Din Rask - Dean Rusk

Din Rask
Dekan Rusk.jpg
54-chi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari davlat kotibi
Ofisda
1961 yil 21 yanvar - 1969 yil 20 yanvar
PrezidentJon F. Kennedi
Lyndon B. Jonson
OldingiXristian Herter
MuvaffaqiyatliUilyam P. Rojers
2-chi Davlat kotibining Uzoq Sharq ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisi
Ofisda
1950 yil 28 mart - 1951 yil 9 dekabr
PrezidentGarri S. Truman
OldingiUilyam Uolton Buttervort
MuvaffaqiyatliJon Mur Allison
1-chi Davlat kotibining xalqaro tashkilotlar ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisi
Ofisda
1949 yil 8 fevral - 1949 yil 26 may
PrezidentGarri S. Truman
OldingiDin Acheson (Kongress aloqalari va xalqaro konferentsiyalar)
MuvaffaqiyatliJon D. Xikerson
Shaxsiy ma'lumotlar
Tug'ilgan
Devid Din Rask

(1909-02-09)1909 yil 9-fevral
Cherokee okrugi, Gruziya, BIZ.
O'ldi1994 yil 20-dekabr(1994-12-20) (85 yosh)
Afina, Gruziya, BIZ.
Siyosiy partiyaDemokratik
Turmush o'rtoqlar
Virjiniya Fouisie
​
(m. keyin1937)​
Bolalar3, shu jumladan Dovud
Ta'limDevidson kolleji (BA )
Sent-Jon kolleji, Oksford (BS, MA )
Berkli Kaliforniya universiteti (LLB )
Imzo
Harbiy xizmat
Sadoqat Qo'shma Shtatlar
Filial / xizmat Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasi
RankUS-O6 insignia.svg Polkovnik
Janglar / urushlarIkkinchi jahon urushi
MukofotlarXizmat legioni
Din Rask Prezident Jonson va Robert Maknamara, 1968 yil 9-fevral

Devid Din Rask (1909 yil 9 fevral - 1994 yil 20 dekabr) Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari davlat kotibi 1961 yildan 1969 yilgacha prezidentlar davrida Jon F. Kennedi va Lyndon B. Jonson. Rask ulardan biri eng uzoq vaqt xizmat qilgan AQSh davlat kotiblari, faqat orqada Kordell Xall.

Tug'ilgan Cherokee okrugi, Gruziya, Rask o'qitgan Mills kolleji tugatgandan so'ng Devidson kolleji. Davomida Ikkinchi jahon urushi, Rask yilda xodim ofitseri bo'lib xizmat qilgan Xitoy Birma Hindiston teatri. U tomonidan yollangan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Davlat departamenti 1945 yilda va 1950 yilda Davlat kotibining Uzoq Sharq masalalari bo'yicha yordamchisi bo'ldi. 1952 yilda Rask prezident bo'ldi Rokfeller jamg'armasi.

G'olib chiqqanidan keyin 1960 yilgi prezident saylovi, Kennedi Raskdan davlat kotibi sifatida ishlashni so'radi. U diplomatik harakatlarni qo'llab-quvvatladi Kuba raketa inqirozi va dastlab u AQSh-ning rolining oshishiga shubha bildirgan bo'lsa ham Vetnam urushi, uning eng kuchli tarafdorlaridan biri sifatida tanildi. 1969 yilda Rask Kennedi va Jonson ma'muriyati davrida davlat xizmatidan nafaqaga chiqqunga qadar ishlagan. Xizmatni tark etgandan so'ng u xalqaro aloqalarda dars bergan. Jorjiya universiteti yuridik fakulteti.

Bolalik va ta'lim

Devid Din Rask qishloq tumanida tug'ilgan[1] ning Cherokee okrugi, Gruziya. Uning otasi - Robert Xyu Rask, oilasi hijrat qilgan mulkdor Shimoliy Irlandiya 1795 yil atrofida. Uning onasi Frensis Yelizaveta (Klotfelter ismli) Rask edi, uning otasi Qora o'rmon Germaniya viloyati va uning onasi Irlandiyada tug'ilgan.[2][3] Rask unga kuchli mehnat odobini meros qilib oldi Presviterian ota-onalar.[4] O'sha paytda Gruziya qishloqlarida o'ta qashshoqlik tufayli, Rask poyabzal sotib olish uchun oyoq kiyimlari juda qimmat bo'lganligi sababli, maktabga yalangoyoq yurishga majbur bo'ldi.[4] O'tgan asrning 80-yillarida o'g'li Boy haqida eslatgan xotirasida (Rask shu paytgacha ko'r bo'lib qolgan edi), u "qattiq qalloblik bilan shug'ullanadigan" dehqonchilikda o'tkazgan yoshligini tasvirlab bergan, chunki Cherokee okrugidagi oilalarning hech birida zamonaviy suv ta'minoti, markaziy isitish kabi qulayliklar mavjud emas edi. , yopiq sanitariya-tesisat yoki elektr energiyasi va kasalliklar doimiy tahdid bo'lgan joylarda.[5] Raskning singlisi, oila cho'chqani o'ldirganida, ular "qichqiriqdan boshqa hamma narsani yeb" berishganini, Raskning o'zi esa "Cherokee okrugida qolgan ruslar oxir-oqibat ushbu murosasiz er tomonidan siqib chiqarilganligini" esladi.[5] Cherokee okrugida toza ichimlik suvi kamdan-kam uchragan, sut esa hashamatli bo'lgan va natijada yosh Rask doimiy tish og'rig'iga duchor bo'lgan.[6] Rask oilasining boyliklarida biroz yaxshilanish 1913 yilda sodir bo'lib, uning otasi Cherokee okrugiga pochtachi sifatida yollangan edi, bu esa oqsoqol Raskga erdagi oldingi teshik o'rniga joy sotib olish uchun etarli daromad olishga imkon berdi.[6] Ruskning onasining sog'lig'ini uning noto'g'ri ovqatlanish, dehqonchilik va bola tarbiyasi buzgan.[6] Yosh Rask uchun uning asosiy tasallisi Presviterian cherkovi edi va u qattiq kalvinistik ish axloqi va axloqini qabul qilishga keldi.[5]

O'sha paytdagi deyarli barcha oq tanli janubliklar singari, Rask demokrat edi va uning bolalik qahramoni Prezident edi Vudro Uilson, Endryu Jonsondan keyin birinchi janubiy prezident.[7] Boshqa ko'plab oq tanli janubiylardan farqli o'laroq, qashshoqlik tajribasi uni qora tanli amerikaliklarga xayrixoh qildi, chunki u bolaligida qora tanli qo'shnilarining qashshoqligi oq qo'shnilariga qaraganda yomonroq bo'lganligini ta'kidladi.[6] Rasklar oilasi ko'chib kelganida Atlanta Cherokee Country-ning qashshoqligidan qutulish uchun u 8 yoshida mahalliy oziq-ovqat do'konida yordamchi sifatida ish boshladi.[6] 9 yoshida Rask Uilson mezbonlik qilgan Atlantada AQShni Millatlar Ligasiga qo'shilishga chaqirgan mitingda qatnashdi.[7] Rask mifologiya va afsonalar asosida o'sgan "Yo'qotilgan sabab" u janubda juda keng tarqalgan va u janubiy madaniyatning militarizmini qabul qilishga kirishgan edi, chunki u o'rta maktab insholarida "agar bizning mamlakatimiz hech qachon muammoga duch kelsa, yigitlar o'zlarini xizmatga tayyorlashlari kerak" deb yozgan edi.[8] 12 yoshida Rask ROTC tarkibiga kirdi, u mashg'ulot vazifalariga juda jiddiy yondoshdi.[9] Rask harbiy xizmatni qattiq hurmat qilgan va keyingi faoliyati davomida u generallarning maslahatlarini qabul qilishga juda moyil bo'lgan.[9]

U ta'lim olgan Atlantadagi davlat maktablari, tugatgan O'g'il bolalar o'rta maktabi 1925 yilda,[10] va ikki yil davomida Atlanta advokatida ishlagan Devidson kolleji. Rask futbolda Uilyam "Monk" Younger tomonidan murabbiylik qilgan va a'zosi bo'lgan Kappa Alpha ordeni Sigma bob,[11] va milliy harbiy sharaf jamiyati Qish va pichoq qo'mondonlik kursant podpolkovnikiga aylanish Zaxiradagi ofitserlar tayyorlash korpusi batalyon. U bitirgan Phi Beta Kappa 1931 yilda.[10] Devidson kollejida o'qiyotganida, Rask kalvinistik ish odobini o'qishiga tatbiq etdi va maktabni tugatgandan so'ng Rodos stipendiyasini yutdi.[4] Rods stipendiyasi uchun bergan intervyusida nima uchun AQSh muhrida Amerika burguti bir tirnoqqa o'qlarni, ikkinchisida esa tinchlik zaytun novdasini olib yurganligi haqida so'ralganda, Rask shunday javob berdi: "Ikkalasi birlashishi kerak. Qurolli kuch va dunyo tinchligi bitta tanganing ikki tomoni. "[7] Jurnalist Stenli Karnov Raskni Horatio Aljer hikoyasidagi qahramonga o'xshatib aytdi, bu janubiy qishloqning qashshoqligidan o'z mehnatsevarligi, qat'iyati va aqlliligi bilan yuqori lavozimlarga ko'tarilgan bola.[4] Ruskning qashshoqlikdan ko'tarilishi uni ehtirosli imonga aylantirdi "Amerika orzusi "va butun hayoti davomida takrorlanib turadigan mavzu uning millati bilan faxrlanishini tez-tez ifoda etishi edi, u har qanday odam, qanchalik kamtarin sharoitda bo'lishidan qat'i nazar," Amerika orzusi "ga ko'tarilishga qodir deb ishondi.[5]

Sifatida Angliyada o'qiyotgan paytida Rods olim da Sent-Jon kolleji, Oksford, u qabul qildi Sesil tinchlik mukofoti 1933 yilda.[10][12] Raskning 30-yillarning boshlarida sodir bo'lgan voqealarni boshdan kechirishi, Karnovga bergan intervyusida uning keyingi qarashlarini hal qildi:

Yaponlar Manjuriyani qo'lga kiritgan yili men kollejda katta yoshda edim va bu rasm hali ham Yaponiyaning hujumiga qarshi yordam so'rab, Millatlar Ligasi oldida turgan Xitoy elchisining kinostudiyasida saqlanib qolgan. Men o'zim Oksford ittifoqida 1933 yil o'sha tunda, ular "bu uy qirol va mamlakat uchun kurashmaydi" degan taklifni qabul qilishganda qatnashgan edim ...
Shunday qilib, o'sha yillarni yashab bo'lmaydi va juda kuchli his-tuyg'ularga ega emas ... bu dunyo hukumatlarining tajovuzni oldini olishida Ikkinchi Jahon urushi falokatini muqarrar qildi.[4]

