USS Liberty hodisasi - USS Liberty incident

USS Ozodlik voqea
Qismi Olti kunlik urush
SH-3A dengiz qiroli 1967 yil 8 iyunda (USN 1123118) .jpg shikastlangan USS Liberty (AGTR-5) usti ustida harakatlanmoqda.
Buzilgan USS Ozodlik hujumdan bir kun keyin (1967 yil 9-iyun)
Sana8 iyun 1967 yil
Manzil
O'rtayer dengizi yaqinida Sinay yarim oroli[1]
NatijaQarang Hujumdan keyin
Ishtirokchilar
 Isroil Qo'shma Shtatlar
Qo'mondonlar va rahbarlar
Kapitan Iftach Spector
Qo'mondon Moshe Oren		Qo'mondon Uilyam L. Makgonagl
Kuch
2 Mirage IIIs
2 Mystère IVlar
3 motorli torpedo qayiqlari		1 Texnik tadqiqot kemasi
Yo'qotishlar va yo'qotishlar
Yo'q34 kishi o'ldirilgan
171 kishi yaralangan
1 kema jiddiy shikastlangan

The USS Ozodlik voqea hujumi edi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari dengiz kuchlari texnik tadqiqot kemasi, USSOzodlik, tomonidan Isroil havo kuchlari samolyot qiruvchi samolyotlar va Isroil dengiz kuchlari motorli torpedo qayiqlari, 1967 yil 8 iyunda, davomida Olti kunlik urush.[2] Birgalikda havo va dengiz hujumida 34 ekipaj a'zosi (dengiz zobitlari, dengizchilar, ikkita dengiz piyodalari va bitta tinch fuqaro halok bo'ldi) NSA xodim), ekipajning 171 a'zosini yarador qildi va kemaga jiddiy zarar etkazdi.[3] O'sha paytda kema ichida edi xalqaro suvlar shimoliy Sinay yarim oroli, taxminan 25,5nmi (29,3 milya; 47,2 km) Misr shahridan shimoli-g'arbda Arish.[1][4]

Isroil USS deb hujum uchun uzr so'radi Ozodlik Misr kemasi deb adashgandan keyin xatoga yo'l qo'yilgan edi.[5] Ikkalasi ham Isroil va AQSh hukumatlari surishtiruvlar o'tkazdi va hisobotlarni chiqardi, bu hujum Isroilning kemaning kimligi to'g'risida chalkashligi sababli xato edi.[6] Boshqalar, shu jumladan hujumdan omon qolganlar, ushbu xulosalarni rad etdilar va hujum qasddan qilingan deb hisoblaydilar.[7][8]

1968 yil may oyida Isroil hukumati to'ladi 3.32 million AQSh dollari (ga teng 24,4 million AQSh dollari 2019 yilda) ga AQSh hukumati hujumda halok bo'lgan 34 kishining oilalari uchun tovon puli. 1969 yil mart oyida Isroil jarohat olgan odamlarga yana 3,57 million dollar (2019 yilda 24,9 million dollar) to'ladi. 1980 yil dekabr oyida moddiy zarar uchun yakuniy to'lov sifatida 6 million dollar (2019 yilda 18,6 million dollar) to'lashga rozi bo'ldi Ozodlik o'zi va 13 yillik qiziqish.[9]

USS Ozodlik

Asosiy maqola: USS Ozodlik (AGTR-5)

USSOzodlik dastlab 7725 tonna (7849 tonna) (engil) fuqarolik yuk kemasi bo'lgan Simmons g'alabasi, ommaviy ishlab chiqarilgan, standart dizayn G'alaba kemasi, mashxurlarga keyingi ketma-ketlik Ozodlik kemalari Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida ittifoqchilarni yuk bilan ta'minlagan. Bu tomonidan sotib olingan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari dengiz kuchlari va yordamchi texnik tadqiqot kemasiga (AGTR) aylantirildi,[10] uchun qopqoq nomi Milliy xavfsizlik agentligi (NSA) "josuslik kemalari" ni amalga oshirmoqda razvedka signallari missiyalar. Birinchi joylashishni 1965 yilda, Afrikaning g'arbiy qirg'oqlari yaqinidagi suvlarda boshladi. Keyingi ikki yil ichida u yana bir qancha operatsiyalarni amalga oshirdi.

Hujum Ozodlik

Hujumga olib keladigan voqealar

Davomida Olti kunlik urush o'rtasida Isroil va bir nechta Arab millatlar, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari saqlab neytral mamlakat holat.[11] Urush boshlanishidan bir necha kun oldin USS Ozodlik sharqqa borishni buyurdilar O'rta er dengizi Misrning Sinay shimoliy qirg'og'i yaqinidagi xalqaro suvlarda signallarni yig'ish vazifasini bajarish uchun maydon.[12] Urush boshlangandan so'ng, uning qo'riqlash hududiga yaqinlashganda uning xavfsizligi xavotiri tufayli bir nechta xabarlar yuborildi Ozodlik Misr va Isroil qirg'oqlariga eng yaqin yo'l nuqtasini (CPA) 12,5 va 6,5 ​​dengiz millaridan (14,4 va 7,5 mil; 23,2 va 12,0 km) mos ravishda 20 va 15 dengiz millariga (23 va 17 milya; 37 va 28 km), so'ngra keyinchalik ikki mamlakat uchun 100 dengiz miliga (120 mil; 190 km) etib bordi.[13] Afsuski, xabarlar bilan ishlash va marshrutizatsiyaning samarasizligi sababli ushbu xabarlar hujum sodir bo'lgunga qadar olinmadi.[13]

Isroil manbalariga ko'ra, 5 iyun kuni urush boshlanganda general Ijak Rabin, Isroil havo kuchlari (IAF) shtat boshlig'i xabardor qilingan Qo'mondon Ernest Karl qal'asi, Amerika dengiz attaşesi Tel-Aviv, Isroil o'z sohilini har qanday vosita, shu jumladan, noma'lum kemalarni cho'ktirish bilan himoya qilishi. U AQShdan kemalarini Isroil qirg'og'idan uzoqroq tutishni yoki hech bo'lmaganda Isroilga aniq pozitsiyalari to'g'risida xabar berishni iltimos qildi.[14][a]

Amerikalik manbalarning ta'kidlashicha, ushbu hududdagi kemalar haqida hech qanday surishtiruv hujum sodir bo'lgunga qadar amalga oshirilmagan Ozodlik. AQSh davlat kotibidan yuborilgan xabarda Din Rask AQSh elchisiga Walworth Barbour Isroilning Tel-Aviv shahrida Rask Isroil bayonotini "tezkor tasdiqlash" ni so'radi. Barbur bunga javoban: "Sinaydan tashqarida ishlaydigan AQSh kemalari haqida ma'lumot so'ralmadi Ozodlik Bundan tashqari, Barbur shunday dedi: "Agar isroilliklar bunday surishtiruv o'tkazgan bo'lsa, u zudlik bilan dengiz operatsiyalari boshlig'iga va boshqa dengiz flotining yuqori qo'mondonliklariga yuborilib, [Davlat departamenti] ga qaytarilishi kerak edi".[15]

Urush boshlanishi bilan kapitan Uilyam L. Makgonagl ning Ozodlik darhol so'radi Vitse-admiral Uilyam I. Martin Qo'shma Shtatlar Oltinchi floti hamrohlik uchun esminets yuborish uchun shtab Ozodlik va uning qurolli eskorti va yordamchi aloqa markazi sifatida xizmat qiladi. Ertasi kuni admiral Martin javob berdi: "Ozodlik xalqaro suvlarda aniq belgilangan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining kemasidir, mojaro ishtirokchisi emas va biron bir davlat tomonidan hujum qilish uchun oqilona mavzu emas. So'rov rad etildi. "[16] Biroq, u bexosdan hujumga uchragan taqdirda, Oltinchi flotning reaktiv qiruvchilari o'n daqiqada tepada bo'lishiga va'da berdi.

Shu bilan birga, 6 iyun kuni Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotida Misrning AQSh mojaroda Isroilni qo'llab-quvvatlayotgani haqidagi shikoyatlariga javoban AQSh elchisi Artur Goldberg aytdi Xavfsizlik Kengashi Oltinchi flotning kemalari to'qnashuvdan bir necha yuz mil uzoqlikda bo'lgan.[13] Bayonot berilganda, shunday bo'lgan, chunki OzodlikEndi Oltinchi flotga tayinlangan, O'rta dengizning markaziy qismida, Liviya va Krit o'rtasida o'tgan.[17] Oxir oqibat Sinay yarim orolidan shimolga taxminan 13 nmi (15 mil; 24 km) ga qadar bug 'chiqardi.[18]

Vashington vaqti bilan 7 iyunga o'tar kechasi, 8 iyun, erta tongda, soat 01:10Z yoki mahalliy vaqt bilan soat 3: 10da, Pentagon Oltinchi flotning shtab-kvartirasiga xabar berish uchun buyruq chiqardi Ozodlik Isroil, Suriya yoki Sinay sohiliga 100 dengiz milidan (120 milya; 190 km) yaqinlashmaslik (Oren, 263-bet).[19]:5, 58 (N ko'rgazma) Dengiz tergov sudining ma'lumotlariga ko'ra[20]:23 ff, 111 ff va Milliy xavfsizlik agentligining rasmiy tarixi,[21] chekinish haqidagi buyruq radiochastota orqali yuborilmagan Ozodlik soat 15:25 gacha uning buyurtmalarini kuzatib bordi Zulu, hujumdan bir necha soat o'tgach, ma'muriy va xabarlarni marshrutlash bo'yicha uzoq qator muammolar tufayli. Dengiz kuchlarining aytishicha, o'sha paytda mojaro bilan bog'liq bo'lgan razvedka ma'lumotlarini o'z ichiga olgan yuqori darajadagi bog'liq bo'lmagan katta miqdordagi transport. va bu malakali mutaxassislarning etishmasligi bilan birlashtirilgan radiomenlar pulni qaytarib olish haqidagi xabarni kechiktirishga hissa qo'shdi.[20]:111 ff

Vizual aloqa

Rasmiy guvohlik bilan birlashtirilgan Ozodlik Hovuzlar jurnali shuni ko'rsatadiki, 8 iyun kuni butun ertalab hujum IAF samolyotlari tomonidan kema turli vaqtlarda va joylarda to'lib toshgan.[18] Asosiy samolyot turi Nord Noratlas; Sinay vaqti bilan soat 9:00 da ikkita noma'lum delta qanotli samolyotlar bo'lgan (GMT +2).[18] Ozodlik ekipaj a'zolarining aytishicha, Noratlas samolyotlaridan biri shu qadar yaqin uchib ketgan Ozodlik uning pervanelerindeki shovqin kemaning pastki qoplamasini buzib tashladi va uchuvchilar va ekipaj a'zolari bir-birlariga qo'l siltadilar.[22] Keyinchalik, ID manbalaridan olingan ma'lumotlarga asoslanib, ortiqcha parvozlar tasodifiy bo'lganligi va samolyot qirg'oq yaqinida payqab qolgan Misr suvosti kemalarini ov qilgani haqida xabar berilgan edi.

