Yaponiyaning Koreyaga hujumlari (1592–1598) - Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)
| Yaponiyaning Koreyaga bostirib kirishi | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Xitoycha ism | |||||||||||
| An'anaviy xitoy | 萬曆 朝鮮 之 役 | ||||||||||
| Soddalashtirilgan xitoy tili | 万历 朝鲜 之 役 | ||||||||||
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| Shimoliy Koreyaning nomi | |||||||||||
| Chosŏn'gŭl | 임진 조국 전쟁 | ||||||||||
| Xancha | 壬辰 祖國 戰爭 | ||||||||||
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| Janubiy Koreya nomi | |||||||||||
| Hangul | 임진왜란 | ||||||||||
| Xanja | 壬辰 倭 亂 | ||||||||||
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| Yaponcha ism | |||||||||||
| Kanji | 文 禄 の 役 | ||||||||||
| Xiragana | ぶ ん ろ く の え き | ||||||||||
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The Yaponiyaning 1592–1598 yillarda Koreyaga bostirib kirishi yoki Imjin urushi ikkita alohida, ammo bog'langan bosqinlarni o'z ichiga olgan: 1592 yildagi dastlabki bosqinchi (Imjinning bezovtalanishi), 1596 yilda qisqa sulh va 1597 yilda ikkinchi bosqin (Chongyu urushi). Mojaro 1598 yilda yapon qo'shinlarining chiqib ketishi bilan yakunlandi[1][21] dan Koreya yarim oroli harbiy tanglikdan keyin[22] Koreyaning janubiy qirg'oq provinsiyalarida.[23] Bu oxir-oqibat Xoseon Korean va Ming Chinese g'alabasiga va Yaponiyaning yarimoroldan chiqarilishiga olib keldi.
Bosqinlar tomonidan boshlangan Toyotomi Hideyoshi zabt etish niyatida Koreya yarim oroli tomonidan boshqarilgan Xitoy va Xoseon va Min sulolalari. Yaponiya tezda Koreya yarim orolining katta qismlarini egallashga muvaffaq bo'ldi, ammo Ming tomonidan kuchaytirishning hissasi,[24][25][26] tomonidan g'arbiy va janubiy sohillari bo'ylab Yaponiya ta'minot flotining buzilishi Xoseon floti,[27][28][29][30] Yaponiya kuchlarini olib chiqishga majbur qildi Pxenyan shimoliy viloyatlari janubga Pusan va yaqin mintaqalar. Keyinchalik, bilan solih qo'shinlar (Jozon fuqarolik qurolli kuchlari)[31] ishga tushirish partizan urushi Yaponlarga qarshi va ta'minotdagi qiyinchiliklar ikkala tomonga xalaqit berar edi, na muvaffaqiyatli hujum uyushtirolmadilar yoki qo'shimcha hududga ega bo'lmadilar, natijada harbiy tanglik yuzaga keldi. Bosqinning birinchi bosqichi 1592 yildan 1596 yilgacha davom etdi va 1596 - 1597 yillar oralig'ida Yaponiya va Min o'rtasidagi muvaffaqiyatsiz tinchlik muzokaralari davom etdi.
1597 yilda Yaponiya ikkinchi marta Koreyaga bostirib kirib, hujumni boshladi. Ikkinchi bosqinchilik sxemasi asosan birinchisini aks ettiradi. Yaponlar quruqlikda dastlabki muvaffaqiyatlarga erishdilar, bir nechta shahar va qal'alarni egallab oldilar, faqat to'xtatildilar va yarimorolning janubiy qirg'oq mintaqalariga chekinishga majbur bo'ldilar. Biroq, ta'qib qilayotgan Ming va Chjuson kuchlari yaponlarni janubiy qirg'oq mintaqalarida qolgan qal'alaridan va mustahkam mavqelaridan uzoqlashtira olmadilar,[32][33][34] har ikki tomon yana o'n oylik harbiy tanglik ichida qulflanib qolgan joyda.
1598 yilda Xideyoshi vafot etishi bilan, quruqlikdagi cheklangan taraqqiyot va Xoseon floti tomonidan etkazib berish liniyalarining uzilishi davom etar ekan, Koreyadagi yapon kuchlari yangi hukumat tomonidan Yaponiyaga qaytib ketishga buyruq berdilar. Besh oqsoqollar kengashi. Tomonlar o'rtasida yakuniy tinchlik muzokaralari keyinchalik bo'lib o'tdi va bir necha yil davom etdi, natijada munosabatlar normallashdi.[35]
Ismlar
Yilda Koreys, birinchi bosqinchilik (1592–1593) "Imjinning yapon bezovtalanishi" deb nomlangan (倭 亂 ; wae yugurdi), bu erda 1592 an imjin yil seksagenar tsikl. Ikkinchi bosqin (1597–1598) "Chjong-yuning ikkinchi urushi" (d). Birgalikda, bosqinlar "deb nomlanadi Imjin urushi.
Yilda Xitoy, urushlar "deb nomlanadiVanli Koreyalik kampaniya ", hukmronlik qilganidan keyin Xitoy imperatori, yoki "Millatni himoya qilish uchun Renchen urushi" (zhāng th). Imjin xitoycha so'zni koreyscha o'qishdir renchen (壬辰).
Yilda Yapon, urush deyiladi Bunroku eki yo'q (文 禄 の 役). Bunroku ga ishora qiladi Yaponiya davri nomi 1592 yildan 1596 yilgacha bo'lgan davr. Ikkinchi bosqin (1597-1598) "deb nomlanganKeyxo eki yo'q"(慶 長 の 役). Davomida Edo davri (17-19 asrlar), urush "deb ham nomlanganKara iri"(唐 入 り" Xitoyga kirish "yoki aniqrog'i" Tangga kirish ", nomi sulola Xitoy bilan sinonim ). Yaponiyaning pirovard maqsadi Min Xitoyga bostirib kirish edi. Biroq, urush paytida, ziddiyat asosan Koreya yarim orolida bo'lganligi haqiqati singib ketganligi sababli, Toyotomi Hideyoshi tez orada uning asl maqsadlarini o'zgartiradi.
Umumiy nuqtai
1592 yilda, taxminan 158,000 qo'shinlari bilan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi Xoseon Koreyani va oxir-oqibat Ming-sulolasi Xitoyni zabt etish niyatida Koreyaning ikki bosqinchiligining birinchisi bo'ladigan ishni boshladi. Dastlab, Yaponiya kuchlari quruqlikda katta muvaffaqiyatlarga erishdilar va ikkalasini ham qo'lga kiritdilar Xansong, Koreya poytaxti va Pxenyan va uch oy ichida Koreya yarim orolining katta qismlarini bosib olishni yakunladi. Ko'plab janglar va to'qnashuvlardan so'ng yaxshi tayyorgarlik ko'rgan, o'ziga ishongan va tajribali yapon kuchlari Sengoku davri, odatda, ko'pchilik er shartnomalarida maydonni egallagan. Biroq quruqlikdagi ushbu muvaffaqiyat Koreya dengiz flotining qirg'oq suvlarida Yaponiya ta'minot flotiga hujum qilishda davom etadigan va Yaponiya yutuqlariga to'sqinlik qiladigan G'arbiy Koreya qirg'oqlari bo'ylab etkazib berish liniyalari buzilganligi va Yaponiya dengiz kuchlarining kuchlari qaytarib berilgan dengiz kampaniyalari bilan cheklangan edi. .[36][37] Ushbu tendentsiyalar, ikkala tomonning istisnolari bundan mustasno, mojaroning aksariyat qismida amal qildi.
Vanli imperatori hukmronligi ostida Min Xitoy tezda yapon bosqinlarini talqin va tahdid sifatida talqin qildi. Imperial Xitoy irmoq tizimi.[38] Minning manfaati, shuningdek, urushni Koreya yarim orolida va o'z hududidan tashqarida ushlab turish edi (hududiy halokatga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun);[39] ular to'qnashuvga shimoldan hujum qilish uchun qo'shimcha kuchlarni yuborish orqali kirishdilar. Keyingi kelishuvlarda Chjuson armiyasining aksariyati shimoliy viloyatlarni yapon hujumlaridan himoya qilishga qaratilgan, shu bilan birga Yaponiya tomonidan bosib olingan hududlarni qaytarib olish uchun Ming armiyasining yurishlarini qo'llab-quvvatlagan. Binobarin, aynan shu Ming boshchiligidagi quruqlik kampaniyalari va Chjuson boshchiligidagi dengiz urushi natijasida Yaponiya armiyasi Pxenyandan janubga chekinishga majbur bo'ldi, bu erda yaponlar janubi-g'arbiy qismi bundan mustasno, Xansong va janubiy viloyatlarini egallab olishda davom etishdi. Jeolla viloyati.[24][25][26] Ta'qib qilayotgan Ming va Chjuson qo'shinlari janubga qarab oldinga o'tishga harakat qildilar, ammo Yaponiya armiyasi tomonidan to'xtatildi. Byeokjevan jangi.[40][41] Keyinchalik, Yaponiya qo'shinlari shimoliy viloyatlarni qayta ishg'ol qilish uchun qarshi hujumni boshladilar, ammo Xenjju qal'asida mudofaa qilayotgan Chizon qo'shinlari tomonidan qaytarib olindi. Bundan tashqari, Xoseonning fuqarolik boshchiligidagi solih qo'shinlari faol ravishda ish olib borishdi partizan urushi janubdagi yapon kuchlariga qarshi, bu esa ular egallab olgan shaharlardagi yaponlarning tutilishini zaiflashtirdi.[31] Keyinchalik, ta'minotdagi qiyinchiliklar ikkala tomonga xalaqit berar ekan, na Yaponlar, na Ming va Jozon qo'shma kuchlari muvaffaqiyatli hujum uyushtirolmadilar yoki qo'shimcha hududga ega bo'lmadilar, natijada Xansun va bu mintaqalarda harbiy tanglik yuzaga keldi. Kaesong. Urush besh yil davomida shu tarzda davom etdi va undan keyin 1596 va 1597 yillar oralig'ida qisqa intermediya bo'lib o'tdi va Yaponiya va Ming oxir-oqibat muvaffaqiyatsiz tinchlik muzokaralarini olib borishdi.[42]
1597 yilda Yaponiya ikkinchi marta Koreyaga bostirib kirib, hujumni boshladi. Ikkinchi bosqinchilik sxemasi asosan birinchisini aks ettiradi. Yaponlar quruqlikda dastlabki yutuqlarga erishdilar, ammo Min kuchlarining hissasi, shuningdek, Chjuson dengiz flotining Yaponiya ta'minot flotini buzishi natijasida yapon qo'shinlari yarim orolning qirg'oqbo'yi mintaqalariga qarab chiqib ketishdi. Ta'qib qilayotgan Ming va Chjuson kuchlari, ammo yaponlarni janubiy qirg'oq mintaqalarida o'zlarining qal'alaridan va mustahkam pozitsiyalaridan siqib chiqara olmadilar.[32][33][34] har ikki tomon o'n oylik harbiy tanglikka qulflanib qolgan joyda.
Xideyoshi 1598 yil sentyabrda vafot etishi, quruqlikdagi cheklangan taraqqiyot va g'arbiy va janubiy qirg'oqlar bo'ylab ta'minot liniyalarining Chuzon dengiz floti tomonidan uzilishining davom etishi bilan Koreyadagi qolgan yapon kuchlari yangi hukumat tomonidan Yaponiyaga qaytib ketishga buyruq berdilar. Besh oqsoqollar kengashi. Tomonlar o'rtasida yakuniy tinchlik muzokaralari keyinchalik bo'lib o'tdi va bir necha yil davom etdi, natijada munosabatlar normallashdi.
Fon
Urushdan oldin Yaponiya va Koreya
1392 yilda general Yi Seonggye muvaffaqiyatli to'ntarishni olib bordi va Koreyada siyosiy hokimiyatni egallab oldi Goryoning U. Seonggye izdoshlari uni tojni egallashga majbur qilishdi Xoseondan Taejo, shu tariqa yangi sulolani o'rnatish.[43] Qirollik qoni yo'qligini hisobga olib, o'z hukmronligi uchun asos izlashda yangi rejim Xitoy tomonidan tan olindi va Xitoy sharoitida Imperial Xitoy irmoq tizimiga qo'shildi. Osmon mandati.[44][45][46] Ushbu irmoq tizimida Xitoy "katta birodar" rolini o'z zimmasiga oldi Koreya orasida eng yuqori pozitsiyani saqlab qolish irmoq davlatlari,[47][48] kabi mamlakatlarni ham o'z ichiga olgan Ryukyu qirolligi, Vetnam, Tailand va Laos,[49][50] "kichik birodar" ning bo'ysunuvchi irqiy rolini qabul qilish evaziga.[51]
1402 yilda yaponlar syogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (bo'lishiga qaramay) Yaponiya imperatori ) Xitoy imperatori tomonidan "Yaponiya qiroli" unvoniga sazovor bo'lgan va shu unvon bilan 1404 yilga kelib xuddi shu tarzda imperatorlik irmoq tizimidagi pozitsiyani qabul qilgan. Ushbu munosabatlar 1408 yilda Yaponiya, Koreyadan farqli o'laroq, o'zining tan olinishini tugatishni tanlaganida tugagan. Xitoy mintaqaviy gegemonlik va boshqa har qanday o'lpon topshiriqlarini bekor qilish.[52] Irmoq tizimiga a'zolik Xitoy bilan har qanday iqtisodiy almashinuv uchun zaruriy shart edi; tizimdan chiqishda Yaponiya Xitoy bilan savdo munosabatlaridan voz kechdi.[53]
Ming yil oldin Suy va Tang Xitoy sulolalari bilan yaqin siyosiy va savdo aloqalari bo'lgan Koreyaning uchta qirolligi. Xuddi shunday, Ming China ham imperatorlik irodasi tizimida yaxlit bo'lib qolgan, ammo Yaponiyadan o'lpon va savdo-sotiq olgan Jozon bilan yaqin savdo va diplomatik aloqalarga ega edi.[54][55][56][57]
Ming Xitoy va Joseon Korea juda ko'p umumiy. Ikkala asr oxiridan keyin XIV asrda paydo bo'ldi Yuan sulolasi, quchoqladi Konfutsiy ideallari jamiyatda va shunga o'xshash tahdidlarga duch kelgan (Yurxen reyderlari va vokou ).[58] Ikkalasida ham urushgacha va urush paytida qabul qilingan qarorlarga ta'sir ko'rsatadigan raqobatdosh ichki siyosiy fraksiyalar mavjud edi.[59][60] Yaqin savdo va umumiy dushmanlar tufayli Jozon va Ming do'stona ittifoqqa ega edilar.
Hideyoshining tayyorgarligi
XVI asrning so'nggi o'n yilligiga kelib, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, eng ustun daimyō, qisqa tinchlik davrida butun Yaponiyani birlashtirdi. U qonuniy vorisi bo'lmagan taqdirda hokimiyatni egallashga kelganligi sababli Minamoto nasabi imperator uchun zarur shōgun komissiya, u o'z hukmronligini qonuniylashtirish va imperator oilasiga qaramligini kamaytirish uchun harbiy kuchga intildi.[61] Shuningdek, Xideyoshi marhum xo'jayinining orzularini ro'yobga chiqarish uchun Xitoyga hujum qilishni rejalashtirgan, Oda Nobunaga,[62] va mumkin bo'lgan tahlikani yumshatish fuqarolik buzilishi yoki bekor turganlarning ko'pligi sabab bo'lgan isyon samuray va birlashgan Yaponiyadagi askarlar.[63] Ehtimol, Xideyoshi kichikroq qo'shni davlatlarni bo'ysundirishni yanada aniqroq maqsad qilib qo'ygan bo'lishi mumkin Ryukyu orollari, Tayvan va Koreya) va katta yoki uzoqroq mamlakatlarga savdo sheriklari sifatida munosabatda bo'lish,[61] chunki Koreyaning istilosi davomida Xideyoshi Xitoy bilan qonuniy hisob-kitob savdosini izladi.[61]
Hideyoshining o'z hukmronligini asoslashi uchun harbiy ustunlikka ehtiyoji bor edi. Shungal asosga ega bo'lmagan, xalqaro miqyosda, oxir-oqibat Yaponiyaning Yaponiyadan pastroqdagi qo'shni davlatlari bilan buyurtma o'zgarishi mumkin edi.[61] Hideyoshi zarur Minamoto naslidan mahrum bo'lganligi sababli Shygun unvonini olmagan, ammo XVI asrda Yaponiyada nasabnomachilar kimdir taniqli ajdodlari munosib narxga ega ekanliklarini "kashf etishlari" juda keng tarqalgan edi, bu Hideyoshi degan fikrni anglatadi. o'rniga yangi ofis yaratishni rejalashtirish bakufu. Xideyoshi, shuningdek, o'zining yangi tashkil topgan davlatini umumiy dushmanga qarshi birlashtirib turadigan va Yaponiyaning ichki isyonini oldini olish uchun tashqi mojaroga duchor bo'ldi. daimyōs uning hukmronligiga qarshi har qanday ambitsiyalarga amal qilishdan. Yaponiya hududidan tashqarida urush olib borish, shuningdek, hududiy vayronagarchilikning oldini oladi va davlat infratuzilmasini saqlab qoladi.[64] Bunday mulohazalar Hideyoshi Shogun emasligi va imperatorlik qoni bilan aloqasi bo'lmaganligi bilan mos keladi.
Ternbull ham istilo sabablari sifatida Xideyoshining shaxsiy ambitsiyalari va megalomaniasini taklif qiladi. Hideyoshi bir qator urushlarda Yaponiyani zabt etgan va endi katta narsalarga murojaat qilmoqchi bo'lib, u nafaqat Xitoyga, balki Filippin va Hindistonga hujum qilish uchun Koreyaga "yo'lini kesish" istagi haqida gapirganini ta'kidladi.[65] Bundan tashqari, ming yillar davomida Xitoy Sharqiy Osiyoning intellektual, iqtisodiy, harbiy va siyosiy markazi bo'lgan va an'anaviy ravishda Sharqiy Osiyo davlatlari Xitoy imperatorlarini o'zlarining xo'jayinlari deb tan olishgan va ularga ruxsat berish evaziga o'lpon to'lashgan. Xitoy bilan savdo. Yaponiya odatda Xitoyga o'lpon to'lash talabiga qarshi turar edi, ammo Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu ulkan Xitoy bozoriga kirish evaziga Xitoy imperatorini o'zining xo'jayini deb tan oldi.[65] Yaponiyaning o'lpon to'lash huquqi va shu bilan Xitoy bilan savdo qilish huquqi 1540 yillarda Ming sudi tomonidan xitoy-yapon qaroqchilarining reydlariga javoban " wakō.[65]
Xitoyga bostirib kirishga intilib, Xideyoshi aslida Sharqiy Osiyoda an'anaviy ravishda Sharqiy Osiyo xalqaro tartibining markazi sifatida Xitoy o'ynagan rolni Yaponiyaga da'vo qilgan. U Yaponiyada o'z mavqeini harbiy qudratiga qarzdor bo'lgan nisbatan kamtarin odam sifatida qo'llab-quvvatladi.[66] Va nihoyat, 1540 - 1550 yillarda wakō Koreyaga bir qator samuray reydlarini uyushtirgan edi, ularning ba'zilari "mini-bosqinlar" ga qadar katta edi. Xideyoshi adashib, dushmanlarini kuchsiz deb o'ylardi.[65]
Hideyoshi Yaponiyani birlashtirishni tugatmasdan ancha oldin Koreya bilan mumkin bo'lgan urushni rejalashtirgan. U ko'plab jabhalarda tayyorgarlik ko'rdi. 1578 yildayoq Hideyoshi, keyin Oda Nobunaga qarshi kurash olib bordi Meriy Terumoto nazorat qilish uchun Chgoku viloyati, Terumotoga Nobunaganing Xitoyni bosib olish rejasi to'g'risida xabar berdi.[67] 1585 yilda Hideyoshi portugaliyalik Iezvit Otasiga aytdi Gaspar Koelo uning butun Sharqiy Osiyoni zabt etish istagi. Xideyoshi Koelhodan xo'jayini Qirolga xabar yuborishini so'radi Ispaniyalik Filipp II u ham Portugaliya qiroli Filipp I bo'lgan va Yaponiyaga yordam berish uchun dengiz flotini tayyor bo'lishini so'ragan (Ming Xitoy, Ispaniya va Portugaliya o'sha davrning asosiy dengiz kuchlari bo'lgan). Ammo Filipp Xideyoshidan voz kechdi va Xitoyni xafa qilmaslikni afzal ko'rdi.[65] Mag'lubiyati Odawara asoslangan Hōjō klani 1590 yilda[68] nihoyat Yaponiyaning ikkinchi birlashishiga olib keldi va Xideyosi keyingi urushga tayyorgarlikni boshladi.
1591 yil martidan boshlab Kyushu daimyōs va ularning ishchi kuchlari qurilgan Nagoya qasri yilda Nagoya, Saga (zamonaviy Karatsu, Saga, bugungi kun bilan aralashmaslik kerak Nagoya shahar Aichi prefekturasi ) bosqinchi kuchlarni safarbar qilish markazi sifatida.[69] 1592 yilda Xideyoshi Filippinlarga xat yuborib, Ispaniya general-gubernatoridan o'lpon talab qildi va Yaponiya allaqachon Koreyadan (bu tushunmovchilik edi) va Ryukyusdan soliq olganligini aytdi.[70]
Harbiy tayyorgarlikka kelsak, 1586 yildayoq 2000 ga yaqin kema qurilishi boshlangan bo'lishi mumkin.[71] Koreyalik harbiylarning kuchini baholash uchun Xideyoshi 1587 yilda Koreyaning janubiy sohillariga 26 ta kemadan iborat hujum kuchini yubordi.[72] Diplomatik jabhada Xideyoshi Yaponiya birlashishini tugatmasdan ancha oldin Xitoy bilan do'stona munosabatlarni o'rnatishni boshladi. Shuningdek, u savdo yo'llarini politsiyaga qarshi kurashishda yordam berdi vokou.[73]
Yaponiya va Koreya o'rtasidagi diplomatik muomalalar
1587 yilda Hideyoshi o'zining birinchi elchisi Yutani Yasuxironi yubordi,[74][75][76] hukmronligi davrida bo'lgan Koreyaga Qirol Seonjo,[77] Koreya va Yaponiya o'rtasida diplomatik munosabatlarni tiklash (1555 yilda Vokou reydidan beri buzilgan).[78] Hideyoshi Koreya sudini Yaponiyaga Xitoyga qarshi urushga qo'shilishga undash uchun asos sifatida foydalanishga umid qildi.[79] Yasuxiro o'zining jangovar kelib chiqishi va koreys rasmiylari va ularning urf-odatlaridan nafratlanadigan munosabati bilan Koreyadan bo'lajak elchi missiyalari va'dasini bajara olmadi.[80]
Taxminan 1589 yil Xideyoshining ikkinchi elchixonasi tarkibida Sō Yoshitoshi (yoki Yoshitomo, g柳川 調 信),[81][82] Yanagava Shigenobu,[83] va buddist rohib Genso (玄 蘇) Koreyaga etib borib, Yaponiyada boshpana topgan bir guruh koreys isyonchilari evaziga Koreyaning Yaponiyadagi elchixonasi va'dasini ta'minladi.[80]
1587 yilda Xideyoshi Yoshitoshining asrab olgan otasi va uning daimyosiga buyruq berdi Tsushima oroli, Sō Yoshishige,[75][84] Chjonson sulolasiga Yaponiyaga bo'ysunish va Xitoyni zabt etishda ishtirok etish yoki Yaponiya bilan ochiq urush istiqbolida bo'lish ultimatumini taklif qilish. Biroq, Tsushima orolida barcha yapon kemalari uchun Koreyaga yagona nazorat punkti sifatida maxsus savdo pozitsiyasi mavjud bo'lgan va Koreyadan o'zlarining 50 ga yaqin kemalari bilan savdo qilish uchun ruxsat olganligi sababli,[85] Sō oilasi Koreya bilan mojaroning oldini olishdan manfaatdor edi va muzokaralarni qariyb ikki yilga kechiktirdi.[81] Hideyoshi buyrug'ini yangilaganida ham, Sō Yoshitoshi Koreya sudiga tashrifini ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi munosabatlarni yaxshilash kampaniyasiga qisqartirdi. Yoshitoshi elchi missiyasining yakunida Korolga kelgan birinchi ilg'or qurollarni - qirol Seonjoga parrandachilik va gugurtali qurollarni taqdim etdi.[86] Ryu Seong-ryong, yuqori martabali olim amaldor, harbiylarga qo'yishni taklif qildi arquebus (a gugurt qulfi qurol) ishlab chiqarishga va foydalanishga topshirildi, ammo Koreya sudi uning xizmatlarini qadrlamadi. Arquebusning bu qiziqmasligi va kuchini kam baholashi urush boshlanishida Koreya armiyasining muvaffaqiyatsizliklariga katta hissa qo'shdi.
