Robert Maknamara - Robert McNamara
Robert Maknamara | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Jahon banki guruhining prezidenti | |
| Ofisda 1968 yil 1 aprel - 1981 yil 1 iyul | |
| Oldingi | Jorj Vuds |
| Muvaffaqiyatli | Tom Klauzen |
| 8-chi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Mudofaa vaziri | |
| Ofisda 1961 yil 21 yanvar - 1968 yil 29 fevral[1] | |
| Prezident | Jon F. Kennedi Lyndon B. Jonson |
| O'rinbosar | Roswell Gilpatric Kir Vens Pol Nitze |
| Oldingi | Tomas Geyts |
| Muvaffaqiyatli | Klark Klifford |
| Shaxsiy ma'lumotlar | |
| Tug'ilgan | Robert Strange Maknamara 1916 yil 9-iyun San-Fransisko, Kaliforniya, BIZ. |
| O'ldi | 2009 yil 6-iyul (93 yosh) Vashington, Kolumbiya, BIZ. |
| Siyosiy partiya |
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| Turmush o'rtoqlar | Diana Masieri Byfild (m. 2004) |
| Bolalar | 3, shu jumladan Kreyg |
| Ta'lim | Berkli Kaliforniya universiteti (BA ) Garvard universiteti (MBA ) |
| Imzo |  |
| Harbiy xizmat | |
| Sadoqat |  Qo'shma Shtatlar |
| Filial / xizmat |  Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasi |
| Xizmat qilgan yillari | 1940–1946 |
| Rank |  Podpolkovnik |
| Birlik |  AQSh armiyasining havo kuchlari |
Robert Strange Maknamara (1916 yil 9-iyun - 2009 yil 6-iyul) amerikalik biznes boshqaruvchisi va sakkizinchisi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Mudofaa vaziri, 1961 yildan 1968 yilgacha Prezidentlar davrida xizmat qilgan Jon F. Kennedi va Lyndon B. Jonson. U Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining ishtirokini kengaytirishda katta rol o'ynadi Vetnam urushi.[3] McNamara instituti uchun mas'ul bo'lgan tizimlarni tahlil qilish yilda davlat siyosati, bugungi kunda ma'lum bo'lgan intizomga aylandi siyosat tahlili.[4]
U tug'ilgan San-Fransisko, Kaliforniya, tugatgan Berkli va Garvard biznes maktabi va xizmat qilgan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasining havo kuchlari davomida Ikkinchi jahon urushi. Urushdan keyin, Genri Ford II McNamara va boshqa bir qator armiya harbiy-havo kuchlari faxriylarini ishlashga yolladi Ford Motor Company. Bular "Whiz Kids "zamonaviy rejalashtirish, tashkil etish va boshqaruvni boshqarish tizimlari bilan Fordni isloh qilishga yordam berdi. Qisqa vaqt ichida Ford prezidenti sifatida ishlaganidan keyin MakNamara Mudofaa vaziri etib tayinlandi.
McNamara Kennedining yaqin maslahatchisi bo'ldi va davomida blokadani ishlatishni yoqladi Kuba raketa inqirozi. Kennedi va Maknamara institutni a Sovuq urush mudofaa strategiyasi moslashuvchan javob qisqa vaqt ichida harbiy javob choralari zarurligini taxmin qildi katta qasos. McNamara Pentagonning razvedka va logistika funktsiyalarini ikkita markazlashgan idoralarga birlashtirdi: Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi va Mudofaani etkazib berish agentligi. Kennedi ma'muriyati davrida McNamara AQShdagi askarlarning to'planishiga rahbarlik qildi Janubiy Vetnam. 1964 yildan keyin Tonkin ko'rfazidagi voqea, Vetnamdagi AQSh askarlari soni keskin o'sdi. McNamara va AQShning boshqa siyosatshunoslari Janubiy Vetnamning kommunistik tuzumga qulashi mintaqadagi boshqa hukumatlar qulashiga olib keladi deb qo'rqishgan. 1966 yil oktyabr oyida u ishga tushirildi Loyiha 100,000, armiyani kamaytirish IQ 354,000 qo'shimcha erkaklarni yuqori stressli yoki xavfli muhitda ishlashga yaroqsiz degan tanqidlarga qaramay, yollashga imkon beradigan standartlar.
Maknamara Amerika qo'shinlarini Vetnamga topshirish samaradorligiga nisbatan tobora ko'proq shubha bilan qaradi. 1968 yilda u prezident bo'lish uchun Mudofaa vaziri lavozimidan iste'foga chiqdi Jahon banki. U qoladi eng uzoq vaqt xizmat qilish Mudofaa vaziri, etti yil davomida o'z lavozimida qoldi. U 1981 yilgacha Jahon banki prezidenti bo'lib ishlagan va Jahon bankining e'tiborini qashshoqlikni kamaytirishga qaratgan. Nafaqaga chiqqanidan keyin u bir qator tashkilotlarning ishonchli vakili bo'lib xizmat qildi, shu jumladan Kaliforniya texnologiya instituti va Brukings instituti. Keyinchalik yozgan asarlari va intervyularida u Vetnam urushi paytida qabul qilgan qarorlaridan afsusda ekanligini bildirdi.
Dastlabki hayot va martaba
Robert Maknamara tug'ilgan San-Fransisko, Kaliforniya.[3] Uning otasi Robert Jeyms Maknamara, ulgurji poyabzal ishlab chiqaradigan kompaniyaning savdo bo'yicha menejeri, onasi esa Klara Nell (g'alati) McNamara edi.[5][6][7] Uning otasining oilasi edi Irland va taxminan 1850 yilda quyidagilarga amal qilgan Buyuk Irlandiyalik ochlik, birinchi bo'lib AQShga hijrat qilgan Massachusets shtati keyinchalik Kaliforniyaga.[8] U bitirgan Pyemont o'rta maktabi yilda Piemont, Kaliforniya 1933 yilda u Rigma sherlari o'g'il bolalar klubining prezidenti bo'lgan[9] va unvoniga sazovor bo'ldi Eagle Scout. McNamara ishtirok etdi Berkli Kaliforniya universiteti va 1937 yilda a B.A. yilda iqtisodiyot voyaga etmaganlar bilan matematika va falsafa. U a'zosi edi Phi Gamma deltasi birodarlik,[10] ga saylangan Phi Beta Kappa ikkinchi kursda o'qigan va a varsity letter yilda ekipaj. McNamara armiya harbiy-havo kuchlariga topshirilgunga qadar U.C.da "Oltin ayiq" batalyonida kursant bo'lgan. Berkli [11] McNamara, shuningdek, UC Berkli kompaniyasining a'zosi bo'lgan Oltin oyi ordeni Bu talabalar jamoasida etakchilikni rivojlantirish uchun tashkil etilgan talabalar va etakchi professor-o'qituvchilarning do'stligi edi. Keyin u ishtirok etdi Garvard biznes maktabi, u qaerda ishlagan M.B.A. 1939 yilda.
Shundan so'ng darhol McNamara bir yil davomida ishladi buxgalteriya hisobi qat'iy Waterhouse narxi San-Frantsiskoda. U qaytib keldi Garvard 1940 yil avgustida biznes maktabida buxgalteriya o'qituvchisi bo'lib, eng ko'p maosh oladigan va eng yosh o'quvchi bo'ldi dotsent shu vaqtda.[12] U shu erda u ofitserlarga biznesda qo'llaniladigan analitik yondashuvlarni o'rgatish dasturida qatnashdi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasining havo kuchlari, u USAAF-ga a sifatida kirdi kapitan 1943 yil boshida, ko'pchiligiga xizmat qilgan Ikkinchi jahon urushi uning statistika nazorati idorasi bilan. Uning asosiy vazifalaridan biri AQSh bombardimonchilarining samaradorligi va samaradorligini tahlil qilish edi, ayniqsa B-29 tomonidan boshqariladigan kuchlar General-mayor Kertis LeMay yilda Hindiston, Xitoy, va Mariana orollari.[13] McNamara statistik nazorat bo'linmasini tashkil etdi XX bombardimonchi qo'mondoni B-29 samolyotlari yonilg'i va yuklarni tashish uchun transport vositalarini ikki baravar oshirish jadvallarini ishlab chiqdi Hump. U 1946 yilda xizmat vazifasini tark etdi podpolkovnik va bilan Xizmat legioni.
Ford Motor Company
1946 yilda, Tex Tornton, a polkovnik MakNamara xizmat qilganida, birgalikda biznes yuritish uchun Statistika nazorati idorasining bir guruh sobiq zobitlarini birlashtirdi. Tornton bir maqolani ko'rgan Hayot jurnali Fordni islohotlarga juda muhtoj deb tasvirlaydi. Genri Ford II, o'zi Ikkinchi Jahon urushi qatnashchisi Dengiz kuchlari, MakNamarani ham o'z ichiga olgan o'n kishilik butun guruhni yolladi.
"Whiz Kids ", ular ma'lum bo'lganidek, pulni yo'qotadigan kompaniyaga xaotik boshqaruvni zamonaviy rejalashtirish, tashkil etish va boshqaruvni boshqarish tizimlari orqali isloh qilishga yordam berdi." Whiz Kids "iborasining kelib chiqishini quyidagicha izohlash mumkin. Yoshligi tufayli Ko'pgina savollarni berish bilan bir qatorda, Ford xodimlari dastlab va kamsitilgan holda, ularni "Viktorina bolalar" deb atashgan, Viktorina bolalar o'zlarini "Whiz Kids" deb atashgan.
Rejalashtirish va moliyaviy tahlil bo'yicha menejer sifatida ish boshlagan MakNamara yuqori darajadagi boshqaruv lavozimlari qatorida tez sur'atlar bilan rivojlandi. McNamara Fordga eng samarali, oqilona ishlab chiqarish vositalarini topish uchun modellarni yaratish uchun kompyuterlarni qabul qildi, bu esa juda ratsionalizatsiyaga olib keldi.[14] MakNamaraning "ilmiy boshqaruv" uslubi, kompyuter sanoat jadvallaridan foydalangan holda, avtosanoatdagi tendentsiyalarni aks ettiruvchi grafikalar 1950-yillarda nihoyatda innovatsion deb topilgan va keyingi o'n yilliklar ichida boshqa rahbarlar tomonidan juda ko'p nusxa ko'chirilgan.[14] 1995 yildagi xotiralarida MakNamara shunday deb yozgan edi: "Men o'n besh yil [Fordda] menejer sifatida muammolarni aniqlashda va tashkilotlarni ko'pincha ularning irodasiga qarshi alternativ harakatlar yo'nalishlari va ularning oqibatlari to'g'risida chuqur va real o'ylashga majbur qilganman".[14] U orqada turgan kuch edi Ford Falcon 1959 yil kuzida taqdim etilgan sedan - 1950 yillarning oxirida taniqli yirik, qimmatbaho transport vositalariga ishlab chiqariladigan kichik, sodda va arzon hisoblagich. McNamara xavfsizlikka katta ahamiyat berdi: Qutqaruvchi variantlar to'plami havfsizlik kamari (o'sha paytdagi yangilik) va haydovchini to'qnashuv paytida rul ustuniga mixlashning oldini olishga yordam bergan parchalangan rul.[15]
Keyin Linkoln chiziqning 1958, 1959 va 1960 yillardagi juda katta modellari ommabop bo'lmaganligi sababli, McNamara kichik versiyalari, masalan, 1961 yil Linkoln kontinental.
1960 yil 9-noyabrda Maknamara birinchi prezident bo'ldi Ford Motor Company tashqaridan Ford oila.
Mudofaa vaziri
Undan keyin saylov 1960 yilda, Saylangan prezident Jon F. Kennedi avval Mudofaa vaziri lavozimini taklif qildi Robert A. Lovett, bu lavozimda allaqachon xizmat qilgan Truman ma'muriyati; Lovett rad etdi, lekin McNamara-ni tavsiya qildi. Kennedi McNamara va uning faoliyati haqida a Vaqt jurnal 1960 yil 2-dekabrdagi maqola va olti kundan keyin 8-dekabr kuni u bilan ukasi va o'ng qo'li bilan suhbatlashdi Robert F. Kennedi hozir ham mavjud.[16] Maknamara Kennediga hukumat to'g'risida hech narsa bilmasligini aytdi, unga Kennedi: "Biz o'z ishimizni birgalikda o'rganishimiz mumkin. Qanday qilib prezident bo'lishni ham bilmayman", deb javob berdi.[16] Maknamara Kennedining ruhlar bilan yozilgan kitobini o'qigan edi Jasoratdagi profillar va undan haqiqatan ham o'zi yozganmisiz, deb so'radi va Kennedi buni talab qildi.[16] Maknamaraning ishonchi va o'ziga bo'lgan ishonchi Kennediga ta'sir qildi.[17] Kennedi Maknamaraga Mudofaa vaziri yoki bo'lish imkoniyatini taklif qildi G'aznachilik kotibi; McNamara bir hafta o'tgach qaytib keldi, mudofaa vaziri lavozimini barcha tayinlashlarda yakuniy tasdiqlash huquqiga ega bo'lish sharti bilan qabul qildi. Mudofaa vazirligi, Kennedining javobi bilan: "Bu shartnoma".[16] McNamaraning Ford bosh direktori lavozimidagi maoshi yiliga qariyb 3 million dollarni tashkil etdi, aksincha Mudofaa vazirining lavozimi yiliga atigi 25000 dollarni tashkil etdi.[18] Moliyaviy qurbonlarni hisobga olgan holda, MakNamara Kennediga o'z rasmiylarini tayinlash va Pentagonni o'z yo'lini boshqarish huquqiga ega bo'lishini talab qila oldi.[19]
Maxsus maslahatchining so'zlariga ko'ra Ted Sorensen, Kennedi MakNamarani "jamoasining yulduzi" deb hisoblardi, uni milliy xavfsizlikdan tashqari, biznes va iqtisodiy masalalardan tashqari, keng doiradagi masalalar bo'yicha maslahat so'rab murojaat qilgan.[20] Maknamara Kennedi ma'muriyatining Kennedi bilan ishlash va muloqot qilish uchun kam sonli a'zolaridan biriga aylandi va u bosh prokurorga yaqinlashdi. Robert F. Kennedi, oxir-oqibat, 1968 yilda Kennedining dafn marosimida palliber bo'lib xizmat qildi.[21]
Dastlab, Prezident Kennedining xabarnomasida bayon etilgan asosiy siyosat Kongress 1961 yil 28 martda MakNamarani mudofaa dasturini qayta yo'naltirishga rahbarlik qildi. Kennedi kontseptsiyasini rad etdi birinchi zarba hujumi va AQSh va uning ittifoqchilariga qarshi yadroviy hujumni to'xtatish uchun etarli strategik qurol va mudofaa zarurligini ta'kidladi. AQSh qurollari, u doimiy ravishda qo'l ostida bo'lishi kerakligini ta'kidladi fuqarolar qo'mondonligi va nazorati va mamlakatning mudofaa holati "mantiqsiz yoki oldindan rejalashtirilmagan umumiy urush xavfini kamaytirishga mo'ljallangan" bo'lishi kerak edi. AQShning chet eldagi kuchlarining ittifoqchilari bilan hamkorlikda asosiy vazifasi "cheklangan urushlar orqali Erkin Dunyoning barqaror eroziyasini oldini olish" edi. Kennedi va Maknamara pozitsiyasi uchun katta qasosni rad etishdi moslashuvchan javob. AQSh favqulodda vaziyatda prezident aytganidek "shafqatsiz chekinish yoki cheksiz qasos" dan boshqa tanlovlarni xohladi. 1961 yilda McNamara tomonidan boshlangan AQShga qarshi harbiy muammolarni ko'rib chiqishda, xalqning "cheklangan urush" qobiliyatini oshirish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilindi. Ushbu harakatlar muhim edi, chunki Maknamara Prezidentni tark etmoqda Duayt D. Eyzenxauer AQShning cheklangan va yadroviy bo'lmagan urushlarni o'tkazish salohiyatini oshirishga asoslangan moslashuvchan javob strategiyasi foydasiga katta qasos siyosati.