Sinay vaqti bilan soat 5:45 da, Isroilning Markaziy qirg'oq qo'mondonligida (CCC) kemani ko'rganligi to'g'risida hisobot qabul qilindi. Ozodlik, havo-dengiz kuzatuvchisi tomonidan "aftidan a qiruvchi, G'azodan g'arbiy 110 km masofada suzib yurish ".[23] Kema joylashgan joy CCC boshqaruv stolida, qizil marker yordamida, noma'lum kemani ko'rsatgan.[24] Tonggi soat 6:00 da havo-dengiz kuzatuvchisi, mayor Uri Meretsning xabar berishicha, kema AQSh dengiz kuchlarining ta'minot kemasi bo'lib tuyulgan; taxminan soat 9:00 da neytral idishni ko'rsatish uchun qizil marker yashil belgiga almashtirildi.[24] Xuddi shu vaqtda, Isroilning samolyot qiruvchi uchuvchisi, Arish shahridan 32 km shimolda joylashgan kema kemani aniqlashga urinib ko'rganidan keyin uning samolyotiga qarata o'q uzgani haqida xabar berdi.[24] Isroil dengiz kuchlari qo'mondonligi tekshiruv o'tkazish uchun ikkita esminetsni jo'natdi, ammo ular uchuvchi xulosasi paytida shubhalar paydo bo'lgandan keyin ertalab soat 9:40 da avvalgi holatiga qaytarildi.[24] Dengiz kuzatuvchisining "Noratlas" qo'nishidan keyin va uning fikri buzilganidan so'ng, u ko'rgan kema yana USS deb aniqlandi Ozodlik, uning "GTR-5" korpus belgilariga asoslangan.[25] USS Ozodlik pozitsiyali ma'lumotlar eskirganligi sababli marker soat 11:00 da CCC boshqaruv jadvalidan olib tashlandi.[26]

Soat 11: 24da Isroil harbiy-dengiz floti boshlig'i Arish dengizdan o'qqa tutilayotgani to'g'risida xabar oldi.[26] Hisobot manbasini tekshirish uchun uning haqiqiyligini aniqlash uchun buyurtma berildi.[26] Xabar Arish shahridagi havodan qo'llab-quvvatlash xodimidan olingan.[27] Bundan tashqari, soat 11: 27da Isroil oliy qo'mondonligi operatsiyalari boshlig'i kema Arishni o'qqa tutayotgani, ammo snaryadlar qisqa vaqt ichida tushib qolganligi to'g'risida xabar oldi.[27] (Tergovchi jurnalist Jeyms Bamford buni ta'kidlaydi Ozodlik faqat to'rttasi bor edi .50 kalibrli pulemyotlar uning pastki qismiga o'rnatildi va shu bilan qirg'oqni o'qqa tuta olmadi.[28]) Amaliyot rahbari hisobotni tekshirishni va Isroil dengiz kuchlarining kemalari Arish sohillari yaqinida bo'lgan-bo'lmaganligini aniqlashni buyurdi.[27] Ertalab soat 11: 45da yana bir xabar Oliy qo'mondonlikka Arish sohiliga ikkita kema yaqinlashayotgani to'g'risida xabar keldi.[27]

Isroil Motor Torpedo qayiqlari (MTB) shakllanishida, v. 1967. Bular USSga hujum qilgan MTBlar edi Ozodlik.

Otishma va kema haqidagi hisobotlar Oliy qo'mondonlikdan Filo Operatsiyalarini boshqarish markaziga etkazildi.[27] Dengiz operatsiyalari boshlig'i ularni jiddiy qabul qildi va soat 12: 05da 914-sonli torpedo qayig'i Arish yo'nalishi bo'yicha patrul qilishni buyurdi.[27] Kod "Pagoda" deb nomlangan 914-diviziya qo'mondon Moshe Oren qo'mondonligida edi.[27] T-203, T-204 va T-206 kabi uchta torpedo qayiqlaridan iborat edi.[27] Kechki soat 12: 15da 914-bo'lim Arish shahridan 32 km shimolda joylashgan pozitsiyani patrul qilish to'g'risida buyruq oldi.[27] Qo'mondon Oren Arish tomon yo'l olganida, unga Harbiy-dengiz operatsiyalari tomonidan Arishning o'qqa tutilganligi to'g'risida xabar berildi va IAF samolyotlari maqsad aniqlangandan keyin hududga yuborilishini aytdi.[27] Bosh shtab boshlig'i Ijak Rabin Misrning o'qqa tutilishi Isroil qo'shinlari oldidan o'tib ketishi mumkin bo'lgan amfibiya qo'nishining boshlanishi ekanligidan xavotirda edi. Rabin ushbu hududdagi noma'lum kemalarni cho'ktirish bo'yicha doimiy buyruqni takrorladi, ammo sovet kemalari yaqin atrofda ishlayotgani sababli ehtiyot bo'lishni maslahat berdi. 13:41 da torpedo qayiqlari noma'lum kemani Arish shahridan 20 mil shimoli-g'arbda va 23 mil (23 km) da aniqladilar. ) sohillari yaqinida Bardavil.[1][29] Kema tezligi ularning radarlarida taxmin qilingan.[29] T-204 dagi jangovar ma'lumot markazi xodimi, praporshunik Hararon Yifra, Orenga nishon 22 mil (35 km) masofada aniqlanganligi, uning tezligi bir necha daqiqada kuzatilganligi, shundan so'ng u aniqlaganligi haqida xabar berdi. nishon g'arbga 30 knot (56 km / soat; 35 milya) tezlikda harakatlanayotganligi. Ushbu ma'lumotlar Filo Operatsiyalarini boshqarish markaziga yuborildi.[29]

Nishonning tezligi sezilarli edi, chunki u nishonning jangovar kemasi ekanligini ko'rsatdi.[29] Bundan tashqari, Isroil qurolli kuchlari ushbu hududda suzib yurgan noma'lum kemalarni 20 tugundan (37 km / soat; 23 milya) tezlikda o'q otishni buyurdilar, bu tezlikni o'sha paytda faqat harbiy kemalar erishishi mumkin edi. Dengiz operatsiyalari boshlig'i torpedo qayiqlaridan hisob-kitoblarini ikki marta tekshirishni iltimos qildi. Yifra ikki marta qayta hisoblab chiqdi va o'z bahosini tasdiqladi.[29] Bir necha daqiqadan so'ng qo'mondon Oren o'z pozitsiyasidan 27 km uzoqlikda joylashgan nishon boshqa yo'nalishda 28 tugun (52 km / soat; 32 milya) tezlikda harakatlanayotganini xabar qildi.[30] Bemford, ammo bunga ishora qilmoqda Ozodlik's eng yuqori tezligi 28 tugundan ancha past edi. Uning manbalariga ko'ra, hujum paytida Ozodlik Sinayning shimoliy qirg'oqlari bo'ylab 5 signal (9,3 km / soat; 5,8 milya) tezlikda signal signallarini ushlab turish vazifasini bajarayotgan edi.[28]

Kema tezligi to'g'risidagi ma'lumotlar, uning yo'nalishi bilan birga, bu Arishni o'qqa tutgandan keyin portga qarab qochgan Misr esminetsi kabi taassurot qoldirdi. Torpedo qayiqlari quvg'in qildi, ammo Misrga etib borguncha nishonga etib borishini o'ylamadi. Qo'mondon Oren Isroil havo kuchlarini jo'natish uchun samolyotni to'xtatib qo'yishni so'radi.[29] Soat 13:48 da Dengiz harakatlari boshlig'i qiruvchi samolyotlarni kema joylashgan joyga jo'natishni so'radi.[31]

Ov sinfini yo'q qiluvchi HMS Blean. Misr dengiz flotida 1967 yilda Hunt sinfidagi esminetslar bo'lgan.

IAF ikki kishilik parvozni jo'natdi Mirage III "Kursa" parvozi nomini olgan qiruvchi samolyotlar Ozodlik taxminan 14:00.[32] Formatsiya rahbari, kapitan Iftach Spector, kemani aniqlashga urinishgan.[32] U torpedo qayiqlaridan biriga radioeshittirish orqali kemaning bitta tutun va bitta ustunli harbiy kemaga o'xshab ketishini kuzatdi.[33] U, shuningdek, aslida kema unga esminets yoki boshqa turdagi kichik kemalar kabi ko'ringanligi haqida xabar berdi.[33] Hujumdan keyingi bayonotda uchuvchilar kemada hech qanday farqlanadigan belgi yoki bayroq ko'rmaganligini aytdi.[33]

Shu nuqtada, qo'mondonlik shtab-kvartirasining qurol-yarog 'tizimlari xodimi, havo boshqaruvchilardan biri va Amerikaning ehtimoliy mavjudligini so'roq qilayotgan bosh havo nazoratchisi o'rtasida qayd qilingan almashinuv bo'lib o'tdi. Almashinuvdan so'ng darhol soat 13:57 da bosh havo nazoratchisi podpolkovnik Shmuel Kislev Mirajlarni hujumga topshirdi.[34]

Havo va dengiz hujumlari

Hujum qilish uchun tozalagandan so'ng, Mirages kemadagi kaptarga hujum qildi va 30 mm to'p va raketalar bilan hujum qildi.[35] Hujum ekipaj kimyoviy hujum mashqlarini tugatgandan bir necha daqiqa o'tgach sodir bo'ldi, kapitan Makgonagl qo'mondonlik ko'prigida.[36] Ekipaj "turish holatida" edi, ularning dubulg'alari va qutqaruv ko'ylagi echib tashlangan. Oren, Maykl B. – Olti kunlik urush: 1967 yil iyun va zamonaviy O'rta Sharqning yaratilishi Jangga tayyorgarlikning "o'zgartirilgan uchinchi sharti" o'rnatildi, bu kemaning to'rtta .50 kalibrli pulemyotlari to'ldirilganligini va o'q-dorilarni yuklashga va o'q otishga tayyorligini anglatardi.[37][38] Sakkiz nafar ekipaj zudlik bilan o'ldirilgan yoki o'limga olib keladigan jarohatlar olgan va keyinchalik vafot etgan, 75 kishi yaralangan.[39] Yaradorlar orasida McGonagle ham bor edi, uning o'ng soniga va qo'liga zarba berilgan.[40] Hujum paytida antennalar uzilib, gaz barabanlari yonib ketdi va kema bayrog'i yiqildi. McGonagle oltinchi flotga tez yordam so'rab, "Noma'lum reaktiv samolyotlar hujumi ostida, tez yordamga muhtoj".

