Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi - Trans-Pacific Partnership

Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi
IESga a'zo davlatlarning rahbarlari.jpg
2010 yilgi IES sammitida 12 ta bo'lajak a'zo davlatlardan 10 nafarining rahbarlari
TuriSavdo shartnomasi
Tayyorlangan5 oktyabr 2015 yil; 5 yil oldin (2015-10-05)[1][2][3]
Imzolangan2016 yil 4-fevral; 4 yil oldin (2016-02-04)
ManzilOklend, Yangi Zelandiya
SamaraliAmalda emas
VaziyatBarcha asl imzolaganlar tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilinishi yoki (imzolanganidan keyin 2 yil o'tgach) kamida 6 ta davlat tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilinishi asl imzolaganlarning yalpi ichki mahsulotining 85 foiziga to'g'ri keladi.[4]
Imzolovchilar
Ratifikatorlar
DepozitariyYangi Zelandiya
TillarIngliz tili (ziddiyat yoki kelishmovchilik holatida ustunlik qiladi), Ispaniya, Vetnam, Yapon, Frantsuz
Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi da Vikipediya

The Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi (IES) deb nomlangan Trans-Tinch okeani bilan hamkorlik shartnomasi, taklif qilingan savdo shartnomasi Avstraliya, Bruney, Kanada, Chili, Yaponiya, Malayziya, Meksika, Yangi Zelandiya, Peru, Singapur, Vetnam va AQSh o'rtasida 2016 yil 4 fevralda imzolangan. AQShning yangi saylangan prezidentidan keyin Donald Tramp AQShning imzosini 2017 yil yanvar oyida IESdan qaytarib oldi,[5] shartnoma zarurat bo'yicha tasdiqlanmadi va kuchga kirmadi. Qolgan mamlakatlar yangi savdo shartnomasini imzolashdi Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi bo'yicha keng qamrovli va progressiv bitim IESning ko'pgina qoidalarini o'zida mujassam etgan va 2018 yil 30 dekabrda kuchga kirgan.

IES kengaytirish sifatida boshlandi Trans-Tinch okeani strategik iqtisodiy sheriklik to'g'risidagi bitim (TPSEP yoki P4) 2005 yilda Bruney, Chili, Yangi Zelandiya va Singapur tomonidan imzolangan. 2008 yildan boshlab kengroq bitim tuzish uchun muhokamaga qo'shimcha mamlakatlar qo'shildi: Avstraliya, Kanada, Yaponiya, Malayziya, Meksika, Peru, AQSh va Vetnam. , muzokara olib borayotgan mamlakatlarni o'n ikkitaga etkazish. 2017 yil yanvar oyida Qo'shma Shtatlar shartnomadan chiqdi.[6] Qolgan 11 ta IES mamlakatlari uni qayta tiklashga 2017 yil may oyida kelishib oldilar[7][8] va 2018 yil yanvar oyida kelishuvga erishildi. 2018 yil mart oyida 11 ta mamlakat kelishuvning qayta ko'rib chiqilgan versiyasini imzoladi Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi bo'yicha keng qamrovli va progressiv bitim.[9] Ularning oltitasi (Avstraliya, Kanada, Yaponiya, Meksika, Yangi Zelandiya va Singapur) tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilingandan so'ng, ushbu davlatlar uchun shartnoma 2018 yil 30 dekabrda kuchga kirdi.

Dastlabki IES ikkalasini ham pasaytirish choralarini o'z ichiga olgan tarifsiz va tarif savdo-sotiqdagi to'siqlar,[10] va tashkil etish investor-davlat nizolarini hal qilish (ISDS) mexanizmi.[11][12] The AQSh Xalqaro savdo komissiyasi,[13] The Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot instituti, Jahon banki va Kanadaning Global Affairs bosh iqtisodchisining idorasi yakuniy kelishuv, agar u ratifikatsiya qilingan bo'lsa, barcha imzolagan davlatlar uchun aniq ijobiy iqtisodiy natijalarga olib keladi, shu bilan birga alternativ metodologiyadan foydalangan holda ikkitadan Tufts universiteti iqtisodchilar kelishuv imzolagan davlatlarga salbiy ta'sir ko'rsatishini aniqladilar.[Izoh 1] Ko'pgina kuzatuvchilar savdo bitimi geosiyosiy maqsadga, ya'ni imzolagan davlatlarning Xitoy savdosiga bo'lgan qaramligini kamaytirishga va imzolagan davlatlarni AQShga yaqinlashtirishga xizmat qilgan bo'lar edi, deb ta'kidlamoqda.[23][24][25][26]

