubhadan boshlash g'oyasiga qiziqish bildirishgan. Kierkegaard shunday yozgan edi: "Fixte sub'ektivlik erkin, cheksiz, salbiyga aylandi. Ammo sub'ektivlik cheksiz abstraktsiyada harakat qilgan bu bo'shliq harakatidan chiqib ketishi uchun uni inkor qilish kerak edi; fikr haqiqatga aylanishi uchun, aniq bo'lishi kerak edi. "[23]
Bizning butun yoshimiz rasmiy intilish bilan o'ralgan. Bu bizni konjenitalizmga e'tibor bermaslikka va nosimmetrik go'zallikni ta'kidlashga, samimiy ijtimoiy munosabatlarni emas, balki odatiylikni afzal ko'rishga undadi. Aynan shu intilish - boshqa muallifning so'zlaridan foydalanish - Fixening va boshqa faylasuflarning ongning aniqligi va tizimni qurishga urinishlari bilan belgilanadi. Robespyer buni gilyotin yordamida bajarishga urinish; Aynan shu narsa bizni shoirlarimizning oqayotgan kapalak misralarida va Auber musiqasida uchratadi va nihoyat aynan shu narsa siyosiy olamdagi ko'plab inqiloblarni keltirib chiqaradi. Shaklga yopishib olish uchun biz ushbu g'oyani amalga oshiradigan vosita bo'lishiga qaramay, men ushbu barcha harakatlar bilan mukammal darajada roziman, lekin unutmaslik kerakki, bu fikrni shaklni emas, balki shaklni belgilashi kerak g'oya. Shuni yodda tutishimiz kerakki, hayot mavhum narsa emas, balki o'ta individual narsa. Shuni unutmasligimiz kerakki, masalan, she'riy dahoning zudlik pozitsiyasidan kelib chiqqan holda, bu g'oya dunyoda vujudga kelishidan boshqa narsa emas va aks ettirish vazifasi faqat g'oyaning paydo bo'lgan-qilinmaganligini tekshirishdir. to'g'ri keladigan shakl. Shakl hayotning asosi emas, balki hayot shaklning asosidir. Tasavvur qiling-a, yunon turmush tarziga g'azablangan kishi yunoncha uslubdagi bino va yunoncha uy xo'jaliklarini tashkil qilish uchun vositani qo'lga kiritgan deb tasavvur qiling - qoniqtiradimi yoki yo'qmi, juda muammoli bo'larmidi yoki tez orada boshqa shaklni afzal ko'radimi? shunchaki u o'zini va u yashagan tizimni etarlicha sinab ko'rmagani uchun. Ammo orqaga sakrash noto'g'ri bo'lgani kabi (umuman olganda, yoshi buni tan olishga moyil), oldinga sakrash ham noto'g'ri - bu ikkalasi ham tabiiy rivojlanish sakrashlar bilan davom etmaydi va hayotning shijoati temirga aylanadi har qanday bunday tajriba, hatto bir lahzada muvaffaqiyatli bo'lsa ham.
— Jurnallar, Bizning jurnalistik adabiyotimiz, 1835 yil 28-noyabr
Kierkegaard va Hegel
Ko'plab faylasuflar Kierkeardning falsafaga qo'shgan eng katta hissalaridan biri uning tanqididir deb o'ylashadi Jorj Vilgelm Fridrix Hegel. Darhaqiqat, Kierkeardning ko'pgina asarlari Hegelning tanqidiga javoban yoki uni tanqid qilib yozilgan. Kierkegaard Hegelian falsafasining ayrim jihatlarini qattiq tanqid qilgan bo'lsa-da, uning faoliyati ham Hegelning ijobiy ta'sirida bo'lganligini va Hegelning o'ziga hurmat ko'rsatganligini ko'rsatadi.
