Fumimaro Konoe - Fumimaro Konoe


Fumimaro Konoe
近衞 文 麿
Fumimaro Konoe profile.jpg
Konoe 1938 yilda
Yaponiya Bosh vaziri
Ofisda
1940 yil 22 iyul - 1941 yil 18 oktyabr
MonarxShwa
OldingiMitsumasa Yonai
MuvaffaqiyatliHideki Tōjō
Ofisda
1937 yil 4-iyun - 1939 yil 5-yanvar
MonarxShwa
OldingiSenjiri Xayashi
MuvaffaqiyatliKiichirō Xiranuma
Shaxsiy ma'lumotlar
Tug'ilgan(1891-10-12)12 oktyabr 1891 yil
Tokio, Yaponiya imperiyasi
O'ldi1945 yil 16-dekabr(1945-12-16) (54 yoshda)
Tokio, Istilo qilingan Yaponiya
Siyosiy partiyaImperatorlik hukmronligiga yordam uyushmasi (1940–1945)
Boshqa siyosiy
bog'liqliklar
Mustaqil (1940 yilgacha)
Turmush o'rtoqlarKonoe Chiyoko (1896–1980)
Olma materKioto imperatorlik universiteti
Imzo

Shahzoda[1] Fumimaro Konoe (Yapon: 近衞 文 麿, Xepbern: Konoe Fumimaro, ko'pincha Konoye, 1891 yil 12 oktyabr - 1945 yil 16 dekabr) yapon siyosatchisi edi va Bosh Vazir. Ishlagan davrida u rahbarlik qilgan 1937 yilda yaponlarning Xitoyga bosqini va diplomatik munosabatlarning buzilishi natijasida Yaponiya Ikkinchi Jahon urushiga kirdi. Shuningdek, u o'z mamlakatini a ga aylantirishda asosiy rol o'ynadi totalitar o'tish orqali davlat Milliy safarbarlik to'g'risidagi qonun va tashkil etish Imperatorlik hukmronligiga yordam uyushmasi.

Kononing AQSh bilan ziddiyatlarni hal qilishga urinishlariga qaramay, harbiylar tomonidan olib borilgan muzokaralar va uning hukumatining rezolyutsiyaga nisbatan egilmasligi tufayli Yaponiya urushga yo'l ochdi. Tinchlik kelishuviga erisha olmaganligi sababli, Konoe harbiy harakatlar boshlanishidan oldin 1941 yil 18 oktyabrda Bosh vazir lavozimidan iste'foga chiqdi. Biroq, u Ikkinchi Jahon urushi oxirigacha imperatorning yaqin maslahatchisi bo'lib qoldi. Urush tugagandan so'ng, u 1945 yil 16-dekabrda o'z joniga qasd qildi.

Hayotning boshlang'ich davri

20 yoshli Fumimaro Konoe.

Fumimaro Konoe 1891 yil 12 oktyabrda Tokioda taniqli shaxsda tug'ilgan Konoe oilasi, qadimiyning asosiy tarmoqlaridan biri Fujiwara klani. Konoe "edisohadagi eng obro'li va eng yuqori martabali olijanob xonadonning boshlig'iUlar Fujivaradan mustaqil bo'lib, XII asrda, qachon Minamoto no Yoritomo Fujivarani beshta alohida uyga ajratdi (go-sekke). "Go-sekke orasida birinchi bo'lib Konoe", va Fumimaro uning 29-etakchisi edi.[2] Uning ukasi Xidemaro Konoye simfonik dirijyor edi. Kononing otasi, Atsumaro, siyosiy jihatdan faol bo'lib, 1903 yilda Rossiyaga qarshi jamiyatini tashkil qilgan.

Fumimaroning haqiqiy onasi uning tug'ilishidan ko'p o'tmay vafot etgan; keyin otasi singlisiga uylandi. Fumimaro o'zini haqiqiy onasi deb o'ylab adashgan va haqiqatni otasi vafotidan keyin 12 yoshida bilib olgan.[3]

Fumimaro otasi vafot etganida oilaviy qarzni meros qilib oldi. Ning moliyaviy ko'magi tufayli zaibatsu Sumitomo, u karerasi davomida olgan va Fujiwara merosxo'rlarining kim oshdi savdosi oilasi to'lovga qodir edi.[4]

U sotsializmni o'qidi Kioto imperatorlik universiteti va tarjima qilingan Oskar Uayld "Sotsializm davrida insonning ruhi "u yapon tilida Saionji Kinmochi.[5] Konoe Saionji-ning himoyachisi bo'ldi, maktabni tugatgandan so'ng u siyosiy karerasini boshlash haqida maslahat olish uchun Saionjiga bordi va Yaponiyaning tinchlik delegatsiyasi tarkibida Versalga ustoziga hamrohlik qilishdan oldin uy vazirligida qisqa vaqt ishladi.[6]

1918 yil dekabrda, oldin Versal, Konoe "Angliya-Amerika markazidagi tinchlikni rad eting" nomli inshoni nashr etdi (yu英 位bng 位位 位 平和 を を 排 す).[7] 1918 yildagi ushbu maqolasida u g'arbiy demokratiyani demokratiyani, tinchlikni va o'z taqdirini qaror toptirishni ikkiyuzlamachilik bilan qo'llab-quvvatlagan deb hujum qildi, shu bilan birga ular ushbu ideallarni irqiy kamsituvchi imperializmning o'z versiyalari orqali aslida buzib tashladilar, deb ta'kidladilar.[8] Uning ta'kidlashicha, xalqlar ligasi aslida g'arbiy kuchlarning holat-kvoni, mustamlakachilik gegemonligini institutsionalizatsiya qilish uchun qilingan harakatdir.[9] Amerikalik jurnalist tarjimasidan so'ng Tomas Franklin Feyrfaks Millard, Saionji o'z jurnaliga raddiya yozdi, Millardning Uzoq Sharq haqidagi sharhi.[10] Saionji Konoyening yozuvlarini beparvo deb hisoblagan, ammo xalqaro miqyosda o'qilgandan so'ng Kononi kechki ovqatga taklif qilgan Sun Yatsen Yaponiyaning tezkor modernizatsiyasiga qoyil qolganlar, u erda pan Osiyo millatchiligini muhokama qildilar.[11]

Parijdagi tinchlik konferentsiyasi paytida Konoe ushbu taklifni taqdim etgan yapon diplomatlaridan biri edi Irqiy tenglik taklifi Millatlar Ligasi Kelishuvi uchun.[12] Irqiy tenglik to'g'risidagi Qo'mita qo'mita oldiga kelganida, Yaponiya, Frantsiya, Serbiya, Gretsiya, Italiya, Braziliya, Chexoslovakiya va Xitoy tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi. Biroq, AQSh prezidenti Vudrou Uilson ushbu band bir ovozdan qo'llab-quvvatlanishini talab qilib, ovozni bekor qildi. Konoe irqiy tenglik to'g'risidagi bandni rad etishni juda yomon qabul qildi va keyinchalik Yaponiyani irqiy tenglik bandini rad etgan holda xo'rlagan deb hisoblagan oq tanlilarga nisbatan g'azabi borligi ma'lum bo'ldi.[13]

Yaponiyaga qaytib kelgach, u bukletni nashr etdi, unda u Frantsiya, Angliya va Amerikaga qilgan sayohatlari, u erdagi yaponlarga qarshi kayfiyatning ko'tarilishidan g'azablanganligi va yaponlarning Amerikaga immigratsiyasini kamsitgan hukumat siyosati haqida qo'shimcha ravishda u Xitoyni xalqaro munosabatlarda Yaponiyaga raqib.[14] Konoe Evropaga ketishidan oldin Geysha Kiku bilan nikohsiz bola tug'di.[15]