Rask 1937 yil 9-iyunda sobiq Virjiniya Fouisiga (1915 yil 5 oktyabr - 1996 yil 24 fevral) uylandi.[10] Ularning uchta farzandi bor edi: Dovud, Richard va Peggi Rask.[13]

Rask o'qitgan Mills kolleji yilda Oklend, Kaliforniya, 1934 yildan 1949 yilgacha (harbiy xizmat paytida bundan mustasno) va u ishlagan LL.B. daraja Berkli Kaliforniya universiteti 1940 yilda. Mills kollejida Rask dekan edi va shu bilan unga baxtsiz dekan Rask unvonini berdi.[14]

1961 yilgacha bo'lgan martaba

Davomida Ikkinchi jahon urushi, Rask piyoda qo'shinlarga zaxira kapitani sifatida qo'shildi va shtab ofitseri bo'lib xizmat qildi Xitoy Birma Hindiston teatri. Urush paytida Rask kelajakdagi dushmani tomonidan qo'mondonlik qilingan Vetnamdagi Vetnam partizanlariga qurol-yarog 'tashlanishiga ruxsat bergan edi. Xoshimin.[15] Urush oxirida u polkovnik edi Xizmat legioni bilan Eman barglari klasteri.[10]

Rask Amerikada qisqacha ishlash uchun qaytib keldi Urush bo'limi Vashingtonda. U qo'shildi Davlat departamenti 1945 yil fevralda va Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining ishlar idorasida ishlagan. Xuddi shu yili u taklif qildi bo'linib ketayotgan Koreya AQSh va Sovet ta'sir doiralarida 38-chi parallel shimol. Keyin Alger Hiss 1947 yil yanvarida shtatni tark etdi, Rask uning o'rnini egalladi (Maxsus siyosiy ishlar idorasi direktori sifatida) Maks Lousental.[16] Rask Marshall rejasi va Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining tarafdori edi.[17] 1948 yilda u davlat kotibi Jorj Marshalni Saudiya Arabistoni kabi neftga boy arab davlatlari bilan munosabatlarni buzishidan qo'rqib, Isroilni tan olmaslik to'g'risida Trumanga maslahat berishda qo'llab-quvvatladi, ammo Trumanning yuridik maslahatchisi Klark Klifford tomonidan bekor qilindi va u prezidentni Isroilni tan olishga ishontirdi. .[18] Marshalldan nima uchun Isroilni tan olganligi sababli iste'foga chiqmaganligini tushuntirishni so'rashganda, u davlat kotibi tashqi siyosatni yakuniy nazoratiga ega bo'lgan prezident tomonidan qabul qilingan qarorlar uchun iste'foga chiqmaganligini aytdi.[19] Marshalga qoyil qolgan Rask uning qarorini qo'llab-quvvatladi va har doim Trumanning so'zlarini keltirdi: "Prezident tashqi siyosatni amalga oshiradi".[20] 1949 yilda u Marshalning o'rniga davlat kotibi bo'lgan Din Acheson boshchiligida davlat kotibi o'rinbosariga aylandi. 1950 yilda Rask o'zining iltimosiga ko'ra Osiyoni eng yaxshi bilishini ta'kidlab, davlat kotibining Uzoq Sharq ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisiga aylantirildi.[21] U AQShning ushbu qarorga qo'shilish qarorida ta'sirli rol o'ynadi Koreya urushi va Yaponiyaning urushdan keyingi g'olib mamlakatlar uchun tovon puli, masalan Rask hujjatlari. Rask ehtiyotkor diplomat edi va har doim xalqaro yordamga murojaat qildi. Rask Osiyo millatchi harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlashni ma'qullab, Evropadagi imperializm Osiyoda halokatga uchragan deb ta'kidladi, ammo Atlantika Acheson Evropa kuchlari bilan yaqinroq aloqalarni qo'llab-quvvatladi, bu esa Amerikaning Osiyo millatchiligini qo'llab-quvvatlashiga to'sqinlik qildi.[22] Rask ehtiyotkorlik bilan Achesonni qo'llab-quvvatlash vazifasi ekanligini e'lon qildi.[23]

Qo'shma Shtatlar Frantsiyani Kommunistik Vetnam partizanlariga qarshi Hind-Xitoy ustidan nazoratni ushlab turishda qo'llab-quvvatlashi kerakmi degan savol tug'ilganda, Rask Vetnam Osiyoda Sovet ekspressionizmining qurollari ekanligini va Frantsiya hukumatini qo'llab-quvvatlashni talab qildi. frantsuzlarni qo'llab-quvvatlashdan bosh tortish tinchlanishga olib keladi.[4] Amerikaning kuchli bosimi ostida frantsuzlar 1950 yil fevralida Vetnam davlatiga nominal mustaqillik berishdi Imperator Bao Dai, buni Qo'shma Shtatlar bir necha kun ichida tan oldi.[24] Biroq, Vetnam davlati hanuzgacha Frantsiyaning mustamlakasi bo'lganligi ma'lum edi, chunki frantsuz rasmiylari barcha muhim vazirliklarni nazorat qilar edilar va imperator matbuotga achchiq e'tiroz bildirdi: "Ular Bao Dai yechimi deb atagan narsa shunchaki Frantsuzcha yechim. "[25] 1950 yil iyun oyida Rask Senatning Tashqi aloqalar qo'mitasida guvohlik berdi: "Bu [Sovet] siyosiy byurosi tomonidan qo'lga kiritilgan va bundan tashqari, siyosiy byuroning vositasiga aylangan fuqarolik urushi. Shuning uchun ham emas odatdagi ma'noda fuqarolar urushi. Bu xalqaro urushning bir qismidir ... Biz ushbu kurashning qaysi turida ekanligimiz nuqtai nazaridan qarashimiz kerak ... Xo Shi Min siyosiy byuro bilan bog'langanligi sababli, bizning siyosatimiz - Bao Dai va frantsuzlarni Hindistonda qo'llab-quvvatlash, ularga doimiy yordam berishga yordam berishga vaqtimiz bo'lguncha. "[4] 1951 yil aprel oyida Truman ishdan bo'shatildi General Duglas MacArthur Xitoyga urush olib borish uchun nima qilish kerakligi masalasida Koreyadagi Amerika kuchlarining qo'mondoni sifatida. O'sha paytda shtab-kvartiralar qo'mitasi raisi general Omar Bredli Xitoy bilan urushni "noto'g'ri urush, noto'g'ri joyda, noto'g'ri joyda va noto'g'ri dushman bilan" deb atagan edi.[26] 1951 yil may oyida Rask Vashingtondagi Xitoy instituti homiyligidagi oshxonada nutq so'zladi, u erda u AQSh Davlat departamentiga oldindan murojaat qilmagan, u erda AQSh Koreyani birlashtirishi kerak degan fikrda. Singman Ri va ag'darish kerak Mao Szedun Xitoyda.[27] Ruskning nutqi u kutganidan ko'ra ko'proq e'tiborni tortdi, chunki sharhlovchi Uolter Lippmann "Bredli va Raskga qarshi" deb nomlangan ustunni olib bordi va Raskni Koreya urushida so'zsiz taslim bo'lish siyosatini ilgari surishda aybladi.[28] Achesonni xijolat qilgani uchun Rask iste'foga chiqishga majbur bo'ldi va Rokenfeller fondi direktori sifatida xususiy sektorga o'tdi.[29]

Rask va uning oilasi ko'chib o'tdi Sarsdeyl, Nyu-York, u a bo'lib xizmat qilgan Rokfeller jamg'armasi 1950 yildan 1961 yilgacha ishonchli shaxs.[30] 1952 yilda u Chester L. Barnarddan keyin fond prezidenti etib tayinlandi.[10]

Davlat kotibi

Asosiy maqolalar: Jon F. Kennedi ma'muriyatining tashqi siyosati va Lyndon B. Jonsonning prezidentligi § Tashqi ishlar

1960 yil 12 dekabrda, Demokratik Saylangan prezident Jon F. Kennedi davlat kotibi lavozimiga Raskni taklif qildi. Rask Kennedining birinchi tanlovi emas, aksincha "eng past umumiy maxraj ", Kennedining birinchi tanlovi sifatida, J. Uilyam Fulbrayt, juda ziddiyatli edi.[31] Devid Xolberstam shuningdek, Raskni "hamma uchun ikkinchi raqam" deb ta'riflagan.[32] Yaqinda Rusk "Prezident" nomli maqola yozgan edi Tashqi ishlar prezidentni tashqi siyosatni davlat kotibi bilan oddiy maslahatchi sifatida boshqarishga chaqirish, bu unga ko'rsatilgandan keyin Kennediga qiziqish uyg'otdi.[33] Fulbraytning segregatsiyani qo'llab-quvvatlashi uni diskvalifikatsiya qilgan degan qarorga kelgach, Kennedi Raskni yig'ilishga chaqirdi, u erda u o'zi Fulbraytni eng yaxshi davlat kotibi lavozimiga tayinlangan shaxs sifatida tasdiqladi.[34] Raskning o'zi Davlat departamentini boshqarishga unchalik qiziqmagan, chunki davlat kotibi uchun yillik ish haqi 25 000 AQSh dollarini tashkil etgan, Rokfeller jamg'armasi direktori sifatida ishi yiliga 60 000 AQSh dollarini tashkil etgan.[35] Rask vatanparvarlik tuyg'usidan kelib chiqib, bu lavozimni egallashga faqat Kennedi uni bu lavozimda ishlashni talab qilganidan keyingina rozi bo'ldi.[36]  

Rask 1961 yil 21 yanvarda qasamyod qildi.[10] Kennedi biograf Robert Dallek Raskning tanlovini shunday izohladi:

Yo'q qilish jarayonida va Oq uydan tashqi siyosatni yuritishga qaror qilgan Kennedi Rokfeller fondi prezidenti Din Rask oldiga keldi. Rask to'g'ri ishonch yorliqlari va to'g'ri qo'llab-quvvatlovchilar bilan maqbul so'nggi tanlov edi. Rodos olimi, kollej professori, Ikkinchi jahon urushi zobiti, Truman boshchiligidagi davlat kotibining Uzoq Sharq bo'yicha yordamchisi, integratsiyaga xayrixoh liberal gruzin va doimiy Stivenson qo'llab-quvvatlovchi, Rask hech kimni xafa qilmadi. Tashqi siyosiy muassasa - Acheson, Lovett, liberallar Bowllar va Stivenson va Nyu-York Tayms - hamma uni maqtashdi. Ammo, eng muhimi, Kennediga 1960 yil dekabrda bo'lib o'tgan bitta uchrashuvdan Rask rahbarlik qilishga urinishdan ko'ra xizmat qiladigan yuzsiz, sodiq byurokrat bo'lishi aniq edi.[37]

