Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop - Joachim von Ribbentrop - Wikipedia
Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop | |
|---|---|
 Ribbentrop 1938 yilda | |
| Reyx vazir tashqi ishlar | |
| Ofisda 1938 yil 4-fevral - 1945 yil 30-aprel | |
| Fyer | Adolf Gitler |
| Oldingi | Konstantin fon Neyrat |
| Muvaffaqiyatli | Artur Seys-Inkvart |
| Germaniyaning Buyuk Britaniyadagi elchisi | |
| Ofisda 1936 yil 11-avgust - 1938 yil 4-fevral | |
| Tomonidan tayinlangan | Adolf Gitler |
| Oldingi | Leopold fon Xesh |
| Muvaffaqiyatli | Gerbert fon Dirksen |
| Shaxsiy ma'lumotlar | |
| Tug'ilgan | Ulrix Fridrix Vilgelm Yoaxim Ribbentrop 1893 yil 30-aprel Vezel, Reyn viloyati, Prussiya qirolligi, Germaniya imperiyasi |
| O'ldi | 16 oktyabr 1946 yil (53 yoshda) Nürnberg, Bavariya, Ittifoqchilar tomonidan bosib olingan Germaniya |
| O'lim sababi | Ijro etilishi osilgan |
| Siyosiy partiya | Natsistlar partiyasi (1932-1945) |
| Turmush o'rtoqlar | Anna Elisabet Xenkell (m. 1920) |
| Bolalar | 5 |
| Kasb | Tadbirkor, diplomat |
| Imzo |  |
| Harbiy xizmat | |
| Sadoqat |  Germaniya imperiyasi (1914-1918) |
| Filial / xizmat | Germaniya armiyasi |
| Birlik | 12-gussar polki |
| Janglar / urushlar | Birinchi jahon urushi |
Ulrix Fridrix Vilgelm Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop (1893 yil 30 aprel - 1946 yil 16 oktyabr) bo'ldi tashqi ishlar vaziri ning Natsistlar Germaniyasi 1938 yildan 1945 yilgacha.
Ribbentrop birinchi bo'lib keldi Adolf Gitler tashqi dunyoni biladigan va eng katta milliy sotsialistlarga qaraganda ko'proq ma'lumotga ega bo'lgan va tashqi ishlar bo'yicha taniqli avtor sifatida yaxshi sayohat qilgan ishbilarmon sifatida. U uyini taklif qildi Schloss Fuschl 1933 yil yanvar oyida Gitler tayinlanganiga olib kelgan maxfiy uchrashuvlar uchun Germaniya kansleri. U Gitlerni yuzaki va iste'dodsiz deb o'ylagan ba'zi partiyalar a'zolaridan nafratlanib, yaqin odamiga aylandi. U elchi etib tayinlandi Sent-Jeyms sudi, Qirollik sudi Birlashgan Qirollik, 1936 yilda, so'ngra 1938 yil fevralda Germaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri.
Oldin Ikkinchi jahon urushi, u vositachilikda asosiy rol o'ynagan Chelik shartnomasi (bilan ittifoq Fashistik Italiya ) va Molotov - Ribbentrop pakti (fashistlar-sovetlarning tajovuz qilmaslik shartnomasi). U Sovetlar bilan yaxshi munosabatlarni saqlab qolishni ma'qul ko'rdi va ularga qarshi chiqdi Sovet Ittifoqiga bostirib kirish. 1941 yil kuzida, tufayli Amerikaning Britaniyaga yordami va tobora tez-tez uchraydigan "hodisalar" Shimoliy Atlantika okeanida Buyuk Britaniyaga kelgan karvonlarni qo'riqlayotgan amerikalik harbiy kemalar o'rtasida Ribbentrop Vashingtondagi yapon-amerika muzokaralarining muvaffaqiyatsizligi uchun va Yaponiya hujum qilish Qo'shma Shtatlar.[1] U qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun qo'lidan kelganicha harakat qildi urush e'lon qilish dan keyin Qo'shma Shtatlarda Perl-Harborga hujum.[2] 1941 yildan boshlab Ribbentropning ta'siri pasayib ketdi.
1945 yil iyun oyida hibsga olingan Ribbentrop sudlangan va o'limga mahkum etilgan da Nürnberg sudlari Evropada Ikkinchi Jahon Urushini boshlash va uni yaratishda uning roli uchun Holokost. 1946 yil 16 oktyabrda u Nyurnberg sudlanuvchilaridan birinchisi bo'ldi ijro etildi tomonidan osilgan.
Hayotning boshlang'ich davri
Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop tug'ilgan Vezel, Reniya Prussiyasi, Richard Ulrich Fridrix Yoaxim Ribbentrop, mansab armiyasi zobiti va uning rafiqasi Yoxanna Sofi Xertvigga.[3] 1904 yildan 1908 yilgacha Ribbentrop oldi Frantsuz Litsey Fabertdagi kurslar Metz,[4] The Germaniya imperiyasi eng kuchli qal'a.[5] Keyinchalik sobiq o'qituvchi Ribbentropni "sinfidagi eng ahmoq, behuda va juda bosqinchi bo'lgan" deb esladi.[6] Uning otasi edi kassa dan Prussiya armiyasi 1908 yilda bir necha bor kamsitgani uchun Kaiser Wilhelm II uning gomoseksualligi uchun va Ribbentrop oilasida ko'pincha pul etishmayotgan edi.[7]
Keyingi 18 oy ichida oila ko'chib o'tdi Arosa, Shveytsariya, bu erda bolalar frantsuz va ingliz xususiy repetitorlari tomonidan o'qitishni davom ettirdilar va Ribbentrop bo'sh vaqtini chang'i va alpinizmda o'tkazdi.[8] Arosada bo'lganidan keyin Ribbentrop ingliz tilini bilish uchun Britaniyaga bir yilga jo'natildi. Ikkalasini ham yaxshi biladi Frantsuz va Ingliz tili, yosh Ribbentrop turli davrlarda yashagan Grenobl, Frantsiya va London, sayohat qilishdan oldin Kanada 1910 yilda.[9]
U ishlagan Molsons banki kuni Stenli ko'chasi yilda Monreal, keyin esa M. P. va J. T. Devis muhandislik firmasi uchun Kvebek ko'prigi qayta qurish. U shuningdek, tomonidan ish bilan ta'minlangan Milliy transkontinental temir yo'l, dan chiziq qurgan Monkton ga Vinnipeg. U jurnalist sifatida ishlagan Nyu-York shahri va Boston ammo tuzalish uchun Germaniyaga qaytib keldi sil kasalligi.[10] U qaytib keldi Kanada va kichik biznes tashkil etish Ottava nemis sharob va shampanlarini import qilish.[11] 1914 yilda u Ottavaning mashhuri uchun raqobatlashdi Minto konkida uchish jamoasi va fevral oyida Bostondagi Ellis Memorial Trophy turnirida ishtirok etishdi.[11][12]
Qachon Birinchi jahon urushi keyinchalik 1914 yilda boshlangan, Ribbentrop tarkibida bo'lgan Kanadani tark etdi Britaniya imperiyasi Germaniya bilan urushgan va neytral tomonga o'tgan Qo'shma Shtatlar.[13] 1914 yil 15-avgustda u suzib ketdi Xoboken, Nyu-Jersi, ustida Gollandiya-Amerika kema Potsdam, bog'langan Rotterdam,[13] va Germaniyaga qaytib kelgandan so'ng Prussiya 12-da ro'yxatdan o'tgan Hussar Polk.[14]
Ribbentrop birinchi bo'lib xizmat qildi Sharqiy front, keyin o'tkazildi G'arbiy front.[13] U komissiyani qo'lga kiritdi va mukofot bilan taqdirlandi Temir xoch. 1918 yilda 1-leytenant Ribbentrop joylashtirilgan Istanbul xodimlar zobiti sifatida.[15] Uning davrida kurka, u boshqa xodim xodimining do'sti bo'ldi, Franz fon Papen.[16]
1919 yilda Ribbentrop Anna Elisabet Xenkell bilan uchrashdi ("Annlies" do'stlariga),[17] boy Visbaden sharob ishlab chiqaruvchisi qizi. Ular 1920 yil 5-iyulda turmush qurishdi va Ribbentrop butun Evropa bo'ylab sharob sotuvchisi sifatida sayohat qila boshladi. U va Ennlisning birga beshta farzandi bor edi.[18] 1925 yilda uning xolasi Gertrud fon Ribbentrop uni asrab oldi, bu unga qo'shib qo'yishga imkon berdi nobiliy zarracha fon uning nomiga.[19]
Erta martaba
1928 yilda Ribbentrop bilan tanishtirildi Adolf Gitler "nemis shampani uchun boshqalar bahosi frantsuz shampani bilan bir xil narxga ega bo'ladigan" xorijiy aloqalarga ega bo'lgan ishbilarmon sifatida.[20] Wolf-Heinrich Graf von Helldorff Birinchi jahon urushida Ribbentrop 12-chi Torgau gussarlarida xizmat qilgan.[21] Ribbentrop va uning rafiqasi qo'shildi Milliy sotsialistik Germaniya ishchilar partiyasi 1932 yil 1-mayda.[22] O'sha yozda Ribbentrop o'zining siyosiy faoliyatini Germaniya kansleri o'rtasida maxfiy elchi bo'lishni taklif qilish bilan boshladi Franz fon Papen, uning urush davridagi eski do'sti va Gitler.[23] Dastlab uning taklifi rad etildi. Olti oy o'tgach, Gitler va Papen uning yordamini qabul qilishdi.[23]
Ularning yuragi o'zgarishi Generaldan keyin sodir bo'ldi Kurt von Shleyxer 1932 yil dekabrda Papen hokimiyatdan chetlashtirildi. Bu murakkab fitnalar majmuasini keltirib chiqardi, unda Papen va prezidentning turli do'stlari bo'lgan Pol fon Xindenburg Shleyxerni haydash uchun Gitler bilan muzokara olib bordi. 1933 yil 22-yanvarda davlat kotibi Otto Meissner va Xindenburgning o'g'li Oskar Gitler bilan uchrashdi, Hermann Göring va Vilgelm Frik Ribbentropning Berlin shahridagi eksklyuziv uyida Dahlem tuman.[23] Kechki ovqat paytida Papen Shleyxer hukumati qulasa, u kantslerlik talabidan voz kechadi va buning o'rniga Gitler kanslerlikka ega bo'lishini ta'minlash uchun Prezident Xindenburg bilan bo'lgan ta'siridan foydalanadi degan xayoliy tavakkal qildi.[24]
Ribbentrop natsistlar partiyasi tomonidan mashhur emas edi Alte Kämpfer (Qadimgi jangchilar); deyarli barchasi unga yoqmadi.[25] Britaniyalik tarixchi Lorens Riz Ribbentropni "fashistlarning deyarli barcha etakchi natsistlari yomon ko'rgan" deb ta'riflagan.[26] Jozef Gebbels "Von Ribbentrop uning ismini sotib olgan, u o'z puliga uylangan va u o'z lavozimiga kirib borganida aldagan" degan kundaligiga ishonganida umumiy fikrni bildirgan.[27] Ribbentrop Gitler bilan istalgan vaqtda uchrashuvsiz uchrashishi mumkin bo'lgan oz sonli odamlar qatoriga kirgan, ammo Gebbels yoki Gyoringdan farqli o'laroq.[28]
Ko'pchiligida Veymar Respublikasi davr, Ribbentrop siyosatsiz edi va yo'q deb ko'rsatdi antisemitizm xurofot.[29] 1928 yilda Ribbentrop tashlagan bir ziyofat mehmoni Ribbentropning noaniq hayratidan tashqari siyosiy qarashlari yo'qligini yozgan. Gustav Stresemann, kommunizmdan qo'rqish va monarxiyani tiklash istagi.[29] Bir nechta Berlin 20-asrning 20-yillarida Ribbentrop bilan ish olib borgan va uni yaxshi bilgan yahudiy ishbilarmonlari keyinchalik u keyinchalik namoyish qilgan yovuz antisemitizmdan hayratlanishdi. Uchinchi reyx, u bunday fikrlarni bildirganini ko'rmaganligini aytdi.[29] Ribbentrop qaynotasining shampan firmasining hamkori sifatida yahudiy bankirlari bilan ish olib borgan va yahudiylarning moliyalashtirilishi bilan Impegroma Importing Company ("Import und Export großer Marken") ni tashkil qilgan.[20]
Dastlabki diplomatik martaba
Fon
Ribbentrop, Gitlerning tashqi siyosat bo'yicha eng sevimli maslahatchisiga aylandi, qisman Germaniyadan tashqaridagi dunyo bilan yaxshi tanishligi bilan, shuningdek, xushomadgo'ylik va sycophancy bilan.[30][31] Keyinchalik nemis diplomatlaridan biri "Ribbentrop tashqi siyosat haqida hech narsani tushunmas edi. Uning yagona istagi Gitlerga yoqish edi", deb esladi.[31] Xususan, Ribbentrop Gitlerning gaplarini diqqat bilan tinglash, uning uy hayvonlari g'oyalarini yodlash va keyin Gitler g'oyalarini o'zinikidek namoyish etish odatiga aylandi, bu Gitlerga juda ta'sirlanib, Ribbentropning ideal Natsional-sotsialistik diplomat ekanligini isbotladi.[32] Ribbentrop tezda Gitler har qanday muammoning eng tubdan hal qilinishini ma'qul ko'rganini va shunga muvofiq Ribbentrop yordamchisi eslaganidek, o'z maslahatini shu yo'nalishda berganini tezda anglab etdi:
Gitler "Grey" deganda, Ribbentrop "Qora, qora, qora" dedi. U har doim buni uch baravar ko'proq aytgan va har doim radikalroq bo'lgan. Bir kuni Ribbentrop bo'lmaganida Gitlerning so'zlarini tingladim: 'Ribbentrop bilan bu juda oson, u har doim juda radikaldir. Qolaversa, menda qolgan boshqa odamlar, ular bu erga kelishadi, muammolari bor, ular qo'rqishadi, biz g'amxo'rlik qilishimiz kerak deb o'ylashadi, keyin men ularni portlatishim kerak, kuchli bo'lishim kerak. Va Ribbentrop butun kunni portlatdi va men hech narsa qilmasligim kerak edi. Men sindirishim kerak edi - juda ham yaxshi! »[33]
Ribbentropning yuksalishiga yordam bergan yana bir omil - Gitlerning Germaniyaning professional diplomatlariga ishonmasligi va ularga nisbatan nafratlanishi. U uning inqilobini to'liq qo'llab-quvvatlamagan deb gumon qildi.[34] Biroq, Tashqi ishlar vazirligi diplomatlari hukumatga sodiqlik bilan xizmat qilishdi va Gitlerga kamdan-kam tanqid qilish uchun asos berishdi.[35] Tashqi ishlar vazirligi diplomatlari ultratovushli, avtoritar va antisemitizm edi. Natijada, ikkala guruh o'rtasida ularning ko'pchiligining fashistlar uchun bemalol ishlashiga imkon beradigan qiymatlar bir-biriga to'g'ri keldi.[36] Shunga qaramay, Gitler hech qachon Tashqi ishlar vazirligiga to'liq ishonmagan va tashqi siyosiy maqsadlarini amalga oshirish uchun kimdirni qidirgan.[35]
Versalni buzish
Fashistlar va Germaniyaning professional diplomatlari ushbu maqsadni yo'q qilishda maqsad bo'lishdi Versal shartnomasi va Germaniyani buyuk kuch sifatida tiklash.[36] 1933 yil oktyabrda Germaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri Baron Konstantin fon Neyrat da eslatma taqdim etdi Qurolsizlanish bo'yicha Butunjahon konferentsiyasi Germaniyaning Versal shartnomasining V qismi bilan qurolsizlanishda davom etishi adolatsiz ekanligini e'lon qildi va boshqa kuchlardan Germaniya darajasiga qadar yoki V qismgacha qurolsizlanishini va Germaniyaga ruxsat berilishini talab qildi. Gleichberechtigung ("qurollanish tengligi"). Frantsiya Neurathning notasini rad etganida, Germaniya notadan chiqib ketdi Millatlar Ligasi va qurolsizlanish bo'yicha Butunjahon konferentsiyasi. Bularning barchasi V qismni bir tomonlama buzish niyatida ekanligidan tashqari, barchasi Frantsiyada bir necha bor qo'ng'iroqlar bo'lib o'tdi. profilaktik urush Germaniya hali ham ozmi-ko'pmi qurolsizlantirilgan paytda fashistlar rejimiga barham berish.[37]
Biroq, noyabr oyida Ribbentrop Gitler va frantsuz jurnalisti o'rtasida uchrashuv tashkil qildi Fernand de Brinon, gazetaga kim yozgan Le Matin. Uchrashuv davomida Gitler o'zining tinchlikni sevishini va Frantsiyaga bo'lgan do'stligini ta'kidladi.[37] Gitlerning Brinon bilan uchrashuvi Frantsiya jamoatchilik fikriga katta ta'sir ko'rsatdi va profilaktik urush chaqiriqlarini to'xtatishga yordam berdi. Bu Frantsiyada ko'pchilikni Gitler tinchlikparvar odam ekanligiga ishontirdi, u faqat Versal shartnomasining V qismini bekor qilishni xohladi.[37]
Qurolsizlanish bo'yicha maxsus komissar
1934 yilda Gitler Ribbentropning maxsus komissari nomini berdi Qurolsizlanish.[38] O'zining dastlabki yillarida Gitlerning tashqi aloqalardagi maqsadi dunyoni kamaytirishni xohlaganiga ishontirish edi mudofaa byudjeti qurolsizlanish bo'yicha idealistik, ammo juda noaniq takliflar qilish orqali (1930-yillarda qurolsizlanish qurollarni cheklash to'g'risidagi bitimlarni tasvirlab bergan).[39] Shu bilan birga, nemislar har doim qurollarni cheklash bo'yicha aniq takliflar bildirishga qarshi turar edilar va ular boshqa kuchlar Germaniyaning qurollarni cheklash bo'yicha takliflarini qabul qilmasliklari sababli harbiy xarajatlarni ko'paytirish bilan oldilar.[39] Ribbentropga Germaniya qurollarni cheklash to'g'risidagi shartnomani chin dildan istayotganiga butun dunyo ishonch hosil qilishini ta'minlash vazifasi yuklandi, ammo u hech qachon bunday shartnoma ishlab chiqilmasligini ta'minladi.[39]
1934 yil 17 aprelda Frantsiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Louis Barthou Gitler tomonidan frantsuzlar Versal shartnomasining V qismini buzganligi uchun Germaniyaga qarshi sanktsiyalarni so'rashi haqida xavotirga sabab bo'lgan "Bartho notasi" deb nomlangan.[40] Ribbentrop mish-mishlarga sabab bo'lgan sanktsiyalarni to'xtatish uchun ko'ngilli ravishda London va Rimga tashrif buyurdi.[41] Tashriflari davomida Ribbentrop Buyuk Britaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri bilan uchrashdi Ser Jon Simon va italyan diktatori Benito Mussolini va ulardan qurolsizlanish byurosining navbatdagi majlisini qoldirishni so'radi, buning evaziga Ribbentrop Berlin bilan yaxshi munosabatlarni va'da qilishdan boshqa hech narsa taklif qilmadi.[41] Qurolsizlanish byurosining yig'ilishi belgilangan muddatlarda davom etdi, ammo Germaniyaga qarshi hech qanday sanktsiyalar qo'llanilmaganligi sababli, Ribbentrop muvaffaqiyatga erishishni talab qila olmadi.[41]
Dienststelle Ribbentrop
1934 yil avgustda Ribbentrop fashistlar partiyasi bilan bog'langan Büro Ribbentrop (keyinchalik nomi o'zgartirildi Dienststelle Ribbentrop). U muqobil tashqi ishlar vazirligi sifatida ishlagan.[42] The Dienststelle Ribbentropo'z vakolatxonalari to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Berlindagi Vilgelmstrasse shahridagi Tashqi ishlar vazirligi binosi oldida joylashgan bo'lib, uning tarkibida quyidagilar to'plami bor edi: Gitlerjugend bitiruvchilar, norozi ishbilarmonlar, sobiq muxbirlar va shuhratparast Natsistlar partiyasi a'zolari, ularning barchasi tashqi siyosatni rasmiy Tashqi ishlar vazirligidan mustaqil va ko'pincha unga zid ravishda olib borishga harakat qildilar.[41] Dienststelle Gitler tashqi siyosatini amalga oshirishda norasmiy vosita bo'lib, Germaniya tashqi ishlar vazirligining an'anaviy tashqi siyosiy institutlari va diplomatik kanallarini ongli ravishda chetlab o'tdi. Biroq, Dienststelle tashqi siyosat sohasida faol bo'lgan boshqa natsistlar partiyasi bo'linmalari bilan ham raqobatlashdi, masalan, fashistlarning tashqi tashkiloti (NSDAP / AO ) boshchiligida Ernst Bohl va Natsistlar partiyasining tashqi ishlar idorasi (APA) boshchiligida Alfred Rozenberg.[43] 1938 yil fevral oyida Ribbentropni Tashqi ishlar vaziriga tayinlash bilan "Dienststelle" ning o'zi ahamiyatini yo'qotdi va idora xodimlarining taxminan uchdan bir qismi Ribbentropni tashqi ishlar vazirligiga kuzatib borishdi.