Tengdoshlar uyi

1916 yilda, universitetda o'qiyotgan paytida Fumimaro tengdoshlar uyida otasining o'rnini egalladi.[16] Evropadan qaytib kelgandan so'ng uni Yaponiyaning yangi paydo bo'lgan eng qudratli siyosiy fraktsiyasi jalb qildi Taisho demokratiyasi 1920-yillarning kenkyukai, boshchiligida Yamagata Aritomo, u 1922 yil sentyabr oyida qo'shildi.[17] The kenkyukai odatda demokratik islohotlarga qarshi bo'lgan konservativ, militaristik fraksiya edi.[18]

Qarama-qarshi fraksiya seiyukai, boshchiligida Xara Kei, bu quyi palatadan kuchini tortdi. Oxir-oqibat seiyukai Aritomo tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlana oldi va Kei 1918 yilda bosh vazir bo'ldi. Konoe tengdoshlar uyi fraksiyonel partiyalar siyosatida betaraf qolishi kerak, deb hisoblaydi, chunki tengdosh sifatida ko'rib chiqilsa, tengdoshlari o'zlarining imtiyozlarini cheklashadi. Shuning uchun u Xara Keyni qo'llab-quvvatladi seiyukai hukumat, aksariyati kabi kenkyukai.[19]

Biroq, 1923 yilga kelib seiyukai ikki guruhga bo'lingan edi va endi hukumatni boshqara olmadi.[20] Turli fraksiyalar hukumatni boshqarish uchun ko'tarilgach, Konoe Kato Komei va uning partiyasi rahbarligi davrida umumiy erkaklar saylov huquqini qo'llab-quvvatladi kenseikai, uning hukumatini dvoryanlar imtiyozlarini jiddiy ravishda cheklashni kuchaytirishdan xalos qilish.[21] U xalqning noroziligini hozirgi siyosiy tizimga yo'naltirishning eng yaxshi usuli va shu bilan zo'ravonlik inqilobini kamaytirishning eng yaxshi usuli deb hisoblaganligi sababli u erkaklarning umumiy saylov huquqiga sodiq qoldi.[22] Tengdoshlar uyi quyi palatadagi turli xil siyosiy fraksiyalar bilan ittifoqqa aylangach, Konoe chapni tark etdi kenkyukai 1927 yil noyabrda.[23]

U dvoryanlarga nisbatan o'z pozitsiyasi singari, u ham imperator siyosiy lavozimlarni egallamasligi kerak, deb hisoblagan, chunki uning nazarida bu imperator obro'sini pasaytiradi, taxtning birlashtiruvchi kuchiga putur etkazadi, imperatorni tanqidlarga duchor qiladi va potentsial ravishda buzadi. ichki xotirjamlik.[24] Uning jadal sanoatlashish davrida uning eng katta qo'rquvi Taisho demokratiyasining siyosiy fraksiyalarining mayda fraktsionizmlari ko'mak bergan chap qanot inqilobi tahdidiga aylanadi.[25] U tengdoshlikni osoyishtalik, totuvlik, mavjud vaziyatni saqlashga bag'ishlangan barqarorlikning tayanchi deb bildi, uning vazifasi saylangan hukumatning ortiqcha narsalarini cheklash edi, ammo uning kuchidan tejamkorlik bilan foydalanish kerak edi.[26]

Ichki ishlar vazirligi bilan ittifoq

Yaponiya ichki ishlar vazirligi juda kuchli edi, politsiya, saylovlar, jamoat ishlari uchun mas'ul edi. Sinto ziyoratgohlari va erlarni rivojlantirish.[27] Ichki ishlar vazirligi, shuningdek, hukmron partiya foydasiga saylovlarga ta'sir o'tkazish uchun suiiste'mol qilingan.[28] Konoe bir paytlar uni aslzodaning qadr-qimmati ostida deb hisoblaganiga qaramay, uy vazirligining muhim amaldorlari bilan ittifoq tuzdi, bu amaldorlar orasida eng muhimi Yoshiharu Tazava, u Yaponiya Yoshlar Zalining boshqaruvchi direktori bo'lganidan keyin u bilan uchrashgan (Nippon Saynenkan) 1921 yilda.[29] Konoe va ushbu rasmiylar mahalliylarning ta'sirini ko'rdilar meiboka siyosiy boshliqlar Yaponiyaning siyosiy barqarorligiga tahdid sifatida, umumiy saylov huquqi, o'qimagan va bu cho'chqa bochkalari siyosatidan foydalangan mahalliy xo'jayinlar tomonidan boshqariladigan dehqonlar uchun ovozni ochdi.[30] Ushbu mansabdorlar, shuningdek, Kononing uy vazirligidagi partiyalarning ta'siridan xavotirda bo'lishdi, bu esa parhezda yuz bergan siyosiy inqilobni aks ettirgan katta aylanmani ko'rdi.[31] Kononing yoshlar zali bilan birlashishi 1921 yil iyulda maqola e'lon qilinganidan ikki oy o'tgach boshlandi, u erda u saylovchilarning siyosiy donoligi va axloqini tarbiyalashga urg'u berdi va ta'lim yoshlarni faqat o'zlarining boshliqlaridan g'oyalarni passiv qabul qilishga o'rgatdi. Yoshlar korpusi (Seynendan) keyinchalik yo'q qilishning umumiy maqsadi bilan odamlar o'rtasida axloqiy, fuqarolik burchini his qilish uchun yaratilgan meiboka tizim.[32]

1925 yil Konoe va ushbu amaldorlar Yangi Yaponiya uchun Ittifoq tuzdilar (Shin Nippon Domei) vakillik hukumati kontseptsiyasini ma'qullagan, ammo partiya va mahalliy qishloq xo'jayinlarining qadr-qimmatini rad etgan, buning o'rniga partiyalar tashqarisidan yangi nomzodlar o'z nomzodlarini ilgari surishlari kerakligini himoya qilgan.[33] Saylovlarni tozalash assotsiatsiyasi (Senkyo Shukusei Domeikai) tashkil etildi, uning maqsadi ko'zga tashlanmagan nomzodlarni qo'llab-quvvatlash orqali cho'chqa bochkasining mahalliy siyosatini chetlab o'tish va kuchsizlantirish edi. meiboka xo'jayinlar, ittifoq hatto siyosiy partiya tuzgan (meiseikai) qo'llab-quvvatlay olmadi va tashkil topgandan keyin ikki yil ichida, 1928 yilda tarqatib yuborildi.[34]

Birinchi Premer-ligaga olib boradigan yo'l

20-asrning 20-yillarida Yaponiya tashqi siyosati asosan Angliya-Amerika siyosati, Versal shartnomasi, Vashington dengiz konferentsiyasi shartnoma tuzildi va buyuk davlatlar o'rtasida mustaqil Xitoy davlatini barpo etish to'g'risida kelishuv mavjud edi.[35] Rivojlanayotgan partiya tizimi idorani sanoat bilan ittifoq asosida boshqargan.[36] 1930-yillarda yuz bergan katta depressiya, sharqda Sovet harbiy qudratining kuchayishi, Yaponiyaning dengiz kuchlari cheklanganligini yanada kuchaytirishi va Yaponiyaning Osiyodagi tajovuziga qarshi Xitoyning qarshilik kuchayishi Yaponiyaning Angliya-Amerika kuchlari bilan hamkorligidan voz kechganligini ko'rsatdi. Yaponiya hukumati tashqi siyosatda muxtoriyat izlay boshladi va inqiroz tuyg'usi chuqurlashgan sari birdamlik va safarbarlik haddan tashqari ustunliklarga aylandi.[37]