Kennedi ma'muriyati kommunistik "milliy ozodlik urushlari" ga qarshi kurashish qobiliyatini oshirishga alohida e'tibor qaratdi, bunda dushman yuzma-yuz harbiy qarama-qarshiliklardan qochib, siyosiy buzg'unchilik va partizan taktikasi. McNamara o'zining 1962 yilgi yillik hisobotida aytganidek: "Harbiy taktika - bu snayper, pistirma va reydning taktikasi. Siyosiy taktika bu terrorizm, tovlamachilik va suiqasddir". Amaliy ma'noda bu AQSh harbiy xizmatchilari va shunga o'xshash ittifoqchilarni tayyorlash va jihozlashni anglatardi Janubiy Vetnam, uchun qarshi qo'zg'olon operatsiyalar.
Davomida Kuba raketa inqirozi 1962 yil oktyabr oyida McNamara a'zosi bo'lib xizmat qildi EXCOMM va Ma'muriyat tomonidan Kuba raketa inqirozini bartaraf etishda katta rol o'ynadi. U raketa zarbasi tufayli blokirovka variantining kuchli tarafdori edi va uni ishontirishga yordam berdi Birlashgan shtab boshliqlari blokirovka qilish variantiga rozi bo'lish.
Oddiy kuchga bo'lgan e'tiborning kuchayishi ushbu maxsus kuchlarning tayyorgarligini to'ldirdi. Bu holatda u zaxiralarni chaqirdi va doimiy qurolli kuchlarni kengaytirishga kirishdi. Holbuki, 1953 yil (oxirigacha) faol ish kuchi taxminan 3,555,000 dan 2,483,000 gacha pasaygan Koreya urushi va 1961 yil, u 1962 yil 30-iyungacha qariyb 2,808,000 ga o'sdi. Keyinchalik kuchlar 2,700,000 atrofida bo'lib, 1965 yilda Vetnam harbiy kuchlari boshlangunga qadar va MakNamara lavozimini tark etgandan so'ng, 1968 yil o'rtalarida qariyb 3,550,000-ga erishdi.[22] Isyonchilarga qarshi urushga qoyil qolgan Kennedi Xalq orasida "Yashil beretlar" nomi bilan tanilgan Maxsus kuchlarni rivojlantirishga katta turtki berdi.[23] AQSh armiyasi rahbariyati aksariyat hollarda qo'zg'olonchilar modasiga qarshi edi va aksariyat isyonchilarga qarshi tayyorgarlik va kuchlar uchun prezident bosimiga qat'iy qarshilik ko'rsatdi. [24] AQSh armiyasi byurokratik siyosat, byudjet sabablari va katta mag'rurligi sababli Evropaning markaziy qismida Qizil Armiyaga qarshi an'anaviy urushga qarshi kurashish uchun maksimal darajada yuqori kuchga mo'ljallangan yuqori texnologik qurollar bilan qurollangan ko'plab bo'linmalar bilan jihozlanmoqchi edi. Uchinchi dunyo mamlakatlarida jangovar miltiqlar kabi nisbatan past texnologik qurollar bilan qurollangan maxsus kuchlarning kichik guruhlariga ega bo'lish. [24]
Yadro strategiyasi, uchlik doktrinasi
1961 yilda McNamara Pentagonni egallab olganida, Qo'shma Shtatlar harbiylari Sovet harbiy kuchlari va tinch aholini o'ldiradigan har qanday turdagi Sovet hujumiga javob berish uchun har tomonlama yadroviy zarbaga tayangan. Bu xuddi shunday edi yadro strategiyasi tomonidan rejalashtirilgan Strategik havo qo'mondonligi (SAC) tomonidan boshqariladi General Kertis LeMay. Maknamara ushbu yondashuvga rozi bo'lmagan. U ushbu strategiya barcha Sovetlarning yo'q qilinishini kafolatlay olmasligini ko'rib, boshqa variantlarni izladi yadro qurollari, shu tariqa AQShni qasos olish uchun himoyasiz qoldirdi. Doktrinasida McNamara alternativasi qarshi kuch faqat dushmanning harbiy kuchlarini nishonga olish orqali AQShning yadro almashinuvini cheklashga urinishi kerak edi.[25] Bu sovet shaharlarini navbatdagi ish tashlash garovida ushlab, qasos va eskalatsiyani oldini oladi. Keyinchalik MakNamara qarama-qarshi kuchlar eskalatsiyani boshqarishi mumkin emas, balki qasosni keltirib chiqarishi mumkin degan xulosaga keldi. AQShning yadro siyosati bir xil bo'lib qoldi.
Boshqa qadamlar
McNamara AQShning tiyilish holatini va harbiy salohiyatini oshirish uchun boshqa choralarni ko'rdi. U ulushini oshirdi Strategik havo qo'mondonligi (SAC) strategik bombardimonchilar 15 daqiqali quruqlikdagi ogohlantirishda 25% dan 50% gacha, shuning uchun ularning raketa hujumiga qarshi zaifligini kamaytiradi. 1961 yil dekabrda u Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining Strike qo'mondonligi (STRICOM). Zarur bo'lganda kuchlarni jalb qilishga vakolatli Strategik armiya korpusi (STRAC), Taktik havo qo'mondonligi va .ning havo kemalari Harbiy havo transporti xizmati va harbiy xizmatlar, Strike Commandning vazifasi "dunyoning istalgan qismida tinchlikka qarshi tahdidlarga tezkorlik bilan va har qanday kuch bilan javob berish, birlashgan buyruqlarni kuchaytirish yoki ... alohida favqulodda operatsiyalarni bajarish" edi. McNamara uzoq masofani ham oshirdi havo kemasi va muhrlangan kosmik tadqiqotlar va rivojlanish uchun imkoniyatlar va mablag'lar. Razvedka va aloqa sohasida alohida va ko'pincha muvofiqlashtirilmagan xizmatlarni ko'rib chiqqandan so'ng, 1961 yilda McNamara ushbu funktsiyalarni Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi va Mudofaa aloqa agentligi (ikkinchisi dastlab kotib Geyts tomonidan 1960 yilda tashkil etilgan), ikkalasi ham JCS orqali mudofaa vaziriga hisobot berishgan. Oxir oqibat razvedka funktsiyasini harbiylar nazorati ostidan olib tashlash va mudofaa vaziri nazorati ostiga olish edi. Xuddi shu yili u Mudofaani etkazib berish agentligi yagona harbiy ta'minotni emas, balki Mudofaa vaziri nazorati ostida yagona ta'minotni sotib olish, taqsimlash va inventarizatsiyani boshqarish bo'yicha ishlash.
McNamara instituti tizimlarni tahlil qilish kuch talablari, qurol tizimlari va boshqa masalalar bo'yicha asosiy qarorlarni qabul qilish uchun asos bo'lib, ko'p munozaralarga sabab bo'ldi. Maknamara davrida uning ikkita asosiy amaliyotchisi, Alen C. Enthoven va K. Ueyn Smit, kontseptsiyani quyidagicha tavsifladi: "Birinchidan," tizimlar "so'zi har bir qarorni zarur bo'lgan qadar keng doirada ko'rib chiqish kerakligini anglatadi ..." Tahlil "so'zi murakkab muammoni uning tarkibiy qismlariga qisqartirish zarurligini ta'kidlaydi Tizimlarni tahlil qilish murakkab masalani hal qiladi va muhim omillarning chigalini ajratadi, shunda ularning har birini o'ziga mos keladigan usul bilan o'rganish mumkin. " Enthoven va Smit tizim tahlilchilari sifatida asosan tinch aholidan foydalanganliklarini aytishdi, chunki ular majburiy rejalashtirishga mustaqil qarashlarni qo'llashlari mumkin edi. McNamaraning harbiy maslahatlarni avvalgi kotiblarga qaraganda kamroq hisobga olish va harbiy fikrlarni bekor qilish tendentsiyasi uning xizmat rahbarlari bilan yoqmasligiga sabab bo'ldi. Bundan tashqari, Tizimlarni tahlil qilish ob'ektiv emas, balki oddiy odamlar tomonidan McNamara allaqachon qabul qilgan qarorlarni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun yaratilgan deb o'ylashdi.[26][iqtibos kerak ]
Eng e'tiborli misol[iqtibos kerak ][27] tizim tahlillari quyidagicha edi Rejalashtirish, dasturlash va byudjet tizimi (PPBS) tomonidan tashkil etilgan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Mudofaa vazirligi Nazoratchi Charlz J. Xitch. Maknamara Xitni mudofaa talablarini muntazam tahlil qilib, uzoq muddatli, dasturiy mudofaa byudjetini ishlab chiqarishga yo'naltirdi. PPBS McNamara boshqaruv dasturining yuragiga aylandi. Enthoven va Smitning fikriga ko'ra, PPBSning asosiy g'oyalari quyidagilardir: "mudofaa dasturi masalalarini keng kontekstga kiritishga urinish va milliy ehtiyoj va adekvatlikning aniq choralarini izlash"; "harbiy ehtiyojlar va xarajatlarni birgalikda hisobga olish"; "yuqori qaror darajasida muqobil variantlarni aniq ko'rib chiqish"; "siyosat tuzishning yuqori darajalarida tahliliy xodimlardan faol foydalanish"; "ikkala kuch va xarajatlarni birlashtirgan reja, bu kelajakdagi qarorlarning yaqin kelajakdagi oqibatlarini taxmin qiladi"; va "ochiq va aniq tahlil, ya'ni har bir tahlil barcha manfaatdor tomonlarga taqdim etilishi kerak, shunda ular hisob-kitoblar, ma'lumotlar va taxminlarni o'rganib chiqishi va xulosaga olib boradigan qadamlarni qayta ko'rib chiqishi mumkin." Amalda, tahlil natijasida ishlab chiqarilgan ma'lumotlar shunchalik katta va shu qadar murakkab ediki, ular barcha manfaatdor tomonlar uchun mavjud bo'lsa-da, ularning hech biri xulosalarga qarshi chiqa olmadi.[28]
PPBSni amalga oshirish uchun ishlab chiqilgan boshqaruv vositalari orasida Besh yillik mudofaa rejasi (FYDP), Prezident Memorandumining loyihasi (DPM), Tayyorlik, axborot va nazorat jadvallari va Rivojlanish kontseptsiyasi (DCP) mavjud. Yillik FYDP shaxsiy xizmat ko'rsatish dasturlarida emas, balki missiyalarga yo'naltirilgan kuchlarni sakkiz yilga, xarajatlar va ishchi kuchini besh yilga prognoz qiladigan bir qator jadvallardan iborat edi. 1968 yilga kelib, FYDP o'nta harbiy sohani qamrab oldi: strategik kuchlar, umumiy maqsadlar uchun kuchlar, razvedka va aloqa, aeroport va muhandislik kuchlari, qo'riqlash va zaxira kuchlari, tadqiqot va tajriba-konstruktorlik ishlari, markaziy ta'minot va texnik xizmat ko'rsatish, o'qitish va tibbiy xizmatlar, ma'muriyat va tegishli faoliyat; va boshqa xalqlarning qo'llab-quvvatlashi.
Prezidentlik memorandumining loyihasi (DPM) - Oq uy uchun mo'ljallangan va odatda tizimni tahlil qilish idorasi tomonidan tayyorlangan - mudofaaning asosiy masalalarini o'rganish va tahlil qilish usuli edi. 1961-1968 yillarda strategik hujum va mudofaa kuchlari kabi mavzularda o'n oltita DPM paydo bo'ldi, NATO strategiya va kuch tuzilishi, harbiy yordam va taktik havo kuchlari. OSD DPM-larni xizmatlarga va Bosh shtab boshlig'i Izoh uchun (JCS); qarorlar qabul qilishda McNamara DPM-ga muqobil yondashuvlar, kuchlar darajasi va boshqa omillar bayonotini kiritdi. DPM yakuniy shaklda qaror hujjatiga aylandi. DPM JCS va harbiy xizmatchilar tomonidan nafratlanar edi, chunki bu ularning Oq uy bilan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aloqa qilish qobiliyatini pasaytirdi.[26][iqtibos kerak ] DPM-lar ham yoqmadi, chunki tizimni tahlil qilish jarayoni juda og'ir bo'lganligi sababli, har qanday xizmat o'z xulosalarini samarali ravishda qarshi olishi mumkin emas edi.[26][iqtibos kerak ]
The Rivojlanish kontseptsiyasi tadqiqot va rivojlanish dasturini boshlash yoki davom ettirishni aniqlash uchun asos yaratish uchun ishlash, jadval, xarajatlar smetasi va texnik xatarlarni o'rganib chiqdi.[29] Ammo amalda, bu xarajatlar yuki bo'lib, harbiylar bilan muomala qilmoqchi bo'lgan kompaniyalar uchun to'siq bo'ldi. Bu harbiy xizmatga xizmat qiladigan bir nechta yirik raqobatbardosh bo'lmagan mudofaa pudratchilarining tendentsiyasiga yordam berdi. Har qanday foydali maqsadga xizmat qilish o'rniga, ko'pincha amalda e'tibordan chetda qolgan ma'lumotlarni ishlab chiqarish uchun zarur bo'lgan ortiqcha xarajatlar butun tizimda xarajatlarni ko'payishiga olib keldi.[29][iqtibos kerak ]
Tayyorlik, ma'lumot va nazorat jadvallari FYDPga qaraganda aniq loyihalar haqida ma'lumot berdi, masalan, Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyoni joylashtirish rejasi jadvallari, masalan, tarqatish jadvali, iste'mol stavkalari va kelajakdagi prognozlari. AQShning Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyodagi kuchlari.
Kuba raketa inqirozi
The Kuba raketa inqirozi 1962 yil oktyabr oyida 13 kun davom etgan Qo'shma Shtatlar va Sovet Ittifoqi o'rtasida bo'lgan. Bu vaqt ichida Robert Maknamara xizmat qilgan. Mudofaa vaziri va ulardan biri Jon F. Kennedining ishonchli maslahatchilar. Kennedi Sovet Ittifoqi raketalarini joylashtirish to'g'risida tasdiq olganida Kuba, u zudlik bilan "Ijroiya qo'mitasi" ni tashkil etdi va "ExComm '. Ushbu qo'mita inqiroz bo'yicha Kennediga maslahat berish uchun AQSh hukumati rasmiylarini, shu jumladan Robert Maknamarani ham o'z ichiga olgan. Kennedi ExCommga shoshilinch ravishda Sovet tahdidiga javoban o'zi bo'lmasdan bir ovozdan javob berishni buyurdi.