Ribbentrop o'zi bilan diplomatiya bilan shug'ullangan, masalan, Frantsiyaga tashrif buyurganida va tashqi ishlar vaziri bilan uchrashganida Louis Barthou.[44] Ularning uchrashuvi davomida Ribbentrop Barthoga Gitler bilan birdaniga uchrashib, Frantsiya-Germaniyaning hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnomasini imzolashni taklif qildi.[44] Ribbentrop Frantsiya siyosatining varianti sifatida profilaktik urushni olib tashlash orqali Germaniyani qayta qurollantirishni yakunlash uchun vaqt sotib olmoqchi edi. Barthou-Ribbentrop uchrashuvi Neuratni g'azablantirdi, chunki tashqi ishlar idorasiga bu haqda xabar berilmagan.[45]
Garchi Dienststelle Ribbentrop Germaniyaning dunyoning barcha burchaklaridagi munosabatlari bilan bog'liq edi, deya ta'kidladi u Angliya-Germaniya munosabatlari, Ribbentrop Gitler Angliya bilan ittifoq tuzishni ma'qul ko'rganligini bilar edi.[41] Shunday qilib, Ribbentrop o'zining dastlabki diplomatik faoliyati davomida Gitlerning sovetlarga qarshi ingliz-german ittifoqi haqidagi orzusini ro'yobga chiqarish uchun juda ko'p ishlagan. Ribbentrop Britaniyaga tez-tez sayohat qilgan va u qaytib kelganida Gitlerga doim inglizlarning aksariyati Germaniya bilan ittifoq tuzishni orzu qilganligi haqida xabar bergan.[41] 1934 yil noyabrda Ribbentrop uchrashdi Jorj Bernard Shou, Janob Ostin Chemberlen, Lord Sesil va Lord Lotian.[46] Lord Lotianning Germaniya va Angliya o'rtasidagi tabiiy do'stlikni maqtaganligi asosida, Ribbentrop Gitlerga Britaniya jamiyatining barcha elementlari Germaniya bilan yaqinroq aloqada bo'lishni xohlashlarini ma'lum qildi. Uning hisoboti Gitlerni xursand qildi va Ribbentrop unga "chet elda dunyo haqida haqiqatni" aytgan yagona odam ekanligini ta'kidladi.[47] Tashqi ishlar vazirligi diplomatlari ittifoq istiqbollarini baholashda shunchalik quyoshli bo'lmagani uchun, Ribbentropning Gitler bilan ta'siri kuchaygan.[47] Ribbentropning shaxsiyati, diplomatik kelishmovchiliklarni yomon ko'rishi bilan, Gitler inqilobiy rejimning shafqatsiz dinamizmi bo'lishi kerak deb o'ylagan.[47]
Ozodlik bilan muxtor elchi
Gitler Ribbentropni tayinlash bilan mukofotladi Reyx Vazir keng imkoniyatlar bo'yicha muxtor elchi. Ushbu lavozimda Ribbentrop muzokaralar olib bordi Angliya-Germaniya dengiz shartnomasi (AGNA) 1935 yilda va Kominternga qarshi pakt 1936 yilda.
Neyrat Angliya-Germaniya dengiz shartnomasiga erishishni iloji yo'q deb o'ylardi. Raqibini obro'sizlantirish uchun u Ribbentropni muzokara o'tkazish uchun Londonga yuborilgan delegatsiya rahbari etib tayinladi.[48] Muzokaralar boshlangandan so'ng, Ribbentrop ser Jon Simonga ultimatum qo'ydi,[49] agar unga Germaniyaning shartlari to'liq qabul qilinmasa, Germaniya delegatsiyasi uyiga ketishini ma'lum qildi.[50] Simon bu talabdan g'azablandi va muzokaralardan chiqib ketdi.[51] Biroq, barchani ajablantirgan narsa, ertasi kuni inglizlar Ribbentropning talablarini qabul qilishdi va AGNA 1935 yil 18-iyunda Londonda Ribbentrop va Ser tomonidan imzolandi. Semyuel Xare, Buyuk Britaniyaning yangi tashqi ishlar vaziri.[52] Diplomatik yutuq Ribbentropning Gitler bilan obro'sini oshirishda katta ish qildi, u AGNA imzolangan kunni "hayotimdagi eng baxtli kun" deb atadi. U Angliya-Germaniya ittifoqining boshlanishiga sabab bo'lganiga ishongan va ushbu voqeani nishonlash uchun butun Germaniyada bayramlarni o'tkazishni buyurgan.[53]
AGNA imzolanganidan so'ng darhol Ribbentrop Angliya-Germaniya ittifoqini yaratish uchun mo'ljallangan keyingi qadamni davom ettirdi. Gleichschaltung Germaniyaning Afrikadagi sobiq mustamlakalarini tiklashni talab qiladigan barcha jamiyatlarning (koordinatsiya). 1935 yil 3-iyulda Ribbentrop Germaniyaning sobiq Afrikadagi mustamlakalarini tiklash bo'yicha harakatlarga rahbarlik qilishi e'lon qilindi.[54] Gitler va Ribbentrop mustamlakalarni tiklashni talab qilish inglizlarni ittifoq tuzishga majbur qilishiga ishonishdi Reyx nemis tilida.[55] Biroq, Ribbentrop va Gitler o'rtasida farq bor edi: Ribbentrop sobiq Germaniya mustamlakalarini tiklashni chin dildan xohlar edi, ammo Gitler uchun mustamlakachilik talablari shunchaki muzokara taktikasi edi. Germaniya Britaniya ittifoqi evaziga o'z talablaridan voz kechadi.[56]
Kominternga qarshi pakt
1936 yil noyabrda Antikomintern pakti Germaniya tashqi siyosatida muhim o'zgarish bo'ldi.[57] Tashqi ishlar vazirligi an'anaviy ravishda Xitoy bilan do'stlik siyosatini ma'qullagan va norasmiy Xitoy-Germaniya ittifoqi 1920 yillarning oxirlarida paydo bo'lgan edi.[58][59] Neurat Germaniyaning Xitoy bilan yaxshi munosabatlarini saqlab qolishga juda ishongan va Yaponiyaga ishonmagan.[58][59] Ribbentrop Tashqi ishlar vazirligining Xitoyni qo'llab-quvvatlashiga qarshi edi va buning o'rniga Yaponiya bilan ittifoq tuzishni ma'qulladi.[58] Shu maqsadda Ribbentrop ko'pincha General bilan yaqin hamkorlik qilgan Xiroshi Osima, avval Yaponiyaning harbiy attashesi va keyin Berlindagi elchi bo'lib ishlagan, Germaniyaning yapon aloqalarini mustahkamlash uchun, g'azablangan qarshiliklarga qaramay Vermaxt va Xitoy-Germaniya aloqalarini afzal ko'rgan Tashqi ishlar vazirligi.[58]
Anti-Komintern paktining kelib chiqishi 1935 yil yozi va kuziga to'g'ri keladi, bu davrni qidirish orasidagi doirani kvadratga aylantirish uchun. yaqinlashish Yaponiya va Germaniyaning Xitoy bilan an'anaviy ittifoqi bilan Ribbentrop va Oshima Xitoy, Yaponiya va Germaniyani bir-biriga bog'lab qo'yish usuli sifatida antikommunistik ittifoq g'oyasini ishlab chiqdilar.[60] Biroq, xitoyliklar bunday ittifoqqa hech qanday qiziqishlari yo'qligini aniq ko'rsatganda (ayniqsa, yaponlar Xitoyning Yaponiyaga bo'ysunish usuli sifatida Xitoyning ushbu bitimga qo'shilishini hisobga olgan holda) Feldmarshal Verner fon Blomberg Germaniyaning Xitoy bilan yaxshi munosabatlariga putur etkazmaslik uchun Gitlerni taklif qilingan shartnomani bekor qilishga ishontirdi.[60] Yaponiyalik do'stlikni xitoyliklarga qaraganda ancha qadrlagan Ribbentrop, Germaniya va Yaponiya bu shartnomani Xitoy ishtirokisiz imzolashi kerak, degan fikrni ilgari surdi.[60] 1936 yil noyabrga kelib, Tokioda ham, Berlinda ham nemis-yapon paktiga bo'lgan qiziqishning tiklanishi Berlinda Anti-Komintern paktining imzolanishiga olib keldi.[61] Pakt imzolangach, Italiya, Xitoy, Buyuk Britaniya va Polshaga takliflar yuborildi. Biroq, taklif qilingan kuchlardan faqat italiyaliklar oxir-oqibat imzolaydilar.[61] Anti-Komintern pakti Germaniyaning Xitoyning ittifoqchisidan Yaponiyaning ittifoqchisiga o'tishining boshlanishi bo'ldi.[62]
Veteranlar almashinuvi
1935 yilda Ribbentrop Birinchi jahon urushi qatnashchilarining Buyuk Britaniya, Frantsiya va Germaniyaga ko'p tashrif buyurgan tashriflarini uyushtirdi.[63] Ribbentrop buni ishontirdi Britaniya qirollik legioni va tinchlikni targ'ib qilishning eng yaxshi usuli sifatida nemis faxriylari bilan uchrashish uchun Germaniyaga delegatsiyalarni yuborish uchun ko'plab frantsuz faxriylari guruhlari.[63] Shu bilan birga, Ribbentrop Frontkämpferbund, rasmiy Germaniya Birinchi Jahon urushi faxriylari guruhi, Britaniya va Frantsiyaga tashrif buyurib, u erda faxriylar bilan uchrashmoqdalar.[63] Faxriylarning tashriflari va xizmatchilarning "endi hech qachon bo'lmaydi" degan va'dalari Buyuk Britaniya va Frantsiyada "Yangi Germaniya" imidjini yaxshilash uchun katta ish qildi. 1935 yil iyul oyida brigada ser Frensis Fizerston-Godli Germaniyaga Britaniya legioni delegatsiyasini boshqargan. The Uels shahzodasi, Legionning homiysi, 1935 yil iyun oyida Legionning yillik konferentsiyasida juda ko'p e'lon qilingan nutqida, u Legionnikidan ko'ra ko'proq erkaklar guruhini Germaniyaga tashrif buyurish va tinchlik haqidagi xabarni etkazish haqida o'ylay olmasligini va u umid qilganligini aytdi. Angliya va Germaniya boshqa hech qachon kurashmasligini.[64] Germaniyaning qayta qurollanishi va uning tinchlik haqidagi xabari o'rtasidagi ziddiyatga kelsak, Ribbentrop Germaniya Versal shartnomasi bilan "xo'rlangan" degan gapni kim tinglasa, Germaniya hamma narsadan avval tinchlikni xohlaydi va Germaniyaning Versalni buzishi uni tiklash harakatining bir qismi edi. Germaniyaning "o'z-o'zini hurmat qilishi". 1930-yillarga kelib, inglizlarning aksariyat fikri bu shartnoma Germaniyaga nisbatan dahshatli adolatsiz va adolatsiz ekanligiga amin edi, shuning uchun Britaniyada ko'pchilik, masalan. Tomas Jons, Vazirlar Mahkamasi kotibining o'rinbosari, Ribbentropning faqat Versal shartnomasi bekor qilinsa, Evropada tinchlik o'rnatiladi degan xabariga juda ochiq edi.[65]
Buyuk Britaniyadagi elchi
1936 yil avgustda Gitler Ribbentropni tayinladi elchi Angliya-Germaniya ittifoqi to'g'risida muzokaralar olib borish to'g'risida buyruq bilan Buyuk Britaniyaga.[66][67] Ribbentrop o'z lavozimini egallashga 1936 yil oktyabrda kelgan. Ribbentropning Londondagi faoliyati cheksiz ijtimoiy g'affakliklar va qo'pol xatolar bilan o'tdi, bu uning inglizlar bilan juda yomon munosabatlarini yomonlashtirdi. Tashqi ishlar vazirligi.
Uyning mehmoni sifatida qolishga taklif qilingan Londonderrining 7-Markizi da Wynyard Hall yilda Durham okrugi, 1936 yil noyabr oyida u xizmatga olib ketilgan Darxem sobori va madhiya Sizning ulug'vor narsalaringiz aytilmoqda e'lon qilindi. Organ xuddi ochiladigan panjaralarni o'ynaganida, xuddi shunday Germaniya milliy madhiyasi, Ribbentrop berdi Natsist salomi va uy egasi uni jilovlashi kerak edi.[68]
Xotinining taklifiga binoan Ribbentrop Berlin ichki bezagichini yolladi Martin Lyuter uning Londonga ko'chib o'tishiga ko'maklashish va u erda Ribbentrop qurgan Germaniyaning yangi elchixonasi loyihasini amalga oshirishda yordam berish (u mavjud elchixona yetarli darajada ulkan emasligini his qilgan). Lyuter hiyla-nayrangchi ekanligini isbotladi va Ribbentropning sevimli xattotiga aylandi.[69]
Ribbentrop 20-asr ingliz monarxlari tomonidan amalga oshirilgan davlat boshqaruvidagi cheklangan rolni tushunmadi. U shunday deb o'yladi Qirol Edvard VIII, Hindiston imperatori, agar xohlasa, Britaniya tashqi siyosatini belgilashi mumkin.[69] U Gitlerni Edvardni qo'llab-quvvatlashiga ishontirdi, ammo bu uning Britaniya jamiyatida taassurot qoldirganiga ishonganidek aldanish edi. Darhaqiqat, Ribbentrop ko'pincha Britaniya siyosati va jamiyatiga nisbatan tuban tushunishni namoyish etdi. Davomida 1936 yil dekabrda taxtdan voz kechish inqirozi, Ribbentrop Berlinga, Ribbentrop Germaniyaning sodiq do'sti sifatida vakili bo'lgan Edvardni hokimiyatdan ag'darish uchun nemislarga qarshi yahudiy-masonik-reaktsion fitna uyushtirgani va tez orada Buyuk Britaniyada Edvard tarafdorlari o'rtasida fuqarolik urushi boshlanishi haqida xabar berdi. Bosh vazirniki Stenli Bolduin. Ribbentropning fuqarolar urushi haqidagi bashoratlarini eshitgan inglizlar ishonchsizlik bilan kutib olishdi.[70]
Ribbentrop eng yaxshi britaniyalik firmalarning tikuvchilarini chaqirib, ularni soatlab kutib, keyin uni ko'rmasdan yuborib, ertasi kuni qaytib kelishga ko'rsatma berib, bu jarayonni takrorlash odatiga ega edi. Bu uning ingliz yuqori jamiyatidagi obro'siga juda katta ziyon keltirdi, chunki London tikuvchilari o'zlarining barcha yaxshi ta'minlangan mijozlariga Ribbentrop bilan kurashish mumkin emasligini aytib, qasos olishdi.[31] Intervyuda uning kotibi Raynxard Spitsi: "U [Ribbentrop] o'zini juda ahmoqona va juda dabdabali tutdi va inglizlar dabdabali odamlarni yoqtirmaydilar", deb aytdi.[31] Xuddi shu intervyusida Spitsi Ribbentropni "dabdabali, mutakabbir va o'ta aqlli emas" deb atadi va u ishlash uchun mutlaqo chidab bo'lmas odam ekanligini aytdi.[31]
Bundan tashqari, Ribbentrop Gitler bilan yaqin bo'lish uchun Londonda iloji boricha kamroq vaqt sarflashni tanladi, bu esa Buyuk Britaniya Tashqi ishlar idorasini nihoyatda g'azablantirdi, chunki Ribbentropning tez-tez yo'qligi ko'plab muntazam diplomatik masalalarni hal qilishga xalaqit berdi.[71] (Punch unga "Orolda yurish" uyga tez-tez sayohat qilgani uchun.)[72] Ribbentrop Britaniyada tobora ko'proq odamni chetlashtirganligi sababli, Reyxsmarsxol Hermann Göring Gitlerni Ribbentrop "ahmoq eshak" deb ogohlantirgan.[31] Gitler Gyoringning tashvishlarini rad etdi: "Ammo u Angliyada juda ko'p muhim odamlarni biladi". Ushbu so'z Gyoringni javob berishga undadi "Mein Fürer, bu to'g'ri bo'lishi mumkin, ammo yomon narsa, ular bilishadi uni".[31]
1937 yil fevral oyida Ribbentrop kutilmagan tarzda salomlashish orqali taniqli ijtimoiy gafni amalga oshirdi Jorj VI "nemis salomi" bilan, qattiq qurollangan fashistlarning salomi:[73] o'sha paytda Ribbentropning qo'lini siqish uchun oldinga qarab yurgan Qirolni imo-ishora deyarli urib yubordi.[72] Ribbentrop uning imidjiga zararni yanada kuchaytirdi va Angliya-Germaniya munosabatlarida kichik inqirozni keltirib chiqardi, shuning uchun bundan buyon barcha nemis diplomatlari qattiq fashistik salom berish va qabul qilish orqali davlat rahbarlarini kutib olishlari kerak edi.[72] Neurat Gitlerga Ribbentrop hukmronligi davrida, agar Sovet elchisi kommunistlarga musht tushirib salom beradigan bo'lsa, Gitler uni qaytarib berishga majbur bo'lishini ta'kidlaganida inqiroz hal qilindi.[74] Neyratning maslahati bilan Gitler Ribbentropning qirol Jorjdan "nemis salomini" olishini va qabul qilishini talabini rad etdi.[75]
Ribbentropning aksariyat vaqtlari Britaniyadan yoki Antikomintern paktini imzolashni yoki Afrikadagi sobiq Germaniya mustamlakalarini qaytarishni talab qilish bilan o'tdi.[76] Shu bilan birga, u ingliz-german ittifoqiga erishishning eng yaxshi usuli sifatida "ta'sir odamlari" deb atagan narsalarga murojaat qilishga ko'p vaqt ajratdi.[77] U ingliz zodagonlari parda ortidan hukmronlik qiladigan qandaydir maxfiy jamiyatni o'z ichiga oladi va agar u Britaniyaning "maxfiy hukumati" ning etarlicha a'zolari bilan do'stlasha olsa, ittifoq tuzishi mumkinligiga ishongan.[78] Ribbentropning Berlinga ittifoqning istiqbollari to'g'risida bergan dastlabki ijobiy xabarlarining deyarli barchasi Lord Londonderri va Lord Lotian kabi ingliz zodagonlaridan chiqqan "Yangi Germaniya" haqidagi do'stona so'zlarga asoslangan edi. Ribbentrop Buyuk Britaniya Vazirlar Mahkamasi vazirlari va yuqori lavozimli mulozimlaridan qabul qilgan salqin qabul, avvaliga u haqida unchalik taassurot qoldirmadi.[79] Ushbu Britaniya hukumati fikri tomonidan qisqacha bayon qilingan Robert, Viskont Krenborne, Parlament Davlat kotibining tashqi ishlar bo'yicha o'rinbosari, Ribbentrop har doim ikkinchi darajali odam edi.[80]
1935 yilda, ser Erik Pipps, Buyuk Britaniyaning Germaniyadagi elchisi, Londonga Ribbentropning ingliz sheriklaridan shikoyat qildi Angliya-Germaniya stipendiyasi. U ularning "inglizlarning do'stligi borasida soxta nemis umidlarini yaratganliklari va jamoatchilik fikri natsistlar rejimiga va uning uslublariga nisbatan tabiiy ravishda dushman bo'lgan Angliyada unga qarshi reaktsiyaga sabab bo'lganligini" his qildi.[81] 1937 yil sentyabrda Britaniya konsuli Myunxen Ribbentropning Nürnbergdagi mitingga olib kelgan guruhi haqida yozishicha, ular orasida "jiddiy odamlar" bo'lgan, ammo Ribbentropning teng miqdordagi ingliz kontingenti "ekssentriklar" va "ozgina bo'lsa ham, ularni vakillari deb atash mumkin". siyosiy yoki ijtimoiy jiddiy ingliz tafakkuri, shu bilan birga ular Angliyada hech qanday siyosiy yoki ijtimoiy ta'sirga ega emas edilar ".[79] 1937 yil iyun oyida, qachon Lord Mount Temple, Angliya-Germaniya stipendiyasi raisi Bosh vazir bilan uchrashishni so'radi Nevill Chemberlen Ribbentrop tomonidan uyushtirilgan tashrif bilan Gitler bilan uchrashgandan so'ng, Robert Vansittart, Britaniya Tashqi ishlar vazirligi Davlat kotibining doimiy o'rinbosari, quyidagicha bayonnoma yozdi:
P.M. [Bosh vazir], albatta, Lord Tog' Ma'badini ko'rmasligi kerak, shuningdek S [tate] ning S [ekretari]. Biz, albatta, havaskorlarning bu abadiy butsasini to'xtatishimiz kerak - va Lord Mount Temple ayniqsa bema'ni narsadir. Amaliy ravishda Germaniya bilan bog'liq bo'lgan ushbu faoliyat diplomatiya vazifasini imkonsiz qiladi.[82]
Vansittartning eslatmasidan so'ng, Angliya-Germaniya Fellowship a'zolari Germaniyaga Ribbentrop tomonidan uyushtirilgan safarlarga borganlaridan keyin Vazirlar Mahkamasi bilan uchrashishni to'xtatdilar.