Rask o'zining janubiy mag'rurligi va hazil tuyg'usini aks ettirgan holda, barcha davlat amaldorlaridan talab qilingan xavfsizlik shaklini to'ldirganda, qarindoshlaridan biri AQSh hukumatini ag'darishga urinib ko'rganmi yoki yo'qmi degan savolga "ha" deb javob berib, bu erda xizmat qilgan bobolarini sanab o'tdi. Konfederatsiya armiyasi.[6] Kennedi Raskga Dekan o'rniga "janob Rask" deb murojaat qilishga moyil edi.[38] Davlat kotibi sifatida u jang qilish uchun harbiy harakatlardan foydalanishga ishongan kommunizm. Cho'chqalar ko'rfazining bosib olinishi to'g'risida shaxsiy shubhalarga qaramay, u hujumga qadar ijroiya kengashi yig'ilishlarida noaniq bo'lib qoldi va hech qachon bunga qarshi bo'lmagan. Ish boshida u AQShning aralashuviga katta shubha bilan qaragan Vetnam,[39] ammo keyinchalik uning AQSh harakatlarini kuchli ommaviy himoyasi Vetnam urushi uni tez-tez urushga qarshi namoyishlarning nishoniga aylantirdi. Xuddi Truman ma'muriyati davrida bo'lgani kabi, Rask ham Vetnamga qarshi shafqatsiz yo'nalishni qo'llab-quvvatladi va tez-tez vazirlar mahkamasi va Milliy xavfsizlik kengashidagi munozaralarda bir xil shov-shuvli mudofaa vaziri bilan ittifoq qildi. Robert Maknamara.[40]

1961 yil fevral oyida, diqqatga sazovor narsa uydirma Kennedi Ottavaga Kanada bosh vaziri bilan uchrashish uchun tashrif buyurganida John Diefenbaker. O'z familiyasini qanday to'g'ri talaffuz qilish borasida ikkilanib, Kennedi Raskdan buni bilib olishni so'radi.[41] Rask yordamchilaridan biri Fay Kolerdan so'radi, u unga Diefenbaker nemis familiyasi ekanligini va u Diefenbawker deb yozilganligini aytdi.[41] Bosh vazir bilan uchrashgandan so'ng, Kennedi uni janob Diefenbaker deb kutib oldi, bu Diefenbakerning familiyasini aytganiga o'xshamaydi va u o'zini shaxsiy deb qabul qilib, o'zaro nafrat va ishonchsizlik bilan ajralib turadigan Kennedi va Diefenbaker o'rtasidagi toksik munosabatlarning boshlanishini belgilaydi. .[42] Saygondagi elchixona xodimi Edvard Lansdeyl tomonidan qilingan tanqidlarga qarshi Rask Janubiy Vetnam qiyin topshiriq bo'lganini aytib, Davlat departamenti faoliyatini himoya qildi.[43] Shundan so'ng, Rask Lansdeyl bo'lgan yordamchilaridan birini u roman qahramoni uchun ilhom manbai bo'lganligi to'g'risida xabar berishni so'radi. Yomon Amerika.[44] 1961 yil 9 martda Kommunist Pathet Lao Jarlar tekisligida g'alabaga erishdi va bir lahzaga Pathet Lao butun Laosni egallab olish arafasida turganday tuyuldi.[45] Rask Laosdagi fuqarolar urushining hech bir tomoni juda qattiq kurashmaganligini bilganida juda jirkanchligini bildirdi va ikkala tomon ham jangni qayta boshlashdan oldin o'n kun davomida suv bayramini nishonlash uchun jangni buzganligi haqidagi xabarni keltirdi.[46] Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyoda katta tajribaga ega bo'lgan Rask, faqat bombardimon qilish Lathetni to'xtatib qo'yishiga shubha bilan qarashini bildirdi va bombardimon faqat erni ushlab turish yoki oldinga o'tish uchun quruqlikdagi qo'shinlar bilan ishlaganini aytdi.[47] Davlat kotibi maslahatchisi Chester Boulz 1961 yil mart oyining oxirida Ruskka maktub yozib, u Kubalik muhojirlarni Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi tomonidan Kubaga bostirib kirishi uchun o'qitilayotgani haqidagi mish-mishlarni eshitganini va u Ruskdan to'xtashini so'rab, bu qoidalar qoidalariga zid ekanligini aytdi. Amerika davlatlari tashkiloti.[48] Rask eslatmani Kennediga etkazmagan va o'zi ham Cho'chqalar ko'rfazining bosib olinishiga qarshi chiqmagan, hattoki o'zining harbiy tajribasi ham uni bitta brigada ag'darib tashlangan Kuba hukumatining "do'zaxda qor to'pi imkoniyatiga dosh berolmasligiga" ishontirgan.[49]

1961 yil aprel oyida, Janubiy Vetnamga yana 100 nafar amerikalik harbiy maslahatchilarni yuborib, jami 800 kishini tashkil etish to'g'risida taklif Kennedi oldida paydo bo'lganida, Rask 1954 yilgi Jeneva kelishuvlarini buzganligini ta'kidlagan taqdirda ham (AQShda bo'lgan) imzolanmagan, lekin bunga rioya qilishga va'da bergan), bu Vetnamdagi chet ellik harbiylar sonini bir vaqtning o'zida 700 nafargacha cheklab qo'ydi.[50] Rask, Jeneva kelishuvlarini bajarishi kerak bo'lgan Hindiston, Polsha va Kanadaning diplomatlaridan tashkil topgan Xalqaro Nazorat Komissiyasining joylashtirilganligi to'g'risida xabardor qilinmasligi va maslahatchilar "diqqatni jalb qilmaslik uchun turli joylarga joylashtirilishi" kerakligini ta'kidladi.[50] Rask orqali, Kennedi, oxir-oqibat, dengizga chiqa olmaydigan Laosga aralashish muammolari, zamonaviy aerodromlarga ega bo'lmagan va Xitoyning aralashuvi xavfi bo'lgan Amerika amerika qo'shinlarini Laosga yuborishni rad etdi.ref> Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 y.124-son Rask Turkiyaga tashrif buyurgan va u Kennedining qarori haqida bilgan.[51] Rask Laosni zararsizlantirish bo'yicha Jeneva konferentsiyasini ochdi va Kennediga muzokaralar muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lishini bashorat qildi.[52] Kommunizmga qarshi ishlaridan tashqari u Rokfeller Jamg'armasiga yordam berish g'oyalarini davom ettirdi rivojlanayotgan xalqlar va shuningdek, jahon savdosini rag'batlantirish uchun past tariflarni qo'llab-quvvatladi. Rask ham g'azabini tortdi Isroil tarafdorlari u ishonganligini ma'lum qilgandan keyin USS Ozodlik voqea voqea sodir bo'lganidan ko'ra, kemaga ataylab qilingan hujum edi.

1961 yil 24 martda Rask o'zining delegatsiyasi sayohat qilishi kerakligi haqida qisqacha bayonot tarqatdi Bangkok va SEATO Agar tinchlik bo'yicha kelishuvlar amalga oshirilmasa, davlatlarning javobgarligini hisobga olish kerak.[53] 1961 yilda Rask hindlarning Goaga bostirib kirishini ma'qullamadi, uni NATOning ittifoqdoshi Portugaliyaga qarshi tajovuzkor harakat deb bilgan, ammo Kennedi Hindiston bilan munosabatlarni yaxshilashni istagan va shuningdek, portugallarning bundan boshqa iloji yo'qligini ta'kidlagan. Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlariga ittifoqdosh.[54] 1961 yil boshida Portugaliyaning Angoladagi mustamlakasida katta isyon boshlanib, Portugaliyaning eng yirik qurol etkazib beruvchisi AQShga bo'lgan ishonchini kuchaytirdi. Ga nisbatan G'arbiy Yangi Gvineya nizosi haqida Gollandiya Yangi Gvineya, Rask Sukarnoni xitoylik deb bilgani uchun NATO ittifoqdoshi Niderlandiyani Indoneziyaga qarshi qo'llab-quvvatlashni ma'qulladi.[54] Rask 1962 yilda Yangi Gvineyadagi Gollandiya qo'shinlariga hujum qilib, Indoneziyani tajovuzda aybladi va Sukarno Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining ustavini buzgan deb hisobladi, ammo yana Kennedi tomonidan bekor qilindi.[54] Agar bo'lsa realpolitik, Kennedi gollandlarning boshqa tanlovi yo'qligini ta'kidladi, ammo AQSh bilan ittifoq qilish kerak edi, demak u ularni oddiy narsa deb qabul qilishi mumkin edi, ammo u o'zini "Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyodagi eng muhim millat" deb atagan Indoneziya kommunistik bo'lishidan juda xavotirda edi.[54] Sukarno bilan munosabatlarni yaxshilash uchun Kennedi Indoneziyaning Gollandiyaning Yangi Gvineyaga bo'lgan da'vosini qo'llab-quvvatlashga qaror qildi; Keyinchalik Rask, Kennedining Indoneziyani mag'lub etish uchun gollandlarni qurbon qilgani va 1969 yilda hududning kelajagini belgilash uchun rejalashtirilgan "maslahat" ning erkin va adolatli bo'lishiga qattiq shubha bilan qaraganini yozdi.[54]