Bosh shtab boshliqlari Kubadagi Sovet raketa uchastkalariga qarshi havo zarbalari berishni ma'qulladilar, bu fikrni Maknamara tutmagan va Kennediga boshliqlarga qarshi maslahat bergan va havo hujumlari deyarli Rubikondan o'tib ketishi haqida ogohlantirgan.[30] Inqiroz paytida McNamaraning qirg'in bosh shtab boshliqlari bilan munosabatlari yomonlashgan va admiral Jorj Anderson va general Kertis LeMay bilan munosabatlari ayniqsa sinovchan edi.[31] Admiral Anderson ham, general LeMay ham Kubaga bostirib kirishni ma'qul ko'rishdi, Sovet Ittifoqi bilan urush muqarrar ekanligi va Kennedi va Maknamaraga bo'lgan munosabati bo'ysunmaslik to'g'risida qaror qabul qilganligi sababli Sovet Ittifoqi bilan urush istiqbollarini mamnuniyat bilan kutib oldilar.[31] Admiral Anderson bir vaqtning o'zida McNamaraga dengiz operatsiyalari xonasidan chiqib ketishni buyurgan edi, chunki u fuqaro sifatida u dengiz masalalari bo'yicha qaror qabul qilish huquqiga ega emas edi, shuning uchun McNamara o'zini Mudofaa vaziri va Anderson unga buyruq berish uchun malakasiz edi. biror narsa qilish.[31]
Shu vaqt ichida Nikita Xrushchevdan ikkita xabar kelib, inqirozni 48 soat ichida hal qilish kerakligi tasdiqlandi. Birinchi xabar, norasmiy xabarda, agar Qo'shma Shtatlar Kubaga bostirib kirmaslikka kafolat bergan bo'lsa, u holda ular raketalarni chiqarib tashlashadi. Ikkinchi xabar, rasmiyroq xabar, agar Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari hujum qilsa, u holda Kuba ko'plab harbiy kuchlar bilan qasos olishga tayyor bo'lganligi to'g'risida radio orqali eshittirildi. Amerika mudofaasini rejalashtirish foydalanishga qaratilgan bo'lsa-da yadro qurollari, Kennedi va Maknamara strategik qurollardan foydalanish o'z joniga qasd qilishi mumkinligini aniq ko'rdilar.[32] 16-oktabr, seshanba kuni ExComm birinchi uchrashuvini o'tkazdi. Rasmiylarning aksariyati raketa uchastkalarini yo'q qilish umidida Kubaga havo hujumini ma'qullashdi, garchi ovoz berish bir ovozdan qabul qilinmasa, ularni boshqa alternativalarga olib keldi. Haftaning oxirida ExComm prezidentga taqdim etish uchun to'rt xil alternativ strategiyani ishlab chiqdi: a blokada, an havo hujumi, an bosqin yoki ularning bir nechta kombinatsiyasi.[33] Ushbu harakatlar OPLAN 312, OPLAN 314 va OPLAN 316 sifatida tanilgan. A karantin Sovetlarning Kubaga yoki undan tashqariga biron bir harbiy texnikani olib kelishining oldini olishning bir usuli edi.[32] 21 oktyabr, yakshanba kuni ikkala alternativani yakuniy ko'rib chiqish paytida Kennedining iltimosiga binoan MakNamara hujumga qarshi va karantin uchun argumentni keltirdi. 24-oktabr, chorshanba kuni EDT soat 10:00 da Kuba atrofidagi karantin chizig'i kuchga kirdi. Kubadan keyin Maknamara: "Strategiya yo'q, faqat inqirozni boshqarish" deb ta'kidladi.[32]
Inqirozdan keyin McNamara Kennediga Admiral Anderson va General LeMayni ishdan bo'shatishni tavsiya qildi.[31] Biroq, Kennedi birdan ikkita boshliqni ishdan bo'shatib yuborsa, Kongressning reaktsiyasidan qo'rqardi.[34] Bundan tashqari, Kennedi Qo'shma Sardorlar bilan kelishmovchiliklari jamoatchilikka aylanishini istamadi va bir vaqtning o'zida ikkala boshliqni ishdan bo'shatish ommaviy axborot vositalarida bunday kelishmovchilik haqida spekülasyonlara sabab bo'lishini his qildi. Kennedi MakNamaraga: "Yaxshi, siz birini ishdan bo'shatishingiz mumkin. Qaysi biri bo'ladi?"[34] Maknamara ikkilanmasdan "Anderson" deb javob berdi.[34] Keyinchalik 1963 yilda Oq uyning e'lon qilishicha, Admiral Anderson Amerikaning Portugaliyadagi yangi elchisi bo'lgan.[34]
Xarajatlarni kamaytirish
McNamara xodimlari tizimni tahlil qilishni qurol ishlab chiqarish va boshqa ko'plab byudjet masalalari bo'yicha qaror qabul qilishda yordam sifatida ta'kidladilar. Kotib Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari milliy xavfsizlik uchun zarur bo'lgan har qanday miqdorni qoplay olishiga ishonadi, ammo "bu qobiliyat bizni mudofaa dollarlarini sarflashimizga ta'sirchanlik va samaradorlik standartlarini qo'llashdan kechirmaydi ... Siz buni qilishingiz kerak yetarli ekanligi haqida hukm. " Ushbu tamoyillarga asoslanib, McNamara taniqli xarajatlarni qisqartirish dasturini ishlab chiqdi va u 1961 yildan boshlab besh yillik davrda 14 milliard dollar tejashga imkon berdi. Garchi u senatorlar va ta'sirlangan kongress okruglari vakillarining tanqidlari bo'roniga dosh berishga majbur bo'lgan bo'lsa ham. , u milliy xavfsizlik uchun keraksiz deb topgan ko'plab harbiy bazalarni va inshootlarni yopdi. U boshqa iqtisodiy tejash choralari to'g'risida ham qat'iy qaror qildi.[35]
Yadroviy qurollanish poygasi, Vetnam urushi va boshqa loyihalar tufayli, Jami majburiyat vakolati (TOA) McNamara yillarida juda ko'paygan. TOA moliyaviy yili 1962 yildagi 48,4 milliard dollardan (2019 yildagi 319 milliard dollarga teng) 1965 yildagi 49,5 (312 dollar) milliardga (Vetnamning katta o'sishidan oldin) 1968 yilda 74,9 (429) milliard dollarga o'sdi, McNamara o'tgan yilgi lavozimida (u tark etgan bo'lsa ham) fevral oyida ofis).[36] 1984 yilgacha emas, DoDning umumiy majburiyat vakolati 1968 yil moliyaviy yiliga nisbatan oshib ketdi doimiy dollar.[iqtibos kerak ]
Dastur konsolidatsiyasi
McNamara xarajatlarini pasaytirishning muhim belgilaridan biri bu turli xil xizmatlarning dasturlarini birlashtirish edi, eng muhimi, samolyotlarni sotib olishda, chunki bu ishdan bo'shatish chiqindilarni va keraksiz xarajatlarni keltirib chiqardi. Maknamara harbiy-havo kuchlarini dengiz flotini qabul qilishga yo'naltirdi F-4 Phantom va A-7 Corsair jangovar samolyotlar, bu juda muvaffaqiyatli bo'lgan konsolidatsiya. Aksincha, uning sinovdan o'tkazilmaganlarni muddatidan oldin qabul qilishni majburlash bo'yicha harakatlari M16 miltiq qurollar jangda muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchraganida, halokatli bo'lgan, ammo keyinchalik Kongressning tekshiruvlarida ushbu muvaffaqiyatsizliklar sabablari armiya qurol-yarog 'korpusining zobitlari nomidan beparvolik va chegara sabotaji sifatida aniqlangan. McNamara rivojlanish dasturlarini birlashtirib, o'z muvaffaqiyatini kengaytirishga harakat qildi va natijada TFX Fleet Air Defence (FAD) samolyotiga dengiz kuchlari talablarini birlashtirish uchun ikki tomonlama xizmat ko'rsatish loyihasi[37] va taktik bombardimonchi uchun havo kuchlari talablari. Uning korporativ dunyodagi tajribasi uni turli xil missiyalar va xizmatlar uchun bitta turni qabul qilish pulni tejashga yordam beradi deb ishonishiga olib keldi. U Umumiy muammolar sababli DOD-ning Boeing-ni afzal ko'rishi o'rniga General Dynamic-ga kirishni talab qildi. Garchi hamma narsani qila oladigan (tez ovozdan yuqori chiziqli, sekin tashuvchi va qisqa aerodromga tushadigan, taktik zarba va hattoki yaqin havo qo'llab-quvvatlaydigan) jangchi sifatida e'lon qilingan bo'lsa-da, oxir-oqibat, ularning har birida muvaffaqiyatga erishish uchun juda ko'p murosalar mavjud edi. Dengiz kuchlari versiyasi juda og'ir va quruqlikka tushishi qiyin bo'lgan va oxir-oqibat a dan keyin bekor qilingan Grumman Tadqiqot shuni ko'rsatdiki, yangi paydo bo'lgan Sovet qobiliyatiga mos kelmaydi MiG-23 va MiG-25 samolyot. F-111 samolyoti havo kuchlari bilan taktik bombardimonchi va elektron jangovar samolyot sifatida o'z o'rnini topadi.[iqtibos kerak ]
Biroq, ko'plab tahlilchilar, TFX loyihasining o'zi muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan bo'lsa-da, McNamara o'z vaqtidan oldinda edi, chunki qiruvchi dizayndagi tendentsiya konsolidatsiya tomon davom etmoqda - F-16 Falcon va F / A-18 hornet ko'p rolli jangchilar sifatida paydo bo'ldi va aksariyat zamonaviy dizaynlar TFX bajarishi kerak bo'lgan ko'plab rollarni birlashtirdi. Ko'p jihatdan Birgalikda Strike Fighter TFX loyihasining qayta tug'ilishi sifatida qaraladi, chunki u uchta havo qurolining (shuningdek, bir nechta xorijiy mijozlarning) ehtiyojlarini qondirishni maqsad qilib, zarba beruvchi va qiruvchi qiruvchi rollarini bajarib, V / STOL va yaqin havo qo'llab-quvvatlashi (va TFX-ga qarshi tanqidlarga o'xshash ko'plab tanqidlarni jalb qilish).[38]
Vetnam urushi
Vetnamga
Prezident Jon F. Kennedi davrida, McNamara mudofaa vaziri bo'lganida, Amerikaning Janubiy Vetnamdagi qo'shinlari 900 dan 16000 maslahatchiga ko'paygan,[39] jang bilan shug'ullanishi kerak emas, balki mashq qilishni o'rgatishlari kerak edi Vetnam Respublikasi armiyasi (ARVN).[40]
The Truman va Eyzenxauer ma'muriyatlar Qo'shma Shtatlarni Vetnamdagi frantsuzlar va mahalliy antikommunistik kuchlarni mamlakatni birlashtirishga qaratilgan shimoldagi kommunistlarning harakatlariga qarshi turish uchun qo'llab-quvvatlashga majbur qilishgan edi, ammo ikkala ma'muriyat ham urushda haqiqiy jangovar kuchlarni tashkil qilmadi. AQShning roli - dastlab moliyaviy ko'mak, harbiy maslahat va maxfiy razvedka yig'ish bilan cheklangan - 1954 yildan keyin frantsuzlar chiqib ketganidan keyin kengaygan. Kennedi ma'muriyati davrida AQShning Janubiy Vetnamdagi harbiy maslahat guruhi doimiy ravishda ko'payib bordi, MakNamaraning fikri bilan 900 dan 16000 gacha.[39] Shundan so'ng AQShning ishtiroki kuchaygan Tonkin ko'rfazidagi voqealar 1964 yil avgust oyida Shimoliy Vetnam dengiz kemalari tomonidan AQSh dengiz kuchlari esminetsiga ikkita taxmin qilingan hujumlar bilan bog'liq.[41]
Kennedi ma'muriyatida McNamara bilan kabinetdagi munozaralarda yaqindan ittifoqdosh bo'lgan Din Rask, Davlat kotibi, ikkalasi ham Amerikaning Janubiy Vetnamni qo'llab-quvvatlashini ma'qullashdi. [42] 1961 yil boshida MakNamara Laosga aralashuvni yoqlab, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi tomonidan oltita AT-6 samolyotiga 200 funtlik bomba tashish uchun moslashtirilishi mumkin, deb aytdi va Rask bu taklifni urib yubordi, chunki Ikkinchi Jahon urushi Birma unga o'rmonlarda bombardimon qilish samarasiz ekanligini va oltita samolyot etarli emasligini o'rgatgan edi.[43] 1961 yil oktyabrda, qachon general Maksvell Teylor va Uolt Uitmen Rostou Janubiy Vetnamga Amerikaning 8000 jangovar qo'shinini yuborishni maslahat berdi, McNamara bu tavsiyani etarli emas deb rad etdi va 8000 qo'shin "ehtimol tarozi bilan tepmasligini" aytdi, buning o'rniga Kennediga Janubiy Vetnamga 6 ta diviziyani yuborishni tavsiya qildi, prezidentning maslahati rad etildi.[44] 1962 yil may oyida MakNamara Janubiy Vetnamga birinchi tashrifini amalga oshirdi va u erda matbuotga "har qanday o'lchov o'lchovi ... biz urushda g'alaba qozonayotganimizni ko'rsatadi".[45] General boshchiligida Pol D. Xarkins, Harbiy yordam qo'mondonligi ofitserlari, Vetnam, Vetnam Kong nazorati ostida bo'lgan Janubiy Vetnamning juda ko'p qismini ko'rsatadigan xaritani o'zgartirdi va Vetnamni o'zlaridan ko'ra zaifroq qilish uchun statistik ma'lumotlarni massaj qildi.[46] Maknamaraning "miqdoriy" uslubi kompyuterlarning Vetnamdagi tendentsiyalar haqida ko'p sonli ma'lumotlarga asoslanganligi, Janubiy Vetnamdagi mashhur qarashlar va qarashlar kabi insoniy o'lchovni va Janubiy Vetnam prezidenti Ngô Dính Diệm hokimiyatda qolishning bir usuli sifatida bir nechta davlat idoralari o'zaro raqobatlashadigan "bo'l va boshqar" strategiyasini ma'qulladi.[45] 1961 yilda Maknamara Laosga aralashishni rejalashtirgan bo'lsa-da, 1962 yilga kelib u o'z fikrini o'zgartirdi.[47] General bilan muhokama paytida Lyman Lemnitser, shtab boshliqlari birlashgan qo'mitasi raisi MakNamara uni bir necha stsenariylar yuz berganda Qo'shma Shtatlar nima qilishini, Lemnitser va boshliqlar javob berishga qodir emasligini so'rab, uni qoqib qo'ygan edi.[47]
1962 yilda MakNamara Vet Kongni ochlikdan qutqarish uchun Pxu Yen tog'laridagi guruch ekinlarini gerbitsid bilan püskürtme rejasini qo'llab-quvvatladi, bu rejani faqat W. Averell Harriman Kennediga ishora qilganida to'xtatilgan ochlik minglab odamlarni o'ldiradi. begunoh odamlarning.[48] 1962 yil oxirida McNamara 1964 yilda amerikalik maslahatchilarni Janubiy Vetnamdan olib chiqishni rejalashtirgan, chunki Pentagon hisob-kitoblariga ko'ra urush o'sha paytgacha g'alaba qozonishi kerak edi.[49] O'sha paytda Maknamara Kennediga: "G'alaba qozonish mumkinligiga yangi ishonch hissi paydo bo'ldi".[50]
1963 yil 2-yanvarda McNamara-ning kompyuterlari unga Vetnam haqida aytgan so'zlariga asoslanib prognozlari va taxminlari qo'pol ravishda buzildi. Ap Bac jangi, bu uchdan boshlandi Vietnam Kong (VC) kompaniyalari ARVN tomonidan o'rab olingan 7-divizion Ap Bac qishlog'ida.[51] 7-bo'limning tanklari, artilleriyasi, zirhli transportyorlari va vertolyotlari bilan taqqoslaganda, ularning soni 10-1 koeffitsientdan kam bo'lganiga va qurolsiz bo'lganiga qaramay, VC keyingi jangda 7-diviziyani mag'lubiyatga uchratdi va o'rmonga qochib ketdi.[52] Polkovnik Jon Pol Vann, 7-bo'limga biriktirilgan amerikalik maslahatchi jangni odatdagi yer tilidagi ma'ruzasida quyidagicha xulosaga keltirdi: "Achchiq lanet ijro, xuddi har doimgidek".[52] Vann, rang-barang shaxs, urush qanday olib borilayotgani to'g'risida ochiqchasiga ochiq tanqid qilish uni ommaviy axborot vositalarining sevimlisiga aylantirdi, McNamara uni juda yoqtirmasdi, chunki u urush g'olib chiqayapti deb turib berishda tanqidni qadrlamadi.[53]
Vannning Diem rejimini buzuq va qobiliyatsiz deb tanqid qilgan ma'ruzalari, Vann tomonidan ilgari surilgan islohotlar keraksiz deb ta'kidlagan McNamara uchun eng yoqimsiz edi. [54] 1963 yil mart oyida Vann armiyasidan iste'foga chiqdi, chunki u martaba tugaganligi haqida xabar oldi. Ap Bac jangidan so'ng, Kennedi kabinetida Diam rejimining hayotiyligi to'g'risida munozara boshlandi, uni Buddist inqirozi 1963 yil may oyida boshlangan.[55] Diemga qarshi to'ntarishni qo'llab-quvvatlash mavzusi birinchi marta 1963 yil avgust oyida Milliy Xavfsizlik Kengashi yig'ilishida Kennedi tomonidan ko'tarilganida, MakNamara Diimni saqlab qolish tarafdori edi.[56] Saygondan qaytgan diplomat Pol Kattenburg, 1963 yil 31 avgustda Rask, Maknamara va vitse-prezident Jonson ishtirok etgan yig'ilishda Qo'shma Shtatlar Diemni qo'llab-quvvatlashni to'xtatib, Janubiy Vetnamni o'z taqdiriga topshirishni taklif qildi.[57] McNamara was stoutly opposed to Kattenburg's suggestion, saying "we have been winning the war".[57]
Unable to gain a consensus about what to do, in September 1963, Kennedy sent McNamara and General Taylor on a "fact-finding mission" to South Vietnam.[57] At a meeting in the Gia Long Palace, President Diem showed McNamara various graphs and charts that purported to be proof that the war was being won, a performance that convinced the war was as good as won.[58] Kennedy wanted a negative assessment of Diệm to justify supporting a coup, but McNamara and Taylor instead wrote about the "great progress" achieved by Diệm and confidently predicted that the "bulk" of the American advisers would leave in 1965 as by that point they predicted the VC insurgency would be crushed. [59] McNamara predicted that if Diệm continued his policies, by 1965 the insurgency would be "little more than organized banditry".[60] With the CIA and the ambassador Genri Kabot lojasi kichik. urging support for a coup while the Pentagon was opposed, Kennedy vacillated and finally being unable to make up his mind, gave the power of decision to Lodge. [61] Lodge, who detested Diệm, gave his approval to the generals plotting against him.[62]
On 1 November 1963, the to'ntarish ishga tushirildi. [63] Keyin prezident saroyi was overrun in the fighting, Diệm was captured trying to flee Saigon and executed on 2 November 1963.[64] The new government in Saigon was headed by General Dương Văn Minh. On 22 November 1963, Kennedi o'ldirildi va muvaffaqiyat qozondi Lindon Jonson. In December 1963, Johnson sent McNamara on another "fact-finding mission" to South Vietnam to assess General Minh's performance.[65] On 19 December 1963, McNamara reported the situation was "very disturbing" as the "current trends, unless reversed in the next two or three months, will lead to neutralization at best or more likely to a Communist-controlled state".[65] He also admitted that the computer models and statistics, which he had attached such importance to, were "grossly in error" and that government control of rural areas had "in fact been deteriorating...to a far greater extent than we realized" since July.[65] Regarding Minh's regime McNamara wrote at present "there is no organized government in South Vietnam".[65] Through McNamara admitted that the new regime was "indecisive and drifting", he advised Johnson to undertake "more forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement".[65] On 30 January 1964, General Minh was overthrown in a bloodless coup d'état by General Nguyon Xan.[66] The change in leadership did not affect the war. Layman Kirkpatrik of the CIA reported in February 1964 after visiting Saigon that he was "shocked by the number of our people and of the military, even those whose job is always to say we are winning, who feel the tide is against us".[67] The same month saw a VC battalion in the Mekong deltasi escape from South Vietnamese troops, who had been rated as some of the very best in the ARVN by the American advisers who had trained them, a battle that underscored the problems in the ARVN.[67]