1937 yil fevral oyida, bilan uchrashuvdan oldin Lord Privy Seal, Lord Galifaks, Ribbentrop Gitlerga Germaniyani, Italiyani va Yaponiyani Britaniyani Afrikadagi sobiq nemis mustamlakalarini qaytarishga majbur qilish maqsadida butun dunyo bo'ylab targ'ibot kampaniyasini boshlashni taklif qildi.[83] Gitler bu g'oyani rad etdi, ammo shunga qaramay, Ribbentrop Lord Galifaks bilan uchrashuvida Britaniyaning Germaniya bilan ittifoq tuzishini va sobiq nemis mustamlakalarini qaytarishini talab qilib, uchrashuvning katta qismini o'tkazdi.[83] Nemis tarixchisi Klaus Xildebrand Ribbentrop-Galifaks uchrashuvidayoq Gitler va Ribbentropning tashqi siyosiy qarashlari paydo bo'la boshlaganini, Ribbentrop 1914 yilgacha bo'lgan nemisni tiklashga ko'proq qiziqishini ta'kidladi. Imperium Sharqiy Evropani bosib olishdan ko'ra Afrikada.[83] Peshqadamlikka ergashish Andreas Xillgruber, Gitlerning a Stufenplan Dunyoni zabt etish uchun (bosqichma-bosqich rejalar bo'yicha) Xildebrand, Ribbentrop Gitlerning nima ekanligini to'liq tushunmagan bo'lishi mumkin deb ta'kidladi. Stufenplan yoki mustamlakachilikni tiklash uchun juda qattiq kurashganida, u Gitler bilan o'z mavqeini yaxshilashi mumkin bo'lgan shaxsiy yutuqqa erishmoqchi edi.[84] 1937 yil mart oyida Ribbentrop ingliz matbuotida nutq so'zlaganida juda ko'p salbiy fikrlarni keltirib chiqardi Leypsig savdo yarmarkasi Leyptsigda u Germaniyaning iqtisodiy farovonligini "sobiq nemis mustamlakachiligini tiklash yoki nemis xalqining o'z kuchi bilan" qondirilishini e'lon qildi.[85] Agar mustamlaka tiklanishi ro'y bermasa, nemislar avvalgi mustamlakalarini kuch bilan qaytarib olishadi degan shama tahdid elchining o'z uyiga tahdid qilgani noo'rin ekanligi to'g'risida juda ko'p dushmanlik sharhini jalb qildi.[85]
Ribbentropning muzokaralar uslubi, bezorilik va muzli sovuqlik aralashmasi va Gitlerni maqtagan uzoq monologlari bilan ko'pchilikni chetlashtirdi.[86] Amerikalik tarixchi Gordon A. Kreyg 1930-yillardagi Evropaning diplomatik sahnasidagi barcha hajmli memuar adabiyotlaridan Ribbentropga atigi ikkita ijobiy murojaat borligini kuzatgan edim.[87] Ikkala ma'lumotnomadan umumiy Leo Geyr fon Shveppenburg, Londonda joylashgan nemis harbiy attaşesi, Ribbentrop Birinchi Jahon urushida jasur askar bo'lganligini va Italiyaning Germaniyadagi elchisining rafiqasi Elisabetta Cerrutining Ribbentropni "fashistlarning eng ko'p yo'naltirganlaridan biri" deb ataganini izohladi.[87] Ikkala holatda ham maqtovlar cheklangan edi, Cerruti faqat Uchinchi Reyxda Ribbentrop kabi yuzaki odam tashqi ishlar vaziri bo'lishi mumkin edi, deb yozdi va Geyr fon Shveppenburg Ribbentropni mutlaqo falokat deb atadi Londondagi elchi.[88] Britaniyalik tarixchi / televizion prodyuser Lorens Ris 1997 yilgi seriyasida qayd etilgan Natsistlar: tarixdan ogohlantirish Ribbentropni bilgan serial uchun intervyu bergan har bir odam unga nisbatan nafratlanishini bildirgan. Bir nemis diplomati Gerbert Rixter Ribbentropni "dangasa va befoyda" deb atagan bo'lsa, boshqasi Manfred fon Shrederning so'zlariga ko'ra, Ribbentrop "behuda va shuhratparast" edi. Ris shunday xulosaga keldi: "Boshqa biron bir natsistni hamkasblari bu qadar yomon ko'rmagan".[31]
1937 yil noyabrda Ribbentrop sobiq Germaniya mustamlakalarini qaytarish borasidagi kuchli tashviqotini Buyuk Britaniya tashqi ishlar vaziriga olib kelganidan beri u juda noqulay ahvolga tushib qoldi. Entoni Eden va Frantsiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Yvon Delbos Germaniyaning Markaziy va Sharqiy Evropadagi chegaralarini hurmat qilish bo'yicha majburiy majburiyatlarni oladigan evaziga Germaniyaning sobiq mustamlakalarini qaytarish bo'yicha muzokaralarni ochishni taklif qilish.[89] Gitler sobiq mustamlakalarni olishdan manfaatdor bo'lmaganligi sababli, ayniqsa, agar bu narx Sharqiy Evropaga kengayishda tormoz bo'lsa, Ribbentrop o'zi ilgari surgan ingliz-frantsuz taklifini rad etishga majbur bo'ldi.[90] Angliya-frantsuz mustamlakasini tiklash to'g'risidagi taklifni rad etgandan so'ng, Ribbentrop, sof yovuzlik sababli, Reyxskolonialbund sobiq Germaniya mustamlakalari uchun qo'zg'alishni kuchaytirish uchun, bu tashqi ishlar idorasini ham, ham Frantsiya tashqi ishlar vazirligi.[90]
Ribbentropning unga tuzilgan bitimga erisha olmaganligi uni xafa qildi, chunki u Gitlerning foydasiga qimmatga tushishi mumkinligidan qo'rqdi va bu uning achchiqlanishiga sabab bo'ldi. Anglofob.[91] Italiya tashqi ishlar vaziri sifatida Count Galeazzo Ciano 1937 yil oxirida o'zining kundaligida qayd etilganidek, Ribbentrop Britaniyadan nafratlanish uchun barcha "ayolning g'azabi" bilan kelgan.[92] Ribbentrop va Gitler bu borada Angliya tashqi siyosati maqsad qilib qo'yilganligini hech qachon tushunmaganlar tinchlantirish Germaniya, u bilan ittifoq emas.[93]
1937 yil noyabr oyida Ribbentrop Rimga Italiyaning Antinomintern paktiga qo'shilishini nazorat qilish uchun borganida, u o'z xostlariga bu pakt haqiqatan ham Buyuk Britaniyaga qarshi qaratilganligini aniq ko'rsatib berdi. Ciano o'zining kundaligida ta'kidlaganidek, Anti-Komintern pakt "nazariy jihatdan antikommunistik, ammo aslida shubhasiz inglizlarga qarshi" edi.[94] Angliya ittifoqiga erisha olmaganligi sababli o'zini Gitler bilan sharmanda bo'lganiga ishongan Ribbentrop 1937 yil dekabrni depressiya holatida o'tkazdi va rafiqasi bilan birgalikda Gitler uchun Britaniyani qoralagan ikkita uzun hujjat yozdi.[90] 1938 yil 2-yanvarda Gitlerga taqdim etilgan birinchi hisobotda Ribbentrop "Angliya bizning eng xavfli dushmanimiz" deb ta'kidlagan.[95] Xuddi shu hisobotda Ribbentrop Gitlerga Britaniya ittifoqi g'oyasidan voz kechishni va buning o'rniga Germaniya, Yaponiya va Italiyaning ittifoq g'oyasini qabul qilishni maslahat berdi. Britaniya imperiyasi.[96]
Ribbentrop o'zining "uchun Memorandum Fyer"Germaniyaning foydasiga Sharqdagi vaziyat-kvoning o'zgarishi faqat kuch bilan amalga oshirilishi mumkin" va bunga erishishning eng yaxshi usuli bu Britaniyaga qarshi global ittifoq tizimini yaratish edi.[97] Besides converting the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British military alliance, Ribbentrop argued that German foreign policy should work to "winning over all states whose interests conform directly or indirectly to ours."[97] By the last statement, Ribbentrop clearly implied that the Soviet Union should be included in the anti-British alliance system he had proposed.[97]
Tashqi ishlar vaziri Reyx
In early 1938, Hitler asserted his control of the military-foreign policy apparatus, in part by sacking Neurath.[98] On 4 February 1938, Ribbentrop succeeded Neurath as Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop's appointment has generally been seen as an indication that German foreign policy was moving in a more radical direction. In contrast to Neurath's cautious and less bellicose nature, Ribbentrop unequivocally supported war in 1938 and 1939.[99]
Ribbentrop's time as Foreign Minister can be divided into three periods. In the first, from 1938 to 1939, he tried to persuade other states to align themselves with Germany for the coming war. In the second, from 1939 to 1943, Ribbentrop attempted to persuade other states to enter the war on Germany's side or at least to maintain pro-German neutrality. U ham ishtirok etgan Operation Willi, an attempt to convince the former Qirol Edvard VIII to lobby his brother, now the king, on behalf of Germany. Many historians have suggested that Hitler was prepared to reinstate the Duke of Windsor as king in the hope of establishing a fascist Britain.[100] If Edward would agree to work openly with the Third Reich, he would be given financial assistance and would hopefully come to be a "compliant" king. Reportedly, 50 million Swiss francs were set aside for that purpose.[101] The plan was never concluded.[102][103][101]
In the final phase, from 1943 to 1945, he had the task of trying to keep Germany's allies from leaving her side. During the course of all three periods, Ribbentrop met frequently with leaders and diplomats from Italiya, Yaponiya, Ruminiya, Ispaniya, Bolgariya va Vengriya. During all of that time, Ribbentrop feuded with various other Nazi leaders.[104] As time went by, Ribbentrop started to oust the Foreign Office's old diplomats from their senior positions and replace them with men from the Dienststelle. As early as 1938, 32% of the offices in the Foreign Ministry were held by men who previously served in the Dienststelle.[105]
One of Ribbentrop's first acts as Foreign Minister was to achieve a total yuz in Germany's Far Eastern policies. Ribbentrop was instrumental in February 1938 in persuading Hitler to recognize the Japanese qo'g'irchoq davlat ning Manchukuo and to renounce German claims upon its former colonies in the Pacific, which were now held by Japan.[106] By April 1938, Ribbentrop had ended all German arms shipments to China and had all of the Germaniya armiyasi officers serving with the Gomintang hukumat ning Chiang Qay-shek recalled, with the threat that the families of the officers in China would be sent to concentration camps if the officers did not return to Germany immediately.[107] In return, the Germans received little thanks from the Japanese, who refused to allow any new German businesses to be set up in the part of China they had occupied and continued with their policy of attempting to exclude all existing German and all other Western businesses from Japanese-occupied China.[107] At the same time, the end of the informal Sino-German alliance led Chiang to terminate all concessions and contracts held by German companies in Kuomintang China.[108]
Munich Agreement and Czechoslovakia's destruction
Ernst fon Vaytsekker, the State Secretary from 1938 to 1943, opposed the general trend in German foreign policy towards attacking Czechoslovakia and feared that it might cause a general war that Germany would lose. Weizsäcker had no moral objections to the idea of destroying Czechoslovakia but opposed only the timing of the attack. He favoured the idea of a "chemical" destruction of Czechoslovakia in which Germany, Hungary and Poland would close their frontiers to destabilise Czechoslovakia economically. He strongly disliked Ribbentrop's idea of a "mechanical" destruction of Czechoslovakia by war, which he saw as too risky. However, despite all of their reservations and fears about Ribbentrop, whom they saw as recklessly seeking to plunge Germany into a general war before the Reyx was ready, neither Weizsäcker nor any of the other professional diplomats were prepared to confront their chief.[109]
Before the Anglo-German summit at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1938, the British Ambassador, Sir Nevil Xenderson, and Weizsäcker worked out a private arrangement for Hitler and Chamberlain to meet with no advisers present as a way of excluding the ultrahawkish Ribbentrop from attending the talks.[110] Hitler's interpreter, Pol Shmidt, later recalled that it was "felt that our Foreign Minister would prove a disturbing element" at the Berchtesgaden summit.[110] In a moment of pique at his exclusion from the Chamberlain-Hitler meeting, Ribbentrop refused to hand over Schmidt's notes of the summit to Chamberlain, a move that caused much annoyance on the British side.[111] Ribbentrop spent the last weeks of September 1938 looking forward very much to the German-Czechoslovak war that he expected to break out on 1 October 1938.[99] Ribbentrop regarded the Myunxen shartnomasi as a diplomatic defeat for Germany, as it deprived Germany of the opportunity to wage the war to destroy Czechoslovakia that Ribbentrop wanted to see. The Sudetland issue, which was the ostensible subject of the German-Czechoslovak dispute, had been a pretext for German aggression.[112] During the Munich Conference, Ribbentrop spent much of his time brooding unhappily in the corners.[113] Ribbentrop told the head of Hitler's Press Office, Fritz Hesse, that the Munich Agreement was "first-class stupidity.... All it means is that we have to fight the English in a year, when they will be better armed.... It would have been much better if war had come now".[113] Like Hitler, Ribbentrop was determined that in the next crisis, Germany would not have its professed demands met in another Munich-type summit and that the next crisis to be caused by Germany would result in the war that Chamberlain had "cheated" the Germans out of at Munich.[114]
In the aftermath of Munich, Hitler was in a violently anti-British mood caused in part by his rage over being "cheated" out of the war to "annihilate" Czechoslovakia that he very much wanted to have in 1938 and in part by his realisation that Britain would neither ally itself nor stand aside in regard to Germany's ambition to dominate Europe.[115][116] As a consequence, Britain was considered after Munich to be the main enemy of the Reyx, and as a result, the influence of ardently Anglophobic Ribbentrop correspondingly rose with Hitler.[115][116][117][118]
Partly for economic reasons, and partly out of fury over being "cheated" out of war in 1938, Hitler decided to destroy the rump state of Czecho-Slovakia, as Czechoslovakia had been renamed in October 1938, early in 1939.[119][120] Ribbentrop played an important role in setting in motion the crisis that was to result in the end of Czecho-Slovakia by ordering German diplomats in Bratislava to contact Father Jozef Tiso, the premier of the Slovak regional government, and pressure him to declare independence from Praga. When Tiso proved reluctant to do so on the grounds that the autonomy that had existed since October 1938 was sufficient for him and that to completely sever links with the Czechs would leave Slovakia open to being annexed by Hungary, Ribbentrop had the German embassy in Budapesht contact the regent, Admiral Miklos Xorti. Horthy was advised that the Germans might be open to having more of Hungary restored to its former borders and that the Hungarians should best start concentrating troops on their northern border at once if they were serious about changing their frontiers. Upon hearing of the Hungarian mobilization, Tiso was presented with the choice of either declaring independence, with the understanding that the new state would be in the German sphere of influence, or seeing all of Slovakia absorbed into Hungary. As a result, Tiso had the Slovak regional government issue a declaration of independence on 14 March 1939; the ensuing crisis in Czech-Slovak relations was used as a pretext to summon Czecho-Slovak President Emil Xaxa to Berlin over his "failure" to keep order in his country. On the night of 14–15 March 1939, Ribbentrop played a key role in the German annexation of the Czech part of Czecho-Slovakia by bullying Hácha into transforming his country into a German protektorat at a meeting in the Reyx kantsleri Berlinda. On 15 March 1939, German troops occupied the Czech areas of Czecho-Slovakia, which then became the Reyx Bogemiya va Moraviya protektorati.
On 20 March 1939, Ribbentrop summoned Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys to Berlin and informed him that if a Lithuanian plenipotentiary did not arrive at once to negotiate to turn over the Memelland to Germany the Luftwaffe would raze Kaunas erga.[121] As a result of Ribbentrop's ultimatum on 23 March, the Lithuanians agreed to return Memel (modern Klaipėda, Lithuania) to Germany.[122]
In March 1939, Ribbentrop assigned the largely ethnically Ukrainian Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia region of Czecho-Slovakia, which had just proclaimed its independence as the Republic of Karpato-Ukraina, to Hungary, which then proceeded to annex it after a short war.[123] This was significant as there had been many fears in the Soviet Union in the 1930s that the Germans would use Ukraina millatchiligi as a tool to break up the Soviet Union.[123] The establishment of an autonomous Ukrainian region in Czecho-Slovakia in October 1938 had promoted a major Soviet media campaign against its existence on the grounds that this was part of a Western plot to support separatism in Sovet Ukraina.[124] By allowing the Hungarians to destroy Europe's only Ukrainian state, Ribbentrop had signified that Germany was not interested, at least for now, in sponsoring Ukrainian nationalism.[123] That, in turn, helped to improve German-Soviet relations by demonstrating that German foreign policy was now primarily anti-Western rather than anti-Soviet.[123]
French-German Non-Aggression pact, December 1938
In December 1938, during the visit of the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to Paris to sign the largely-meaningless French-German Non-Aggression pact, Ribbentrop had conversations with French Foreign Minister Jorj Bonnet, which Ribbentrop later claimed included a promise that France would recognize all of Eastern Europe as Germany's exclusive ta'sir doirasi.