Misr Prezidenti Nosir Vashingtonda Misrning Sovet Ittifoqi bilan ittifoqi va zarur bo'lgan har bir arab davlati hukumatini, ayniqsa Saudiya Arabistoni kabi ittifoqchilarini ag'darishni talab qiladigan umumiy arab davlatini tuzish rejalari tufayli Vashingtonda muammo tug'diruvchi sifatida qaraldi. Arabiston.[55] In Arablar sovuq urushi Misr va Saudiya Arabistoni o'rtasida, Rask ikkinchisini afzal ko'rdi.[55] Biroq, shu bilan birga, Rask Kennediga Nosirni Sovet Ittifoqidan AQShga qarshi Misr uchun eng yaxshi savdolashib olish uchun o'ynashni xohlagan buzg'unchi deb da'vo qildi va agar u sovetparast yo'nalishga egilsa, bu chunki Qo'shma Shtatlar Misr qurollarini Isroilga qarshi ishlatilishi mumkinligidan qo'rqib, ularni sotishdan bosh tortdi, aksincha Sovetlar misrliklarga yadro qurolidan mahrum bo'lgan har qanday qurolni sotishga tayyor edilar.[55] Raskning ta'kidlashicha, Qo'shma Shtatlar hanuzgacha Misrga nisbatan sezilarli ta'sir ko'rsatuvchi vositaga ega PL 480 Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining ortiqcha qishloq xo'jaligi mahsulotlarini har qanday "do'st millat" ga AQSh dollari o'rniga mahalliy valyutada sotishiga ruxsat beruvchi qonun ..[56] Misrda hukumat non kabi asosiy oziq-ovqat mahsulotlarini tannarxidan yoki narxidan past narxlarda sotishni subsidiyalashtirdi va Misr qishloq xo'jaligi imkoniyatlaridan ustun bo'lgan Misr aholisining ko'payishi Misrdan oziq-ovqat mahsulotlarini import qilishni talab qildi. Nosir o'z xalqini oziq-ovqat bilan ta'minlash uchun PL 480 oziq-ovqat savdosiga juda qaram bo'lib qoldi va bundan tashqari Sovet Ittifoqi Amerikaning Misrga sotadigan oziq-ovqat mahsulotlariga teng kelishiga umid qila olmadi.[57] Noser PL 480 oziq-ovqat savdosi evaziga u Isroil bilan urush boshlamasligini aytdi va buning uchun u o'zining barcha otashin nutqlari uchun arab-isroil mojarosini "muz qutisida" saqlashga va'da berdi.[55] Rask Kennedi va keyinchalik Jonsonga PL 480 oziq-ovqat mahsulotlarini Misrga sotishni to'xtatish uchun Kongress bosimiga qarshi turish kerakligini ta'kidlab, PL 480 savdosining tugashi faqat Nosirni Sovet Ittifoqiga yaqinlashtirishi va Misr o'rtasidagi tinchlikni saqlaydigan ta'sirchanlikni tugatishini aytdi. va Isroil.[55] Nosir 1962 yil sentyabr oyida Saudiya Arabistoni tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan qirollik partizanlariga qarshi respublika hukumatini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun Yamanga 70 000 Misr qo'shinlarini yuborganida, Rask Yaman qirolistlarini qo'llab-quvvatlashning bilvosita usuli bo'lgan Saudiya Arabistoniga qurol sotishni ko'payishini ma'qulladi.[55] Vashingtondagi qaror qabul qiluvchilar bilan umumiy ravishda, Rask Qo'shma Shtatlar Saudiya Arabistonini Misrga qarshi qo'llab-quvvatlashi kerakligini his qildi, ammo u Kennediga Nosirni juda qattiq itarmaslikni maslahat berdi, chunki bu uni Sovet Ittifoqiga yaqinlashtiradi.[55] 1962 yil 8 oktyabrda Misr bilan AQSh o'rtasida "Tinchlik uchun oziq-ovqat" shartnomasi imzolandi, kelgusi uch yil davomida Misrga 390 million dollarlik bug'doyni sotish majburiyatini oldi.[58] 1962 yilga kelib Misr Qo'shma Shtatlardan iste'mol qilingan bug'doyning 50 foizini import qildi va PL 480 qonuniga egalik qilish har yili harbiy xarajatlarning og'irligi tufayli Misrning tashqi zaxiralari deyarli yo'q qilingan paytda yiliga 180 million dollarni tashkil etdi.[59]

Davomida Kuba raketa inqirozi u diplomatik harakatlarni qo'llab-quvvatladi. JFK kutubxonasi rahbari Sheldon Stern tomonidan Kennedining audio yozuvlarini sinchkovlik bilan ko'rib chiqish EXCOMM uchrashuvlar shuni ko'rsatadiki, Raskning munozaralarga qo'shgan hissasi, ehtimol yadroviy urushning oldini oldi.[60]

1963 yil may oyida Nosir Yamanda partizan urushiga qarshi kurash botqog'iga tushib qolganidan g'azablanib, Yamandagi Misr havo kuchlari eskadronlariga Saudiya Arabistonidagi shaharlarni bombardimon qilishni boshlashni buyurdi.[55] Misr va Saudiya Arabistoni urush yoqasida bo'lganida, Kennedi Raskning yordami bilan Amerikaning og'irligini Saudiya Arabistoni tomoniga tashlashga qaror qildi.[55] Kennedi tinchgina AQSh havo kuchlarining bir nechta eskadrilyasini Saudiya Arabistoniga jo'natdi va Nosirni Saudiya Arabistoniga hujum qilsa, AQSh Misr bilan urushga kirishishini ogohlantirdi.[55] Amerikaliklarning ogohlantirishlari o'z samarasini berdi va Nosir ehtiyotkorlik jasoratning eng yaxshi qismi deb qaror qildi.[55] Amerika-Misr munosabatlaridagi barcha keskinliklarga qaramay, Rask hali ham Misrga PL 480 oziq-ovqat savdosini tugatgandan ko'ra davom ettirish yaxshiroq, deb ta'kidladi, arab-isroil mojarosini Nosir aytganidek, "muz qutisida" ushlab turdi. Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Misrni boshqarish vositalariga ega.[55]

1963 yil avgust oyida Buddistlar inqiroziga reaktsiya sifatida Janubiy Vetnam Prezidenti Diyemni ag'darishga qaratilgan siyosiy taklif Kennediga taqdim etilganda, Kennedi ma'muriyatini bir qator tushunmovchiliklar ro'y berdi, agar u avval Rask o'z roziligini bersa, uni qabul qilish haqida o'ylashini aytdi.[61] Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining sessiyasida qatnashish uchun Nyu-Yorkka borgan Rask, Kennedi avval ma'qullagan degan taassurot bilan ehtiyotkorlik bilan ma'qulladi.[61] Bu aniq bo'lmaganida, Kennedi tashqi siyosat guruhini Oq uyda MakNamara, vitse-prezident Lindon Jonson va Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi direktori Jon Makkon kabi bir necha kishi bilan bo'ronli uchrashuvga yig'di, boshqalari esa maslahatchiga o'xshab, Diem bilan gaplashdilar. Jorj Ball, V. Avrell Harriman va Rojer Xilsman Diyemni ishdan bo'shatish haqida bahslashdilar.[61] Kennedining g'azablanishidan ko'prog'i, Rask toshbo'ron sukut saqladi va yon bosishni istamadi.[61] Uchrashuv oxirida Kennedi xitob qildi: "Xudoyim, mening hukumatim qulaydi!"[61] 1963 yil 31-avgustda diplomat Pol Kattenburg Saygondan qaytib keldi, u erda Janubiy Vetnamdagi jamoatchilik fikri Diyemga nisbatan katta dushmanlik qilgani, bu esa unga "biz sharafli chiqishimiz" vaqti kelganligini ko'rsatdi.[62] Yig'ilgan barcha amaldorlar Kattenburgning Rask bilan aytgan g'oyasini rad etishdi: "biz urushni yutmagunimizcha ... tortib olmaymiz".[62] Rask Kattenburgni Janubiy Vetnamdan Gayanaga qayta tayinladi.[62]

L-R: Llevellin Tompson, Sovet tashqi ishlar vaziri Andrey Gromyko va Rask 1967 yilda Glassboro sammit konferentsiyasi

U o'zining tarjimai holida eslaganidek, Men ko'rganimdek, Rask prezident Kennedi bilan yaxshi munosabatda bo'lmagan. Prezident tez-tez Maskning maslahat sessiyalaridagi sustkashligidan g'azablanar edi va Davlat departamenti "bir piyola jele kabi" ekanligini va u "hech qachon yangi g'oyalar bilan chiqmasligini" his qilar edi. 1963 yilda, Newsweek Milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha maslahatchisi McGeorge Bundy-ning "Sovuq urush uchun salqin bosh" nomli maqolasini chop etdi.[63] Hikoya muallifi Ruskni "o'zining kuchliligi va qat'iyatliligi bilan tanimagan" deb yozgan va Bandi "haqiqiy davlat kotibi" ekanligini ta'kidlagan.[63] Prezidentga maxsus maslahat Ted Sorensen Kennedining tashqi ishlarda yaxshi bilgan va amaliyotda bo'lganligi sababli o'zining davlat kotibi sifatida ishlaganiga ishongan. Sorensen, shuningdek, prezident tez-tez Ruskka nisbatan sabrsizligini bildirib, uni favqulodda uchrashuvlar va inqirozlarga tayyor emasligini his qilganini aytdi.[64] Rask o'zining tarjimai holida aytib berganidek, u bir necha bor iste'foga chiqishni taklif qilgan, ammo bu hech qachon qabul qilinmagan.[65] 1964 yilgi saylovlar oldidan Raskning ishdan bo'shatilishi haqidagi mish-mishlar Prezident Kennedining 1963 yilda Dallasga safari oldidan ko'paygan. Bir ozdan keyin Kennedi o'ldirildi, Rask yangi prezidentga iste'foga chiqishni taklif qildi, Lyndon B. Jonson.[66] Biroq, Jonson Raskning iste'fosini rad etdi va uni butun ma'muriyati davomida davlat kotibi sifatida saqlab qoldi.[66] Lindon B. Jonson 1973 yilda vafot etganida, Rask tabriklangan qachon u sobiq prezident davlatda yotish.[67]

1964 yil iyun oyida Rask uchrashdi Herve Alphand, Vashingtondagi Frantsiya elchisi, ikkala Vetnamni zararsizlantirish bo'yicha Frantsiya rejasini muhokama qilish uchun, Rask shubha bilan qaragan rejani.[68] Rask Alphandga shunday dedi: "Biz uchun Janubiy Vetnam mudofaasi Berlinni himoya qilish bilan bir xil ahamiyatga ega".[68] Bunga javoban Alphand: "Berlinni yo'qotish G'arb xavfsizligining poydevorini silkitib yuboradi. Boshqa tomondan, agar biz Janubiy Vetnamni yo'qotib qo'ysak, biz ko'p yo'qotmas edik" dedi.[68] Aksincha, Rask Berlin masalasi va Vetnam urushi Sovet Ittifoqi va AQShga qarshi bir xil kurashning bir qismi ekanligini ta'kidladi.[68]

Rask tezda Jonsonning eng sevimli maslahatchilaridan biriga aylandi va Demokratik partiyaning Milliy anjumanidan oldin ikkalasi haqida suhbatlashdi Robert F. Kennedi Prezidentning noqulayligi uchun Jonsonning sherigi bo'lishni juda xohlagan.[69] Jonson ham, Rask ham Kennedi nima bo'lishidan qat'iy nazar, bir kun prezident bo'lish istagi bilan "g'ayrioddiy ambitsiyali" ekaniga qo'shilishdi. Rask Jonsonga shunday dedi: "Janob Prezident, men shunchaki o'zimning shuhratparastligim bilan fikrimni o'rab olmayman. Men buni qanday tushunishni bilmayman."[69]Tonkien ko'rfazidagi voqeadan so'ng, Rask Tonkein ko'rfazidagi rezolyutsiyani qo'llab-quvvatladi.ref> Langguth, A.J. Bizning Vetnam Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 p.302 1964 yil 29 avgustda davom etayotgan prezidentlik saylovlari chog'ida Rask AQSh tashqi siyosatining izchillik va ishonchliligini ta'minlash uchun ikki tomonlama qo'llab-quvvatlashni talab qildi va respublikachilar partiyasidan prezidentlikka nomzod Barri Goldwater "buzuqlik" yaratayotgan edi.[70] Keyingi oy, 10-sentabr kuni Davlat departamentining asosiy auditoriyasida bo'lib o'tgan matbuot anjumanida Rask senator Golduoterning tanqidlari AQSh prezidentining mojarolar va tinchlik bilan ishlashini "asosiy tushunmovchilikni aks ettiradi" dedi.[71]