Konoe 1931 yilda tengdoshlar uyining vitse-prezidentligini oldi.[38] 1932 yilda siyosiy partiyalar kabinet ustidan nazoratni yo'qotdi, bundan buyon kabinetlar siyosiy elita va harbiy fraksiyalar vakillarining ittifoqlari bilan tuzildi, hukumat siyosiy partiyalarni va chap qanotda qolganlarni bostirishni kuchaytirdi, chunki Yaponiya o'z resurslarini urushga safarbar qildi.[39]

Konoe 1933 yilda tengdoshlar uyi prezidentligiga ko'tarildi, uning 30-yillarning o'rtalarida elita siyosiy fraktsiyalari, elita siyosati konsensusi va milliy birdamlikdagi siyosiy vositachiligiga qaratilgan sa'y-harakatlari.[40] U to'ng'ich o'g'lini yubordi Fumitaka AQShda o'qish, da Princeton, uni siyosatga tayyorlashni va uni Amerikada Yaponiyaning qodir tarafdoriga aylantirishni istab. Fumimaro otasining moliyaviy ahvoli yomonligi sababli chet elda o'qimagan, garchi uning elita zamondoshlarining aksariyati.[41] U 1934 yilda Fumitakaga tashrif buyurgan va Yaponiyaga qarshi kayfiyatning ko'tarilishidan hayratda qolgan, bu tajriba AQShga nisbatan g'azabini yanada kuchaytirdi, u o'zini xudbin va irqchi deb qabul qildi va u qo'shimcha ravishda AQShni iqtisodiy falokatni oldini olmaganlikda aybladi. Konoe 1935 yilda qilgan nutqida "monopollashtirish"Ango-Amerika alyansining resurslari tugashi va o'rniga"xalqaro yangi shartnoma"Yaponiya kabi mamlakatlarga ularning ko'payib borayotgan populyatsiyasi to'g'risida g'amxo'rlik qilishda yordam berish.[42]

Konoe Versaldan beri barqaror bo'lib kelmoqda, u Yaponiyani teng va g'arbiy kuchlarning raqibi deb bilgan, Yaponiyaning Xitoyda kengayish huquqiga ega ekanligiga ishongan, ekspansiya omon qolish deb hisoblagan va hanuzgacha "Angliya-Amerika kuchlari dunyodagi iqtisodiy hukmronligini amalga oshirishga intilayotgan ikkiyuzlamachilar bo'lib, Yaponiyani buyuk davlat sifatida omon qolish huquqidan mahrum qilishdi.."[43]

Bosh vazir va Xitoy bilan urush

Tengdoshlar uyining prezidenti, 1936 y

Liberalga suyangan Saionji Kinmochi bilan o'qitishiga, universitetda sotsializmni o'rganishiga va umumiy saylov huquqini qo'llab-quvvatlashiga qaramay, u fashizmga qarama-qarshi jozibaga ega bo'lib tuyuldi, bu esa keksayishni g'azablantirdi va qo'rqitdi. janrMasalan, u xuddi kiyinganligi haqida xabar berilgan Gitler Saionjining qizi 1937 yilda turmushga chiqishidan oldin kostyumlar kechasida.[44] Ushbu shubhalarga qaramay, Saionji Kononi imperator nomzodini ko'rsatdi va 1937 yil iyun oyida Konoe Bosh vazir bo'ldi.[45] Konoe o'sha vaqtdan va Xitoy bilan urush o'rtasida qisqa vaqtni ultra-millatchi liderlarning afv etilishini ta'minlashga harakat qildi 26 fevral voqeasi, uning ustozi Saionjini o'ldirishga uringan rahbarlar.[46] Konoe bosh vazirlik lavozimiga kirishganidan keyin harbiy va qonuniy vazirlarni avvalgi kabinetda saqlab qoldi va siyosiy partiyalardan vazirlarni qabul qilishdan bosh tortdi, u partiya hukumatini tiriltirishda qiziq emas edi.[47] Bir oy o'tgach, Yapon qo'shinlari Pekin yaqinida Xitoy qo'shinlari bilan to'qnashdilar Marko Polo ko'prigidagi voqea, Yaponiya harbiy rahbariyati o'rtasida xalq Xitoy bilan urushga tayyor emasligi to'g'risida kelishuvga erishildi va sulh 11 iyulda tuzildi.[48] Konoe hukumati Xitoyga ko'proq bo'linishlar yuborib, keng ko'lamli urush boshlanishiga sabab bo'lganidan so'ng, sulh bitimi 20 iyulda buzilgan.[49]

1937 yil noyabrda Konoe fuqarolik hukumati va harbiylar o'rtasida qo'shma konferentsiyaning yangi tizimini yaratdi aloqa konferentsiyalari. Ushbu aloqa yig'ilishlarida bosh vazir, tashqi ishlar vaziri, armiya va dengiz floti vazirlari va ularning bosh shtab boshliqlari qatnashdilar. Ushbu kelishuv harbiylar foydasiga nomutanosiblikni keltirib chiqardi, chunki har bir ishtirokchi siyosat ishlab chiqishda teng huquqqa ega edi.[50]

Bosh vazir Kiichiru Xiranuma (1867-1952, lavozimida 1939 yil yanvar-avgust, markaz, oldingi qator) va uning kabinet a'zolari, shu jumladan portfelsiz vazir Fumimaro Konoe (Xiranumadan o'ngda), ichki ishlar vaziri Kyichi Kido (ikkinchi qator, Xiranuma va Konoe o'rtasida), dengiz vaziri Mitsumasa Yonai (orqa qator, qorong'u harbiy kostyum bilan) va urush vaziri Seishirō Itagaki (Yonayning o'ng tomonida, engil harbiy kostyum bilan), uning ma'muriyatining ochilish kunida.