A'zolik

  Tomonlar
  Imzolovchilar
  Imzo chekuvchisi qaytarib olingan

IES uchun muzokaralarda o'n ikki mamlakat qatnashdi: 2005 yil to'rtta tomon Trans-Tinch okeani strategik iqtisodiy sheriklik to'g'risidagi bitim va sakkizta qo'shimcha mamlakat. O'n ikkitasi 2016 yilning 4 fevralida IESga imzo chekdi.[27] Shartnoma barcha imzolagan davlatlar tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilingandan so'ng, agar bu ikki yil ichida sodir bo'lgan bo'lsa, kuchga kirishi kerak edi. Agar kelishuv 2018 yil 4 fevralgacha hamma tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilinmagan bo'lsa, unda barcha imzolagan davlatlarning yalpi ichki mahsulotining 85 foizidan ko'prog'ini tashkil etadigan kamida 6 davlat tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilingandan so'ng kuchga kirgan bo'lar edi. 2017 yil yanvar oyida Qo'shma Shtatlarning kelishuvdan chiqishi shartnomaning kuchga kiradigan har qanday istiqbolini amalda tugatdi. Bunga javoban qolgan tomonlar kelishuvning yangi versiyasi bo'yicha muzokaralarni muvaffaqiyatli olib bordilar, unda 85% YaIM chegarasi yo'q edi CPTPP, 2018 yil dekabrida kuchga kirgan.

MamlakatHolati 2005 yil TPSEP shartnomasiIESning boshlanishi
Muzokaralar
IESning imzosiIESni ratifikatsiya qilish
 SingapurPartiya (2006 yil 28-may)2008 yil fevral2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 BruneyPartiya (2006 yil 28-may)2008 yil fevral2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 Yangi ZelandiyaPartiya (2006 yil 12-iyul)2008 yil fevral2016 yil 4-fevral2017 yil 11-may
 ChiliPartiya (2006 yil 8-noyabr)2008 yil fevral2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 AvstraliyaPartiyasiz2008 yil noyabr2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 PeruPartiyasiz2008 yil noyabr2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 VetnamPartiyasiz2008 yil noyabr2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 MalayziyaPartiyasiz2010 yil oktyabr2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 MeksikaPartiyasiz2012 yil oktyabr2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 Kanada[28]Partiyasiz2012 yil oktyabr2016 yil 4-fevralYo'q
 YaponiyaPartiyasiz2013 yil may2016 yil 4-fevral20 yanvar 2017 yil

Chiqib olingan a'zo

2017 yil 23 yanvarda AQSh Prezidenti Donald Tramp imzolangan prezidentlik memorandumi ga kelishuvdan AQSh imzosini qaytarib olish, 2016 yil fevralida bo'lgani kabi uni ratifikatsiya qilishni deyarli imkonsiz qildi.[29]

MamlakatHolat 2005 yil TPSEP shartnomasiIESning boshlanishi
Muzokaralar
IESning imzosiOlingan
 Qo'shma ShtatlarPartiyasiz2008 yil fevral2016 yil 4-fevral23 yanvar 2017 yil[30]

2018 yil 13 aprelda Tramp Qo'shma Shtatlar Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligiga qaytadan qo'shilishi mumkinligini aytdi.[31][32][33][34]

Potentsial a'zolar

APEC mavjud TPP a'zolari rozi bo'lgan boshqa yurisdiktsiya kabi a'zolar ham IESga qo'shilishlari mumkin. A'zolik to'g'risidagi ariza qabul qilingandan so'ng, shartnoma taraflarining komissiyasi qo'shilish shartlarini muhokama qiladi.