Mirajonlar o'q-dorilarini sarf qilgandan keyin ketishdi va ularning o'rnini ikkitadan uchish egalladi Dassault Super Mystères kodi bilan nomlangan "Royal" parvozi. Sirlar qurollangan edi napalm bombalar va kapitan Yossi Zuk va uning qanotboshisi Yaakov Hamermish tomonidan boshqarilgan. Mysteres kema ustida o'zlarining yuklarini bo'shatib, o'zlarining zambaraklari bilan ishladilar. Kema ustki qismining katta qismi yonib ketdi.[32] Isroil harbiy-dengiz kuchlari, javoban o'q yo'qligi haqida ogohlantirib, nishon Isroil bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida ogohlantirganda, Mysteres yana hujum qilishga tayyor edi. Kislev uchuvchilarga identifikatsiya qilishda shubha tug'ilsa hujum qilmaslik kerakligini aytdi va Isroil dengiz kuchlari tezda ushbu hududdagi barcha kemalari bilan bog'lanishdi. Isroil harbiy-dengiz kuchlari uning hech bir kemasi olov ostida emasligini aniqladilar va samolyot hujum qilish uchun tozalandi. Biroq, Kislev hali ham javob qaytarishning etishmasligi bilan bezovtalanib, kemani aniqlash uchun so'nggi urinishni talab qildi. Kapitan Zuk kemani tuzish paytida shaxsni aniqlashga urinib ko'rdi. U bayroq ko'rmaganligini xabar qildi, ammo kemaning GTR-5 belgisini ko'rdi. Kislev darhol hujumni to'xtatishni buyurdi. Kislev kema Amerika ekanligini taxmin qildi.

Kema lotin alifbosi belgilariga ega bo'lganligi, shtab boshlig'i Rabinni kema sovetnikidan qo'rqishiga olib keldi. Misr harbiy kemalari o'zlarining shaxsini G'arb belgilariga yashirganliklari ma'lum bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, odatda arab harflari va raqamlarini namoyish etishgan. Rabin torpedo qayiqlarini kemadan xavfsiz masofada turishni buyurdi va ikkitasini yubordi Hornet (Aérospatiale Super Frelon) vertolyotlari tirik qolganlarni qidirish uchun. Ushbu radioaloqalar Isroil tomonidan yozib olingan. Buyruq torpedo qayig'ining jurnalida ham qayd etilgan, ammo qo'mondon Oren uni olmaganligini da'vo qilgan. Yong'inni to'xtatish buyrug'i soat 14:20 da, torpedo qayiqlari yetib kelishidan yigirma to'rt daqiqa oldin berilgan Ozodlik's pozitsiyasi.[b]

Vaqt oralig'ida ekipaj a'zolari bortda Ozodlik katta Amerika bayrog'ini osib qo'ydi. Havo hujumining dastlabki qismida va torpedo qayiqlari ko'rilmaguncha, Ozodlik oltinchi flot aviatashuvchisi tomonidan qabul qilingan qayg'uli xabarni yubordi USS Saratoga.[39] Samolyot tashuvchisi USS Amerika sakkizta samolyot yubordi. Tashuvchi strategik mashqlar o'rtasida edi. Vitse-admiral Uilyam I. Martin bir necha daqiqadan so'ng samolyotni esladi.

Makgonagl dengiz tergov sudida guvohlik berdi

havo hujumining so'nggi lahzalari, shimol-sharqdan qariyb 135 [daraja] qariyb 15 [dengiz] milga yaqin masofada uchta tezyurar qayiq kemaga yaqinlashayotgani qayd etildi. O'sha paytda kema hali ham [g'arbiy tomonga] to'g'ri 283 [daraja] yo'nalishda edi, tezligi noma'lum, lekin beshta tugundan ortiq ekanligiga ishonishdi.[20]:38

Makgonagl "torpedo qayiqlarini dastlabki ko'rish vaqti ... taxminan 14:20 bo'lganiga ishonganini" va "qayiqlar xanjarning etakchi nuqtasi markaziy qayiq bilan takoz tipidagi shaklda bo'lgan ko'rinadi" deb guvohlik berdi. Taxminan qayiqlarning tezligi taxminan 50 dan 56 km / s gacha 27 dan 30 gacha tugunni tashkil etgan va "ular kemaga torpedani uchirishga yaqinlashgani ko'rinib turibdi".[20]:38

Torpedo qayiqlari yetib kelganida, qo'mondon Oren kema Arishni yoki 30 knot (56 km / soat) tezlikka qodir bo'lgan kemani o'qqa tutgan halokatchi bo'la olmasligini ko'rdi. Torpedo qayiqlaridan birida xizmat qilayotgan Isroil harbiy-dengiz zaxirachisi Maykl Limorning so'zlariga ko'ra, ular kema bilan geliograf va radio orqali bog'lanmoqchi bo'lishgan, ammo javob olishmagan.[41] 6000 metr (20000 fut) balandlikda T-204 to'xtab qoldi va "AA" signalini berdi, bu "o'zingizni aniqlang" degan ma'noni anglatadi.[iqtibos kerak ] Zarar etkazilgan uskunalar tufayli McGonagle faqat qo'li bilan javob berishi mumkin edi Aldis chiroq.[iqtibos kerak ] Oren xuddi shunday javobni esladi Ibrohim al-Aval paytida Misr esminetsi tomonidan qo'lga olingan Suvaysh inqirozi va dushman kemasiga duch kelganiga amin edi.[iqtibos kerak ] U arab flotlari uchun Isroilni identifikatsiya qilish bo'yicha yo'riqnoma bilan maslahatlashib, kema Misr ta'minot kemasi bo'lgan degan xulosaga keldi El Quseir, uning pastki qismini, midship ko'prigini va tutunini kuzatishga asoslangan. T-203 qayig'ining kapitani mustaqil ravishda bir xil xulosaga keldi. Qayiqlar jangovar shakllanishga o'tdilar, ammo hujum qilmadilar.[42][43]

Ozodlik Isroil torpedo qayiqlaridan qochishga buriladi

Torpedo qayiqlari tezlik bilan yaqinlashganda kapitan Makgonagl dengizchiga 51-sonli avtomat pulemyotiga o'tishni va o't ochishni buyurdi.[20]:38 Biroq, keyinchalik u qayiqlar Isroil bayrog'ini ko'tarib yurganini payqadi va "samolyot Isroil bo'lishi ehtimoli borligini va hujum xato bilan qilinganini tushundi".[20]:39 Kapitan Makgonagl qurolga o'rnatilgan 51-sonli odamga o't o'chirishni buyurdi, ammo odam buyruqni anglab yetguncha torpedo qayiqlariga qisqa otilib chiqdi.[20]:39

Makgonagl 53-sonli avtomat markaziy torpedo qayig'iga qariyb 51 ta o'q uzilgan vaqtda o'q uzishni boshlaganini va uning olovi "o'ta samarali bo'lganligi va maydon va markaziy torpedo qayig'ini yopib qo'yganini" kuzatdi.[20]:39 53-sonli pulemyot plyonkasi yonida, uchuvchilar uyi orqasida joylashgan.[20]:16 Makgonagl ko'rmagan yoki "ko'prikning sarkard qanotidan 53-chi toqqa chiqa olmagan".[20]:39 Shunday qilib, u "janob Lukasni ko'pikning port tomoni atrofida, osmon yoritgichlari yoniga yubordi, u [avtomat 53) avtomatchi deb ishongan [dengizchi] Kinteroga o't o'chirishni aytadimi?" .[20]:39 Ensayner Lukas "bir necha daqiqadan so'ng 53-chi tog'da hech kimni ko'rmaganligini xabar qildi".[20]:39 Havodan hujum paytida qo'mondon ko'prigidan chiqib ketgan va kapitan Makgonaglga yordam berish uchun qaytib kelgan Lukas,[20]:14 o'q ovozi o'q-dorilardan bo'lishi mumkin deb ishongan pishirish, yaqin atrofdagi yong'in tufayli.[20]:16 Ilgari, Lukas Quinterodan torpedo qayiqlarini o'qqa tutish to'g'risida iltimosini qondirgan edi, yaqin atrofdagi yong'in issiqligi uni 53-quroldan quvib chiqarmadi.[20]:26,27 Keyinchalik McGonagle, tergov sudida, bu ehtimol u "juda samarali" otishma hodisasi bo'lganligi haqida guvohlik berdi.[20]:49

Yong'in ostiga tushgandan so'ng, torpedo qayiqlari o'zlarining zambaraklari bilan o'q uzdilar va o'ldirdilar Ozodlik boshqaruvchi.[44] Keyin torpedo qayiqlari beshta torpedani ishga tushirishdi Ozodlik.[45] 1235Z da (mahalliy vaqt bilan 2:35)[44] torpedani urish Ozodlik ustida starboard ustki qismning oldinga tomoni, kemaning tadqiqot joylariga aylantirilib, yuk tashish joyida 12 metr kenglikdagi teshik hosil qildi va 25 nafar harbiy xizmatchilar, ularning hammasi razvedka bo'limidan o'ldirildi va o'nlab odamlar yaralandi.[44] Aytishlaricha, torpedo korpusning asosiy qismiga urilib, u energiyaning katta qismini yutgan; ekipaj a'zolari, agar torpedaning ramkasini o'tkazib yuborgan bo'lsa Ozodlik ikkiga bo'lingan bo'lar edi. Qolgan to'rtta torpedalar kemani sog'inib qolishdi.[iqtibos kerak ]