German threat to Poland and British guarantee
Initially, Germany hoped to transform Poland into a satellite state, but by March 1939, German demands had been rejected by the Poles three times, which led Hitler to decide, with enthusiastic support from Ribbentrop, upon the destruction of Poland as the main German foreign policy goal of 1939.[125] On 21 March 1939, Hitler first went public with his demand that Danzig rejoin the Reyx and for "extra-territorial" roads across the Polsha koridori. That marked a significant escalation of the German pressure on Poland, which had been confined to private meetings between German and Polish diplomats. The same day, on 21 March 1939, Ribbentrop presented a set of demands to the Polish Ambassador Yozef Lipski about Poland allowing the Dantsigning ozod shahri to return to Germany in such violent and extreme language that it led to the Poles to fear their country was on the verge of an immediate German attack.[126] Ribbentrop had used such extreme language, particularly his remark that if Germany had a different policy towards the Soviet Union then Poland would cease to exist, that it led to the Poles ordering partial safarbarlik and placing their armed forces on the highest state of alert on 23 March 1939.[126] In a protest note at Ribbentrop's behaviour, Poland's Foreign Minister Jozef Bek reminded him that Poland was an independent country and not some sort of German protectorate that Ribbentrop could bully at will.[127] Ribbentrop, in turn, sent out instructions to the German Ambassador in Warsaw, Count Xans-Adolf fon Moltke, that if Poland agreed to the German demands, Germany would ensure that Poland could partition Slovakia with Hungary and be ensured of German support for annexing Ukraine.[128] If the Poles rejected his offer, Poland would be considered an enemy of the Reyx.[128] On 26 March, in an extremely-stormy meeting with the Polish Ambassador Yozef Lipski, Ribbentrop accused the Poles of attempting to bully Germany by their partial mobilisation and violently attacked them for offering consideration only of the German demand about the "extra-territorial" roads.[129] The meeting ended with Ribbentrop screaming that if Poland invaded the Free City of Danzig, Germany would go to war to destroy Poland.[129] When the news of Ribbentrop's remarks was leaked to the Polish press, despite Beck's order to the censors on 27 March, it caused anti-German riots in Poland with the local Nazi Party headquarters in the mixed town of Lininco destroyed by a mob.[130] On 28 March, Beck told Moltke that any attempt to change the status of Danzig unilaterally would be regarded by Poland as a casus belli.[131] Though the Germans were not planning an attack on Poland in March 1939, Ribbentrop's bullying behaviour towards the Poles destroyed any faint chance Poland allowing Danzig to return to Germany.[132]
The German occupation of the Czech areas of Czecho-Slovakia on 15 March, in total contravention of the Munich Agreement, which had been signed less than six months before, infuriated British and French public opinion and lost Germany any sympathy.[133] Such was the state of public fury that it appeared possible for several days afterwards that the Chamberlain government might fall because of a backbench rebellion.[134] Even Ribbentrop's standard line that Germany was only reacting to an unjust Versailles treaty and wanted peace with everyone, which had worked so well in the past, failed to carry weight. Reflecting the changed mood, Conservative MP Alfred Duff Kuper ga yozgan xatida The Times:
Some of us are getting rather tired of the sanctimonious attitude which seeks to take upon our shoulders the blame for every crime committed in Europe. If Germany had been left stronger in 1919 she would sooner have been in a position to do what she is doing today.[135]
Moreover, the British government had genuinely believed in the German claim that it was only the Sudetenland that concerned it and that Germany was not seeking to dominate Europe. By occupying the Czech parts of Czecho-Slovakia, Germany lost all credibility for its claim to be only righting the alleged wrongs of Versailles.
Shortly afterwards, false reports spread in mid-March 1939 by the Romanian minister in London, Virgil Tilea, that his country was on the verge of an immediate German attack, led to a dramatic U-turn in the British policy of resisting commitments in Eastern Europe.[136] Ribbentrop truthfully denied that Germany was going to invade Ruminiya. But his denials were expressed in almost identical language to the denials that he had issued in early March, when he had denied that anything was being planned against the Czechs; thus they actually increased the "Romanian war scare" of March 1939.[137] From the British point of view, it was regarded as highly desirable to keep Romania and its oil out of German hands. Since Germany itself had hardly any sources of oil, the ability of the Royal Navy to impose a blockade represented a British trump card to deter and, if necessary, win a war.[138][139] If Germany were to occupy oil-rich Romania, that would undercut all of the British strategic assumptions on Germany's need to import oil from the Americas. Since Poland was regarded as the East European state with the most powerful army, Poland had to be tied to Britain as the best way of ensuring Polish support for Romania; it was the obvious quid pro quo that Britain would have to do something for Polish security if the Poles were to be induced to do something for Romanian security.[140]
On 31 March 1939, Chamberlain announced before the House of Commons the British "guarantee" of Poland, which committed Britain to go to war to defend Polish independence, though pointedly the "guarantee" excluded Polish frontiers.[141] As a result of the "guarantee" of Poland, Hitler began to speak with increasing frequency of a British "encirclement" policy, which he used as the excuse for denouncing, in a speech before the Reyxstag on 28 April 1939, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland.[142]
kurka
In late March, Ribbentrop had the German muvaqqat ishlar vakili yilda kurka, Xans Kroll, start pressuring Turkey into an alliance with Germany.[143] The Turks assured Kroll that they had no objection to Germany making the Balkans its economic sphere of influence but would regard any move to make the Balkans into a sphere of German political influence as most unwelcome.[143]
In April 1939, when Ribbentrop announced at a secret meeting of the senior staff of the Foreign Office that Germany was ending talks with Poland and was instead going to destroy it in an operation late that year, the news was greeted joyfully by those present.[144] Polshaga qarshi feelings had long been rampant in the agency and so, in marked contrast to their cool attitude about attacking Czechoslovakia in 1938, diplomats such as Weizsäcker were highly enthusiastic about the prospect of war with Poland in 1939.[144] Professional diplomats such as Weizsäcker who had never accepted the legitimacy of Poland, which they saw as an "abomination" created by the Versailles Treaty, were wholehearted in their support of a war to wipe Poland off the map.[144] The degree of unity within the German government with both the diplomats and the military united in their support of Hitler's anti-Polish policy, which stood in contrast to their views the previous year about destroying Czechoslovakia, very much encouraged Hitler and Ribbentrop with their chosen course of action.[144]
In April 1939, Ribbentrop received intelligence that Britain and Turkey were negotiating an alliance intended to keep Germany out of the Balkans.[145] On 23 April 1939, Turkish Foreign Minister Shukrü Saracoğlu told the British ambassador of Turkish fears of Italian claims of the Mediterranean as Mare Nostrum and German control of the Balkans, and he suggested an Anglo-Soviet-Turkish alliance as the best way of countering the Axis.[146] As the Germans had broken the Turkish diplomatic codes, Ribbentrop was well aware as he warned in a circular to German embassies that Anglo-Turkish talks had gone much further "than what the Turks would care to tell us".[147] Ribbentrop appointed Franz fon Papen Germany's ambassador in Turkey with instructions to win it to an alliance with Germany.[148] Ribbentrop had been attempting to appoint Papen as an ambassador to Turkey since April 1938.[149] His first attempt ended in failure when Turkish President Mustafo Kamol Otaturk, who remembered Papen well with considerable distaste from World War I, refused to accept him as ambassador and complained in private the nomination of Papen must have been meant as some sort of German sick joke.[149] The German embassy in Ankara had been vacant ever since the retirement of the previous ambassador Fridrix fon Keller in November 1938, and Ribbentrop was able to get the Turks to accept Papen as ambassador only when the Saracoğlu complained to Kroll in April 1939 about when the Germans were ever going to send a new ambassador.[149] Papen's attempt to address Turkish fears of Italian expansionism by getting Ribbentrop to have Count Galeazzo Ciano promise the Turks that they had nothing to fear from Italy backfired when the Turks found the Italo-German effort to have been patronising and insulting.[150]
Instead of focusing on talking to the Turks, Ribbentrop and Papen became entangled in a feud over Papen's demand to bypass Ribbentrop and to send his dispatches straight to Hitler.[148] As a former chancellor, Papen had been granted the privilege of bypassing the Foreign Minister while he was ambassador to Austria. Ribbentrop's friendship with Papen, which went back to 1918, ended over that issue.[148] At the same time, Ribbentrop took to shouting at the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin, Mehemet Hamdi Arpag, as part of the effort to win Turkey over as a German ally. Ribbentrop believed that Turks were so stupid that one had to shout at to make them understand.[148] One of the consequences of Ribbentrop's heavyhanded behaviour was the signing of the Anglo-Turkish alliance on 12 May 1939.[148]
From early 1939 onwards, Ribbentrop had become the leading advocate within the German government of reaching an understanding with the Soviet Union as the best way of pursuing both the short-term anti-Polish and long-term anti-British foreign policy goals.[151] Ribbentrop first seems to have considered the idea of a pact with the Soviet Union after an unsuccessful visit to Varshava in January 1939, when the Poles again refused Ribbentrop's demands about Danzig, the "extra-territorial" roads across the Polish Corridor and the Anti-Comintern Pact.[152] Davomida Molotov - Ribbentrop pakt muzokaralari, Ribbentrop was overjoyed by a report from his ambassador in Moscow, Count Fridrix Verner fon der Shulenburg, of a speech by Soviet leader Jozef Stalin before the 18th Party Congress in March 1939 that was strongly anti-Western, which Schulenburg reported meant that the Soviet Union might be seeking an accord with Germany.[153] Ribbentrop followed up Schulenburg's report by sending Dr. Julius Schnurre of the Foreign Office's trade department to negotiate a German-Soviet economic agreement.[153] At the same time, Ribbentrop's efforts to convert the Anti-Comintern Pact into an anti-British alliance met with considerable hostility from the Japanese over the course of the winter of 1938–1939, but with the Italians, Ribbentrop enjoyed some apparent success. Because of Japanese opposition to participation in an anti-British alliance, Ribbentrop decided to settle for a bilateral German-Italian anti-British treaty. Ribbentrop's efforts were crowned with success with the signing of the Chelik shartnomasi in May 1939, but it was accomplished only by falsely assuring Mussolini that there would be no war for the next three years.[154]
Pact with Soviet Union and outbreak of World War II
Ribbentrop played a key role in the conclusion of a Soviet-German hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi bitim, Molotov - Ribbentrop pakti, in 1939 and in the diplomatic action surrounding the attack on Poland. In public, Ribbentrop expressed great fury at the Polish refusal to allow for Danzig's return to the Reyx or to grant Polish permission for the "extra-territorial" highways, but since the matters were intended after March 1939 to be only a pretext for German aggression, Ribbentrop always refused privately to allow for any talks between German and Polish diplomats about those matters.[155] Ribbentrop feared that if German–Polish talks took place, there was the danger that the Poles might back down and agree to the German demands, as the Czechoslovaks had done in 1938 under Anglo-French pressure, depriving the Germans of their excuse for aggression.[155] To block German–Polish diplomatic talks further, Ribbentrop had the German Ambassador to Poland, Count Hans-Adolf von Moltke, recalled, and he refused to see the Polish ambassador, Yozef Lipski.[155] On 25 May 1939, Ribbentrop sent a secret message to Moscow to tell the Soviet Foreign Commissar, Vyacheslav Molotov, that if Germany attacked Poland "Russia's special interests would be taken into consideration".[156]
Throughout 1939, Hitler always privately referred to Britain as his main opponent but portrayed the coming destruction of Poland as a necessary prelude to any war with Britain.[157] Ribbentrop informed Hitler that any war with Poland would last for only 24 hours and that the British would be so stunned with this display of German power that they would not honour their commitments.[158] Along the same lines, Ribbentrop told Ciano on 5 May 1939, "It is certain that within a few months not one Frenchman nor a single Englishman will go to war for Poland".[159]
Ribbentrop supported his analysis of the situation by showing Hitler only the diplomatic dispatches that supported his view that neither Britain nor France would honour their commitments to Poland. In that, Ribbentrop was particularly supported by the German Ambassador in London, Gerbert fon Dirksen, who reported that Chamberlain knew "the social structure of Britain, even the conception of the British Empire, would not survive the chaos of even a victorious war" and so would back down over Poland.[160] Furthermore, Ribbentrop had the German embassy in London provide translations from pro-appeasement newspapers such as the Daily Mail va Daily Express for Hitler's benefit, which had the effect of making it seem that British public opinion was more strongly against going to war for Poland than it actually was.[161][162] The British historian Victor Rothwell wrote that the newspapers used by Ribbentrop to provide his press summaries for Hitler were out of touch not only with British public opinion but also with British government policy in regard to Poland.[162] The press summaries Ribbentrop provided were particularly important, as Ribbentrop had managed to convince Hitler that the British government secretly controlled the British press, and just as in Germany, nothing appeared in the British press that the British government did not want to appear. Furthermore, the Germans had broken the British diplomatic codes and were reading the messages between the Foreign Office in London to and from the Embassy in Warsaw.[159] The decrypts showed that there was much tension in Anglo-Polish relations, with the British pressuring the Poles to allow Danzig to rejoin the Reyx and the Poles staunchly resisting all efforts to pressure them into concessions to Germany.[159] On the basis of such decrypts, Hitler and Ribbentrop believed that the British were bluffing with their warnings that they would go to war to defend Polish independence.[159] During the summer of 1939, Ribbentrop sabotaged all efforts at a peaceful solution to the Danzig dispute, leading the American historian Gerxard Vaynberg to comment that "perhaps Chamberlain's haggard appearance did him more credit than Ribbentrop's beaming smile", as the countdown to a war that would kill tens of millions inexorably gathered pace.[163]
Nevill Chemberlenning Evropa siyosati in 1939 was based upon creating a "peace front" of alliances linking Western and Eastern European states to serve as a "tripwire" meant to deter any act of German aggression.[164] The new "containment" strategy adopted in March 1939 was to give firm warnings to Berlin, increase the pace of British rearmament and attempt to form an interlocking network of alliances that would block German aggression anywhere in Europe by creating such a formidable deterrence to aggression that Hitler could not rationally choose that option.[165] Underlying the basis of the "containment" of Germany were the so-called "X documents", provided by Karl Fridrix Goerdeler, over the course of the winter of 1938–1939. They suggested that the German economy, under the strain of massive military spending, was on the verge of collapse and led British policy-makers to the conclusion that if Hitler could be deterred from war and that if his regime was "contained" long enough, the German economy would collapse, and, with it, presumably the Nazi regime.[166] At the same time, British policymakers were afraid that if Hitler were "contained" and faced with a collapsing economy, he would commit a desperate "mad dog act" of aggression as a way of lashing out.[167] Hence, emphasis was put on pressuring the Poles to allow the return of Danzig to Germany as a way of resolving the crisis peacefully by allowing Hitler to back down without him losing face.[168] As part of a dual strategy to avoid war via deterrence and appeasement of Germany, British leaders warned that they would go to war if Germany attacked Poland, but at the same time, they tried to avoid war by holding unofficial talks with would-be peacemakers such as the British newspaper proprietor Lord Kemsli, the Swedish businessman Aksel Venner-Gren and another Swedish businessmen Birger Dahlerus, who attempted to work out the basis for a peaceful return of Danzig.[169]
In May 1939, as part of his efforts to bully Turkey into joining the Axis, Ribbentrop had arranged for the cancellation of the delivery of 60 heavy howitzers from the Škoda ishlaydi, which the Turks had paid for in advance.[170] The German refusal either to deliver the artillery pieces or refund the 125 million Reyxmarks that the Turks had paid for them was to be a major strain on German-Turkish relations in 1939 and had the effect of causing Turkey's politically-powerful army to resist Ribbentrop's entreaties to join the Axis.[170] As part of the fierce diplomatic competition in Anqara in the spring and the summer of 1939 between von Papen and French Ambassador Rene Massigli with British Ambassador, Sir Xyug Natchbull-Xugessen to win the allegiance of Turkey to either the Axis or the Allies, Ribbentrop suffered a major reversal in July 1939 when Massigli was able to arrange for major French arms shipments to Turkey on credit to replace the weapons that the Germans had refused to deliver to the Turks.[171]
1939 yil iyun oyida, Frantsiya-Germaniya munosabatlari were strained when the head of the French section of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Otto Abets, was expelled from France following allegations that he had bribed two French newspaper editors to print pro-German articles.[172] Ribbentrop was enraged by Abetz's expulsion and attacked Count Johannes von Welczeck, the German Ambassador in Paris, over his failure to have the French readmit him.[173] In July 1939, Ribbentrop's claims about an alleged statement of December 1938 made by French Foreign Minister Jorj Bonnet were to lead to a lengthy war of words via a series of letters to the French newspapers between Ribbentrop and Bonnet over precisely what Bonnet had said to Ribbentrop.[174]
On 11 August 1939, Ribbentrop met the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, and the Italian Ambassador to Germany, Count Bernardo Attolico, in Zaltsburg. During that meeting, both Ciano and Attolico were horrified to learn from Ribbentrop that Germany planned to attack Poland that summer and that the Danzig issue was just a pretext for aggression.[175] When Ciano asked if there was anything Italy could do to broker a Polish-German settlement that would avert a war, he was told by Ribbentrop, "We want war!"[176] Ribbentrop expressed his firmly held belief that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland, but if that occurred, he fully expected the Italians to honour the terms of the Chelik shartnomasi, which was both an offensive and defensive treaty, and to declare war not only on Poland but on the Western powers if necessary.[175] Ribbentrop told his Italian guests that "the localisation of the conflict is certain" and "the probability of victory is infinite".[175] Ribbentrop brushed away Ciano's fears of a general war. He claimed, "France and England cannot intervene because they are insufficiently prepared militarily and because they have no means of injuring Germany".[159] Ciano complained furiously that Ribbentrop had violated his promise given only that spring, when Italy signed the Chelik shartnomasi, that there would be no war for the next three years. Ciano said that it was absurd to believe that the Reyx could attack Poland without triggering a wider war and that now the Italians were left with the choice of going to war when they needed three more years to rearm or being forced into the humiliation of having to violate the terms of the Pact of Steel by declaring neutrality, which would make the Italians appear cowardly.[175] Ciano complained in his diary that his arguments "had no effect" on Ribbentrop, who simply refused to believe any information that did not fit in with his preconceived notions.[175] Despite Ciano's efforts to persuade Ribbentrop to put off the attack on Poland until 1942 to allow the Italians time to get ready for war, Ribbentrop was adamant that Germany had no interest in a diplomatic solution of the Danzig question but wanted a war to wipe Poland off the map.[175] The Salzburg meeting marked the moment when Ciano's dislike of Ribbentrop was transformed into outright hatred and of the beginning of his disillusionment with the pro-German foreign policy that he had championed.[177]
On 21 August 1939, Hitler received a message from Stalin: "The Soviet Government has instructed me to say they agree to Herr von Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August".[156] The same day, Hitler ordered German mobilisation.[159] The extent that Hitler was influenced by Ribbentrop's advice can be seen in Hitler's orders for a limited mobilisation against Poland alone.[159] Weizsäcker recorded in his diary throughout the spring and summer of 1939 repeated statements from Hitler that any German–Polish war would be a localized conflict and that there was no danger of a general war if the Soviet Union could be persuaded to stay neutral.[178] Hitler believed that British policy was based upon securing Soviet support for Poland, which led him to perform a diplomatic U-turn and support Ribbentrop's policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union as the best way of ensuring a local war.[178] That was especially the case as decrypts showed the British military attaché to Poland arguing that Britain could not save Poland in the event of a German attack and that only Soviet support offered the prospect of Poland holding out.