1590 yil aprelda Koreya elchilari, shu jumladan Xvan Yun-gil va Kim Saung-il[87] uchun chap Kioto, u erda ular Xideyoshi uni tugatayotganda ikki oy kutishdi Xojo klaniga qarshi kampaniya.[88] Qaytib kelgach, ular tantanali sovg'alarni almashishdi va King Seonjoning xatini Hideyoshiga etkazishdi.[88] Xideyoshi adashib koreyslar Yaponiyaga katta hurmat bajo keltirish uchun kelgan deb taxmin qildi. Shu sababli elchilarga diplomatik vakillar uchun rasmiy muomala berilmadi. Oxir oqibat, Koreya elchilari Xideyosidan Koreya shohiga javob yozishni iltimos qilishdi, ular Sakay portida 20 kun kutishdi.[89] Elchilar tomonidan juda noo'rin ekanligi sababli so'ralgan holda qayta ishlangan maktub Koreyani Yaponiyaga bo'ysunishga va Xitoyga qarshi urushga qo'shilishga taklif qildi.[86]
Elchilar qaytib kelgach, Chjuson sudi Yaponiyaning taklifiga oid jiddiy muhokamalarni o'tkazdi;[90] esa Xvan Yun-gil Yaponiyaning harbiy kuchlari va niyatlarining qarama-qarshi baholari haqida xabar berdi. Ular shunga qaramay, urush yaqinlashib kelayotganini ta'kidladilar. Kim Saungil Xideyoshining maktubi shunchaki blufdan boshqa narsa emas deb da'vo qildi. Bundan tashqari, sud Yaponiyaning turli urug 'qo'shinlari bilan bir-biriga qarshi kurashayotgani bilan notinch bo'lganini bilgan holda, o'sha paytdagi ko'plab yapon qo'shinlarining kuchlari va qobiliyatlarini sezilarli darajada pasaytirdi. Ba'zilar, shu jumladan qirol Seonjo, Mingga Yaponiya bilan aloqalar to'g'risida ma'lumot berish kerak, degan fikrni ilgari surdi, chunki bunday qilmaslik Mingni Koreyaning sodiqligidan shubha ostiga qo'yishi mumkin edi, ammo sud nihoyat tegishli harakatlar tartibi aniqlanguncha kutib turishga qaror qildi.[91]
Oxir oqibat Xideyoshining diplomatik muzokaralari Koreya bilan kerakli natijani bermadi. Chison sudi Yaponiyaga Koreyadan pastroq davlat sifatida murojaat qildi va o'zini Xitoy irmoq tizimidagi maqomiga ko'ra o'zini ustun deb bildi. Bu Xideyoshining bosqinchilik tahdidlari oddiy wokou yapon qaroqchilarining reydlaridan yaxshiroq emas deb noto'g'ri baholagan.[92] Koreya sudi Shigenobuga topshirdi[83] Xindeyoshining uchinchi elchixonasi Genso, qirol Seonjoning Xideyoshini Xitoy irmoq tizimiga qarshi chiqqani uchun tanbeh bergan maktubi. Hideyoshi yana bir xat bilan javob qaytardi, ammo diplomat tomonidan u odat bo'yicha kutilganidek shaxsan o'zi taqdim etmagani uchun sud unga e'tibor bermadi.[93] Ikkinchi iltimosini rad etgandan so'ng, Xideyoshi 1592 yilda Koreyaga qarshi qo'shinlarini ishga tushirishga kirishdi.
Kuchlar
Yaponiya
Yaponiya kuchlarining asosiy qismi bu edi samuray, Yaponiya jamiyatida hukmronlik qilgan Yaponiyaning harbiy kastasi.[94] Yaponiya jamiyati ikkiga bo'lingan edi to'rtta kast: samuraylar, dehqonlar, hunarmandlar va savdogarlar, shu tartibda. Samuray kastasi Yaponiyadagi erlarning katta qismiga egalik qilar, qilich ko'tarish va yetarlicha hurmatga ega bo'lmagan har qanday oddiy odamni joyida qatl etish huquqiga ega edi va ularga otlarga egalik qilish va jangga chiqish huquqi berildi.[94] 1592 yilga qadar standart samuray qurollari yari, nayza, ko'pincha samurayga raqibini otidan tortib olishga imkon beradigan xoch pichog'i bilan pichoqlashni nazarda tutgan.[94] Agar samuraylar raqibini pichoq bilan emas, balki kesib tashlamoqchi bo'lsa, qurol bu edi dachi, ulkan tutqichli nihoyatda uzun qilich yoki naginata, juda o'tkir egri pichoqli qutb.[94] Barcha samuray qurollarining eng mashhuri bu edi katana, ingliz harbiy tarixchisi Stiven Ternbull tomonidan "... urush tarixidagi eng yaxshi qirrali qurol" deb ta'riflangan qilich.[94] Samuray hech qachon qalqon ko'tarmasdi katana zarbalarni burish uchun ishlatiladi.[94] 1592 yilga kelib samuraylarning zirhi bo'lgan lamellar Samuraylarni o'qlardan himoya qilishga yordam beradigan qattiq plastinka qo'shilib, bir-biriga bog'langan temir yoki teri tarozilaridan yasalgan.[94] Samuray jangda temir niqobini kiyib, ot sochidan yasalgan mo'ylov va tashqi tomonga yopishtirilgan "qabih kulish" bilan psixologik urush olib bordi.[95] Koreyaga yuborilgan yapon askarlarining aksariyati ashigaru (piyoda askarlar), odatda chaqirilgan dehqonlar nayza bilan qurollangan edilar, tanegashima (Yapon arquebuslari), yoki yumi (Yapon kamonlari).[95] Samuraylardan qimmatbaho zirhli kostyumlari bilan farqli o'laroq ashigaru ko'kragiga temir zirhli arzon kostyumlar kiyib olgan.[95] The ashigaru arquebuslar bilan qurollanganlar yevropalik uslubda jang qilishga o'rgatilgan, erkaklar o'q otishni o'rganish uchun qurollarini otish uchun mashq qilishgan, so'ngra tizzadan pastga tushish uchun o'q otishgan, orqalaridagi odamlar esa o'q uzishgan va tsikl takrorlangan. qayta-qayta.[95]
Yaponiya birinchi diviziyasining qo'mondoni va bosqinchi kuchlarning umumiy qo'mondoni bo'lgan Konishi Yukinaga, a daimyō (lord) Uto Higo viloyati yilda Kyushu, harbiy mahoratga qaraganda diplomatik mahorati tufayli bosqinchi kuchlar qo'mondoni sifatida tanlangan, chunki Toyotomi Xideyoshi koreyslarning qarshilik ko'rsatishini kutmagan edi.[96] Konishi 1583 yilda katoliklikni qabul qilgan va ispan va portugallarga Dom Agostinyo nomi bilan tanilgan.[97] Keti Kiyomasa Ikkinchi diviziyani Koreyaga olib borgan Yaponiyada tanilgan Toranosuke ("yosh yo'lbars") va koreyslarga uning shafqatsizligi sababli "shayton general" sifatida.[97] Kato - "Shizugatakening ettita nayzasi" dan biri, 1583 yilda samuraylar bir-biri bilan jang qilgan Shizugatake jangida janglarda o'zini ko'rsatgan ettita samuray guruhi. mano manova bu erda Kato o'z mohirligini xoch pichoqli nayza bilan namoyish etib, kesilgan va sho'rlangan boshlari keyin yashil bambuk dastasiga bog'lanib, Katoning xizmatchilaridan biri jangga olib borgan juda ko'p odamlarni kesib tashladi.[97] Kato sadoqatli izdoshi edi Nichiren buddizmi, Yaponiyada militarizm va ultra-millatchilik bilan chambarchas bog'liq bo'lgan buddizmning bir turi va uning Katolik Konishi Koreyadagi kampaniya davomida ikki kishi deyarli uchrashmagan darajada darajada do'stona emas edi.[98] Katoning jangovar standarti oq vimpel bo'lib, unda Nichirenning o'zi o'qiyotgan deb yozilgan xabar bor edi Namu Myōhō Renge Kyō ("Ilohiy Qonunning Lotusiga salom").[98] Dengiz qo'mondoni "Shizugatakening etti nayzasi" dan yana biri Vakizaka Yashuaru edi. daimyō 1585 yilda Ichki dengizdagi Avaji orolidan, u erda dengiz sayohatlari haqida ko'p narsa bilib olgan, chunki orol dengizchilar uchun xavfli bo'lgan girdobga yaqin joylashgan.[98] Toyotomi Hideyoshi hech qachon Yaponiyaning poytaxti Edo (zamonaviy Tokio) da qolib ketmagan; ammo, Xitoyni zabt etish g'oyasi uning obsesyoni edi va butun urush davomida u mag'lubiyatni qabul qilishdan bosh tortdi, urushga shunchaki iroda kuchi masalasi sifatida qaradi, faqat uning samuraylari etarlicha qattiq kurashgan bo'lsa, u Xitoyni olishi mumkinligiga ishondi, deb yozadi Ternbull: " Shunday qilib, taktik ma'noda Xideyoshini qo'mondonlardan biri deb hisoblash mumkin emas, lekin uning irodasi butun loyihani o'limigacha boshqarganligi sababli uning siyosiy ta'sirini inobatga olish mumkin emas ".[99]
Min Xitoy
Min Xitoy armiyasi Osiyodagi eng yirik qo'shin bo'lib, jami 845 mingga yaqin qo'shin bo'lgan. Biroq, 1592 yilda Imperator armiyasi mo'g'ullar bilan urushlar va janubi-g'arbiy qismida isyonni bostirish bilan shug'ullangan.[95] Ming armiyasi katta tashkiliy ishlarga qodir edi, masalan, mo'g'ullarga qarshi qurol kuchini ta'minlash uchun 480 km qattiq landshaft bo'ylab 400 ta artilleriya qurolini olib keldi.[95]
Ming armiyasining asosiy qismi beshta qismga bo'lingan piyoda qo'shin edi; qurol, qilich, kamondan qurollanganlar olov o'qlari, oddiy o'qlari bo'lgan kamonchilar va otliqlar va artilleriya tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan nayzalar.[95] Xitoy piyoda askarlari uchun asosiy qurol-yarog 'va arquebus bo'lgan, otliqlar esa otliq kamonchilar bo'lgan.[95] Xitoy piyoda askarlari konus shaklida temir dubulg'a va charm yoki temirdan yasalgan zirhli kostyumlar kiyishgan.[100]
Ternbullning so'zlariga ko'ra, "Xitoy dala artilleriyasi va qamal to'pi mintaqadagi eng yaxshi qurol edi".[100] Xitoy artilleriyasi quyma temirdan yasalgan va bir necha turga bo'lingan, eng muhimi "buyuk general qurol" va folang zhi (佛朗 支), ikkinchisi esa pog'onali artilleriya qurollari.[100]
Xitoy qo'mondonlaridan biri edi Li Rusong, Yaponiya hisoblarida an'anaviy ravishda kamsitilgan odam. Turnbullning taxminiga ko'ra, u "Ming Xitoyning eng mohir generallaridan biri" bo'lgan.[101] Li Pyekeyk jangida mag'lubiyatga uchragan bo'lsa-da, mag'lubiyati vaqtinchalik edi. U yaponlarni Koreyadan chiqarib yuborish maqsadiga erishgan qobiliyatli strateg edi va P'yekjeyekdagi mag'lubiyatiga e'tibor qaratgan yaponlarning hisoblari uning yutuqlaridan chalg'itishga xizmat qildi.[101]
Boshqa bir Xitoy dengiz qo'mondoni edi Chen Lin, asli Guandun Yaponiyani mag'lub etish va Koreyani himoya qilishda hal qiluvchi rol o'ynagan. Urushda g'alaba qozonishga yordam berganidan keyin Chen Koreya va Xitoyda qahramon sifatida nishonlandi. Keyinchalik Chen. Asoschisi bo'ldi Gvandong Jin urug‘i Koreyadan va bugungi kunda uning avlodlari Xitoy va Koreyaga tarqalib ketgan. Dengiz va harbiy yutuqlari uchun Chenga Guangdong ustasi laqabi berilgan.[102]
Joseon Korea
Chjuson armiyasidagi zobitlar faqat zodagonlardan edi, ammo juda militaristik yapon zodagonlaridan farqli o'laroq, yoshligidan boshlab askar bo'lishga o'rgatilgan edi, chunki Chjuson zodagonlari uchun stipendiya qadrlanib, urush Konfutsiy janob-olimlariga noloyiq narsa sifatida kamsitilgan edi.[103] Koreyalik generallarning sifati juda o'zgaruvchan edi, chunki ba'zi koreys zobitlari qobiliyatiga ega edilar, boshqalari esa urushni o'rganishga ko'p vaqt ajratmagan, kamondan o'q otishni, yozishni, xattotlik bilan shug'ullanishni va Konfutsiy klassiklarini o'qishni afzal ko'rishgan.[104] Koreyalik piyoda askarlar xitoycha uslubdagi shapka va dubulg'a kiyishgan, ammo zirhsiz.[104] Koreyslarning standart qilichi Xvando edi, bu tinchlik davrida Jozon askarlari tomonidan tez-tez ishlatiladigan egri qilich, u yaponiyalik hamkasbiga qaraganda qisqa, ammo yengilroq edi. Noyob koreys qurollari bu edi qaltirash, temir tirnoqlari bilan milga bog'langan zanjirning tutqichi vazifasini bajaruvchi, qizil rangga bo'yalgan 1,5 metr uzunlikdagi qattiq yog'och tayoq.[104] Chjoon piyoda askarlari ko'pincha kamondan o'q otar edilar va 1592 yildagi yapon manbasi koreyslar yaponlardan faqat kamonchi sifatida askar sifatida ustun ekanliklarini ta'kidladilar, chunki ularning kamonlari 300 metr (980 fut) yapon kamonchilariga qarshi 450 metr masofaga ega edi.[104]
Koreys standarti qurol edi seungja "g'alaba qurol", tayoqchaga biriktirilgan qo'l miltiqiga o'xshash qurol. Koreyalik artilleriya, ammo yapon artilleriyasidan ancha ustun edi va yaponlardan farqli o'laroq, koreyslar tashish qobiliyatiga ega kemalarni qurishgan og'ir to'plar.
Ternbull Koreyaning najoti uning dengiz kuchlari ekanligini yozgan.[105] Koreyaning standart kemasi panokseon, odatiy yapon harbiy kemalaridan unchalik farq qilmaydigan harbiy kema, faqat koreys kemalari og'ir to'plarni olib yurishgan, yapon kemalari esa yo'q edi.[105] Mashhur "toshbaqa kemalari "og'ir zirhli va qurollangan va Yaponiya kemalarida vayronagarchiliklarni keltirib chiqaradigan bu Koreya dengiz floti kemalarining ozchilik qismi edi.[105] Koreys va yapon akkauntlari ikkalasi ham "toshbaqa kemalari ", ammo bunday kema omon qolgani yo'q va tarixchilar toshbaqa kemalari qanday ko'rinishda bo'lganligi to'g'risida bahslashmoqdalar, ammo aksariyati endi ular aslida toshbaqa shaklida ekanligiga qo'shilishadi.[105] Admiral Yi Sun-gunoh, urushni chap dengiz qo'mondoni sifatida boshlagan[n 1] ning Jeolla viloyati, Koreya dengiz flotining qo'mondoni bo'lishi kerak edi va Ternbull "Koreyaning eng buyuk qahramoni" va "butun dunyo tarixidagi taniqli dengiz qo'mondonlaridan biri" deb ta'riflagan.[98]
Harbiy qobiliyat
O'sha paytda Xoseon va Ming China uchun xavfsizlik uchun ikkita katta tahdid shu edi Yurxen xalqi, kim shimoliy chegaralari bo'ylab reyd qilgan va vokou, qirg'oqdagi qishloqlarni va savdo kemalarini o'ldirgan.[107][108]
Nisbatan tinchlik muhitidagi ushbu mudofaa pozitsiyasi koreyslarni o'zlarining qal'alari va harbiy kemalarining kuchiga bog'liq bo'lishga majbur qildi. Ning uzatilishi bilan porox va o'qotar qurol texnologiyasi Goryeo paytida Xitoydan, Xitoy asl qurol-aslaha dizaynlarini takomillashtirdi momaqaldiroq qulashi bombasi va dengizda katta samaradorlik bilan ishlatilgan rivojlangan to'pni ishlab chiqardi. Xitoy Osiyoda yangi harbiy texnologiyalarning asosiy manbai bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, Koreya bu davrda ham to'p, ham kema qurilishi uchun ishlab chiqarish bazasi bo'lgan.[109]
Yaponiya, aksincha, a fuqarolar urushi holati bir asrdan oshiq vaqt mobaynida Yaponiyani juda mohir jangovar jamiyatga aylantirish natijasi bo'ldi. Qachon savdogarlar Portugaliya imperiyasi Yaponiyaga keldi va tanishtirdi arquebuslar va mushketlar, Yaponiya lashkarboshilari bunga tezda moslashdilar buzuvchi yangilik, ishlab chiqarish ommaviy ravishda The Tanegashima gugurtasi. Davom etayotgan fuqarolik mojarosida yaponlar yaxshilandi burg'ulash va yangi quroldan unumli foydalanish taktikasi, bu ularga Koreya qo'shinlari oldida katta ustunlik beradi.
Koreya to'pi quruqlikda samarali foydalanish uchun moslashtirilmagan va o'qotar qurollar unchalik rivojlangan dizaynga ega bo'lmagan. The kichik qurollar Yaponiya askarlari tomonidan olib borilgan quruqlik va qamal paytida ayniqsa samarali bo'lgan.[110] This strategic difference in weapons development and implementation contributed to the trend during the war of Japanese dominance on land and Korean dominance at sea.
As Japan had been at war since the mid-15th century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi had half a million battle-hardened soldiers at his disposal[111] to form a remarkable professional army in Asia for the invasion of Korea.[112] While Japan's chaotic state had left the Koreans with a very low estimate of Japan as a military threat,[112] there was a new sense of unity among the different political factions in Japan, as indicated by the "qilich ovi " in 1588 (the confiscation of all weapons from the peasants).[113] Along with the hunt came "The Separation Edict" in 1591, which effectively put an end to all Japanese vokou piracy by prohibiting the daimyōs from supporting the pirates within their fiefs.[113] Ironically, the Koreans believed that Hideyoshi's invasion would be just an extension of the previous pirate raids that had been repelled before.[114] As for the military situation in Joseon, the Korean scholar official Ryu Seong-ryong observed, "not one in a hundred [Korean generals] knew the methods of drilling soldiers":[115] rising in rank depended far more on social connections than military knowledge.[116] Korean soldiers were disorganized, ill-trained, and ill-equipped,[116] and they had been used mostly in construction projects such as building castle walls.[117]
Problems with Joseon defense policies
There were several defects with the organization of the Joseon-era Korean military defense system.[118] One example was a policy that stated that local officers could not individually respond to a foreign invasion outside of their jurisdiction until a higher ranking general, appointed by the King's court, arrived with a newly mobilized army.[118] This arrangement was highly inefficient since the nearby forces would remain stationary until the mobile border commander arrived on the scene and took control.[118] Secondly, as the appointed general often came from an outside region, he was likely to be unfamiliar with the natural environment, the available technology, and manpower of the invaded region.[118] Finally, as a main army was never maintained, new and ill-trained recruits conscripted during war constituted a significant part of the army.[118]
The Korean court managed to carry out some reforms, but they remained problematic. For example, the military training center established in 1589 in Gyongsang viloyati recruited mostly men either too young or too old to be good soldiers, augmented by some adventure-seeking aristocrats and slaves buying their freedom, because able-bodied men of the right age, targeted by the policy, had higher priorities such as farming and other economic activities.[118]
The dominant form of the Korean fortresses was the sanseong ("mountain fortress"),[119] which consisted of a stone wall that continued around a mountain in a serpentine fashion.[112] These walls were poorly designed with little use of towers and cross-fire positions (usually seen in European fortifications), and were mostly low in height.[112] It was a wartime policy for these fortresses to serve as boshpana qasrlari and for everyone to evacuate to one, with those who failed to do so being assumed to be collaborators with the enemy; however, the policy never held any great effect because the fortresses were out of reach for most refugees.[112]
Qo'shin kuchi
Hideyoshi mobilized his army at Nagoya Castle, a castle located in the old Hizen Province on Kyushu, newly built for the sole purpose of housing the invasion forces and the reserves. None of the original structures remain, but the castle's ruined foundations survive in the formerly separate town of Chinzei, now part of the city of Karatsu in Saga Prefecture.[120] The first invasion consisted of nine divisions totaling 158,800 men, of which the last two of 21,500 were stationed as reserves on Tsushima oroli va Ikki oroli navbati bilan.[121] The Japanese used a total of 320,000 troops throughout the entire war.[111]
On the other side, Joseon maintained only a few military units with no field army, and its defense depended heavily on the mobilization of the citizen soldiers in case of emergency.[117] During the first invasion, Joseon deployed a total of 84,500 regular troops throughout, assisted by 22,000 irregular volunteers.[122] Ming troops never numbered more than 60,000 troops in Korea at any point of the war.[123]
Qurol
Since its introduction by the Portuguese traders on the island of Tanegashima in 1543,[124] the arquebus had become widely used in Japan.[125] While both Korea and China had also been introduced to firearms similar to the Portuguese arquebus, most were older models. The Korean soldiers' small arms were qo'l to'plari with a simple mechanism and with either a gunstock or wooden shaft attached. After the Japanese diplomats presented the Korean court arquebuses as gifts, the Korean scholar-official Ryu Seong-ryong advocated the use of the new weapon, but the Korean court failed to realize its potency.[88] In contrast, the Japanese often deployed the arquebus in combination with archery in war.[126]
During siege actions, Chinese deployed rattan shields va iron pavises (large shields), reputed to be musket-proof. The Chinese used a variety of weapons, including the Chinese long bow,[127] qilich,[128][129] firearms, early kinds of land mines va erta qo'l bombalari.[130]
The Koreans also demonstrated massive use of hwacha – multiple rocket-propelled arrows, notably during the Siege of Pyongyang in January 1593. It had the ability to fire up to 200 singijeon, a type of rocket arrow, all at one time. The hwacha consisted of a two-wheeled cart carrying a board filled with holes into which the singijeon kiritilgan. Although the Chinese had their own rocket arrows, the Chinese opted for hand-carried hu dun pao, or "crouching tiger cannons".
The Japanese defeated successive Korean armies with a combination of muskets, spears, and swords. While muskets used by the Japanese were superior to Korean bows in terms of penetration and range,[131] the former lacked the fire rate of the latter. Numerous battle accounts from the Annal of Joseon dynasty and various essays, diaries of Korean officials and commanders show that musket alone could not ensure victory. By employing both musket and arme blanche ("cold steel", swords, lances, spears, and the like), the Japanese were able to achieve success during the early phase of war. Indeed, the ferocious charge of Japanese troops with spears and swords were often more decisive than with muskets. This was because the Koreans were poorly trained in close combat, and lacked battlefield experience and discipline. Thus Korean soldiers were unable to hold their line against charging Japanese soldiers. The following words from a Korean military official named Shi-eon Lee to the Korean king discusses this weakness:
The King asked him [Shi-eon Lee], "You have already told me about the low accuracy of Japanese muskets. Why, then, are Korean armies having great problem with defeating them?"
[Shi-eon Lee] then answered,"The Korean soldiers cower before the enemy and flee for their lives even before they have engaged the enemy. As for the commanders, they seldom leave their positions because they fear that they might be executed for deserting. However, there is a limit to executing deserting soldiers since there are so many of them. Truly, the Japanese aren't good musketeers, but they advance so rapidly that they appear right in front of the Koreans in the time Koreans can shoot only two arrows. It is said that Koreans are good archers, but they seldom hit the targets when the enemy is too far away, and are too scared to shoot when the enemy is near because they fear Japanese swords. Archery often becomes useless because Koreans, fearing the Japanese arme blanche, can barely shoot. The Japanese are reputed to be good swordsmen, but it is possible for Koreans to draw swords and hold their ground. However, the Koreans seldom do this and merely run for their lives."[132]
However, another Korean official, Yu Song-nyong, claims that the Japanese arquebusiers had undeniable superiority over long distances, which (along with low discipline and combat experience of the Korean army) was the main cause of defeats:
1592 yilgi bosqinchilikda hamma narsa supurib tashlandi. Ikki haftada yoki bir oy ichida shaharlar va qal'alar yo'qoldi va sakkizta yo'nalishda hamma narsa buzildi. Garchi bir asrlik tinchlik bo'lganligi va odamlar urushni yaxshi bilmaganliklari sababli (qisman) bu sodir bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, aslida yaponlar bir necha yuz qadam nariga etib boradigan va har doim nimani teshib beradigan mushketlardan foydalanganlar. ular shamol va do'l kabi kelgan va kamon va o'qlarni solishtirib bo'lmaydigan darajada urishgan.[133]
Today, the Japanese exclusively use muskets to attack fortifications. They can reach [the target] from several hundred paces away. Our country’s bows and arrows cannot reach them. At any flat spot outside the walls, the Japanese will build earthen mounds and “flying towers.” They look down into the fortifications and fire their bullets so that the people inside the fortifications cannot conceal themselves. In the end the fortifications are taken. One cannot blame [the defenders] for their situation.[134]
Japanese soldiers also relied on their advantage in ranged combat. One of the Japanese commanders wrote home in 1592:
Please arrange to send us guns and ammunition. There is absolutely no use for spears. It is vital that you arrange somehow to obtain a number of guns. Furthermore, you should certainly see to it that those person departing [for Korea] understand this situation. The arrangements for guns should receive your closest attention.[135]
The Japanese commander Asano Yukinaga wrote home to his father:
When the troops come [to Korea] from the province of Kai, have them bring as many guns as possible, for no other equipment is needed. Give strict orders that all men, even the samurai, carry guns.[136]
The Koreans seldom employed field artillery, with cannon being mainly used in siege action and for defending castles. There were only very few instances of Koreans employing artillery in the field, with largely ineffective results.[137] Some irregular Korean units with government-supplied weapons fired explosive shells from mortars, but this occurred only in isolated instances.[137] The Chinese were more active in employing field artillery than the Koreans. One of the notable Chinese field guns was the "Great General Cannon", a large breech-loading cannon with a two-wheeled cart, shooting an iron ball weighing about 10 kilograms. The Japanese employed field artillery only where strategically advantageous in both siege and field warfare situations, often using captured pieces where available.