Janubiy Koreya 2006 yilgi kelishuvda qatnashmadi, lekin IESga kirishga qiziqish bildirdi,[35] va uni muvaffaqiyatli yakunlagandan so'ng, AQSh tomonidan 2010 yil dekabrida TPP muzokaralar raundiga taklif qilingan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari va Koreya Respublikasi o'rtasida erkin savdo shartnomasi.[36] Janubiy Koreyada IESning ayrim a'zolari bilan o'zaro savdo shartnomalari tuzilgan edi, ammo avtomobil ishlab chiqarish va qishloq xo'jaligi kabi sohalarda hali ham kelishib olinishi kerak edi, shuning uchun IESning keyingi ko'p tomonlama muzokaralari biroz murakkablashdi.[37] Savdo shartnomasini kengaytirishning ikkinchi to'lqini doirasida Janubiy Koreya IESga qo'shilishi mumkin.[38]

IESga a'zo bo'lishdan manfaatdor bo'lgan boshqa mamlakatlar va mintaqalarga Tayvan,[39] Filippinlar,[40] va Kolumbiya[41] 2010 yil holatiga ko'ra; Tailand[42] 2012 yil holatiga ko'ra; va Indoneziya,[43]Bangladesh,[44] va Hindiston[45] 2013 yildagi yuridik professor Edmund Simning so'zlariga ko'ra, ushbu mamlakatlarning aksariyati o'z davlatlarini o'zgartirishi kerak protektsionist IESga qo'shilish uchun savdo siyosati.[46]

Eng yirik iqtisodiyot tinch okeani ko'rfazi muzokaralarda ishtirok etmaydi Xitoy. Ga ko'ra Brukings instituti 2013 yilda Xitoyga nisbatan TPP loyihasi uchun eng asosiy muammo "bu Xitoyni savdo va sarmoyalash bo'yicha ushbu yangi standartlarga imzo chekishga undash uchun etarlicha kuchli havasni keltirib chiqarmasligi mumkin. Xitoy hozirgacha o'z savdo tashabbuslarini jadallashtirish bilan o'z munosabatini bildirdi. Osiyoda. "[47] 2013 yilda Xitoy baribir IESga qo'shilishdan manfaatdor bo'lishi mumkin deb o'ylardi.[48] Akademik tahlil shuni ko'rsatdiki, agar IES ishtirok etsa, IES yanada muvaffaqiyatli bo'lar edi, ammo Xitoyga keltiradigan foydalari moddiy emas.[49]

2015 yil oktyabr oyida Indoneziya Prezidenti Joko Vidodo Indoneziyaning IESga qo'shilish niyatini e'lon qildi.[50]

Shri-Lanka IESga qo'shilish istagi haqida e'lon qildi va hozirda uning maqsadga muvofiqligini o'rganmoqda.[51][52]

MamlakatHolat 2005 yilgi kelishuvTPP holatiE'lon qilingan foizlar
 KolumbiyaPartiyasizE'lon qilingan foizlar2010 yil yanvar
 FilippinlarPartiyasizE'lon qilingan foizlar2010 yil sentyabr
 TailandPartiyasizE'lon qilingan foizlar2012 yil noyabr
 TayvanPartiyasizE'lon qilingan foizlar2013 yil sentyabr
 Janubiy KoreyaPartiyasizE'lon qilingan foizlar2013 yil noyabr
 IndoneziyaPartiyasizIshtirok etish niyati e'lon qilindi[50]2015 yil oktyabr
 Shri-LankaPartiyasizE'lon qilingan foizlar[53]2015 yil noyabr
 Birlashgan QirollikPartiyasizQo'shilish niyati e'lon qilindi[54]Iyun 2020
 XitoyPartiyasizIshtirok etish niyati e'lon qilindi[55]Noyabr 2020

Tarix

Trans-Tinch okeani strategik iqtisodiy sheriklik to'g'risidagi bitim

Bruney, Chili, Singapur va Yangi Zelandiya 2005 yilda imzolangan va 2006 yilda kuchga kirgan Trans-Tinch okeani strategik iqtisodiy sherikligi to'g'risidagi bitimning (TPSEP) ishtirokchilari hisoblanadi. TPSEPning dastlabki shartnomasida qo'shilish to'g'risidagi band mavjud va a'zolar tomonidan tasdiqlangan. " ushbu shartnomaga boshqa iqtisodiyotlar tomonidan qo'shilishini rag'batlantirish majburiyati ".[56][57] Bu tovarlarning savdosi, kelib chiqish qoidalari, savdo vositalari, sanitariya va fitosanitariya tadbirlari, savdo, xizmatlar savdosi, intellektual mulk, davlat xaridlari va raqobat siyosatidagi texnik to'siqlar. Boshqa narsalar qatori, u barchani 90 foizga qisqartirishni talab qildi tariflar 2006 yil 1 yanvarga qadar a'zo davlatlar o'rtasida va barcha savdo tariflarining 2015 yilgacha nolga tushirilishi.[58]