Nankinni qo'lga olishdan oldin, Chang Kay Shek Germaniyaning Xitoydagi elchisi orqali muzokaralar olib borishga urindi, ammo Konoe uverturani rad etdi.[51] Ko'p o'tmay Nankin qirg'ini, Konoe 1938 yil yanvarida bayonot chiqarib, u erda "Gomindang agressiyasi mag'lub bo'lishiga qaramay to'xtamagan edi"bu shunday edi"o'z xalqini katta azob-uqubatlarga duchor qilish"va Yaponiya endi Chang bilan muomala qilmasligini, olti kundan keyin u nutq so'zladi va mojaroning davom etishi uchun Xitoyni aybladi.[52]Nankingni olgandan so'ng, Yaponiya armiyasi Yangtze daryosi vodiysiga ko'tarilish qobiliyatiga shubha bilan qaragan va Xitoy bilan urushni to'xtatish uchun Germaniyaning vositachilik taklifini qabul qilishni ma'qul ko'rgan.[53] Konoe, aksincha, tinchlikka qiziqmas edi,[betaraflik bu bahsli] va buning o'rniga Chi Kay-Shek hech qachon qabul qilmasligini bilgan ataylab kamsituvchi shartlarni taklif qilib, urushni avj oldirishni tanladi,[betaraflik bu bahsli] Xitoy ustidan "umumiy g'alaba" ni qo'lga kiritish.[54][qo'shimcha ma'lumot (lar) kerak ] 1938 yil yanvar oyida Konoe hukumati endi Chiang bilan muomala qilmasligini, balki yangi rejimning rivojlanishini kutishini e'lon qildi. Keyinchalik tushuntirishlar so'raganda, Konoe u Chiang rejimini tan olmaslikdan ko'proq narsani nazarda tutganini, ammo uni "rad etganini" va "yo'q qilishini" aytdi.[55] Amerikalik tarixchi Gerxard Vaynberg Kononing urushni avj oldirishi haqida shunday yozgan edi: "1931-1941 yillarda o'n yil ichida Tokioning fuqarolik hukumati kuchlarni, jasoratni va zukkolikni to'plagan holda, ular tinchlik masalasida harbiylarni bekor qilishdi. Yaponiya uchun halokatli, Xitoy uchun va Kononing o'zi uchun halokatli natijalar.[56]Savdo muvozanati buzilganligi sababli 1937 yil oxiriga kelib Yaponiya o'zining oltin zaxiralarining katta qismini yo'qotib qo'ydi va Konoe shimolning Xitoy resurslarini ekspluatatsiyalashga yo'naltirilgan yangi iqtisodiy tizim bu iqtisodiy tanazzulni to'xtatishning yagona yo'li deb o'ylardi va u AQShning "ochiq eshigini" rad etdi Versaldan beri bo'lgan siyosat, ammo Xitoyning janubida ochiq g'arbiy manfaatlarni qoldirdi.1938 yil 3-noyabrda Kono Yaponiya Sharqiy Osiyoda yangi tartibni izlamoqda, Chiang endi Xitoy uchun gapirmaydi, Yaponiya Xitoyni qayta tiklaydi chet el kuchlari yordamisiz va bu "uch tomonlama munosabatlar. . . Yaponiya, Manchukuo va Xitoy"bo'lardi"yangi madaniyatni yaratish va butun Sharqiy Osiyoda yaqin iqtisodiy birdamlikni amalga oshirish."[57]

1938 yil aprelda Konoe va harbiylar a Milliy safarbarlik to'g'risidagi qonun favqulodda holat e'lon qilgan Diet orqali markaziy hukumatga barcha ishchi kuchi va materiallarni boshqarish imkoniyatini berdi va Yaponiya bozoriga xom ashyo oqimini etkazib berdi.[58] Yaponlarning g'alabalari Syuzhou, Xankov, Kanton, Vuchang, Xanyangda davom etdi - ammo baribir xitoyliklar kurashni davom ettirdilar. Konoe 1939 yil yanvar oyida iste'foga chiqdi va rais etib tayinlandi Maxfiy kengash. U boshqa birov tomonidan tugatilishida katta ishtirok etgan urushni tark etdi, bu esa Yaponiya jamoatchiligini hayratda qoldirdi, chunki bu urush cheksiz g'alabalar seriyasi deb aytilgan edi.[59] Kiichirō Xiranuma uning o'rniga Bosh vazir lavozimini egalladi. Konoe 1-darajali mukofot bilan taqdirlandi Chiqayotgan quyosh ordeni 1939 yilda.

Kononing ikkinchi muddati, Matsuoka tashqi siyosati

Bosh vazir Fumimaro Konoe (1891–1945, lavozimida 1937–39 va 1940–41)

Bosh vazirning siyosatidan norozilik tufayli Mitsumasa Yonai, Yaponiya armiyasi Kononi Bosh vazir sifatida chaqirib olishni talab qildi. 23 iyun kuni Konoe Maxfiy kengash raisi lavozimidan iste'foga chiqdi,[60] va 1940 yil 16-iyulda Yonai kabineti iste'foga chiqdi va Konoe Bosh vazir etib tayinlandi. Uning birinchi harakatlaridan biri bu Muqaddas urushni ta'qib qilishni qo'llab-quvvatlovchi parhez a'zolari ligasi deputat kabi siyosatchilarning qarshiliklariga qarshi turish Saitō Takao kimga qarshi gapirgan Ikkinchi Xitoy-Yaponiya urushi 2-fevral kuni parhezda.[iqtibos kerak ]

Yonay armiyani vaziriga javoban Yaponiyani fashistlar bilan birlashtirishdan bosh tortgan edi Shunroku Xata iste'foga chiqdi va armiya uning o'rniga nomzod ko'rsatishni rad etdi.[61] Konoe o'limidan oldin oxirgi marta Saionijdan keyin chaqirib olindi, o'sha yili Kono oxirgi marta qaytib keldi, qaytib kelgandan so'ng Konoe Xitoy bilan urushni tugatishga kirishdi va Yangi Tartibot Harakati yo'li bilan siyosiy partiyalarni nazoratdan olib tashladi hukumat.[62] Konoe o'sha yili siyosiy partiyalarni muvaffaqiyatli tugatdi va shu bilan armiyadagi urush tarafdorlariga yordam berib, partiyalarni juda liberal va bo'linishlarga ega deb bildi.[63] The Imperatorlik hukmronligiga yordam uyushmasi (IRAA) 1940 yilda Konoe ostida urush davri safarbarlik tashkiloti sifatida mahalliy bilan ittifoq asosida tashkil etilgan. meiboka, chunki ularning hamkorligi qishloq aholisini safarbar qilish uchun zarur edi.[64] Konoe hukumati IRAA tarkibiga kirishi uchun siyosiy partiyalarni bosim o'tkazdi, u fashistlar partiyasiga o'xshash siyosiy partiyani tuzish haqidagi chaqiriqlarga qarshilik ko'rsatdi, chunki bu 1920-yilgi siyosiy nizolarni qayta tiklaydi, buning o'rniga u IRAAni yagona siyosiy buyurtma sifatida targ'ib qilish uchun harakat qildi va qo'shimcha ravishda ishondi. siyosiy partiyaning boshlig'i bo'lish zodagonning qadr-qimmati ostida bo'ladi.[65]

The Yaponlarning frantsuz Hind-Xitoyiga bosqini Konoe bosh vazir lavozimiga chaqirilishidan oldin armiya tomonidan rejalashtirilgan edi.[66] Bosqin Xitoy bilan urush olib borish uchun zarur bo'lgan manbalarni ta'minlab, g'arbiy ta'minotni to'xtatadi Gomintang qo'shinlari, Yaponiya harbiylarini ko'proq hududga tahdid qilish uchun strategik joyga joylashtiring va umid qilamanki ularni qo'rqitaman Gollandiyalik Sharqiy Hindiston Yaponiyani neft bilan ta'minlashga.[67] AQSh javob berdi Eksport nazorati to'g'risidagi qonun Tashqi ishlar vazirining javobiga qaramay, Changga yordamni ko'paytirdi Yosuke Matsuoka imzolagan Uch tomonlama pakt Kononing ba'zi maslahatchilari, shu jumladan Yaponiyaning AQShdagi sobiq elchisi e'tirozi yuzasidan 1940 yil 27 sentyabrda Kikujiro Ishii.[68] 4 oktabr kuni bo'lib o'tgan matbuot anjumanida Konoe AQSh uch tomonlama kuchlarning niyatlarini noto'g'ri tushunmasligi va ularga yangi dunyo tartibini o'rnatishda yordam berishi kerakligini aytdi, shuningdek, agar u AQSh provokatsion harakatlarini tugatmasa va ataylab tanlagan bo'lsa uch tomonlama kuchlarning harakatlarini noto'g'ri tushunish, urushdan boshqa variant qolmas edi.[69] 1940 yil noyabrda Yaponiya Xitoy-Yaponiya shartnomasini imzoladi Vang Jinvey Sun Yatsenning shogirdi bo'lgan va Nanjindagi raqib Gomintang hukumatining rahbari bo'lgan Kono hukumati barcha egallab olingan hududlarni Tsinvey hukumatiga topshirmadi, uning vakolatlarini pasaytirdi va bu asosan noqonuniy qo'g'irchoq sifatida qaraldi.[70] 1940 yil dekabrda inglizlar Birma yo'lini qayta ochdilar va Changning Gomintangiga 10 million funt qarz berdilar.[71] Konoe muqobil neft manbasini olish uchun 1941 yilning yanvarida gollandlar bilan muzokaralarni tavsiya qildi.[72]