The Koreans actively deployed their cavalry divisions in action. But the terrain was often mountainous, which was not generally suitable for cavalry, the farmland tended to have many ditches, and it was often barren and lacked grass essential for feeding the horses. In addition, Japanese use of the arquebus at long range and in concentrated volleys negated any possibility of effective cavalry tactics.[129] Korean cavalrymen's primary weapons were bows, with swords and lances holding only subsidiary positions. Most cavalry action for the Koreans took place in the Chungju jangi at the beginning of the war, where they were outnumbered and wiped out by Japanese infantry.[138] Although the Japanese divisions also fielded cavalry they usually dismounted when engaged in action, acting more as o'rnatilgan piyoda askarlar. While specialized firearms were used on horseback, most cavalrymen preferred the conventional yari (nayza),[139] but its use was limited by the increasing use of firearms by the Koreans and Chinese.[140]
In contrast to the Japanese advantages on land, the Koreans possessed an advantage at sea. Because of advanced artillery and shipbuilding technology, along with an extensive naval history against Japanese pirates, the Korean navies fielded highly advanced and formidable ships. By the time of the Japanese invasion, Korea employed the panokseon, a powerful galley-type ship armed with cannon that outranged most Japanese vessels. The Korean navy used this naval superiority to disrupt the Japanese logistical network off the west coast of the Korean Peninsula. This advantage, however, did not affect Japan's ability to continuously reinforce its armies through the supply route from Tsushima in Japan to Pusan in Korea, especially once Korean naval bases in the immediate area were neutralized by Japanese ground forces. The Korean navy led by Yi Sun-sin would withdraw and re-base in the northern border of Jeolla viloyati. While not able to entirely prevent reinforcement, the Korean navy continued to harass and inflict losses on the Japanese supply fleets throughout the duration of the war.
As virtually all Japanese ships in the first phase of the war lacked cannon artillery,[109] Korean ships outranged and bombarded Japanese ships with impunity outside the range of the Japanese muskets, arrows, and catapults.[109] When the Japanese attempted to outfit cannon to their ships,[141] their lightweight ship design prohibited using more than a few per vessel, and vessels usually lacked the firepower or range of their Korean counterparts.[142] In order to bolster their fleet, the Japanese considered employing two Portuguese galleons in the invasion.[143]
In addition to a lack of effective naval armament, most Japanese ships were modified merchant vessels more suited for transportation of troops and equipment than fielding artillery weapons.[109][144]
Ongoing Bozhou Miao rebellion in China
The Bozhou isyoni tomonidan Bozxou podsholigi, which lasted from 1589–1600, was going on in Bozhou (Zunyi, Guychjou ) in southwestern China at the same time as the Imjin war in Korea.[145][146][147][148][149][150][151][152][153][154] After winning the war, General Chen Lin would later return to Guizhou to quell the uprisings.[155]
Imjin War: First invasion (1592–1593)
| First wave of the Japanese invasion[156] | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1st div. | Konishi Yukinaga | 7,000 | 18,700 |
| Sō Yoshitoshi | 5,000 | ||
| Matsura Shigenobu (ja) | 3,000 | ||
| Arima Xarunobu | 2,000 | ||
| Ōmura Yoshiaki (ja) | 1,000 | ||
| Gotō Sumiharu (ja) | 700 | ||
| 2nd div. | Keti Kiyomasa | 10,000 | 22,800 |
| Nabeshima Naoshige | 12,000 | ||
| Sagara Yorifusa (ja) | 800 | ||
| 3rd div. | Kuroda Nagamasa | 5,000 | 11,000 |
| Ōtomo Yoshimasa | 6,000 | ||
| 4th div. | Shimazu Yosixiro | 10,000 | 14,000 |
| Mōri Yoshimasa (ja) | 2,000 | ||
| Takaxashi mototanasi (ja), Akizuki Tanenaga, Suketaka (ja), Shimazu Tadatoyo[157] | 2,000 | ||
| 5th div. | Fukusima Masanori | 4,800 | 25,000 (sic) |
| Toda Katsutaka | 3,900 | ||
| Chōsokabe Motochika | 3,000 | ||
| Ikoma Chikamasa | 5,500 | ||
| Ikushima (Kurushima Michifusa )? | 700 | ||
| Xachisuka Iemasa (ja) | 7,200 | ||
| 6th div. | Kobayakava takakaji | 10,000 | 15,700 |
| Kobayakava Xidekane, Tachibana Muneshige, Tachibana Naotsugu (ja), Tsukushi Xirokado, Ankokuji Ekei | 5,700 | ||
| 7th div. | Meriy Terumoto | 30,000 | 30,000 |
| Jami | 137,200 | ||
| Reservers (8th div.) | Ukita Hideie (Tsushima oroli ) | 10,000 | 21,500 |
| (9th div.) | Toyotomi Hidekatsu (ja) va Xosokava Tadaoki (ja) (Ikki oroli ) | 11,500 | |
| Jami | 158,700 | ||
| Stationed force at Nagoya | Tokugawa Ieyasu, Uesugi Kagekatsu, Gamō Ujisato va boshqalar | 75,000 | 75,000 |
| Jami | 233,700 | ||
| Naval force exclusion | Kuki Yoshitaka, Vakizaka Yasuharu, Kato Yoshiaki, Tani Yoshitsugu | −9,000 | |
| Jami (yaxlitlangan) | 225,000 | ||
Dastlabki hujumlar
Landing of a Japanese army
On May 23, 1592, the First Division of the Japanese invasion army, consisting of 7,000 men led by Konishi Yukinaga,[158] left Tsushima in the morning, and arrived outside the port city of Pusan kechqurun.[159] Korean naval intelligence had detected the Japanese fleet, but Wy Gyun, the Right Naval Commander of Gyeongsang, misidentified the fleet as trading vessels on a mission.[160] A later report of the arrival of an additional 100 Japanese vessels raised his suspicions, but the general did nothing about it.[160] Sō Yoshitoshi landed alone on the Busan shore to ask the Koreans for safe passage to China one last time; the Koreans refused as they had previously done, and Sō Yoshitoshi laid siege to the city. Konishi Yukinaga attacked the nearby fort of Dadaejin Keyingi tong.[159] Japanese accounts claim that the battles resulted in the complete annihilation of Korean forces (one claims 8,500 deaths, and another, 30,000 heads), while a Korean account claims that the Japanese themselves took significant losses before sacking the city.[161] Chǒng Pal, the Korean commander at Busan was killed by a Japanese bullet, and with his death, Korean morale collapsed.[162] In the meantime Konishi took the fortress of Dadejin, where under heavy volleys of supporting fire, the Japanese were able to place ladders against the walls, and took the fortress.[163] Konishi ordered that no prisoners be taken, and the entire garrison was massacred.[163] Konishi and the First Division then turned north, marching to take Seoul.[163] The disciplined Japanese brought down a rain of bullets that was lethal to anyone not taking cover.[163] On the morning of May 25, 1592, the First Division arrived at Dongnae eupseong.[161] Konishi sent a message to Song Sanghyǒn, the commander of the Dongnae fortress, explaining to him that his objective was the conquest of China and if the Koreans would just submit, their lives would be spared. Song replied "It is easy for me to die, but difficult to let you pass", which led Konishi to order that no prisoners be taken to punish Song for his defiance.[163] Natijada Dongnani qamal qilish lasted twelve hours, killed 3,000, and resulted in Japanese victory.[164] The Japanese took no prisoners and killed everyone at Dongnae, civilian and military, even killing all of the cats and dogs of Dongnae.[163] Konishi's intention was to terrify the Koreans into submission by showing them what the price of resisting Japan was, but he instead stimulated Korean resistance, as ordinary Koreans were enraged at an enemy who invaded without provocation and behaved so brutally.[163]
After taking Dongnae, Konishi took the castle of Miryang, which he followed up by taking Taegu, which surrendered without opposition as the Koreans were concentrating their army further north.[165] Having crossed the Naktong River, Konishi learned that the Koreans were concentrating their troops at Sangju.[165] In the meantime, desperate Korean envoys had been sent to the Forbidden City in Beijing to ask the Wanli Emperor to protect his loyal vassals in Korea by sending an army to drive out the Japanese.[165] The Chinese assured the Koreans that an army would be sent, but they were engaged in a major war in Ningxia, and the Koreans would have to wait for the arrival of their assistance.[165]
Occupation of Gyeongsang Province
Katō Kiyomasa's Second Division landed in Busan on May 27, and Kuroda Nagamasa's Third Division, west of Nakdong, on May 28.[166] The Second Division took the abandoned city of Tongdo on May 28, and captured Kyonju 30 may kuni.[166] The Third Division, upon landing, captured the nearby Gimhae castle by keeping the defenders under pressure with gunfire while building ramps up to the walls with bundles of crops.[167] By June 3, the Third Division captured Unsan, Changnyong, Hyonpung, and Songju.[167] Meanwhile, Konishi Yukinaga's First Division passed the Yangsan mountain fortress (captured on the night of the Battle of Dongnae, when its defenders fled after the Japanese scouting parties fired their arquebuses), and captured the Miryang castle on the afternoon of May 26.[168] The First Division secured the Cheongdo fortress in the next few days, and destroyed the city of Daegu.[168] By June 3, the First Division crossed the Nakdong daryosi, and stopped at the Sonsan mountain.[168]
Sangju jangi
Upon receiving the news of the Japanese attacks, the Joseon government appointed General Yi Il as the mobile border commander, as was the established policy.[169] General Yi headed to Myongyong near the beginning of the strategically important Choryong pass to gather troops, but he had to travel further south to meet the troops assembled at the city of Degu.[168] There, General Yi moved all troops back to Sangju, except for the survivors of the Battle of Dongnae who were to be stationed as a rearguard at the Choryong pass.[168] 4-iyun kuni[170] General Yi deployed a force of less than 1,000 men on two small hills to face the approaching First Division.[171] Assuming that the sight of rising smoke was from the burning of buildings by a nearby Japanese force, General Yi sent an officer to scout on horseback; however, as he neared a bridge, the officer was ambushed by Japanese musket fire from below the bridge, and was beheaded.[171] The Korean troops, watching him fall, were greatly demoralized.[171] Soon the Japanese began the Sangju jangi with their arquebuses; the Koreans replied with their arrows, which fell short of their targets.[171] The Japanese forces, having been divided into three, attacked the Korean lines from both the front and the two flanks; the battle ended with General Yi Il's retreat and 700 Korean casualties.[171]
Chungju jangi
General Yi Il then planned to use the Choryong pass, the only path through the western end of the Sobaek mountain range, to check the Japanese advance.[171] However, another commander appointed by the Joseon government, Shin Rip, had arrived in the area with a cavalry division and moved 100,000 combined troops[172] to the Chungju fortress located above the Choryong pass.[173] Rather than face a siege, Shin Rip decided to fight a battle in the open fields of Tangeumdae, which he felt ideal for the deployment of his cavalry unit.[173] Since the cavalry consisted mostly of new recruits, however, Shin Rip was concerned that his troops may easily be tempted to flee the battle. As a result, he felt the need to trap his forces in the triangular area formed by the convergence of the Talcheon va Han rivers in the shape of a "Y".[173] This field, however, was dotted with flooded rice paddies and was generally not suitable for cavalry action.[173]
On June 5, 1592 the First Division of approximately 18,000 men led by Konishi Yukinaga left Sangju and reached an abandoned fortress at Mungyong by nightfall.[174] The next day, the First Division arrived at Tangumdae in the early afternoon where they faced the Korean cavalry unit at the Chungju jangi. Konishi divided his forces into three and attacked with arquebuses from both flanks as well as the front.[174] The Korean arrows fell short of the Japanese troops, which were beyond their range, and General Sin's two charges failed to break the Japanese lines. General Shin then killed himself in the river, and the Koreans that tried to escape by the river either drowned or were decapitated by the pursuing Japanese.[174]
Capture of Hanseong
The Second Division led by Katō Kiyomasa arrived at Chungju, with the Third Division camped not far behind.[175] There, Katō expressed his anger against Konishi for not waiting at Busan as planned, and attempting to take all of the glory for himself; Nabeshima Naoshige then proposed a compromise of dividing the Japanese troops into two separate groups to follow two different routes to Xansong (the capital and present-day Seoul), and allowing Katō Kiyomasa to choose the route that the Second Division would take to reach Hanseong.[175] The division of the Japanese forces was mainly due to the rivalry between Katō and Konishi, but there was a certain "strategic merit" in dividing their forces in that Katō's advance into northeastern Korea would protect the Japanese from any attempt by the Jurchen leader Nurhaci to attack their eastern flank.[165] However, the division of the Japanese forces also meant that Konishi would have to take on the Chinese alone when their army arrived in Korea.[165]
The two divisions began the race to capture Hanseong on June 8, and Katō took the shorter route across the Han River while Konishi went further upstream where smaller waters posed a lesser barrier.[175] Konishi arrived at Hanseong first on June 10 while the Second Division was halted at the river with no boats with which to cross.[175] The First Division found the castle undefended with its gates tightly locked, as King Seonjo had fled the day before.[176] The Japanese broke into a small floodgate, located in the castle wall, and opened the capital city's gate from within.[176] Katō's Second Division arrived at the capital the next day (having taken the same route as the First Division), and the Third and Fourth Divisions the day after.[176] Meanwhile, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions had landed on Busan, with the Ninth Division kept in reserve on the island of Ikki.[176]
Parts of Hanseong had already been looted and torched, including bureaus holding the slave records and weapons, and they were already abandoned by its inhabitants.[176] General Kim Myong-won, in charge of the defenses along the Han River, had retreated.[177] The King's subjects stole the animals in the royal stables and fled before him, leaving the King to rely on farm animals.[177] In every village, the King's party was met by inhabitants, lined up by the road, grieving that their King was abandoning them, and neglecting their duty of paying homage.[177] Parts of the southern shore of the Imjin daryosi was burnt to deprive the Japanese troops of materials with which to make their crossing, and General Kim Myong-won deployed 12,000 troops at five points along the river.[177]
Japanese campaigns in the north
Crossing of the Imjin River
While the First Division rested in Hanseong (present-day Seoul), the Second Division began heading north, only to be delayed for two weeks by the Imjin River.[177] The Japanese sent a message to the Koreans on the other bank requesting them to open way to China, but the Koreans rejected this.[177] Afterwards, the Japanese commanders withdrew their main forces to the safety of the Paju fortress; the Koreans saw this as a retreat, and 13,000 Korean troops launched an attack at dawn against the remaining Japanese troops on the southern shore of the Imjin River.[177] The main Japanese body counterattacked against the isolated Korean troops, and acquired their boats. The Korean troops under General Kim Myong-won retreated with heavy losses to the Kaesong qal'a.[178]
Distribution of Japanese forces in 1592
With the Kaesong castle having been sacked shortly after General Kim Myong-won retreated to Pyeongyang,[178] the Japanese troops divided their objectives: the First Division would pursue the Korean king in Pyongan viloyati in the north (where Pxenyan joylashgan); the Second Division would attack Hamgyong viloyati in the northeastern part of Korea; the Sixth Division would attack Jeolla viloyati at the southwestern tip of the peninsula; the Fourth Division would secure Gangwon Province in the mid-eastern part of the peninsula; and the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions would stabilize the following provinces respectively: Xvanxe viloyati (below Pyongan Province), Chungcheong viloyati (below Gyeonggi Province); Gyongsang viloyati (in the southeast where the Japanese first had landed); va Kyonggi viloyati (where the capital city is located).[179]
Capture of Pyongyang
The First Division under Konishi Yukinaga proceeded northward, and sacked Pyongsan, Sohung, Pungsan, Hwangju, and Chunghwa along the way.[180] At Chunghwa, the Third Division under Kuroda Nagamasa joined the First, and continued to the city of Pxenyan orqasida joylashgan Taedong daryosi.[180] A total of 10,000 Korean troops guarded the city against the 30,000 advancing Japanese.[181] They were led by various commanders including the Generals Yi Il and Kim Myong-won, and their defense preparations had assured that no boats were available for Japanese use.[180]
At night, the Koreans silently crossed the river and launched a successful surprise attack against the Japanese encampment.[180] However, this alerted the rest of the Japanese army, which attacked the rear of the Korean positions and destroyed the remaining reinforcements crossing the river.[182] The remainder of the Korean troops then retreated back to Pyongyang, and the Japanese troops gave up their pursuit of the Koreans to observe the manner in which the Koreans had crossed the river.[182]
The next day, using what they had learned from observing the retreating Korean troops, the Japanese began sending troops to the other shore over the shallow points in the river, in a systematic manner, and at this sight the Koreans abandoned the city overnight.[183] On July 20, 1592, the First and Third Divisions entered the deserted city of Pyongyang.[183][184] In the city, they managed to capture 100,000 tons of military supplies and grain.[184]
Campaigns in Gangwon Province
The Fourth Division under the command of Mōri Yoshinari set out eastward from the capital city of Hanseong (present-day Seoul) in July, and captured a series of fortresses along the eastern coast from Anbyon ga Samcheok.[183] The division then turned inward to capture Jeongseon, Yeongwol va Pxyonchxan, and settled down at the provincial capital of Wonju.[183] There Mōri Yoshinari established a civil administration, systematized social ranks according to the Japanese model, and conducted land surveys.[183] Shimazu Yoshihiro, one of the generals in the Fourth Division, arrived at Gangwon late, due to the Umekita Rebellion, and finished the campaign by securing Chuncheon.[185]
Campaigns in Hamgyong Province and Manchuria
Katō Kiyomasa, leading the Second Division of more than 20,000 men, crossed the peninsula to Anbyon okrugi with a ten-day march, and swept north along the eastern coast.[185] Among the castles captured was Hamhung, the provincial capital of Hamgyong Province. There a part of the Second Division was assigned to defense and civil administration.[186]
The rest of the division, 10,000 men,[181] continued north, and fought a battle on August 23 against the southern and northern Hamgyong armies under the command of Yi Yong at Songjin (present-day Kimchaek ).[186] A Korean cavalry division took advantage of the open field at Songjin, and pushed the Japanese forces into a grain storehouse.[186] There the Japanese barricaded themselves with bales of rice, and successfully repelled a formation charge from the Korean forces with their arquebuses.[186] While the Koreans planned to renew the battle in the morning, Katō Kiyomasa ambushed them at night; the Second Division completely surrounded the Korean forces with the exception of an opening leading to a swamp.[186] Those that fled were trapped and slaughtered in the swamp.[186]
Koreans who fled gave alarm to the other garrisons, allowing the Japanese troops to easily capture Kilju tumani, Myongchon tumani va Kyongsong County.[186] The Second Division then turned inland through Puryong okrugi tomonga Hoeryong, where two Korean princes had taken refuge.[186] On August 30, 1592, the Second Division entered into Hoeryong where Katō Kiyomasa received the Korean princes and the provincial governor Yu Yong-rip, these having already been captured by the local inhabitants.[186] Shortly afterward, a Korean warrior band handed over the head of an anonymous Korean general, plus General Han Kuk-ham, tied up in ropes.[186]
Katō Kiyomasa then decided to attack a nearby Jurchen castle across the Tumen River yilda Manchuriya to test his troops against the "barbarians", as the Koreans called the Jurchens (Orangkae koreys tilida va Orangai, both derived from the Mo'g'ul muddat Urianxay "forest barbarian").[187] Kato's army of 8,000 was joined by 3,000 Koreans, at Hamgyong, because the Jurchens periodically raided across the border.[187] Soon the combined force sacked the castle, and camped near the border; after the Koreans left for home, the Japanese troops suffered a retaliatory assault from the Jurchens.[187] Katō Kiyomasa retreated with his forces to avoid heavy losses.[187] Because of this invasion, rising Jurchen leader Nurhaci offered military assistance to the Joseon and Ming in the war. However, the offer was refused by both countries, particularly Joseon, saying that it would be disgraceful to accept assistance from the "Barbarians" to the north.