Endi hamma narsa yo'lga qo'yilgan va odatda bu tizimni ommalashtirishni ham o'z ichiga oladi -har bir tizim uchun fizik u barcha erkaklarni ushlab turadi. Qanaqasiga Kant uning davrida muomala qilinganligi hammaga ma'lum, shuning uchun men faqat hamma uchun cheksiz leksikonlar, qisqacha ma'lumotlar, ommabop prezentatsiyalar va tushuntirishlarni va hokazolarni eslatib o'tishim kerak. Va keyinchalik Hegel qanday ahvolga tushdi, Hegel, eng zamonaviy faylasuf, uning qat'iy shakli tufayli kim sukut saqlashga buyruq berishi mumkin? Has not the logical trinity been advanced in the most ludicrous way? And therefore it did not astound me that my shoemaker had found that it could also be applied to the development of boots, since, as he observes, the dialectic, which is always the first stage in life, finds expression even here, however insignificant this may seem, in the squeaking, which surely has not escaped the attention of some more profound research psychologist. Unity, however, appears only later, in which respect his shoes far surpass all others, which usually disintegrate in the dialectic, a unity which reached the highest level in that pair of boots Carl XII wore on his famous ride, and since he as an orthodox shoemaker proceeded from the thesis that the immediate (feet without shoes—shoes without feet) is a pure mavhumlik and took it [the dialectical] as the first stage in the development. And now our modern siyosatchilar! By veritably taking up Hegel, they have given a striking example of the way one can serve two masters, in that their revolutionary striving is paired with a life-outlook which is a remedy for it, an excellent remedy for lifting part of the illusion which is necessary for encouraging their fantastic striving. And the actuality of the hodisa will surely not be denied if one recalls that the words "immediate or spontaneous unity" occur just as necessarily in every scientific-scholarly treatise as a brunette or a blonde in every well-ordered romantic household. At the happy moment everyone received a copy of Holy Scriptures, in which there was one book which was almost always too brief and sometimes almost invisible, and this was, I regret—the Havoriylarning ishlari. And how curious it is to note that the present age, whose social striving is trumpeted quite enough, is ashamed of the monks and nuns of the O'rta yosh, when at the same time, to confine ourselves to our own native land, a society has been formed here which seems to embrace almost the entire kingdom and in which a speaker began thus: Dear Brothers and Sisters. How remarkable to see them censure the Jesuitry of the Middle Ages, since precisely the liberal development, as does every one-sided enthusiasm, has led and must lead to that. And now Christianity—how has it been treated? I share entirely your disapproval of the way every Christian concept has become so volatilized, so completely dissolved in a mass of fog, that it is beyond all recognition. To the concepts of faith, incarnation, tradition, inspiration, which in the Christian sphere are to lead to a particular historical fact, the philosophers choose to give an entirely different, ordinary meaning, whereby faith has become the immediate consciousness, which essentially is nothing other than the vitale Fluidum of mental life, its atmosphere, and tradition has become the content of a certain experience of the world, while inspiration has become nothing more than God's breathing of the life-spirit into man, and incarnation no more than the presence of one or another idea in one or more individuals.
— Journals IA 328 1836 or 1837
In a journal entry made in 1844, Kierkegaard wrote:
If Hegel had written the whole of his logic and then said, in the preface or some other place, that it was merely an experiment in thought in which he had even begged the question in many places, then he would certainly have been the greatest thinker who had ever lived. As it is, he is merely comic.
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 1844)[6])
While Kierkegaard was a student of theology at the University of Copenhagen, Gegelizm had become increasingly popular. Yoxan Lyudvig Xayberg va Hans Lassen Martensen were key figures in Danish Hegelianism. Kierkegaard remarked in his journal on 17 May 1843 that Heiberg's writings were "borrowed" from Hegel, implying Heiberg would have been a nobody without Hegel.
Kierkegaard objected to Hegel's claim that he had devised a system of thought that could explain the whole of reality, with a dialektik analysis of history leading the way to this whole. Hegel claimed that the doctrines and history of Christianity could be explained as a part of the rational unfolding and development of our understanding of the natural world and our place within it. Kierkegaard considered Hegel's explanation of Christianity as a necessary part of world history to be a distortion of the Christian message and a misunderstanding of the limits of human reason. He attempted to refute this aspect of Hegel's thought by suggesting that many doctrines of Christianity—including the doctrine of Incarnation, a God who is also human—cannot be explained rationally but remain a logical paradox. However, he was in favor of youthful striving after truth.