On 8 March 1964, McNamara visited South Vietnam to report to President Johnson about how well the new regime of Khánh was handling the war. [68] Upon landing in Saigon, McNamara told the press: "We shall stay for as long it takes to ...win the battle against the Communist insurgents".[68] During his visit, McNamara spoke memorized phrases in mangled Vietnamese (McNamara kept forgetting that Vietnamese is a tonal language) in speeches praising Khánh as South Vietnam's "best possible leader".[69] McNamara always ended his speeches by shouting out what he thought was a phrase meaning "Long live a free Vietnam!", but as he used the wrong tones, instead he said "Vietnam, go to sleep!"[70] McNamara pressed Khánh to put South Vietnam on a war footing by conscripting all able-bodied young men into the military, which he promised he would do.[71] Khánh did not keep his promise as wealthy and middle class South Vietnamese families objected to having their sons conscripted, and as a result the burden of conscription called by Khánh's national service law fell only on sons of poor families, provoking much resentment.[71] After returning to Washington on 13 March, McNamara reported to Johnson that the situation had "unquestionably been growing worse" since his last visit in December 1963 with 40% of the countryside now under "Vietcong control or predominant influence"; most of the South Vietnamese people were displaying "apathy and indifference"; the desertion rate in the ARVN was "high and increasing" while the VC were "recruiting energetically".[69] The "greatest weakness" accordingly to McNamara was the "uncertain viability" of Khánh's government, which might be overthrown at any moment as the ARVN was ridden with factionalism and intrigue.[69]
To save South Vietnam, McNamara recommended that the United States make it "emphatically clear" its willingness to support Khánh to the hilt.[69] Other recommendations, which were accepted in a National Security Council "action memorandum" called for the United States to pay for an increase in the ARVN, provide the Vetnam Respublikasi havo kuchlari with more planes and helicopters, and for the United States to pay for more civil servants to administer rural South Vietnam.[69] More importantly, the "action memorandum" redefined the Vietnam War as not only important for Asia, but for the entire world as the document asserted the global credibility of the United States was now at stake as it was claimed America's allies would lose faith in American promises if the South Vietnamese government were overthrown.[69] The "action memorandum" argued that to "lose" South Vietnam would fatally weaken American global leadership, making the war a "test case" of American willingness to continue as a global power.[69]
In April 1964, Senator Ueyn Mors called the war "McNamara's War".[72] In response, McNamara told the press that he was honored, saying "I think it is a very important war, and I am pleased to be identified with it and do whatever I can to win it".[73] In May 1964, Senator Richard Russell advised Johnson against relying too much on McNamara, saying "McNamara is the smartest fella any of us know. But he's got too much-he's opinionated as hell-and he's made up his mind".[73] Russell told Johnson that he should find an expert, preferably a World War Two general who was "not scared to death of McNamara" to go to South Vietnam to say that the war was unwinnable and that the United States should pull out, advice that Johnson rejected.[72]
Although South Vietnam by 1964 was receiving a sum of American economic and military aid that ran to $2 million per day, the South Vietnamese state was falling apart with corruption reaching such a point that most South Vietnamese civil servants and soldiers were not being paid while the projects for "rural pacification" that the United States had paid for had collapsed as the money had instead been stolen.[74] The advice that McNamara and other American officials gave to the South Vietnamese to make reforms to crack down on corruption and make the government more effective was always ignored as by this point the South Vietnamese government knew very well that the Americans, having repeatedly promised in public that they would never permit the "loss" of South Vietnam, were now prisoners of their own rhetoric.[74] The threats to withhold aid were bluffs, which the South Vietnamese exposed by simply ignoring the American advice, leading to a situation whereby Stenli Karnov, the Vietnam correspondent for the Vaqt noted:"...America lacked leverage...For the South Vietnamese knew that the United States could not abandon them without damaging its own prestige. So despite their reliance on American aid, now more than a half-billion dollars a year, they could safely defy American dictates. In short, their weakness was their strength".[74] One South Vietnamese minister told Karnow at the time: "Our big advantage over the Americans is that they want to win the war more than we do".[74] To compensate for the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese state, by late winter of 1964, senior officials in the Johnson administration such as McNamara's deputy, Uilyam Bandi, the assistant secretary of defense, were advocating American intervention in the war.[75] Such intervention presented a constitutional problem: to intervene on the scale envisioned would mean waging war, and only Congress had the legal power to declare war.[75] Fearful of causing a war with China, Johnson was opposed to the plans of Khánh to invade North Vietnam, and he was even less enthusiastic about having the United States invade North Vietnam.[71] To declare war on North Vietnam would lead to irresistible political pressure at home to invade North Vietnam. As such, the solution was floated for Congress to pass a resolution granting Johnson the power to wage war in Vietnam. [75]
By 1964, the U.S. Navy sent destroyers into the Tonkin ko'rfazi to support raids by South Vietnamese commandos on North Vietnam and to gather intelligence.[76] On 2 August 1964, one destroyer, the USSMaddoks was involved in a naval skirmish with North Vietnamese Vetnam Xalq dengiz kuchlari torpedo boats within North Vietnamese waters.[77] On 4 August 1964, the Maddoks and another destroyer, the USSTyorner Joy, initially claimed to have been attacked by the North Vietnamese torpedo boats in international waters on a stormy night, but shortly afterward reported there was probably no attack.[78] Kapitan John J. Herrick ning Maddoks reported that the "torpedo boats" were almost certainly just radar "blips" caused by the "freak weather effects" of the storm and the reports of an attack on his ship were due to an "overeager" radar operator who mistook the motors of the ship for the rush of torpedoes.[79] Johnson promptly seized upon the reports of an attack on a Navy warship in international waters to ask Congress to pass a resolution giving him the authority to wage war in Vietnam. [79] McNamara, via Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr. of the Pacific fleet, put strong pressure on Herrick to say that his ship had been attacked by torpedo boats, despite his strong doubts on the subject.[80] On 5 August 1964, McNamara appeared before Congress to present proof of what he claimed was an attack on the Navy's warships in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin and stated it was imperative that Congress pass the resolution as quickly as possible.[81] Records from the Lyndon Johnson Library have indicated that McNamara may have misled Johnson on the purported attack on a U.S. Navy destroyer by allegedly withholding recommendations from US Pacific Commanders against executing airstrikes.[82] McNamara was also instrumental in presenting the event to Congress and the public as justification for escalation of the war against the communists.[83] In 1995, McNamara met with former North Vietnam Defense Minister Võ Nguyên Giap, who told his American counterpart that the August 4 attack never happened, a conclusion McNamara eventually came to accept.[84]
President Johnson ordered Pirs Arrou operatsiyasi, retaliatory air strikes on North Vietnamese naval bases. Congress approved, with only Senators Ueyn Mors (D. -Yoki ) va Ernest Gruening (D-AK ), voting against,[85] The Tonkin ko'rfazi, authorizing the president "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the U.S. and to prevent further aggression." Regardless of the particulars of the incident, the larger issue would turn out to be the sweeping powers granted by the resolution. It gave Johnson virtually unfettered authority to expand retaliation for a relatively minor naval incident into a major land war involving 500,000 American soldiers. "The fundamental issue of Tonkin Gulf involved not deception but, rather, misuse of power bestowed by the resolution," McNamara wrote later.[86] Though Johnson now had the authority to wage war, he proved reluctant to use it, for example by ignoring the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bomb North Vietnam after a VC attack on Bien Hoa Air Base killed five Americans and destroyed 5 B-57 bombardimonchilar.[87] Knowing of Johnson's hesitance, on 1 December 1964 McNamara recommended a "graduated" response program, urging Johnson to launch Barrel rulosini ishlatish, a bombing offensive against the part of the Xoshimin izi in the southern part of neutral Laos, which was approved by the president.[88] On Christmas Eve 1964, the VC bombed the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, killing two Americans.[89] Despite McNamara's recommendations to bomb North Vietnam, Johnson still hesitated.[90]
McNamara at war
In 1965, in response to stepped-up military activity by the VC in South Vietnam and their North Vietnamese allies, the U.S. began bombing North Vietnam, deployed large military forces and entered into combat in South Vietnam. McNamara's plan, supported by requests from top U.S. military commanders in Vietnam, led to the commitment of 485,000 troops by the end of 1967 and almost 535,000 by June 30, 1968. In January 1965, McNamara together with the National Security Adviser McGeorge Bandi co-wrote a memo to President Johnson stating "both of us are now pretty well convinced that our present policy can lead only to disastrous defeat" as it was hopeless to expect the unstable and corrupt South Vietnamese government to defeat the VC who were steadily "gaining in the countryside".[91] Bundy and McNamara wrote "the time for has come for hard choices" as the United States now had the alternatives of either negotiating with North Vietnam to "salvage what little can be preserved" or to resort to intervention to "force a change".[91] Both Bundy and McNamara stated that they favored the latter, arguing that the commitment of U.S troops to fight in South Vietnam and a strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam were now required.[91] McNamara's hawkish stance on Vietnam was well known in Washington and many in the press often referred to the war as "McNamara's war" as he was the one in the cabinet always pressing for greater American involvement.[92]
In February 1965, the VC attacked the American airfield at Pleiku, killing 8 Americans and destroying 10 aircraft.[93] After hearing of the attack, Johnson assembled his national security team together with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, John W. McCormack, and the Senate Majority Leader, Mayk Mensfild, to announce "I've had enough of this".[94] Only Mansfield and the Vice President, Xubert Xamfri, objected to Johnson's plans to bomb North Vietnam.[94] Aircraft from the carrier, USSRanger, ishga tushirildi Olovli Dart operatsiyasi bombing the North Vietnamese army base at Đồng Hới o'sha kuni kechroq.[94] McNamara was forced to tell Johnson that the Flaming Dart raids had done little damage owning to the heavy clouds, which caused the pilots to miss when dropping their bombs, and more raids would be needed.[95] On 11 February, Johnson ordered more bombing raids, and 2 March approved Rolling Thunder operatsiyasi, a strategic bombing offensive against North Vietnam that was originally planned to last eight weeks, and instead went on for three years.[96] After the bombing raids started, General Uilyam Vestmoreland ning Harbiy yordam qo'mondonligi, Vetnam (MACV), cabled Johnson to say that Da Nang aviabazasi was vulnerable as he had no faith in the ability of the South Vietnamese to protect it, leading him to ask for American troops to be deployed instead.[97] On 8 March 1965, two battalions from the Qo'shma Shtatlar dengiz piyoda korpusi ga tushishdi Danang, making the beginning of the ground war for the United States.[98] On 20 April, McNamara urged Johnson to send 40,000 troops to Vietnam, advice that was accepted.[99]
By June 1965, Westmoreland was reporting that South Vietnam was faced with a "collapse", which would require 180,000 troops to stop, which would be just a "stopgap", and another 100,000 troops would be needed "to seize the initiative from the enemy".[100] McNamara's advice in July 1965 to Johnson to commit more 180,000 troops to South Vietnam together with a stepped up aerial offensive to destroy North Vietnam's economy was called by Bundy "rash to the point of folly".[101] Bundy stated that for Johnson to agree to McNamara's request to send more troops "was a slippery slope toward total U.S. responsibility and corresponding fecklessness on the Vietnamese side".[101] Bundy argued that it was the responsibility of the South Vietnamese government to stop the VC and that if the Americans continued to do all the fighting, then the United States would lack the necessary leverage to pressure Saigon into making reforms, turning "...the conflict into a white man's war, with the United States in the shoes of the French".[101] To resolve the debate, later in July 1965, McNamara visited South Vietnam on yet another "fact-finding mission" for President Johnson and met the new South Vietnamese Premier, Air Marshal Nguyon Cao Kỳ, who had just overthrown Khánh.[102] Air Marshal Kỳ wore a flamboyant uniform which he had designed himself of a white jacket, black pants, red socks and black shoes which led McNamara to dub him as looking "like a saxophone player in a second-rate nightclub".[102] McNamara was not impressed with Kỳ, reporting to Johnson that he saw little evidence that he was capable of winning the war, and the United States would have to send more troops to South Vietnam.[102] Upon his return to the United States, McNamara told the press that the U.S forces in Vietnam were inflicting "increasingly heavy losses" on the VC, but in private told President Johnson that the situation was "worse than a year ago".[102]