The signing of the Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on 23 August 1939 was the crowning achievement of Ribbentrop's career. He flew to Moscow, where, over the course of a thirteen-hour visit, Ribbentrop signed both the Non-Aggression Pact and the secret protocols, which partitioned much of Eastern Europe between the Soviets and the Germans.[179] Ribbentrop had expected to see only the Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov and was most surprised to be holding talks with Jozef Stalin o'zi.[180] During his trip to Moscow, Ribbentrop's talks with Stalin and Molotov proceed very cordially and efficiently with the exception of the question of Latviya, which Hitler had instructed Ribbentrop to try to claim for Germany.[181] When Stalin claimed Latvia for the Soviet Union, Ribbentrop was forced to telephone Berlin for permission from Hitler to concede Latvia to the Soviets.[182] After finishing his talks with Stalin and Molotov, Ribbentrop, at a dinner with the Soviet leaders, launched into a lengthy diatribe against the British Empire, with frequent interjections of approval from Stalin, and exchanged toasts with Stalin in honour of German-Soviet friendship.[183] For a brief moment in August 1939, Ribbentrop convinced Hitler that the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union would cause the fall of the Chamberlain government and lead to a new British government that would abandon the Poles to their fate.[184] Ribbentrop argued that with Soviet economic support, especially in the form of oil, Germany was now immune to the effects of a British naval blockade and so the British would never take on Germany. On 23 August 1939, at a secret meeting of the Reyx 's top military leadership at the Berghof, Hitler argued that neither Britain nor France would go to war for Poland without the Soviet Union, and fixed "X-Day", the date for the invasion of Poland, for 26 August.[185] Hitler added, "My only fear is that at the last moment some Shvaynxund will make a proposal for mediation".[186] Unlike Hitler, who saw the Non-Aggression Pact as merely a pragmatic device forced on him by circumstances, the refusal of Britain or Poland to play the roles that Hitler had allocated to them, Ribbentrop regarded the Non-Aggression Pact as integral to his anti-British policy.[187]
Imzosi Molotov - Ribbentrop pakti on 23 August 1939 not only won Germany an informal alliance with the Soviet Union but also neutralized Anglo-French attempts to win Turkey to the "peace front". The Turks always believed that it was essential to have the Soviet Union as an ally to counter Germany, and the signing of the pact undercut completely the assumptions behind Turkish security policy.[188] The Anglo-French effort to include the Balkans into the "peace front" had always rested on the assumption that the cornerstone of the "peace front" in the Balkans was to be Turkey, the regional superpower.[189] Because the Balkans were rich in raw materials such as iron, zinc and oil[iqtibos kerak ], which could help Germany survive a British blockade, it was viewed as highly important by the Allies to keep German influence in the Balkans to a minimum. That was the principal motivation behind efforts to link British promises to support Turkey in the event of an Italian attack, in exchange for Turkish promises to help defend Romania from a German attack.[190] British and French leaders believed that the deterrent value of the "peace front" could be increased if Turkey were a member, and the Turk bo‘g‘ozlari were open to Allied ships.[189] That would allow the Allies to send troops and supplies to Romania over the Qora dengiz and through Romania to Poland.[189]
On 25 August 1939, Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler wavered for a moment when the news reached Berlin of the ratification of the Angliya-Polsha harbiy ittifoqi and a personal message from Mussolini that told Hitler that Italy would dishonour the Pact of Steel if Germany attacked Poland.[191] This was especially damaging to Ribbentrop, as he always assured Hitler, "Italy's attitude is determined by the Rome-Berlin Axis".[191] As a result of the message from Rome and the ratification of the Anglo-Polish treaty, Hitler cancelled the invasion of Poland planned for 26 August but ordered it held back until 1 September to give Germany some time to break up the unfavourable international alignment.[191] Though Ribbentrop continued to argue that Britain and France were bluffing, both he and Hitler were prepared, as a last resort, to risk a general war by invading Poland.[192] Because of Ribbentrop's firmly-held views that Britain was Germany's most dangerous enemy and that an Anglo-German war was inevitable, it scarcely mattered to him when his much-desired war with Britain came.[192] The Greek historian Aristotle Kaillis wrote that it was Ribbentrop's influence with Hitler and his insistence that the Western powers would fail to go to war for Poland that was the most important reason that Hitler did not cancel Fall Weiß, the German invasion of Poland, altogether, instead of only postponing "X-day" for six days.[192] Ribbentrop told Hitler that his sources showed that Britain would not be militarily prepared to take on Germany at the earliest until 1940 or more probably 1941, so that meant that the British were bluffing.[193] Even if the British were serious in their warnings of war, Ribbentrop took the view that since a war with Britain was inevitable, the risk of a war with Britain was acceptable and so he argued that Germany should not shy away from such challenges.[193]
1939 yil 27-avgustda Chemberlen Gitlerga xat yubordi, u Chemberlenning Berlindagi razvedka manbalaridan Ribbentrop Gitlerni Molotov-Ribbentrop shartnomasi Buyuk Britaniyaning Polshadan voz kechishini kafolatlashiga ishonch hosil qilgani to'g'risida eshitganligi haqidagi xabarlarga qarshi turish uchun yubordi. Chemberlen o'z xatida shunday yozgan:
Germaniya-Sovet kelishuvining mohiyati qanday bo'lishidan qat'i nazar, u Buyuk Britaniyaning Polsha oldidagi majburiyatini, Buyuk Britaniyaning Buyuk Britaniyaning Hukumati bir necha bor va ochiq-oydin bayon qilgan va ular bajarishga qat'iy qaror qilgan majburiyatini o'zgartira olmaydi.
Agar Buyuk Britaniyaning hukumati 1914 yilda o'z pozitsiyasini yanada aniqroq ko'rsatganida edi, bu katta falokatning oldini olgan bo'lar edi. Ushbu da'voda biron bir kuch mavjud bo'ladimi yoki yo'qmi, Buyuk Britaniyaning hukumati shu munosabat bilan bunday fojiali tushunmovchilik bo'lmasligiga qaror qildi.
Agar ish qo'zg'atilishi kerak bo'lsa, ular o'zlarining buyrug'idagi barcha kuchlarni kechiktirmasdan ishga solishga qaror qilishadi va tayyorgarlik ko'rishadi va bir marta jangovar harakatlar tugaganligini oldindan bilish mumkin emas. Agar urush bir marta boshlangan bo'lsa, u qatnashadigan bir nechta jabhalardan birortasida muvaffaqiyat ta'minlanishi kerak bo'lsa ham, u erta tugaydi deb o'ylash xavfli illuziya bo'ladi.[194]
Ribbentrop Gitlerga Chemberlenning maktubi shunchaki bluf ekanligini aytib, xo'jayini uni chaqirishga undaydi.[193]
1939 yil 30-dan 31-avgustga o'tar kechasi Ribbentrop Buyuk Britaniya elchisi Ser bilan nihoyatda qizg'in almashinuv o'tkazdi Nevil Xenderson, agar Ribbentropning yarim tunda bergan talabiga e'tiroz bildirgan bo'lsa, agar o'sha tunda Polshaning muxtor vakili Germaniyaga "so'nggi taklif" ni muhokama qilish uchun Berlinga kelmasa, urush boshlanishi uchun javobgarlik bu erda qolmaydi. Reyx.[195] Xenderson Germaniyaning "yakuniy taklifi" ning shartlari juda oqilona ekanligini ta'kidladi, ammo Ribbentropning Polshaning "oxirgi taklifni" qabul qilish muddati eng asossiz ekanligini ta'kidladi va shuningdek, Ribbentrop nima uchun Polshaning maxsus vakolatli vakili bilan uchrashishni talab qilganini bilishni talab qildi. "so'nggi taklif" ni Elchiga taqdim eta olmadi Yozef Lipski yoki "yakuniy taklif" ning yozma nusxasini taqdim eting.[196] Henderson - Ribbentrop uchrashuvi shunchalik keskin tus oldiki, ikkala odam zarba berishga oz qoldi.[197] Amerikalik tarixchi Gerxard Vaynberg Xenderson - Ribbentrop uchrashuvini tasvirlab berdi:
Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop 1939 yil 30–31 avgust kunlari yarim tunda Germaniya talablarining bir nusxasini Buyuk Britaniya elchisiga [Xendersonga] berishni rad etganida, ikkalasi deyarli zarba berishdi. Germaniyaga uzoq vaqtdan beri imtiyozlar berib kelgan elchi Xenderson bu erda Germaniya hukumati boshlashga qaror qilgan urushga tayyorlab qo'ygan ataylab o'ylab topilgan alibi ekanligini tan oldi. Hendersonning g'azablangani ajablanarli emas; fon Ribbentrop esa urushni oldinda ko'rgan va uyga nur sochib qaytgan.[198]
Ribbentrop nazarda tutganidek, "yakuniy taklif" ni qabul qilishning tor chegarasi Buyuk Britaniya hukumati Polsha hukumati bilan Germaniyaning taklifi to'g'risida o'z vaqtida Polsha hukumati bilan bog'lanishni imkonsiz qildi, u erda Polshada Polshaning vakolatli vakili kelishini tashkil qilish ham bor edi. o'sha tunda Berlinda, shu bilan Ribbentropga polshaliklar nemislarning "so'nggi taklifini" rad etganligini da'vo qilishga imkon berdi.[199] Xuddi shunday, Britaniya vazirlar mahkamasining maxsus yig'ilishi "yakuniy taklif" ni ko'rib chiqishga chaqirdi va bu xabarni Berlin tomonidan jiddiy taklif emasligi sababli Varshavaga etkazishdan bosh tortdi.[191] Germaniyaning taklifini "rad etish" 1939 yil 1 sentyabrda Germaniyaning Polshaga qarshi agressiyasi uchun ishlatilgan bahonalardan biri edi. Britaniyalik tarixchi DC Vatt shunday deb yozgan edi: "Ikki soatdan keyin Berlin radiosi o'n oltita fikrni efirga uzatdi va Polsha ularni rad etganini qo'shimcha qildi. Ribbentrop tufayli ular hech qachon ularni ko'rmagan edilar ".[200] 31-avgust kuni Ribbentrop elchi Attoliko bilan uchrashdi, unga Polshaning "saxiy" nemislarning 16 bandlik tinchlik rejasini "rad etishi" Germaniyaning Mussolinining Dansig maqomi to'g'risida konferentsiya chaqirish taklifidan manfaatdor emasligini anglatishini aytdi.[201] Polsha nemislarning "so'nggi taklifini" rad etishidan tashqari, Polshaga qarshi tajovuz ham oqlandi Gleyvits voqeasi Germaniya va Polsha chegarasida SS tomonidan uyushtirilgan boshqa hodisalar.[202]
1939 yil 1-sentabr kuni ertalab Germaniyaning Polshani bosib olganligi haqidagi xabar paydo bo'lishi bilanoq, Mussolini Germaniya-Polsha urushini jahon urushiga aylanishini to'xtatish uchun yana bir umidsiz tinchlik vositachilik rejasini boshladi. Mussolinining motivlari hech qanday tarzda alturistik bo'lmagan. Buning o'rniga, u butunlay Italiyani urushga majburlagan mamlakat Po'lat Paktining tuzog'idan qutulish istagi bilan to'la tayyor emas edi. Agar u o'zini qo'rqoq qilib ko'rsatadigan betaraflikni e'lon qilish kerak bo'lgan xo'rlikka duch kelgan bo'lsa. Frantsiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Jorj Bonnet o'z tashabbusi bilan harakat qilib, Italiyaning Frantsiyadagi elchisi Baronga aytdi Raffaele Guariglia, Frantsiya Mussolinining tinchlik rejasini qabul qilganligi.[203] Kaput bor edi Havas 1 sentyabr kuni yarim tunda bayonot chiqaring: "Frantsiya hukumati, boshqa bir qator hukumatlar singari, bugun ham Evropadagi qiyinchiliklarning echimini qidirib, Italiya taklifini qabul qildi. To'g'ri ko'rib chiqilgandan so'ng, Frantsiya hukumati" ijobiy javob "berdi".[204] Frantsuzlar va italiyaliklar Mussolinining tinchlik rejasiga jiddiy qarashgan bo'lsa-da, zudlik bilan otashkesimni to'xtatish va Polsha chegaralarini ko'rib chiqish uchun 1938 yilgi Myunxen konferentsiyasida to'rtta hokimiyat konferentsiyasini chaqirishgan, Buyuk Britaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri Lord Halifaks, agar nemislar chekinmasa. zudlik bilan Polshadan Britaniya taklif qilingan konferentsiyada qatnashmaydi.[205] Ribbentrop nihoyat Germaniyaning o't ochishni to'xtatish, Polshadan chiqib ketish yoki taklif qilingan tinchlik konferentsiyasida qatnashishdan manfaatdor emasligini aytib, Mussolinining tinchlik rejasini buzdi.[206]
1939 yil 3 sentyabr kuni ertalab, Chemberlen, agar Germaniya Polshaga hujum qilsa, Britaniyaning urush e'lon qilishi haqidagi tahdidini davom ettirdi, ko'rinadigan darajada hayratga tushgan Gitler Ribbentropdan "Endi nima?" Deb so'radi, Ribbentropning javobi yo'q edi. Frantsiya elchisidan keladigan "shunga o'xshash xabar" bo'lar edi Robert Kulondre, Frantsiyaning urush e'lonini taqdim etish uchun o'sha kuni tushdan keyin kelgan.[207] Keyinchalik Vaytsekker: "3-sentabr kuni inglizlar va frantsuzlar urush e'lon qilganda, Gitler, nihoyat, hayratga tushdi va zarar bilan boshlashi kerak edi", deb esladi.[159] Britaniyalik tarixchi Richard Overy Gitler 1939 yil sentyabrda boshlayapti deb o'ylagan narsa faqat Germaniya va Polsha o'rtasidagi mahalliy urush edi va uning bu qaroriga asosan umumiy urush xavfini juda kam baholashga asoslangan edi.[208] Ribbentropning ta'siri Gitlerning 1939 yilda ittifoqdoshi sifatida o'zi istagan mamlakat - Buyuk Britaniya bilan dushman va o'zi istagan mamlakat - Sovet Ittifoqi bilan ittifoqdoshi sifatida urushga kirishganini kuzatgan.[209]
Ikkinchi Jahon urushi boshlangandan so'ng, Ribbentrop Polshadagi aksiyaning ko'p qismini Gitler bilan sayohat qilgan.[210] 1939 yil 27 sentyabrda Ribbentrop Moskvaga ikkinchi bor tashrif buyurdi. U erda Sovet tashqi komissari bilan uchrashuvlarda Vyacheslav Molotov va Jozef Stalin, u Sovet Ittifoqi foydasiga tajovuz qilmaslik to'g'risidagi Paktning Yashirin protokollarini qayta ko'rib chiqishga rozi bo'lishga majbur bo'ldi, eng muhimi, Stalinning talabiga rozi bo'ldi Litva Sovet Ittifoqiga borish.[211] Angliya blokadasining o'rnatilishi buni amalga oshirdi Reyx Sovetni iqtisodiy qo'llab-quvvatlashiga juda bog'liq bo'lib, u Stalinni Ribbentrop bilan kuchli muzokaralar holatiga keltirdi. 1940 yil 1 martda Ribbentrop qabul qildi Sumner Uels, AQSh prezidenti uchun tinchlik missiyasida bo'lgan Amerika davlat kotibining o'rinbosari Franklin Ruzvelt, va amerikalik mehmonini suiiste'mol qilish uchun qo'lidan kelganicha harakat qildi.[212] Uelles Ribbentropdan Germaniya qanday shartlar asosida murosa tinchligi to'g'risida muzokaralar olib borishga tayyor bo'lishi mumkinligini so'radi Feneni urushi haqiqiy urushga aylandi. Ribbentrop Uellesga faqatgina nemislarning umumiy g'alabasi "biz xohlagan tinchlikni berishi mumkin" dedi. Uelles Ruzveltga Ribbentropning "umuman yopiq va o'ta ahmoqona aqli" borligi haqida xabar bergan.[213] 1940 yil 10 martda Ribbentrop Rimga Mussolini bilan uchrashish uchun tashrif buyurdi, u unga Italiya yaqinda urushga kirishishini va'da qildi.[214] Italiyaga bir kunlik sayohati uchun Ribbentropga gimnastika bo'yicha murabbiy, massajchi, shifokor, ikkita sartarosh va tashqi ishlar vazirligining turli xil huquqiy va iqtisodiy ekspertlari kabi o'ttiz besh kishilik xodimlar hamrohlik qildilar.[215] Italo-Germaniya sammitidan so'ng Brenner dovoni Gitler va Mussolini ishtirok etgan 1940 yil 18 martda graf Siano o'zining kundaligida shunday yozgan edi: "Rimda hamma Ribbentropni yoqtirmaydi".[216] 1940 yil 7-mayda Ribbentrop Tashqi ishlar vazirligining yangi bo'limiga asos soldi Abteilung Deutschland (Ichki Germaniya ishlari bo'limi), ostida Martin Lyuter, unga barcha antisemitizm ishlari uchun javobgarlik yuklangan.[217] 1940 yil 10-mayda Ribbentrop Gollandiya, Belgiya va Lyuksemburg elchilarini chaqirib, ularga nemislar bu xalqlarni bosib olganidan bir necha soat o'tgach, nemislarning o'z mamlakatlariga bostirib kirishini asoslovchi yozuvlarni taqdim etdi.[218] Ribbentropning g'azabidan ko'p narsa, kimdir Germaniyaning hujumi rejalarini Gollandiyaning Berlindagi elchixonasiga etkazdi, bu esa Ribbentropni keyingi bir necha oy ichida yangilikni kim tarqatganligi to'g'risida muvaffaqiyatsiz tekshiruv o'tkazishga bag'ishladi. Ushbu tergov agentlikni buzib tashladi, chunki hamkasblar bir-birlarini qoralashga da'vat etilgan.[218]
1940 yil iyun oyining boshlarida, Mussolini Gitlerga 1940 yil 10-iyunda urushga kirishini aytganida, Gitler eng mulohazali bo'lib, xususiy ravishda Mussolinini qo'rqoq oportunist deb atagan va 1939 yil sentyabr oyida Po'lat shartnomasi shartlarini buzgan. va 1940 yil iyun oyida Frantsiya kaltaklangani aniq bo'lganidan va Angliya tez orada tinchlik o'rnatishi mumkin bo'lganidan keyin urushga kirishgan.[219] Ribbentrop Gitlerning italiyaliklarga bergan bahosi bilan o'rtoqlashdi, ammo Italiyaning urushga kirishishini mamnuniyat bilan qabul qildi. Qisman, bu Ribbentrop muzokaralar olib borgan Chelik Paktining ahamiyatini tasdiqlaganga o'xshaydi va bundan tashqari, endi Italiya bilan ittifoqchi bo'lgan Tashqi ishlar vazirligi ko'proq ish qilishi kerak edi.[219] Ribbentrop so'zda chempion bo'ldi Madagaskar rejasi 1940 yil iyun oyida butun Evropadagi yahudiylarni deportatsiya qilish uchun Madagaskar Britaniyaning taxmin qilingan mag'lubiyatidan keyin.[220]