1941 yil fevral oyida Konoe tanladi Admiral Nomura Yaponiyaning AQShdagi elchisi sifatida.[73] Matsuoka va Stalin imzolagan Sovet-yapon neytrallik shartnomasi 1941 yil 13 aprelda Moskvada, Sovet Ittifoqi Yaponiya bilan urush bo'lgan taqdirda ittifoqchilarga yordam bermasligini aniq ko'rsatib berdi.[74] 1941 yil 18 aprelda Nomuradan AQSh va Yaponiya o'rtasidagi o'zaro tushunish loyihasi - diplomatik yutuq haqida xabar keldi.[75] Ushbu bitimning asosini ikki amerikalik ishlab chiqqan Merknoll ruhoniylar Jeyms Edvard Uolsh va Jeyms M. Qurg'oqchilik, postmaster general orqali Frank C. Uoker ruhoniylar Ruzvelt bilan uchrashdilar.[76] Polkovnik bankir Tadao Ikava bilan maslahatlashgan holda ishlab chiqilgan taklifning mazmuni Xideo Ivakura va Nomura tarkibiga Amerikaning Manchukuo tomonidan tan olinishi, Chiang hukumatining yaponlar qo'llab-quvvatlanishi bilan qo'shilishi kiradi. Qayta tashkil etilgan Xitoy milliy hukumati, savdo aloqalarini normallashtirish, yapon qo'shinlarini Xitoydan olib chiqish, Xitoy mustaqilligini o'zaro hurmat qilish va Yaponiyaning AQShga ko'chishi boshqa fuqarolar bilan kamsitishlardan xoli bo'lgan tenglik asosida amalga oshiriladi.[77]

Matsuoka Tokioga qaytib kelganida, aloqa konferentsiyasi bo'lib o'tdi va u o'z tushuncha loyihasiga qarshi chiqqani, bu ularning fashistlarning ittifoqchilariga xiyonat qilishiga ishonganligi sababli, Yaponiya Germaniyaga ushbu loyihani ko'rishga ruxsat berishi kerak deb o'ylardi, keyin charchaganini aytib yig'ilishni tark etdi, Konoe ham o'z villasiga, bu masalani majburlash o'rniga, isitma haqida da'vo qildi[78] Matsuoka zudlik bilan hujum qilishga undadi Britaniya Singapur va Konoe va uning kabinetini ochiq tanqid qila boshladi, uning Kononi o'rniga bosh vazir lavozimini egallashni istashi shubhali bo'lib qoldi.[79] Matsuoka AQSh loyihasini qarshi taklifga o'zgartirdi, unda asosan Yaponiyaning Xitoyga nisbatan Tinch okeanidagi kengayishi va Tinch okeanidagi kengayish borasida eng katta imtiyozlari paydo bo'ldi, keyin Nomura uni Vashingtonga etkazib berdi.[80]

1941 yil 22-iyun, yakshanba kuni Gitler Molotov-Ribbentrop shartnomasi Sovet Ittifoqiga bostirib kirish bilan, bosqinga to'g'ri kelib, Kordell Xall yaponlarga tushunishga oid loyihaning yana bir tuzatishini taqdim etdi, ammo bu safar Yaponiyaning Manchukuoni nazorat qilish huquqini tan olishmadi, yangi loyihada Yaponiyaning tinchlikdagi harbiy ekspansiya huquqi ham butunlay rad etildi.[81] Xull, Yaponiya Gitler bilan ittifoqchi ekan, kelishuvni amalga oshirish imkonsiz bo'ladi, deb aytgan bayonotni o'z ichiga olgan, u Matsuokani alohida tilga olmagan, ammo uni chetlatish kerakligi, tashqi ishlar vaziri endi Sovet Ittifoqiga zudlik bilan hujum qilish tarafdori va buni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri imperatorga qilgan.[82] Konoe imperatordan kechirim so'rashga va Yaponiya Sovet Ittifoqi bilan urushga kirishmoqchi emasligiga ishontirishga majbur bo'ldi.[83]

Matsuoka bunga amin edi Barbarossa tez nemislarning g'alabasi bo'lar edi va u endi Singapurga hujum qilishga qarshi edi, chunki u g'arbiy ittifoqchilar bilan urushni qo'zg'atadi.[84] Matsuoka Sovet Ittifoqiga qarshi hujumni qo'llab-quvvatlash va janub tomon yanada kengayishiga qarshi keskin bahs yuritgan bir qator aloqa konferentsiyalaridan so'ng, Frantsuz Hind-Xitoyining janubiy yarmini bosib olish va bosib olish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilindi, bu 2-iyuldagi imperatorlik konferentsiyasida rasmiylashtirildi. .[85] Imperiya konferentsiyasining ushbu rezolyutsiyasiga Yaponiya AQSh va Angliya bilan kerak bo'lganda urushdan qochib ketmasligi haqidagi bayonot kiritilgan.[86] 10-iyuldan boshlab Konoe Yaponiyaning Xallning anglashuv loyihasiga kiritilgan so'nggi tuzatishlariga munosabatini muhokama qilish uchun bir qator aloqa anjumanlarini o'tkazdi.[87] Yaponiyaliklar Hindistonning janubini egallab olish jarayoni tugamaguncha javob berilmaslikka qaror qilindi, agar u tinch yo'l bilan o'tadigan bo'lsa, ehtimol AQSh okkupatsiyaga aralashuvisiz toqat qilishga ishonishi mumkin.[88] 14-iyul kuni Matsuoka kasallik tufayli Yaponiya uch tomonlama shartnomadan voz kechmaydi degan javobni tayyorladi, u Xullning asosan unga qaratilgan bayonotiga hujum qildi va ertasi kuni javobni Germaniyaga tasdiqlash uchun yubordi.[89] Loyihani nemislarga vazirlar mahkamasining ruxsatisiz yuborish Kono va uning butun kabinetini ommaviy iste'foga chiqishiga va hukumatni Matsuokasiz 16-iyulda islohot qilishga olib borgan so'nggi masala edi, Matsuoka kasalligi sababli ushbu favqulodda hukumat yig'ilishida qatnashmadi.[90]

Uchinchi hukumat va Qo'shma Shtatlar bilan urushdan qochishga urinish

Konoe o'zining kabinet vazirlari, shu jumladan urush vaziri bilan Hideki Tojo, ikkinchi qator, chapdan ikkinchi (1940 yil 22-iyul)