McNamara also advised the president that by early 1966 he would have to send 100,000 more troops to South Vietnam in order to win the war, and would need to mobilize the Reserves and state National Guards as well.[102] Johnson accepted the first recommendation while rejecting the latter, disregarding Bundy's warnings that to send more troops would paradoxically mean less leverage over South Vietnam.[102] To mobilize the Reserves and National Guards would mean having to call up hundreds of thousands of men from civilian life, which would inevitably disrupt the economy, which in turn would require ending the peacetime economy and putting the economy on a war footing. Johnson rejected a wartime economy as imposing too many sacrifices on ordinary Americans while threatening his chances for reelection. Because the Reserves were never called up, the Army had to send much of its manpower to Vietnam, leaving the U.S divisions in Western Europe in a "skeletal" condition as there was a shortage of volunteers.[103] To make up the shortfall, the Army had to rely upon qoralama, which caused much domestic opposition, especially as the draft system offered generous exemptions for those attending university and college, leading to the burden of the draft falling disproportionately upon men from poorer families.[103] Because of the refusal to call up the Reserves, McNamara had to increase the draft call in July 1965 from 17,000 per month to 35,000 per month.[104] As most of the 18 and 19-year-old draftees had a high school degree or less, this also led to a decline in the Army's intellectual standards, with many officers complaining that most of the draftees were not intelligent enough to be trained for technical duties or promoted up the ranks.[103] Throughout the war, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, pressed very strongly for the reserves and national guards to be called out, saying the war was steadily ruining the U.S. Army.[105] Though McNamara warned the president in July 1965 that the war would cost an extra $10 billion dollars in defense spending over the next year, Johnson at a press conference said his administration would be spending only an extra $300–400 million dollars until January 1966.[106] McNamara warned that the increased spending would spark inflation and raise the deficit, advising Johnson to ask Congress to increase taxes to forestall those eventualities.[106] Johnson responded that Congress would not vote for higher taxes, leading McNamara to argue that the president should at least try, saying "I would rather fight for what's right and fail than not try".[106] Johnson snapped: "Goddammit, Bob, that's what's wrong with you-you aren't a politician".[106]
On 2 November 1965, Norman Morrison, a Quaker burned himself alive in the parking lot of the Pentagon to protest the war.[107] All McNamara saw from his office was the smoke rising from the parking lot, but he was sufficiently troubled by the incident that he refused to discuss with it with his family, all the more so because his wife Margey was opposed to the war and sympathized with Morrison's feelings, if not his suicide.[108] On 7 November 1965, McNamara sent Johnson a memo saying that the "substantial loss of American lives" in Vietnam was worth the sacrifice in order to contain China, which McNamara called the world's most dangerous nation.[108] McNamara wrote that the deployment of troops to South Vietnam would "make sense only if they are in support of a long-term United States policy to contain China", writing that the process of "containing" China would require "American attention, money and, from time to time unfortunately lives".[108]
The casualty lists mounted as the number of troops and the intensity of fighting escalated. McNamara put in place a statistical strategy for victory in Vietnam. He concluded that there were a limited number of VC fighters in South Vietnam and that a war of attrition would destroy them. He applied metrics (body counts) to determine how close to success his plan was.[109] Faced with a guerrilla war, the question of holding territory was irrelevant as the VC never operated for extended periods in areas where the Americans were strong and if the Americans occupied an area in force, the VC simply moved to other areas where the American presence was weaker.[109] Westmoreland had decided, with the support of McNamara, to defend all of South Vietnam, believing that he could win via a strategy of attrition as he would simply inflict enough losses to end the enemy's ability to wage war.[110] McNamara devised the "body count" measurement to determine how well the Americans were doing, reasoning if the Americans were inflicting heavy losses as measured by the "body count", it must be a sign that they were winning.[109] Umumiy Uilyam Peers wrote critically of the "body count" strategy, stating: "...with improper leadership, 'body count' could create competition between units, particularly if these statistics were compared like baseball standings and there were no stringent requirements as to how and by whom the counts were to be made".[109] The obsession with "body counts" led to much exaggeration of the losses inflicted on the enemy as the officers with the highest "body counts" were promoted while also fueling a grisly competition between units to achieve the highest "body counts" that led to innocent civilians being killed to inflate their daily "body counts". It is generally accepted by historians that the vast daily losses that U.S. officers claimed to have inflicted on the VC were fabricated as many officers desperate for a promotion reported "body counts" well above what they were actually achieving.[109]
The U.S. Army sabotaged the efforts of Kennedy and McNamara to develop a more counterinsurgency role by simply declaring that the Army's basic unit, the division, was flexible enough to engage against guerrillas while also promising that the traditional fondness for using maximum firepower would not present a problem as firepower use would be "discriminating".[111] In Vietnam, this led to divisions, whose size limited them and their supply trains to the road, using massive amounts of firepower against guerrillas who were often "nimble" enough to evade all of the firepower brought to bear.[112] Instead, the standard tactics of bringing massive firepower to bear in the form of napalm and artillery strikes against the guerrillas often killed civilians, fueling support for the VC.[112] The Special Forces did fight in Vietnam, but only as an adjutant to the traditional infantry and armored divisions, which did most of the fighting.[112] In a 1966 memo, McNamara admitted that the sort of counterinsurgency war envisioned by Kennedy with the Special Forces leading the fight had not occurred, and wrote that the responsibility for this "undoubtedly lies with bad management" on the part of the Army. [112]
Ko'ngilsizlik
Up to November 1965, McNamara who been a supporter of the war, first started to have doubts about the war, saying at a press conference that "it will be a long war", which completely contradicted his previous optimistic statements that the war would be brought to a close soon.[110] Although he was a prime architect of the Vietnam War and repeatedly overruled the JCS on strategic matters, McNamara gradually became skeptical about whether the war could be won by deploying more troops to South Vietnam and intensifying the bombing of North Vietnam, a claim he would publish in a book years later. He also stated later that his support of the war was given out of loyalty to administration policy. He traveled to South Vietnam many times to study the situation firsthand and became increasingly reluctant to approve the large force increments requested by the military commanders.[113][tekshirish uchun etarlicha aniq emas ]
As a Christmas gesture, Johnson ordered a bombing pause over North Vietnam and went off to his ranch in Texas for the holidays.[114] McNamara went with his family for skiing in Colorado, but upon hearing that the president was open to extending the bombing pause for a few more days, he left his family at the sky lodge in the Rockies to fly to the Johnson ranch on 27 December 1965.[114] McNamara knew that Johnson tended to listen to the advice of Rusk who saw extending the bombing pause as weakness, and wanted a meeting with Johnson without Rusk present.[114] McNamara argued to the president in a three hour long meeting that the North Vietnamese would not open peace talks unless the bombing were stopped first, as they kept saying repeatedly, and persuaded Johnson to extend the bombing pause into January.[114] At a New's Eve Party attended by Washington's elite to welcome 1966, McNamara expressed doubts about America's ability to win the war.[115] A week later at a dinner party attended by the economist Jon Kennet Galbraith and Johnson's speechwriter Dick Goodwin, McNamara stated that victory was unobtainable, and the best that could be achieved was an "honorable withdrawal" that might save South Vietnam as a state.[116] In February 1966, during the Honolulu conference, McNamara during an "off-the-record" chat with a group of journalists spoke about the war in very jaded terms, stating frankly that Operation Rolling Thunder was a failure.[92] McNamara stated that North Vietnam was a backward Third World country that did not have the same advanced industrial infrastructure of First World nations, making the bombing offensive useless. [92] McNamara concluded: "No amount of bombing can end the war".[92] Karnow, one of the journalists present during the "off-the-record" conversation, described McNamara's personality as having changed, noting the Defense Secretary, who was normally so arrogant and self-assured, convinced he could "scientifically" solve any problem, as being subdued and clearly less self-confident.[92]
In October 1966, McNamara returned from yet another visit to South Vietnam, full of confidence in public and doubt in private.[117] McNamara told the media that "process has exceeded our expectations" while telling the president he saw "no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon".[117] Though McNamara reported to Johnson that American forces were inflicting heavy losses on the North Vietnamese and VC, he added that they could "more than replace" their losses and that "full security exists nowhere" in South Vietnam, even in areas supposedly "pacified" by the Americans.[117] Worse of all, McNamara complained that the South Vietnamese were still not carrying their full share of the load, as they expected the Americans to do all the fighting for them, stating: "This important war must be fought and won by the Vietnamese themselves. We have known this from the beginning. But the discouraging truth is that, as was the case in 1961 and 1963 and 1965, we have not found the formula, the catalyst, for training and inspiring them into effective action".[117]
Because the effects of Operation Rolling Thunder were more easily measured than with the ground war, McNamara was especially troubled by the revelation that the bombing offensive had not caused the collapse of North Vietnam's economy as predicted.[118] In June 1967, American bombers hit North Vietnam's hydroelectric plants and reduced North Vietnam capacity to generate electricity by 85%, accordingly to McNamara's calculations. [119] At the same time, he also calculated that the annual amount of electricity generated in North Vietnam was equal only to a fifth of the electricity generated every year at the Potomak elektr energiya kompaniyasi o'simlik Iskandariya, Virjiniya, making the destruction of North Vietnamese power plants meaningless to the outcome of the war as the amount of electricity generated was so small.[119] He also calculated in 1967 that over the last two years, American bombers had inflicted damage on North Vietnam equal to about $300 million while at the same time, Rolling Thunder had cost the U.S. Air Force about 700 aircraft shot down over North Vietnam whose total value was about $900 million, making the bombing campaign uneconomical.[119] McNamara's doubts were encouraged by his civilian aides such as Lesli X. Gelb va John McNaughton, who complained that their wives and teenage children were chiding them as "war criminals" when they came home from work.[120] McNamara's own teenage son, Robert Craig McNamara, was opposed to the war and denounced his father when he came from work every day.[121] McNamara was shocked to discover that the American flag was hanging upside down in his son's bedroom as the younger McNamara told him that he was ashamed of America because of him.[122] McNaughton told McNamara that after having talked to some of the young people that "a feeling is widely and strongly held...that 'the Establishment' is out of its mind" and the dominant opinion was "that we are trying to impose some U.S. image on distant peoples we cannot understand and that we carrying the thing to absurd lengths."[120]
In November 1966, McNamara visited Harvard University and the car driving him to see Genri Kissincer was surrounded by anti-war protesters who forced the automobile to stop.[122] The students refused to let the car move until McNamara debated their leader, Michael Ansara, the president of the Harvard branch of Demokratik jamiyat uchun talabalar.[122] McNamara agreed to the debate, and standing on the hood of his car answered the charge from a student in the crowd that the United States was waging aggression by saying the war started in 1954, not 1957, which he knew "because the International Control Commission wrote a report that said so. You haven't read it, and if you have, you obviously didn't understand it".[122] When the student answered that he had read the International Control Commission's report and it did not say that, McNamara responded he had been a far better university student than his opponent, saying "I was tougher than you then and I'm tougher today! I was more courteous then, and I hope I'm more courteous today!".[123] As McNamara continued to insult the crowd and the mood grew more ugly, he fled into Kvinsi uyi, from which he escaped via underground tunnels to see Kissinger.[124] The confrontation with the students had shaken him, and it took half an hour before he was ready to address Kissinger's class.[124]
In a memo of 19 May 1967, McNamara stated the military side of the war was going well with the Americans killing thousands of the enemy every month, but the political side was not as South Vietnam remained as dysfunctional as ever as he wrote: "Corruption is widespread. Real government control is confined to enclaves. There is rot in the fabric".[125] McNamara wrote that the idea that the American forces would temporarily stabilize the situation so the South Vietnamese could take over the war themselves was flawed as the dysfunctional South Vietnamese state would never be able to win the war, thus meaning the Americans would have to stay in Vietnam for decades to come. He advised Johnson not to accept Westmoreland's call for an additional 200,000 soldiers as that would mean calling up the Reserves, which in turn would require a wartime economy.[125] The economic sacrifices that ending the peacetime economy would entail would make it almost politically impossible to negotiate peace, and in effect would mean placing the hawks in charge, which was why those of a hawkish inclination kept pressing for the Reserves to be called up.[125] The economic sacrifices could only be justified to the American people by saying the war would be brought to a victorious conclusion. McNamara rejected the advice of the hawks, warning that steps such as bombing North Vietnam's dikes and locks to flood the farmland with the aim of causing a famine; mining the coast of North Vietnam to sink Soviet ships bringing in arms; invading Laos and Cambodia; and finally in the last resort using nuclear weapons if the other measures failed were likely to alienate world opinion and increase domestic opposition.[125] McNamara wrote: "The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one".[125] Finally, McNamara dismissed the Domino Theory as irrelevant since General Suxarto had seized power in Indonesia in 1965 and proceeded to wipe out the Indonesian Communist Party, the third-largest in the world, killing hundreds of thousands of Indonesian Communists.[125] He argued that with Suharto in power in Indonesia that "the trend in Asia was now running in America's favor, which reduced the importance of South Vietnam".[125] To the Americans, Indonesia was the most important of all the "dominoes" in Southeast Asia, and McNamara argued that even if the South Vietnamese "domino" were to fall, the Indonesian "domino" would still stand.[125]