Urush davridagi ittifoqchilar bilan aloqalar
Ribbentrop, a Frankofil, Germaniya ruxsat berishi kerak, deb ta'kidladi Vichi Frantsiya majburiy Frantsiya-Germaniya sherikligi doirasida cheklangan mustaqillik darajasi.[221] Shu maqsadda Ribbentrop o'zining hamkasbini tayinladi Dienststelle, Otto Abets, Frantsiyadagi elchisi sifatida siyosiy martabasini ko'tarish bo'yicha ko'rsatmalar bilan Per Laval, Ribbentrop Germaniyaga eng ma'qul bo'lgan frantsuz siyosatchisi bo'lishga qaror qilgan.[222] Frantsiyada Tashqi ishlar vazirligining ta'siri turlicha edi, chunki u erda hokimiyat uchun raqobatlashadigan ko'plab boshqa idoralar mavjud edi. Ammo umuman olganda, 1943 yil oxiridan 1944 yil o'rtalariga qadar tashqi ishlar vazirligi Frantsiyadagi kuch jihatidan SSdan keyin ikkinchi o'rinda turadi.[223]
1937 yilning ikkinchi yarmidan boshlab Ribbentrop Germaniya, Italiya va Yaponiya o'rtasida bo'linishni tashkil qiluvchi ittifoq g'oyasini ilgari surdi. Britaniya imperiyasi ular orasida.[96] Sovet-Germaniya hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnomani imzolagandan so'ng, Ribbentrop bu g'oyani eksa ittifoqi uchun kengaytirdi va Sovet Ittifoqini Evroosiyo Angliya kabi dengiz davlatlarini yo'q qiladigan blok.[224] Nemis tarixchisi Klaus Xildebrand Gitlerning tashqi siyosiy dasturidan tashqari, fashistlar partiyasida alternativ tashqi siyosiy dasturlarga ega bo'lgan yana uchta fraktsiya bor edi, ular Xildebrand tomonidan agrar, inqilobiy sotsialistlar va Vilgelmine imperatorlarini tayinladilar.[225] Boshqa bir nemis diplomat tarixchisi Volfgang Mixalka fashistlarning tashqi siyosiy dasturiga to'rtinchi alternativa borligini va bu Ribbentropning Germaniya, Sovet Ittifoqi, Italiya va Yaponiyaning to'rtta totalitar davlatlarini o'z ichiga olgan Evro-Osiyo bloklari kontseptsiyasi ekanligini ta'kidladi. Boshqa fraktsiyalardan farqli o'laroq, Ribbentropning tashqi siyosiy dasturi Gitlerning 1939–41 yillarda ijro etilishiga yo'l qo'ygan yagona dastur edi, garchi bu Gitler ilgari surgan o'zining tashqi siyosiy dasturining vaqtincha bankrotligi tufayli sodir bo'lgan bo'lsa. Mein Kampf va Tsveytlar Buch Angliya bilan ittifoqqa erisha olmaganidan so'ng, haqiqiy fikr o'zgarishiga qaraganda.[224] Ribbentropning tashqi siyosiy tushunchalari Gitlerdan farq qilar edi, chunki Ribbentropning xalqaro munosabatlar kontseptsiyasi ko'proq an'anaviy Vilgelminega qarzdor edi. Machtpolitik Gitlerning shafqatsiz va cheksiz kurashida qamal qilingan turli xil "irqlar" haqidagi irqchi va sotsial-darvinist qarashlariga qaraganda Lebensraum.[187] Gitler va Ribbentrop tomonidan tuzilgan tashqi siyosatning turli xil kontseptsiyalari ularning munosabatiga ko'rsatib berildi Singapurning qulashi 1942 yilda: Ribbentrop Buyuk Britaniyaning ushbu mag'lubiyatini Germaniyada bayram kuni bo'lishini xohlar edi, Gitler esa har qanday bayramni Singapur tamoyillari uchun achinarli kun sifatida ko'rsatishini taqiqladi. oq ustunlik. Farqning yana bir sohasi - Ribbentropning Britaniyaga nisbatan obsesif nafratidir, u uni asosiy dushman deb bilgan va Sovet Ittifoqini inglizlarga qarshi kurashda muhim ittifoqchi deb bilgan. Gitler Sovet Ittifoqi bilan ittifoqni faqat taktik deb bilgan va uning tashqi ishlar vaziri kabi hech qaerda inglizlarga qarshi bo'lmagan.[187]
1940 yil avgustda Ribbentrop nazorat qildi Ikkinchi Vena mukofoti, bu taxminan 40% ni ko'rgan Transilvaniya Ruminiya viloyati Vengriyaga qaytib keldi.[226] Ruminiyaning shuncha qismini vengerlarga berish to'g'risidagi qaror Gitler edi, chunki Ribbentropning o'zi Vena konferentsiyasining katta qismini Vengriya delegatsiyasiga 1938 yilda Chexoslovakiyaga hujum qilishda sovuqqonligi uchun baland ovoz bilan hujum qilib, so'ngra ularning o'ljalaridagi adolatli ulushidan ko'proq narsani talab qildi.[226] Nihoyat Ribbentrop o'z qarorini e'lon qilishga yaqinlashganda, Ribbentropning Ruminiya foydasiga hukmron bo'lishini kutgan Vengriya delegatsiyasi xursandchilik bilan, Ruminiya tashqi ishlar vaziri esa Mixail Manoilesku hushidan ketdi.[226]
1940 yilning kuzida Ribbentrop Ispaniyani eksa tomon urushga kirishiga majbur qilish uchun barqaror, ammo muvaffaqiyatsiz harakat qildi. Ispaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri bilan muzokaralari davomida, Ramon Serrano Süner, Ribbentrop Sunkerni o'zini beparvo tutishi bilan, ayniqsa Ispaniyadan voz kechish haqidagi taklifi bilan duch keldi Kanareykalar orollari Germaniyaga.[227] G'azablangan Söner Ispaniyaning bir santimetr hududini berishdan ko'ra, Kanareykalarning Atlantika okeaniga cho'kishini ko'rishni afzal deb aytdi. Ribbentrop ko'proq muvaffaqiyatga erishgan maydon 1940 yil sentyabr oyida, Uzoq Sharq agenti bo'lganida paydo bo'ldi. Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Doktor Geynrix Georg Stahmer, Yaponiya tashqi ishlar vaziri bilan muzokaralarni boshlang, Yōsuke Matsuoka, uchun Amerikaga qarshi ittifoq. Ushbu muzokaralarning yakuniy natijasi 1940 yil 27 sentyabrda Berlinda imzolangan Uch tomonlama pakt Ribbentrop, graf Ciano va Yaponiya elchisi tomonidan Saburō Kurusu.[228]
1940 yil oktyabrda, Gallerlar Yozef Burkkel va Robert Vagner yahudiylarni ishg'ol qilinmagan Frantsiyaga to'liq haydab chiqarishni nazorat qildilar; ular ularni nafaqat Elzas-Lotaringiyaning o'sha yozga qo'shilgan qismlaridan chiqarib yuborishgan Reyx, shuningdek, ulardan Gaue shuningdek.[229] Ribbentrop Vichi Frantsiya hukumati tomonidan mamlakatdan chiqarib yuborilishi yuzasidan kelib tushgan shikoyatlarga "eng dilatant tarzda" murojaat qildi.[229]
1940 yil noyabr oyida Sovet Tashqi Komissarining tashrifi paytida Vyacheslav Molotov Berlinga, Ribbentrop Sovet Ittifoqini imzolashga harakat qildi Uch tomonlama pakt.[230] Ribbentrop Sovetlar va nemislar Buyuk Britaniya imperiyasi shaklida umumiy dushmanni baham ko'rganliklarini va shu tariqa, eksa tomon urushga kirishish Kremlning manfaatlariga mos kelishini ta'kidladilar.[230] U Buyuk Britaniyani mag'lubiyatga uchratgandan so'ng, ular o'z hududlarini quyidagi tarzda o'yib topishni taklif qildilar: Sovet Ittifoqi Hindiston va O'rta Sharqqa, Italiyaga O'rta er dengizi hududiga, Yaponiyaga Uzoq Sharqdagi inglizlarning egaliklariga ega bo'lishadi (albatta, deb taxmin qilsak) Yaponiya urushga kirishadi), Germaniya esa Markaziy Afrika va Britaniyani egallaydi.[230] Molotov Sovet Ittifoqining eksa tomonida urush boshlashi g'oyasiga ochiq edi, ammo urushga kirish narxi sifatida Germaniya Finlyandiya, Bolgariya, Ruminiya, Turkiya, Vengriya va Yugoslaviyani eksklyuziv Sovet ta'sir doirasi sifatida tan olishini talab qildi. .[230] Ribbentropning Molotovni Evropaga nisbatan talablaridan voz kechishga ishontirishga urinishlari, chunki Germaniya bilan Sovet ittifoqining narxi muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi. Molotov Berlinni tark etganidan so'ng, Sovet Ittifoqi Uch tomonlama paktni imzolashni va O'q tomonida urushga kirishni xohlashini bildirdi. Ribbentrop hammasi Stalinning taklifini qabul qilgan bo'lsa-da, Gitler shu nuqtada u Sovet Ittifoqiga hujum qilishni xohladi. The Germaniya-Sovet o'qi muzokaralari hech qaerga olib bormadi.
Ikkinchi Jahon urushi davom etar ekan, Ribbentropning SS tobora kuchayib bordi. 1941 yil yanvarda SS va Tashqi ishlar vazirligi o'rtasidagi munosabatlarning nadir darajasiga erishilganda Temir qo'riqchi a harakat qildi Ruminiyadagi to'ntarish. Ribbentrop Marshalni qo'llab-quvvatladi Ion Antonesku hukumat va Gimmler temir gvardiyani qo'llab-quvvatladi.[231] Muvaffaqiyatsiz to'ntarish natijasida Buxarest, Tashqi ishlar vazirligi dalillarni yig'di SD Ribbentrop SD politsiyasi attashelarining vakolatlarini keskin cheklashiga olib kelgan davlat to'ntarishini qo'llab-quvvatlagan edi. 1939 yil oktyabr oyidan boshlab ular o'zlari joylashgan Germaniya elchixonalaridan mustaqil ravishda faoliyat yuritdilar.[232] 1941 yilning bahorida Ribbentrop yig'ilishni tayinladi SA erkaklar Sharqiy Evropadagi Germaniya elchixonalariga, bilan Manfred von Killinger jo'natildi Ruminiya, Zigfrid Kasche ga Xorvatiya, Adolf Bekkerlga Bolgariya, Ditrix fon Yagov Vengriya va Xans Ludin ga Slovakiya.[233] Ilgari hech kim diplomatik lavozimda bo'lmagan bu barcha odamlarning asosiy xususiyati shundaki, ular Lyuterning yaqin do'stlari bo'lgan va bu ikkiga bo'linishga imkon bergan. SS (SS va SA o'rtasidagi an'anaviy raqobat hali ham kuchli edi).[233]
1941 yil mart oyida Yaponiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Yōsuke Matsuoka, Germanofil, Berlinga tashrif buyurgan. 1941 yil 29 martda Matsuoka bilan suhbat chog'ida Ribbentrop Gitlerning ko'rsatmasiga binoan yaponlarga bo'lajak narsalar haqida hech narsa demadi Barbarossa operatsiyasi, Gitler Sovet Ittifoqini yakka o'zi mag'lub etishiga ishongan va buning o'rniga yaponlarning Angliyaga hujum qilishini afzal ko'rgan.[234] Gitler yaponlarni Sovet Ittifoqiga hujum qilishiga olib keladigan har qanday ma'lumotni ularning qulog'iga etib borishini istamadi. Ribbentrop Matsuokani Tokiodagi hukumatni Buyuk Britaniyaning Singapurdagi dengiz bazasiga hujum qilishga da'vat qilishga undashga urinib, Qirollik floti Atlantika urushidagi ishtiroki tufayli qasos olish uchun juda zaif edi. Matsuoka bunga javoban Singapurni bosib olishga tayyorgarlik ishlari olib borilayotganini aytdi.[235]
1940–41 yil qishida Ribbentrop kuchli bosim o'tkazdi Yugoslaviya qirolligi Germaniya legatsiyasining maslahatiga qaramay, Uch tomonlama paktni imzolash Belgrad bunday harakat, ehtimol, ag'darishga olib keladi Valiahd shahzoda Pol, Yugoslaviya Regenti.[236] Ribbentropning maqsadi nemislarning Gretsiyaga bostirib kirishiga imkon beradigan mamlakat orqali tranzit huquqlarini qo'lga kiritish edi. 1941 yil 25 martda, Yugoslaviya istaksiz ravishda Uch tomonlama paktni imzoladi; ertasi kuni Yugoslaviya harbiylari qonsiz to'ntarish bilan shahzoda Polni ag'darib tashladi.[236] Gitler buyruq berganida Yugoslaviya istilosi, Ribbentrop qarshi edi, chunki u Tashqi ishlar idorasi ishg'ol qilingan Yugoslaviya boshqaruvidan chetlatilishi mumkin deb o'ylardi.[237] Gitler Ribbentropning bostirib kirishga qarshi ekanligidan norozi bo'lganida, vazir keyingi ikki kun davomida yotog'ida yotdi.[237] Ribbentrop sog'ayib ketgach, agentlik ta'sirini oshirish orqali imkoniyat berishga intildi Xorvatiya mustaqillik.[237] Ribbentrop tanladi Usta Xorvatiyani boshqarish. Unda bo'lgan Edmund Veesenmayer 1941 yil aprel oyida general bilan muzokaralarni muvaffaqiyatli yakunladi Slavko Kvaternik Partiyaning Xorvatiyani Germaniya istilosidan keyin boshqarganligi to'g'risida Usta.[237] Yugoslaviyani Uch tomonlama paktni imzolashga undashdan bosh tortishni maslahat bergan Belgraddagi Germaniya legatsiyasidan noroziligini aks ettirgan holda, Ribbentrop Germaniya legionini Germaniyadan oldin qaytarib olishni rad etdi. Belgradni bombardimon qildi 1941 yil 6 aprelda. Xodimlar olov bombardimonidan iloji boricha omon qolish uchun qoldi.[238]
Ribbentrop yoqdi va qoyil qoldi Jozef Stalin va 1941 yilda Sovet Ittifoqiga qilingan hujumga qarshi edi.[239] U sovet diplomatiga bir so'zni etkazdi: "Iltimos, Stalinga ayting-chi, men bu urushga qarshi bo'lganman va bu Germaniyaga katta baxtsizlik keltirishini bilaman". Ribbentrop 1941 yil 22 iyunda Germaniyaning urush e'lon qilganini Sovet elchisi generalga taqdim etishi kerak bo'lgan vaqt kelganida Vladimir Dekanozov, tarjimon Pol Shmidt sahnani tasvirlab berdi:
Bu 1941 yil 22-iyun, yakshanba kuni ertalab soat to'rtdan oldin tashqi ishlar vazirining kabinetida. U shanba boshidan beri vazirga qo'ng'iroq qilib kelgan Sovet elchisi Dekanozovni kutmoqda. Dekanozovga Moskvadan shoshilinch xabar keldi. U har ikki soatda bir marta qo'ng'iroq qilar edi, ammo vazirga shahardan uzoqda ekanligi aytilgan. Yakshanba kuni ertalab soat ikkilarda fon Ribbentrop qo'ng'iroqlarga javob berdi. Dekanozovga fon Ribbentrop darhol u bilan uchrashishni istashini aytdi. Uchrashuv ertalab soat 4 ga belgilangan
Fon Ribbentrop asabiylashmoqda, katta idorasining bir chetidan u boshiga qafaslangan hayvon singari yuqoriga va pastga qarab yurib, qayta-qayta: "The Fyer juda to'g'ri. Biz Rossiyaga hujum qilishimiz kerak, aks holda ular bizga hujum qilishadi! "U o'zini xotirjam qilyaptimi? O'zining diplomatik yutug'ining yo'q qilinishini oqlayaptimi? Endi uni yo'q qilish kerak", chunki bu Fyurer 'tilak ".[240]
Nihoyat Dekanozov paydo bo'lganda, Ribbentrop qisqa bayonotni o'qidi, chunki Reyx 1941 yil iyulida Germaniyaga hujum qilish uchun Sovet rejasi tufayli "harbiy qarshi choralar ko'rishga" majbur qilingan.[240] Ribbentrop general Dekanozovga Germaniya "harbiy qarshi choralar" ko'rishga majbur bo'lganligi to'g'risidagi bayonotni o'qish bilan cheklanib, urush e'lonini taqdim etmadi.[240]
Qarshi bo'lganiga qaramay Barbarossa operatsiyasi va Britaniyaga qarshi to'planishni afzal ko'rgan Ribbentrop 1941 yil 28 iyunda Gitler bilan maslahatlashmasdan Yaponiyani Sovet Ittifoqiga hujum qilish uchun doimiy harakatlarni boshladi.[241] Ammo Ribbentropning Yaponiyani urushga kirishga undashdagi maqsadlari Sovetlarga qaraganda ko'proq inglizlarga qarshi edi.[241] 1941 yil 10-iyulda Ribbentrop generalga buyruq berdi Evgen Ott, Germaniyaning Yaponiyadagi elchisi:
Yaponiyani Rossiyaga qarshi urushda iloji boricha tezroq ishtirok etish borasidagi sa'y-harakatlaringiz bilan davom eting ... Tabiiy maqsad, avvalgidek, Germaniya va Yaponiyaning uchrashuvini o'tkazish kerak. Trans-Sibir temir yo'li Rossiyaning qulashi bilan Uch tomonlama kuchlarning dunyodagi mavqei shu qadar ulkan bo'ladiki, Angliyaning qulashi, ya'ni Britaniya orollarini mutlaq yo'q qilish masalasi faqat vaqt. Butun dunyodan butunlay ajralib qolgan Amerika, keyinchalik Buyuk Britaniya imperiyasining qolgan uchlik kuchlari uchun muhim bo'lgan pozitsiyalarini egallab olishga duch keladi.[241]
Yaponiyani Barbarosaga olib kirish uchun qilgan sa'y-harakatlari doirasida, 1941 yil 1-iyulda Ribbentrop Germaniya bilan diplomatik aloqalarni uzdi. Chiang Qay-shek va tanigan Yapon qo'g'irchoq hukumati ning Vang Tszinvey Xitoyning qonuniy hukmdorlari sifatida.[242] Ribbentrop Vangni tan olish Germaniyani qo'llab-quvvatlaydigan Yaponiya tashqi ishlar vazirining obro'sini oshirishi mumkin bo'lgan davlat to'ntarishi sifatida qabul qilinishiga umid qildi. Yōsuke Matsuoka, Amerika-Yaponiya muzokaralarini ochishga qarshi bo'lgan.[242] Ribbentropning barcha urinishlariga qaramay, Matsuoka 1941 yilning iyulida tashqi ishlar vaziri lavozimidan ozod qilindi va yapon-amerika muzokaralari boshlandi.[242]
Urushdan keyin Ribbentrop aybdor deb topildi Holokost rahbarlarini ishontirishga qaratilgan harakatlari asosida sun'iy yo'ldosh mamlakatlari Yahudiylarni fashistlarni yo'q qilish lagerlariga surgun qilish uchun Uchinchi Reyxning.[243] 1941 yil avgust oyida Germaniyada yashovchi chet ellik yahudiylarni deportatsiya qilish to'g'risida savol tug'ilganda, Ribbentrop deportatsiyaga qarshi Tashqi ishlar vazirligining ta'sirini maksimal darajaga ko'tarish usuli sifatida qarshi chiqdi.[244] Reyxda yashovchi chet el yahudiylarini deportatsiya qilish uchun Ribbentrop Lyuter bilan hukumatlar bilan kelishuvlar olib borgan Ruminiya, Slovakiya va Xorvatiya ushbu davlatlar fuqaroligiga ega bo'lgan yahudiylarni deportatsiya qilishga ruxsat berish.[244] 1941 yil sentyabrda Reyxning vakolatli vakili Serbiya, Feliks Benzler, Ribbentropga SS 8000 serb yahudiylarini hibsga olgani haqida xabar bergan, ular ommaviy ravishda qatl etishni rejalashtirgan. U qirg'inni to'xtatish uchun ruxsat so'radi.[244] Ribbentrop savolni Lyuterga topshirdi, u Benzlerga qirg'inda to'liq hamkorlik qilishni buyurdi.[244]