The Second Division continued east, capturing the fortresses of Jongseong, Onsong okrugi, Kyongvon tumani va Kyonghung okrugi va nihoyat etib keldi Sosupo daryosi daryosida Tumen River.[187] There the Japanese rested on the beach, and watched a nearby volcanic island on the horizon that they mistook as Fuji tog'i.[187] After the tour, the Japanese continued their previous efforts to bureaucratize and administrate the province, and allowed several garrisons to be handled by the Koreans themselves.[188]
Having secured Pyeongyang, the Japanese planned to cross the Yalu daryosi into Jurchen territory, and use the waters west of the Korean peninsula to supply the invasion.[189] Biroq, Yi Sun-gunoh, chap dengiz qo'mondoni lavozimini egallagan[n 1] ning Jeolla viloyati (Koreyaning g'arbiy suvlarini qoplaydi), Yaponiya qo'shinlari va materiallarini tashiydigan kemalarini muvaffaqiyatli yo'q qildi.[189] Xitoyga bostirib kirishda etarlicha qurol va qo'shinlarga ega bo'lmagan Yaponiya, urush maqsadini Koreyani bosib olish bilan o'zgartirdi.[189]
Yapon qo'shinlari Busan portiga tushganda, Bak (ham yozilgan) Park ) Kyongson viloyatining chap dengiz qo'mondoni Xong butun parkini, bazasini va barcha qurol-yarog 'va ta'minotni yo'q qildi va qochib ketdi.[160] Wy Gyun, O'ng dengiz qo'mondoni, shuningdek, o'z bazasini yo'q qildi va tark etdi va faqat to'rtta kemasi bilan Konyangga qochib ketdi.[160] Shunday qilib, Kyonsan viloyati atrofida Koreys dengiz kuchlari harakati bo'lmagan va omon qolgan to'rtta jami flotdan ikkitasi faqat yarim orolning boshqa (g'arbiy) tomonida faol bo'lgan.[160] Keyinchalik Von Gyun Yi Sun-singa jangda yaponlarning ta'siriga tushib qolganligi sababli Konyangga qochib ketganligi to'g'risida xabar yubordi.[190] Y Sun Sun tomonidan yaqin atrofdagi orolga xabarchi yuborildi Namhae urushga tayyorgarlik ko'rish uchun Yi buyrug'ini berish, faqat uni o'z aholisi tomonidan o'ldirilgan va tashlab ketilgan deb topish.[190] Askarlar yashirincha qochishni boshlaganlarida, Yi Sun-sin "qochqinlarni hibsga olish to'g'risida" buyruq berib, qochqinlardan ikkitasini qaytarib olib, boshlarini oldirdi; keyin u boshlarini namoyish qilish uchun chiqarib qo'ydi.[190] Yi Sun-sinning janglari urushga barqaror ta'sir ko'rsatdi va Yaponiyaning oldinga siljishini qo'llab-quvvatlagan g'arbiy Koreya yarim oroli bo'ylab dengiz yo'llarida katta yukni keltirib chiqardi.[191]
Koreya dengiz floti dushman harakatlari to'g'risida ma'lumot olish uchun mahalliy baliqchilar va razvedka qayiqlari tarmog'iga tayangan.[191] 1592 yil 21-iyul tongida Yi Sun-sin va Yi Eok-gi 24 bilan suzib boring panokseonlar, 15 ta kichik harbiy kemalar va 46 ta qayiq (ya'ni baliqchilar uchun qayiqlar) va suvga etib kelishdi Gyongsang viloyati quyosh botishi bilan.[191] Yaponlar Koreya sohillarida yuqoriga va pastga suzib yurib, dengiz bo'yidagi barcha qishloqlarni talon-taroj qilib, yoqib yuborishgan va Koreya dengiz flotining qarshiliklarini kutishmagan.[192]
Ertasi kuni Jeolla floti Von Gyun ularni kutib olishi kerak bo'lgan joyda belgilangan joyga suzib ketdi va 23 iyul kuni Yi Sun-sin bilan uchrashdi. 91 kemadan iborat kengaytirilgan flotilla[196] keyin aylana boshladi Geoje oroli, Gadeok oroliga jo'nab ketdi, ammo skaut kemalari 50 yapon kemasini aniqladilar Okpo port.[191] Yaqinlashayotgan Koreya flotini ko'rib, talonchilik bilan band bo'lgan yaponlarning bir qismi kemalariga qaytib, qochishga kirishdilar.[191] Bunda Koreya floti Yaponiya kemalarini o'rab oldi va ularni artilleriya bombardimonlari bilan yakunladi.[197] Yaponlar o'qlari va arquebuslari bilan o'q uzishdi, ammo koreyslar ulardan ancha uzoqlashib, yaponlarning olovini samarasiz qilishdi.[192] Yaponlar tomonidan o'z kemalaridan birida jinsiy qul sifatida foydalanish uchun olib borilgan o'spirin koreys qizi esladi:
To'plar va uzun o'qlar bizning kemalarimizdan yapon kemalariga do'ldek quyildi. Raketalar bilan urilganlar qonga cho'mgan holda o'lib yiqildilar, boshqalari esa yovvoyi hayqiriqlar bilan kemada dumalab ketishdi yoki tepaliklarga ko'tarilish uchun suvga sakrashdi. O'sha paytda men uzoq vaqt davomida qayiqning tubida qo'rquv bilan harakatsiz qoldim, shuning uchun tashqi dunyoda nima bo'layotganini bilmasdim.[192]
O'sha kuni koreyslar yana beshta yapon kemasini payqashdi va to'rttasini yo'q qilishdi.[197] Bir kunlik janglardan so'ng, Yi floti Yaponiyaning 26 kemasini yo'q qildi.[198] Ertasi kuni koreyslar Jeokjinpoda Yaponiyaning 13 kemasiga yaqinlashdilar.[197] Okpo-dagi avvalgi yutuqlar singari, Koreya floti ham Yaponiyaning 11 kemasini yo'q qildi - Okpo jangini bitta kemasini yo'qotmasdan yakunladi.[197] Admiral Yi qirol Sonjoga o'zining g'alabasi haqida bergan hisobotida yaponlarning samuray dubulg'asini juda g'alati deb topdi:
Qizil-qora yaponcha zirhlar, temir dubulg'alar, ot peshtoqlari, oltin tojlar, oltin junlar, oltin zirhlar, patlar kiyimi, patlar supurgi, qobiq karnay-surnaylari va boshqa ko'plab qiziq narsalar, boy bezaklari bilan g'alati shakllarda tomoshabinlarni g'alati arvohlar singari hayratga soladi. yoki g'alati hayvonlar.[198]
Koreyslar bironta kemasini yo'qotmagan Okpo jangi haqida yapon generallari eshitib, hayratda qolishdi, chunki bu ularni Yaponiyadan uzib qo'yish bilan tahdid qilar edi.[198] G'alabadan so'ng, Yi qirg'oq bo'yidagi ko'plab qishloqlarning yoqib yuborilgan qoldiqlarini topdi, u erda yaponiyaliklar ayollarni qul qilib, barcha erkaklarni o'ldirishgan.[198]
Okpo jangidan taxminan uch hafta o'tgach,[199] Yi Sun-sin va Von Gyun jami 26 kema (Yi Sun-sin ostida 23 ta) bilan Bay buxtasi tomon suzib ketishdi. Sacheon Yaponiya borligi to'g'risida razvedka hisobotini olganidan keyin.[200] Yi Sun-sin o'zining flotining katta qismini tashkil etadigan baliq ovi kemalarini yangi qurib bitkazilgan foydasiga qoldirgan edi toshbaqa kemasi.[199] Sacheonda yapon kemalari yaponlarning qo'mondonlik bazasini o'rnatgan burunning ostidagi ko'rfazda langarga qo'yilgan.[198]
Kaplumbağa kemasi - a panokseon yuqori darajadagi qo'mondonlik punktini olib tashlash, miltiq o'qlarini kavisli devorlarga o'zgartirish va temir pog'onali (va ehtimol olti burchakli temir plitalar bilan qoplangan tomni) qo'shib qo'yish bilan loyihalash; bu bahsli[193][194][195]).[201] Uning devorlarida jami 36 ta port portlari, shuningdek, kema ekipaji a'zolari tashqi qurollarini o'qqa tutib o'tishlari mumkin bo'lgan to'p ustidagi teshiklar mavjud edi.[200] Ushbu dizayn dushmanlarning kemaga chiqishiga va ichkaridagi xodimlarga qarab turishiga to'sqinlik qildi.[201] Kema Sharqiy Osiyo teatridagi eng tezkor va boshqariluvchan harbiy kema edi, unga ikkita suzib yuruvchi va kemaning 16 eshkakchasida navbatma-navbat 80 eshkak eshish kuchi yordam berdi.[144] Butun urush davomida oltitadan ko'p bo'lmagan kaplumbağa kemalari xizmat qildi va ularning asosiy vazifasi dushman saflarini chuqur kesib o'tish, to'plari bilan vayronagarchiliklar va dushman flagmanini yo'q qilish edi.[144]
1592 yil 8-iyulda flot Bay ko'rfaziga etib keldi Sacheon, bu erda dengiz to'lqini Koreya flotining kirishiga to'sqinlik qildi.[199] Shuning uchun Yi Sun-sin flotga chekinishni buyurishni buyurdi, bu yapon qo'mondoni, Vakisaka Yasuharu, uning chodiridan tosh ustida kuzatilgan.[201] Yaponlar quvg'in qilishga qaror qilib, o'zlarining 12 ta kemalarini bordilar va Koreya flotini ta'qib qildilar.[199] Koreys dengiz floti qarshi hujumga o'tdi, toshbaqa kemasi oldinda edi va barcha 12 kemani muvaffaqiyatli yo'q qildi.[199] [202] Admiral Yi qirol Sonjoga qilgan hisobotida shunday deb yozgan edi: "Oldin men Yaponiyaning istilosini oldindan bilganimda, kaplumbağa kemasini yasadim ... ajdar boshi bilan, uning og'zidan zambarak otishimiz mumkin edi va orqasida temir nayzalari teshilib turar edi. Dushman oyoqlariga o'tirmoqchi bo'lganida, u toshbaqa shaklida bo'lgani uchun, bizning erkaklar ichkaridan qarashlari mumkin, ammo dushmanlar tashqaridan qarashlari mumkin emas. U shunchalik tez harakat qiladiki, hatto ko'pchilikning o'rtasiga tushib ketishi mumkin har qanday ob-havo sharoitida dushmanlarning yuzlab to'plari ularga to'p va o'q otish moslamalari bilan hujum qilish uchun ".[202] Yaponlar o'zlarining kodlariga rioya qilishdi Bushido shafqatsizlarcha jang qilish bilan, lekin toshbaqa kemalarining ustun otashin kuchi va zirhi.[202] Admiral Yi kemadan buyruq berdi va yapon snayperi o'qni yelkasiga qo'yganida qattiq yaralandi.[202]
Miruk oroli tomonidan olib borilgan Tanpo'o jangida, Kurushima Michiyuki boshchiligidagi 21 yapon kemasi Koreyaning dengiz qirg'og'idagi qishloqni ishdan bo'shatish jarayonida edi, o'shanda koreys floti qiyinchilik tug'dirgan edi.[203] Yi yana bir bor o'ziga xos odatiy taktikaga amal qilib, da'vogarlik qilish uchun oldinga chiqdi va keyin ularni ochiq dengizda pistirma qilishdan oldin yaponiyaliklar bilan chekinib ketdi.[204] Jangdan keyin bergan intervyusida asirga olingan va Kurushimaning bekasi bo'lishga majbur bo'lgan koreys qizi: "Jang kuni u [Kurushima] o'tirgan pavilon kemasida o'qlar va o'qlar yomg'ir yog'di. Avvaliga uni urishdi qosh, ammo tebranmagan edi, ammo o'q uning ko'kragiga sanchilganda u qattiq qichqiriq bilan yiqilib tushdi ", toshbaqa kemasi" bu pavilion kemasiga yaqinlashib, uni ajdarning og'zidan o'q otib, o'q va to'p to'plarini to'kib sindirdi. boshqa to'pdan ".[204]
G'alabadan so'ng, Yi keyingi kunlarda Tanghanpo'da topilgan yapon kemalarini qidirib topdi.[204] Yi kemalarini aylana shaklida shakllantirgan, toshbaqa kemasi esa Yaponiya flagmanini boshqargan, natijada jangovar jang bo'lgan.[205] Yi yaponlarni yo'q qilishni xohlar edi va yaponlar qochib qutulish uchun o'z kemalarini qo'ya qolishidan qo'rqib, jangni ochiq dengizga olib chiqish uchun chekinishga buyruq berdilar, bu esa yaponlarning omon qolish ehtimolini pasaytirdi.[205] Yi qirol Sonjoga qilgan hisobotida yaponlar koreyalik tinch aholiga rahm-shafqat ko'rsatmaganliklarini, zo'rlashlari, qiynashlari va qotilliklari yoshiga va jinsiga etibor bermasliklarini va shuning uchun ham ularga rahm-shafqat ko'rsatmasligini ta'kidladi. Tasdiqlangan chekinish yaponiyaliklar bilan koreyslarni kuzatib, ochiq dengizga borgan va Yi shunday yozgan:
Keyin bizning kemalarimiz to'satdan to'rt tomondan dushman maketini o'rab oldilar, ikkala qanotdan ham to'liq tezlikda ularga hujum qildilar. Samolyot uchuvchisi boshlig'i bo'lgan toshbaqa dushman pavilon kemasini yana bir bor urib yubordi, uni to'p bilan o'qqa tutdi va boshqa kemalarimiz otash parda va yelkanlarini olov o'qlari bilan urdi. G'azablangan alangalar otilib chiqdi va dushman qo'mondoni o'q tegib o'lib yiqildi ".[205]
Yaponiya kemalaridan birortasidan tashqari barchasi olib ketilgan yoki cho'kib ketgan va Yi qirol Sonjodan 43 ta samuray zobitlarining tuzlangan boshlarini yuborgan.[205] Ertasi kuni qochib ketgan bitta yapon kemasi uni qo'lga olish uchun yuborilgan koreys kemasiga duch keldi va bu koreyslar yapon kemasiga o'tirganda vahshiy kurashga olib keldi.[205] Yaponiya kemasi kapitani "qo'lida uzun qilichni ushlab yolg'iz o'zi turdi va qo'rqmasdan oxirigacha jang qildi", uni o'ldirish uchun 10 ta o'qni oldi.[206] Yaponiya kemasining 88 nafar dengizchisining hammasi o'ldirildi va Yining quloqlari "tuzlangan va sudga jo'natish uchun qutiga solingan".[206]
Hansando jangi
Koreya dengiz flotining muvaffaqiyatiga javoban Toyotomi Xideyoshi uch komandirni quruqlikdagi faoliyatdan chaqirib oldi: Vakisaka Yasuharu, Kato Yoshiaki va Kuki Yoshitaka.[207] Ular Yaponiya bosqinchi kuchlarining to'liq tarkibida dengiz vazifalariga ega bo'lgan birinchi qo'mondonlar edi.[207] Hideyoshi agar koreyslar dengiz boshqaruvini qo'lga kiritgan bo'lsalar, bu Koreyaga bosib olishning oxiri bo'lishini tushungan va koreys flotini Yining boshi bilan unga olib kelishni buyurgan.[208] Sobiq qaroqchi Kuki eng katta dengiz tajribasiga ega bo'lgan, Kato Yoshiaki esa Shizugatakening etti nayzasidan biri bo'lgan.[208] Biroq, qo'mondonlar Pusanga Xideyoshining buyrug'i chiqarilishidan to'qqiz kun oldin etib kelishdi va Koreya dengiz flotiga qarshi turish uchun otryadni yig'ishdi.[207] Oxir-oqibat Vakisaka tayyorgarligini yakunladi va harbiy sharafni qo'lga kiritishga bo'lgan ishtiyoqi uni boshqa qo'mondonlar tugashini kutmasdan koreyslarga qarshi hujumga o'tishga undadi.[207]
53 ta kemadan iborat Koreya dengiz floti[209] Yi Sun-sin va Yi Ok-ginining buyrug'i bilan quruqlikdagi yapon qo'shinlari oldinga siljishgani uchun qidirish va yo'q qilish operatsiyasini olib borishgan. Jeolla viloyati.[207] Jeolla viloyati yirik harbiy harakatlar ta'sir qilmagan yagona Koreyaning hududi bo'lib, uchta qo'mondon va yagona faol Koreys dengiz kuchlari uchun uy bo'lib xizmat qildi.[207] Koreya harbiy-dengiz floti dushmanning quruqlikdagi qo'shinlari samaradorligini pasaytirish uchun yaponlarga harbiy-dengiz yordamini yo'q qilishni eng yaxshi deb hisobladi.[207]
1592 yil 13 avgustda Miruk orolidan suzib yurgan Koreya floti Dangpo yaqinda katta yapon floti bo'lganligi to'g'risida mahalliy razvedka ma'lumotlarini oldi.[207] Bo'rondan omon qolganidan so'ng, Koreys floti Tanpoga langar tashlagan edi, u erda Yaponiya floti Koje orolini ajratib turadigan Gyeonnaeryangning tor bo'g'oziga kirganligi haqidagi xabar bilan plyajda mahalliy odam paydo bo'ldi.[210] Ertasi kuni ertalab Koreya floti Yaponiyaning bo'g'ozlarida langarga qo'yilgan 82 ta kemadan iborat flotini ko'rdi Gyeonnaeryang.[207] Bo'g'ozning torligi va suv osti jinslari xavfi tufayli Yi Sun-sin oltita kemani o'lja sifatida 63 yapon kemasini keng dengizga tortib yubordi;[209] Yaponiya floti ta'qib qildi.[207] Ochiq suvda bo'lganida, Yaponiya floti Yi Sun-sin tomonidan "kran qanoti" deb nomlangan yarim doira shaklida Koreyaning floti bilan o'ralgan.[207] Yaponiya flotiga qarshi to'qnashuvni boshlagan kamida uchta toshbaqa kemasi (ulardan ikkitasi yangi tugallangan), koreys kemalari yapon formasiga o'q otib o'q uzdilar.[207] Keyin Koreya kemalari yapon kemalari bilan erkin kurash olib bordi va yaponlarning bortga chiqishining oldini olish uchun etarli masofani saqlab qoldi; Yi Sun-sin faqat jiddiy zarar ko'rgan yapon kemalariga qarshi kurashga ruxsat berdi.[207] Jang paytida Koreya dengiz floti yapon kemasining ekipajlariga katta zarar etkazgan va ularning kemalarida qattiq yong'inlarni keltirib chiqargan metall korpusli yong'in bombasidan foydalangan.[211] Ga ko'ra Vakizaka ki: "Manabe Samanosuke degan odam o'sha kuni kema kapitani bo'lgan va u turgan kemani yoqib yuborishgan. Bu uni qiynab, boshqa samuraylarni armiyada uchratishi mumkin, deb aytdi, o'z joniga qasd qildi va vafot etdi".[208] Yi "son-sanoqsiz yaponlarning o'qlari urilib, suvga o'lik tushganligi" ni ta'kidlagan, ammo "... to'rt yuzga yaqin charchagan yapon qochishga yo'l topolmay, qayiqlarini tashlab, qirg'oqqa qochib ketganidan" shikoyat qilgan.[208]
Jang Koreyaning g'alabasi bilan yakunlandi, 59 yaponning Yaponiyadagi yo'qotishlari - 47 ta yo'q qilindi va 12 ta qo'lga olindi.[212] Jang paytida birorta ham Koreya kemasi yo'qolmadi. Koreys askarlari jang davomida bir necha koreyalik harbiy asirlarni qutqarishdi. Vakisaka o'zining flagmani tezligi tufayli qochib qoldi.[212] Hansando jangida mag'lub bo'lganligi haqidagi xabar Toyotomi Hideyoshiga etib kelganida, u Yaponiya bosqinchi kuchlariga barcha boshqa dengiz harakatlarini to'xtatishni buyurdi.[207]
Angolpo va Dangxangpo jangi
Yi Eok-gi o'z parki bilan Yi Sun-sin va Von Gyunga qo'shildi va Gyonsang suvlarida dushman kemalarini qidirishda qatnashdi.[213] 13-iyul kuni admirallar Dangpo jangidan qochib ketgan bir qator yapon kemalari Danghangpo ko'rfazida langarga qo'yilganligi to'g'risida ma'lumot olishdi.[213]
1592 yil 16-avgustda Yi Sun-sin o'z flotini Angolpo portiga olib bordi, u erda Angolpo jangida 42 yapon kemasi to'xtab qoldi.[207] Qisqa to'qnashuvdan so'ng u ochiq okeanga yolg'on chekinishni buyurdi. Yaponiya floti Koreya flotini ta'qib qildi, flagman etakchi o'rinni egalladi. Biroq, Yaponiya kemalari ochiq dengizga etib borganida, Admiral Yi panokson harbiy kemalariga Yaponiya flotini o'rab olishni buyurdi. Atrofda Yaponiya floti yo'q qilindi.
Busan jangi
A dengiz kuchlari nishon 1592 yil 1 sentyabrda birinchi bosqichda bo'lib o'tdi Yaponiyaning Koreyaga bostirib kirishi. Bu Koreyaning flotiga kutilmagan hujumi edi Toyotomi Hideyoshi joylashgan Pusan. Jang davomida Yaponiya qo'shinlari 100 kemasini yo'qotdi, Koreys kemalari yo'qolib qolmadi. Ofitser Voon (ko ) va oltita koreys askarlari, shuningdek son-sanoqsiz yapon askarlari o'ldirildi.[214][215][216] Biroq, oxir-oqibat, Koreyaning floti Busanni egallab olmagan holda orqaga chekindi.[217][iqtibos kerak ] In Chison sulolasi yilnomalari (Koreyaning rasmiy tarixi, unda joylashgan Koreya hukumati mutasaddisi tomonidan yozilgan Xanyang tumani ), Koreya dengiz floti Pusanda yaponlarni mag'lub eta olmaganligi qayd etilgan.[217] Biroq, boshqa birlamchi tarixiy manbalarda, masalan, Chjuson byurokratlari tomonidan yozilgan rasmiy Chjuson kompaktiumi (李忠武 李忠武 公) va Yi Sun-gunning urush kundaligi va uning harbiy hisobotlari, bu Koreyaning hal qiluvchi g'alabasi sifatida qayd etilgan. Zamonaviy tarixchilar, shuningdek, jangni Koreyaning hal qiluvchi g'alabasi sifatida xulosa qilishdi.[218][219][220][221][222][214][215][223][224][225] Ba'zi koreys tarixchilari Yi Sun-Sinning urush kundaligiga qaraganda ko'proq ishonishadi Chison sulolasi yilnomalari ular o'qiyotganda Imjin urushi chunki u voqea joyidagi qo'mondon edi.[226][227]
Jangdan keyin Koreya hukumati Yi-ni ko'tarib chiqdi Samdo Sugun Tongjesa (삼도 수군 통제사; 三 道 水 軍 統制 統制 使), so'zma-so'z "Uch viloyatning dengiz qo'mondoni", bu 1896 yilgacha Koreya dengiz floti qo'mondoni unvoni bo'lgan.[228]
Yaponiyada Joseonning rasmiy tarixiga murojaat qilib, natija Yaponiyaning strategik g'alabasi sifatida taqdim etiladi.[217]
Koreya militsiyalari
Urush boshlangandan beri koreyslar "solih qo'shinlar" (의병) deb nomlangan harbiy guruhlarni yapon bosqiniga qarshi turish uchun uyushtirdilar.[229] Ushbu jangovar guruhlar butun mamlakat bo'ylab ko'tarilib, janglarda, partizan reydlarida, qamallarda, urush davriga kerakli narsalarni tashishda va qurishda qatnashgan.[230]
Urush paytida koreys "solih armiyasi" militsiyasining uchta asosiy turi mavjud edi: omon qolgan va etakchisiz koreyalik doimiy askarlar, vatanparvar yangbans (aristokratlar) va oddiy odamlar va buddist rohiblar.[230] 1592 yil yoziga kelib, solih armiyada xizmat qilgan 22200 ga yaqin koreys partizanlari bor edi, ular Yaponiya kuchlarining katta qismini bog'lab qo'yishdi.[231]
Birinchi bosqinchilik paytida, Jeolla viloyati Koreya yarim orolidagi yagona tegmagan hudud bo'lib qoldi.[230] Yi Sun-sin tomonidan dengizda muvaffaqiyatli patrullik qilishdan tashqari, ko'ngilli kuchlar faoliyati yapon qo'shinlarini boshqa ustuvorliklar foydasiga viloyatni chetlab o'tishga majbur qildi.[230]
Gvak Jae-u ning Nakdong daryosi bo'yidagi yurishlari
Gvak Jae-u yapon bosqinchilariga qarshi birinchi bo'lib qarshilik guruhini tuzgan koreyalik militsiya harakatining taniqli rahbari edi.[232] U joylashgan Yiryong shahrida er egasi bo'lgan Nam daryosi ichida Gyongsang viloyati. Koreyada Gvakni sirli, romantik qahramon sifatida eslashadi.[231] Koreyalik doimiy aholi shaharni tark etganligi sababli[230] hujum yaqinlashganday tuyuldi, Gvak ellik shahar aholisini uyushtirdi; ammo Uchinchi divizion chiqib ketdi Changvon to'g'ri tomonga Seongju.[232] Gvak o'z armiyasini ta'minlash uchun tashlab qo'yilgan hukumat do'konlaridan foydalanganda, Gyansang viloyati hokimi Kim Su Gvak guruhini isyonchilar deb atadi va uni tarqatib yuborishni buyurdi.[232] Gvak boshqa er egalaridan yordam so'rab, qirolga to'g'ridan-to'g'ri murojaat yuborganida, gubernator Gvakka qarshi yaponlarni boshidan kechirgan muammolarga qaramay qo'shin yubordi.[232] Biroq, keyinchalik poytaxtdan bir amaldor viloyatga qo'shin yig'ish uchun keldi va amaldor yaqin joyda yashaganligi va uni taniganligi sababli Gvakni gubernator bilan bog'liq muammolardan xalos qildi.[232]
Gvak Jae-u o'z qo'shinlarini partiyalar uyushmasidagi baland qamish qopqog'i ostida partizan urushiga joylashtirdi. Nakdong va Nam daryolari.[232] Ushbu strategiya Yaponiya kuchlariga Yo Sun-sin va uning floti joylashgan Jeolla provinsiyasiga osonlikcha kirish imkoniyatini bermadi.[232]
Uiryong / Chongjin jangi
Kobayakava Takakage boshchiligidagi oltinchi diviziya Jeolla viloyatini zabt etishga mas'ul edi.[232] Oltinchi bo'lim Yaponiyaning belgilangan marshruti (ya'ni yuqoridagi Uchinchi bo'lim) orqali Songjuya yurib, chap tomonga kesib o'tdi Geumsan yilda Chungcheong, uni Kobayakava viloyatga bostirib kirishi uchun boshlang'ich bazasi sifatida ta'minladi.[232]
Ankokuji Ekei Miriy Terumoto va Toyotomi Xideyoshi o'rtasidagi muzokaralardagi roli tufayli sobiq buddist rohib generalga aylandi, Jeolla provinsiyasini bosib olishda ayblangan oltinchi diviziya bo'linmalariga rahbarlik qildi. Bo'limlar Uiryongga yurish boshladi Changvon va etib keldi Nam daryosi.[232] Ankokujining skautlari daryo tubini o'lchaydigan metrlarni ekstraditsiya qilishdi, shunda butun otryad daryodan o'tishi mumkin edi; bir kechada koreys militsionerlari metrlarni daryoning chuqur qismlariga o'tkazdilar.[232] Yapon qo'shinlari kesib o'tishni boshlaganlarida, Gvakning militsiyasi ularni pistirmaga qo'ydi va yaponlarga katta yo'qotishlarga olib keldi.[232] Oxir-oqibat, Jeolla provinsiyasiga o'tish uchun Ankokujining odamlari shimol tomonga xavfsiz bo'lmagan joylar atrofida va yapon garnizonli qal'alari xavfsizligi atrofida harakat qilishlari kerak edi.[232] Kaenyongda Ankokujining nishoni o'zgartirildi Gochang, Kobayakava Takakage yordamida olinishi kerak.[232] Biroq, butun Jeolla kampaniyasi qachon tark etildi Kim Myon va uning partizanlari Ankokuji qo'shinlarini tog'lar ichidagi yashirin joylardan o'q uzib, muvaffaqiyatli pistirmadilar.[232]
Jeolla koalitsiyasi va Yongin jangi
Yapon qo'shinlari Xansongga (hozirgi Seul) qarab yurishganida, Yo'lla viloyatining gubernatori Yi Kvang o'z armiyasini poytaxt shahri tomon boshlab, yaponlarning taraqqiyotini tekshirishga urindi.[233] Poytaxt allaqachon ishdan bo'shatilganligi haqidagi xabarni eshitib, gubernator o'z qo'shinini olib ketdi.[233] Biroq, armiya bir necha ko'ngilli kuchlarni to'plash bilan 50 ming kishigacha ko'payganida, Yi Kvan va tartibsiz qo'mondonlar Xansongni qaytarib olish maqsadlarini qayta ko'rib chiqdilar va qo'shma kuchlarni shimolga olib bordilar. Suvon, Xansongdan 42 km (26 milya) janubda.[233][234] 4 iyun kuni 1900 kishidan iborat avtoulov qo'riqchisi Yong-in shahridagi qal'ani egallab olishga urinib ko'rdi, ammo Vakizaka Yasuxaru boshchiligidagi 600 yapon himoyachisi koreyslar bilan 5 iyunga qadar asosiy yapon qo'shinlari qal'ani ozod qilish uchun kelguniga qadar qochishdi.[233][235] Yaponiya qo'shinlari Jeolla koalitsiyasiga qarshi muvaffaqiyatli hujumga o'tib, koreyslarni qurollarini tashlab, orqaga chekinishga majbur qilishdi.[233]