McNamara commissioned the Vietnam Study Task Force on June 17, 1967. He was inspired by the confrontation at Harvard the previous November as he had discovered that the students he had been debating knew more about Vietnam's history than he did.[126] The task was assigned to Gelb and six officials who was instructed by McNamara to examine just how and why the United States became involved in Vietnam, starting with American relations with the Viet Minh in World War Two.[127] Through Gelb was a hawk who had written pro-war speeches for the Republican Senator Jacob Javits, he and his team became disillusioned as they wrote the history; at one point when discussing what were the lessons of Vietnam, Paul Gorman, one of the historians went up to the blackboard to write simply, "Don't".[128] By April 1969, The Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force as the Pentagon Papers were officially titled, was finished, but widely ignored within the government.[128] Intended as the official record of US military involvement in Indochina, the final report ran to 3,000 pages and was classified as "Top Secret – Sensitive".[127] The report was ultimately leaked in 1971 to the Nyu-York Tayms tomonidan Daniel Ellsberg, a former aide to McNamara's Assistant Secretary of Defense, John McNaughton. The leak became known as the Pentagon hujjatlari, revealing that McNamara and others had been aware that the Vietnam offensive was futile. Subsequent efforts by the Nikson administration to prevent such leaks led indirectly to the Votergeyt bilan bog'liq janjal. McNamara said that the Domino nazariyasi was the main reason for entering the Vietnam War. In the same interview he stated, "Kennedy hadn't said before he died whether, faced with the loss of Vietnam, he would [completely] withdraw; but I believe today that had he faced that choice, he would have withdrawn."[129]
Ijtimoiy tenglik
To commemorate President Garri S Truman 's signing an order to end segregation in the military, McNamara issued Directive 5120.36 on July 26, 1963. This directive, Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, dealt directly with the issue of racial and gender discrimination in areas surrounding military communities. The directive declared, "Every military commander has the responsibility to oppose discriminatory practices affecting his men and their dependents and to foster equal opportunity for them, not only in areas under his immediate control, but also in nearby communities where they may live or gather in off-duty hours." (para. II.C.)[130] Under the directive, commanding officers were obligated to use the economic power of the military to influence local businesses in their treatment of minorities and women. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, the commanding officer could declare areas off-limits to military personnel for discriminatory practices.[131]
ABM
Toward the end of his term McNamara also opposed an ballistikaga qarshi raketa (ABM) system proposed for installation in the U.S. in defense against Soviet missiles, arguing the $40 billion "in itself is not the problem; the penetrability of the proposed shield is the problem."[132] Under pressure to proceed with the ABM program after it became clear that the Soviets had begun a similar project, McNamara finally agreed to a "light" system which he believed could protect against the far smaller number of Chinese missiles. However, he never believed it was wise for the United States to move in that direction because of psychological risks of relying too much on nuclear weaponry and that there would be pressure from many directions to build a larger system than would be militarily effective.[133]
He always believed that the best defense strategy for the U.S. was a parity of o'zaro ishonch bilan yo'q qilish Sovet Ittifoqi bilan.[134] An ABM system would be an ineffective weapon as compared to an increase in deployed nuclear missile capacity.[135]
Chiqish
McNamara wrote of his close personal friendship with Jackie Kennedy and how she demanded that he stop the killing in Vietnam.[136] As McNamara grew more and more controversial after 1966 and his differences with the President and the Birlashgan shtab boshliqlari ustida Vetnam strategiya jamoatchilik spekulyatsiyasining mavzusiga aylandi, uning lavozimidan ketishi haqida tez-tez mish-mishlar tarqaldi. 1967 yilga kelib, McNamara asabiy taranglikdan azob chekayotgan edi, chunki u bir necha kun soqol olmasdan yurdi va uning jag'lari bir necha soat davomida tinimsiz titrab turadigan spazmlarga duch keldi.[137] Jonson u haqida shunday dedi: "Bilasizmi, u juda yaxshi odam, ajoyib odam, Bob Maknamara. U hamma narsani berdi, deyarli hamma narsani berdi va bilasiz, biz boshqa Forrestalni sotib olishga qodir emasmiz" (birinchisiga havola) Mudofaa vaziri, Jeyms Forrestal, ish bilan bog'liq stress va depressiya tufayli o'z joniga qasd qilgan).[137]
Senator Jon C. Stennis konservativ janubiy demokrat edi, u katta a'zo sifatida katta ta'sirga ega edi Qurolli kuchlar Senat qo'mitasi.[138] Stennis o'zini nazoratchi emas, balki harbiy chempion deb bilar edi va shuning uchun harbiylar unga ma'lumotlarini Kapitoliy tepaligida olib borishini bilgan holda tez-tez berib turar edi.[139] McNamara rahbariyati bilan o'zlarining baxtsizliklarini aks ettirgan holda, 1967 yil bahorida katta generallar va admirallar Stennisga Mudofaa vaziri urushni noto'g'ri boshqarayotganiga ishonganliklari haqida xabar berishdi, bu esa 1967 yil avgustda Senatning Qurolli Kuchlar qo'mitasida ayblovni ko'rib chiqish uchun tinglovlarni rejalashtirishga olib keldi. "malakasiz fuqarolik havaskorlar" (ya'ni McNamara) "professional harbiy mutaxassislar" ning urushda g'alaba qozonishiga yo'l qo'ymayapti, chunki u McNamara Shimoliy Vetnamning begunoh tinch aholisini himoya qilish uchun Shimoliy Vetnamni bombardimon qilishda juda ko'p cheklovlar qo'ygan.[139] Senat Qurolli Kuchlar qo'mitasining raisi, senator Kichik Richard Rassel, urushga qarshi edi, ammo u vatanparvar bo'lmagan ko'rinishni istamagani sababli, u eng ehtiyotkor va iliq so'zlar bilan o'z qarshiligini bildirdi va shuning uchun qirg'iy Stennis qo'mita raisining o'rinbosari unvonidan ko'ra ko'proq kuchga ega edi.[140]
Tinglovlar 1967 yil 8 avgustda ochilgan va Stennis o'z guvohlari sifatida ko'plab admirallarni va Havo Kuchlari generallarini chaqirgan, ularning barchasi AQSh "bir qo'lni orqasiga bog'lab" kurashayotganiga ishonganliklari to'g'risida guvohlik berib, McNamara rahbariyatini shikoyat qilayotganlarida yashirincha tanqid qilmoqda. Shimoliy Vetnamni urushda g'alaba qozonishlariga to'sqinlik qilmoqda deb da'vo qilgan bombalarni bombardimon qilishda "o'ta cheklovchi nazorat".[139] Maknamaraning o'zi 1967 yil 25 avgustda Senatning Qurolli Kuchlar qo'mitasi oldida guvoh sifatida paydo bo'lganida, u urushga bo'lgan ishonchini yo'qotganligini qat'iy isbotlab, urushni juda iliq so'zlar bilan himoya qilib, Shimoliy Vetnamga qarshi bombardimon kampaniyasi samarasiz bo'lganligini tasdiqladi. bombardimon cheklovlari haqidagi savol ma'nosiz.[141] MakNamara cheklangan 57 maqsadning barchasini hech qanday ahamiyatga ega emasligini aytdi, masalan, Xanoydagi shinalar zavodi kuniga atigi 30 dona shinalar ishlab chiqargan yoki Shimoliy Vetnamga etkazib beradigan Sovet kemalariga zarba berish xavfi juda katta.[142] U amerikalik bombardimonchilarning Sovet dengizchilariga jarohat etkazish yoki o'ldirish paytida sovet savdogarlariga zarar etkazishi yoki cho'ktirishi ehtimoli Uchinchi Jahon urushiga sabab bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida ogohlantirdi.[142] McNamara, bombardimon kampaniyasi Xoshimin yo'lidan tushadigan etkazib berishni kamaytira olmaganligi sababli, Vetnamga kurashni davom ettirish uchun kuniga atigi 15 tonna zaxiraga ehtiyoj borligi va "agar bu miqdor besh baravar ko'p bo'lsa ham, bo'lishi mumkin faqat bir nechta yuk mashinalari orqali tashiladi ".[141] MakNamara, bombardimon qilingan reydlar "agrar va sodda" bo'lgan Shimoliy Vetnam iqtisodiyotiga zarar etkazmaganligini va Shimoliy Vetnam xalqi "G'arb dunyosida ko'pchiligimiz odatiy hol deb biladigan zamonaviy qulayliklar va qulayliklar" bilan tanish emasligini aytdi.[141] Maknamara, shuningdek, Shimoliy Vetnam xalqi "tartib-intizomga o'rganib qolganligi va mahrumlik va o'limga begona emasligi" sababli bombardimon hujumi bilan Shimoliy Vetnamning ruhiyati buzilmaganligini ta'kidladi, ammo barchasi Xanoydagi rahbariyat bombardimon reydlaridan ta'sirlanmaganligini ko'rsatdi. Shunday qilib, unga "muzokaralar stoliga bomba qo'yilishi mumkinligiga ishonch" yo'q edi.[141] McNamara urushda faqat biron bir genotsidgina g'alaba qozonishi mumkin degan xulosaga keldi: "Janubdagi dushman operatsiyalari, men ko'rgan har qanday xabar asosida, havo bombardimonlari bilan to'xtatilishi mumkin emas, ya'ni Shimoliy Virtual qirg'in. Vetnam va uning xalqi "deb nomlangan.[141]
Stennisdan tashqari Senatning Qurolli Kuchlar qo'mitasining boshqa a'zolari senatorlar edi Genri M. Jekson, Strom Thurmond va Styuart Simington, ularning barchasi McNamara'dan so'roq qilishda unga juda dushman edilar.[141] Senator Thurmond MakNamarani tanqid qildi: "Menimcha, bu kommunistlarni joylashtirish haqidagi bayonot. Bu kommunistlarni tinchlantirish haqidagi bayonot. Bu g'alaba qozonmaslik to'g'risida bayonot".[143] Maxsus ravishda, McNamara Thurmondning "eshak" ekanligini his qildi, u janubiy aqidaparast, johil siyosatchi, uning yagona qadriyatlari aqlsiz militarizm, oq ustunlikka g'ayratli e'tiqod va o'zidan ancha yoshroq ayollarga uylanishni yaxshi ko'rish edi. McNamara uning ostida Thurmond tomonidan so'roq qilinishi kerakligini his qildi, bu nima uchun u Thurmondga bergan javoblarida asosan truculent bo'lganligini tushuntirdi.[143]
Stennis qo'mitaning hisobotini yozdi, unda McNamara "harbiy qo'mondonlar va shtab qo'shma boshliqlarining bir ovozdan bergan tavsiyalarini doimiy ravishda bekor qilganlikda" ayblanib, u Stennis yozgan "tizimli, o'z vaqtida va qattiq harakatlarni" taklif qilgan.[141] Stennis Shimoliy Vetnam fuqarolarini himoya qilish uchun bombardimon cheklovlarini qo'ygani uchun McNamarani la'natladi va faqat McNamara harbiylardan olgan barcha maslahatlariga bo'ysungan taqdirda, urush osonlikcha g'alaba qozonishini aytdi.[141] Stennisga tinglovlar ta'sir qilmadi, chunki u eshituvlar boshlanishidan oldin qo'mita hisobotini yozgan edi.[141] Jonson tinglovlarni Mudofaa vazirining Rolling Thunder portlashlarini tanqid qilishida aks etganidek, urush shiddati ostida "taranglashmoqda" deb hisoblagan Maknamarani ishdan bo'shatish vaqti kelganining isboti deb bildi.[144] Jonsonning fuqarolik huquqlari to'g'risidagi qonunchiligiga qattiq qarshilik ko'rsatgan ashaddiy oq supremacist Stennis, Jonsonning eski dushmani edi, bu prezidentni 1967 yil avgust oyida Stennisning g'alabasi deb qaraladigan MakNamarani ishdan bo'shatmaslikka qaror qilishiga va buning o'rniga kutishga qaror qildi. bir necha oy McNamarani ishdan bo'shatish.[145] Uning biografiga bergan intervyusida, Doris Kearns Gudvin, Jonson McNamara "tazyiqlar" qilayotganini aytdi, chunki urush bosimi unga juda katta edi va shuning uchun u uni "qolishga majbur qilish uchun la'nati adolatsiz narsa" bo'lganligi sababli uni ishdan bo'shatishga qaror qildi.[146] Jonson uzoq vaqtdan beri Texasdan kelgan "oq axlat" sifatida unga qaragan aka-uka Kennedilarga nafrat va nafrat bilan qaragan. Senator Robert F. Kennedi 1967 yilga kelib urushning etakchi tanqidchisi sifatida paydo bo'lgan va Jonson Kernsga McNamara-ning asabiy tanazzulga uchraganligi, undan McNamaraning yaqin do'sti Kennedi foydalanganligi haqidagi fikrini bildirdi.[146] Jonson Kearnsga shunday dedi: "Bobbi [Kennedi] har kuni McNamaraga urush dahshatli va axloqsiz bo'lganini va u ketishi kerakligini aytib chaqirar edi".[146] Jabrni yumshatish uchun Jonson Kernsga buni McNamara bilan gaplashganini va unga prezidentlikni taklif qilishga qaror qilganini aytdi. Jahon banki, "o'shanda u haqiqatan ham istagan yagona ish".[146] Jonson Jahon banki prezidenti lavozimini McNamara uchun tanlagan edi, chunki uning qoidalari prezidentning a'zo davlatlarning ichki ishlariga aralashishini taqiqlaydi, bu esa McNamara ishdan ketganidan keyin urushni tanqid qilishiga yo'l qo'ymaydi.[147] Jonsonning eng katta qo'rquvi shundaki, agar u McNamarani ishdan bo'shatgan bo'lsa, unda u va urushni tanqid qilishda Kennedi bilan birga bo'lishi mumkin; uning eng uzoq muddatli mudofaa vaziri maqomini hisobga olgan holda, bunday tanqidlar ayniqsa zarar etkazishi mumkin.[147]
Muxbir McNamaradan Stennis tinglovlarida u va Bosh shtab boshliqlari o'rtasidagi ziddiyatni ko'rsatadimi, deb so'raganida, MakNamara shunday javob berdi: "Mening politsiyam Qo'shma Shtatlarnikidan farq qilmaydi va menimcha, ular buni birinchi bo'lib aytishadi".[148] Umumiy Earle "Bus" Wheeler, shtab boshliqlari birlashgan raisi McNamara rahbariyatidan norozi bo'lib qolgan va bu so'zlardan g'azablangan. MakNamaraning Qo'shma Sardorlar uni qo'llab-quvvatlaganligi haqidagi da'vosiga javoban, u Qo'shma Sardorlarga McNamara rahbariyatiga norozilik sifatida barchasini iste'foga chiqarishni taklif qildi.[148] Umumiy Garold K. Jonson Jonsonning 1965 yilda zaxiralarni chaqirmaslik to'g'risida qarorini qabul qilishda noto'g'ri ravishda McNamarani ayblagan armiya, Uilerning rejasiga rozi bo'ldi, chunki u 1965 yilda iste'foga chiqmaganligi.[149] Reja General bo'lganida qulab tushdi Uolles M. Grin Dengiz piyodalari korpusi u bilan borishdan bosh tortdi.[149]
1967 yil 21 oktyabrda Maknamara ko'rdi Pentagonda mart Pentagondagi ofisidagi urushga qarshi norozilik, u hippi qizlarning qurollariga gullar qo'yganiga guvoh bo'ldi DC milliy gvardiyasi xodimi Pentagon oldida turgan.[150] McNamara gipotipa qizlari gvardiyachini "urush emas, muhabbat qilish" uchun vasvasa qilish uchun ko'kragini ochishganida, u guvohning yuzlariga tupurgan paytda "jahannam" deb ta'riflagan.[150] Biroq, Pentagon namoyishchilaridagi martni ijtimoiy tanazzulning alomati deb bilganiga qaramay, uning xarakterli raqobatbardosh ruhi, agar u Pentagon martini boshqargan bo'lsa, u Pentagonni egallab olib, uni yopgan bo'lar edi, deb ta'kidlagan edi. pastga, hippilarga kerakli intizom va aql etishmasligini aytdi.[150] 1967 yil 31 oktyabrda MakNamara Jonsonga eslatma yozib, ertasi kuni urushni davom ettirish mumkin emasligini aytdi, chunki bu "xavfli, hayotga qimmat va Amerika xalqi uchun qoniqarsiz".[151] Jonson memo eslatmalarining chetiga "Biz qanday qilib bunday xulosaga kelamiz?" va "Nega bunga ishonasiz?"[151]
1967 yil noyabr oyining boshlarida Jonsonga imzolangan memorandumda MakNamaraning qo'shinlar sonini muzlatib qo'yish, Shimoliy Vetnamni bombardimon qilishni to'xtatish va AQShning Janubiy Vetnamga quruqlikdagi janglarni topshirish bo'yicha tavsiyalari prezident tomonidan rad etilgan. Maknamaraning tavsiyalari uning Vetnamdagi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining shu kungacha amalga oshirilgan strategiyasi barbod bo'lganligi haqidagi so'zlariga to'g'ri keldi. Keyinchalik MakNamara ushbu eslatma haqida Jonsondan "hech qachon eshitmaganligini" aytdi. Natijada, o'sha yilning 29 noyabrida MakNamara iste'foga chiqishini va Jahon banki prezidenti bo'lishini e'lon qildi. Boshqa omillar AQShda urushga qarshi harakatning kuchayishi, Jonsonning qayta saylanishini kutayotgan prezidentlik kampaniyasining yaqinlashishi va MakNamaraning qo'llab-quvvatlashi - shtab boshliqlari qo'mondonligining e'tirozlari sababli 17-chi qurilish. Janubiy va Shimoliy Vetnamni parallel ravishda ajratib, Vetnam qirg'og'idan Laosga o'tadigan istehkomlar qatorini. Prezidentning McNamara-ning Jahon bankiga o'tishi to'g'risida e'lon qilishi, uning bu ishga bo'lgan qiziqishini va mudofaa vaziri lavozimida etti yildan so'ng (avvalgi va merosxo'rlardan ko'ra ko'proq) o'zgarishga loyiqligini ta'kidladi.