1964 yil 7 sentyabrda Jonson Vetnamda nima qilish kerakligi to'g'risida konsensus izlash uchun o'zining milliy xavfsizlik guruhini yig'di.[72] Rask ehtiyotkorlik bilan maslahat berib, Jonson diplomatiya tugagandan keyingina harbiy choralarni ko'rishi kerakligini ta'kidladi.[73] 1964 yil sentyabr oyida Rask Janubiy Vetnam generallar xunti o'rtasidagi cheksiz to'qnashuvlardan va muvaffaqiyatsiz davlat to'ntarishidan keyin g'azablandi. Nguyon Xan ga xabar yubordi Maksvell Teylor, Saygondagi elchi, 14 sentyabr kuni, Xon va boshqa xuntaga "aniqlik bilan tushuntirish" kerakligini aytib, Jonson janglardan charchaganini aytdi.[74] Rask, shuningdek, Teylorga: "Qo'shma Shtatlar Janubiy Vetnam rahbarlari o'rtasida davom etib kelayotgan janjallarni subsidiyalash uchun Janubiy Vetnamga, harbiy texnika, iqtisodiy resurslar va xodimlarga katta yordam ko'rsatmadi", deb aytishni buyurdi.[74] Vashingtondagi Janubiy Vetnamning surunkali siyosiy beqarorligi bilan bog'liq umumiy bezovtalikni aks ettirgan holda, Rask Jonsonga murojaat qildi: "Biz qandaydir tarzda bu odamlar harakatlanish tezligini o'zgartirishimiz kerak va men buni amerikaliklarning o'z ishlariga keng tarqalgan aralashuvi bilan amalga oshirish mumkin deb o'ylayman. "[75] Vashingtonda tobora ortib borayotgan tuyg'u shundaki, agar Janubiy Vetnam Vetnam Kongi partizanlarini yakka o'zi mag'lub eta olmasa, amerikaliklar janubiy Vetnam g'alaba qozonishga qodir emasligi isbotlagan urushga kirishib, g'alaba qozonishlari kerak edi.[75] 21-sentabr kuni Rask AQSh tashqaridan siqib chiqarilmasligini aytdi Tonkin ko'rfazi va uning "kommunistik ko'l" bo'lishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik, u erda Amerika kuchlarining doimiy borligi bilan ta'minlanadi.[76]

1964 yil sentyabr oyida BMT Bosh kotibi tomonidan tinchlik tashabbusi boshlandi U Thant u o'z vatani Birmada yashirin tinchlik muzokaralarini o'tkazishga urinib ko'rgan, uni Sovet Ittifoqi rahbari Nikita Xrushchev qo'llab-quvvatlagan, Xo Chi Minni prognoz qilinayotgan tinchlik muzokaralarida ishtirok etish uchun bosim o'tkazgan va agar u Shimoliy Vetnamga Sovet Ittifoqining yordamini ko'paytirar ekan. avval urushni tugatish uchun diplomatik harakatlarda qatnashgan.[74] U Tant Raskka Sovet Ittifoqi bosimi Shimoliy Vetnamning boshqa qurol etkazib beruvchisi sifatida ishlayotganga o'xshaydi, deb aytdi Xitoy, faqat Sovet Ittifoqi etkazib bera oladigan yuqori texnologiyali qurollarga teng kela olmaydi.[74] Rask Jonsonga tegishli ushbu ma'lumotni bosmadi, chunki Birmadagi rejalashtirilgan muzokaralarda qatnashish "tajovuzni qabul qilish yoki tasdiqlash" belgisini bergan bo'lar edi.[74] Oktyabr oyida tinchlik tashabbusi Xrushyovni hokimiyatdan chetlashtirilishi bilan tugatildi va uning o'rnini bosuvchi Leonid Brejnev U Tantning rejasi bilan qiziqmadi.[74]

1964 yil 1-noyabrda Vet Kong Kongning Bien-Xoadagi aviabazasiga hujum qilib, 4 amerikalikni o'ldirdi.[77] Saykondagi Elchi Teylorga yuborgan xabarida Rask saylovlar 48 soatdan kam vaqt ichida bo'lib o'tishi haqida yozgan edi, Jonson harakat qilishni xohlamadi, ammo saylovlardan so'ng "biz shimolga nisbatan muntazam ravishda harbiy bosim kampaniyasini olib boramiz. har doim ularning harakatlarida ko'rilgan ".ref> Langgut, AJ Bizning Vetnam Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 p.319

1964-yil 23-dekabrda Noser Port-Saidda amerikaliklarga qarshi zo'ravon nutq so'zlab, AQSh bilan munosabatlaridagi antenani kuchaytirishga qaror qildi va unda Eronni "Amerika va sionistlar mustamlakasi" deb atadi va Jonson Misrni kamaytirmoqchi ekanligini da'vo qildi. Eronning maqomi.[78] Nosir orqali uning nutqi Qo'shma Shtatlarni Saudiya Arabistoniga harbiy yordamni kamaytirishga majbur qilishi mumkin, deb umid qilar edi, bu teskari ta'sir ko'rsatdi. Kennediga qaraganda isroillik tarafdori bo'lgan Jonson nutqdan g'azablandi. Keyinchalik Rask esladi: "Biz Nosir egilib, qirib tashlaydi, etiklarimizni yalaydi va" Sam amakiga rahmat "deb aytishini kutmagan edik, lekin biz uning AQShga qarshi ashaddiy tanqidini hech bo'lmaganda mo''tadil deb kutgan edik. Buning o'rniga u o'rnidan turdi. Qohiradagi katta olomon oldida va "Qizil dengizga yordamingizni tashlang!"[79] On January 5, 1965, Johnson suspended all PL 480 aid to Egypt, an action that immediately plunged the Egyptian economy into a crisis.[80] Nasser realized what he had done and began to lobby for the resumption of PL 480 food sales, but got nowhere.[81] Through Nasser knew the best way of ending the crisis was to pull out of Yemen and seek a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the United States, he instead turned towards the Soviet Union to seek support for the rapidly contracting Egyptian economy.[82] On March 19, 1965, Rusk commented that Russia was appearing "disinclined to put its full weight behind" international agreements on Vietnam and Laos during a press conference.[83] In April 1965, Senator Kennedy during a visit to the White House advised Johnson to sack Rusk and replace him with Bill Moyers.[84] Johnson at first thought this was a joke, saying that Kennedy's brother had him appointed him Secretary of State, and was astonished to learn that Kennedy was serious. The president replied: "I like Bill Moyers, but I'm not about to remove Rusk."[84]

In May 1965, Rusk told Johnson that the "Four Points" presented by the North Vietnam premier Dong as peace terms were deceptive because "the third of those four points required the imposition of the National Liberation Front on all South Vietnam."[85] In June 1965, when General William Westmoreland requested of Johnson 180, 000 troops to Vietnam, Rusk argued to Johnson that the United States had to fight in Vietnam to maintain "the integrity of the U.S. commitment" throughout the world, but also wondered aloud if Westermoreland was exaggerating the extent of the problems in South Vietnam in order to have more troops under his command.[86] However, despite his doubts about Westmoreland Rusk in a rare memo to the president warned that if South Vietnam were lost "the Communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war."[87] At another meeting, Rusk stated the United States should had committed itself to Vietnam more heavily in 1961, saying that if U.S. troops had been sent to fight then, the present difficulties would not exist.[88] Rusk came into conflict with his undersecretary of state, George Ball, about Vietnam. When Ball argued the governing duumvirate of Thieu and Ky in South Vietnam were "clowns" unworthy of American support, Rusk replied: "Don't give me that stuff. You don't understand that at the time of Korea we had to go out and dig up Syngman Rhee out of the bush where he was hiding. There was no government in Korea, either. We're going to get some breaks, and this thing is going to work."[89] Rusk felt that Ball's memos arguing that American involvement in the war should be seen by as few as possible.[90] At meetings of the National Security Council, Rusk consistently argued against Ball.[91] 

In 1964 and again in 1965, Rusk approached the British Prime Minister Garold Uilson to ask for British troops to go to Vietnam, requests that were refused. The normally Anglophile Rusk saw the refusal as a "betrayal".[92] Rusk told Lui Heren, the American correspondent for the Times of London: "All we needed was just one regiment. The Black Watch would have done it. Just one regiment, but you wouldn't. Well, don't expect us to save you again. They can invade Sussex and we won't do a damn thing about it."[92] Shortly before his death, Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the UN, mentioned in an interview with the journalist Eric Severeid the aborted peace terms in Rangoon in 1964, saying the UN Secretary General U Thant was disappointed that Rusk had rejected the terms.[93] When Johnson asked Rusk about the matter, the latter replied that in diplomacy "there is a difference between rejecting a proposal and not accepting it", a distinction that maintained that U Thant had missed.[93]

In December 1965, when McNamara first told Johnson that the "military action approach is an unacceptable way to a successful conclusion" and urged him to pause the bombing of North Vietnam, Rusk advised the president that there was only a 1 in 20 chance that a bombing pause would lead to peace talks.[94] However, Rusk argued for the bombing pause, saying "You must think about the morale of the American people if the other side keeps pushing. We must be able to say that all has been done."[94] When Johnson announced the bombing pause on Christmas Day 1965, Rusk told the press "We have put everything into the basket of peace except the surrender of South Vietnam."[95] Some of the language that Rusk included in his offer for peace talks seemed to calculate to inspire rejection such as the demand that Hanoi must publicly vow "to cease aggression" and the bombing pause was "a step toward peace, although there has not been the slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to what they would do if the bombing stopped."[93]On December 28, 1965, Rusk sent a cable to Genri Kabot lojasi kichik, the ambassador in Saigon, presenting the bombing pause as merely a cynical exercise in public relations as he wrote: "The prospect of large-scale reinforcements in men and defense budget increases for the next eighteen-month period requires solid preparation of the American public. A crucial element will be a clear demonstration that we have explored fully every alternative but the aggressors has left us no choice."[95] Rusk ordered Genri A. Byurad, the ambassador in Rangoon, to make contact with the North Vietnamese ambassador to Burma with the offer that the bombing pause might be extended if North Vietnam made "a serious contribution to peace".[95] The offer was rejected as the North Vietnamese refused to open peace talks until the bombing raids were stopped "unconditionally and for good".[95] Like the other newly independent states in Africa and Asia, the North Vietnamese were extremely sensitive to any violation, real or perceived, of their newly achieved sovereignty, and the North Vietnamese Politburo regarded the bombing as a major violation of their nation's sovereignty.[96] In a way that the Johnson administration had much trouble understanding, the North Vietnamese felt to negotiate with the Americans reserving the right to resume the bombing would be to accept a diminution of their country's independence, hence the demand for an unconditional bombing halt.[96] In January 1966, Johnson ordered the Rolling Thunder bombing raids to resume.[95]