Keyin torpedo qayiqlari yopildi va tuzilgan o'zlarining to'plari va pulemyotlari bilan kema tanasi.[iqtibos kerak ] Ba'zi ekipajlarning so'zlariga ko'ra, torpedo qayiqlari ziyonni nazorat qiluvchi tomonlar va dengizga chiqishga tayyorlanayotgan dengizchilarga qarata o'q uzgan. (Qarang quyida bahsli tafsilotlar.) Kemadan suzib chiqqan qutqaruv salini T-203 ko'tarib olib, AQSh dengiz floti belgilariga ega ekanligi aniqlandi. Keyin T-204 aylanib chiqdi Ozodlikva Oren GTR-5 belgisini ko'rdi, ammo bayroqni ko'rmadi.[iqtibos kerak ] Kema kimligini aniqlash uchun soat 15:30 ga qadar vaqt ketdi. Sal oldin Ozodlik'shaxsini tasdiqladi, Saratoga tomon an'anaviy qurollar bilan qurollangan sakkizta samolyotni uchirdi Ozodlik. Kema shaxsini tasdiqlagandan so'ng, Bosh shtabga xabar berildi va dengiz attashelari qal'asiga uzr so'raldi. Samolyot yaqinlashmoqda Ozodlik ga qaytarib berildi Saratoga.

Hujumdan keyin

6-flot flagman, USSKichik tosh yonida turish Ozodlik
USS LIBERTY yodgorligi
Arlington milliy qabristoni

AQSh Milliy xavfsizlik agentligi tomonidan e'lon qilingan tutib olingan radioaloqa stenogrammasiga ko'ra, taxminan soat 14:30 da, torpedo qayig'iga hujum boshlanishiga yaqin IAFning ikkita vertolyoti jo'natildi. Ozodlik's joylashuvi. Vertolyotlar taxminan 15: 10da, torpedo kemaga urilganidan taxminan 35 daqiqa o'tgach etib keldi. Yetib kelganidan keyin vertolyot uchuvchilaridan biri uning yerdagi boshqaruvchisidan kema Amerika bayrog'i ostida yurganligini tekshirishni so'ragan. Vertolyotlar havo hujumi paytida haddan tashqari qulab tushgan bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan kemaning ekipaj a'zolarini qisqa qidiruvni amalga oshirdi. Hech kim topilmadi. Vertolyotlar kemadan taxminan soat 15:20 da chiqib ketishdi.

Hujum boshlanganidan ikki soat o'tgach, taxminan soat 16 da Isroil AQShning Tel-Avivdagi elchixonasiga o'z harbiy kuchlari AQSh dengiz kuchlari kemasiga noto'g'ri hujum qilgani to'g'risida xabar berdi. Kema "amerikalik ekanligi" tasdiqlanganda, torpedo qayiqlari soat 16:40 atrofida yordam berish uchun qaytib kelishdi;[46] buni rad etdi Ozodlik. Keyinchalik, Isroil AQSh dengiz flotining attashe komandiri Qasrni kemaga uchirish uchun vertolyot bilan ta'minladi.[47] (32, 34-betlar)

Vashingtonda, Prezident Lyndon B. Jonson dan xabar olgan edi Birlashgan shtab boshliqlari bu Ozodlik noma'lum kema tomonidan sharqiy vaqt bilan ertalab soat 9:50 da torpedoed edi. Jonson Sovetlar ishtirok etgan deb taxmin qildi va Moskvaga hujum va samolyotlarning jo'natilishi haqidagi yangiliklar bilan ishonch bildirdi Saratoga. U hech qanday ochiq bayonot bermaslikni tanladi va bu vazifani unga topshirdi Fil G. Gulding, o'sha paytda mudofaa vazirining jamoat ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisi bo'lgan.[48] Ko'p o'tmay, isroilliklar kemaga noto'g'ri hujum qilganliklarini aytishdi. Jonson ma'muriyati Isroil elchisiga "qattiq norozilik" ni etkazdi Avraem Xarman. Shu orada, tez orada Isroil Bosh vaziri tomonidan uzr so'raldi Levi Eshkol, Tashqi ishlar vaziri Abba Eban va Muvaqqat ishlar vakili Efrayim Evron. 48 soat ichida Isroil qurbonlar va ularning oilalariga tovon puli to'lashni taklif qildi.[42]

Garchi Ozodlik jiddiy zarar ko'rgan, eni 39 fut balandlikdan 24 fut balandlikdagi (12 m × 7,3 m) teshik va burilgan keel bilan, ekipaj uni suvda ushlab turdi va u o'z kuchi bilan hududdan chiqib ketishga muvaffaq bo'ldi. Ozodlik keyinchalik yo'q qiluvchilar tomonidan kutib olindi USS Devis va USS Massey va kreyser USS Kichik tosh. Tibbiy xodimlar ko'chirildi Ozodlikva uni kuzatib qo'yishdi Maltada, u erda unga vaqtinchalik ta'mirlash ishlari olib borildi. Bular 1967 yil iyul oyida qurib bo'lingandan so'ng, Ozodlik AQShga qaytib keldi. U 1968 yil iyun oyida ekspluatatsiya qilingan va Dengiz kemalari registri. Ozodlik ga o'tkazildi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari dengiz ma'muriyati (MARAD) 1970 yil dekabrda va 1973 yilda hurda uchun sotilgan.

Boshidanoq, Isroilning yanglish kimlik haqidagi bayonotlariga javob Vashingtonda ma'muriyatning shubhasiz qabul qilinishiga qadar ochiq ishonmaslik o'rtasida bo'lib o'tdi. Kotib Raskning 10 iyun kuni Isroil elchisiga qilgan aloqasi, boshqa narsalar qatorida:

Hujum paytida USS Ozodlik Amerika bayrog'ini ko'tarib yurgan va uning tanasida katta oq harflar va raqamlarda aniq ko'rsatilgan edi. ... Tajriba shuni ko'rsatadiki, kemaning bayrog'i ham, identifikatsiya raqami ham havodan osongina ko'rinib turardi ... Shunga ko'ra, USS Ozodlik hujumdan taxminan bir soat oldin Isroil samolyotlari tomonidan aniqlangan yoki hech bo'lmaganda uning fuqaroligi aniqlangan. ... Kema Isroil harbiy kuchlari tomonidan aniqlangan yoki aniqlanishi kerak bo'lganidan keyin, torpedo qayiqlarining keyingi hujumi, inson hayotiga nisbatan beparvolikni namoyon etadi.[49][50]

Isroilda esdalik lavhasi Yashirin dengiz muzeyi[c]

Jorj Lenjovskiy eslatadi: "Prezident Jonson o'zining davlat kotibidan farqli o'laroq, fojiali hodisaning Isroil versiyasini to'liq qabul qilishi muhim edi". Uning ta'kidlashicha, Jonson o'zi haqida faqat bitta kichik xatboshisini kiritgan Ozodlik uning tarjimai holida,[51] unda u Isroilning tushuntirishini qabul qildi, ishni minimallashtirdi va o'lganlar va yaradorlar sonini mos ravishda 34 dan 10 gacha va 171 ni 100 ga tushirib yubordi. Lenjovski yana shunday deydi: "Aftidan Jonson Isroilni jilovlashdan ko'ra, Sovet Ittifoqi bilan yuzaga kelishi mumkin bo'lgan to'qnashuvdan qochishdan manfaatdor edi".[52]

McGonagle oldi "Shuhrat" medali, harakatlari uchun AQShning eng yuqori medalidir.[53][54] "Sharaf" medali odatda Oq uyda AQSh prezidenti tomonidan taqdim etiladi,[54][55] ammo bu safar u Vashington dengiz flotidagi Yardda taqdirlandi Dengiz kuchlari kotibi ommaviy bo'lmagan marosimda.[54] Boshqalar Ozodlik Dengizchilar hujum paytida va undan keyingi harakatlari uchun bezak olishdi, ammo mukofotlarning aksariyat qismida Isroil jinoyatchi sifatida qayd etilmagan. Biroq, 2009 yilda a Kumush yulduz kema aloqasini tiklagan buzilgan antennani tiklash uchun pulemyot va o'q otishda jasorat ko'rsatgan ekipaj a'zosi Terri Halbardierga mukofot berildi; uning mukofotida Isroil tajovuzkor deb nomlangan.[56]

Hujum bo'yicha tergovlar

Hodisa yuzasidan AQSh dengiz kuchlari, Bosh shtab boshliqlari, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi, AQSh uyi va Senati, NSA va Isroil hukumati tomonidan olib borilgan bir nechta tergovlar bo'lgan. Ushbu masala bo'yicha olib borilgan barcha tergovlar xuddi shu tarzda aloqa etishmasligidan kelib chiqmoqda va jinoiy javobgarlikka tortilish uchun hech qanday sabab yo'q.[57]

AQSh hukumatining tekshiruvlari

Sud Isroil qurolli kuchlari Ozodlikni to'g'ri aniqlash uchun keng imkoniyatlarga ega ekanligi to'g'risida dalillar keltirdi. Sud Isroil samolyotlari va motorli torpedo kemalarining hujum qilish to'g'risidagi qarorini qabul qilish sabablari to'g'risida qaror chiqarish uchun etarli ma'lumotga ega emas edi ... Hujumchilarning aybdorligi to'g'risida qaror chiqarish sud uchun javobgar emas edi va hech qanday dalil yo'q edi hujum qilgan xalqdan eshitildi.