Asl va muzokaralar olib boruvchi tomonlar Osiyo-Tinch okeani iqtisodiy hamkorlik (APEC) a'zolari bo'lishiga qaramay, TPSEP APEC tashabbusi emas. Biroq, IES ko'rib chiqilmoqda[kim tomonidan? ] taklif etilganlar uchun yo'l topuvchi bo'lish Osiyo Tinch okeanining erkin savdo zonasi (FTAAP), APEC tashabbusi.

Original muzokaralar

2008 yil yanvar oyida AQSh Tinch okeanining 4 (P4) a'zolari bilan muzokaralarga kirishdi savdoni erkinlashtirish moliyaviy xizmatlarda.[59] Bu 19 rasmiy muzokaralar raundiga va keyingi qator qo'shimcha uchrashuvlarga olib keldi, masalan Bosh muzokarachilarning uchrashuvlari va vazirlarning uchrashuvlari va natijada 2015 yil 5 oktyabrda e'lon qilingan kelishuvga erishildi.

Dastlabki shartnomani tasdiqlash

Dastlabki kelishuv Yaponiya va Yangi Zelandiya tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilingan.

Mintaqadagi Yaponiyaning asosiy raqobati Xitoy bo'lib, Janubiy-Sharqiy Osiyo iqtisodiyoti qanday rivojlanishi kerakligi to'g'risida qutbli qarashlarga ega bu ikki davlat.[iqtibos kerak ] IESdan oldin Yaponiya AQSh blokirovka qilgan Osiyo Valyuta Jamg'armasini (AMF) tashkil etish orqali ustunlikka erishishga harakat qildi. 2011 yilga kelib Yaponiya Xitoy va Koreya bilan "XXR - Yaponiya - Koreya Respublikasi erkin savdo shartnomasi" deb nomlangan kooperatsiya shartnomasini tuzishga muvaffaq bo'ldi, shuningdek CJK FTA deb nomlanuvchi, bu erda AQSh Yaponiyaning niyati Xalqdan foydalanish edi. Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari ko'magida TPP muzokaralarini Xitoydan Yaponiya kun tartibiga o'tkazish uchun Xitoy Respublikasi kartasi.[60] Yaponiyada ratifikatsiya qilish uchun bir qator vakolatlarni qishloq xo'jaligi vazirligidan bosh vazirga o'tkazadigan siyosiy islohotlar talab qilindi.[61]2016 yil 9-dekabrda, qaror ishtirok etish Kengashchilar uyi va 2017 yil 20 yanvarda birinchi ratifikatsiya qilingan mamlakat sifatida shartnomaning depozitariysiga (Yangi Zelandiya) ratifikatsiya qilish bo'yicha ichki protseduralar to'g'risida xabar berdi.[62]

Yangi Zelandiya IESni 2017 yil 11 mayda ratifikatsiya qildi.[63] Bosh Vazir Jasinda Ardern hukumatga chet el chayqovchilariga mavjud Yangi Zelandiya uylarini sotib olishni taqiqlash uchun ruxsat berish uchun Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi (TPP) to'g'risidagi bitimni o'z vaqtida Vetnamda qayta ko'rib chiqishga intiladi. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, "Bizning fikrimiz shundan iboratki, bizning savdo maqsadlarimizni qondirish bilan birga, talabni yumshatish va chet el chayqovchilariga mavjud uylarni sotib olishlarini taqiqlash orqali biz arzon narxdagi uy-joy bilan ta'minlashga bo'lgan istagimizni muvozanatlash mumkin bo'ladi.[64]

Qo'shma Shtatlarning chiqib ketishi

AQShning Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi bo'yicha muzokaralar va kelishuvdan chiqishi to'g'risida Prezident Memorandumi (2017)