Keyin Frantsiya Prezidenti Sharl de Goll withdrew France from the common NATO military command in February 1966 and ordered all American military forces to leave France, President Johnson asked Rusk to seek further clarification from President de Gaulle by asking whether the bodies of buried American soldiers must leave France as well.[97] Rusk recorded in his autobiography that de Gaulle did not respond when asked, "Does your order include the bodies of American soldiers in France's cemeteries?"[98][99]

In February 1966, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Fulbright held hearings on the Vietnam War and Fulbright had called as expert witnesses George F. Kennan and General James Gavin, who were both critical of the Vietnam War.[100] Rusk who served as Johnson's principle spokesman on Vietnam was sent by the president together with General Maxwell Taylor to serve as his rebuttal witnesses before the Foreign Relations Committee.[100] Rusk testified that the war was a morally justified struggle to halt "the steady extension of Communist power through force and threat".[100] Karnow wrote the televised hearings were a compelling "political theater" as Fulbright and Rusk verbally dueled about the merits of the Vietnam war with both men pouncing on any weaknesses in the other's argument.[100]

By 1966, the Johnson administration had become divided between the "hawks" and the "doves", through the latter term was somewhat misleading as the "doves" within the administration merely favored opening peace talks to end the war as opposed to pulling out U.S forces from Vietnam.[101] Rusk together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle "Bus" Wheeler and the National Security Adviser Uolt Uitmen Rostou were the leading "hawks" while the leading "doves" was Rusk's former ally McNamara together with Harriman.[102] Rusk equated withdrawal from Vietnam as "appeasement", through at times he was willing to advise Johnson to open peace talks as a way to rebut domestic criticism that Johnson was unwilling to consider alternative ways to end the war.[102]

On April 18, 1967, during a speech in Washington in regards to ending the conflict in South Vietnam, Rusk said the United States was prepared to "take steps to deescalate the conflict whenever we are assured that the north will take appropriate corresponding steps."[103] Rusk's support for the Vietnam War caused considerable torment for his son Richard who was opposed to the war, but enlisted in the Marine Corps and refused to attend anti-war demonstrations out of love for his father.[104] The psychological strain caused the younger Rusk to suffer a nervous breakdown and led to a break between father and son.[7] In 1967, Rusk was opposed to the Operation Pennsylvania peace plan flouted by Henry Kissinger, saying "Eight months pregnant with peace and all of them hoping to win the Nobel Peace Prize".[105] When Kissinger reported that the North Vietnamese would not begin peace talks unless the bombing was stopped first, Rust advocated continuing the bombing, telling Johnson: "If the bombing isn't having that much effect, why do they want to stop the bombing so much?"[106]

Rusk planned to offer to resign in the summer of 1967, because "his daughter planned to marry a black classmate at Stanford University, and he could not impose such a political burden on the president"[107] after it became known that his daughter, Peggy, planned to marry Guy Smith,[108] "a black Georgetown grad working at NASA".[109] Aslida Richmond yangiliklari rahbari stated that it found the wedding offensive, further saying that "anything which diminishes [Rusk's] personal acceptability is an affair of state."[110] He decided not to resign after talking first to Robert S. Maknamara and Lyndon Johnson.[111] A year after his daughter's wedding, Rusk was invited to join the faculty of the Jorjiya universiteti Law School, only to have his appointment denounced by Roy Harris, an ally of Alabama Governor George Wallace and a member of the university's board of regents, who stated that his opposition was because of Peggy Rusk's interracial marriage. The university nonetheless appointed Rusk to the position.[108]

In October 1967, Rusk told Johnson that he believed the March on the Pentagon was the work of "the Communists", and pressed Johnson to order an investigation to prove it.[112] The investigation was launched involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and military intelligence, and found "no significant evidence that would prove Communist control or direction of the U.S. peace movement and its leaders."[112] Rusk said that the report was "naive" and that the agents should had done a better investigation.[112]

When Johnson first discussed dropping out of the 1968 election at a National Security Council meeting in September 1967, Rusk was opposed, saying: "You must not go down. You are the Commander-in-chief, and we are in war. This would have a very serious effect on the country."[113] When McNamara advised Johnson in October 1967 to agree to North Vietnam's demand that the United States cease the bombing campaign as the precondition for opening peace talks, Rusk opposed the idea of a "bombing pause" as removing the "incentive for peace", and urged Johnson to continue Operation Rolling Thunder.[114] By this time, many at the State Department were concerned by Rusk's drinking on the job with Uilyam Bandi later saying that Rusk was a like a "zombie" until he started to drink.[115] McNamara was shocked when he visited him at Foggy Bottom in the afternoon and saw Rusk open his desk to pull out a bottle of scotch which he proceeded to drink in its entirety.[113] Unlike the abrasive McNamara who was widely disliked at the Pentagon, Rusk was sufficiently liked by his colleagues in the State Department that none leaked their concerns about his drinking to the media.[116]

On January 5, 1968, notes by Rusk were delivered to Sovet Ittifoqining AQShdagi elchisi Anatoliy Dobrinin, pleading support from the US to "avoid recurrence of" claimed bombing of Russian cargo ships in the Xayfong North Vietnam port the day prior.[117] On February 9, Rusk was asked by Senator Uilyam Fulbrayt over his possible information in regards to a US tactical nuclear weapons introduction in South Vietnam report.[118]

Like other members of the Johnson administration, Rusk was shaken by the surprise of the Tet Offensive.[119] During a news briefing at the height of the Tet Offensive, Rusk who was known for his courteous manner, was asked how the Johnson administration was taken by surprise, causing him to snap in fury: "Whose side are you on? Now, I'm the Secretary of State of the United States, and I'm on our side! None of your papers or your broadcasting apparatuses are worth a damn unless the United States succeeds. They are trivial compared to that question. So I don't know why people have to be probing for things that one can bitch about, when there are two thousand stories on the same day about things that are more constructive."[119] However, despite his rage at the media whom he felt were misrepresenting the war, he admitted to finding signs that public opinion was shifting against the war. He later recalled that during a visit to Cherokee County in February 1968 that people were telling him: "Dean if you can't tell us when this war is going to end, well then maybe we just ought to chuck it."[119] Rusk added "The fact was that we could not, in any good faith, tell them."[119] Shortly afterwards, in March 1968 Rusk appeared as a witness before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Fulbright that was examining allegations that the Johnson administration had been dishonest about the Tonkin ko'rfazidagi voqea 1964 yilda.[120] Fulbright made his sympathies clear by wearing a necktie decorated with doves and olive branches.[121] Through Rusk handled well himself under the relentless questioning by Fulbright, the televised hearings were another blow to the prestige of the Johnson administration as it became very apparent to the viewers that a number of senators were now opposed to the war or were only lukewarm in their support.[120] When Fulbright asked Rusk to promise Congress a greater say in the war, Rusk replied that Johnson would consult "appropriate members of Congress".[122] When Senator Claiborne Pell asked if the war was worth all the suffering, Rusk charged that he was suffering from "moral myopia" about "the endless struggle for freedom".[123]

On April 17, during an American Society of Newspaper Editors luncheon meeting, Rusk admitted that the United States has taken "some lumps" propaganda wise but the Johnson administration should persist in trying to find a location of neutrality for the peace talks to occur.[124] The following day, Rusk added 10 sites to the 5 proposed initially, accusing Xanoy of having a propaganda battle over neutral areas for discussion during a press conference.[125]


Just before the peace talks in Paris were due to open on 13 May 1968, Rusk advocated bombing North Vietnam north of the 20 parallel, a proposal strongly opposed by the Defense Secretary Clark Clifford who stated it would wreck the peace talks.[126] Clifford persuaded a reluctant Johnson to stick by his promise of 31 March 1968 of no bombing north of 20 paraellel.[127] Rusk continued his advocacy of bombing north of 20 parallel, telling Johnson on 21 May 1968 "We will not get a solution in Paris until we prove they can't win in the South".[128] During a meeting on 26 July 1968, Johnson briefed all three presidential candidates about the state of the war and the peace talks.[129] Rusk who attended the meeting agreed with Richard Nixon's statement that bombing provided leverage in the Paris peace talks, saying: "If the North Vietnamese were not being bombed, they would have no incentive to do anything".[130] When Nixon asked "Where was the war lost?", Rusk replied: "In the editorial rooms of this country".[131]

On June 26, Rusk assured Berlin citizens that the United States along with its North Atlantic Treaty partners were "determined" in securing Berlin's liberty and security, additionally criticizing the recent travel restrictions of Sharqiy Germaniya as violating "long standing agreements and practice."[132]

On September 30, Rusk met privately with Isroil tashqi ishlar vaziri Abba Eban yilda Nyu-York shahri for discussion on peace plans from the Yaqin Sharq.[133]

In October 1968, when Johnson considered a complete bombing halt to North Vietnam, Rusk was opposed.[134] On November 1, Rusk said long term allies of the North Vietnam bomb halt should pressure Hanoi to accelerate their involvement in the peace talks in Paris.[135]

On December 1, citing the halt of bombing in North Vietnam, Rusk said that the Soviet Union would need to come forward and do what it could to forward peace talks in southeast Asia.[136] On December 22, Rusk appeared on television to officially confirm the 82 surviving crew members of the USS Pueblo intelligence ship, speaking on behalf of the hospitalized President Johnson.[137]

In the last days of the Johnson administration, the president wanted to nominate Rusk to the Supreme Court.[138] Through Rusk had studied the law, he did not have a law degree nor had he ever practiced the law, but Johnson pointed out that the constitution did not require legal experience to serve on the Supreme Court and "I've already talked to Dick Russell and he said you'd be confirmed easily."[138] However, Johnson failed to reckon with Senator Jeyms Istland, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who was also a white supremacist and a supporter of segregation.[139] Through Eastland was a fellow Southerner, he had neither forgotten nor forgiven Rusk for allowing his daughter to marry a black man. Eastland announced he would not confirm Rusk if he were nominated to the Supreme Court.

On January 2, 1969, Rusk met with five Jewish American leaders in his office to assure them the US had not changed its policy in the Middle East recognizing the sovereignty of Isroil, one of the leaders, the American-Israeli Public Affairs committee's Irving Kane, saying afterward that Rusk had successfully convinced him.[140]

Iste'fo

January 20, 1969 marked Rusk's last day as Secretary of State, and upon leaving Foggy Bottom he delivered a brief valedictory: "Eight years ago, Mrs. Rusk and I came quietly. We wish now to leave quietly. Thank you very much..."[141] At a farewell dinner hosted by Dobrynin, the longest-serving ambassador in Washington, Rusk told his host: "What's done cannot be undone."[141] After the dinner, Rusk drove away in a modest car that barely seemed to be working, which Dobrynin considered to an apt symbolic end to the Johnson administration.[141] Upon his return to Georgia, Rusk suffered from a prolonged bout of depression and suffered from psychosomatic illnesses, visiting doctors with complaints of chest and stomach pains that appeared to have no physical basis.[141] Unable to work, Rusk was supported throughout 1969 by the Rockefeller Foundation who paid him a salary as a "distinguished fellow".[141]   

On July 27, 1969, Rusk voiced his support for the Nikson administration's proposed anti-ballistic missile system, saying that he would vote for it, were he a senator, from an understanding that further proposals would be reviewed if any progress would be made in Soviet Union peace talks.[142] The same year, Rusk received both the Silvanus Tayer mukofoti va Prezidentning Ozodlik medali, with Distinction.