1941 yilning kuzida Ribbentrop Vashingtondagi yapon-amerika muzokaralari muvaffaqiyatsiz tugashi va Yaponiyaning AQShga hujum qilishi uchun ishladi.[1] 1941 yil oktyabrda Ribbentrop buyurdi Evgen Ott, Germaniyaning Yaponiyadagi elchisi, amerikaliklarga imkon qadar tezroq hujum qilish uchun yaponlarga bosim o'tkazishni boshlash uchun.[1] Ribbentrop Gitlerga Amerikaning Buyuk Britaniyaga ko'rsatadigan yordami va Shimoliy Atlantika okeanida U-qayiqlar va Britaniyadagi konvoylarni qo'riqlayotgan Amerika harbiy kemalari o'rtasida tobora tez-tez sodir bo'layotgan "hodisalar" ni hisobga olgan holda AQSh va Germaniya o'rtasida urush muqarrarligini ta'kidladi. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, bunday urush Yaponiyaning AQShga hujumi bilan boshlanishi uni boshlashning eng yaxshi usuli edi.[1] Ribbentrop Gitlerga 1914 yilgacha Kanadada va Qo'shma Shtatlarda o'tkazgan to'rt yillik faoliyati tufayli u amerikaliklarning hamma narsalarini yaxshi bilishini aytdi; u Qo'shma Shtatlar jiddiy harbiy kuch emas deb o'ylardi.[1] 1941 yil 4-dekabrda Yaponiya Bosh elchisi Xiroshi Osima Ribbentropga Yaponiya AQSh bilan urush arafasida ekanligini aytdi. O'z navbatida, Ribbentrop Germaniya amerikaliklarga qarshi urushga qo'shilishini va'da qildi.[245] 1941 yil 7-dekabrda Ribbentrop yaponlarning yangiliklaridan xursand bo'ldi Perl-Harborga hujum va Qo'shma Shtatlarga qarshi urush e'lon qilinishini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun qo'lidan kelganicha harakat qildi. U etkazib berdi rasmiy deklaratsiya amerikalikka Muvaqqat ishlar vakili Leland B. Morris 1941 yil 11-dekabrda.[2] 1942 yil qish va bahorda, Amerikaning urushga kirishishidan so'ng, Qo'shma Shtatlar, Lotin Amerikasi davlatlarini, Argentina va Chilidan tashqari, Germaniyaga qarshi urush e'lon qilish uchun muvaffaqiyatli bosim o'tkazdi.[246] Ribbentrop Kosta-Rika va Ekvador kabi kichik davlatlardan urush e'lonlarini qabul qilishni chuqur xo'rlik deb bildi va Lotin Amerikasi elchilaridan birortasini ko'rishdan bosh tortdi. U o'rniga Vaytssekker ularning urush e'lonlarini qabul qilgan.[246]
1942 yil aprel oyida, diplomatik hamkasbi tarkibida Case Blue, Rossiyaning janubidagi harbiy operatsiya, Ribbentrop Sovet Ittifoqiga qarshi muhojirlarning to'plamini yig'di Kavkaz ichida Adlon mehmonxonasi ularni surgun hukumatlari rahbarlari deb e'lon qilish niyatida Berlinda.[247] Ribbentrop nuqtai nazaridan, bu Germaniya armiyasining Kavkazga kirib borishi bilan uni xalq tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanishini ta'minlash va nemislar bu hududni egallab olganidan keyin Kavkazni boshqargan tashqi ishlar idorasi bo'lishining ikki tomonlama foydasiga ega edi.[247] Alfred Rozenberg, Germaniya Sharq vaziri, buni o'zining vakolat doirasiga kirib borish deb bildi va Gitlerga "Adlon" mehmonxonasidagi muhojirlar "Ittifoq agentlari uyasi" ekanligini aytdi.[248] Ribbentropning hafsalasi pir bo'lgan Gitler Rozenberg tomoniga o'tdi.[248]
SS bilan tez-tez qattiq raqobatlashishiga qaramay, Tashqi ishlar vazirligi yahudiylarni o'lim lagerlariga deportatsiya qilishda muhim rol o'ynadi. Frantsiya (1942–44), Vengriya (1944–45), Slovakiya, Italiya (1943 yildan keyin), va Bolqon. Ribbentrop barchasini tayinladi Holokost bilan bog'liq ish Martin Lyuter, dan bo'lgan eski crony Dienststelle da Tashqi ishlar vazirligi vakili bo'lgan Vannsi konferentsiyasi.[249] 1942 yilda elchi Otto Abets 25000 frantsuz yahudiylarining deportatsiyasini ta'minladi va elchi Xans Ludin 50 ming slovak yahudiylarining o'lim lagerlariga deportatsiyasini ta'minladi.[250] Faqat bir marta, 1942 yil avgustda, Ribbentrop deportatsiyani cheklashga harakat qildi, ammo SS bilan yurisdiktsion kelishmovchiliklar tufayli.[250] Ribbentrop deportatsiyani to'xtatdi Ruminiya va Xorvatiya; birinchisiga nisbatan SS ruminlar bilan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri muzokaralar olib borayotgani uchun haqorat qilingan va ikkinchisida SS va Lyuter o'zlarining ishg'ol zonasida italiyaliklarga o'z yahudiylarini birinchi bo'lib deportatsiya qilish uchun bosim o'tkazganligini bilgan. Ribbentropga xabar berish. U Italo-Germaniya munosabatlaridagi barcha voqealar to'g'risida xabardor bo'lib turishni talab qilgan.[250] 1942 yil sentyabrda, tashqi ishlar vazirining harakatlaridan norozi bo'lgan Gitler bilan uchrashuvdan so'ng, Ribbentrop yo'nalishini o'zgartirib, deportatsiyani zudlik bilan tiklashga buyruq berdi.[251]
1942 yil noyabrda, undan keyin Mash'al operatsiyasi (ingliz-amerikaliklarning Shimoliy Afrikaga bosqini), Ribbentrop Frantsiya hukumatining boshlig'i bilan uchrashdi Per Laval Myunxenda. U Lavalga Germaniyaning Frantsiyaning ishg'ol qilinmagan zonasi va Tunisni bosib olishi uchun ultimatum topshirdi.[252] Ribbentrop Shimoliy Afrikadagi Vichi frantsuz qo'shinlarini rasmiy ravishda Germaniya qo'mondonligi ostida joylashtirishni tashkil qilishga muvaffaq bo'lmadi.[252] 1942 yil dekabrda u Italiya tashqi ishlar vaziri Count bilan uchrashdi Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolinining nemislarni Shimoliy Afrikaga hujum qilishga e'tibor qaratish uchun Sovet Ittifoqida mudofaaga chaqirgan talabini bajargan. Ribbentrop Gitler bilan birga Italiyaning urush harakatlarini kamaytirishga qo'shildi.[252] Graf Ciano bilan Sharqiy Prussiyada bo'lgan o'sha uchrashuvda, Per Laval keldi. U tez orada Gitler va Ribbentropning frantsuz politsiyasini yanada radikal antisemitizm qo'mondonligi ostiga olish va yuz minglab frantsuz ishchilarini Germaniyaning urush sanoatida ishlashga yuborish haqidagi talablariga rozi bo'ldi.[253]
Ribbentropning SS bilan munosabatlaridagi yana bir past nuqta 1943 yil fevralda, SD Lyuter boshchiligidagi ichki makonni qo'llab-quvvatlaganida yuz berdi. putch Ribbentropni tashqi ishlar vaziri lavozimidan chetlatish.[254] Lyuter Ribbentropdan ajrab qolgan, chunki Frau Ribbentrop Lyuterga uy xizmatkori sifatida munosabatda bo'lgan. U erini Lyuter tomonidan korruptsiya bilan bog'liq ayblovlar bo'yicha tergovni buyurishga undadi.[255] Lyuterniki putch asosan muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi, chunki Gimmler Lyuter boshchiligidagi tashqi ishlar vazirligi Ribbentrop versiyasidan ko'ra xavfli raqib bo'lishiga qaror qildi. So'nggi daqiqada u Lyuterdan yordamini tortib oldi.[256] Keyinchalik putch, Lyuter yuborilgan Zaxsenhauzen kontslageri.[256]
1943 yil aprel oyida, Vengriyaning Regent bilan yig'ilish paytida Miklos Xorti, Ribbentrop vengerlarni o'zlarining yahudiy aholisini o'lim lagerlariga surgun qilishlarini qat'iyan talab qilgan, ammo bu muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lgan. Uchrashuv davomida Ribbentrop "yahudiylarni yo'q qilish yoki kontsentratsion lagerlarga olib borish kerak. Boshqa imkoniyat yo'q" deb e'lon qildi.[257]
Ta'sirning pasayishi
Urush davom etar ekan, Ribbentropning ta'siri susayib qoldi. Dunyoning aksariyat qismi Germaniya bilan urushganligi sababli, diplomatiya qiymati cheklanganligi sababli tashqi ishlar vazirligining ahamiyati pasayib ketdi. 1944 yil yanvarga kelib Germaniya faqat Argentina, Irlandiya, Vichi Frantsiya, bilan diplomatik aloqalar o'rnatdi Italiya ijtimoiy respublikasi Italiyada, Daniyani bosib oldi, Shvetsiya, Finlyandiya, Slovakiya, Vengriya, Ruminiya, Xorvatiya, Bolgariya, Shveytsariya, Muqaddas Taxt, Ispaniya, Portugaliya, Turkiya, Tailand, Yaponiya va Yaponiyaning qo'g'irchoq davlatlari. Manchukuo va Xitoyning Vang Tszinvey rejimi. O'sha yilning oxirida Argentina va Turkiya Germaniya bilan aloqalarni uzdilar; Ruminiya va Bolgariya ittifoqchilarga qo'shildi va Finlyandiya Sovet Ittifoqi bilan alohida sulh tuzdi va Germaniyaga urush e'lon qildi.
Gitler Ribbentropni tobora charchagan deb topdi va undan qochishga kirishdi.[258] Tashqi ishlar vazirining Germaniyaning hech bo'lmaganda ba'zi dushmanlari - xususan Sovet Ittifoqi bilan tinchlik izlashga ruxsat so'raganligi ularning uzoqlashishida muhim rol o'ynadi.[259] Uning ta'siri pasayganligi sababli, Ribbentrop o'z vaqtini boshqa natsistlar rahbarlari bilan Gitlerning foydasiga erishish uchun antisemitizm siyosati ustidan nazorat qilish bilan o'tkazdi.[260]
Tashqi ishlar vazirligining ko'plab eski diplomatlari qatnashganida, Ribbentrop katta zarba oldi 1944 yil 20-iyul putch va Gitlerga suiqasd qilish.[261] Ribbentrop fitna haqida bilmagan edi, ammo tashqi ishlar vazirligining hozirgi va sobiq a'zolarining ishtiroki unga yomon ta'sir qildi.[262] Gitler Ribbentropning "bo'rtib ketgan ma'muriyati" unga diplomatlar faoliyatiga tegishli yorliqlarni saqlashga to'sqinlik qilayotganini sezdi.[263] Ribbentrop SS, u bilan yarashgan, Tashqi ishlar idorasini bu ishda ishtirok etganlardan tozalash uchun putch.[264] Gitlerga qilingan suiqasddan bir necha soat o'tgach, Ribbentrop, Gyoring, Dönits va Mussolini Rastenbergda Gitler bilan choy ichishgan edi, Do'nits Luftvafening muvaffaqiyatsizliklariga qarshi temir yo'lni boshladi. Gyoring darhol suhbatning yo'nalishini Ribbentropga va Germaniyaning tashqi siyosatining bankrotligiga aylantirdi. "Siz iflos kichkina shampan sotuvchisi! Og'zingizni yoping!" Gyoring baqirdi va Ribbentropni marshal tayog'i bilan urish bilan qo'rqitdi.[265]
1945 yil 20 aprelda Ribbentrop Gitlerning Berlinda tug'ilgan kunining 56 yilligiga tashrif buyurdi.[266] Uch kundan so'ng, Ribbentrop Gitler bilan uchrashishga urindi, ammo fyurerning muhimroq ishlari borligini tushuntirib rad etildi.[267]
Hibsga olish
Gitler o'z joniga qasd qilganidan so'ng, Ribbentrop yangi Prezident davrida rol o'ynashga urinib ko'rdi, Karl Dönitz, lekin rad etildi. He went into hiding under an assumed name (Herr Reiser) in port city of Hamburg. On 14 June, after Germany's surrender, Ribbentrop was arrested by Sergeant Jacques Goffinet,[268] a French citizen who had joined the 5-maxsus havo xizmati, the Belgian SAS, and was working with British forces near Hamburg.[269] He was found with a rambling letter addressed to the British Prime Minister Uinston Cherchill criticizing British foreign policy for Germaniyaga qarshi kayfiyat, and blaming Britain's failure to ally with Germany before the war for the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany and the advancement of Bolshevizm into central Europe.[270]
Sinov va ijro
Ribbentrop was a defendant at the Nürnberg sudlari. The Allies' Xalqaro harbiy tribunal convicted him on four counts: crimes against peace, deliberately planning a war of aggression, war crimes, and insoniyatga qarshi jinoyatlar.[271] According to the judgment, Ribbentrop was actively involved in planning the Anschluss, as well as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. He was also deeply involved in the "yakuniy echim "; as early as 1942 he had ordered German diplomats in Axis countries to hasten the process of sending Jews to o'lim lagerlari sharqda. He supported the lynching of Allied airmen shot down over Germany, and helped to cover up the 1945 murder of Major-General Gustav Mesni, a French officer being held as a prisoner of war. He was held directly responsible for atrocities which took place in Denmark and Vichi Frantsiya, since the top officials in those two occupied countries reported to him. Ribbentrop claimed Hitler solely made the important decisions, and he had been deceived by Hitler's repeated claims of only wanting peace. The Tribunal rejected this argument, saying that given how closely involved Ribbentrop was with the execution of the war, "he could not have remained unaware of the aggressive nature of Hitler's actions."[272] Even in prison, Ribbentrop remained loyal to Hitler: "Even with all I know, if in this cell Hitler should come to me and say 'do this!', I would still do it."[273]
Gustav Gilbert, an American Army psychologist, was allowed to examine the Nazi leaders who stood trial. Among other tests, he administered a German version of the Wechsler–Bellevue IQ test. Joachim von Ribbentrop scored 129, the 10th highest among the Nazi leaders tested. At one point during the trial, a US Army interpreter asked Ernst Freiherr fon Weizsäcker how Hitler could have promoted Ribbentrop to high office. Freiherr von Weizsäcker responded, "Hitler never noticed Ribbentrop's babbling because Hitler always did all the talking."[274]
On 16 October 1946, Ribbentrop became the first of those sentenced to death at Nuremberg to be osilgan after Göring committed suicide just before his scheduled execution.[271] The hangman was U.S. Master Sergeant Jon C. Vuds. Ribbentrop was escorted up the 13 steps of the gallows and asked if he had any final words. He said: "God protect Germany. God have mercy on my soul. My final wish is that Germany should recover her unity and that, for the sake of peace, there should be understanding between East and West. I wish peace to the world."[275] Nuremberg Prison Commandant Burton C. Andrus later recalled that Ribbentrop turned to the prison's Lutheran chaplain, Genri F. Gerekke, immediately before the hood was placed over his head and whispered, "I'll see you again."[276] His body, as those of the other nine executed men and the corpse of Hermann Göring, was cremated at Ostfridxof (Myunxen) va kullar daryoga sochilib ketishdi Isar.[277][278][279]
Filmdagi tasvirlar
Joachim von Ribbentrop has been portrayed by the following actors in film, television and theatre productions:
- Genri Daniell in the 1943 United States propaganda film Moskvaga missiya
- Grem Chapman in the 1970 television sketch comedy series Monty Pythonning uchadigan sirkasi
- Genrix Borovskiy in the 1971 Polish film Epilogue at Nürnberg
- Jefri Tuni 1973 yilda ingliz televizion ishlab chiqarishida Adolf Gitlerning o'limi
- Robert Xardi in the 1974 television production Yig'ish bo'roni
- Kosti Klemelä in the 1978 Finnish television production Sodan ja rauhan miehet
- Demeter Bitenc in the 1979 Yugoslavian television production Slom
- Anton Diffring in the 1983 United States television production Urush shamollari
- Hans-Dieter Asner in the 1985 television production Mussolini va men
- Richard Kane in the 1985 US/Yugoslavian television production Mussolini: aytilmagan voqea
- Jon Vudvin in the 1989 British television production Urushgacha sanoq
- Bo'ri Kahler 1993 yilda Savdogar-fil suyagi film Kunning qoldiqlari
- Benoît Girard in the 2000 Canadian/US TV production Nürnberg
- Ivaylo Geraskov in the 2006 British television docudrama Nürnberg: Sudda fashistlar
- Edvard Beyker-Duly in the 2010 BBC Wales/Masterpiece TV production Yuqorida, pastda
- Xolger Xandke in the 2011 Film Lyuks mehmonxonasi
- Orest Ludwig in the 2020 mini-series Amerikaga qarshi fitna
Shuningdek qarang
- Otto Abets: German Ambassador to Vichy France (1940–1944)
- Rudolf Buttmann: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1920–1943)
- Xans-Geynrix Diekxof: German Ambassador to the United States of America (1937–1938) and Spain (1943–1945)
- Gerbert fon Dirksen: German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1928–1933), Japan (1933–1938), and the United Kingdom (1938–1939)
- Fashistlar Germaniyasining lug'ati
- Fritz Grobba: German Ambassador to Iraq (1932–1939, 1941) and Saudi Arabia (1938–1939)
- Ulrix fon Xassell: German Ambassador to Italy (1932–1938)
- Eduard Hempel: German Ambassador to Ireland (1937–1945)
- Walther javohiri: German diplomat
- Leopold fon Xesh: German Ambassador to France (1923–1932) and the United Kingdom (1932–1936)
- Manfred Freiherr fon Killinger: German Ambassador to the Slovak Republic (1940) and Romania (1940–1944)
- Natsistlar partiyasi rahbarlari va amaldorlari ro'yxati
- Xans Lyuter: German Ambassador to the United States of America (1933–1937)
- Evgen Ott: German Ambassador to Japan (1938–1942)
- SS-Obergruppenführer ro'yxati
- Geynrix Georg Stahmer: German Ambassador to Japan (1942–1945)
- Xans Tomsen: German diplomat
- Diego fon Bergen: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1915–1918, 1920–1943)
- Franz fon Papen: German Ambassador to Austria (1934–1938) and Turkey (1939–1944)
- Sesil fon Renthe-Fink: German Ambassador to Denmark (1940–1942)
- Fridrix Verner fon der Shulenburg: German Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1934–1941)
- Ernst fon Vaytsekker: German Ambassador to the Vatican (1943–1945)
Adabiyotlar
- ^ a b v d e Bloch, p. 345.
- ^ a b Bloch, pp. 346–347.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 1–2.
- ^ Les années liberté, 1944–1945, Le Républicain Lorrain, Metz, 1994, (p. 32). (fr).
- ^ L'Express, n° 2937, « Metz en 1900 », 18–24 October 2007. (fr).
- ^ Weitz, p. 6.
- ^ Bloch, p. 5.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 3–4.
- ^ Bloch, p. 6.
- ^ Weitz, p. 13.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 7.
- ^ Lawson, Robert (2007). "Ribbentrop in Canada 1910 to 1914: A Note". Xalqaro tarixni ko'rib chiqish. 29 (4): 821–832. doi:10.1080/07075332.2007.9641142. JSTOR 40110928. S2CID 159731198.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 8.
- ^ Hozirgi tarjimai holi 1941 yil, pp. 707–709.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 8–9.
- ^ Bloch, p. 9.
- ^ Bloch, p. 12.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 12–13.
- ^ Shirer, William (1990). Uchinchi reyxning ko'tarilishi va qulashi: fashistlar Germaniyasining tarixi. Nyu York: Simon va Shuster. p. 1056. ISBN 9780671728687.
- ^ a b Hozirgi tarjimai holi 1941 yil, p. 708[o'lik havola ]
- ^ Weitz, p. 38.
- ^ Bloch, p. 26.
- ^ a b v Turner, p. 70.
- ^ Turner, p. 116.