— AQSh Mudofaa vazirligining 1967 yil 28 iyundagi yangiliklari Hujum bo'yicha tergov-dengiz sudiga tegishli.
Torpedo zarar Ozodliktadqiqot bo'limi (Starboard yon)

Amerikalik so'rovlar, memorandumlar, guvohlik yozuvlari va ular bilan bog'liq yoki eslatilgan turli xil hisobotlar Ozodlik hujum quyidagilarni o'z ichiga oladi, lekin ular bilan chegaralanmaydi:

AQSh harbiy-dengiz tergov sudi yozuvlari tomonidan ko'rsatmalar mavjud Ozodlik ekipaj a'zolari, hujumga oid fotosuratlar va turli hisobotlar.[58] Sud guvohlik yozuvlarida "kapitan va uning ekipaji o'rtasidagi ko'p sonli kelishmovchiliklarga duch kelgan sayoz tergov" aniqlangan degan xulosaga keldi.[59] Harbiy-dengiz floti Tergov sudining ish yuritish yozuvlariga ko'ra, to'rt kun guvohlik berishni tinglash uchun sarf qilingan: hujumdan omon qolgan o'n to'rt kishi va AQSh dengiz kuchlarining bir necha ekspert guvohlari uchun ikki kun, AQSh dengiz kuchlarining ikkita ekspert guvohi uchun ikki kun.[60] Ishtirok etgan Isroil xodimlaridan hech qanday guvohlik eshitilmadi.[60][57]

Ozodlik hodisasi bo'yicha AQShning rasmiy yozuvlari belgilandi juda sirli va keng jamoatchilik uchun yopiq.[57] AQSh hukumati va Isroil birgalikda ta'kidladilar: "Isroilning USS Liberty samolyotiga hujumi xato tufayli sodir bo'ldi va bundan boshqa narsa yo'q".[57] A'zosi Admiral Tomas H. Murer Birlashgan shtab boshliqlari Ozodlik voqeasi sodir bo'lgan paytda, u "isroilliklarning bu noto'g'ri shaxsiyat holati bo'lganligi haqidagi da'vosini qabul qila olmaydi", deb aytgan.[57]

Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Memorandumi ikkita hujjatdan iborat: biri 1967 yil 13 iyunda, ikkinchisi 1967 yil 21 iyunda. 13 iyundagi memorandum - "hujumning holatlari to'g'risidagi hisobot ... mavjud bo'lgan barcha manbalardan olingan".[61] 21-iyundagi memorandum Isroil tomonidan olib borilgan surishtiruvlar natijalarini tahlil qilishdir.[61] Xulosa shunday yakunlanadi: "Hujum AQShga nisbatan yomon niyat bilan qilingan emas va xato bilan qilingan, ammo ID shtab-kvartirasi va hujum qilgan samolyotning Ozodlik va undan keyin torpedo qayiqlari tomonidan uyushtirilgan hujum ham nomuvofiq, ham qo'pol beparvolikdan dalolat berdi. "[61]

The Klark Klifford hisobot yakunlandi: "Ozodlikka qarshi asossiz hujum Isroil hukumati to'liq javobgarlikka tortilishi kerak bo'lgan Isroil harbiy xizmatchilari jazolanishi kerak bo'lgan qo'pol beparvolik harakatini tashkil etadi."[57]

Senatning Xalqaro aloqalar qo'mitasi ko'rsatmalarida chet elda chet eldan yordam olishga ruxsat berish to'g'risidagi qonun loyihasini tinglash paytida, bir qator senatorlarning savollari va bayonotlari va o'sha paytdagi javoblari mavjud. Mudofaa vaziri, Robert Maknamara, haqida Ozodlik hujum. Aksariyat hollarda senatorlar aytganidek, senatorlar hujumdan qo'rqishdi Burke B. Hikenlooper: "O'qiganlarimdan, bu [hujum] tasodif bo'lganiga bir daqiqaga toqat qilolmayman." Qo'mita raisi aytganidek, hujum haqida ko'proq ma'lumot olishdan xavotir bor edi J. Uilyam Fulbrayt: "Taxminan ikki hafta oldin biz [hujum bo'yicha tergov xulosasini] so'ragan edik va bu haqda hozirgacha Kotib Raskdan olmagan edik ... Biz unga etib borgunimizcha boshqa mavzudagi mavzularda bo'lamiz." Kotib MakNamara tergov xulosasini tezkor ravishda etkazib berishni va'da qilib, "... buni to'rt soat ichida olasiz" va so'zlarini quyidagicha yakunladi: "Men shunchaki tergov xulosasida ongli ravishda niyat qilganligi to'g'risida dalillar mavjud emasligini ta'kidlamoqchiman. AQSh kemasiga hujum qiling. "[62]

The Qurolli kuchlar qo'mitasi tergov xulosasi, "Mudofaa vazirligining butun dunyo bo'ylab aloqalarini ko'rib chiqish"[63][64] ga qaratilgan tergov emas edi Ozodlik bilan bog'langan aloqa oqimini tavsiflovchi bo'lim mavjud bo'lsa-da, hujum Ozodlik voqea.[63][64]

The Milliy xavfsizlik agentligi (NSA) tarixiy hisobot, nomi bilan aytganda, AQSh harbiy-dengiz floti tergov sudi yozuvlari, harbiy va hukumatning turli xil xabarlari va memorandumlari va shaxsiy tarkibi uchun shaxsiy intervyulariga ishora qiluvchi tarixiy hisobotdir.[64] Hisobot "Javobsiz savollar" deb nomlangan bo'lim bilan yakunlanadi va aybdorlik to'g'risida xulosa chiqarmaydi.[64] Shu bilan birga, unda sir saqlangan hujjatlar mavjud edi: «Ko'p sonli har bir rasmiy intervyu Ozodlik ekipaj a'zolari haqiqatan ham Ozodlik Amerika bayrog'ini ko'targaniga dalillarni keltirdilar va bundan tashqari, ob-havo sharoiti uni osonlikcha kuzatish va identifikatsiyalashni ta'minlash uchun juda mos edi. "[65]

The USS Ozodlik Veteranlar uyushmasi kemadagi faxriylardan tashkil topgan bo'lib, AQSh Kongressi tergovlari va AQShning boshqa tergovlari aslida hujumni tergov qilish emas, balki faqat AQSh dengiz kuchlari tergov sudining dalillaridan foydalangan holda xabar berish yoki kommunikatsiya kabi masalalarni o'z ichiga olgan aybdorlik bilan bog'liq bo'lmagan tekshiruvlar ekanligini ta'kidlaydi. .[57] Ularning fikriga ko'ra, AQSh harbiy-dengiz floti tergov sudi bu voqea bo'yicha bugungi kunga qadar yagona haqiqiy tergov.[60] Ularning aytishicha, bu shoshilinch ravishda, atigi o'n kun ichida o'tkazilgan, garchi sud raisi, Kontr-admiral Isaak Kidd, to'g'ri o'tkazish uchun olti oy vaqt kerakligini aytdi.[60] So'rov texnik topshiriqlar Ozodlik ekipajidagi kamchiliklar hujum natijasida kelib chiqqan jarohatlar va o'limlarga sabab bo'ladimi-yo'qmi bilan cheklangan.[60]

The Milliy arxivlar yilda Kollej parki, Merilend, tomonidan olingan ma'lumotni tasdiqlovchi dalillarni o'z ichiga olmaydi Ozodlik Golan frontidagi voqealar va Isroilning u erdagi niyatlari haqida Vashingtonning allaqachon batafsil tasvirini kuchaytirdi.[57]

Isroil hukumatining tekshiruvlari

Isroil tashqi ishlar vazirligining Isroilning Vashingtondagi elchixonasiga yo'llagan xatiga ko'ra:

Yaratilgan og'ir vaziyatda, natijani yumshatishning yagona usuli bu AQSh hukumati oldida ushbu ofat uchun odamlarni jinoiy javobgarlikka tortish niyatimiz borligini e'lon qilishdir. Buni bugun kechqurun Isroilda e'lon qilishimiz kerak. ... it is crucial that our announcement about prosecuting those who are to blame be publicized before – I repeat, before – the publication of the American report here.[66]

Two subsequent Israeli inquiry reports and a historical report concluded the attack was conducted because Ozodlik was confused with an Egyptian vessel and because of failures in communications between Israel and the U.S. The three Israeli reports were:[57]

  • Fact Finding Inquiry by Colonel Ram Ron ("Ram Ron Report"—June 1967)[67]
  • Preliminary Inquiry (Hearing) by Examining Judge Yeshayahu Yerushalmi ("Yerushalmi Report"—July 1967)[68] (Adjudication of IDF negligence complaints.)
  • Historical Report "The Ozodlik Incident"—IDF History Department report (1982)[69]

In the historical report, it was acknowledged that IDF naval headquarters knew at least three hours before the attack that the ship was "an electromagnetic audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy" but concluded that this information had simply "gotten lost, never passed along to the ground controllers who directed the air attack nor to the crews of the three Israeli torpedo boats".[57][69]

The Israeli government said that three crucial errors were made: the refreshing of the status board (removing the ship's classification as American, so that the later shift did not see it identified), the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the lack of notification from the returning aircraft informing Israeli headquarters of markings on the front of the hull (markings that would not be found on an Egyptian ship). As a common root of these problems, Israel blamed the combination of alarm and fatigue experienced by the Israeli forces at that point of the war when pilots were severely overworked.[57][65][69]

After conducting his own fact-finding inquiry and reviewing evidence, Judge Yerushalmi's decision was: "I have not discovered any deviation from the standard of reasonable conduct which would justify committal of anyone for trial." In other words, he found no negligence by any IDF member associated with the attack.[57][58]

Ongoing controversy and unresolved questions

Some intelligence and military officials dispute Israel's explanation.[70] Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State at the time of the incident, wrote:

I was never satisfied with the Israeli explanation. Their sustained attack to disable and sink Ozodlik precluded an assault by accident or some trigger-happy local commander. Through diplomatic channels we refused to accept their explanations. I didn't believe them then, and I don't believe them to this day. The attack was outrageous.[71]

Retired naval Leytenant komandir Jeyms Ennes, a kichik ofitser (and off-going Kemaning xodimi ) ustida Ozodlik's bridge at the time of the attack, authored a book titled Assault on the Liberty describing the incident and saying, among other things, that the attack was deliberate.[72] Ennes and Joe Meadors, also a survivor of the attack, run a website about the incident.[73] Meadors states that the classification of the attack as deliberate is the official policy of the USS Ozodlik Veterans Association,[74] to which survivors and other former crew members belong. Other survivors run several additional websites. Citing Ennes's book, Lenczowski notes: Ozodlik's personnel received firm orders not to say anything to anybody about the attack, and the naval inquiry was conducted in such a way as to earn it the name of "coverup".[52]

In 2002, Captain Ward Boston, JAGC, U.S. Navy, senior counsel for the Court of Inquiry, said that the Court of Inquiry's findings were intended to cover up what was a deliberate attack by Israel on a ship that the Israelis knew to be American. In 2004, in response to the publication of A. Jey Kristol kitobi The Liberty Incident, which Boston said was an "insidious attempt to whitewash the facts", Boston prepared and signed an affidavit in which he said that Admiral Kidd had told him that the government ordered Kidd to falsely report that the attack was a mistake, and that Boston and Kidd both believed the attack was deliberate.[75] Cristol wrote about Boston's professional qualifications and integrity, on page 149 of his book:

Boston brought two special assets in addition to his skill as a Navy lawyer. He had been a naval aviator in World War II and therefore had insight beyond that of one qualified only in the law. Also, Kidd knew him as a man of integrity. On an earlier matter Boston had been willing to bump heads with Kidd when Boston felt it was more important to do the right thing than to curry favor with the senior who would write his fitness report.