Boshqalar McNamara-ning ishdan ketishiga boshqacha nuqtai nazar bilan qarashadi. Masalan, Stenli Karnov uning kitobida Vetnam: tarix Prezident McNamara'dan ketishni so'raganligini qat'iy taklif qiladi.[146] Tarixchi Artur Shlezinger, kichik U McNamara va senator Kennedining suhbati paytida ishtirok etganligini aytdi. Birinchisi ikkinchisiga faqat Jonsonning Mudofaa vaziri lavozimidan "iste'foga chiqqan" va Jahon banki prezidenti etib tayinlangani haqidagi e'lonlarini o'qiganidan eshitganligini aytdi. . [146] Maknamaraning o'zi savolga nisbatan noaniqlik bildirdi.[152][153] 1967 yil 17-noyabrda Financial Times Londonning Vashingtondagi fosh etilgan manbalariga asoslanib, McNamara Jahon bankining navbatdagi prezidenti bo'lishini aytdi va bu McNamara uchun juda kutilmagan bo'ldi.[147] Shundan so'ng, McNamara Kennedi bilan uchrashdi, u unga norozilik sifatida iste'foga chiqishini va urushni tanib bo'lmaydigan deb e'lon qilishini aytdi, McNamara rad etgan maslahat, Jonson do'st edi va u hali ham unga sodiq edi.[154] McNamara iste'foga chiqishni rad etganda, Kennedi unga Jahon banki raisligidan voz kechib, urushni tanqid qilishda unga qo'shilish kerakligini aytdi, McNamara buni rad etdi.[155] Jonson McNamara Uchinchi Dunyodagi qashshoqlikdan xavotirda ekanligini va Jahon banki prezidenti sifatida xizmat qilish ehtimoli McNamara uchun qarshilik ko'rsatishga juda moyil bo'lishini bilar edi.[155]
Maknamara 1968 yil 29 fevralda ishdan ketgan; uning sa'y-harakatlari uchun Prezident uni ikkalasini ham mukofotladi Ozodlik medali[156] va Ajoyib xizmat medali. Makkamaraning Mudofaa vaziri bo'lgan so'nggi kuni esda qolarli kun bo'ldi. Shafqatsiz milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha maslahatchisi, Uolt Uitmen Rostou, o'sha kuni hukumat yig'ilishida AQSh urushda g'alaba qozonish arafasida turibdi. Rostov Jonsonni Janubiy Vetnamga yana 206 ming amerikalik qo'shinni yuborib, u erdagi yarim millionga qo'shilish va Shimoliy Vetnamga bombardimon uyushtirish sonini keskin oshirishga chaqirdi.[157] O'sha paytda McNamara Rostovga g'azablanib: "Unday bo'lsa nima bo'ladi? Bu xudojo'y bombardimon kampaniyasi, hech narsaga arzimaydi, hech narsa qilinmadi, ular Ikkinchi Jahon Urushida butun Evropaga qaraganda ko'proq bomba tashladilar va bunday bo'lmagan. lanet ish qildi! "[158] Keyin McNamara ko'z yoshlarini to'kdi, Jonsonga urushni yutib bo'lmasligini qabul qiling va Rostovni tinglashni to'xtating.[159] Prezidentning yordamchisi Genri Makferson ushbu voqeani esladi: "U bizga tanish statistikani esga oldi - biz Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida butun Evropaga qaraganda Vetnamga qanday qilib ko'proq bomba tashlagan edik. Keyin uning ovozi buzildi va uning ko'zlarida yosh bor edi U havo urushining befoydaligi, jirkanch befoydaligi haqida gapirar ekan, qolganlarimiz jimgina o'tirdik-men uchun og'zim ochilib, mudofaa vazirining o'zi olib borgan kampaniya haqida shu tarzda gaplashayotganini tinglardim. Men juda hayratda qoldim ".[160]
Maknamara Pentagondan ketganidan ko'p o'tmay, u nashr etdi Xavfsizlik mohiyati, uning faoliyatining turli jihatlari va asosiy milliy xavfsizlik masalalari bo'yicha pozitsiyasini muhokama qilish. U Jahon Banki tark etilguniga qadar mudofaa yoki Vetnam masalasida yana bir bor gapirmadi.
Jahon banki prezidenti
Robert Maknamara 1968 yil aprelidan 1981 yil iyunigacha 65 yoshga to'lganida Jahon banki rahbari bo'lib ishlagan.[161] 1968 yil mart oyida McNamara-ning do'sti senator Kennedi Jonsonga qarshi chiqish maqsadida Demokratik saylovlarda ishtirok etdi. Kennedi McNamaradan Kubaning raketa inqirozi paytida uning etakchisini maqtagan bayonotni ushbu bayonot televizion reklama uchun mo'ljallanganligini tushunib, lenta qilishni iltimos qildi.[137] MakNamara Kennedining "zukko diplomatiyasini" maqtab, u "xotirjam va salqin, qat'iyatli, ammo o'zini tutib turadigan, hech qachon to'r qoqmagan va hech qachon shivirlamagan".[162] Garchi bu Jahon banki qoidalarini buzgan bo'lsa-da, McNamara Kennedining iste'foga chiqish va Jahon banki prezidentligini rad etish haqidagi talablarini rad etgani uchun o'zini aybdor his qildi.[162] Unga lenta uchun hujum qilingan Nyu-York Tayms uni "yomon mulohaza va kambag'al didi" uchun qo'zg'atuvchi tahririyatda.[162] Bir lahzaga Maknamara uni Jahon bankidan haydashidan qo'rqdi.[162]
McNamara-ning Jahon bankining ofisida uning mudofaa kotibi bo'lgan vaqtiga oid hujjatlarini saqlash uchun seyf o'rnatildi, bu odatdagi odob-axloq, sobiq mudofaa kotiblariga, ular o'z xatti-harakatlari bo'yicha tortishuvlarga duch kelishi va o'zlarini himoya qilishni istashlari mumkin edi. yozuv.[128] 1969 yil aprel oyida Pentagon hujjatlari tugagach va Makamaraning ofisiga bir nusxa olib kelgach, u g'azablanib: "Men ko'rishni xohlamayman! Uni qaytarib oling!"[128] 1969 yilga kelib, Maknamara Vetnam urushini unutishni xohladi va avvalgi ishi haqida hech qanday eslatmani istamadi.[162]
Bankdagi 13 yillik faoliyati davomida u asosiy o'zgarishlarni kiritdi, eng muhimi, Bankning e'tiborini qashshoqlikni kamaytirishga qaratdi. U kengash tarkibidagi ziddiyatli mamlakatlar bilan sog'liqni saqlash, oziq-ovqat va ta'lim loyihalari shaklida rivojlanish uchun kreditlar ajratish uchun mablag'larni ko'paytirish bo'yicha muzokaralar olib bordi. Shuningdek, u moliyalashtiriladigan loyihalar samaradorligini baholashning yangi usullarini joriy etdi. McNamara davrida boshlangan e'tiborga loyiq loyihalardan biri bu oldini olish uchun qilingan harakatlar edi daryo ko'rligi.[161][163]
Ayni paytda Jahon bankining a stipendiya uning nomi ostida dastur.[164]
Jahon banki prezidenti sifatida u 1968 yilda e'lon qildi Xalqaro valyuta fondi va Jahon banki guruhining yillik yig'ilishi tug'ilishni nazorat qilish amaliyotiga ruxsat beruvchi mamlakatlar manbalarga imtiyozli kirish huquqini qo'lga kiritishi.
Davomida favqulodda vaziyat Hindistonda MakNamara majburiy sterilizatsiya qilish to'g'risida "Nihoyat, Hindiston o'z aholisining muammosini samarali hal qilish uchun harakat qilmoqda" deb ta'kidladi.[165][166][167]
Post-Jahon banki faoliyati va baholari
1981 yildan 1984 yilgacha MakNamara Vasiylik Kengashida ishlagan Amerika universiteti Vashingtonda[168]
1982 yilda MakNamara milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha boshqa bir qator sobiq amaldorlarga qo'shilib, Qo'shma Shtatlar harbiy harakatlar yuz berganda Evropada yadro qurolini ishlatmaslikka va'da berishga chaqirdi; keyinchalik u NATOning mudofaa holati elementi sifatida yadro qurolini yo'q qilishni taklif qildi.
| Tashqi video | |
|---|---|
 Kitoblar Debora Shapley bilan intervyu Va'da va kuch: Robert Maknamaraning hayoti va davri, 1993 yil 21 mart, C-SPAN |
1993 yilda Vashingtonlik jurnalist Debora Shapley Robert Maknamaraning 615 betlik biografiyasini nashr etdi Va'da va kuch: Robert Maknamaraning hayoti va davri. Shapli kitobini quyidagi so'zlar bilan yakunladi: "Yaxshi va yomonroq yo'llar bilan McNamara hozirgi dunyoda juda ko'p shakllandi - va o'zini qamoqqa tashladi. XIX asrning taniqli bo'lmagan yozuvchisi F.V.Boremem quyidagicha xulosani taklif qildi:" Biz qaror qabul qilamiz. Va keyin qarorlarimiz o'zgaradi. bizni yarating. "
Maknamaraning xotirasi, Retrospect-da, 1995 yilda nashr etilgan bo'lib, uning nuqtai nazaridan Vetnam urushi haqidagi hisobot va tahlilni taqdim etdi. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra Nyu-York Tayms nekrologiya, "[h] e Pentagondan ketishdan oldin urush befoyda degan xulosaga keldi, ammo u umrining oxirigacha jamoatchilik bilan bu fikrni o'rtoqlashmadi. 1995 yilda u o'zining urushga qarshi kurashiga qarshi chiqdi va o'zini tan oldi "noto'g'ri, o'ta noto'g'ri" bo'lganligi haqida xotirada. " Buning evaziga u o'sha paytda "masxaralash olovi" ga duch keldi.[3] 1995 yil noyabrda Maknamara Vetnamga qaytib keldi, bu safar Xanoyga tashrif buyurdi. .[169] "Rolling Thunder" operatsiyasining me'morlaridan biri bo'lganiga qaramay, McNamara, hatto bomba hujumidan omon qolganlardan ham hayratlanarli darajada iliq kutib olishdi va ko'pincha pirat nashrlariga imzo chekishni so'rashdi. Retrospect-da Vetnamda noqonuniy tarjima qilingan va nashr etilgan. [170] Uning tashrifi paytida Maknamara urush paytida qarama-qarshi raqam bilan uchrashdi, general Võ Nguyên Giap Shimoliy Vetnam mudofaa vaziri bo'lib ishlagan.[170] McNamara-Giap uchrashuvida qatnashgan amerikalik tarixchi Charlz Noy ikki kishining uslubidagi farqlarni kuzatib, McNamara bilan Giapni ko'pincha raqamli narsa bilan bog'liq savollarni berish uchun bir necha bor xalaqit berar edi, Giap esa turli xil vetnamliklardan iqtibos keltirgan holda uzoq vaqt monolog berdi. Miloddan avvalgi miloddan avvalgi 111 - 938 yillarda Vetnam Xitoy viloyati bo'lganida Vetnamning Xitoyga qarshi qo'zg'olonlari bilan boshlangan shoirlar kabi madaniyat arboblari. [170] Neu o'zining taassurotini shunday yozdi: McNamara qisqa vaqt ichida o'ylaydigan shaxs, Giap esa uzoq muddat o'ylagan.[170]
Urush tumanlari: Robert S. Maknamara hayotidan o'n bitta dars 2003 yil Errol Morris asosan Robert McNamara bilan suhbatlar va arxiv materiallaridan iborat hujjatli film. Bu g'alaba qozonish uchun davom etdi Hujjatli film uchun Oskar mukofoti. Ushbu shaxsiy hisobning o'ziga xos tuzilishi samimiy dialogning xususiyatlari bilan amalga oshiriladi. Maknamara tushuntirganidek, bu uning AQSh mudofaa vaziri sifatida uzoq va ziddiyatli davridagi tajribalarini, shuningdek shaxsiy va jamoat hayotining boshqa davrlarini o'rganish jarayoni.[171]
McNamara keyingi yillarda siyosatdagi ishtirokini saqlab, tanqidiy bayonotlar berdi Bush ma'muriyat 2003 yil Iroqqa bostirib kirish.[172] 2006 yil 5-yanvarda McNamara va eng ko'p yashagan sobiq mudofaa kotiblari va Davlat kotiblari urushni muhokama qilish uchun Oq uyda Prezident Bush bilan qisqa uchrashdi.[173]
Shaxsiy hayot
McNamara 1940 yil 13-avgustda o'zining o'spirin sevgilisi Margaret Kreygga uylandi. U mohir oshpaz edi va Robertning eng sevimli taomlari u deb tanilgan edi mol go'shti burjinoni.[174] Margaret Maknamara, sobiq o'qituvchi, yosh bolalar uchun o'qish dasturini boshlash uchun kabinetning turmush o'rtog'i sifatida o'z lavozimidan foydalangan, O'qish juda muhimdir bu mamlakatdagi eng katta savodxonlik dasturiga aylandi. U 1981 yilda saraton kasalligidan vafot etdi.