Let a doubting youth, but an existing doubter with youth's lovable, boundless confidence in a hero of scientific scholarship, venture to find in Hegelian positivity the truth, the truth of existence-he will write a dreadful epigram on Hegel. Do not misunderstand me. I do not mean that every youth is capable of overcoming Hegel, far from it. If a young person is conceited and foolish enough to try that, his attack is inane. No, the youth must never think of wanting to attack him; he must rather be willing to submit unconditionally to Hegel with feminine devotedness, but nevertheless with sufficient strength also to stick to his question-then he is a satirist without suspecting it. The youth is an existing doubter; continually suspended in shubha, he grasps for the truth-so that he can exist in it. Consequently, he is negative, and Hegel's philosophy is, of course, positive-no wonder he puts his trust in it. But for an existing person pure thinking is a kimera when the truth is supposed to be the truth in which to exist. Having to exist with the help of the guidance of pure thinking is like having to travel in Denmark with a small map of Europe on which Denmark is no larger than a steel pen-point, indeed, even more impossible. The youth's admiration, his enthusiasm, and his limitless confidence in Hegel are precisely the satire on Hegel. This would have been discerned long ago if pure thinking had not maintained itself with the aid of a reputation that impresses people, so that they dare not say anything except that it is superb, that they have understood it-although in a certain sense that it is indeed impossible, since no one can be led by this philosophy to understand himself, which is certainly an absolute condition for all other understanding. Socrates has rather ironically said that he did not know for sure whether he was a human being or something else, but in the confessional a Hegelian can say with all solemnity: I do not know whether I am a human being-but I have understood the system. I prefer to say: I know that I am a human being, and I know that I have not understood the system. And when I have said that very directly, I shall add that if any of our Hegelians want to take me into hand and assist me to an understanding of the system, nothing will stand in the way from my side. In order that I can learn all the more, I shall try hard to be as obtuse as possible, so as not to have, if possible, a single presupposition except my ignorance. And in order to be sure of learning something, I shall try hard to be as indifferent as possible to all charges of being unscientific and unscholarly. Existing, if this is to be understood as just any sort of existing, cannot be done without passion.
— Soren Kierkegaard 1846, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Hong p. 310-311
To refute Hegel's claim that Christianity should be understood as a part of the necessary evolution of thought, or in Hegelians terms, Spirit, in Qo'rquv va titroq, Kierkegaard attempts to use the story of Ibrohim to show that there is a goal higher than that of ethics (questioning the Hegelian claim that doing one's ethical duty is the highest that can be said of a human being) and that faith cannot be explained by Hegelian ethics, (disproving Hegel's claim that Christianity can be rationally explained by philosophy). Either way, this work can be read as a challenge to the Hegelian notion that a human being's ultimate purpose is to fulfill ethical demands.
Kierkegaard's strategy was to invert this dialectic by seeking to make everything more difficult. Instead of seeing scientific knowledge as the means of human redemption, he regarded it as the greatest obstacle to redemption. Instead of seeking to give people more knowledge he sought to take away what passed for knowledge. Instead of seeking to make God and Christian faith perfectly intelligible he sought to emphasize the absolute transcendence by God of all human categories. Instead of setting himself up as a religious authority, Kierkegaard used a vast array of textual devices to undermine his authority as an author and to place responsibility for the existential significance to be derived from his texts squarely on the reader. … Kierkegaard's tactic in undermining Hegelianism was to produce an elaborate parody of Hegel's entire system. The pseudonymous authorship, from Yoxud ga Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, presents an inverted Hegelian dialectic which is designed to lead readers away from knowledge rather than towards it.
— William McDonald, "Søren Kierkegaard", ichida Stenford falsafa entsiklopediyasi
By doing this, Hegelian critics accuse Kierkegaard of using the dialectic to disprove the dialectic, which seems somewhat contradictory and hypocritical. However, Kierkegaard would not claim the dialectic itself is bad, only the Hegelian premise that the dialectic would lead to a harmonious reconciliation of everything, which Hegel called the Mutlaqo. Kierkegaard stated this most clearly in his book Anksiyete tushunchasi:
Dogmatikalar must not explain hereditary sin but rather explain it by presupposing it, like that vortex about which Greek speculation concerning nature had so much to say, a moving something that no science can grasp. That such is the case with dogmatics will readily be granted if once again time is taken to understand Shleyermaxr 's immortal service to this science. He was left behind long ago when men chose Hegel. Yet Schleiermacher was a thinker in the beautiful Greek sense, a thinker who spoke only of what he knew. Hegel, on the contrary, despite all his outstanding ability and stupendous learning, reminds us again and again by his performance that he was in the German sense a professor ning falsafa on a large scale, because he a tout prix [at any price] must explain all things.
— Anksiyete tushunchasi, trans. Reidar Thomte, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 20
Kierkegaardian scholars have made several interpretations of how Kierkegaard proceeds with parodying Hegel's dialectic. One of the more popular interpretations argues the aesthetic-ethical-religious stages are the triadic process Kierkegaard was talking about. Bo'limga qarang Spheres of existence qo'shimcha ma'lumot olish uchun. Another interpretation argues for the world-individual-will triadic process. The dialectic here is either to assert an individual's own desire to be independent and the desire to be part of a community. Instead of reconciliation of the world and the individual where problems between the individual and society are neatly resolved in the Hegelian system, Kierkegaard argues that there's a delicate bond holding the interaction between them together, which needs to be constantly reaffirmed. Jan-Pol Sartr takes this latter view and says the individual is in a constant state of reaffirming his or her own identity, else one falls into yomon niyat.