- ^ Vatt, p. 329.
- ^ Rees, p. 243.
- ^ Snayder, p. 295.
- ^ Gunther, Jon (1940). Evropa ichida. Nyu-York: Harper va birodarlar. p. 6.
- ^ a b v Bloch, pp. 16, 20–21.
- ^ Craig, pp. 420–421.
- ^ a b v d e f g h Rees, p. 93.
- ^ Kreyg, p. 420.
- ^ Rees, p. 95.
- ^ Jacobsen, pp. 59–60, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ a b Jacobsen, p. 59, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ a b Trevor-Roper, Hugh "Hitler's War Aims" from Uchinchi reyxning aspektlari, H. W. Koch (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 241–242.
- ^ a b v Bloch, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Demetz, Peter (2009). Prague in Danger: The Years of German Occupation, 1939–45: Memories and History, Terror and Resistance, Theater and Jazz, Film and Poetry, Politics and War. Nyu-York: Farrar, Straus va Jirou. p. 56. ISBN 9780374531560.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 56.
- ^ Kreyg, p. 421.
- ^ a b v d e f Kreyg, p. 422.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 59–61.
- ^ Tammo Luther: Volkstumspolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1933–1938: die Auslandsdeutschen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Traditionalisten und Nationalsozialisten. Frants Shtayner Verlag, 2004 yil, ISBN 3-515-08535-1. Diagramm "Versuche zur Zentralisierung der Volkstumspolitik (Volksdeutscher Rat) / Stufe II (15. Oktober 1934)", Organigramm Stab Rudolf Heß/Bormann↔Hitler↔Auswärtiges Amt, p. 113.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 52.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 52–53.
- ^ Kreyg, p. 423.
- ^ a b v Kreyg, p. 425.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 68–69.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 71–72.
- ^ Bloch, p. 72.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 72–73.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 73–74.
- ^ Kershou, Yan. Gitler Xubris New York: Norton, 1999, p. 558.
- ^ Weitz, p. 94.
- ^ Hildebrand, p. 40.
- ^ Hildebrand, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Bloch, p. 106.
- ^ a b v d Bloch, p. 81.
- ^ a b Kreyg, p. 432.
- ^ a b v Vaynberg 1970 yil, p. 342
- ^ a b Vaynberg 1970 yil, p. 343
- ^ Bloch, pp. 120–121.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 65.
- ^ Bloch, p. 79.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 92–93.
- ^ Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham (editors) Natsizm 1919-1945 yillar. Volume 3. Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination. A Documentary Reader. University of Exeter Press, Exeter, Devon, United Kingdom, 1997, p. 673.
- ^ Bloch, p. 110.
- ^ Bloch, Michael (2011), Ribbentrop, Hachette UK, ISBN 978-1405513609
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 107.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 121–123.
- ^ Bloch, p. 120.
- ^ a b v Bloch, pp. 125–127.
- ^ Biagi, Enzo (1983). La seconda guerra mondiale, una storia di uomini [The world war two, a history of men] (italyan tilida). Milan: Gruppo editoriale Fabbri. p. 591.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 126–127.
- ^ Bloch, p. 127.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 113–114, 120, 125–127.
- ^ Bloch, p. 114.
- ^ Vatt, p. 37.
- ^ a b Waddington, p. 58.
- ^ Letter of 30 August 1939 to Harold Macmillan, cited in Macmillan, Harold (1966), Winds of Change 1914–1939, London: Makmillan, p. 604
- ^ Waddington, p. 64.
- ^ Waddington, pp. 59–60.
- ^ a b v Hildebrand, p. 48.
- ^ Hildebrand, p. 49.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 128.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 116–117.
- ^ a b Kreyg, p. 419.
- ^ Craig, pp. 419–420.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 145–146.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 146.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 131–133.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 131–134, 146–147.
- ^ Maiolo, Joseph. Qirollik floti va fashistlar Germaniyasi, London: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 36–37, 190–191.
- ^ Bloch, p. 142.
- ^ Bloch, p. 148.
- ^ a b Michalka 1985, pp. 271–273.
- ^ a b v Hillgruber, pp. 64–65.
- ^ Overy, Richard. "Misjudging Hitler" pp. 93–115, from The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered Gordon Martel (ed.) Routledge: London, United Kingdom, 1999. pp. 101–103.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 195.
- ^ Yenne, Bill (2015). Operation Long Jump: Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Greatest Assassination Plot in History. Regnery Publishing. p. 60. ISBN 978-1-62157-440-8.
- ^ a b Cadbury, Deborah (2015). Urushdagi shahzodalar: Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining eng qorong'u kunlarida Buyuk Britaniyaning Qirollik oilasi ichidagi achchiq jang. Jamoat ishlari. 157– betlar. ISBN 978-1-61039-404-8.
- ^ Dundas, Deborah (5 March 2015). "Andrew Morton on the Duke and Duchess of Windsor and the Nazis". Yulduz. Olingan 25 yanvar 2019.
- ^ Travis, Alan (20 July 2017). "Churchill tried to suppress Nazi plot to restore Edward VIII to British throne". Guardian. Olingan 25 yanvar 2019.
- ^ Bloch, p. 230.
- ^ Jacobsen, p. 81, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 178–179.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 179.
- ^ Vaynberg 1980 yil, p. 182
- ^ Kaillis, p. 91.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 193.
- ^ Bloch, p. 194.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 196–197.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 196.
- ^ Weinberg 1970, pp. 462–463.
- ^ a b Hillgruber, Andreas (1974). "England's Place in Hitler's Plans for World Dominion". Zamonaviy tarix jurnali. 9 (1): 5–22 (15). doi:10.1177/002200947400900101. JSTOR 260265. S2CID 159878696.
- ^ a b Weinberg 1980, pp. 506–507.
- ^ Messerschmidt, pp. 671, 682–683.
- ^ Rothwell, pp. 90–91.
- ^ Watt, pp. 142–143.
- ^ Myurrey, Uilyamson. The Change in the European Balance of Power. Prinston universiteti matbuoti: Princeton, NJ, USA, 1984, p. 268.
- ^ Watt, pp. 156–157.
- ^ Vatt, p. 157.
- ^ a b v d Rothwell, pp. 118–119.
- ^ Rothwell, p. 119.
- ^ Weinberg 1980, pp. 537–539, 557–560.
- ^ a b Vatt, p. 158.
- ^ Watt, pp. 158–159.
- ^ a b Vatt, p. 159.
- ^ a b Watt, pp. 159–160.
- ^ Vatt, p. 160.
- ^ Watt, pp. 160–161.
- ^ Watt, pp. 159–161.
- ^ Watt, pp. 155–157, 166–167.
- ^ Vatt, p. 167.
- ^ Gilbert, Martin Britain and Germany Between The Wars Longmans: Bungay, 1966, p. 17.
- ^ Watt, pp. 168–176.
- ^ Vaynberg 1980 yil, p. 541.
- ^ Vaynberg 1980 yil, p. 547
- ^ Myurrey, Uilyamson. The Change in the European Balance of Power. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1984, p. 286.
- ^ Strang, Bruce (1996). "Once more onto the Breach: Britain's Guarantee to Poland, March 1939". Zamonaviy tarix jurnali. 31 (4): 721–752 (736–737). doi:10.1177/002200949603100406. JSTOR 261045. S2CID 159558319.
- ^ Cienciala, Anna. "Poland in British and French Policy in 1939", from Finney, Patrick (ed.), Ikkinchi jahon urushining kelib chiqishi. Edward Arnold: London, 1997, p. 418.
- ^ Messerschmidt, p. 702.
- ^ a b Vatt, p. 275.
- ^ a b v d Kaillis, p. 164.
- ^ Bloch, p. 222.
- ^ Vatt, p. 278.
- ^ Vatt, p. 279.
- ^ a b v d e Bloch, p. 223.
- ^ a b v Vatt, p. 280.
- ^ Vatt, p. 281.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 233–235.
- ^ Weitz, pp. 195–196.
- ^ a b Weitz, p. 207.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 224–226.
- ^ a b v Weinberg 1980, pp. 561–562, 583–584.
- ^ a b Weitz, p. 208.
- ^ Weinberg 1980, pp. 579–581.
- ^ Kreyg, p. 436.
- ^ a b v d e f g h Overy, p. 125, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ Overy, Richard & Wheatcroft, Andrew The Road To War, London: Makmillan, 1989, p. 56.
- ^ Vatt, p. 385.
- ^ a b Rothwell, p. 106.
- ^ Vaynberg 1980 yil, p. 650
- ^ Messerschmidt, p. 695.
- ^ Vaynberg 1980 yil, p. 544
- ^ Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 436–437.
- ^ Overy, p. 103, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ Greenwood, Sean "The Phantom Crisis: Danzig, 1939" pp. 225–246 from The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered Gordon Martel (ed.) Routledge: London, United Kingdom, 1999 p. 238.
- ^ Watt, pp. 394–407.
- ^ a b Vatt, p. 304.
- ^ Watt, pp. 308–309.
- ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony (1977) Frantsiya va Ikkinchi jahon urushining kelishi, London: Frank Kass. p. 332. ISBN 978-0714630359.
- ^ Vatt, p. 325.
- ^ Adamthwaite, Anthony (1977) Frantsiya va Ikkinchi jahon urushining kelishi, London: Frank Kass. 290–292 betlar. ISBN 978-0714630359.
- ^ a b v d e f Watt, pp. 426–429.
- ^ Wheeler-Bennett, p. 454.
- ^ Watt, pp. 428–429.
- ^ a b Overy, pp. 124–125, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 247–249.
- ^ Vatt, p. 457.
- ^ Vatt, p. 458.
- ^ Watt, pp. 458–459.
- ^ Watt, pp. 459–460.
- ^ Bloch, p. 251.
- ^ Wheeler-Bennett, pp. 446–447.
- ^ Wheeler-Bennett, p. 447.
- ^ a b v Michalka 1993, p. 169
- ^ Vatt, p. 310.
- ^ a b v Vatt, p. 309.
- ^ Vatt, p. 276.
- ^ a b v d Kaillis, p. 161.
- ^ a b v Kaillis, pp. 163–164.
- ^ a b v Kaillis, p. 163.
- ^ Vaynberg 1980 yil, p. 623
- ^ Bloch, p. 256.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 256–257.
- ^ Bloch, p. 257.
- ^ Vaynberg 1994 yil, p. 43
- ^ Bloch, pp. 257–258.
- ^ Vatt, p. 526.
- ^ Watt, pp. 527–528.
- ^ Watt, pp. 532–534.
- ^ Vatt, p. 545.
- ^ Vatt, p. 550.
- ^ Vatt, p. 572.
- ^ Watt, pp. 583–585.
- ^ Bloch, p. 260.
- ^ Overy, pp. 125–126, in Uchinchi reyx.
- ^ Rees, p. 87.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 262–264.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 264–265.
- ^ Bloch, p. 274.
- ^ Offner, Arnold "The United States and National Socialist Germany" pp. 413–427 from The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement Volfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), London: George Allen, 1983 pp. 421–422.
- ^ Weitz, pp. 234–235.
- ^ Weitz, p. 234.
- ^ Weitz, p. 236.
- ^ Bloch, p. 272.
- ^ a b Weitz, p. 239.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 307.
- ^ Weitz, p. 241.
- ^ Bloch, p. 363.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 296–297.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 384–385.
- ^ a b Michalka 1985, pp. 276–277.
- ^ Hildebrand, pp. 15–21.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 325.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 308–309.
- ^ Bloch, p. 305.
- ^ a b Krausnick, Helmut "The Persecution of the Jews" pp. 1–125, from The Anatomy of the SS State, New York: Walker and Company, 1968, p. 57.
- ^ a b v d Hildebrand, p. 104.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 320–321.
- ^ Bloch, p. 329.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 330.
- ^ Sesil, Robert. Gitlerning Rossiyani bosib olish to'g'risidagi qarori, 1941 yil, Devid MakKey, 1976, p. 114, ISBN 0679507159.
- ^ Trial of German Major War Criminals, vol. 3, pp. 379–380.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 322.
- ^ a b v d Bloch, p. 323.
- ^ Vaynberg 1994 yil, p. 220
- ^ Bloch, pp. 308–316.
- ^ a b v Weitz, p. 268.
- ^ a b v Hillgruber, p. 91.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 344.
- ^ Bloch, p. 353.
- ^ a b v d Bloch, p. 354.
- ^ Bloch, p. 346.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 380.
- ^ a b Bloch, pp. 350–351.
- ^ a b Bloch, p. 351.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 353–354.
- ^ a b v Bloch, p. 356.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 356–357.
- ^ a b v Weitz, p. 291.
- ^ Bloch, p. 397.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 365–367.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 365–366.
- ^ a b Bloch, pp. 366–367.
- ^ Browning, Christopher (1990) "Ribbentrop, Joachim von," in Holokost entsiklopediyasi Vol. 3, Israel Gutman (ed.), New York: Macmillan. p. 1273. ISBN 978-0028971650
- ^ Bloch, pp. 338–339, 361, 385–388, 420–422.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 385–388.
- ^ Michalka 1993, p. 170
- ^ Bloch, pp. 405–406.
- ^ Bloch, p. 407.
- ^ Bloch, p. 408.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 405–407.
- ^ Shirer, p. 1056.
- ^ Bloch, p. 425.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 425–426.
- ^ http://www.francaislibres.net/liste/fiche.php?index=71380
- ^ Biagi, p. 2743.
- ^ Bloch, pp. 431–432.
- ^ a b Biagi, p. 2757.
- ^ "Judgment against Ribbentrop", Xalqaro harbiy tribunal Yahudiylarning virtual kutubxonasi.
- ^ Snayder, p. 296.
- ^ Applebome, Peter (14 March 2007). "Veteran of the Nuremberg Trials Can't Forget Dialogue With Infamy". The New York Times.
- ^ Bloch, p. 456.
- ^ Andrus, Burton C. (1969) I Was the Nuremberg Jailor, New York: Coward-McCann, p. 195.
- ^ Darnstädt, Thomas (13 September 2005), "Ein Glücksfall der Geschichte", Der Spiegel (14), p. 128
- ^ Manvell va Fraenkel 2011 yil, p. 393.
- ^ Har 2001 yil, p. 205.
Bibliografiya
- Bloch, Maykl. Ribbentrop. New York: Crown Publishing, 1992. ISBN 0-517-59310-6.
- Braunning, Kristofer R. The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office: A Study of Referat D III of Abteilung Deutschland, 194–43. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978. ISBN 0-8419-0403-0.
- Craig, Gordon. "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop" in Gordon A. Kreyg va Feliks Gilbert (tahr.) The Diplomats 1919–39. Prinston: Prinston universiteti matbuoti, 1953, pp. 406–436.
- Xildebrand, Klaus. Uchinchi reyxning tashqi siyosati, Anthony Fothergill (trans.). London: Batsford, 1973. ISBN 0-520-02528-8.
- Hillgruber, Andreas. Germaniya va Ikki jahon urushi, Uilyam C. Kirbi (trans.). Kembrij, Massachusets: Garvard universiteti matbuoti, 1981. ISBN 0-674-35321-8.
- Kaillis, Aristotle. Fashistik mafkura, London: Routledge, 2000 ISBN 0415216117.
- Messerschmidt, Manfred "Foreign Policy and Preparation for War" from Germaniya va Ikkinchi Jahon urushi, Wilhelm Deist, Hans-Erich Vokmann & Wolfram Wette (eds.), Vol. I, Clarendon Press: Oxford, United Kingdom, 1990.
- Michalka, Wolfgang. "From Anti-Comintern Pact to the Euro-Asiatic Bloc: Ribbentrop's Alternative Concept to Hitler's Foreign Policy Programme". In H. W. Koch (ed.), Uchinchi reyxning aspektlari. London: Macmillan 1985, pp. 267–284. ISBN 0-333-35272-6.
- Michalka, Wolfgang (1993). "Joachim von Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant to Foreign Minister". Yilda Smelser, Ronald; Zitelmann, Rainer (tahr.). Natsistlar elitasi. London: Makmillan. ISBN 0-333-56950-4.
- Oursler Jr., Fulton. "Secret Treason", Amerika merosi, 42 (8) (1991).
- Snyder, Louis. Uchinchi reyxning ensiklopediyasi. Nyu-York: McGraw-Hill, 1976 yil. ISBN 0-07-059525-9.
- Lukes, Igor, and Erik Goldstein (eds.). The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II. London: Frank Cass Inc, 1999. ISBN 0-7146-8056-7.
- Ris, Lorens Natsistlar: tarixdan ogohlantirish, New York: New Press, 1997 ISBN 056349333X.
- Rothwell, Victor. Ikkinchi jahon urushining kelib chiqishi, Manchester University Press: Manchester, United Kingdom, 2001 ISBN 0719059585.
- Uchinchi reyx. Leitz, Christian (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, ISBN 0-631-20700-7. Maqolalar:
- Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf. "The Structure of Nazi Foreign Policy, 1933–45" pp. 49–94.
- Manvell, Rojer; Fraenkel, Geynrix (2011) [1962]. Gering: mashhur fashistlar rahbarining ko'tarilishi va qulashi. London: Skyhorse. ISBN 978-1-61608-109-6.
- Overy, Richard (2001). Interrogations: The Nazi Elite in Allied Hands. London: Allen Leyn. ISBN 978-0-7139-9350-9.
- Tyorner, Genri Eshbi. Gitlerning hokimiyat tepasiga o'ttiz kun: 1933 yil yanvar. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1996. ISBN 978-0201407143.
- Shirer, William L. (1960). Uchinchi reyxning ko'tarilishi va qulashi. Nyu York: Simon va Shuster, 1959. ISBN 978-0-671-62420-0
- Waddington, Geoffrey. "'An Idyllic and Unruffled Atmosphere of Complete Anglo–German Misunderstanding': Aspects of the Operation of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop in Great Britain 1934–1939". Tarix, Volume 82, 1997, pp. 44–74.
- Watt, D. C. Urush qanday boshlandi: Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining zudlik bilan kelib chiqishi, 1938-1939 yillar. London: Heinemann, 1989. ISBN 0-394-57916-X.
- Vaynberg, Gerxard (1970). The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933–36. Chikago: Chikago universiteti matbuoti. ISBN 0-226-88509-7.
- Weinberg, Gerhard (1980). The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II 1937–39. Chikago: Chikago universiteti matbuoti. ISBN 0-226-88511-9.
- Vaynberg, Gerxard (1994). Qurolli dunyo. Kembrij: Kembrij universiteti matbuoti. ISBN 0521618266.
- Weitz, John. Hitler's Diplomat: The Life And Times Of Joachim von Ribbentrop. Nyu-York: Ticknor va Filds, 1992 yil. ISBN 0-395-62152-6.
- Uiler-Bennet, Jon Quvvatning Nemezisi, London: Makmillan, 1967 yil.
- Windsor, Wallis. The Heart has its Reasons: The Memoirs of the Duchess of Windsor. Bath: Chivers Press, 1956.
Qo'shimcha o'qish
- Fest, Yoaxim S., and Bullock, Michael (trans.) "Joachim von Ribbentrop and the Degradation of Diplomacy" in The Face of the Third Reich New York: Penguin, 1979 (orig. published in German in 1963), pp. 265–282. ISBN 978-0201407143.
Tashqi havolalar
- The Trial of German Major War Criminals, access date 1 July 2006.
- Newspaper clippings about Joachim von Ribbentrop ichida 20-asr matbuot arxivi ning ZBW
| Diplomatik postlar | ||
|---|---|---|
| Oldingi Leopold fon Xesh | German Ambassador to the Court of St. James 1936–1938 | Muvaffaqiyatli Gerbert fon Dirksen |
| Siyosiy idoralar | ||
| Oldingi Konstantin fon Neyrat | Germaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri 1938–1945 | Muvaffaqiyatli Artur Seys-Inkvart |
| |||||||||||||||