Following his retirement, he taught international law at the Jorjiya universiteti yuridik fakulteti yilda Afina, Gruziya (1970–1984). Rusk was emotionally exhausted after 8 years as Secretary of State and narrowly survived a nervous breakdown in 1969.[7] Roy Harris, a university regent who served as the Georgia campaign manager for the presidential campaign of George Wallace in 1968 tried to block Rusk's appointment under the ostensible grounds "We don't the university to be a haven for broken-down politicians", but in reality because he was opposed to a man who had allowed his daughter to marry a black man.[141] However, Harris's vote was overruled. Rusk found that the return to teaching in 1970 to resume the academic career he had abandoned in 1940 to be emotionally satisfying as the other professors remembered him as being like a "junior associate seeking tenure".[7] Rusk told his son "the students I was privileged to teach helped rejuvenate my life and make a new start after those hard years in Washington."[7] In the 1970s, he was a member of the Committee on Present Danger, a hawkish group opposed to détente with the Soviet Union and distrustful of treaties to control the nuclear arms race.[143] In 1984, Rusk's son Richard, whom he had not spoken to since 1970 owing to the opposition of Rusk fil to the Vietnam War, surprised his father by returning to Georgia from Alaska to seek a reconciliation.[144] As part of the reconciliation process, Rusk who had gone blind by this point, agreed to dictate his memoirs to his son who recorded what he said and wrote it down into what became the book Men ko'rganimdek.[144]    

In a review of his memoir Men ko'rganimdek, the American historian Warren Cohen noted little of the acrimony of his relations with McNamara, Bundy and Fulbright appeared, but that Rusk was unremitting hostile in his picture of Kennedy's closest adviser and right-hand man, his younger brother Robert together with the UN Secretary General U Thant.[145] Yilda Men ko'rganimdek, Rusk expressed considerable anger at the media's coverage of the Vietnam War, accusing anti-war journalists of "faking" stories and images that portrayed the war in an unflattering light.[145] Rusk spoke about he called the "so-called freedom of the press" as he maintained that journalists from The New York Times va Washington Post only wrote what their editors told them to write, saying if there was true freedom of the press that both newspapers would have portrayed the war more positively.[145] Despite his hawkish views towards the Soviet Union, Rusk stated during his time as Secretary of State that he never saw any evidence that the Soviet Union planned to invade Western Europe and he "seriously doubted" that it ever would.[145] Cohen noted that in contrast to Kennedy that Rusk was more warmer and protective towards Johnson, whom he clearly got on better with than he ever did with Kennedy.[146] Sharhida Men ko'rganimdek, tarixchi Jorj C. Herring wrote that the book was mostly dull and uninformative when it came to Rusk's time as Secretary of State, telling little that historians did not already know, and the most interesting and passionate parts concerned his youth in the "Old South" and his conflict with and reconciliation with his son Richard.[147] U vafot etdi yurak etishmovchiligi yilda Afina, Gruziya on December 20, 1994, at the age of 85.[148] He and his wife are buried at the Oconee Hill Cemetery in Athens.

Rusk Eating House, the first women's eating house at Davidson College, was founded in 1977 and is named in his honor. The Dean Rusk International Studies Program at Davidson College is also named in his honor.

Dekan Rusk o'rta maktabi, located in Canton, Georgia, was named in his honor, as was Dean Rusk Hall on the campus of the University of Georgia.

Meros

The consensus of historians is that Rusk was a very intelligent man, but very shy and so deeply immersed in details and the complexities of each case, that he was reluctant to make a decision, and unable to clearly explain to the media what the government's policies were.[149] Jonathan Coleman says that he was deeply involved in Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, NATO, and Vietnam. Typically he was highly cautious on most issues, except for Vietnam:

He established only a distant relationship with President Kennedy but worked more closely with President Johnson. Both presidents appreciated his loyalty and his low‐key style. Although an indefatigable worker, Rusk exhibited little talent as a manager of the Department of State.[150]

Regarding Vietnam, historians agree that President Johnson relied heavily on the advice of Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert Maknamara, and national security adviser McGeorge Bandi to the effect that a communist takeover of all of Vietnam was unacceptable, and the only way to prevent it was to escalate America's commitment. Johnson took their conclusions and rejected dissenting views.[151]

Rusk's son Rich wrote about his father's time as Secretary of State: "With this reticent, reserved, self-contained, emotionally bound-up father of mine from rural Georgia, how could the decision making have gone any differently? His taciturn qualities, which served him so well in negotiating with the Russians, ill-prepared him for the wrenching, introspective, soul-shattering journey that a true reappraisal of Vietnam policy would have involved. Although trained for high office, he was unprepared for such a journey, for admitting that thousands of American lives, and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, might have been lost in vain."[146]

George Herring wrote about Rusk in 1992: "He is a man utterly without pretense, a thoroughly decent individual, a man of stern countenance and unbending principles. He is a man with a passion for secrecy. He is a shy and reticent man, who as Secretary of State sipped scotch to loosen his tongue for press conferences. Stolid and normally laconic, he also has a keen, dry wit. He has often been described as the "perfect number two," a loyal subordinate who had strong- if unexpressed-reservations about the Bay of Pigs operation, but after its failure could defend it as though he had planned it."[152]

Summarizing the views of historians and political scientists, Smith Simpson states:

Here was a man who had much going for him but failed in crucial respects. A decent, intelligent, well-educated man of broad experience in world affairs who, early in life, evidenced qualities of leadership, seemed diffidently to hold back rather than to lead as secretary of state, seeming to behave, in important ways, like a sleeve-plucking follower of presidents rather than their wise and persuasive counselor.[153]