This process of reconciliation leads to a "both/and" view of life, where both thesis and antithesis are resolved into a synthesis, which negates the importance of personal responsibility and the human choice of either/or. Ish Yoxud is a response to this aspect of Hegel's philosophy. A passage from that work exemplifies Kierkegaard's contempt for Hegel's philosophy. Note the comparison between "A" and "B" (Judge Vilhelm) in Yoxud va Stages on Life's Way.
Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you will also regret it. Marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way. Whether you marry or you do not marry, you will regret it either way. Laugh at the stupidities of the world, and you will regret it; weep over them, and you will also regret it. Laugh at the stupidities of the world or weep over them, you will regret it either way. Whether you laugh at the stupidities of the world or you weep over them, you will regret it either way. Trust a girl, and you will regret it. Do not trust her, and you will also regret it. … Hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it either way. Whether you hang yourself or do not hang yourself, you will regret it either way. This, gentlemen, is the quintessence of all the wisdom of life.
— Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part I, Hong
My dear reader, if you do not have the time and opportunity to take a dozen years of your life to travel around the world to see everything a world traveler is acquainted with, if you do not have the capability and qualifications from years of practice in a foreign language to penetrate to the differences in national characteristics as these become apparent to the research scholar, if you are not bent upon discovering a new astronomical system that will displace both the Copernican va Ptolemeyka -then marry; and if you have time for the first, the capability for the second, the idea for the last, then marry shuningdek. Even if you did not manage to see the whole globe or to speak in many tongues or to know all about the heavens, you will not regret it, for marriage is and remains the most important voyage of discovery a human being undertakes; compared with a married man's knowledge of life, any other knowledge of it is superficial, for he and he alone has properly immersed himself in life.
— Søren Kierkegaard, Judge Vilhelm, Stages on Life's Way, Hong p. 89
Here are two more from 1846:
As is well known, Hegelian philosophy has canceled the principle of contradiction, and Hegel himself has more than once emphatically held judgment day on the kind of thinkers who remained in the sphere of understanding and reflection and who have therefore insisted that there is an either/or. Since that time, it has become a popular game, so that as soon as someone hints at an aut/aut [either/or] a Hegelian comes riding trip-trap-trap on horse and wins a victory and rides home again. Among us, too, the Hegelians have several times been on the move, especially against Bishop Mynster, in order to win spekulyativ thought's brilliant victory; va Bishop Mynster, has more than once become a defeated standpoint, even though for being a defeated standpoint he is holding up very well, and it is rather to be feared that the enormous exertion of the victory has been too exhausting to the undefeated victors. And yet there may be a misunderstanding at the root at the conflict and the victory, Hegel is perfectly and absolutely right in maintaining that, looked at eternally, sub specie aeterni, there is no aut/aut either/or in the language of abstraction, in pure thought and pure being. Where the devil would it be, since abstraction, after all, simply removes the contradiction; therefore Hegel and the Hegelians should instead take the trouble to explain what is meant by the masquerade of getting contradiction, movement, transition, etc. into logic. The defenders of aut/aut are in the wrong if they push their way into the territory of pure thinking and want to defend their cause there.
— Falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy asoslangan bo'lmagan xat yozish, I jild, p. 305
According to Hegel the truth is the continuous world-historical process. Each generation, each stage of this process, is legitimated and yet is only an element of the truth. Short of resorting to a bit of charlatanry, which helps by assuming that the generation in which Hegel lived or the one after him is imprimatur, and this generation is the last and dunyo tarixi is past, we are all implicated in shubha. The passionate question of truth does not even come up, because philosophy has first tricked the jismoniy shaxslar into becoming ob'ektiv. The positive Hegelian truth is just as deceptive as happiness was in paganism. Not until afterward does one come to know whether or not one has been happy, and thus the next generation comes to know what truth was in the preceding generation. The great secret of the system is close to Protagoralar "s sofizm "Hammasi nisbiy ", except that here everything is relative in the continuous process. But no living soul is served by that …
— Falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy asoslangan bo'lmagan xat yozish, Volume I, by Johannes Climacus, edited by Søren Kierkegaard, 1846, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 1992, Princeton University Press, p. 33
The whole idea of one generation spending all its time studying past generations and then the next generation spending their time studying past generations and making moral and social comments about preceding generations was called, "The Hegelian cud-chewing process with three-stomachs—first immediacy—then regurgitation—then down again." He said, "Maybe a succeeding master-mind could continue this with four stomachs, etc., down once more and up again. I don't know if the master-mind grasps what I mean."[24]
Kierkegaard va Schelling
In 1841–1842, Kierkegaard attended the Berlin lectures of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Schelling was a critic of Georg Xegel and a professor at the Berlin universiteti. The university started a lecture series given by Schelling in order to espouse a type of positive philosophy which would be diametrically opposed to Gegelizm. Kierkegaard was initially delighted with Schelling. Before he left Copenhagen to attend Schelling's lectures in Berlin, he wrote to his friend Peter Johannes Sprang:
Schelling lectures to a select, numerous, and yet also undique conflatum auditorium. During the first lectures it was almost a matter of risking one's life to hear him. I have never in my life experienced such uncomfortable crowding—still, what would one not do to be able to hear Schelling? His main point is always that there are two philosophies, one positive and one negative. The negative is given, but not by Hegel, for Hegel's is neither negative nor positive but a refined Spinozaism. The positive is yet to come. In other words, in the future it will not be only the lawyers who become the doctores juris utriusque, for I venture to flatter myself that without submitting another dissertation I shall become a magister philosophiae utriusque.
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 1841)[6]
At Berlin, Kierkegaard gave high praises to Schelling. In a journal entry made sometime around October or November 1841, Kierkegaard wrote this piece about Schelling's second lecture:
I am so pleased to have heard Schelling's second lecture -- indescribably! I have sighed for long enough and my thoughts have sighed within me; when he mentioned the word, "reality" in connection with the relation of philosophy to reality the fruit of my thought leapt for joy within me. I remember almost every word he said from that moment on. … Now I have put all my hopes in Schelling!
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 1841)[6]
As time went on, however, Kierkegaard, as well as many in Schelling's audience, began to become disillusioned with Schelling. In a particularly insulting letter about Schelling, Kierkegaard wrote to his brother, Peter Kierkegaard:
Schelling drivels on quite intolerably! If you want to form some idea what this is like then I ask you to submit yourself to the following experiment as a sort of self-inflicted sadistic punishment. Imagine person R's meandering philosophy, his entirely aimless, haphazard knowledge, and person Hornsyld's untiring efforts to display his learning: imagine the two combined and in addition to an impudence hitherto unequalled by any philosopher; and with that picture vividly before your poor mind go to the workroom of a prison and you will have some idea of Schelling's philosophy. He even lectures longer to prolong the torture. … Consequently, I have nothing to do in Berlin. I am too old to attend lectures and Schelling is too old to give them. So I shall leave Berlin as soon as possible. But if it wasn't for Schelling, I would never have travelled to Berlin. I must thank him for that. … I think I should have become utterly insane if I had gone on hearing Schelling.
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 27 February 1842)[6]
It is common knowledge that Aristotel used the term first philosophy primarily to designate metafizika, though he included within it a part that accorded to our conception belongs to ilohiyot. In paganism it is quite in order for theology to be treated there. It is related to the same lack of an infinite penetration reflection that endowed the theater in paganism with reality as a kind of divine worship. If we now abstract from this ambiguity, we could retain the designation and by first philosophy understand that totality of science which we might call "ethnical," whose essence is immanence and is expressed in Greek thought by "recollection," and by second philosophy understand that totality of science whose essence is transcendence or repetition. Schelling called attention to this Aristotelian term in support of his own distinction between negative and positive philosophy. By negative philosophy he meant "logic"; that was clear enough. On the other hand, it was less clear to me what he really meant by positive philosophy, except insofar as it became evident that it was the philosophy that he himself wished to provide. However, since I have nothing to go by except my own opinion, it is not feasible to pursue this subject further. Constantin Constantius has called attention to this by pointing out that immanence runs aground upon "interest." With this concept, actuality for the first time comes into view.
— Anksiyete tushunchasi 1844, p. 21 and Note p. 21 Nichol
Kierkegaard became disillusioned with Schelling partly because Schelling shifted his focus on actuality, including a discussion on quid sit [what is] and quod sit [that is], to a more mythological, psychic-type pseudo-philosophy. Kierkegaard's last writing about Schelling's lectures was on 4 February 1842. He wrote the following in 1844:
Some men of Schelling's school have been especially aware of the alteration that has taken place in nature because of sin. Mention has been made also of the anxiety that is supposed to be in inanimate nature. Schelling's main thought is that anxiety, etc., characterize the suffering of the deity in his endeavor to create. In Berlin he expressed the same thought more definitely by comparing God with Gyote and Jon Von Muller,[25] both of whom felt well only when producing, and also by calling attention to the fact that such a bliss, when it cannot communicate itself, is unhappiness.