Haqida nutq paytida 2016 yilgi prezidentlik kampaniyasi, Respublika partiyasi nomzod Donald Tramp saylansa, AQShni Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligidan chiqarishga va'da berdi. Uning ta'kidlashicha, kelishuv AQSh iqtisodiyoti va uning mustaqilligiga "putur etkazadi".[65][66] 2016 yil 21-noyabr kuni Tramp videomurojaatida "Amerikani birinchi o'ringa qo'yish" iqtisodiy strategiyasini taqdim etdi va "ish joylari va sanoatni Amerika qirg'oqlariga qaytaradigan adolatli, ikki tomonlama savdo bitimlari" to'g'risida muzokaralar olib borishini aytdi. Ushbu reja doirasida Tramp AQShning Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligidan birinchi kunida chiqish niyatini tasdiqladi.[67][68][69] Makkonnell TPP Trampning inauguratsiyasi oldidan Kongressning oqsoq o'rdak sessiyasi paytida ko'rib chiqilmasligini tasdiqladi.[70]

Prezident Trump imzoladi prezidentlik memorandumi[Izoh 2] 2017 yil 23 yanvarda AQShni IESdan olib chiqish.[71] AQSh senatori Jon Makkeyn chekinishni tanqid qildi va "bu bizning imkonimiz bo'lmagan paytda Osiyo-Tinch okeani mintaqasida Amerikaning ajralib chiqishidan tashvish beruvchi signal beradi" dedi.[72] AQSh senatori Berni Sanders bu harakatni olqishladi va "So'nggi 30 yil ichida biz bir qator savdo bitimlarni tuzdik [...], bu bizga millionlab munosib maoshli ish o'rinlarini sarf qildi va" tubanlik poygasi "ni keltirib chiqardi, bu esa amerikaliklarning ish haqini pasaytirdi ishchilar."[73]

Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari jamoatchilik fikri

2018 yilda umumiy tashqi savdo bo'yicha o'tkazilgan tadqiqotda tadqiqotchilar amerikalik kattalarning aksariyati tashqi savdoni tashqi tahdid emas, balki AQSh o'sishi uchun qulay deb bilishini aniqladilar.[74] Xalqaro kontekstda amerikaliklar odatda Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini eng kam qo'llab-quvvatlaydilar va savdo bitimini qo'llab-quvvatlashda AQSh jamoatchiligi o'rtasida aniq partizan bo'linishi mavjud.[75]

Prezident Donald Tramp IESga uning 2016 yilgi saylovoldi platformasining asosiy qoidasi sifatida qarshilik ko'rsatgan va bu uning mashhur bo'lishiga hissa qo'shgan.[76]

Tanqidchilar Tramp Xitoyning iqtisodiy va geostrategik ta'sirini ushlab turish uchun ish olib borgan bo'lsa-da, IESdan chiqib ketish aynan shu maqsadda tuzilgan shartnomaning samaradorligini pasaytirganidan shikoyat qildilar.[77]

Yangi muzokaralar va CPTPP

Qo'shma Shtatlar chiqib ketganidan keyin IESning kelajagi noaniq edi. Shunga qaramay, bir nechta imzo chekuvchilar AQShning ishtirokisiz IESni qayta ishlash niyatida ekanliklarini bildirdilar.[78]

2018 yil yanvar oyida qolgan o'n bir mamlakat qayta ishlangan IESni kelishib oldilar, endi "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi bo'yicha keng qamrovli va progressiv bitim "(CPTPP). CPTPP asosan TPP bilan bir xil, ammo AQShning talabiga binoan TPPga qo'shilgan va endi majburiy emas bo'lgan 20 ta qoidadan mahrum.[79] Ushbu qoidalar birinchi navbatda investitsiyalar bilan bog'liq, davlat buyurtmasi va intellektual mulk.[80]

Keyin Buyuk Britaniya norasmiy muzokaralarni olib bordi va keyin yangilangan muzokaralarga qo'shildi Brexit va CPTPP-ga qo'shilish istagini bildirdi.[81]

Mundarija

Kelishuv matnining "yuridik tekshiruvdan o'tkazilishi shart" versiyasi a'zo bo'lajak partiyalar tomonidan 2015 yil 5 noyabrda e'lon qilingan.[82] To'liq kelishuv loyihalarining bir qismi ilgari ommaga oshkor qilingan edi.[83] Olingan hujjatlardagi ko'plab qoidalar avvalgi savdo shartnomalari asosida tuzilgan.[iqtibos kerak ]