— A. Jay Cristol, The Liberty Incident

Cristol said he believes that Boston is not telling the truth about Kidd's views and any pressure from the U.S. government.[76] Cristol, who also served as an officer of the U.S. Navy's Judge Advocate General, suggests that Boston was responsible in part for the original conclusions of the Court of Inquiry and, that by later declaring that they were false, Boston has admitted to "lying under oath". Cristol also notes that Boston's statements about pressure on Kidd were hearsay, and that Kidd was not alive to confirm or deny them and that Boston did not maintain, prior to his affidavit and comments related to it, that Kidd spoke of such instructions to Boston or to others. Cristol also provides a handwritten 1991 letter from Admiral Kidd[77] that, according to Cristol, "suggest that Ward Boston has either a faulty memory or a vivid imagination". According to James Ennes, however, Admiral Kidd urged Ennes and his group to keep pressing for an open congressional probe.[78]

The following arguments, found in official reports or other sources, were published to support the hypothesis that the attack was due to mistaken identity:

  • Accidents and mistakes do occur in wartime. Jurnalist Zeev Shiff gave an example of a do'stona olov incident where Israeli aircraft had bombed an Israeli armored column south of the West Bank town of Jenin the day before the attack on the Ozodlik.[79] Also given as an example was a similar incident that took place during the Suvaysh inqirozi in 1956, when Israeli aircraft attacked and damaged the British frigate HMS Vinç after mistaking it for an Egyptian warship, at a time when Britain and Israel were fighting together.[80]
  • The incident took place during the Olti kunlik urush when Israel was engaged in battles with two Arab countries and preparing to attack a third, creating an environment where mistakes and confusion were prevalent. For example, at 11:45, a few hours before the attack, there was a large explosion on the shores of El-Arish followed by black smoke, probably caused by the destruction of an ammunition dump by retreating Egyptian forces. The Israeli army thought the area was being bombarded, and that an unidentified ship offshore was responsible.
  • As the torpedo boats approached, Ozodlik opened fire on them. McGonagle said that he felt sure the torpedo boat captains believed they were under fire from the Ozodlik. Ensign Lucas, testified that he gave permission for the firing of the 03 level machine gun after the torpedo boats began firing at Ozodlik. Later, when the gun was unmanned, heat from a nearby fire apparently caused machine gun rounds at the gun to explode.[20]
  • Admiral Shlomo Erell, head of the Israeli Navy in 1967, stated that no successful argument of benefit has been presented for Israel purposely attacking an American warship, especially considering the high cost of predictable complications that would follow an attack on a powerful ally. He also pointed out that Israel notified the American embassy immediately after the attack.[81]
Imtiyozlar starboard korpus va yuqori qurilish attack damage

Several books and the BBC documentary USS Ozodlik: Dead in the Water deb ta'kidladi Ozodlik was attacked in order to prevent the U.S. from knowing about the forthcoming attack in the Golan balandliklari, which would violate a cease-fire to which Israel's government had agreed.[82] However, Syria did not accept the cease fire until 9 June, after the attack on Ozodlik.[83] Russian author Joseph Daichman, in his book History of the Mossad, states Israel was justified in attacking the Ozodlik.[84] Israel knew that American radio signals were intercepted by the Soviet Union and that the Soviets would certainly inform Egypt of the fact that, by moving troops to the Golan Heights, Israel had left the Egyptian border undefended.[85]

Lenczowski notes that while the Israeli decision to "attack and destroy" the ship "may appear puzzling", the explanation seems to be found in Ozodlik's nature and its task to monitor communications from both sides in the war zone. He writes that timely knowledge of their decision to invade Syria and preparatory moves toward it "might have frustrated Israeli designs for the conquest of Syria's Golan Heights" and, in the sense of Ennes's accusations, provides "a plausible thesis that Israel deliberately decided to incapacitate the signals-collecting American ship and leave no one alive to tell the story of the attack".[86]

The U.S. ambassador to Israel, Barbour, had reported on the day of the Ozodlik attack that he "would not be surprised" by an Israeli attack on Syria, and the IDF Intelligence chief told a White House aide then in Israel that "there still remained the Syria problem and perhaps it would be necessary to give Syria a blow".[87]

The 1981 book Qurol by Russell Warren Howe says that Ozodlik was accompanied by the Polaris ballistik raketasi qurollangan Lafayet- sinf suvosti kemasi USSAndrew Jackson, which filmed the entire episode through its periscope but was unable to provide assistance.[d]

James Bamford, a former ABC News producer, says in his 2001 book Sirlar to'plami,[88] that Israel deliberately attacked Ozodlik to prevent the discovery of what he described as war crimes, including the killing of Egyptian prisoners of war by the IDF that he alleges was taking place around the same time in the nearby town of El-Arish.[89] Biroq, ko'ra KAMERA, his claim that 400 Egyptians were executed has been cast into doubt since reporters present in the town claimed that there had been a large battle and this was the main cause of casualties.[90] Bamford also stated that eyewitness Gabi Bron had claimed he saw 150 people executed by Israeli troops at El-Arish.[88] However, Gabi Bron claimed to have only seen 5 people executed by Israeli troops.[91][92]

The press release for the BBC documentary film Suvda o'lik states that new recorded and other evidence suggests the attack was a "daring ploy by Israel to fake an Egyptian attack" to give America a reason to enter the war against Egypt. It claimed that President Lyndon B. Jonson launched allegedly nuclear-armed aircraft targeted against Cairo from a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The aircraft were recalled only just in time, when it was clear the Ozodlik had not been sunk and that Israel had carried out the attack. An information source for the aircraft being nuclear-armed, James Ennes later stated:

It is clear that I was mistaken about the aircraft involved, as F4s do not carry nuclear weapons. Others tell me that the aircraft that were launched carried Bullpup missiles, which might easily be mistaken for nuclear bombs. And we learned much later that the USS Amerika was involved in a nuclear weapons loading drill at the very time the ship learned of the attack on the Liberty and that this drill is one factor that delayed America's response to our call for help. It is also possible that those were the weapons seen by our sources.Also confusing this issue is an oral history report from the American Embassy in Cairo, now in the LBJ Library, which notes that the Embassy received an urgent message from Washington warning that Cairo was about to be bombed by US forces, presumably in mistaken retaliation for the USS Liberty attack. That strange message was never explained or cancelled.[93]

The video also provides hearsay evidence of a covert alliance of U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.[94]

Admiral Tomas H. Murer, avvalgi Shtab boshliqlarining birlashgan raisi and a critic of the official United States Government version of events, chaired a non-governmental investigation into the attack on the Ozodlik in 2003. The committee, which included former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia Jeyms E. Akins, found Israel to be culpable and suggested several theories for Israel's possible motives, including the desire to blame Egypt and so bring the U.S. into the Six-Day War.[95]

Ga binoan Jon Loftus va Mark Aarons ularning kitobida, The Secret War Against the Jews, Ozodlik was attacked because the Israelis knew that the ship's mission was to monitor radio signals from Israeli troops and pass troop movement information to the Egyptians.[96]

NSA tapes and subsequent developments

The NSA reported that there had been no radio intercepts of the attack made by the Ozodlik herself, nor had there been any radio intercepts made by the U.S. submarine USSAmberjack. Within an hour of learning that the Ozodlik had been torpedoed, the director of the U.S. Milliy xavfsizlik agentligi, LTG Marshall S. Karter, sent a message to all intercept sites requesting a search of communications that might be connected to the attack or any reaction to it. The only such communication reported was intercepted by a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft that flew near the attacks from 2:30 pm to 3:27 pm, Sinai time (1230 to 1327 Z ); it had collected voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hatzor Airfield following the attack on the Ozodlik.[97]

On 2 July 2003, the NSA released copies of these recordings and their translations and summaries.[98] These revelations were elicited as part of a Axborot erkinligi to'g'risidagi qonun lawsuit by Florida bankruptcy judge and retired naval aviator Jay Cristol. Two linguists who were aboard the EC-121 when the recordings were made said separately that at least two additional tapes were made that had been withheld.[7] English language translations of the released tapes indicate that the Israelis spoke of hitting an Egyptian supply ship even after the end of attack.[99][100] The rescue helicopters relayed urgent requests that the rescuers ask the first survivor pulled out of the water what his nationality is; there was discussion as to whether the survivors would speak Arabic.[101]

A summary of the NSA-translated tapes[102] indicates that at 1234Z Hatzor air control began directing two Israeli Air Force helicopters to an Egyptian warship, to rescue its crew: "This ship has now been identified as Egyptian." The helicopters arrived near the ship at about 1303Z: "I see a big vessel, near it are three small vessels ..." At 1308Z, Hatzor air control indicated concern about the nationality of the ship's crew: "The first matter to clarify is to find out what their nationality is." At 1310Z, one of the helicopter pilots asked the nearby torpedo boats' Division Commander about the meaning of the ship's hull number: "GTR5 is written on it. Does this mean something?" The response was: "Negative, it doesn't mean anything." At 1312Z, one of the helicopter pilots was asked by air control: "Did you clearly identify an American flag?" No answer appears in the transcript, but the air controller then says: "We request that you make another pass and check once more if this is really an American flag." Again, no response appears in the transcript. At about 1314Z, the helicopters were directed to return home.