Kononing uchinchi hukumati 18 iyulda admiral bilan rasmiy ravishda tuzilgan Teijiro Toyoda tashqi ishlar vaziri sifatida.[91] Ruzvelt ma'muriyati Matsuokaning ishdan bo'shatilishi Yaponiyaning doimiy tajovuzkor harakatlaridan to'xtab qolishini anglatadi degan umidda, Frantsiya hukumati harbiy harakatlar bilan tahdid qilinganidan so'ng, Yaponiya armiyasiga 22-iyul kuni, ikki kun ichida butun Frantsiya Hind-Xitoyini bosib olishga ruxsat berganida, bu umidlar puchga chiqdi. keyinchalik AQSh muzokaralarni to'xtatdi va Yaponiya aktivlarini muzlatib qo'ydi, Britaniya, Gollandiya va Kanada hukumatlari bundan ko'p o'tmay shunga ergashdilar.[92] O'sha kuni Ruzvelt muzokaralarni to'xtatdi, u Nomura bilan uchrashdi va u erda elchiga Yaponiya Hindistondan chiqib ketishga rozi bo'lsa va uning betaraflik maqomiga ega bo'lishiga rozi bo'lsa, yapon aktivlari muzlatilishi mumkinligi haqida aytdi.[93] Ruzvelt Yaponiyaning Xitoydagi ekspansiyasiga toqat qilinishini, ammo Hindiston Xitoyning qizil chizig'i ekanligini nazarda tutgan holda, Yaponiya Gitler dunyo hukmronligiga moyilligini ko'rmayotganidan qanday bezovta bo'lganligini ham aytdi.[94] Kono Ruzveltning taklifini amalga oshirishda tajovuzkor choralar ko'rmadi, u boshchiligidagi militaristlarni jilovlay olmadi. Hideki Tojo u urush vaziri sifatida imperator tomonidan ma'qullanganligi sababli musodara qilishni qaytarilmas deb hisoblagan.[95]

28 iyulda yaponlar rasmiy ravishda janubiy Hindistonni egallay boshladilar.[96] Bunga javoban 1 avgustda AQSh Yaponiyaga neft eksportini taqiqladi.[97] 1940 yilda Yaponiya neftining 93 foizini AQSh etkazib berar ekan, neftning o'rnini bosadigan manbani topish juda muhim edi.[98] Dengiz kuchlari shtabi boshlig'i Osami Nagano Yaponiyaning neft zaxiralari ikki yil ichida to'liq tugashini imperatorga ma'lum qildi.[99] Kononing kabineti Frantsuz janubidagi Hind-Xitoyni bosib olishlari natijasida AQShning embargo moyini oldindan ko'ra olmadi.[100] 1 avgustda Xachiro Arita Konoga AQSh bilan muzokaralar davom etayotgan paytda harbiylarning Hindistonning janubini bosib olishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik kerakligi to'g'risida xat yozdi, Konoe kemalar allaqachon jo'natilganligi va o'z vaqtida orqaga qaytish imkoni yo'qligi va uning qo'lidan kelgani shu edi. "ilohiy aralashuv" uchun ibodat qiling.[101]

6 avgustda Kono hukumati Hindistondagi urush tugagandan keyingina Ruzveltning zararsizlantirish taklifini rad etganida chiqib ketishini e'lon qildi, lekin bundan keyin ham kengaytirmaslikka va'da berdi va Xitoyda urushni tugatishda AQShning vositachiligini so'radi.[102] 8 avgustda Konoe Nomura orqali Ruzvelt bilan uchrashuv o'tkazishni so'radi, taklif kelib tushdi Kinkazu Saionji uning vafot etgan ustozi Saionji Kinmochining nabirasi, Konoga har oygi norasmiy nonushta klubi orqali maslahat bergan, bu erda Konoe fuqarolik elita bilan siyosat bo'yicha maslahatlashgan.[103] Xotsumi Ozaki, Kononing do'sti va maslahatchisi bo'lgan, xuddi shu nonushta klubining a'zosi edi, u ham a'zosi edi Richard Sorge sovet josuslari jurnali.[104]

Nomura Ruzvelt bilan uchrashdi va Kononing sammiti taklifi to'g'risida gapirdi, Yaponiyaning Hindchinadagi Ruzveltdagi tajovuzkorligini qoralagandan so'ng, Ruzvelt u uchrashuvga ochiq ekanligini va ular Alyaskaning Juneau shahrida uchrashishlari mumkinligini aytdi.[105] 3 sentyabrda aloqa bo'yicha konferentsiya bo'lib o'tdi, unda Konoe Ruzvelt bilan tinchlikni izlashni davom ettirishga qaror qilindi, ammo shu bilan birga, agar oktyabr oyining o'rtalariga qadar tinchlik to'g'risidagi bitim amalga oshmasa, Yaponiya ham urush olib boradi, shuningdek Yaponiya uch tomonlama pakt.[106] Konoe, Saionji va uning tarafdorlari Xitoydan qo'shinlarni olib chiqishga tayyorligini ta'kidlagan taklifni ishlab chiqdilar, ammo Konoe bu taklifni kiritmadi, aksincha tashqi ishlar vazirligining taklifiga qo'shildi, takliflarning farqi shundaki, tashqi ishlar vazirligi qo'shinlarni olib chiqib ketishdan oldin Xitoy va Yaponiya o'rtasida tuzilgan kelishuv bilan shartlangan edi.[107]

5 sentyabrda Konoe imperatorni shtab boshliqlari bilan uchrashdi Xajime Sugiyama Admiral Osami Nagano, diplomatik yutuq bo'lmagan taqdirda, vazirlar mahkamasining urush boshlash to'g'risidagi qarori to'g'risida unga xabar berish uchun imperatorni Ruzvelt bilan muzokaralar nima bo'lganligi haqida xavotirga solib qo'ydi, u Konodan urushdan muzokaraga o'tishni talab qildi, Konoe javob berdi. siyosiy jihatdan imkonsiz bo'lar edi, keyin imperator bu harbiy tayyorgarlik haqida nima uchun uni zulmatda saqlaganini so'radi.[108] Keyin imperator Sugiyamani Occident bilan ochiq urushning muvaffaqiyati haqida so'radi. Sugiyama ijobiy javob berganidan so'ng, Xirohito armiyani Xitoyga bostirib kirishni atigi uch oy ichida yakunlanishini bashorat qilganini eslab, uni tanbeh berdi.[109]

6 sentyabrda imperator ikki shtab boshlig'i tomonidan diplomatiya asosiy urg'u ekanligiga ishonch bildirilgandan so'ng, imperatorlar konferentsiyasida vazirlar mahkamasining qarorini ma'qulladi, faqat diplomatik muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan taqdirda urush orqaga qaytish imkoniyati sifatida.[110] O'sha kuni kechqurun Konoe AQShning Yaponiyadagi elchisi bilan maxfiy ravishda kechki ovqatni tashkil qildi Jozef Grew (15 avgustda, Xiranuma Kiichiro uning kabineti a'zosi bo'lgan va avvalgi bosh vazir o'ta millatchi tomonidan olti marta otib tashlangan edi, chunki u Grewga juda yaqin edi) Konoe Grewga Ruzvelt bilan uchrashishga sayr qilishga tayyorligini aytdi. , Keyin Gryu boshliqlarini Ruzveltga sammit taklifini qabul qilishni maslahat berishga undadi.[111]

Kono imperatorlik konferentsiyasining ertasi kuni uchrashuv tashkil qildi Shahzoda Naruxiko Xigashikuni va armiya vaziri Tojo, bu urush kalxatini Konoye bilan moslashtirishga urinish edi.[112] Xigashikuni Tojoga imperator va Kono urush masalasida muzokaralarni ma'qul ko'rganligi sababli, armiya vaziri ham kerak, agar u qarama-qarshilik siyosatiga amal qilolmasa, uni tark etishi kerakligini aytdi.[113] Tojo, agar Yaponiyaning g'arbiy qurshovi qabul qilinadigan bo'lsa, Yaponiya o'z hayotini to'xtatadi, deb javob berdi Tojo, agar AQSh bilan urushda g'alaba qozonish uchun ozgina imkoniyat bo'lsa ham, Yaponiya bunga tayyorlanib, uni amalga oshirish kerak, deb ishondi. o'rab olingan va yo'q qilingan.[114]

1941 yil kuzida ko'zga ko'rinadigan darajada qayg'u chekdi Perl-Harborga hujum.