Birinchi Geumsan aksiyasi
General Kvak o'z ixtiyoriy armiyasini safarbar qilgan vaqt atrofida Gyongsang viloyati, Gyeong-myeongga boring yilda Jeolla viloyati 6000 kishidan iborat ko'ngilli guruh tuzdi.[233] Go keyin o'z kuchlarini boshqa militsiya bilan birlashtirishga urindi Chungcheong viloyati, ammo viloyat chegarasini kesib o'tgach, oltinchi divizion Kobayakava Takakage hujum uyushtirganini eshitdi. Jeonju (poytaxti Jeolla viloyati ) Geumsandagi tog 'qal'asidan. Go o'z hududiga qaytib keldi.[233] General Gvak Yong bilan kuchlarni birlashtirgan Go' keyin o'z askarlarini Gyumsanga boshlab bordi.[233] U erda, 10-iyul kuni ko'ngilli kuchlar mag'lubiyatdan so'ng Gyumsanga chekinayotgan yapon qo'shini bilan jang qilishdi Ichi jangi ikki kun oldin 8-iyul kuni.[236]
Jangchi rohiblar
Budxist roj Xyujon shoh Sjooning da'vati bilan barcha monaxlarni qurol olishga da'vat etgan manifestni e'lon qildi va "Afsuski, jannat yo'li endi yo'q. Yerning taqdiri tanazzulga yuz tutmoqda. Osmon va aqlga qarshi bo'lib, shafqatsiz dushman mingta kemada dengizni kesib o'tishga moyil edi ".[237] Hyujǔng samuraylarni "zaharli shaytonlar" deb atadi, ular "ilonlar yoki shafqatsiz hayvonlar singari zaharli" bo'lib, ularning shafqatsizligi zaif va begunohlarni himoya qilish uchun buddizmning pasifizmidan voz kechishga asos bo'lgan.[238] Xyujen o'z murojaatini "Bodhisattvaning rahm-shafqat zirhini kiyib, shaytonni yiqitish uchun xazinali qilichni ushlab, Sakkizta xudoning chaqmoq chaqnagichini bog'lab, oldinga chiqishga!"[238] Kamida 8000 rohib Hyujonning chaqirig'iga javob berdi, ba'zilari koreys vatanparvarligi tuyg'usidan, boshqalari esa Konfutsiylikni targ'ib qilish niyatida sinofil sudi tomonidan kamsitilishga duchor bo'lgan buddizm maqomini yaxshilash istagi bilan.[238]
Chungch'ong viloyatida Abbot Ynggyu o'zini faol partizan etakchisi sifatida ko'rsatdi va 1100 kishidan iborat Sodiq armiyasi bilan birgalikda Cho Xon da yaponlarga hujum qildi va mag'lub etdi Cheongju jangi 1592 yil 6 sentyabrda.[238] G'alabadan so'ng, Koreya rahbarlari kim eng mas'uliyatli ekanligi haqida o'zaro janjallashishni boshladilar va aynan shu narsa koreyslar hujumga o'tganda, Yun Songak boshchiligidagi oddiy askarlar Cho boshchiligidagi solih armiya va abbat ostidagi jangchi rohiblar qatnashishdan bosh tortdilar. Yŏnggyu alohida yurish qildi.[239] 1592 yil 22 sentyabrda Cho 700 ta solih armiya partizanlari bilan Kobayakava Takakage boshchiligidagi 10000 kishilik yapon qo'shiniga hujum qildi.[239] Tyornbull Geumsanning ikkinchi jangini Choning bema'nilik harakati deb ta'rifladi, chunki uning sonli kuchi "eng qattiq samuraylarning 10000" ni o'z zimmasiga oldi, u solih armiyani o'rab olgan va ularni "yo'q qilgan", Kobayakava buyrug'i bilan butun koreys kuchlarini yo'q qilgan. hech qanday mahbus ushlanmaydi.[240] Cho'ga yordam berishga majbur bo'lganini his qilgan Abbot Ynggyu endi o'zining jangchi rohiblarini Kobayakavaga qarshi Gyumsanning uchinchi jangida boshqargan, ular ham xuddi shunday taqdirni - "butunlay yo'q qilish" ni boshdan kechirishgan.[240] Biroq, Geumsan taniqli vakili bir oy ichida ketma-ket uchta koreys hujumini uyushtirganligi sababli, Kobayakava boshchiligidagi 6-diviziya orqaga qaytarildi, chunki Xideyoshi taniqli odam uni ushlab turish qiyin emas deb qaror qildi va mintaqaning azob chekayotgan aholisi uchun. faqat shu narsa muhim edi.[240] Yaponlarning chiqib ketishi partizanlarning keyingi hujumlarini ilhomlantirdi va bir solih armiya etakchisi Pak Chin Yaponiyaning nazorati ostidagi Kyongju devorining ustiga biron narsa urib yubordi, bu esa "qaroqchilarni" keltirib chiqardi, chunki koreys akkauntlari har doim yaponlarni uni tekshirishga chaqirdi; ob'ekt 30 yaponni o'ldirgan bomba bo'lib chiqdi.[240] Yapon qo'mondoni o'z garnizoni endi kuchsizligidan qo'rqib, qirg'oqqa chekinishni buyurdi wajo Ssaengp'o-da.[240]
Jinjuni qamal qilish
Jinju (진주) mudofaa qiluvchi strategik qal'a edi Gyongsang viloyati. Yaponiya qo'mondonlari Jinjuni boshqarish Jeolla provintsiyasining guruch kamarlaridan osonlikcha foydalanish imkoniyatini anglatishini bilar edilar. Shunga ko'ra, katta armiya ostida Xosokava Tadaoki yaqinlashdi Jinju. Jinjuni himoya qildi Kim Si Min (김시민), Koreyadagi eng yaxshi generallardan biri, 3000 kishilik Koreya garnizoniga qo'mondonlik qilgan.[241] Kim yaqinda Yapon qurollariga teng bo'lgan 170 ga yaqin yangi arquebuslarni sotib oldi.[241] Odatdagidek yaponlar boshlarini yig'ishni boshladilar Taikōki Jirza'emon ismli samurayning "birinchi boshni ko'tarib baland ko'targanini eslatib o'tdi. Qolgan besh kishi ham hujum qilib, ajoyib boshlarni olib ketishdi".[241] Yaponlar odatda Koreyaning qal'alari va shaharlarini olishda unchalik qiynalmaganlar va samuraylar orasida koreyslarning jangovarlik qobiliyatiga nisbatan nafratlanish odatiy hol edi, shuning uchun ular Jinjuni barj bilan urishganda, yaponlar uchun bu katta ajablanib bo'ldi. Kimning odamlari o'zlarining arquebuslarini o'qqa tutayotganda og'ir sovuq toshlar va bomba tashlaganliklari sababli, ularning hujumi sovuqni to'xtatdi.[241]
Xosokava samuraylar tomonidan bu safar bambuk qalqonlari ostida ilgarilab ketayotganida, arquebuslaridan olov yopilgan holda yangi hujum uyushtirishni buyurdi va bu ularga Jinjuning devorlari bo'ylab narvonlarini o'rnatishga imkon berdi.[242] Koreyaliklar toshlarni uloqtirishlari va yaponlarga qarshi bombalarni kechiktirishlari bilan qirg'in sodir bo'ldi.[242] The Taikōki xabar berdi:
Biz bo'lishga harakat qilsak ichiban nori ["birinchi bo'lib ko'tarilish"], ular to'dadek ko'tarilishdi. Shu sababli zinapoyalar deyarli buzilib ketdi va o'rtoqlar ko'tarilishdan yiqilib tushishdi, shuning uchun ular narvonlardan foydalana olmadilar. Xosokava Tadaokining ukasi Sadaoki ham shundaylardan biri bo'lib, uning o'ng va chap tomonidagi narvonlarda piyoda askarlar hamrohligida edi va qat'iy amr berdi: "Men shaxsan qal'aga chiqmagunimcha, bu narvon bitta odam ko'tarilishi kerak. Agar kimdir toqqa chiqsa, men uni olib ketaman bosh! ", keyin u ko'tarildi. Shu sababli, narvon buzilmadi va uni ko'rgan odamlar baland ovoz bilan maqtashdi. Binobarin, ko'p o'tmay u qo'llarini devorga qo'ydi, lekin qal'a ichkarisidan kirmoqchi bo'lganida, nayzalar va naginata Uni yiqitishga urinish uchun unga itarishdi va afsus bilan u xandaqning tubiga yiqildi.[243]
Uch kun davomida yaponlar Jinjuga xandaklar ularning o'liklariga to'la bo'lishlari bilan samarasiz hujum qilishdi.[244] 1592 yil 11-noyabrda Kvak Chje-u boshchiligidagi koreys partizanlari kuchi yordam kuchi sifatida etib kelishdi va yaponlarni o'z kuchi undan kattaroq deb o'ylab aldash uchun Kvak o'z odamlariga kechalari tepaliklarda o't yoqishni buyurdi. ularning qobig'ini puflash paytida.[244] 12-noyabr kuni Xosokava Jinjuni bosib olishga oxirgi urinishni buyurdi, shunda general Kim bilan shimoliy darvozalarda og'ir janglar boshiga yapon o'qi tushganida o'ldirildi, ammo koreys arquebus olovi yaponlarni haydab chiqardi.[245] O'sha paytda Nam daryosiga juda zarur bo'lgan o'q-dorilarni olib kelgan yana bir Koreya yordam kuchlari kelib, Xoskokavaning qamalni buzishiga sabab bo'ldi, chunki yaponlar dushman hududida chuqurlikda va uning orqasini qoplash uchun zaxira yo'q, bu davom ettirish juda xavfli. qamal.[244] Mag'lubiyat haqida eshitgan Xideyoshi g'azablanib, yaponlarni hech qachon koreyslar mag'lubiyatga uchratmasliklari kerakligini aytdi va qasos olishga va'da berdi.[244] Arquebuslar, zambaraklar va minomyotlar yordamida koreyslar yaponlarni Jeolla provinsiyasidan haydashga muvaffaq bo'lishdi. Jinjudagi jang Koreyaning eng katta g'alabalaridan biri hisoblanadi, chunki bu yaponlarning Jeolla viloyatiga kirishiga to'sqinlik qildi.
Ming China aralashuvi
Yaponlar istilosini qaytarishga qodir bo'lmagan Koreya, oxir-oqibat yaponlarning turli xil moddiy-texnik va tashkiliy qiyinchiliklariga qaramay, Yaponiyaning ilgarilashini to'xtatish uchun Ming Xitoyning aralashuviga tayanishi kerak edi.[246]
Koreya sudi tarixchisi Ryu Seong-ryongning ta'kidlashicha, Koreyaning dengiz g'alabasi Yaponiya Koreyani qamrab olishga uringan "qurollaridan birini kesib", bosqinchilarning butun strategiyasini to'xtatib qo'ydi, Konishi Yukinaga armiyasini Pxenyanda izolyatsiya qildi va Xitoy suvlarini qo'rqqanlardan himoya qildi. Yaponiyaning hujumi, masalan, Koreyaning "samoviy armiya quruqlikdan yordamga kelishi mumkin".[208][246]
Xonsondagi inqirozni ko'rib, Min sulolasi Vanli imperatori va uning saroyi dastlab ularning irmog'ini qanday qilib tezda bosib olish mumkinligi to'g'risida shubha va shubha bilan to'lgan edi.[247]
Koreya sudi dastlab Ming sulolasidan yordam so'rashga ikkilanib, Pxenyanga chekinishni boshladi.[248] Pxenyan qo'lga olingandan so'ng, Liaodongdagi mahalliy gubernator qirol Seonjoning yordam so'rab, 5000 boshliqlardan iborat oz sonli kuchini yubordi. Zu Chengxun.[249] Mo'g'ullar va yurxenlarga qarshi muvaffaqiyatli kurash olib borgan general Zu, haddan tashqari o'ziga ishongan, yaponlarni xo'rlagan.[250] Ushbu otliq qo'shin deyarli to'siqsiz ilgarilab, Pxenyanga kirishga muvaffaq bo'ldi, ammo shaharda yapon qo'shinlari tomonidan zudlik bilan va qat'iy mag'lubiyatga uchradi. 1592 yil 23 avgustda xitoyliklar kuchli yomg'ir bo'roni ostida hujum qilishdi va yaponlarni hayratda qoldirdi.[251] Yaponlar o'zlarining xitoyliklardan oltidan bittadan ko'pligini tushunib etgach, xitoylik otliq qo'shinlarning Pxenyan ko'chalarida tarqalishiga va xitoyliklarni yo'q qilish uchun o'zlarining ustun sonlaridan foydalangan holda qarshi hujumga ruxsat berishdi.[251] Xitoyliklar Pxenyan tashqarisidagi loyli dalalarga chekinishganda, samuraylar ularni yuzlab kesib tashladi.[251] Ushbu ishda ularning etakchi generallaridan biri Shi Ru o'ldirilgan. Yaponlar Sharqiy Osiyodagi eng yirik kuch bo'lgan Xitoydan kelgan armiyani mag'lubiyatga uchratganidan juda xursand bo'lishdi, ammo Konishi 1592 yilning kuzida umidsizlikni kuchaytirdi, chunki Yaponiyadan qo'shimcha kuchlar kelmasligi aniq bo'ldi.[251] Koreyaning solih armiyasi partizanlari xujumlari tufayli shimoliy Koreyadagi yapon kuchlari Janubiy Koreyadagi kuchlardan ajralib qolgan paytda Admiral Yi floti har qanday yapon kemalarining tushishiga to'sqinlik qilar edi.[251] Seulda bo'lib o'tgan konferentsiyada Konishi Ukita Hideiega xitoyliklar yana ko'p sonli hujumlar uyushtirsa, Pxenyan ushlab turilishi mumkinligiga ishonch yo'qligini aytdi.[251] 1592 yilning ikkinchi yarmida Ming vaziyatni aniqlashtirish uchun Pxenyanga tergov guruhlarini yubordi.[252] Ming vaziyatdan to'liq xabardor bo'lib, 1592 yil sentyabrgacha to'liq kuchaytirish to'g'risida qaror qabul qildi. Ningsiyadagi g'alaba bilan xitoyliklar nihoyat Koreyada mavjud kuchlarga ega bo'ldilar va Ningxia qo'zg'olonini bostirgan general Li Rusong yuborildi. yaponlarni Koreyadan quvib chiqaring.[251]
O'sha paytga kelib, bu mahalliy kuchlar hal qila oladigan vaziyatdan ko'ra jiddiyroq holat ekanligi aniq bo'ldi. Shu tariqa Ming imperatori 1593 yil yanvarida general boshchiligida ko'proq kuchlarni safarbar qildi va jo'natdi Li Rusong va imperator noziri Song Yingchang Birinchisi, Min sulolasining Liaodong harbiy magistratining o'g'illaridan biri bo'lgan Li Chengliang ikkinchisi esa byurokratik ofitser bo'lgan (Ming harbiy qonunchiligida har qanday harbiy zobit Imperatorlik sudi tomonidan tayinlangan hamroh byurokratga ega bo'lib, generalning boshlig'i vazifasini bajarishi kerak edi). Qolgan xatlar to'plamiga ko'ra Song Yingchang, Ming armiyasining kuchi 40 ming atrofida edi,[253] asosan shimoldagi garnizonlardan tashkil topgan, shu jumladan yapon qaroqchilariga qarshi tajribaga ega bo'lgan 3000 ga yaqin erkak Qi Jiguang. Li qishki kampaniyani o'tkazishni xohlar edi, chunki muzlagan zamin uning artilleriya poyezdini kuzgi yomg'irlar loyga aylangan yo'llar ostidan osonroq harakatlanishiga imkon beradi.[254] 1593 yil 5-yanvarda Vu Vayzhon Yalu daryosi orqali Koreyaga 3000 kishilik avans kuchini olib bordi, so'ngra o'sha kuni har biri 2000 kishidan iborat ikkita batalyon.[251] Uijjuda qirol Sonjo va Koreya sudi Li va boshqa xitoylik generallarni Koreyada rasmiy ravishda kutib olishdi, u erda strategiya muhokama qilindi.[255]
Tailand, Xitoy sulolalarining uzoq yillik sodiq irodali davlati,[256][257] Hideyoshining rejalariga aralashish uchun to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Yaponiyaga hujum qilishni taklif qildi, ammo Ming qabul qilmadi, aksincha Tailandga hujum qilishni buyurdi Birma.[258]
Pxenyan qamal qilinishi
1593 yil 5-fevralda Ming ekspeditsiya armiyasi tashqariga etib keldi Pxenyan accompanied by a group of Korean soldiers. Ming general Li Rusong was appointed the supreme commander of all armies in Korea. After initial attempts to negotiate with the Japanese defenders under Konishi Yukinaga buzildi,[24] the two sides began skirmishing on the outskirts over the next couple of days, with Li Rusong attempting to dislodge a Japanese garrison on the hills north of the city while Konishi Yukinaga attempted a night raid on the Ming camp.[24] The Japanese night attack was beaten off by the Chinese fire archers, and Li ordered a feigned retreat, leading the over-confident samurai to fall into a trap, resulting in their annihilation.[255] The Sino-Korean force consisted of 43,000 Chinese, 10,000 Koreans, plus Righteous Army guerrillas and about 5,000 warrior monks.[259] Li admitted that the Japanese infantry were better equipped with guns, but assured his officers: "Japanese weapons have a range of a few hundred paces, while my great cannon have a range of five to six li [2.4 km]. How can we not be victorious?"[260] The city of Pyongyang was one of the most powerful fortresses in Korea, and to take it, Li's plans called for surrounding the city on all four sides, starting a fierce bombardment under which his infantry would advance.[261]
The Korean warrior monks led by Abbott Hyujong attacked Konishi's headquaraters on Mount Moranbong, coming under heavy Japanese arquebus fire, taking hundreds of dead, but they persevered.[262] Later that same day, the Chinese under Wu joined the attack on Mount Moranbong, and with a real danger that Konishi would be cut off from the rest of his army, So Yoshitomo led a counterattack that rescued the Japanese forces from Mount Moranbong.[261] After the fall of Mount Moranbong after two days fighting, Li ordered his cannons to open fire while fire arrows and incendiary bombs set much of the city on fire.[261] On the morning of February 6, Li ordered an all-out assault on three sides of the city. The Chinese took heavy losses as the Japanese fire was withering, but Li, whose horse was killed, was able to bring up the siege ladders, called "cloud ladders" by the Chinese.[263] Li had offered 5,000 ounces of silver for the first man to get over the wall, an honor that was claimed by an infantryman from Zhejiang province named Luo Shangzhi, who got up unto the wall while using his halberd to great effect.[263]
Japanese defenders were forced off the walls fairly quickly, and retreated to the citadel they built on the eastern portions of the city. Chinese officers initially scoffed at the earth walls of the Japanese citadel, but after coming under fire from the Japanese arquebuses, soon learned to respect the defense.[263] The Chingbirok reported: "The enemy built clay walls with holes on top of their fortress, which looked like a beehive. They fired their muskets though those holes as much as they could, and as a result, a number of Chinese soldiers were wounded".[263] The allies were unwilling to commit to a direct assault on the heavily defended fortification during the day. Instead they left an opening for the Japanese to rally while making preparations for a fire assault on their position at night. Japanese forces sallied out of the undefended eastern walls and made a run for Hanseong (Seoul), and they were hit with additional ambushes on the way back south and took heavy casualties.[24][264]
A samurai, Yoshino Jingoze'emon wrote about the retreat:
There was hardly a gap between the dead bodies that filled the surroundings of Matsuyama Caste [Mount Moranbong]. Finally, when we had repulsed the enemy, they burned the food storehouses in several places, so there was now no food. On the night of the seventh day we evacuated the caste, and made our escape. Wounded men were abandoned, while those who were not wounded but simply exhausted crawled almost prostrate along the road...Because it is a cold country, there is ice and deep snow, and hands and feet are burned by the snow, and this gives rise to frostbite, which makes them swell up. The only clothes they had were the garments worn under their armour, and even men who were normally gallant resembled scarecrows on the mountains and fields because of their fatigue, and were indistinguishable from the dead.[265]
The fortress of Pungsan, held by Otomo Yoshimune of the Third Division, had been abandoned and burned down by him, before Konishi's force reached it, adding to the misery of the retreat.[265] Otomo ruined his reputation by retreating without being attacked, and as a result the Otomo family, one of the oldest and most respected daimyō families on Kyushu, were disgraced forever, as under Bushido, cowardice was the worst disgrace for a samurai.[265] Otomo's disgrace was also a blow for the efforts of Jesuit missionaries in Japan as Otomo had converted to Catholicism after long talks with Portuguese Jesuits, and many Japanese concluded that Christianity with its emphasis on love and gentleness was not a suitable religion for a samurai.[265] Song Ying Chang's letters on March 1, 1593, described the battle in full to the Ming court. After their defeat, the Japanese shifted their strategy to urish va ishlatish taktikasi va pistirmalar. Dan foydalanish gunpowder technology and street fighting contributed to the victory, which would permanently deter the invasion.[266]
Byeokjevan jangi
Soon after retaking Pyongyang, Li also succeeded in retaking the major city of Kaesong on January 19, 1592,[267] and met only minor resistance from the Japanese defenders.
Overconfident with his recent success and possibly misled by false reports,[268] Li Rusong advanced towards the capital city of Hanseong (Seoul) with his allied army of 20,000[269] on January 21, 1593. On January 26, the force ran into an unexpected confrontation at Byeokjegwan with a large Japanese formation of about 30,000.
Initially, the scouting party of the group under Cha Da Sho and a Korean general confronted a small band of Japanese numbering no more than 600 men. The party overran them successfully but soon ran into a much larger host under Tachibana Muneshige, and retreated to a nearby hill to defend themselves.
Upon hearing of his scouting party's plight, Li decided to rush forward with the rest of his small host. He met up with his scouting party around noon, but by that time even more Japanese forces were converging on the area.
The Ming forces gradually retreated north while fighting off several waves of attacks. Li Rusong and many other generals personally fought in the brawl, and they sustained heavy casualties before they met up with the rest of their army toward the later portion of the day. Li's horse was killed, and he was saved from being cut down by a samurai when Chinese officer, Li Yousheng, sacrificed himself by taking on the samurai who killed him, but in the interval, Li escaped.[270] During the ferocious fighting, Chinese armor proved no match for the katanalar of the Japanese while the Japanese infantry proved equal to repulsing Chinese cavalry.[270] The Japanese pursued the defeated Ming army back up the pass to its highest point, and after a few more hours of fighting.[271][272][273][274][275] At that point, the Japanese gave up further attacks and both sides pulled back. Because the Ming suffered heavy casualties among their elite retinues, Li became reluctant to move aggressively for the remainder of the war.[276] However, the Japanese victory "did nothing to change the overall strategy, and the retreat from Seoul was delayed only by a few days".[270]
Xenjju jangi
The Japanese invasion into Jeolla province was broken down and pushed back by General Kvon Yul at the hills of Ichiryeong, where outnumbered Koreans fought Japanese troops in the Byeokjevan jangi and gained a victory. Kwon Yul quickly advanced northwards, re-taking Suwon and then swung north toward Haengju where he would wait for Chinese reinforcements. After he was informed that the Ming army under Li Rusong was pushed back at Byeokje, Kwon Yul decided to fortify Haengju.[270] Kwon's force of 2,300 men were a mixture of regulars, warrior monks, and Righteous Army guerrillas.[270]
Bolstered by the victory at the Byeokjevan jangi, Katō and his army of 30,000 men advanced to the south of Hanseong to attack Haengju Fortress, an impressive mountain fortress that overlooked the surrounding area.[270] An army of a few thousand led by Kwon Yul was garrisoned at the fortress, waiting for the Japanese. Katō believed his overwhelming army would destroy the Koreans and therefore ordered the Japanese soldiers to simply advance upon the steep slopes of Haengju with little planning at about 6 am.[270] Kwon Yul responded to the Japanese advance with fierce fire from the fortification using hwachas, rocks, handguns, and bows.[270] The hwach'a ("fire wagon") was a cart that could fire either 100 rockets or 200 arrows at once; The hwach'a took much time to load, but were capable of bringing down deadly fire.[277] Kwon had trained his men to fire their hwach'as all at once, and as the Japanese were packed closely together, the volley from the "fire wagons" inflicted heavy losses.[277] The women of Hanseong joined their menfolk, bringing up rocks in their skirts.[277] In the course of 9 assaults, the Japanese pushed the Koreans back to their second line, but could no further, losing about 10,000 dead in the process.[277] The Chingbirok wrote: "Kwon Yul ordered his soldiers to gather the dead bodies of the enemy and vent their anger by tearing them apart and hanging them on the branches of the trees".[277] Facing unexpected resistance and mounting casualties, Katō burned his dead and finally pulled his troops back.