Er-xotinning ikkita qizi va bir o'g'li bor edi. O'g'il Robert Kreyg Maknamara, talaba sifatida Vetnam urushiga qarshi bo'lgan, endi Kaliforniyada yong'oq va uzum etishtirish bilan shug'ullanadi.[175] U Syerra bog'lari egasidir Uinters, Kaliforniya. Qizim Ketlin McNamara Spears a o'rmonchi Jahon banki bilan.[176] Ikkinchi qizi - Margaret Elizabeth Pastor.[3]
Errol Morris hujjatli filmida McNamara, u bilan ham, uning rafiqasi bilan ham urishganligi haqida xabar beradi poliomiyelit Ikkinchi Jahon urushi tugaganidan ko'p o'tmay. McNamara kasalxonada nisbatan qisqa vaqt bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, uning rafiqasi ishi jiddiyroq edi va uning tibbiy hisob-kitoblarini qondirish tashvishi uning Garvardga qaytmaslik, lekin Ford Motor Company-da maslahatchi sifatida xususiy sanoat sohasiga kirishga qaror qildi.
Fordda
Ishlayotganda Ford Motor Company, McNamara yashagan Ann Arbor, Michigan o'rniga odatdagi avtomatik ijro etuvchi domenlardan ko'ra Grosse Pointe, Birmingem va Bloomfield Hills. U va uning rafiqasi universitet shaharchasi bilan aloqada bo'lishga intildilar Michigan universiteti ) urushdan keyin Garvardga qaytish umidlari to'xtatilgandan keyin.
Yil bitiruvchisi
1961 yilda u yilning eng yaxshi bitiruvchisi deb topildi Berkli Kaliforniya universiteti.[177]
Hujum qilishga urinish
| Tashqi video | |
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| Kitoblar Pol Xendrikson bilan intervyu Tiriklar va o'liklar: Robert Maknamara va yo'qolgan urushning beshta hayoti, 1996 yil 27 oktyabr, C-SPAN |
1972 yil 29 sentyabrda paromda yo'lovchi Martaning uzumzori MakNamarani kemada tanib, uni okeanga uloqtirmoqchi bo'ldi. Maknamara ayblovlarni rad etishdan bosh tortdi. Bu odam noma'lum bo'lib qoldi, ammo bir necha yil o'tgach, muallif bilan suhbatlashdi Pol Xendrikson, hujumchining so'zlarini keltirgan: "Men shunchaki (Maknamara) Vetnamga qarshi chiqmoqchi edim".[178]
Beva va o'lim
Xotini vafotidan keyin Maknamara uchrashdi Katarin Grem, u bilan 1960-yillarning boshidan beri do'st bo'lgan.[iqtibos kerak ] Grem 2001 yilda vafot etdi.
2004 yil sentyabr oyida MakNamara AQShda 40 yildan ortiq yashagan, italiyada tug'ilgan beva ayol Diana Masieri Byfildga turmushga chiqdi. Bu uning ikkinchi nikohi edi. U o'ttiz yildan ko'proq vaqt davomida sobiq Ernest Byfild bilan turmush qurgan OSS ofitser va Chikago mehmonxonasi merosxo'ri, onasi Gladis Tartier 400 gektarlik (1.6 km²) Glen Ora ko'chmas mulkini ijaraga olgan. Middleburg, Virjiniya, Jon Kennediga prezidentligi davrida.[179][180]
Hayotining oxirida McNamara hayotning ishonchli vakili edi Vasiylik kengashi ning Kaliforniya texnologiya instituti (Caltech), Tinchlik va xavfsizlik bo'yicha iqtisodchilarning ishonchli vakili, ishonchli shaxs Nigeriya Amerika universiteti va uchun faxriy ishonchli vakili Brukings instituti.
Maknamara 2009 yil 6 iyul kuni soat 05:30 da Vashington shahridagi uyida, 93 yoshida vafot etdi.[181][182] U dafn etilgan Arlington milliy qabristoni yilda Arlington, Virjiniya.
Makkamaraning mudofaa vaziri bo'lgan yillaridagi hujjatlari Jon F. Kennedi nomidagi Prezident kutubxonasi va muzeyi yilda Boston, Massachusets.
Ommaviy madaniyatda
McNamara tomonidan tasvirlangan Dilan Beyker filmda O'n uch kun (2000), tomonidan Alek Bolduin filmda Urushga yo'l (2002), tomonidan Klensi Braun filmda Chappaquiddik (2017) va tomonidan Bryus Grinvud filmda Xabar (2017). U filmlarda ham tasvirlangan yoki uydirma qilingan Oktyabr raketalari va Transformatorlar: Oyning qorong'usi. McNamara mavzusi edi Errol Morris hujjatli Urush tumanlari (2003). U xuddi shunday mavzusi edi Menga qarshi! bitta "Yuqori bosim past "2010 yilda. Simon va Garfunkel 1966 yilgi albom, Petrushka, adaçayı, bibariya va kekik "deb nomlangan qo'shiqni o'z ichiga olganOddiy Desultory Filippi (yoki men qanday qilib Robert McNamara'd edim) ". McNamara Burch tuyg'usi - taqiqlangan operatsiyalar (2010) Zombie xaritasi, "Besh" yonida Jon F. Kennedi, Fidel Kastro va Richard Nikson.
Shuningdek qarang
- Kaliforniya Texnologiya institutining ishonchli vakillari ro'yxati
- Prezidentning Ozodlik medali bilan taqdirlanganlar ro'yxati
- Partiya chegaralarini kesib o'tgan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlaridagi siyosiy tayinlashlar ro'yxati
- Project Bo'yoq markeri
- Urush tumanlari
- Urushga yo'l
- Burgut skautlari ro'yxati
- Loyiha 100,000
- McNamara noto'g'ri
Ishlaydi
| Tashqi video | |
|---|---|
| Kitoblar MakNamara bilan intervyu Retrospect-da: Vetnam fojiasi va darslari, 1995 yil 23 aprel, C-SPAN |
- (1968) Xavfsizlik mohiyati: ofisdagi mulohazalar. Nyu York, Harper va Row, 1968; London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1968 yil. ISBN 0-340-10950-5.
- (1973) Yuz mamlakat, ikki milliard kishi: rivojlanish o'lchovlari. Nyu-York, Praeger Publishers, 1973. ASIN B001P51NUA[183]
- (1981) Jahon bankidagi McNamara yillari: Robert S. McNamara-ning asosiy siyosat manzillari, 1968-1981; Helmut Shmidt va Leopold Senghorning so'zlari bilan. Baltimor: Jahon banki tomonidan nashr etilgan Jons Xopkins universiteti matbuoti, 1981. ISBN 0-8018-2685-3.
- (1985) Sahroi sharqiy Afrikaning muammolari. Vashington, DC: 1985 yil.
- (1986) Falokatga yo'l qo'ymaslik: yadro asrining birinchi asridan omon qolish. Nyu-York: Pantheon Books, 1986 yil. ISBN 0-394-55850-2 (qattiq qopqoqli); ISBN 0-394-74987-1 (Pbk.).
- (1989) Sovuqdan: 21-asrdagi Amerika tashqi va mudofaa siyosati uchun yangi fikrlash. Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 1989 yil. ISBN 0-671-68983-5.
- (1992) Global xavfsizlikning o'zgaruvchan tabiati va uning Janubiy Osiyoga ta'siri. Vashington, DC: Vashingtonning Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik bo'yicha kengashi, 1992 y.
- (1995) Retrospect-da: Vetnam fojiasi va darslari. (Brayan VanDeMark bilan.) Nyu-York: Times Books, 1995 y. ISBN 0-8129-2523-8; Nyu-York: Amp kitoblar, 1996 y. ISBN 0-679-76749-5.
- (1999) Cheksiz tortishuv: Vetnam fojiasiga javob izlash. (Robert S. McNamara, Jeyms G. Blight va Robert K. Brigham.) Nyu-York: Jamoatchilik bilan aloqalar, 1999 y. ISBN 1-891620-22-3 (hc).
- (2001) Uilsonning arvohi: 21-asrda mojaro, odam o'ldirish va falokat xavfini kamaytirish. (Robert S. Maknamara va Jeyms G. Blight.) Nyu-York: Jamoatchilik bilan aloqalar, 2001 yil. ISBN 1-891620-89-4.
OAV
Tashqi ko'rinish
- Kuba raketa inqirozi qayta ko'rib chiqildi. The Idea Channel uchun ishlab chiqarilgan Tarmoq tanlash uchun bepul, 1983.
- II bosqich, I qism (U1016) (1983 yil 27 iyun)
- Robert S. McNamara bilan, McGeorge Bandi, Richard Noyshtadt, Jorj V. Bal & U. Aleksis Jonson yilda Vashington
- II bosqich, II qism (U1017) (1983 yil 27 iyun)
- Robert S. McNamara bilan, McGeorge Bandi, Richard Noyshtadt, Jorj V. Bal & U. Aleksis Jonson yilda Vashington
- II bosqich, I qism (U1016) (1983 yil 27 iyun)
Izohlar
Adabiyotlar
- ^ "Robert S. McNamara - Jon F. Kennedi / Lyndon Jonson ma'muriyati". Mudofaa vazirining devoni - tarixiy idora.
- ^ a b "Robert S. McNamara 93 yoshida vafot etdi; Vetnam urushi me'mori". Los-Anjeles Tayms.
Zamonaviy biografiyada 1961 yilda yozilgan ma'lumotlarga ko'ra, Maknamara ro'yxatdan o'tgan respublikachi edi. Kolumbiya okrugidagi jamoat ma'lumotlariga ko'ra, u 1978 yilda partiyaviyligini Demokratga o'zgartirdi.
- ^ a b v d Vayner, Tim (2009 yil 6-iyul). "Robert S. Maknamara, foydasiz urush me'mori, 93 yoshida vafot etdi". Nyu-York Tayms. Olingan 2009-07-06.
- ^ Radin, Beril (2000), Makiavellidan tashqari: Siyosat tahlili yoshga to'g'ri keladi. Jorjtaun universiteti matbuoti.
- ^ Vayner, Tim. "Robert S. Maknamara, foydasiz urush me'mori, 93 yoshida vafot etdi".
- ^ network.nationalpost.com, Vetnam davridagi AQSh mudofaa vaziri Robert Maknamara vafot etdi: hisobot[doimiy o'lik havola ], 2009 yil 6-iyul, 2009 yil 6-iyulda olingan
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Kreyg MakNamara - yong'oq va uzum anaçlarını ishlab chiqaradigan ko'p tarmoqli dehqonchilik operasi bo'lgan Sierra Orchards egasi. U Kaliforniya qishloq xo'jaligi etakchisi dasturi bitiruvchisi, Amerika etakchilik forumining katta a'zosi va qishloq xo'jaligi va atrof-muhit fanlari kolleji dekanining maslahat kengashi a'zosi. McNamara UC / SAREP (Barqaror qishloq xo'jaligi tadqiqotlari va ta'lim dasturi ) va qishloq va shahar o'rta maktab o'quvchilarini barqaror fermerlik, ilm-fan va texnologiyalar bilan tanishtirib, FARMS rahbariyati dasturini yaratdi. U 1996 yilda Rimda bo'lib o'tgan Butunjahon oziq-ovqat sammitida AQShning 10 vakilidan biri bo'lgan.
- ^ "Ketlin McNamara Weds J. S. Spears". Nyu-York Tayms. 1987 yil 1 yanvar. 16. Olingan 2009-07-06.
- ^ "Kal kunlari - yil bitiruvchilari". sunsite.berkeley.edu.
- ^ Xendrikson, Pol: Tiriklar va o'liklar: Robert Maknamara va yo'qolgan urushning beshta hayoti. Amp, 1997 yil. ISBN 0-679-78117-X.
- ^ Roxanne Roberts (2004-09-07). "Robert Maknamara uchun to'y qo'ng'iroqlari". Washington Post.
- ^ "Obituaries; Gladys R. Tartier, xayriyachi, Dies". 1993-05-03.
- ^ Sahifa, Syuzan (2009 yil 6-iyul). "Mudofaaning sobiq kotibi Robert Maknamara 93 yoshida vafot etdi". USA Today.
- ^ "Robert S. Maknamara, sobiq mudofaa vaziri, 93 yoshida vafot etdi". Nyu-York Tayms, 2009 yil 6-iyul.
- ^ McNamara, Robert S. (1973 yil 30 sentyabr). Yuz mamlakat, ikki milliard odam; rivojlanish o'lchovlari. Praeger Publishers - Internet arxivi orqali.
Qo'shimcha o'qish
- Karnov, Stenli Vetnam tarixi, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983, ISBN 0140265473.
- Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillardagi urush. Simon & Schuster, 2000 yil ISBN 0743212312
- Makken, Leo "" Menejment - bu eshik "- lekin qayerga? Robert Maknamaraning" martaba saboqlari "ni qayta ko'rib chiqish." Boshqaruv va tashkiliy tarix, 11.2 (2016): 166–188.
- Makmaster, Gerbert R. Dereliction of duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam (1998).
- Martin, Keir "Robert McNamara and the limits of 'bean counting'" pages 16–19 from Bugungi kunda antropologiya, Volume 26, Issue #3, June 2010.
- Milne, Devid America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War, New York: Hill & Wang, 2009, ISBN 978-0-374-10386-6
- Neu, Charles "Robert McNamara's Journey to Hanoi: Reflections on a Lost War" pages 726-731 from Amerika tarixidagi sharhlar, Volume 25, Issue #4, December 1997.
- Rosenzweig, Phil. "Robert S. McNamara and the Evolution of Modern Management." Garvard biznes sharhi, 91 (2010): 87–93.
- Shafer, Michael O'limga olib keladigan paradigmalar: AQSh qarshi qo'zg'olon siyosatining muvaffaqiyatsizligi, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988, ISBN 9781400860586.
- Shapli, Debora. Promise and Power: The life and times of Robert McNamara (1993)
- Sharma, Patrick Allan. Robert McNamara's Other War: The World Bank and International Development (Uof Pennsylvania Press; 2017) 228 pages;.
- Sorley, Lewis "Body Count" from The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War A Political, Social and Military History edited by Spencer Tucker, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 page 42.
- Slater, Jerome. "McNamara's failures—and ours: Vietnam's unlearned lessons: A review " Xavfsizlikni o'rganish 6.1 (1996): 153–195.
- Stevenson, Charles A. SECDEF: Mudofaa vazirining deyarli imkonsiz ishi (2006). ch 3
Tashqi havolalar
- Robert McNamara on the JFK and LBJ White House Tapes
- Federal Bureau of Investigation Records: The Vault - Robert McNamara
- AP obituary yilda Washington Post
- Iqtisodchi nekrolog
- Robert Maknamara - Daily Telegraph obzori
- McNamara's Evil Lives On by Robert Scheer, Millat, 2009 yil 8-iyul
- McNamara and Agent Orange
- Biography of Robert Strange McNamara (website)
- Historical Office US Department of Defense
- Interview about the Cuban Missile Crisis va Interview about nuclear strategy for the WGBH series Yadro asrida urush va tinchlik.
- Annotated bibliography for Robert McNamara from the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
- Oral History Interviews with Robert McNamara, from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
- Tashqi ko'rinish kuni C-SPAN
- "Robert McNamara". Qabrni toping. Olingan 12 iyun, 2013.
- Conversations with History: Robert S. McNamara, from the University of California Television (UCTV)
| Siyosiy idoralar | ||
|---|---|---|
| Oldingi Tomas Geyts | Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Mudofaa vaziri 1961–1968 | Muvaffaqiyatli Klark Klifford |
| Diplomatik postlar | ||
| Oldingi Jorj Vuds | Jahon banki guruhining prezidenti 1968–1981 | Muvaffaqiyatli Tom Klauzen |
Jahon banki toifasi
Vakolat nazorati  |
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|---|
- Patler, Nicholas. Norman's Triumph: the Transcendent Language of Self-Immolation Quaker History, Fall 2015, 18–39.