10 sentyabrda Nomura Xull bilan uchrashdi va unga Yaponiyaning so'nggi taklifi boshlang'ich bo'lmaganligi va Yaponiya sammit yig'ilishi bo'lib o'tmasdan oldin Xitoyga nisbatan yon berishlari kerakligini aytdi.[115] 20 sentyabr kuni aloqa yig'ilishi qayta ko'rib chiqilgan taklifni qabul qildi, bu Xitoydan chiqib ketish uchun shartlarni qattiqlashtirdi.[116] 25 sentyabrdagi aloqa konferentsiyasida, sammit muzokaralari to'xtab qolganini sezgan Tojo va militaristlar kabinetni 15 oktyabrdagi urush uchun haqiqiy muddatni belgilashga majbur qilishdi.[117] Ushbu uchrashuvdan so'ng Konoe xo'jayiniga shaxsiy muhrni aytdi Koichi Kido u iste'foga ketmoqchi edi, ammo Kido u bilan gaplashdi, keyin Konoe 2 oktyabrgacha Kamakuradagi villada o'zini yolg'iz tutdi va tashqi ishlar vaziri Toyoda yo'qligida muzokaralarni o'z zimmasiga oldi.[118] Toyoda Ruzveltdan Kono sammitda faqat imtiyozlar berishi mumkin, ammo militaristlarning ta'siri tufayli oldindan bajara olmasligini va har qanday yarashuv nemislarga oldindan etkazilishi xavfi bilan sodir bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida Ruzveltga aytishni so'radi. Konoe shkafini pastga tushiring.[119] Gryu 29-sentabrdagi muloqotda Ruzveltga sammitni yoqladi.[120]

1 oktyabrda Konoe dengiz floti vazirini chaqirdi Oikava Kamakuraga, u Amerikaning talablarini qabul qilishda hamkorlik qilishga sodiqligini ta'minladi, dengiz floti AQSh bilan urushda g'alaba qozonish ehtimoli borligini bilar edi.[121] Oikava Tokioga qaytib keldi va dengiz floti shtabi boshlig'i Naganoning hamkorligini ta'minlayotganday tuyuldi, shu jumladan Toyoda tashqi ishlar vaziri sifatida ular keyingi aloqalar konferentsiyasida potentsial ko'pchilikni tashkil etdilar.[122] On 2 October Hull delivered to Nomura a statement constituting the preconditions for a summit meeting, Hull made it clear that the Japanese army would have to demonstrate that they were going to pull troops out of French Indochina and China.[123]

At the liaison conference of 4 October, Hull's response was still being processed and could not be fully discussed, Nagano changed his position and now agreed with the army and advocated a deadline for war, Konoe and Oikawa were largely silent, and did not try to bring him back to the side of negotiation, a final decision was further postponed.[124] The army and the navy were in opposition to each other and held separate high level meetings each respectively confirming their resolve to either go to war, or pull back from the brink, however Nagano continued to oppose open confrontation of the army, while Oikawa did not want to take the lead as the only member of the liaison conference to oppose war.[125]

Konoe met privately with Tojo twice, in a failed attempt to convince him to a troop withdrawal, and to take the war option off the table on 5 and 7 October.[126] In the 7 October meeting Konoe told Tojo that "military men take wars too lightly", Tojo's response was "occasionally one must gather up enough courage, close one's eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu ", Konoe responded that was okay for the individual "but if I think of the national polity that has lasted twenty six hundred years and of the hundred million Japanese belonging to this nation, I, as a person in the position of great responsibility, cannot do such a thing".[127] The next day Tojo met with Oikawa, and showed some doubt when he told him that it would be a betrayal of those who had already died in the war for the army to pull troops out of China, but that he was also worried about the many more who would die in an eventual war with the US, and that he was considering a troop withdrawal.[128]

Konoe held a meeting on 12 October with military ministers Tojo, Oikawa, and the foreign minister Toyoda, which became known as the Tekigaiso conference.[129] Konoe began by saying that he had no confidence in the war they were about to wage and would not lead it, but neither Oikawa or Konoe was willing to take the lead in demanding the army agree to taking the war option off the table, Toyoda was the only member willing to declare that the imperial conference of 6 September was a mistake, implying that the war option should be taken off the table, while Tojo forcefully argued that an imperial resolution could not be violated.[130]

On 14 October one day before the deadline, Konoe and Tojo met one last time, where Konoe attempted to impress upon Tojo the need to stand down from war, and accede to US demands for a military withdrawal from China and Indochina, Tojo ruled a troop withdrawal as out of the question.[131] In the cabinet meeting that followed Tojo declared that the decision of the imperial conference had been thoroughly deliberated, that hundreds of thousands of troops were being moved south as they spoke, that if diplomacy were to continue they must be sure that it would result in success, and that the imperial edict had specifically declared that negotiations must bear fruit by early October (which meant the deadline had already been passed), after this conference Tojo went to see lord keeper of the privy seal Kido, to push for Konoe's resignation.[132]

That same evening Tojo sent Teiichi Suzuki (at that time the head of the cabinet planning board) to Konoe with a message urging him to resign, stating that if he resigned Tojo would endorse prince Higashikuni as the next prime minister, Suzuki told Konoe that Tojo realized now that the navy was unwilling to admit that it could not fight the US, he also told Konoe that Tojo believed the current cabinet must resign and bear the responsibility of wrongfully calling for the imperial indict, and only someone of Higashikuni's imperial background could reverse it.[133] The next day on 15 October Konoe's friend and advisor Hotsumi Ozaki was exposed and arrested as a soviet spy.[134]

Konoe resigned on 16 October 1941, one day after having recommended Shahzoda Naruxiko Xigashikuni to the Emperor as his successor.[135] Two days later, Hirohito chose General Tōjō as Prime Minister. In 1946, Hirohito explained this decision: "I actually thought Prince Higashikuni suitable as chief of staff of the Army; but I think the appointment of a member of the imperial house to a political office must be considered very carefully. Above all, in time of peace this is fine, but when there is a fear that there may even be a war, then more importantly, considering the welfare of the imperial house, I wonder about the wisdom of a member of the imperial family serving [as prime minister]."[136] Six weeks later, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor.

Konoe justified his demission to his secretary Kenji Tomita. "Of course His Imperial Majesty is a pacifist and he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: 'You were worried about it yesterday but you do not have to worry so much.' Thus, gradually he began to lead to war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more to war. I felt the Emperor was telling me: 'My prime minister does not understand military matters. I know much more.' In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and the navy high commands."[137]

Post premiership, final years of the war and suicide

On 29 November 1941, at a luncheon with the emperor with all living former prime ministers in attendance, Konoe voiced his objection to war.[138] Upon hearing of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Konoe said regarding Japan's military success, "What on earth? I really feel a miserable defeat coming, this will only last 2 or 3 months."[139]

Konoe played a role in the fall of the Tōjō government in 1944. In February 1945, during the first private audience he had been allowed in three years,[140] he advised the Emperor to begin negotiations to end Ikkinchi jahon urushi. Buyuk Chemberlenning so'zlariga ko'ra Hisanori Fujita, Shōwa, still looking for a tennozan (a great victory), firmly rejected Konoe's recommendation.[141]

After the beginning of the American occupation, Konoe served in the cabinet of Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, the first post-war government. Having refused to collaborate with U.S. Army officer Bonner Fellers in "Operation Blacklist" to exonerate Shōwa and the imperial family of criminal responsibility, he came under suspicion of harbiy jinoyatlar.[iqtibos kerak ] In December 1945, during the last call by the Americans for alleged war criminals to report to the Americans, he took siyanid kaliy poison and committed suicide. His grave is at the Konoe clan cemetery at the temple of Daitoku-ji in Kyoto.