IESning tarkibi ishlab chiqilgan standartlardan ancha yuqori Jahon savdo tashkiloti. IES tarkibiga a salbiy ro'yxat savdo-sotiqni erkinlashtirish uchun qamrab olingan barcha sohalarning, aniq ko'rsatilgan sohalardan tashqari. IES yangi reglamentni o'z ichiga oladi onlayn savdo, xorijiy investorlarga munosabat, intellektual mulkni yanada keng qamrovli himoya qilish, mehnat kodekslari va bu borada betaraflik to'g'risidagi bitim davlat korxonalari.[84]

2016 yilgi tadqiqot Merilend universiteti siyosatshunoslar Todd Alli va Endryu Lugg, IES a'zolari 1995 yildan beri imzolagan 74 ta savdo shartnomalaridan, IES matni AQShning avvalgi savdo shartnomalari bilan o'xshashligini aniqladilar.[85] 2017 yilgi tadqiqotlar shuni ko'rsatdiki, IES hukumatning ushbu davlat siyosati sohalarida erkin qonun chiqarishi va qoidalarni amalga oshirish qobiliyati jihatidan boshqa savdo shartnomalariga nisbatan yuqori ko'rsatkichlarga ega.[86]

Savdo to'siqlari

Shartnoma 18000 dan ortiq tariflarni pasaytiradi.[87] AQShda ishlab chiqarilgan barcha tovarlarga va deyarli barcha AQSh fermer xo'jaliklari mahsulotlariga tariflar butunlay bekor qilinadi, aksariyat o'chirishlar darhol yuz beradi.[88] Ga ko'ra Kongress tadqiqot xizmati, IES "AQShning eng yirik bo'lar edi FTA savdo oqimlari bo'yicha (AQShda 905 milliard dollarlik mahsulot va xizmatlar eksporti va 2014 yilda 980 milliard dollarlik import) ".[21] AQShni hisobga olmaganda, imzolaganlar global yalpi ichki mahsulotning taxminan 40 foizini va jahon savdosining uchdan bir qismini tashkil qiladi.[89]

Bundan tashqari, bitim tezkor jo'natmalar uchun tezlashtirilgan bojxona protseduralarini yuklaydi va elektron uzatmalarga bojxona to'lovlarini qo'llashni taqiqlaydi. Bundan tashqari, onlayn operatsiyalar uchun qo'shimcha maxfiylik, xavfsizlik va iste'molchilar himoyasini talab qiladi va onlayn bojxona shakllarini nashr etishni rag'batlantiradi. Ushbu qoidalar kichik biznes uchun ayniqsa foydali bo'lishi kutilmoqda.[88]

Atrof muhitni muhofaza qilish

Ga ko'ra Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi, "IES tarixdagi har qanday savdo bitimining atrof-muhitga oid eng mustahkam majburiyatlarini o'z ichiga oladi".[90] USTR ta'kidlashicha, IES imzolagan davlatlardan o'z majburiyatlarini bajarishni talab qiladi Yo'qolib ketish xavfi ostida bo'lgan yovvoyi fauna va flora turlarining xalqaro savdosi to'g'risidagi konventsiya (CITES) ramziy turlarni himoya qilish va saqlash.[90] USTR ma'lumotlariga ko'ra, IES zararli baliq ovlash subventsiyalarini taqiqlovchi birinchi savdo shartnomasi, masalan, o'z hissasini qo'shadiganlar ortiqcha baliq ovlash.[90] USTR, TPPni imzolagan davlatlardan "noqonuniy baliq ovlashga qarshi kurashish", "baliqchilikni barqaror boshqarish usullarini targ'ib qilish" va "botqoq erlarni va muhim tabiiy hududlarni muhofaza qilish", "yovvoyi tabiat savdosiga qarshi kurashish," noqonuniy daraxt kesish, va "noqonuniy baliq ovlash" va "dengiz atrofini kemalar ifloslanishidan himoya qilish, shu jumladan o'z majburiyatlarini bajarish bilan MARPOL (dengiz ifloslanishining oldini olish bo'yicha xalqaro bitim) ".[90]