— Anksiyete tushunchasi, p. 59–60, Note p. 59
Although Schelling had little influence on Kierkegaard's subsequent writings, Kierkegaard's trip to Berlin provided him ample time to work on his masterpiece, Yoxud. In a reflection about Schelling in 1849, Kierkegaard remarked that Schelling was "like the Reyn at its mouth where it became stagnant water—he was degenerating into a Prussian 'Excellency'." (Journals, January 1849)[6]
Kierkegaard va Shopenhauer
Kierkegaard became acquainted with Artur Shopenhauer 's writings quite late in his life. Kierkegaard felt Schopenhauer was an important writer, but disagreed on almost every point Schopenhauer made. In several journal entries made in 1854, a year before he died, Kierkegaard spoke highly of Schopenhauer:
In the same way that one disinfects the mouth during an epidemic so as not to be infected by breathing in the poisonous air, one might recommend students who will have to live in Denmark in an atmosphere of nonsensical Christian optimism, to take a little dose of Schopenhauer's Ethic in order to protect themselves against infection from that malodourous twaddle.
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 1854)[6]
However, Kierkegaard also considered him, a most dangerous sign of things to come:
Schopenhauer is so far from being a real pessimist that at the most he represents 'the interesting': in a certain sense he makes astsetizm interesting--the most dangerous thing possible for a pleasure-seeking age which will be harmed more than ever by distilling pleasure even out of asceticism… is by studying asceticism in a completely impersonal way, by assigning it a place in the system.
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 1854)[6]
Kierkegaard believes Schopenhauer's ethical point of view is that the individual succeeds in seeing through the wretchedness of existence and then decides to deaden or mortify the joy of life. As a result of this complete asceticism, one reaches contemplation: the individual does this out of sympathy. He sympathizes with all the misery and the misery of others, which is to exist. Kierkegaard here is probably referring to the pessimistic nature of Schopenhauer's philosophy. One of Kierkegaard's main concerns is a suspicion of his whole philosophy:
After reading through Schopenhauer's Ethic one learns—naturally he is to that extent honest—that he himself is not an ascetic. And consequently he himself has not reached contemplation through asceticism, but only a contemplation which contemplates asceticism. This is extremely suspicious, and may even conceal the most terrible and corrupting voluptuous melankoliya: a profound misantropiya. In this too it is suspicious, for it is always suspicious to propound an ethic which does not exert so much power over the teacher that he himself expresses. Schopenhauer makes ethics into genius, but that is of course an unethical conception of ethics. He makes ethics into genius and although he prides himself quite enough on being a genius, it has not pleased him, or nature has not allowed him, to become a genius where asceticism and mortification are concerned.
— Søren Kierkegaard, (Journals, 1854)[6]
Little else is known about Kierkegaard's attitude to Schopenhauer. On Schopenhauer himself, Kierkegaard felt that Schopenhauer would have been patronizing. "Schopenhauer interests me very much, as does his fate in Germany. If I could talk to him I am sure he would shudder or laugh if I were to show him [my philosophy]." (Journals, 1854)[6]
Kierkegaard va Sharq falsafasi
Because Kierkegaard read Schopenhauer, and because Schopenhauer was heavily influenced by Eastern philosophy, it would seem that Kierkegaard would have shown an awareness of Eastern philosophy. There is, however, little direct reference to Asian thought in Kierkegaard's writings. Anyone who is familiar with such Asian traditions as Buddhist, Taoist, or Shinto philosophy, will quickly see the philosophical similarities that Kierkegaard shares with these traditions. These similarities perhaps explain the Japanese reception of Kierkegaard and the fact that Japanese awareness and translations of Kierkegaard were appearing at least 30 years before any English translations.[26] There is also extensive Japanese scholarship on Kierkegaard, a scholarship that interprets Kierkegaard's philosophy in terms of Asian thought.[27] This interpretation is understandable when one sees that Kierkegaard's central concerns of subjectivity, anxiety, freedom, despair, and self-deception, are also of central concern to Buddhism and, consequently, that there is nothing exclusively Christian about such concerns.[28] Both Kierkegaard and Zen Buddhism, for example, have seen the predicaments of existence in very similar ways.[29] A specific example of the similarities here can be seen in Yurak pokligi where Kierkegaard describes the state of awareness that one must enter in order to partake of confession. Kierkegaard's description of this state is similar to the state of meditation described by Buddhist philosophers.[30] It is distinct, however, in that the aim of confession, for Kierkegaard, is "to center itself upon this relation to itself as an individual who is responsible to God" (cf. Kierkegaard, "Purity of Heart").[31] Kierkegaard aims to claim back the subject from the "crowd" mentality of Christendom (cf. Kierkegaard, "On the Dedication to 'That Single Individual' ")[32] and reaffirm the absolute responsibility to God, which is our telos (cf. Kierkegaard, "Fear and Trembling").[33]