The Xenjju jangi was an important victory for the Koreans, as it greatly improved the morale of the Korean army. The battle is celebrated today as one of the three most decisive Korean victories (the other two being the Jinjuni qamal qilish (1592) va Hansando jangi ). Today, the site of Haengju fortress has a memorial built to honor Kvon Yul. By this time, the Japanese invasion force of about 150,000 men were down to about 53,000 men with Chinese reinforcements arriving every day.[277] Most of the Japanese were suffering from hunger, frostbite, and snow-blindness and some Japanese soldiers were so weakened by hunger that they were unable to defend themselves from tigers in the mountains.[277] With the situation untenable, the Japanese retreated to the coast.[270]
To'xtab qolish
Keyin Byeokjevan jangi, the Ming army took a cautious approach and moved on Hanseong (present-day Seoul) again later in February after the successful Korean defense in the Xenjju jangi.[278]
The two sides remained at a stalemate between the Kaesong ga Xansong line for the next couple of months, with both sides unable and unwilling to commit to further offensives. The Japanese lacked sufficient supplies to move north, and the defeat at Pyongyang had caused part of the Japanese leadership such as Konishi Yukinaga va Ishida Mitsunari to seriously consider negotiating with the Ming dynasty forces. This got them into a heated debate with other hawkish generals such as Keti Kiyomasa, and these conflicts would eventually have further implications following the war in Japan when the two sides became rivals in the Sekigaxara jangi.
The Ming forces had their own set of problems. Soon after arriving in Korea the Ming officials began to note the inadequate logistical supply from the Korean court. The records by Qian Shizhen noted that even after the siege of Pyongyang the Ming forces were already stalled for nearly a week due to the lack of supplies, before moving on to Kaesong.[279] As the time went on the situation only become more serious. When the weather warmed, the road condition in Korea also became terrible, as numerous letters from Song Yingchang and other Ming officers attest, which made resupplying from China itself also a tedious process.[280]
The Korean countryside was already devastated from the invasion when the Ming forces arrived, and in the heart of winter it was extremely difficult for the Koreans to muster sufficient supplies. Even though the court had assigned the majority of the men on hand to tackle the situation, their desire to reclaim their country, along with the militarily inexperienced nature of many of their administrators, resulted in their continual requests to the Ming forces to advance despite the situation. These events created an increasing level of distrust between the two sides.
Though by mid April 1593, faced with ever-greater logistical pressure from a Korean naval blockade of Yi Sun-sin in addition to a Ming force special operation that managed to burn down a very significant portion of the Japanese grain storage,[281] the Japanese broke off talks and pulled out of Hanseong.
Jinjuni ikkinchi qamal qilish
Unlike the First Siege of Jinju, the second siege resulted in a Japanese victory. Hideyoshi was especially determined to take Jinju and ordered that the previous Japanese failure to take the city be avenged.[282] Ukita Hidei led 90,000 Japanese troops to take Jinju, making it the largest mobilization of Japanese forces for a single operation in the entire war.[282] The Koreans, not knowing where the Japanese were going, divided their forces with Kim Ch'ǒnil commanding the garrison of 4,000 soldiers at Jinju, who were joined by volunteers, guerrillas, and a small Chinese force, making for a force of about 60,000.[282] On 20 July 1593, the Japanese began to construct wooden shields to allow them to advance against the walls.[283] To the west were Konishi Yukinaga with 26,000 men and to the north were Kato Kiyomasa with 25,000 while Ukita commanded the reserve of 17,000.[283] On 21 July 1593, the Japanese attacked, breaking the dyke that filled the moat around Jinju, while the samurai advanced under their wooden shields, to be stopped by Korean fire arrows, cannonballs, and arquebsues.[282] On 23 July, the Japanese attacked with wooden siege towers, which were knocked down by Korean cannon fire.[284] On 25 July, under a flag of truce, Ukita sent a messenger to Kim, telling him that the Japanese would slaughter 10,000 Korean peasants whom they had taken prisoner if Jinju did not surrender at once, but Kim refused, and so 10,000 Korean peasants were beheaded.[285]
The Japanese now attacked with armored carts called "tortoise shell wagons", which allowed the Japanese to advance up to the walls, where the sappers would pull out the stones, but as a Japanese account complained: "They tried to attack, but from inside the caste pine torches were thrown that set the grass alight. The soldiers inside the tortoise wagons were also burned and retreated".[282] On 27 July the Japanese again attacked with the "tortoise shell wagons", but this time, there was a heavy thunderstorm that prevented Korean attempts to incinerate the Japanese by dropping torches soaked in fat.[286] The Japanese sappers broke down a section of the wall and a great rush broke out with the samurai pushed each other down as it was a great honor to be the first samurai to enter a fortress.[286] Goto Mototsgu, a retainer of Kuroda was about to be the first samurai to enter Jinju when Iida Kakbei, a retainer of Kato's, threw the Nichiren flag into the breach to claim that honor for himself.[286] The Korean garrison was out of ammunition and were short of swords, so many Koreans fought with wooden sticks against the onrush of samurai armed with katanalar.[286] One Korean, General Sŏ Yewon, engaged in a lengthy single combat with a samurai named Okamoto Gonjo, which ended when the wounded General Sŏ lost his breath and fell down by a tree, and Okamoto took the chance to sever his head with a single blow from his katana.[286] Sŏ's head fell down by the Nam river, which as it was a great honor for a samurai to take the head of their enemies, led Okamoto to order a search to find Sŏ's head, so that it could be salted and taken back to Japan.[286] The Korean commander, General Kim, committed suicide.[286]
As usual, the Japanese took no prisoners, killing almost everyone both military and civilian, and the Nam river ran red with blood as thousands attempted to swim across the Nam, only to be cut down by the samurai waiting on the other side.[286] The chronicler of the Kato family noted: "All the Chinese were terrified of our Japanese blades, and jumped into the river, but we pulled them and cut off their heads".[286] Korean accounts mention that almost all of the 60,000 soldiers in Jinju were killed while Japanese accounts mention the samurai sent 20,000 heads back to Japan after their victory.[286] Faqat kisaneng (courtesans) of Jinju were spared as they pressed to service the victorious Japanese generals at a party they held to celebrate their victory on the evening of the same day at the Ch'oksŏngu Pavilion on a nearby hill as it offered the best view of the "hellish scene" below them.[286] One courtesan, Nongae, attracted the attention of a samurai, Keyamura Rokunosuke, whom she lured to a cliff by promising him sex, and then threw both herself and him off the cliff, becoming a national heroine in Korea.[287] Jinju was taken only for symbolic purposes, and instead of advancing, the Japanese force at Jinju retreated back to Busan as there was a larger Chinese force to the north.[288] Hideyoshi was well satisfied that he had avenged the defeat of 1592 at Jinju, though Turnbull argued that to lose so many men to take a town only for symbolic reasons was wasteful.[288]
Xitoy va Yaponiya o'rtasida muzokaralar va sulh (1594–1596)
There were two factors that triggered the Japanese to withdraw: first, a Chinese commando penetrated Hanseong (present-day Seoul) and burned storehouses at Yongsan, destroying most of what was left of the Japanese troops' depleted stock of food. Secondly, Shen Weijing made another appearance to conduct negotiations, and threatened the Japanese with an attack by 400,000 Chinese. The Japanese under Konishi and Kato, aware of their weak situation, agreed to withdraw to the Pusan area while the Chinese would withdraw back to China. A ceasefire was imposed, and a Ming emissary was sent to Japan to discuss peace terms.[289] For the next three years, there was little fighting as the Japanese retained control of a few coastal fortresses with the rest of Korea being controlled by the Koreans.[290]
By May 18, 1594, all the Japanese soldiers had retreated to the area around Busan and many began to make their way back to Japan. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce.
Once peace negotiations between China and Japan finally got underway, Chinese negotiators gave the Ming Emperor the mistaken impression that he was about to deal with a minor state that had been subdued by war. Furthermore, they conveyed the idea that the Japanese regent, Hideyoshi, was prepared to become his vassal. Under such conditions, the Chinese sought to resolve the issue in their favor by including Japan in their tributary system of foreign relations. They would establish Hideyoshi as king of Japan and grant him the privilege of formal tribute trade relations with the Ming dynasty.
In Japan, Hideyoshi's negotiators apparently led him to believe that China was suing for peace and was ready to accept him as their emperor. Thus, Hideyoshi issued the demands of a victor; first, a daughter of the Ming emperor must be sent to become the wife of the Japanese emperor; second, the southern provinces of Joseon must be ceded to Japan; third, normal trade relations between China and Japan must be restored; and fourth, a Joseon prince and several high-ranking government officials must be sent to Japan as hostages.
Bargaining from such fundamentally different perspectives, there was no prospect whatsoever for success in the talks. Early in 1597, both sides resumed hostilities.[291]
Koreya harbiy qayta tashkil etilishi
Harbiy islohotlar bo'yicha taklif
During the period between the First and Second invasions, the Korean government had a chance to examine the reasons why they had been easily overrun by the Japanese. Ryu Seong-ryong, the Prime Minister, spoke out about the Korean disadvantages.
Ryu pointed out that Korean castle defenses were extremely weak, a fact which he had pointed out before the war. He noted how Korean castles had incomplete fortifications and walls that were too easy to scale. He also wanted cannons set up in the walls. Ryu proposed building strong towers with gun turrets for cannons. Besides castles, Ryu wanted to form a line of defenses in Korea. In this kind of defense, the enemy would have to scale many walls in order to reach Hanseong (Seoul).
Ryu also pointed out how efficient the Japanese army was, since it took them only one month to reach Hanseong, and how well organized they were. He noted how the Japanese moved their units in complex maneuvers, often weakening their enemy with the use of arquebuses, then attacking with jangovar qurol.
Harbiy tayyorgarlik agentligi
Qirol Seonjo and the Korean court finally began to reform the military. In September 1593, the Military Training Agency (훈련도감, alternately translated as Military Training Command) was established. The agency carefully divided the army into units and companies. Within the companies were squads of archers, arquebusiers, swordsmen, and spear infantry. The agency set up divisional units in each region of Korea and garrisoned battalions at castles. The agency, which originally had less than 80 troops, soon grew to about 10,000.
One of the most important changes was that both upper class citizens and slaves were subject to the draft. All males had to enter military service to be trained and familiarized with weapons.
It was also around this time that the military scholar Han Gyo (한교) wrote the martial arts manual Muyejebo, kitob asosida Tsixiao Sinshu by the famous Chinese general Qi Jiguang.
Chongyu urushi: Ikkinchi bosqin (1597–1598)
| Japanese second invasion wave[156] | ||
|---|---|---|
| Army of the Right | ||
| Miri Hidemoto | 30,000 | |
| Keti Kiyomasa | 10,000 | |
| Kuroda Nagamasa | 5,000 | |
| Nabeshima Naoshige | 12,000 | |
| Ikeda Hideuji | 2,800 | |
| Chsokabe Motochika | 3,000 | |
| Nakagava Xidenari | 2,500 | |
| Jami | 65,300 | |
| Army of the Left | ||
| Ukita Hideie | 10,000 | |
| Konishi Yukinaga | 7,000 | |
| Sō Yoshitoshi | 1,000 | |
| Matsura Shigenobu | 3,000 | |
| Arima Xarunobu | 2,000 | |
| Amura Yoshiaki | 1,000 | |
| Sumiharu bor | 700 | |
| Xachisuka Iemasa | 7,200 | |
| Miriy Yoshinari | 2,000 | |
| Ikoma Kazumasa | 2,700 | |
| Shimazu Yosixiro | 10,000 | |
| Shimazu Tadatsune | 800 | |
| Akizuki Tanenaga | 300 | |
| Takaxashi mototanasi | 600 | |
| Suketaka | 500 | |
| Sagara Yorifusa | 800 | |
| Jami | 49,600 | |
| Dengiz qo'mondonligi | ||
| Tōdō Takatora | 2,800 | |
| Kato Yoshiaki | 2,400 | |
| Vakisaka Yasuharu | 1,200 | |
| Kurushima Michifusa | 600 | |
| Mitaira Saymon | 200 | |
| Jami | 7,200 | |
| Jami | 122,100 | |
After the failed peace negotiations of the inter-war years, Hideyoshi launched the second invasion of Korea. One of the main strategic differences between the first and second invasions was that conquering China was no longer an explicit goal for the Japanese. Failing to gain a foothold during Katō Kiyomasa's Chinese campaign and the near complete withdrawal of the Japanese forces during the first invasion had established that the Korean peninsula was the more prudent and realistic objective.
Soon after the Chinese ambassadors had safely returned to China in 1597, Hideyoshi sent approximately 200 ships with an estimated 141,100 men under the overall command of Kobayakava Xideaki.[113] Japan's second force arrived unopposed on the southern coast of Gyeongsang Province in 1596. However, the Japanese found that the Korean army was both better equipped and better prepared to deal with an invasion than several years prior.[292] In addition, upon hearing the news in China, the imperial court in Beijing appointed Yang Xao (楊鎬) as the supreme commander of an initial mobilization of 55,000 troops from various (and sometimes remote) provinces across China, such as Sichuan, Chjetszyan, Huguang, Fujian va Guandun.[293] A naval force of 21,000 was included in the effort.[294] Rey Xuang, a Chinese-American historian, estimated that the combined strength of the Chinese army and navy at the height of the second campaign was around 75,000.[294] Korean forces totaled approximately 30,000 with General Gvon Yul 's army in Gong Mountain (공산; 公山) in Degu, General Gwon Eung 's (권응) troops in Kyonju, Gvak Jae-u 's soldiers in Changnyeong (창녕), Yi Bok-nam 's (이복남) army in Naju va Yi Si-yun qo'shinlari Chungpungnyeong.
Dastlabki hujum
 | Ushbu bo'lim uchun qo'shimcha iqtiboslar kerak tekshirish. (Iyul 2020) (Ushbu shablon xabarini qanday va qachon olib tashlashni bilib oling) |
Initially the Japanese found limited success, being largely confined to Gyongsang viloyati and only launching numerous raids to harass and weaken the Korean defenders. In the early Autumn of 1597, the Japanese began a more focused and sustained advance. The Japanese planned to attack Jeolla viloyati in the southwestern part of the peninsula and eventually occupy Jeonju, viloyat markazi. Korean success in the first Jinjuni qamal qilish in 1592 had mostly saved this area from devastation during the first invasion (the second siege of Jinju in 1593, while a Japanese victory, was only undertaken for symbolic purposes). Two Japanese armies, under Miri Hidemoto va Ukita Hideie, began the assault in Busan and marched towards Jeonju, taking Sacheon and Changpyong along the way.
Yi Sun-sinni ishdan bo'shatish uchun fitna
The Korean navy was again to play a crucial part in the second invasion, as in the first, by hampering Japanese advances on land by harassing supply fleets at sea.[295] However, despite his previous successes, Yi Sun-sin was both demoted and jailed by King Seonjo, largely due to a Japanese plot to deceive the Korean court and take advantage of the court's political infighting. Government officials gave direct orders to launch a surprise naval operation against the Japanese, based on a tip from a presumed reliable Japanese spy. Yi refused to obey these orders, knowing that this was an obvious trap meant to have his own fleet sail into an ambush. This development allowed others within the court to further advance their personal agendas while Yi was severely punished. Ultimately, Won Gyun was appointed in Yi Sun-sin's place at the head of the Korean navy.
Chilcheollyang jangi
After Won Gyun replaced Yi Sun-sin as head of the navy, he was quick to take action and justify his newly acquired position. He gathered the entire Korean fleet, which now had more than 100 ships outside of Yosu, to search for the Japanese. Without any previous preparations or planning, Won Gyun then had his entire fleet sail towards Busan.
After one day at sea, Won Gyun was informed of a large Japanese fleet near Busan. He decided to attack immediately, despite reports of exhaustion among the crew of the ship.
Keyingi paytda Chilcheollyang jangi, Won Gyun was completely outmaneuvered by the Japanese in a surprise attack. His ships were overwhelmed by arquebus fire and the traditional Japanese boarding attacks, which largely resulted in the destruction of his entire fleet. Prior to this engagement, Bae Soel, a naval officer who did not submit to Won Gyun's leadership, kept thirteen panokseons under his command and out of the battle, instead escaping to the southwestern Korean coast. These would form the entire fighting force of the Korean navy during the immediately following months.
The Battle of Chilcheollyang was Japan's only decisive naval victory of the war. Won Gyun was himself killed by a Japanese garrison after he struggled ashore on an island after the destruction of his flagship. The victory allowed the Japanese navy to safely escort its troop ships and to support planned landing operations.[296]
Namvonni qamal qilish
After the disaster at Chilcheollyang, the allied defenses in the south began to quickly break down and the Japanese forces stormed into Jeolla viloyati. Garnizoni Namvon became their next key target.
Namwon was located fifty kilometres southeast of Jeonju. Correctly predicting a Japanese attack, a coalition force of 6,000 soldiers (including 3,000 Chinese troops under Yang Yuan and civilian volunteers) were prepared to fight the approaching Japanese forces.[297] The Japanese laid siege to the walls of the fortress with ladders and siege towers.[298] The two sides exchanged volleys with arquebuses and bows. Eventually the Japanese forces scaled the walls and sacked the fortress. According to Japanese commander Okochi Hidemoto, muallifi Chosen Ki, Namvonni qamal qilish resulted in 3,726 casualties[299] among the Korean and Chinese forces.[300] The Korean forces and its leaders were almost entirely killed.
When the gates were opened, many Koreans simply laid down on their knees, knowing the samurai would behead them while others tried to flee north, where the samurai commanded by Katō Yoshiaki and Shimazu Yoshihiro were waiting and proceeded to cut down all Koreans with their katanalar.[301] The Japanese Buddhist monk Keinen who was traveling with the samurai described a scene of utter horror as the full moon illuminated the scenes of destruction with much of the town on fire, the formerly white walls of Namwǒn turned red with blood, and he heard the wailing of the Koreans, knowing it was their time to die as the samurai gave no mercy, killing all.[302] Faqat Yang Yuan managed to sally out after the walls were breached, with a handful of men, to return to Hanseong (Seoul). He was later executed by the Ming court because of his defeat in battle. Traditionally, samurai collected the heads of those they killed, and Hideyoshi had insisted that the samurai sent him noses of those they had killed as proof that they were fighting.[302] Okochi counted the heads of 3,725 Koreans killed that day, and removed their noses, which were pickled in salt and sent back to Japan.[302] All of the noses of Koreans killed by the samurai are buried near the shrine to the Great Buddha put up by Hideyoshi in Kyoto, which as Turnbull noted "...they remain to this day inside Kyoto's least mentioned and most often avoided tourist attraction, the grassy burial mound that bears the erroneous name of the Mimizuka, the 'Mound of Ears'.".[302]
Xvanzeoksan jangi
Hwangseoksan Fortress consisted of extensive walls that circumscribed the Hwangseok Mountains and garrisoned thousands of soldiers led by generals Jo Jong-do va Gwak Jun. Qachon Keti Kiyomasa laid siege to the mountain with the Army of the Right, which he attacked at night under the full moon, the Koreans lost morale and retreated with 350 casualties.[301] The successful siege did not, however, lead to a subsequent advance from beyond Gyeongsang Province.
Birinchi koreys va ming qarshi hujum
Upon the start of the second invasion, the Ming emperor was furious about the entire debâcle of the peace talks and turned his wrath on many of its chief supporters; ayniqsa Shi Xing, the Minister of War, who was removed from his position and jailed (he died several years later, in prison). The chief negotiator, Shen Vekin, ijro etildi. Xing Jie was named the new minister of war and Yang Xao as the new chief superintendent (Jin Lue) of Korea; Xing Jie himself was also stationed in Korea for the remainder of the war. The Ming leadership quickly pulled in many units stationed near its border with Korea.
Jiksan jangi
After the steady Japanese advances on land, they planned to assault Hanseong (present-day Seoul) by late August or early September 1597. However, the plans were foiled by a Ming defense around Jiksan (modern-day Cheonan ).
Forces under Kuroda Nagamasa formed the vanguard of the right army and marched toward Hanseong, which deeply disturbed the court at Hanseong. Several of the Ming generals stationed in Korea suggested to the court that they pull back their forces until they could gather more reinforcements, but the Ming administrators overruled their generals and ordered them to make a stand. Thus the chief commander of the Ming forces at the time, Ma Guy, sent out General Jie Sheng (解生) and three other generals with an elite cavalry force to confront the Japanese forces.
According to Korean records, the Ming forces ran into the vanguard forces under Kuroda around the area of Jiksan. On the first day, they beat back a small scouting party. On the second day, the two forces clashed in earnest, with the Japanese being beaten back.[303] Soon afterwards, a larger Japanese force showed up and the Ming forces also retreated. The Japanese army moved forward and occupied Kyonggi viloyati.[304] This battle greatly relieved the Joseon and Ming courts and was seen as the beginning of a turnaround in the land campaign.[iqtibos kerak ]
Myongnyang jangi
After the debacle in Chilcheollyang, King Seonjo immediately reinstated Yi Sun-sin. Yi Sun-sin quickly returned to Yeosu, where he found the majority of his navy destroyed. Yi re-organized the navy, now reduced to the thirteen ships that Bae Seol had held back from Chilcheollyang and approximately 200 men.[305] On October 26, 1597, in the Myongnyang bo'g'ozi, Yi Sun-sin encountered a large Japanese fleet of approximately 133 warships, with a further 200 logistical ships in support.[306] By making use of a narrow passage, Yi positioned his ships in a battle line that prevented the Japanese navy from making use of their numerical superiority. The Myongnyang jangi resulted in a Korean victory, with Yi Sun-sin retaking the naval initiative.[307] The Koreans did not lose a single ship and destroyed approximately 30 Japanese combat ships, severely damaging another 30 (the oft-cited number of 333 ships in the Japanese fleet includes support ships, which would not be considered combat ships). The Battle of Myeongnyang is considered Yi Sun-sin's greatest battle, largely as a result of the disparity of numbers. G'alabadan keyin ham Jozon harbiy-dengiz floti qolgan Yaponiya dengiz kuchlari sonidan ko'proq edi, shuning uchun Admiral Yi Sariq dengiz o'z parkini to'ldirish va ko'chma mudofaa uchun ko'proq joyga ega bo'lish.[308]Koreya dengiz floti orqaga qaytgandan so'ng, Yaponiya dengiz kuchlari Koreyaning g'arbiy sohiliga, Yeonggvan okrugidagi ba'zi orollar yaqiniga bostirib kirdi.[309][310][311][312]
Ulsan qamalida
By January 29, 1598, the Joseon and Ming allied forces achieved victory in Jiksan and pushed the Japanese further south. After the news of the loss at Myeongnyang, Keti Kiyomasa and his retreating army looted Kyonju, sobiq poytaxti Birlashtirilgan Silla.
The Japanese forces sacked the city and many artifacts and temples were destroyed, most prominently, the Bulguksa, a Buddhist temple. Ming and Joseon forces continued to harass the Japanese forces, who then withdrew further south to Ulsan,[313] a harbor that had been an important Japanese trading post a century before, and which Katō had chosen as a strategic stronghold.
Yi Sun-sin's control of the areas around the coast of Jeolla permitted no supply ships to reach the western side of the Korean Peninsula, into which many extensive tributaries merge. Without provisions and reinforcements, the Japanese forces were constrained to the coastal fortresses, known as wajō, that they still controlled. The advancing Ming forces attempted to take advantage of this situation by attacking Ulsan. This siege was the first major offensive from the Ming forces in the second phase of the war.
The effort of the Japanese garrison (about 7,000 men) of Ulsan was largely dedicated to its fortification in preparation for the expected attack. Katō Kiyomasa assigned command and defense of the base to Katō Yasumasa, Kuki Hirotaka, Asano Nagayoshi, and others before proceeding to Sosaengpo.[314] The Ming army's first assault on January 29, 1598, caught the Japanese army unaware and still encamped, for the large part, outside Ulsan's unfinished walls.[315]
A total of around 36,000 troops with the help of singijeons va hwachas nearly succeeded in sacking the fortress, but reinforcements under the overall command of Miri Hidemoto came across the river to aid the besieged fortress.[316] Although the Japanese garrison was desperately short of supplies, the Ming commander Ma Guy judged the situation to be going against the allies, because more and more Japanese forces began to arrive from the surrounding area and the allied forces were quickly becoming outnumbered.[317] Late one night, Ma Guy decided to order a general organized retreat of the allied forces, but soon confusion set in, and matters were further complicated by heavy rainfall and harassing attacks by the Japanese. The chief superintendent Yang Xao panicked and left hastily for Hanseong ahead of the army.[318][319][320]
The general retreat quickly turned into a chaotic rout, of which the Japanese took quick advantage by attacking the retreating Ming and Joseon forces.[321] The retreating Ming and Joseon forces had 20,000 losses.[322] The disaster was a heavy setback for Joseon, who would not be in a position to move on the Japanese position again for more than eight months.
1598 yilgi so'nggi ittifoqdosh hujum
After the Siege at Ulsan, the two sides remained in a stalemate for the next several months. Xing Jie decided that they would require further reinforcements to launch a final large offensive to permanently remove the Japanese presence on the Korean Peninsula.