On 10 October 2003, Quddus Post ran an interview with Yiftah Spector, one of the pilots who participated in the attack.[103] Spector said the ship was assumed to be Egyptian, stating that: "there was positively no flag". The interview also contains the transcripts of the Israeli communications about the Ozodlik. However, the journalist who transcribed the tapes for that article, Arieh O'Sullivan, later confirmed that "the Israeli Air Force tapes he listened to contained blank spaces".[7] The Ozodlik's survivors contradict Spector. According to subsequently declassified NSA documents: "Every official interview of numerous Ozodlik crewmen gave consistent evidence that the Ozodlik was flying an American flag—and, further, the weather conditions were ideal to ensure its easy observance and identification."[104]

On 8 June 2005, the USS Ozodlik Veterans Association filed a "Report of War Crimes Committed Against the U.S. Military, June 8, 1967" with the Department of Defense (DoD). Ular aytishdi Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E requires the Department of Defense to conduct a thorough investigation of the allegations contained in their report. DoD has responded that a new investigation would not be conducted since a Navy Court of Inquiry had already investigated the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack.

As of 2006, the NSA had yet to declassify "boxes and boxes" of Ozodlik hujjatlar. Numerous requests under both declassification directives and the Freedom of Information Act are pending with various agencies including the NSA, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi va Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi. "On 8 June 2007, the National Security Agency released hundreds of additional declassified documentson the Israeli attack on the USS Ozodlik, a communications interception vessel, on 8 June 1967."[98]

On 2 October 2007, The Chicago Tribune published a special report[7] into the attack, containing numerous previously unreported quotes from former military personnel with first-hand knowledge of the incident. Many of these quotes directly contradict the NSA's position that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots, saying that not only did transcripts of those communications exist, but also that it showed the Israelis knew they were attacking an American naval vessel.

Two diplomatic cables written by Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassador in Washington, to Abba Eban, Isroilniki tashqi ishlar vaziri, have been declassified by Israel and obtained from the Israel State Archive. The first cable, sent five days after the attack, informs Eban that a U.S. informant told him (Harman) that there was "clear proof that from a certain stage the pilot discovered the identity of the ship and continued the attack anyway".[15] The second cable, sent three days later, added that the White House is "very angry" because "the Americans probably have findings showing that our pilots indeed knew that the ship was American".[7] Documents of the Israeli General Staff meetings, declassified in October 2008, show no discussion of a planned attack on an American ship.[105]

On 30 October 2014, Al-Jazira broadcast a documentary film containing recent first-hand accounts by several survivors of the incident.[106] The documentary argues that Israel knew the ship was American, and planned to blame its sinking on Egypt in order to draw the US into the war on the Israeli side.

Details in dispute

The "Second Ensign" flown during the attack. Israel Defense Forces' investigative reports say their pilots and torpedo boat commander saw no flags during the attack.

Many of the events surrounding the attack are the subject of controversy:

  • Visibility of American flag: The official Israeli reports say that the reconnaissance and fighter aircraft pilots, and the torpedo boat captains did not see any flag on the Ozodlik. Official American reports say that the Ozodlik was flying her American flag before, during and after the attack; the only exception being a brief period in which one flag had been shot down and was replaced with a larger flag. The helicopters sent to the attack site to provide assistance after the air attack noticed an American flag flying from the ship almost immediately upon their arrival at the attack site[107] and informed their controller.
  • U.S. crewmen's perceptions of intent: Surviving crewmembers of the Ozodlik say that Israel's attack on the ship was "deliberate" and with full knowledge that the vessel was American. Israeli investigation and history reports agree that the attack was deliberate—but against what they believed was an Egyptian vessel.
Damaged USS Ozodlik one day after attack (9 June 1967)
An auxiliary ship of the Egyptian Navy
  • Distinctiveness of USS Liberty's appearance: Yoki yo'qligi haqida bahslashmoqda Ozodlik would have been immediately recognizable as a different vessel from the Egyptian ship El Quseir. Admiral Tom Moorer stated that the Ozodlik was the most identifiable ship in the U.S. Navy and in an interview with the Vashington Post stated that it was "ridiculous" to suggest that it would not be identified as such. Israel states in its inquiry and history reports that the identification as the El Quseir was made by the torpedo boats while the Ozodlik was enveloped in smoke and was based on "The Red Book", a guide to Arab fleets that did not include U.S. vessels.(Web site with images of both ships )
  • Identification markings: Ozodlik bore an eight-foot-high "5" and a four-foot-high "GTR" along either bow, clearly indicating her hull (or "pennant") number (AGTR-5), and had 18-inch (460 mm)-high letters spelling the vessel's name across her qattiq. These markings were not cursive Arab yozuvi lekin Lotin alifbosi. Israeli pilots initially said they were primarily concerned with ensuring the ship was not an Israeli warship and that they ended the air attack when they noticed the Latin alphabet markings.[108]
  • Ship's identification known during attack: A Jeyms Bamford kitob[109] published in 2001 said that secret NSA intercepts indicate that Israeli pilots had full knowledge they were attacking a U.S. vessel.[110] The NSA website denies that there are any U.S. recordings of the attack itself; this is disputed by several intelligence specialists who say they have read the original transcripts.[iqtibos kerak ]
  • Effort for identification: The American crew says the attacking aircraft did not make identification runs over Ozodlik, but began to strafe immediately. Israel says several identification passes were made. The Naval Court of Enquiry, based on the Israeli timeline of events, found: "One may infer from the fact that within a period of approximately 15 minutes, the request was transmitted (for aircraft to be dispatched), received, a command decision made, aircraft dispatched, and the attack launched, that no significant time was expended in an effort to identify the ship from the air before the attack was launched."[111]
  • Speed of the vessel: According to Israeli accounts, the torpedo boat made erroneous measurements that indicated that Ozodlik was steaming at 30 kn (35 mph; 56 km/h). Israeli naval doctrine at the time required that a ship traveling at that speed must be presumed to be a warship. A second boat calculated Ozodlik's speed to be 28 kn (32 mph; 52 km/h). The maximum sustained speed of Ozodlik was only 17.5 kn (20.1 mph; 32.4 km/h), 21 kn (24 mph; 39 km/h). According to the Court of Enquiry findings the ship was steaming at 5 kn (5.8 mph; 9.3 km/h) at the time of the attack.
Commander W.L. McGonagle in his damaged cabin after the attack
  • Motive: James Bamford, among others, says one possible motive was to prevent the United States from eavesdropping on Israeli military activities and monitoring the events taking place in nearby Gaza.[110] In a study of the incident concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support either accidental or deliberate attack, Colonel Peyton E. Smith wrote of the possibility that "The attack was most likely deliberate for reasons far too sensitive to be disclosed by the US (or) Israeli government and that the truth may never be known".[112] Author and former crew member James M. Ennes theorized, in the epilogue of his book Assault on the Liberty, that the motive was to prevent the ship's crew from monitoring radio traffic that might reveal Israel as the aggressor in its impending invasion of Syria, which the White House opposed. Ga ko'ra Tuhmatga qarshi kurash ligasi "the argument that Israel knowingly attacked an American ship has always lacked a convincing motive".[113]
  • Israeli aircraft markings: AQSh Ozodlik Veterans Association says that the attacking Israeli aircraft were not marked,[74] but a crewmember recalls watching a Jewish officer cry on seeing the blue Star of David on their fuselages.[7] The torpedo boats that attacked Ozodlik flew the Israeli flag.[44]
  • Jamming: During U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Wayne L. Smith, Radioman Chief, testified that radio communications were intermittently jammed. Rear Admiral Kidd (a senior member of Naval Court of Inquiry) reported: "Ozodlik reported apparent discriminate jamming on certain CW and voice circuits just before and during each aircraft's individual attack." None of the Israeli Defense Forces' investigations or reports confirm or deny radio frequency jamming.
  • Jamming as a motive: A UPI report published by The Washington Star on 19 September 1977 indicated CIA documents obtained by the American Palestine Committee suggested Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan ordered the attack because Ozodlik was jamming Israeli communications. A CIA document dated 23 June 1967 said Ozodlik had been jamming Israeli communications. Another CIA document dated 9 November 1967 quoted unidentified agency informants as saying Dayan personally ordered the attack; the CIA said the documents were "unevaluated for accuracy".[114]
  • Israeli ships' actions after the torpedo hit: Officers and men of Ozodlik say that after the torpedo attack and the abandon ship order, motor torpedo boats strafed the ship's topside with automatic gunfire preventing men from escaping from below, and either machine-gunned or confiscated the empty life rafts that had been set afloat.[115][75] IDF buni aytmoqda Ozodlik was not fired upon after the torpedo attack and that a rescue raft was fished from the water while searching for survivors.[116]
  • Israeli offers of help: The Ozodlik's captain, several of the Ozodlik's crewmen and the Israelis stated that help was offered, but at different times. The Ozodlik's Deck Log, signed by the captain, has an entry at 15:03 stating: "One MTB returned to the ship and signaled, 'Do you need help.' " The Israel Defense Forces's History Report and the Ram Ron report both say that help was offered at 16:40 and the offer was rejected.[116][46]
  • U.S. rescue attempts: At least two rescue attempts were launched from U.S. samolyot tashuvchilar nearby but were recalled, according to the Ozodlik's senior Naval Security Group officer, Lieutenant Commander David Lewis. Lewis made an audio yozuv va keyinroq yozgan about a meeting 6th Fleet Rear Admiral Lawrence Geis requested in his cabins:

    He told me that since I was the senior Ozodlik survivor on board he wanted to tell me in confidence what had actually transpired. He told me that upon receipt of our SOS, aircraft were launched to come to our assistance and then Washington was notified. U shunday dedi Mudofaa vaziri (Robert Maknamara ) had ordered that the aircraft be returned to the carrier, which was done. RADM Geis then said that he speculated that Washington may have suspected that the aircraft carried nuclear weapons so he put together another flight of conventional aircraft that had no capability of carrying nuclear weapons. These he launched to assist us and again notified Washington of his actions. Again McNamara ordered the aircraft recalled. He requested confirmation of the order being unable to believe that Washington would let us sink. This time President Johnson ordered the recall with the comment that he did not care if every man drowned and the ship sank, but that he would not embarrass his allies.