Harald Hoffding (1843–1931) helped introduce Kierkegaard to Western Europe in the early years of the 20th century. He compared Kierkegaard to Eastern philosophy in his 1914 book The Philosophy Of Religion shu tarzda, shu ravishda, shunday qilib:
A characteristic and very frequent type of religious faith is determined by the need of rest. The main cause of fatigue and exhaustion in life is chiefly unrest and distraction of mind. We are influenced on so many sides that it is difficult for us to collect our thoughts; we are drawn in so many directions that we find it difficult to focus our will on any one aim; so many different and changing feelings are aroused that the inner harmony of the mind is exposed to the danger of dissolution. Owing to this feeling of misfit with our ideal we experience an inner need, while our outer needs are borne in upon us in the guise of pain, frailty, and dependence on the elementary wants of life. In Upanishadlar we find: "The Self (Atma), the sinless one, who redeems from old age, death, suffering, hunger, and thirst, whose wishes are the right ones and whose decree is the right one I am that self which men must inquire after and seek to know. He who has found and known this Self has attained all worlds and all wishes." And in another place: "Save me, for I feel in this world's life like a frog in a sealed fountain." Jesus of Nazareth says: "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you. Learn of me, and ye shall find rest for your souls." "Unquiet is our heart," says Augustine to his God, "until it find rest in Thee." This need for rest rises to a passion in natures such as Sankt-Tereza, Paskal, and Soren Kierkegaard. There is no doubt an element of deep pathos in Avgustin also, but in his case we have the Platonist and the prince of the church combined with the earnest seeker, and it is the combination of all these elements which renders him such a unique figure in the history of the religious life. St. Theresa felt the need of union with God so powerfully that death alone could satisfy it: "I knew not where else to seek this life but in death. The fish, drawn out of the water, sees at any rate the end of its torment; but what death can compare with the life in which I languish?"With Kierkegaard, too, his great desire was to be released from the struggle of life. The lines which he desired should be inscribed on his gravestone express this longing: "A little while the search is o'er. The din of battle sounds no more." In this life the believer finds himself in an alien element; between the inner and the outer, between life and its conditions there is a want of harmony. In Kierkegaard s case, too, we get the metaphor of the fish out of water; it is characteristic of this type that the same figure should be employed by the ancient Indians in the Upanishads, by the Spanish nun of the sixteenth century, and by the northern thinker of the nineteenth century. This trait sheds a light on the psychology of religion. The aim of man is infinite, but he is condemned to spend his life in the world of finitude, and hence it follows that his existence acquires a sort of spasmodic character. In Kierkegaard, and even in Pascal, this opposition is more sharply brought out than in St. Theresa. In the latter it evokes longing and inner aspiration, but her will is occupied entirely by the highest object, and only her memory and her imagination are free to analyse her experiences. But both Pascal and Kierkegaard have constantly to summon the will to their aid; in their case they have a desperate struggle to keep themselves upright in face of the harsh discord between the true life and the conditions of actual life; to hold fast to the thought of the object of faith and to resist the onslaughts of doubt.
— Harald Hoffding, The Philosophy Of Religion, p. 116–118, translated from the German edition by B. E. Meyer 1914
Shuningdek qarang
Adabiyotlar
- ^ Makgrat, Alister E. The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought. Blackwell Publishing, 1993. p 202
- ^ Matustik, M. J. and M. Westphal (eds). Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, Indiana University Press, 1995, ISBN 0-253-20967-6
- ^ Green, Ronald M. Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt. SUNY Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7914-1107-9
- ^ Masalan, Falsafiy qismlarga ilmiy asoslangan bo'lmagan xat yozish: "Socrates' infinite merit is to have been an mavjud thinker, not a speculative philosopher who forgets what it means to exist… The infinite merit of the Socratic position was precisely to accentuate the fact that the knower is an existing individual, and that the task of existing is his essential task." Swenson/Lowrie translation (1941), pp. 184–5.