Uning nabirasi, Morihiro Xosokava, became prime minister fifty years later.

A SCAP sud tekshiruvchisi ijro etish postmortem on Konoe (17 December 1945)

Shuningdek qarang

Ajdodlar

Adabiyotlar

  1. ^ Although – in accordance with the system adopted by the Japanese imperial government from the Meiji period through the end of WWII – the official English translation of Konoe's title was "prince", the title of kōshaku (公爵 [ja ]) was actually a closer equivalent to "gersog ".
  2. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 453. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  3. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 455. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  4. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 456. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  5. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 23, 33-betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  6. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 456–457. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  7. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 35. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  8. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 35. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  9. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 457. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  10. ^ Kazuo Yagami, Konoe Fumimaro and the Failure of Peace in Japan, 1937–1941: A Critical Appraisal of the Three-time Prime Minister (McFarland, 2006):19.
  11. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. pp. 42, 36. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  12. ^ Makmillan, Margaret Parij 1919: Dunyoni o'zgartirgan olti oy, New York: Random House, 2007 page 317
  13. ^ Makmillan, Margaret Parij 1919: Dunyoni o'zgartirgan olti oy New York: Random House, 2007 page 487
  14. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 36-37 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  15. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971- (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 35. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  16. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 456. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  17. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 459–460, 462. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  18. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 462. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  19. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 460. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  20. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 462–663. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  21. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 463–464. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  22. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 466–467. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  23. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 464. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  24. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 465–466. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
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  27. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 468. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
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  31. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 468–469. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
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  34. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 470. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  35. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 471. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
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  40. ^ Berger, Gordon M. (1974). "Japan's Young Prince. Konoe Fumimaro's Early Political Career, 1916–1931". Monumenta Nipponika. 29 (4): 475. doi:10.2307/2383896. ISSN  0027-0741. JSTOR  2383896.
  41. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 37. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  42. ^ LaFeber, Valter. (1997). The clash : a history of U.S.-Japan relations (1-nashr). Nyu-York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp.183. ISBN  0393039501. OCLC  35990234.
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  44. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 38. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
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  47. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 29. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  48. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 30. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  49. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 31. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  50. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 39. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  51. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 33. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  52. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 32. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  53. ^ Weinberg Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II 1937–39, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 176.
  54. ^ Weinberg Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany : Starting World War II 1937–39, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 176.
  55. ^ Vakabayashi, Bob Tadashi (1991). "Emperor Hirohito on Localized Aggression in China Arxivlandi 2011-07-21 da Orqaga qaytish mashinasi ". Sino-Japanese Studies 4 (1), p. 15.
  56. ^ Weinberg Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany : Starting World War II 1937–39, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980 page 176.
  57. ^ LaFeber, Valter. (1997). The clash : a history of U.S.-Japan relations (1-nashr). Nyu-York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp.189. ISBN  0393039501. OCLC  35990234.
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  59. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 52. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  60. ^ The Ambassador in Japan (Joseph C. Grew) to the Secretary of State, 24 June 1940, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, vol. IV, p. 962
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  63. ^ LaFeber, Valter. (1997). The clash : a history of U.S.-Japan relations (1-nashr). Nyu-York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp.195. ISBN  0393039501. OCLC  35990234.
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  94. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 145. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  95. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 147. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  96. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971- (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 148. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  97. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971- (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 151. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  98. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 27. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  99. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 148. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  100. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 152-153 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  101. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 152. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  102. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 155-156 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  103. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 155. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  104. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 122. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  105. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 159. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  106. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 171. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  107. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 172. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  108. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 173. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  109. ^ Gerbert Bix, Xirohito va zamonaviy Yaponiyaning yaratilishi, 2000, p.411, 745.
  110. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 175–176 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  111. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 177. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  112. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). New York: 2013. p. 178. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  113. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 179. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  114. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 180. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  115. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 184. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  116. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 186. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  117. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 187. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  118. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 188. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  119. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 190. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  120. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971- (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 189. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  121. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 192. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  122. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 192-193 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  123. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 193. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  124. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 195. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  125. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 197-198 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  126. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. pp. 196–197, 200. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  127. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 201. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  128. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. 201–202 betlar. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  129. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 202. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  130. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 204. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  131. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 208. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  132. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 209. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  133. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 210. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  134. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 212. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  135. ^ Piter Vetsler, Xirohito va urush, 1998, p.41
  136. ^ Wetzler, ibid., p.44, Terasaki Hidenari, Shôwa tennô dokuhakuroku, 1991, p.118
  137. ^ Akira Fujiwara, Shôwa tennô no ju-go nen sensô, 1991, p.126, citing Tomita's diary
  138. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 275. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  139. ^ Hotta, Eri, 1971– (2013). Japan 1941 : countdown to infamy (First Vintage books ed.). Nyu York. p. 11. ISBN  978-0307739742. OCLC  863596251.CS1 maint: bir nechta ism: mualliflar ro'yxati (havola)
  140. ^ Herbert Bix, Xirohito va zamonaviy Yaponiyaning yaratilishi, Perennial, 2001, p.756
  141. ^ Fujita Hisanori, Jijûchô no kaisô, Chûô Kôronsha, 1987, p.66–67, Bix, ibid., p.489

Bibliografiya

  • Connors, Lesley. The Emperor's Advisor: Saionji Kinmochi and Pre-War Japanese Politics, Croom Helm, London, and Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, 1987
  • Iriye, Akira. The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, Longman, London and New York, 1987.
  • Yansen, Marius B. (2000). The Making of Modern Japan. Kembrij: Garvard universiteti matbuoti. ISBN  9780674003347; OCLC  44090600
  • Lash, Joseph P. Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941, W. W. Norton and Co, New York, 1976.
  • Oka, Yoshitake. Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography, Translated by Shumpei Okamoto and Patricia Murray, University of Tokyo Press, Tokyo, Japan, 1983.

Tashqi havolalar

Siyosiy idoralar
Oldingi
Tokugawa Iesato
Tengdoshlar uyining prezidenti
June 1933 – June 1937
Muvaffaqiyatli
Yorinaga Matsudaira
Oldingi
Kazushige Ugaki
Mustamlaka ishlari vaziri
Sep 1938 – Oct 1938
Muvaffaqiyatli
Yoshiaki Hatta
Oldingi
Kazushige Ugaki
Tashqi ishlar vaziri
Sept 1938 – Oct 1938
Muvaffaqiyatli
Xachiru Arita
Oldingi
Senjiri Xayashi
Yaponiya Bosh vaziri
Jun 1937 – Jan 1939
Muvaffaqiyatli
Kiichirō Xiranuma
Oldingi
Kiichirō Xiranuma
Yaponiya Maxfiy Kengashining Prezidenti
Jan 1939 – June 1940
Muvaffaqiyatli
Yoshimichi Xara
Oldingi
Mitsumasa Yonai
Yaponiya Bosh vaziri
Jul 1940 – Oct 1941
Muvaffaqiyatli
Hideki Tōjō
Oldingi
Heisuke Yanagawa
Adliya vaziri
Iyul 1941 yil
Muvaffaqiyatli
Michiyo Iwamura