Reinforcements from China began to pour in through most of mid-1598, with Chen Lin va Deng Zilong and their navy arriving in May. By September 1598, the Ming presence in Korea had swelled to 75,000 overall, by far the largest at any point in the war.
Xing Jie divided his forces into four groups, with Ma Guy leading the offensive against Ulsan yet again, Li Rumei leading the offensive against Sacheon, Chen Lin commanding the navy, and Liu Ting va Yi Sun-gunoh coordinating a land-sea effort against Suncheon.
Just before they set out, however, news came that Li Rusong was killed by Mongolian tribesmen back in Liao Dong. Xing Jie decided to remove his emotionally weakened brother Li Rumei foydasiga Dong Yi Yuan.
In June 1598, after Commander Konishi Yukinaga raised concerns about the supply situation and limited prospects for further territorial gains in the peninsula, 70,000 troops were withdrawn back to Japan, with only 60,000 left behind to guard the territory still under Japanese control. These forces were mostly Satsuma askarlari Shimazu klani under commanders Shimazu Yoshihiro and his son Tadatsune.[323] Kato Kiyomasa remained in command of the defenses of Ulsan while Konishi himself commanded the defenses at Suncheon. The forces at Sacheon and Ulsan continued to be engaged in a military deadlock in the months that followed.
At Ulsan, Kato Kiyomasa defended the castle with 10,000 Japanese soldiers.[324] In September 1598, 29,500 Ming and Joseon troops tried again to capture Ulsan Castle, but all their attempts were repulsed by the Japanese. The Ming and Joseon forces withdrew with heavy losses.[325][326]
Sacheon jangi
The Chinese believed that Sacheon was crucial to their goal of retaking the lost castles in Korea and ordered a general attack. Although the Chinese made initial progress, the tide of battle turned when Japanese reinforcements attacked the rear of the Chinese army and the Japanese soldiers inside the fortress sallied from the gates and counter-attacked.[327] The Chinese Ming forces retreated with 30,000 losses, with the Japanese in pursuit.[328] According to Chinese and Korean sources concerning the battle, the forces led by Dong Yi Yuan had breached the castle wall and were making progress in capturing the castle until a gunpowder accident caused an explosion in their camp, and the Japanese took advantage of the situation to rout the confused and weakened troops.[329]
Sunxenni qamal qilish
At Suncheon, Konishi Yukinaga defended the castle with 13,700 Japanese soldiers.[330] A total of 50,000 Ming and Joseon troops tried to capture it, but their attempts were repulsed and they retreated with heavy losses.[331][332][333]
Hideyoshining o'limi
In the fall of 1598, following the successful Japanese defense at the battles of Sacheon, Ulsan, and Suncheon, the Ming, Joseon, and Japanese forces were locked in a military stalemate in the south of the peninsula[32][334] After the death of Hideyoshi on September 18, 1598, the Council of Five Elders, in late October, issued orders for the withdrawal of all forces from Korea. Xideyoshining o'limi Kengash tomonidan armiyaning ruhiy holatini saqlab qolish uchun sir tutilgan.
Noryang-Pointdagi jang
Noryang punktidagi jang urushdagi so'nggi dengiz jangi bo'ldi. Shimazu Yosixiro boshchiligidagi 500 ta kemadan iborat Yaponiya floti yig'ilib, Konishi Yukinaga ostida bloklangan flot bilan bog'lanishga va Pusan orqali Yaponiyaga qaytib ketishga tayyorlanmoqda.[335]
Yi Sun-sin boshchiligidagi Koreya dengiz floti Noryanning tor bo'g'ozlarida langarga qo'yilgan Shimazu flotini kashf etdi. Hududning tor geografiyasini ta'kidlab, Ming general Chen Lin, kim rahbarlik qildi Deng Zilong va Yi Sun-gun,[336] 1598 yil 16-dekabrda zulmat qopqog'ida yapon flotiga qarshi to'p va olov o'qlari.
Tong otishi bilan Yaponiya flotining deyarli yarmi tarqab ketdi. Qolgan yapon kemalarini ta'qib qilish paytida Yi Sun-sin ham, Deng Zilong ham o'ldirildi.[337] Katta yo'qotishlarga qaramay, oxir-oqibat jang Koreya kuchlari uchun taktik g'alaba bo'ldi va Yaponiya flotining yarmidan ko'pini yo'qotishga olib keldi.[338]
Biroq, strategik jihatdan, yaponlar o'z maqsadlariga erishib, avvalroq Ming va Koreya kuchlari tomonidan qamalga olingan Konishi Yukinagaga 16 dekabr kuni o'z qal'asini tark etib, o'z odamlari bilan birga va Namxey orolining janubiy uchi orqali suzib o'tib, qarshiliksiz chekinishga ruxsat berib, ikkalasini ham chetlab o'tdilar. Noryan bo'g'ozi va jang. Konishi, Shimazu, Kato Kiyomasa va boshqa chap yapon generallari Pusan shahrida to'planib, 21-dekabrda Yaponiyaga chiqib ketishdi. Oxirgi kemalar 24-dekabr kuni Yaponiyaga suzib borib, etti yillik urushga chek qo'ydi.
Urushdan keyingi muzokaralar
Bosqinlar natijasida Tsushima Koreya bilan savdo-sotiqni yo'qotishdan juda ko'p zarar ko'rganligi sababli, o'sha paytda Tsushimada hukmron bo'lgan Sō oilasining Yoshitoshi Yaponiya tomonidan olib borilgan tinchlik muzokaralarida etakchilik qildi. U munosabatlarni normallashtirish uchun 1599 yilda Jozinga to'rtta tinchlik missiyasini yubordi. Dastlabki uchtasi asirga olinib, to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Xitoy qo'shinlari tomonidan Pekinga jo'natilgan, ammo to'rtinchisi, 1601 yilda, Chuson sudidan qolgan Jozon asirlari qaytib kelgandan keyin munosabatlarni normallashtirish va'dasini muvaffaqiyatli qo'lga kiritgan.[339] Yaponiya qo'shinlari chiqib ketganidan keyin Ming qo'shinlari Koreyada bo'lishni davom ettirar ekan, Xoseon uchun Yaponiya bilan munosabatlarni normallashtirish uchun asosiy rag'batlantirish xitoylik askarlarning o'z hududlaridan chiqib ketishi edi. Min xitoylarining o'zlari vayronagarchiliklarni keltirib chiqardilar va ularning mavjudligi Jozonning milliy iqtisodiyoti va infratuzilmasini og'irlashtirmoqda.[339] Chjusonning talabiga javoban Yoshitoshi zudlik bilan bir necha zion mahbuslarini ozod qildi va 1603-1604 yillarda Chjuson elchilariga Kiotoda muzokaralar uyushtirib, yana 3 mingni vataniga qaytarishda yordam berdi. Tokugawa Ieyasu, o'sha paytda Yaponiya Shogun.[339]
Tinchlik munosabatlari to'g'risidagi diplomatik muzokaralarni davom ettirishda Jusson 1606 yilda o'z shartlarini kengaytirdi va Shogundan tinchlik so'rab rasmiy xat yozishni va bu mamlakatni bulg'agan yapon askarlarini topshirishni talab qildi. Xoseon Qirollik maqbaralari Xansong (Seul) yaqinida.[339] Shogunat bunday talabga hech qachon rozi bo'lmasligini anglagan Yoshitoshi uning o'rniga soxta xat va bir guruh jinoyatchilarni yubordi; Ming askarlarini haydab chiqarishga bo'lgan katta ehtiyoj Jozoni 1608 yilda qabul qilishga va elchi yuborishga majbur qildi.[339] Natijada natija Jozon mahbuslarining qaytishi va ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi diplomatik va savdo aloqalarining tiklanishi edi.[340]
Natijada va xulosa
Yapon istilolari Sharqiy Osiyodagi zamonaviy qurol-yarog 'bilan jihozlangan ko'p sonli qo'shinlar ishtirokidagi birinchi mintaqaviy urushlar edi.[341] Mojaro Yaponiyaning 200 ming kishilik, Xitoy armiyasining 80 ming kishilik,[123] va yuz minglab mahalliy koreys kuchlarining doimiy ravishda joylashtirilishi.
Bosqinlar, shuningdek, mavjud bo'lgan Xitoy dunyosi tartibiga qarshi ikki darajadagi muammo bo'lib qoldi:[342] harbiylar, bu urush Ming Xitoyning eng yuqori harbiy kuch maqomiga qarshi chiqdi Sharqiy Osiyo va siyosiy, bu urush Xitoyning irmoq davlatlarini himoya qilishda yordam berishga tayyorligini tasdiqladi.[343]
Yo'qotishlar va yutuqlar
Toyotomi Hideyoshining niyatlaridan farqli o'laroq, Koreyaga yapon bosqinlari narxi Toyotomi klanining Yaponiyadagi kuchini sezilarli darajada zaiflashtirdi. Hideyoshi vafotidan keyin uning yosh o'g'li Toyotomi Hideyori boshiga aylandi Toyotomi klani. Biroq, yo'qotishlar har xil daimyōs Bu kampaniya davomida urushdan keyin Yaponiyada hokimiyat muvozanati buzilishiga hissa qo'shgan omil bo'ldi. Koreyadagi mojaro paytida ishlatilgan kuchlarning aksariyati Kyushu va G'arbiy Xonsyu g'arbida joylashgan daimyos (qisman geografik qulayligi bilan) hissasini qo'shganligi sababli, Xideyoshi ittifoqi Tokugavaning asosan sharqiy qo'llab-quvvatlaydigan kuchlari bilan oxir-oqibat kurash uchun kuchsizlanib qoldi. Ieyasu (o'zi hech qachon Koreyaga kuch yubormagan). Tokugava Yaponiyani birlashtirishga va 1603 yilda o'zini Shogun deb tan olishga qaror qildi Sekigaxara jangi asosan g'arbga asoslangan koalitsiyaga qarshi daimyōs.[344]
Ming Xitoy, shuningdek, Koreyani himoya qilishdagi roli uchun og'ir moliyaviy yukni o'z zimmasiga oldi va shu o'n yil ichida bir qator boshqa to'qnashuvlarga qarshi kurashdi. Urush, shuningdek, Xitoyning Manchuriyadagi mavqeini bilvosita zaiflashtirdi, bu esa manchjurlarning yangi boshlig'i Nurxaciga o'z ta'siri va hududini kengaytirish imkoniyatini berdi. Nurxachining zabt etilishi oxir-oqibat Min sulolasining qulashi va davlatning ko'tarilishi bilan yakunlanadi Tsing sulolasi 1644 yilda.[345] Biroq, sinosentrik Ming himoya qilgan irmoq tizimi Qing tomonidan saqlanib kelinmoqda va oxir oqibat, urush vaziyatni saqlab qolishga olib keldi - savdo-sotiqning tiklanishi va uchala tomonning o'zaro munosabatlari normallashishi bilan.[346]
Mojaro faqat Koreya zaminida olib borilganligini hisobga olsak, oxir-oqibat Koreya uchta ishtirokchidan eng ko'p zarar ko'rdi.[345] U o'zining harbiy kuchi va tinch aholisining katta qismini yo'qotdi, ko'plab madaniy meros ob'ektlari buzilgan yoki yo'q qilingan va ko'plab texnologik yutuqlar talon-taroj qilingan.[347] Bosqinlar ko'p jihatdan millat tarixidagi boshqa voqealarga qaraganda dahshatli bo'lgan (hatto, shubhasiz, bundan ham ko'proq) Koreya urushi ).[346] Yarim orol ekin maydonlarining urushgacha bo'lgan umumiy miqdorining oltmish olti foizigacha qisqarishiga olib keldi,[348] Koreyaning asosan qishloq xo'jaligi iqtisodiyotiga katta zarar etkazdi;[140] keyingi yillarda butun Koreya bo'ylab ocharchilik, kasalliklar va isyonlar keng tarqaldi.[345] Yilda Kyungsang viloyati yolg'iz ishlov berilgan erlarning 90% vayron qilingan.[349]Tarixiy arxivlar, madaniy va ilmiy asarlar (masalan Ja-gyuk-roo suv soati[350]) va mohir hunarmandlar susayishiga olib keldi Koreya ilmi.[351]Koreyslarning asosiy saroylari Kyonbokgung, Changdeokgung va Changgyeonggung yoqib yuborilgan va Deoksugung vaqtincha saroy sifatida ishlatilgan. The Baekjeong (Eng past darajadagi ijtimoiy koreys aholisi) bosqinchilik natijasida ichki xavfsizlik etishmasligidan foydalanib, o't qo'ydilar changnye (Koreya davlat idoralari), unda aholini ro'yxatga olish daftarlari saqlangan.[352] Erlarni ro'yxatga olish va ro'yxatga olish registrlarining yo'q qilinishi soliqni qayta tiklashni qiyinlashtirdi, chunki soliq va jabrdiydalar ularga asoslangan edi. Hukumat olish uchun unvon va unvonlarni almashtirishga majbur bo'ldi napsok don,[349] va yangban elita uy xo'jaliklari soliqlaridan ozod qilingan bu fursatdan foydalanib, yer egaligini ko'paytirdi va shu bilan markaziy hukumatni mulkdan olinadigan soliqlardan mahrum qildi.[353]
19-asr oxiri tarixchisi Geo X. Jonsning taxminiga ko'ra umumiy harbiy va fuqarolik qurbonlari millionga teng,[354] va umumiy jangovar talofatlar 250,000 dan 300,000 gacha bo'lgan.[355] Hammasi bo'lib 185000 dan ortiq koreys va 29000 dan ortiq xitoylik askarlar o'ldirilgan va urush davomida yaponlar tomonidan 50-60 ming asir olingan.[356] Qo'lga tushganlar orasida keyinchalik 7500 nafari mojaro tugashi bilan diplomatik yo'llar bilan Koreyaga qaytarilgan.[357] Qolgan asirlarning katta qismi evropalik savdogarlarga - asosan portugal tilida sotilgan Makao, keyin ularni Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyo bo'ylab qayta sotgan.[358][359]
Yaponiyaga olib kelingan asirlar, jumladan olimlar, hunarmandlar, dori-darmon ishlab chiqaruvchilar va oltin eritadigan korxonalar Yaponiyaga ko'plab madaniy va texnologik yutuqlarni taqdim etishdi.[356] Keyingi yillarda, Yaponiya sopol idishlari va san'at rivojlangan va ularnikiga sezilarli o'xshashlikni rivojlantirgan Koreyalik hamkasblar.[191] Qishloq xo'jaligi kabi boshqa sohalardagi yutuqlarga texnika va bosqinlar paytida qo'lga kiritilgan va qo'lga kiritilgan hunarmandlar ham yordam berishdi. Yapon tipografiya xitoy shriftlarini qabul qilish bilan rivojlangan.[360] Chunki Koreya sopol idishlari Yaponiyada juda qadrlangan edi, ko'plab yapon lordlari Kyushu va Yaponiyaning boshqa qismlarida qo'lga olingan koreys kulollari bilan sopol ishlab chiqaradigan pechlar tashkil etishdi.[361] Ishlab chiqarish Arita chinni Yaponiyada 1616 yilda shaharchada boshlangan Imari urushdan keyin u erga ko'chib o'tishga majbur bo'lgan koreys kulollari yordamida.[361]
Urushdagi vahshiyliklar
Yaponiya qo'shinlari janglarda tinch aholiga qarshi jinoyatlar bilan shug'ullangan va ko'pincha tartibsiz ravishda o'ldirilgan. Kuydirilgan yer siyosati ko'pincha ishlatilgan: ekinlar yoqib yuborilgan va qishloq xo'jalik hayvonlari Jusson yoki Min kuchlari tomonidan ishlatilishining oldini olish uchun so'yilgan.[161] Asosiy janglardan tashqarida tinch aholidan oziq-ovqat va materiallar sotib olish uchun reydlar keng tarqalgan edi.[362] Asirga olingan mahbuslar ko'pincha yomon munosabatda bo'lishgan yoki ochlik va e'tiborsizlik tufayli o'limga qadar ishlashgan.[363] O'sha paytdagi jang maydonidagi amaliyotga rioya qilgan holda, yaponlar ham halok bo'lgan askarlarning quloq va burunlarini jang maydonida qilgan ishlarining isboti sifatida va qurbonlar sonini qayd etish uchun to'plashdi.[364] Chjuson va Min kuchlarining qurbon bo'lish darajasi va kampaniya davomida to'plangan quloqlarning ko'pligi Hideyoshining Buyuk Budda yaqinida katta tepalik qurish uchun etarli edi. Mimizuka ("Quloqlar tepasi")[365]
Koreyalik qo'shinlar, shuningdek, fuqarolardan oziq-ovqat va materiallarni zo'rlik bilan ham individual, ham uyushgan darajada sotib olishlari ma'lum bo'lgan.[168] Koreys qaroqchilar va avtoulovchilar urush paytida yuz bergan tartibsizlikdan foydalanib, bosqinchi partiyalar tuzib, boshqa koreyslarni talon-taroj qildilar.[366]
Xoseonni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun kelgan Ming qo'shinlari, ko'pincha vayronagarchilik miqdori va sodir etgan jinoyatlar darajasi bo'yicha yaponlardan qolishmas edi.[339] Ming kuchlari ko'pincha sodiq Jozon fuqarolari va yapon hamkasblari o'rtasida farq qilmas edilar.[367] E'tiborga loyiq bir vaziyatda, fuqarolar Namhae, Xitoy generali kim Chen Lin yaponiyalik hamkasblar deb nomlangan, asossiz o'ldirilgan.[367] Zudlik bilan Yaponiyaning harbiy tahdidi zararsizlantirilgandan so'ng, Ming qo'shinlarining tezda Koreyaning hududidan chiqib ketishini istagan Juzon istagi oxir-oqibat tinchlik qaror topishiga turtki bo'ldi.[339]
Meros
Urush uchta mamlakatda ham katta meros qoldirdi. Kontekstida Yaponiya imperializmi, bosqinlar Yaponiyaning global kuchga aylanish uchun birinchi urinishi sifatida qaralmoqda.[346] Koreyani qisman bosib olish natijasida Koreyaning Yaponiyaning ta'sir doirasiga kirishi haqidagi yapon kontseptsiyasi ishlab chiqildi va 19-asr oxiri va 20-asr boshlarida Yaponiya rahbarlari 1592–1597-yillardagi bosqinlardan foydalanishni asoslab berishdi. ularning Koreyani 20-asrga qo'shib olishlari.[368]
Xitoyda urush XX asr davomida Yaponiya imperializmiga qarshi millatchilikka qarshilik ko'rsatish uchun siyosiy jihatdan ishlatilgan.[346] Xitoy akademiyasida tarixchilar ushbu urushni Vanli imperatorining "Uchta buyuk jazolash kampaniyasi" deb sanaydilar.[346] Zamonaviy xitoy tarixchilari aksiyalarni ko'pincha Xitoy va Koreya o'rtoqlik qilgan do'stlik namunasi sifatida ishlatishadi.[iqtibos kerak ]
Koreyada bu urush koreys millatchiligining tarixiy asosidir va Xitoyda bo'lgani kabi, 20-asr davomida Yaponiya imperializmiga qarshi millatchilik qarshiligini qo'zg'atish uchun ilhomlanib, siyosiy jihatdan foydalanilgan. Koreya mojaro paytida bir nechta milliy qahramonlarga ega bo'ldi, shu jumladan Admiral Yi Sun-sin va Chen Lin (asoschisi Gvandong Jin urug‘i ).[346] Zamonaviy Koreyadagi yaponlarga qarshi kayfiyat Yaponiyaning 1592 yildagi bosqinchiligiga qadar kuzatilishi mumkin, ammo asosiy sabab bu so'nggi voqealarda, xususan koreyslar boshidan kechirgan qiyinchiliklar davomida Yaponiyaning Koreyani bosib olishi 1910 yildan 1945 yilgacha.
Xalqaro xabardorlik
Sharqiy Osiyodagi urushga katta qiziqish bo'lishiga qaramay,[369] Yaponiyaning Koreyaning istilolari G'arbda keng ma'lum emas.[370] Tarixchi Stiven Ternbull kabi unvonlarga bog'laydi Hideyoshining Koreyani bosib olishlari (shunchaki Toyotomi Hideyoshi biografiyasining kengaytirilgan qismi) va Yaponiyaning Koreyaga bostirib kirishi (shunchaki yaponiyalik wokou qaroqchi reydlarining kattaroq takrorlanishi) "urush" degan farq yo'q.[108] Ko'pgina tarix darsliklarida urushga faqat bir necha satr zikr qilingan, faqat bundan mustasno Samuray bosqini: Yaponiyaning Koreyadagi urushi 1592–98 Turnbull tomonidan ushbu mavzu bo'yicha ingliz tilida to'liq ilmiy tadqiqotlar mavjud emas,[371] Merdok ham, Sansom ham Yaponiyadagi umumiy tarixiy tadqiqotlarida mavzuni batafsil yoritgan bo'lishsa-da, Yaponiya tarixi (1903) va Yaponiya tarixi (1958) navbati bilan. Genri Kissincer mojaroni eslatib o'tadi Jahon tartibi (2014).
Shuningdek qarang
- Yaponiyaning Koreyaga hujumlari xronologiyasi (1592–98)
- Yaponiyaning Koreyaga istilosi davridagi janglar ro'yxati (1592–98)
- Yaponiyaning Koreyaga bostirib kirishi paytida dengiz urushlari ro'yxati (1592-98)
- Koreyaning dengiz tarixi
- Koreyadagi yapon qal'alari
- Koreyadagi yaponlarga qarshi kayfiyat
Izohlar
Adabiyotlar
- Eslatma: Barcha veb-saytlar bu erda mustaqil ravishda ro'yxatlangan Adabiyotlar Bo'lim.
- ^ a b Li, Kennet (1997 yil 1-yanvar). Koreya va Sharqiy Osiyo: Feniks haqida hikoya. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 108. ISBN 9780275958237. Olingan 26 mart, 2015. "Shunday qilib, 1592-1598 yillardagi Koreya-Yaponiya urushi yakunlandi, yaponlar umuman mag'lubiyatga uchradi va keng miqyosda chekinmoqda. Koreyslarning g'alabasi osonlikcha qo'lga kiritilgani yo'q."
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. Koreyaning samuray bosqini 1592–1598, p. 87 "Yaponiyaning 500 kemasidan atigi 50 nafari uyga cho'chish uchun omon qoldi."
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 269.
- ^ a b v d e f Imjin urushi, 1592-98
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 148.
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 338.
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 305.
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 439.
- ^ https://greatmingmilitary.blogspot.com/2019/08/critique-samuel-hawley-p2.html
- ^ Swope 2009 yil, p. 351.
- ^ a b Hawley 2005 yil, p. 105.
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 115.
- ^ Xolli, p. 116.
- ^ a b Hawley 2005 yil, p. 433.
- ^ Hawley 2005 yil, p. 446.
- ^ a b 1592-1598 yillardagi Sharqiy Osiyo urushining oqibatlari
- ^ Ulsan qamalida, 20,000+ o'ldirilgan, https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%98%8E%E5%8F%B2/%E5%8D%B7320 Ming tarixi 320 bob "士卒 物故 物故 者". Sacheon jangi (1598), 30,000+ o'ldirilgan, Ternbull, Stiven; Samuray bosqini: Yaponiyaning Koreyadagi urushi 1592–98. London: Cassell & Co, 2002, p. 222.
- ^ Turnbull 2002 yil, p. 222.
- ^ Turnbull 2002 yil, p. 230.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 229.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. Koreyaning samuray bosqini 1592–1598, p. 85
- ^ Ming tarixi 322-bob Yaponiya "前後 七 載 載 (Etti yil davomida) ， 喪 師 數 十萬 (Yuz minglab askarlar o'ldirilgan) ， 糜 餉 數 百萬 (Millionlab urush xarajatlari sarf qilingan) ， 中朝 與 朝鮮 迄 無 勝算 (U erda Xitoy va Koreyada g'alaba qozonish ehtimoli yo'q edi). (Xideyoshining o'limi bilan urush tugadi.) "" 至 關 白 白 死 兵禍 始 休 休。. "
- ^ Peres, Lui (2013). Yaponiya urushda: Entsiklopediya. Santa Barbara, Kaliforniya: ABC-CLIO. p. 141. ISBN 9781598847413 https://books.google.com/books?id=RHXG0JV9zEkC&q=Korean+victory+imjin+war&pg=PA140. Yo'qolgan yoki bo'sh
sarlavha =(Yordam bering) "Koreya va Xitoy kuchlari Yaponiya qo'shinlarini ushlab tura olishdi va janglarni janubiy viloyatlarda cheklashdi." - ^ a b v d e "明 史 / 卷 238 - 維基 文庫 自由 的 圖書館". zh.wikisource.org.
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 137-43, 204-27-betlar.
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 134, "(Koreys) urush vaziri Y Xang-bok Xitoydan yordam olish Koreyaning omon qolishi uchun yagona yo'l ekanligiga ishora qildi."
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven (2012 yil 20-noyabr). Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini 1592–98. Osprey nashriyoti. p. 17. ISBN 9781782007128. Olingan 25 mart, 2015. "Uning dengizdagi g'alabalari Yaponiyaning mag'lubiyatida hal qiluvchi ahamiyatga ega bo'lishi kerak edi, garchi Yi 1598 yildagi so'nggi jangida o'lishi kerak edi."