- ^ Hong, Howard V. and Edna H. "Subjectivity/Objectivity." Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers. Vol. 4. Indiana University Press, 1975, pp. 712–13. ISBN 0-253-18243-3
- ^ a b v d e f g h men j k l Kierkegaard, Syoren. Papers and Journals, trans. A. Hannay, London, Penguin Books, 1996.
- ^ Uotts, Maykl. Kierkegaard. Oneworld, 2003, ISBN 1-85168-317-8
- ^ "Dictionary of the History of Ideas". Arxivlandi asl nusxasi on 2006-06-18. Olingan 2006-02-03.
- ^ Kierkegaard, Syoren. The Two Ages, trans. Xovard va Edna Xong. Prinston universiteti matbuoti, ISBN 978-0-691-07226-5
- ^ Perkins, Robert L. Two Ages: International Kierkegaard Commentary. Mercer University Press, ISBN 978-0-86554-081-1
- ^ Ikki asr, p.75, Hong translation.
- ^ Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript, Hong 1992 p. 88.
- ^ Here are some verses from the Bible about loving your neighbor Love thy neighbor
- ^ "D. Anthony Storm". Kierkegaard Commentary. Olingan 15 sentyabr, 2006.
- ^ Works of Love, Hong p. 44
- ^ Kangalar[doimiy o'lik havola ]
- ^ [1], Kierkegaard and the Greek World: Aristotle and other Greek authors.
- ^ a b v d e Robert C. Solomon, No Excuses: Existentialism and the Meaning of Life, The Great Courses, The Teaching Company, http://www.thegreatcourses.com/tgc/courses/course_detail.aspx?cid=437
- ^ Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion vol 1 also see Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, March 13, 1847 by Soren Kierkegaard, copyright 1993 by Howard Hong, Princeton University Press p. 12ff
- ^ Qarang Sevgi asarlari va Xristianlikda mashq qiling
- ^ Qarang Xulosa qiladigan ilmiy bo'lmagan poststript p. 555ff
- ^ Qarang The Concept of Irony, p. 272ff
- ^ Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, Hong p. 275
- ^ Journals and Papers 25 August 1936 1A229
- ^ See his Universal History published in 1818 https://openlibrary.org/authors/OL4431565A/John_von_Muller
- ^ Masugata, Kinya, "A Short History of Kierkegaard's Reception in Japan", in J. Giles (ed.) Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 31–52
- ^ Mortensen, Finn Hauberg, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, University Press of Southern Denmark, 1996
- ^ Giles, James "Introduction: Kierkegaard's among the Temples of Kamakura", in J. Giles (ed.) Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 1–30
- ^ Jacobson, Nolan Pliny, "The Predicament of Man in Zen Buddhism and Kierkegaard", Sharq va G'arb falsafasi 2, 1952, 238–253
- ^ Giles, James, "To Practice One Thing: Kierkegaard through the Eyes of Dogen", in J. Giles (ed.) Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 87–105
- ^ "Arxivlangan nusxa". Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2011-06-04 da. Olingan 2011-03-26.CS1 maint: nom sifatida arxivlangan nusxa (havola)
- ^ http://www.ccel.org/k/kierkegaard/untruth/untruth.htm
- ^ Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, ed. va trans. Howard and Edna Hong, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 81.
Qo'shimcha o'qish
- Dru, Alexander. The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard, Oxford University Press, 1938.
- Duncan, Elmer. Søren Kierkegaard: Maker of the Modern Theological Mind, Word Books 1976, ISBN 0-87680-463-6
- Garff, Joakim. Søren Kierkegaard: Biografiya, Princeton University Press 2005, ISBN 0-691-09165-X.
- Hannay, Alastair. Kierkegaard: Biografiya, Kembrij universiteti matbuoti, 2003 yildagi yangi nashr, ISBN 0-521-53181-0.
- Kierkegaard. Anksiyete tushunchasi, Princeton University Press, 1981, ISBN 0-691-02011-6
- Kierkegaard. The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, Princeton University Press 1989, ISBN 0-691-07354-6
- Kierkegaard. O'limgacha bo'lgan kasallik, Princeton University Press, 1983, ISBN 0-691-02028-0
- Lippit, John. Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling, Routledge 2003, ISBN 0-415-18047-3
- Ostenfeld, Ib and Alastair McKinnon. Søren Kierkegaard's Psychology, Wilfrid Laurer University Press 1972, ISBN 0-88920-068-8
- Westphal, Merold. Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Purdue University Press 1996, ISBN 1-55753-090-4