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Adabiyotlar

  1. ^ MORRISON, DONALD (July 30, 1990). "Ghost Dad (bk rvw of AS I SAW IT by Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk)". Vaqt. Olingan 4-fevral, 2008. I won't be around for history's verdict," says Rusk, now 81 and ailing in his Georgia retirement, "and I am perfectly relaxed about it.
  2. ^ Page 425 of Congressional Directory,89th Congress, Second Session, January 1966
  3. ^ "Rusk, (David) Dean | Encyclopedia.com". www.encyclopedia.com. Olingan 26 iyul, 2020.
  4. ^ a b v d e f g Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, New York: Viking, 1983 p.179
  5. ^ a b v d Herring, George (Spring 1992). "Rusks on Rusk: A Georgian's Life as Collaborative Autobiography". Jorjiya tarixiy chorakligi. 76 (1): 63.
  6. ^ a b v d e f Zeiler, Thomas Din Rask, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000 p.4
  7. ^ a b v d e f g Herring, George (Spring 1992). "Rusks on Rusk: A Georgian's Life as Collaborative Autobiography". Jorjiya tarixiy chorakligi. 76 (1): 64.
  8. ^ Herring, George (Spring 1992). "Rusks on Rusk: A Georgian's Life as Collaborative Autobiography". Jorjiya tarixiy chorakligi. 76 (1): 63–64.
  9. ^ a b Zeiler, Thomas Din Rask, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000 p.5
  10. ^ a b v d e f g Anonim. "Biography of Dean Rusk". Devidson kolleji. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2007 yil 30-yanvarda. Olingan 3 fevral, 2008.
  11. ^ "Famed Fraternity Members". Kappa Alpha ordeni. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2008 yil 9 mayda. Olingan 3 fevral, 2008.
  12. ^ Turner, Arthur Campbell; Francis Carney; Jan Erickson (April 5, 2005). "Transcription of Oral History Audio Interview with ARTHUR CAMPBELL TURNER April 6 and May 28, 1998" (PDF). Kaliforniya universiteti, Riversayd. p. 8. Olingan 3 fevral, 2008.
  13. ^ "Parks Rusk Collection of Dean Rusk Papers". Siyosiy tadqiqotlar va tadqiqotlar bo'yicha Richard B. Rassel kutubxonasi. Jorjiya universiteti. pp. Biographical Note. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2008 yil 17 mayda. Olingan 4-fevral, 2008.
  14. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.60
  15. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.60
  16. ^ Lowenthal, Max (1948), Dawson, Donald S. (ed.), 1948 Diary of Max Lowenthal, Library of Congress, p. 155
  17. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  18. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  19. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  20. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  21. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  22. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  23. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.65
  24. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, New York: Viking, 1983 p.180
  25. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, New York: Viking, 1983 p.175
  26. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.69
  27. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.69
  28. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.69
  29. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.69
  30. ^ Dean Rusk 60s Foreign Policy Leader Dies
  31. ^ Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M. (2008). Journals 1952-2000. Pingvin kitoblari. p.98. ISBN  978-0-14-311435-2. Elizabeth Farmer told me this evening that, at five this afternoon, it looked as if it would be Rusk in State, with Bowles and Bundy as Undersecretaries. (Ken, by the way, told me that Jack had called him on the 7th and talked seriously about Mac as Secretary.) I asked why Rusk had finally emerged. Elizabeth said, 'He was the lowest common denominator.' Apparently Harris Wofford succeeded in stirring the Negroes and Jews up so effectively that the uproar killed Fulbright, who was apparently Jack's first choice.
  32. ^ Halberstam, David (1972). Eng yaxshi va eng yorqin. Tasodifiy uy. p.32. ISBN  0-394-46163-0.
  33. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.43
  34. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.43
  35. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.43
  36. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam 1954-1975, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.43-44
  37. ^ Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917–1963, p. 315, 2003, Little, Brown and Company
  38. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.126
  39. ^ Henry II, John B.; William Espinosa (Autumn 1972). "The Tragedy of Dean Rusk". Tashqi siyosat. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (8): 166–189. doi:10.2307/1147824. JSTOR  1147824.
  40. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, New York: Viking, 1983 p.249
  41. ^ a b Nash, Knowlton Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990 p.63
  42. ^ Nash, Knowlton Kennedy and Diefenbaker: Fear and Loathing Across the Undefended Border, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990 p.63
  43. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.115
  44. ^ Langgut, A.J. Our Vietnam New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000 p.116
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  53. ^ "DEAN RUSK WARNS OF LAOS DANGERS; ON WAY TO SEATO". Chicago Tribune. March 24, 1961.
  54. ^ a b v d e Zeiler, Thomas Din Rask, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000 p.100
  55. ^ a b v d e f g h men j k l Zeiler, Thomas Din Rask, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000 p.95
  56. ^ Ferris, Jesse Nasser's Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.102
  57. ^ Ferris, Jesse Nasser's Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.102-103 & 151
  58. ^ Ferris, Jesse Nasser's Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.105
  59. ^ Ferris, Jesse Nasser's Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.103
  60. ^ Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, by Sheldon M. Stern, Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 80.
  61. ^ a b v d e Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, New York: Viking, 1983 p.287
  62. ^ a b v Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, New York: Viking, 1983 p.293
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  64. ^ Sorensen, Ted (2008). Counselor: A Life At The Edge Of History. HarperCollins. pp.233–234. ISBN  978-0-06-079871-0. President Kennedy was less satisfied with his secretary of state, Dean Rusk...John F. Kennedy, more than any president since FDR, was his own secretary of state...But it was not the White House staff that said the State Department was 'like a bowl of jelly', or that it 'never comes up with any new ideas'. Bular Jon Kennedining so'zlari edi ... Oq uyning bir nechta tasmasi prezidentning Raskka nisbatan sabrsizligini aniqladi ... shuningdek JFK yoki RFK Raskning o'zi favqulodda yig'ilishlar va inqirozlarga hozir bo'lgani kabi puxta tayyorgarlik ko'rgan deb ishonmagan.
  65. ^ Rusk 1990 yil, 198-bet
  66. ^ a b Rusk 1990 yil, 311, 321, 327-betlar
  67. ^ Rusk 1990 yil, p. 328
  68. ^ a b v d Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillar, Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 y.297
  69. ^ a b Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillar, Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 y.310
  70. ^ "Rask Barrining ishonch telefoni uchun haq oldirdi". Chicago Tribune. 1964 yil 30-avgust.
  71. ^ "Barrining portlashlari ahmoqona, Rask uchun ayblovlar". Chicago Tribune. 1964 yil 11 sentyabr.
  72. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 p.398
  73. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 s.399
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  76. ^ Korman, Seymur (1964 yil 22 sentyabr). "Qizillar AQShni Ko'rfazdan siqib chiqara olmaydi, deydi Rask". Chicago Tribune.
  77. ^ Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 y.319
  78. ^ Ferris, Xese Nasserning Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.137
  79. ^ Ferris, Xese Nasserning Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.138
  80. ^ Ferris, Xese Nasserning Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.138-139
  81. ^ Ferris, Xese Nasserning Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.139
  82. ^ Ferris, Xese Nasserning Gamble, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013 p.141
  83. ^ "Rossiya Vetnam shartnomalarini qo'llab-quvvatlamayapti - Rusk". Chicago Tribune. 1965 yil 20 mart.
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  85. ^ Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillar, Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 p.365
  86. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 s.423
  87. ^ Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillar, Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 s.371
  88. ^ Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillar, Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 p.378
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  92. ^ a b Prenderghast, Jerald Britaniya va Vetnamdagi urushlar: qo'shinlar, qurol-yarog 'va razvedka ta'minoti, 1945-1975 yillar Jefferson: McFarland, 2015 yil 109-bet
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  94. ^ a b Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 s.482
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  97. ^ Ogden, Kristofer (1995 yil 18 sentyabr). "Bomba yo'q!". Vaqt. 146 (12). 166-189 betlar. Olingan 11 fevral, 2009.
  98. ^ "Endryu Roberts Bruges guruhiga murojaat qildi". The Bryugge guruhi. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2009 yil 22-iyulda. Olingan 11 fevral, 2009.
  99. ^ Shoenbaum, Tomas J. (1988). Tinchlik va urush olib borish: Truman, Kennedi va Jonson yillarida Dekan Rask. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Simon va Shuster. p.421. ISBN  0-671-60351-5.
  100. ^ a b v d Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 s.486
  101. ^ Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 p.502
  102. ^ a b Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 p.503
  103. ^ King, Uilyam (1967 yil 19 aprel). "Rask yana Xanoydan tinchlik uchun harakat qilishni so'raydi". Chicago Tribune.
  104. ^ Herring, Jorj (1992 yil bahor). "Rusklar Raskda: Gruzinning hayoti hamkorlikda tarjimai hol". Jorjiya tarixiy chorakligi. 76 (1): 64–66.
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  106. ^ Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 y. 457
  107. ^ Retrospect-da, Robert McNamara, pg. 282
  108. ^ a b Romano, Rene Kristin (2003). Musobaqani aralashtirish. Garvard universiteti matbuoti. pp.204–205.
  109. ^ Rik, Frank (2006 yil 2-noyabr). "Kechki ovqatga kim keladi deb taxmin qiling". The New York Times. p. W-10.
  110. ^ http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,943987,00.html
  111. ^ McNamara, Robert S. (1995). Retrospect-da: Vetnam fojiasi va darslari. Tasodifiy uy. p.282. ISBN  0-8129-2523-8. Bugungi kunda o'quvchilarga uning miyasida nima bo'lganini tushunish qiyin bo'lishi mumkin. Ammo o'sha paytda bu menga juda aniq edi: u janubiy prezident bo'lgani uchun janubiy prezident uchun ishlaganligi sababli, bunday nikoh - agar u iste'foga chiqmasa yoki uni to'xtatmasa - unga ham, prezidentga ham ulkan tanqidlarni keltirib chiqaradi deb ishongan. . .... [T] u prezident kutganimdek munosabat bildirdi - yaqinlashib kelayotgan nikoh uchun tabriklar bilan. Bilishimcha, nikoh dekanga yoki prezidentga siyosiy yoki shaxsiy ta'sir ko'rsatmadi.
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  116. ^ Langgut, A.J. Bizning Vetnam 1954-1975 yillar, Nyu-York: Simon va Shuster, 2000 p.459
  117. ^ "Bomba hujumi ayblovida AQSh tomonidan kafolatlangan shoshilish". Chicago Tribune. 1968 yil 5-yanvar.
  118. ^ "Rusk viktorina qilindi". Chicago Tribune. 1968 yil 9 fevral.
  119. ^ a b v d Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 p.548
  120. ^ a b Karnov, Stenli Vetnam: tarix, Nyu-York: Viking, 1983 s.558
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  124. ^ Freeburg, Rassel (1968 yil 17 aprel). "Xanoy Rask tomonidan ogohlantirildi: umidlarni buzmang". Chicago Tribune.
  125. ^ Yuenger, Jeyms (1968 yil 18-aprel). "Ruskning Evropada 4 ta, Osiyoda 6 ta ismlari".. Chicago Tribune.
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  132. ^ Zigert, Elis (1968 yil 26-iyun). "Berlin erkin qoladi, Rusk garovi". Chicago Tribune.
  133. ^ Fulton, Uilyam (1968 yil 30 sentyabr). "Rusk, Isroil konferentsiyasi; O'rta Sharq rejasini rad eting". Chicago Tribune.
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  135. ^ Yuenger, Jeyms. "Rask tinchlik yo'lida Xanoyni itarish uchun yordam so'raydi". Chicago Tribune.
  136. ^ Kling, Uilyam (1968 yil 1-dekabr). "Rusk Sovet Ittifoqining tinchligini ta'minlashga da'vat etadi". Chicago Tribune.
  137. ^ "Rask televidenieda Pueblo yangiliklarini buzdi". Chicago Tribune. 1968 yil 22-dekabr.
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  140. ^ Yuenger, Jeyms (1969 yil 2-yanvar). "Isroilni tan olish AQShning maqsadi, deydi Rask". Chicago Tribune.
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  142. ^ Jons, Uilyam (1969 yil 27-iyul). "Rask ABMni qo'llab-quvvatlaydi, tinchlik ishini qutlaydi". Chicago Tribune.
  143. ^ Koen, Uorren (1991 yil bahor). "Dekan Raskga yangi yorug'lik? Mulohaza uchun insho". Siyosatshunoslik chorakda. Siyosiy fanlar akademiyasi. 106 (1): 124. doi:10.2307/2152177. JSTOR  2152177.
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  149. ^ Rojer Xilsman, Millatni ko'chirish: Jon Kennedi ma'muriyatidagi tashqi siyosat siyosati (1967) 40-43 betlar.
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  152. ^ Herring, Jorj (1992 yil bahor). "Rusklar Raskda: Gruzinning hayoti hamkorlikda tarjimai hol". Jorjiya tarixiy chorakligi. 76 (1): 66.
  153. ^ Smit Simpson, "Taniqli obzor" Siyosatshunoslikning istiqbollari (1991) 20#4 221-49 Iqtibos

Qo'shimcha o'qish

  • Koen, Uorren I. Din Rask (1980).
  • Colman, Jonathan. "The Jelly Bowl": Kennedi va Jonson yillarida AQSh Davlat departamenti, 1961-1968 yillar. " Gaaga diplomatiyasi jurnali 10.2 (2015): 172-196. onlayn
  • Genri, Jon B. va Uilyam Espinozalar. "Dekan Raskning fojiasi". Tashqi siyosat 8 (1972): 166–189. JSTOR-da
  • Nuenlist, nasroniy. "Jim odam: Din Rask va G'arbiy Evropa." Transatlantik tadqiqotlar jurnali 6.3 (2008): 263–278.
  • Shoenbaum, Tomas J. Tinchlik va urush olib borish: Truman, Kennedi va Jonson yillarida Dekan Rask (1988).
  • Snayder, Uilyam P. "Dekan Rask Jon Foster Dullesga, 1953 yil may-iyun: ofis, birinchi 100 kun va qizil Xitoy". Diplomatik tarix 7.1 (1983): 79–86.
  • Stupak, Ronald J. "Din Rask xalqaro munosabatlar: uning falsafiy tasavvurlarini tahlil qilish." Australian Outlook 25.1 (1971): 13–28.
  • Zayler, Tomas V. Din Rask: Amerika missiyasini chet elda himoya qilish (2000).

Birlamchi manbalar

  • Din Rask va Ernest K. Lindli. Ozodlik shamollari - Davlat kotibi Dek Raskning nutqlari va bayonotlaridan tanlov, 1961 yil yanvar - 1962 yil avgust. (1963).
  • Din Rask, Richard Raskka aytganidek. Men ko'rganimdek (1990), o'g'liga aytilgan xotiralar onlayn ko'rib chiqish

Tashqi havolalar

Davlat idoralari
Oldingi
Din Acheson
davlat kotibining yordamchisi sifatida Kongress aloqalari va Xalqaro konferentsiyalar		 Davlat kotibining xalqaro tashkilotlar ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisi
1949		Muvaffaqiyatli
Jon D. Xikerson
Oldingi
Uilyam Uolton Buttervort		 Davlat kotibining Uzoq Sharq ishlari bo'yicha yordamchisi
1950–1951		Muvaffaqiyatli
Jon Mur Allison
Siyosiy idoralar
Oldingi
Xristian Herter		 AQSh davlat kotibi
Quyida xizmat qilgan: Jon F. Kennedi, Lyndon B. Jonson
1961–1969		Muvaffaqiyatli
Uilyam P. Rojers
Mukofotlar
Oldingi
Bob umid		 Silvanus Tayer mukofoti sohibi
1969		Muvaffaqiyatli
Ellsvort bunkeri