- ^ Peres, Lui G. (2013). Yaponiya urushda: Entsiklopediya. ABC-CLIO. p. 140. ISBN 978-1-59884-741-3.
Yaqinda Yaponiyaning to'liq g'alabasi paydo bo'lganidek, Admiral Yi urushga kirdi va oqimni tezda o'zgartirdi.
- ^ Elisonas, Yurgis. "Ajralmas uchlik: Yaponiyaning Xitoy va Koreya bilan munosabatlari." Yaponiyaning Kembrij tarixi. Vol. 4. Ed. Jon Uitni Xoll. Kembrij: Kembrij UP, 1991. p. 278.
- ^ Li, Ki-Baik. Koreyaning yangi tarixi. Trans. Edvard Vagner va Edvard J. Shults. Seul: Ilchokak, 1984. bet. 212.
- ^ a b Lyuis, Jeyms (2014 yil 5-dekabr). Sharqiy Osiyo urushi, 1592–1598: Xalqaro munosabatlar, zo'ravonlik va xotira. Yo'nalish. 160-61 betlar. ISBN 9781317662747. Olingan 2 may, 2015. "1592 yilda paydo bo'lgan solih qo'shinlar Koreyaning sakkizta viloyatida Yaponiya harbiylari tomonidan tarqatilgan mahalliy boshqaruvni buzdi. Adolatli armiya faoliyati Toyotomi rejimining Min Xitoyni bo'ysundirish va Koreya ustidan hukmronlikni kengaytirish istagi umidsizligining eng muhim omillaridan biri edi. . "
- ^ a b v Chjuson Dynasty Koreys tili yilnomalari http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kna_13110012_007
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 222. Xitoyning Min kuchlari 30000 yo'qotish bilan chekinishdi
- ^ a b https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%98%8E%E5%8F%B2/%E5%8D%B7320 Ming tarixi 320-bob. 20000 yo'qotish
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven; Koreyaning samuray bosqini 1592–1598, 5-7 betlar
- ^ Taker, Spenser (2009 yil 23-dekabr). Konfliktlarning global xronologiyasi: Qadimgi dunyodan zamonaviy O'rta Sharqgacha. ABC-CLIO. p. 881. ISBN 9781851096725. "Ushbu [Koreyslarning] g'alabalari yaponlarni dengiz kuchlarini yuborishga olib keldi ... Ertasi kuni u Yaponiyaning 12 kemasini asirga oldi va boshqa 40 dan ortiq odamni Xansan-doodan cho'ktirib yubordi"
- ^ Peres, Lui (2013). Yaponiya urushda: Entsiklopediya. ABC-CLIO. p. 140. ISBN 9781598847413. "Tez orada ketma-ket g'alabalar ketma-ket kelib, qo'shimcha kuchlarni olib ketayotgan yapon flotining yo'q qilinishi bilan yakun topdi ... Yi 120 dan ortiq harbiy kemalarni yoqib yubordi yoki cho'ktirdi va 100 ming yapon askarlari bo'lgan konvoyning katta qismini yo'q qildi."
- ^ Swope. 2002. p. 761.
- ^ Lyuis, Jeyms B. (2014). Sharqiy Osiyo urushi, 1592–1598: Xalqaro munosabatlar, zo'ravonlik va xotira. Yo'nalish. ISBN 978-1-317-66274-7.
"Biroq, Minning ishtirok etishi Chosenga yordam berish niyatidan ko'ra ko'proq o'zini himoya qilish bilan bog'liq edi. O'sha paytda Yaponiya" Minga kirish uchun yo'l qarz olish "rejalarini aniq e'lon qilgan edi. Shu sababli, Ming qo'rqqan edi. Liaodongning xavfsizligini ta'minladi va oxir-oqibat Yaponiya armiyasi tomonidan bosib olingan Chosen shahridan Pekinga xavf tug'dirishi haqida xavotirga tushdi.
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob 官軍 乃 退 駐 開 城
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 143,
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上 曰: "與 我國 人 何如? 或 曰:‘ 倭 不能 馬 戰 ’云, 然 耶?"時 言曰: "馬 戰 亦非 極難 之。。 倭 賊 初 不能 終, 終 亦能 之 矣。" 上 曰: "倭 賊 不能 射, 而 人 莫敢 敵, 何?"時 言曰: "我國 人 見 賊, 則 先 潰 以 走 爲 能事。 將 則 忠, 畏 有 軍 律, 不敢。 軍 之 者, 不可 勝 誅, 惟其 不可 勝, 是以 走耳。 倭 賊 雖 不能 射, 兩 之間, 忽 焉 前, 我國 之 雖 曰 善射, 遠 則不 中, 近 則 倭 可畏。 發 發 之後, 恐 其 短 兵 接, 未得 發 矢, 射 亦 不足 恃 矣。 倭 善用 劍, 我國 人 若 而 進, 則 可以 敵 矣。。 人 人 不能 如此, 皆以 走 爲 策, 走 且不 及, 則爲 賊 所殺。 賊 見 我國 之 人, 或 或 死, 樂 爲之 赴 戰 是以, 倭 之 氣 增長; 我 之 氣 沮喪 矣。
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變 初, 以 申 砬 爲 都 使, 領 大軍, 禦 于 鳥 嶺。 砬 不 計, 迎 入 於 廣 廣 計, 左右 彌滿, 曾 未, 十萬 十萬 精兵,一敗塗地。
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- ^ Park, Mi-Yeon; Kang, Min-Kyung; Cho, Myon Xi; Choi, Seul-Yul; Park, Pil-Sook (2012). "Seul Milliy universiteti kutubxonasi". Koreya oziq-ovqat madaniyati jamiyati jurnali. 27 (6): 598–606. doi:10.7318 / KJFC / 2012.27.6.598.
- ^ "이순신 을 본직 은 그대로 둔채 수군 통제사 에 겸임 겸임 시키다 (만력 21 년 (1593) 8 월 1 일)".
- ^ "의병 (義 兵)". Entsiklopediya. Yahoo Korea!. Olingan 2007-10-07.
- ^ a b v d e Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 108-09 betlar.
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini, 1592–98, London: Osprey 2008 yil 44-bet
- ^ a b v d e f g h men j k l m n o Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 110-15 betlar.
- ^ a b v d e f g h Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 116-23 betlar.
- ^ "Suvon". Britannica entsiklopediyasi. Olingan 2007-09-01.
- ^ "용인 전투". Daum Communications. Olingan 2007-09-01.
- ^ "이치 전투 (조선 역사) [梨 峙 戰 鬪]". Daum 백과 사전 (Janubiy Koreyadagi veb-portal). Daum Communications.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini, 1592–98, London: Osprey 2008 yil 45-46 betlar
- ^ a b v d Ternbull, Stiven Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini, 1592–98, London: Osprey 2008 yil 46-bet
- ^ a b Turnbull 2008 y.47
- ^ a b v d e Turnbull 2008 y.48
- ^ a b v d Turnbull 2008 p. 49.
- ^ a b Turnbull 2008 p. 50.
- ^ Turnbull 2008 p. 50-51.
- ^ a b v d Turnbull 2008 p. 51.
- ^ Turnbull 2008 p. 52.
- ^ a b Yaponiyaning Kembrij tarixi, 4-jild, p279
- ^ "Chjuson sulolasining yillik yozuvlari". Olingan 2013-08-29.
時 變 起 倉卒, 訛 言。 僚 左 〔僚佐〕 煽 言: "朝鮮 與 與 與 與 詭 詭 國 國 國 國 國 國 國 國, 猛士 北 猛士 猛士, 北 他人 爲 王, 托 托 被 王, 實爲 Rating 爲。 "流言 聞 於 上 國。 朝廷 疑 信 相 半, 半 尙 書 石 星 密諭 遼東, 遣 崔世臣 、 林世祿 等。
- ^ "Chjuson sulolasining yillik yozuvlari". Olingan 2013-08-29.
時 或 欲 請 兵 天朝, 大臣 以爲: "遼 、 廣 之 人 性, 性 甚 頑 暴, 若 天兵 渡江, 蹂躪 我國, 則 江 以西 未 陷 諸郡, 盡 爲 赤地。" 兩 爭論 久, kun 久 久決, 聞 天朝 差 崔世臣 、 林世祿 來, 大臣 啓 遣 根 托 以 迎 慰, 實 我國 我國 疲 破 之 陳 天兵, 天兵 難於 久住 之, 州 州 回去, 故 有是 啓。
- ^ Toni Jakues (2007). Janglar va qamallar lug'ati: P-Z. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-313-33539-6.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.52.
- ^ a b v d e f g h Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.53.
- ^ "Chjuson sulolasining yillik yozuvlari". Olingan 2013-08-29.
兵部 尙 書 石 星 密諭 遣, 遣 崔世臣 、 等 等。 以 採 審 賊 爲名, 實 欲 馳至 平壤, 請 國王 相會, 審 其 眞 僞 而 歸。
- ^ Song Yingchangning 1593 yil 16-fevraldagi sudga rasmiy xabarida yozilgan maktubida, jami 38.537 kishi kelgan.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.52-53
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.54.
- ^ Gambe, Annabelle R. (2000). Chet eldagi xitoylik tadbirkorlik va Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyodagi kapitalistik rivojlanish. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 99. ISBN 9783825843861. Olingan 19 iyul 2016.
- ^ Chinvanno, Anuson (1992-06-18). Tailandning Xitoyga nisbatan siyosati, 1949–54. Springer. p. 24. ISBN 9781349124305. Olingan 19 iyul 2016.
- ^ Leonard, Jeyn Kate (1984). Vey Yuan va Xitoyning dengiz dunyosini qayta kashf etishi. Garvard Univ Osiyo markazi. 137-38 betlar. ISBN 9780674948556. Olingan 19 iyul 2016.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.58.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.54
- ^ a b v Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.59.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y. 50-bet.
- ^ a b v d Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y. 60-bet.
- ^ "Chjuson sulolasining yillik yozuvlari". Olingan 2013-08-29.
- ^ a b v d Ternbull, Stiven 2008 y.61.
- ^ Piter Lorge (2005 yil 25 oktyabr). Dastlabki zamonaviy Xitoyda urush, siyosat va jamiyat, 900–1795. Yo'nalish. p.134. ISBN 978-0-203-96929-8.
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob 十九 日 ， 如柏 (Li Rusong ) 遂 複 開 城
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob 官軍 既 連勝 ， 有 輕敵 心 二十 七 bugungi kun 再 進。。 人 以 以 賊 棄 王 京 京 告。 如 松 松 信 ， 將 將 輕騎 趨 碧 蹄。
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 145.
- ^ a b v d e f g h men Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 62
- ^ Ming tarixi 20-bob "李如松 進攻 王 ， 遇 倭 於 碧 蹄 ， ， 敗績。" https://zh.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ 明 史 / 卷 20.
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob "官軍 喪失 甚多 會 天 天 ， 騎 入 稻 畦 中 不 得逞。 倭 背 嶽山 ， 面 漢水 聯營 城中 ， 廣 樹 飛 樓 ， 退 駐 城 城。。" https://zh.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ 明 明 / 卷 238
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob "初 ， 官軍 平壤 ， ， 鋒銳 甚 不 復 問 問 封 事。 及 及 碧 蹄 敗 衄" https://zh.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ 明 明 / 卷 238
- ^ Ming tarixi 320-bob "如 松 既 ， 輕騎 趨 碧 蹄 館 ， 敗 ， 退 駐 開 城。" 320. https://zh.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ 明 史 / 卷 320
- ^ Ming tarixi 322-bob "如 松 乘勝 碧 碧 蹄 ， 敗 而退 師 師。" https://zh.m.wikisource.org/wiki/ 明 史 / 卷 322
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob 將 輕騎 趨 碧 蹄 館 距 王 京 三十裏 ， 猝 遇 倭 ， 圍 數 重。。 如 松 搏 部下 鏖戰 鏖戰。 一 倭 搏 如 松 松 被殺。。。 等 等 等 等前 夾擊 ， 如 梅 射 倭 墜馬 ， 楊元兵 亦 至 ， 斫 重圍 入 ， 倭 倭 乃 退 退 ， 喪失 喪失 甚多 甚多 會 天 久雨 ， 入 入 稻 ， ， 面 漢水 聯營 聯營 聯營 面 面 漢水 聯營城中 ， 廣 樹 飛 ， 箭 砲 不 絕 ， ， 官軍 乃 退 駐 開 城。
- ^ a b v d e f g Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 63
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven (2012 yil 20-noyabr). Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini 1592–98. Osprey nashriyoti. p. 63. ISBN 9781782007128. Olingan 2 may, 2015. "Umidsizlikka tushgan xitoylik general Li Rusong Xenjjudagi g'alaba haqida eshitgach, janjalga qaytishga qaror qildi va xitoylik qo'shinlar yana bir bor janubiy Seulga qarab harakatlana boshladilar."
- ^ "Sharqiy ekspeditsiya yozuvlari" da bayonotlar Qian Shizhen
- ^ Tomonidan turli xil harflar Song Yingchang jumladan, 1593 yil 10 fevralda Li Rusongga "今 今 糧草 未 敷 泥濘 難 進 進" deb yozilgan xat.
- ^ Ming tarixi 238-bob 聞 倭 將 平 秀 嘉 龍山 倉 ， 積 粟 數 數 十萬 ， 密令 大受 率 率 死士 從 間 間 焚。。 倭 乏 乏 食。
- ^ a b v d e Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 67-bet
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, s.68
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, s.69-70
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 70-bet
- ^ a b v d e f g h men j k Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, s.71
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, s.71 & 74
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 74
- ^ Yaponiyaning Kembrij tarixi, 4-jild, Zamonaviy Yaponiyaning dastlabki davrlari, p. 281.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, 75-bet
- ^ Kimyoviy, Bill. "Ch 12 - Yapon istilolari: Uy jabhasi". Yo'lbars ko'zi bilan Koreya. Koreya tarixi loyihasi. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2009-04-03 da. Olingan 2007-07-04.
- ^ Kimyoviy, Bill. "Ch 12 - yapon bosqinlari: Buyuk tinchlik qo'shig'i". Yo'lbars ko'zi bilan Koreya. Koreya tarixi loyihasi. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2007-09-27. Olingan 2007-07-04.
- ^ Xoli, Imjin urushi, op. keltirish, p. 450.
- ^ a b Xuang, Rey, "O'pka Chin va Van-li hukmronligi, 1567–1620". yilda Xitoyning Kembrij tarixi. Vol. 7, Ming sulolasi, 1368–1644, I qism, Denis Tvithet va Jon Farbank tahririda. Kembrij universiteti matbuoti, 1988, p. 572.
- ^ Li, Ki-Baik, Koreyaning yangi tarixi, Edvard Vagner va Edvard J. Shuls tomonidan tarjima qilingan, Ilchorak / Garvard University Press, 1984, p. 214, ISBN 0-674-61575-1.
- ^ Avstraliya katalogida nashr etilgan Milliy kutubxona, Yapon dengiz kuchi: Dengiz xalqining o'ziga xoslik uchun kurashi, Sajima, N (Naoko), 1959–. Tachikava, K (Kyoichi), 1966–. ISSN 1835-7679, ISBN 978-0-642-29705-1 [1]
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 191.
- ^ 脇 坂 紀, 太 田 藤 四郎 va 塙 保 己 一, muharrirlar, 続 続 書 類 従 [Zoku Gunsho Ruiju seriyasi], 1933, p. 448.
- ^ Bu to'plangan burunlar sonining yozuviga ishora qiladi, chunki koreys kampaniyasi paytida samuraylar ko'proq burun yig'ish odatidan farqli o'laroq, Yaponiya materikiga olib borish maqsadga muvofiq bo'lmaganligi sababli, qancha burun yig'ganiga qarab to'langan.
- ^ Hidemoto, Okochi, g朝鮮 記 [Tanlangan Ki], 太 田 藤 四郎 va 塙 保 己 一, muharrirlar, 続 続 書 類 従 [Zoku Gunsho Ruiju seriyasi], 1933
- ^ a b Ternbull, Stiven Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini, 1592–98, London: Osprey 2008 yil 82-bet
- ^ a b v d Ternbull, Stiven Samuraylarning Koreyaga bosqini, 1592–98, London: Osprey 2008 yil 81-bet
- ^ "Chison sulolasi yilnomalari". Olingan 2013-12-12.
解 生 等 伏兵 於 稷山 之 沙坪 乘, 乘 賊 未及 城 列, 縱 突 騎 擊 之, 賊 披靡 而 走, 死者 甚多.又遣 游擊 擺 賽, 將 兩千 繼之, 與 四 將 合 勢, 游擊 又 破 之.是 日, 經理 提督 請 上 出 江 上, 上 而 行 行, 人心 洶, 士庶 接 荷擔 而立, 內殿 壁 兵 幸 幸, 及 捷報 致 ， ， 京 中。。。
- ^ "Chison sulolasi yilnomalari". Olingan 2013-12-12.
賊 於 初十 日, 搶掠 安 城, 進犯 竹山 境。
- ^ 桑田 忠 親 [Kuwata, Tadachika], tahr., 旧 参謀 本部 編纂, [Kyu Sanbo Honbu], 朝鮮 の 役 [Chousen no Eki] (1981 y の 戦 史 [Nihon no Senshi] 5-jild), 1965, p. 192.
- ^ Nanjung Ilgi. Admiral Yi Sun-sinning urush kundaligi. Xa Tae Xun tarjimasi, Sohn Pov-key tomonidan tahrirlangan. Yonsei University Press, Seul, Koreya, 1977, p. 312, ISBN 89-7141-018-3.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 202,
- ^ Yi Sun-gunoh, Nanjung Ilgi 1597 yil 17-sentyabr - 2-oktabr (Xitoy Lunisolar taqvimi)
- ^ "Chison sulolasi yilnomalari". Olingan 2013-12-09.
靈光避亂儒生李洪鍾等船隻, 忠淸營前浦到泊, 問水路賊勢, 則洪鍾言內, 在海中時, 連遇上來鮑作人, 詳問下道賊勢, 則賊船或三四隻, 或八九隻, 入靈光以下諸島, 殺擄極慘, 靈光地有避亂船七隻, 無遺陷沒。
- ^ "Annals of the Joseon Dynasty". Olingan 2014-08-19.
退泊于務安地, 連日焚蕩
- ^ 毛利高棟文書
- ^ 강항(姜沆) 간양록(看羊錄)
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 203.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, pp. 204–05.
- ^ 文禄u12539 ・慶長役における被虜人の研究, 東京大学出版, 1976, p. 128, ASIN 4130260235.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 215.
- ^ "The annual records of the Joseon Dynasty". Olingan 2013-08-29.
接伴使戶曹參議宋諄啓曰: "蔚山之賊, 被圍日久, 援船多來泊, 又於賊窟迤西遠山, 山上盛張旗幟, 以助聲勢。
- ^ History of the Ming chapter 259 明年正月二日，行長救兵驟至。鎬大懼，狼狽先奔，諸軍繼之。賊前襲擊，死者無算。副將吳惟忠、遊擊茅國器斷後，賊乃還，輜重多喪失。
- ^ History of the Ming chapter 238 明年正月二日，行長來援，九將兵俱潰。賊張旗幟江上，鎬大懼，倉皇撤師
- ^ Annals of Seonjo record on 1/14 1598 正月初三日夜間, 喧說船賊下陸, 而唐軍卒然解圍, 一時移陣。
- ^ "The annual records of the Joseon Dynasty". Olingan 2013-08-29.
初四日朝, 諸軍馬鳥驚魚駭, 達夜崩潰, 俱棄器械, 狼藉原陸。 臣失副摠所在, 追至安東, 亦不相逢, 姑留待候副摠之行, 而以天將接伴之臣, 奉使無狀, 至於相失, 措躬無地, 席藁待罪耳
- ^ https://zh.wikisource.org/wiki/%E6%98%8E%E5%8F%B2/%E5%8D%B7320 History of the Ming chapter 320 士卒物故者二萬
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 219.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven; Samuray bosqini: Yaponiyaning Koreyadagi urushi 1592–98. London: Cassell & Co, 2002, p. 217
- ^ Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 31-10-12-7 Korean language http://sillok.history.go.kr/inspection/insp_king.jsp?id=kna_13110012_007&tabid=k
- ^ Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 31-10-12-7 Chinese language http://sillok.history.go.kr/inspection/insp_king.jsp?id=wna_13110012_007&tabid=w
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, pp. 220–21.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 222.
- ^ The History of the Ming chapter 239 朝鮮再用師，詔一元隸總督邢玠麾下，參贊軍事。尋代李如梅為禦倭總兵官。時兵分四路。一元由中路，禦石曼子於泗州，先拔晉州，下望晉，乘勝濟江，連毀永春、昆陽二寨。賊退保泗州老營，攻下之，遊擊盧得功陣歿。前逼新寨。寨三面臨江，一面通陸，引海為濠，海艘泊寨下千計，築金海、固城為左右翼。一元分馬步夾攻。步兵遊擊彭信古用大棓擊寨，碎其數處。眾軍進逼賊濠，毀其柵。忽營中炮裂，煙焰漲天。賊乘勢沖擊，固城援賊亦至。騎兵諸將先奔，一元亦還晉州。事聞，詔斬遊擊馬呈文、郝三聘，落信古等職，充為事官；一元亦奪宮保，貶秩三等。
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 222.
- ^ Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 31-10-12-5 http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/wna_13110012_005
- ^ Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 31-10-12-6 http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/wna_13110012_006
- ^ Annals of the Joseon Dynasty 31-10-12-6 http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kna_13110012_007
- ^ Annals of the Joseon Dynasty Chinese language http://sillok.history.go.kr/inspection/insp_king.jsp?id=wna_13110012_007&tabid=w
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 227.
- ^ "The History of the Ming". Olingan 2013-12-20.
璘(Chen Lin)遣子龍(Deng Zilong)偕朝鮮統制使李舜臣(Yi Sun-sin)督水軍千人
- ^ "The History of the Ming". Olingan 2013-12-20.
他舟误掷火器入子龙舟，舟中火，贼乘之，子龙战死。舜臣赴救，亦死。
- ^ "The annual records of the Joseon Dynasty". Olingan 2013-08-30.
軍門都監啓曰: "卽者陳提督差官入來曰: ‘賊船一百隻捕捉, 二百隻燒破, 斬首五百級, 生擒一百八十餘名。 溺死者, 時未浮出, 故不知其數。 李總兵一定死了云。 敢啓。" 傳曰: "知道。" (According to Chen Lin, Our army captured [approximately] 100 enemy ships, destroyed [approximately] 200 ships, beheaded 500 enemy soldiers, and caught 180-plus soldiers alive. The number of drowned enemy soldiars is unknown, because they have not all sunk.)
- ^ a b v d e f g Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 235.
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 236.
- ^ Swope. 2005. p. 13.
- ^ Swope. 2002. p. 757
- ^ Swope. 2002. p. 781
- ^ Ternbull, Stiven. 2002, p. 233.
- ^ a b v Strauss, Barri. p. 21.
- ^ a b v d e f Swope. 2002. pp. 758–59.
- ^ Jurgis Elisonas, "The inseparable trinity:Japan's relations with China and Korea", in John Whitney Hall (tahr.) The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol.4 Cambridge University Press 1991 pp. 235–99 p. 278, (Keinen pp. 292–93).
- ^ "Early Joseon Period". Tarix. Bosh vazirning devoni. Olingan 2007-03-30.
- ^ a b Jinwung Kim, A History of Korea: From "Land of the Morning Calm" to States in Conflict,
- ^ Yi, Gwang-pyo; Yoon Wang-joon (2007-02-20). 500년 전의 첨단과학 다시 숨쉰다…자격루 복원-작동 성공 (koreys tilida). Donga. Olingan 2007-07-04.
- ^ Kim, Yung-sik. p. 55
- ^ "Annals of the Joseon Dynasty". Olingan 2013-08-29.
都城宮省火。 車駕將出, 都中有姦民, 先入內帑庫, 爭取寶物者。 已而駕出, 亂民大起, 先焚掌隷院、刑曹, 以二局公、私奴婢文籍所在也。 遂大掠宮省、倉庫, 仍放火滅迹。 景福、昌德、昌慶三宮, 一時俱燼。 昌慶宮卽順懷世子嬪欑宮所在也。 歷代寶玩及文武樓、弘文館所藏書籍、春秋館各朝《實錄》、他庫所藏前朝史草、【修《高麗史》時所草。】《承政院日記》, 皆燒盡無遺。 內外倉庫、各署所藏, 竝被盜先焚。 臨海君家、兵曹判書洪汝諄家亦被焚, 以二家常時號多畜財故也。 留都大將斬數人以警衆, 亂民屯聚, 不能禁。
- ^ Richard Bulliet, Pamela Crossley, Daniel Headrick, Steven Hirsch, Lyman Johnson, The Earth and Its Peoples, Brief: A Global History, Cengage Learning, 2014 6th ed. p.456.
- ^ Jones, Geo H., Vol. 23 No. 5, p. 254
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Tashqi havolalar
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- Imjin Vaeran janglari (koreys tilida)
- Imjin Vaeran (koreys tilida)
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- Imjinvayran (inglizchada)
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