Morin va Baumier Kanadaning xalqaro siyosiy iqtisod bo'yicha tadqiqot kafedrasi (Xalqaro Savdo va Barqaror Rivojlanish Markazi uchun yozish) IES atrof-muhitni muhofaza qilish bo'yicha juda ko'p sonli qoidalarni va atrof-muhitni muhofaza qilishning ko'plab sohalarini o'z ichiga olgan bo'lsa-da, ushbu standartlarning juda oz qismi innovatsion bo'lib, ularning aksariyati AQShning avvalgi kelishuvlaridan ko'chirilgan. va IES atrof-muhitni muhofaza qilish kun tartibiga asl va ilg'or hissa bo'lish imkoniyatini boy bergan. Biroq, IES atrof-muhitni muhofaza qilishda Amerika va Evropaning yondashuvlaridan foydalangan holda innovatsion hisoblanadi. Darhaqiqat, buni amalga oshirishda TPP AQShning odatdagi shartnomalaridan ancha batafsil va aniqroq bo'ldi, shu bilan birga Evropa kelishuvlariga qaraganda qonuniy ravishda kuchliroq bo'ldi.[91]

2013 yilda IES bo'yicha muzokaralar olib borilayotgan paytda, Syerra klubi Mas'uliyatli savdo direktori Ilana Sulaymon IES "bizning iqlimimiz va atrofimizga bevosita tahdid solishi mumkin, deb ta'kidladi [shu jumladan] korporatsiyalarga beriladigan yangi huquqlar va qazilma yoqilg'i sanoatidagi yangi cheklovlar bularning barchasi bizning hayotimizga katta ta'sir ko'rsatmoqda iqlimi, suvi va quruqligi. "[92] 2014 yil yanvar oyida Atrof-muhit bobining loyihasi chiqarilgandan so'ng, Tabiiy resurslarni himoya qilish kengashi va Butunjahon tabiatni muhofaza qilish jamg'armasi IESni tanqid qilishda Sierra Club bilan birlashdi.[93] Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining e'lonidan keyin Barqaror rivojlanish maqsadlari (SDG) 2015 yil 25 sentyabrda va IESni yakunlash jarayoni bir hafta o'tgach, tanqidchilar SDG va IES o'rtasidagi o'zaro aloqalarni muhokama qildilar. Bir tanqidchi IESni SDGlarga turli xil foyda va kamchiliklarni taqdim etadi deb bilsa ham,[94] boshqasi IESni SDGlar bilan mos kelmaydigan deb hisoblaydi, agar rivojlanish qoidalari IESning boshqa tomonlari bilan to'qnashsa, boshqa jihat ustuvor ahamiyat kasb etadi.[95] The Erning do'stlari IESga qarshi chiqishgan.[96][97]

The oq uy ning qo'llab-quvvatlovchi bayonotlarini keltirdi Butunjahon yovvoyi tabiat fondi, Tabiatni muhofaza qilish, Insonparvarlik jamiyati, Yovvoyi tabiatni muhofaza qilish jamiyati, Yovvoyi tabiatni himoya qiluvchilar, Xalqaro hayvonlarni muhofaza qilish jamg'armasi, Butunjahon hayvonlarni muhofaza qilish va IES foydasiga boshqa ekologik guruhlar.[98][99] The Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot instituti IES "hozirgi kungacha olib borilgan eng ekologik toza savdo bitimi" ekanligini ta'kidlaydi.[100] ISDS bilan bog'liq holda, PIIE tahlilchilari ISDS da'volari natijasida kelib chiqadigan atrof-muhit siyosatidagi cheklovlar haqida juda kam dalillar mavjudligini ta'kidlamoqdalar.[101]

Tomonidan sentyabr 2016 hisoboti Qishloq xo'jaligi va savdo siyosati instituti (IATP) "mamlakatlar iqlimni himoya qilish choralarini ko'rsalar, savdo qoidalari va iqlim maqsadlari o'rtasidagi ziddiyatlar kuchayib borishini" bashorat qilmoqda.[102]:1 Hisobotda aytilishicha, IES kabi savdo shartnomalari iqtisodiyot va hukumat siyosati uchun keng ko'lamli qoidalarni belgilab beradi va shu bilan tovar ayirboshlashni tez-tez qazib olish sohalarida kengaytiradi va korporatsiyalar va moliya firmalarini kelajakdagi iqlimni barqarorlashtirish choralaridan himoya qiladi.[102]