Adabiyotlar

Izohlar

  1. ^ The failure of the Israeli navy's attacks on Egyptian and Syrian ports early in the war did little to assuage Israel's fears. The U.S. had previously rejected Israel's request for a formal naval liaison. 31 may kuni Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassador to Washington, had warned Under Secretary of State Evgeniy V. Rostov that if war breaks out, "we would have no telephone number to call, no code for plane recognition, and no way to get in touch with the AQSh Oltinchi floti ". (Oren 2000 )
  2. ^ While Egyptian naval ships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. The fact that the ship had Western markings led Rabin to fear that it was Soviet, and he immediately called off the jets. Two IAF Hornet helicopters were sent to look for survivors—Spector had reported seeing men overboard—while the torpedo boat squadron was ordered to hold its fire pending further attempts at identification. Though that order was recorded in the torpedo boat's log, [the commander], Oren, claimed he never received it. (Oren 2000 )
  3. ^ Translation: "We express deep sorrow for the thirty-four friends who died by our hands in combat they should not have been involved in. May their memory be blessed. Veterans of MTB squadron"
  4. ^ Bir nechta Ozodlik crew members testified that they had briefly seen a periscope during the attack. In 1988, the Lyndon Johnson Library declassified and released a document from the Ozodlik archive with the "Top Secret—Eyes Only" security caveat (Document #12C sanitized and released 21DEC88 under review case 86–199). This "Memorandum for the Record" dated 10 April 1967 reported a briefing of the "303 Committee" by General Ralph D. Steakley. According to the memo, General Steakley "briefed the committee on a sensitive DOD project known as FRONTLET 615", which is identified in a handwritten note on the original memorandum as "submarine within U.A.R. waters". Further Freedom of Information Act requests returned no information on any project called "FRONTLET 615". In February 1997, a senior member of the crew of the submarine USSAmberjack told James Ennes that he had watched the attack through the periscope and took pictures. According to the official ship's history from the Department of Defense, Amberjack's mission between 23 April and 24 July was reconnaissance within U.A.R. suvlar. When contacted, four crewmen stated that they were so close to Ozodlik when it came under attack that some of the crew believed Amberjack itself was under depth charge attack. August Hubal, Captain of the Amberjack, insists that the vessel was 100 mi (160 km) from the Ozodlik and when told the crew believed they were closer replied "They must be mistaken". On 2 July 2003, as a result of a lawsuit using the Freedom of Information Act by Joel Leyden on behalf of the Israel News Agency requesting any evidence that the U.S. submarine Amberjack had gathered by means of its periscope, the National Security Agency stated that there had been "no radio intercepts made by the U.S. submarine Amberjack". James Ennes believes that if the submarine photography exists, it should show that the ship's flag was clearly visible to the attacking fighters and torpedo boats.

Iqtiboslar

  1. ^ a b v "Wikimapia.org Tag". Arxivlandi asl nusxasidan 2006 yil 14 dekabrda. Olingan 17 iyun 2010.
  2. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, pp. 1–2, 5, 25–26, 28
  3. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, pp. 28–29, 52
  4. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 26
  5. ^ Cristol, A.Jay (2013). The Liberty Incident Revealed: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship. Dengiz instituti matbuoti. pp. 61, 113–114. ISBN  978-1-61251-387-4.
  6. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 57
  7. ^ a b v d e f Crewdson, John (2 October 2007). "New revelations in attack on American spy ship". Chicago Tribune. Arxivlandi asl nusxasidan 2007 yil 11 oktyabrda. Olingan 4 oktyabr 2007.
  8. ^ Ofer, Aderet (11 July 2017). "'But sir, it's an American ship.' 'Never mind, hit her!' When Israel attacked USS Liberty". Haaretz.
  9. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 64
  10. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 2018-04-02 121 2
  11. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 1
  12. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 5
  13. ^ a b v Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 21
  14. ^ IDF History Report 1982, p. 22.
  15. ^ a b Skott 2009 yil, p. 197
  16. ^ Ennes 1987, 38-39 betlar
  17. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 20
  18. ^ a b v Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 25
  19. ^ "Voqealar xronologiyasi" (PDF). Arxivlandi asl nusxasi (PDF) 2007 yil 28 iyunda. Olingan 17 iyun 2007.
  20. ^ a b v d e f g h men j k l m n o p q U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry Arxivlandi 2006 yil 19 dekabr Orqaga qaytish mashinasi Court of Inquiry for USS Ozodlik attack, Record of Proceedings, 18 June 1967
  21. ^ NSA History Report, 21-23 betlar
  22. ^ Ennes 1987, p. 62
  23. ^ IDF History Report 1982, 6-7 betlar
  24. ^ a b v d IDF History Report 1982, p. 7
  25. ^ IDF History Report 1982, 7-8 betlar
  26. ^ a b v IDF History Report 1982, p. 8
  27. ^ a b v d e f g h men j IDF History Report 1982, p. 10
  28. ^ a b Bamford, Body of Secrets
  29. ^ a b v d e f IDF History Report 1982, p. 11
  30. ^ Yerushalmi Inquiry Report Arxivlandi 2008 yil 30-may kuni Orqaga qaytish mashinasi p 3
  31. ^ IDF History Report 1982, p. 12
  32. ^ a b v IDF History Report 1982, p. 13
  33. ^ a b v IDF Ram Ron Report 1967, p. 5
  34. ^ Skott 2009 yil, p. 215
  35. ^ Skott 2009 yil, p. 47
  36. ^ Skott 2009 yil, pp. 44–46
  37. ^ Gerhard & Millington 1981, 25-26 betlar
  38. ^ Skott 2009 yil, p. 39
  39. ^ a b Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 28
  40. ^ Skott 2009 yil, p. 66
  41. ^ "Israeli Seaman Describes Attack". Owosso Argus-press. Owosso, Michigan. 6 iyul 1967. p. 12.
  42. ^ a b Oren 2000.
  43. ^ IDF History Report 1982, p. 16
  44. ^ a b v d Gerhard & Millington 1981, p. 29
  45. ^ IDF History Report 1982, p. 17
  46. ^ a b IDF Ram Ron Report 1967, p. 9
  47. ^ "NSA History Report" (PDF). Arxivlandi asl nusxasi (PDF) on 13 March 2004. Olingan 27 sentyabr 2006.
  48. ^ USS LIBERTY hodisasida jamoatchilik bilan aloqalar. Arxivlandi 2013 yil 13-iyul kuni Orqaga qaytish mashinasi
  49. ^ "Davlat kotibi Raskdan Isroil elchisiga diplomatik eslatma". AQSh Davlat departamenti: Tarixchi idorasi. AQSh hukumati. Arxivlandi asl nusxasidan 2016 yil 1 yanvarda. Olingan 9-noyabr 2015.
  50. ^ Lenzovskiy 1990 yil, p. 111 zikr qilish Ennes 1987 yil, p. 285, ilova S
  51. ^ Jonson, Lindon Beyns (1971). Vantage Point: Prezidentning istiqbollari, 1963-1969. Xolt, Raynxart va Uinston. 300-301 betlar. Isroil qurolli qayiqlari va samolyotlari tomonidan kemaga xatolik bilan hujum qilinganligini bilib oldik. O'n kishi Ozodlik ekipaj halok bo'ldi va yuz kishi yaralandi. Ushbu yurakni ezadigan epizod biz kabi isroilliklarni qattiq xafa qildi.
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Bibliografiya

Qo'shimcha o'qish

  • Bregman, Ahron (2002). Isroil tarixi. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN  0-333-67631-9.
  • Kristol, A. Jey (2002). The Ozodlik Voqea: 1967 yil Isroilning AQSh dengiz kuchlari josuslik kemasiga hujumi. Dulles, Virjiniya: Brassiningniki. ISBN  1-57488-414-X.
  • Olti kunlik urush: 1967 yil iyun va zamonaviy O'rta Sharqning yaratilishi, Maykl B. Oren tomonidan, Oksford universiteti matbuoti (ISBN  0-19-515174-7)
  • Jumboq saroyi, Jeyms Bamford tomonidan, Penguin Books, 1982, Isroilning SIGINT kemasiga USS hujumi haqida batafsil ma'lumot berilgan Ozodlik, va undan oldingi voqealar, 279–293 betlarda.
  • Sirlar to'plami, Jeyms Bamford tomonidan, voqea haqida batafsil bob ajratadi va bu ataylab qilingan degan xulosaga keladi. Ikki kun, 2001 (ISBN  0-09-942774-5)
  • Piter Xonam, Sianid operatsiyasi: nima uchun USS bombasi Ozodlik Uchinchi jahon urushiga sabab bo'lgan, Vizion papkalar. 2003 yil, ISBN  1-904132-19-7,
  • Entoni Pirson, Sukunat fitnasi: USS-ga hujum Ozodlik, 1979 yil ISBN  0-7043-2164-5
  • Jon Borne, USS Ozodlik, Turli xil tarix va rasmiy tarix
  • Tomas, Baylis (1999). Isroil qanday yutdi: Arab-Isroil to'qnashuvining qisqacha tarixi. Lanham, Merilend: Leksington kitoblari. ISBN  0-7391-0064-5. "Olti kunlik urush va uning oqibatlari" mavzusidagi 15-bobda voqealar ketma-ketligini va arab shaharlaridagi bir vaqtda qilingan hujumlarni ajratib, AQShning ushbu ayg'oqchi kemasiga qilingan hujum AQShning Isroil harbiy harakatlarini kuzatib borishining oldini olish uchun qilingan qasddan qilingan xatti-harakatlar bo'lganligini o'rganib chiqdi. va har qanday aloqa yuborilishidan oldin bortdagi barcha AQSh xodimlarini o'ldirish niyatida edi.
  • Fillip F. Turni va Jon Glenn, O'sha kuni ko'rgan narsalarim: Isroilning 1967 yil 8 iyunda USS Liberty bortidagi AQSh harbiy xizmatchilarining qirg'inlari va uning oqibatlari, Ozodlik nashrlari, 2009 yil, ISBN  978-1-4507-1554-6
  • Viktor Torn va Jon Glenn, Mamlakatsiz kema: USS Liberty-ga qilingan hujum guvohlari, American Free Press, Vashington, DC, 2009 yil ISBN  978-0-9818086-6-6

Tashqi havolalar

Koordinatalar: 31 ° 23′24 ″ N 33 ° 22′48 ″ E / 31.3900 ° N 33.3800 ° E / 31.3900; 33.3800