Yaxshi boshqaruv

Ga ko'ra Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi, imzo chekuvchilar qo'shilishlari shart Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Korrupsiyaga qarshi konvensiyasi (UNCAC); davlat xizmatchilarining poraxo'rligini jinoiy javobgarlikka tortish; davlat amaldorlarining odob-axloq qoidalarini o'z ichiga olgan; manfaatlar to'qnashuvini kamaytirish bo'yicha choralar ko'rish; korrupsiyaga qarshi kurashish to'g'risidagi qonunlar va me'yoriy hujjatlarni samarali ijro etish; va korrupsiyaga qarshi kurashga xususiy tashkilotlarni jalb qilish.[103]

Inson huquqlari

Ga ko'ra Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi, IES ekspluatatsion bolalar mehnati va majburiy mehnatni taqiqlaydi; huquqini kafolatlaydi jamoaviy bitim; va ish bilan kamsitishni taqiqlaydi.[104] USTRning ta'kidlashicha, "Xalqaro Mehnat Tashkiloti va Jahon Savdo Tashkilotining tadqiqotlari shuni ko'rsatadiki, kengaytirilgan savdo imkoniyatlarini ishchilarni kuchli himoya bilan birlashtirish ishchilarga norasmiy sektor ishlaridan ish haqini to'laydigan, tartibga solinadigan eksport sohalarida rasmiy ishlarga o'tishda yordam beradi. eng kam ish haqi, nafaqalar va xavfsizlik dasturlari ".[104] USTR ta'kidlashicha, "tadqiqotlar shuni ko'rsatadiki, savdo plyuralistik institutlarni rivojlantirish va ochiq ma'lumot almashinuvini ko'paytirish orqali inson huquqlari sharoitlarini yaxshilaydi".[104]

PolitiFact Prezident Obamaning Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi tufayli "bizda shunday mamlakat bor Malayziya bunga qarshi jiddiy choralar ko'rish odam savdosi "asosan" to'g'ri.[105] PolitiFact Malayziya 2015 yil iyun oyida odam savdosi qurbonlariga munosabatni yaxshilash uchun o'z qonuniga o'zgartishlar kiritib, IESga rioya qilishni boshlaganini ta'kidlaydi.[105] O'zgarishlar qatorida Malayziya jabrlanganlarga hukumat boshpanalaridan, o'tish davridagi uy-joylardan yaxshiroq foydalanish imkoniyatini va jabrlanuvchilarga qulay tarzda qaytarish tartibini taqdim etdi.[105] Malayziya, shuningdek, qurilish sohasida odam savdosini to'xtatish choralarini ko'rdi.[105]

2017 yil avgust oyida Reuters agentligi Vetnam hukumati Tramp ma'muriyatining Trans-Tinch okeani hamkorligini bekor qilish to'g'risidagi qarori tufayli, inson huquqlariga nisbatan repressiyalarni kuchaytirayotgan edi.[106] IESga a'zo bo'lish Vetnamni ilgari inson huquqlari bo'yicha yaxshi natijalarni ko'rsatishga undagan edi.[106]

Intellektual mulk

Elektr energiyasi ishlab chiqaradigan elektr inshootlari loyihasining intellektual mulk bo'limida Shartnoma taraflari himoya qilishning minimal darajasini belgilaydilar. savdo belgilari, mualliflik huquqi va patentlar.[107] Mualliflik huquqi muallifning umri davomida va 70 yil davomida beriladi,[107] kabi mualliflik huquqlarini himoya qilishni buzganlik uchun jinoiy jazo belgilashni talab qiladi Raqamli huquqlarni boshqarish.[108]

Ga ko'ra Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi, IES imzolagan shaxslardan kuchli patentga layoqatlilik standartini o'rnatishni va mualliflik huquqini himoya qilishni talab qilishni talab qilib, yangilikka turtki beradi.[109]

Uolter Park, iqtisod professori Amerika universiteti Mavjud adabiyotlarga asoslanib, IESdagi farmatsevtika vositalari rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlarda aloqador bo'lmagan litsenziyalashni kuchaytiradi, mahalliy o'rganishga hissa qo'shadigan texnologik transferlarga olib keladi, ko'plab mamlakatlarda yangi dori-darmonlarni ishlab chiqarishni rag'batlantiradi, marketing va tarqatishni kengaytiradi. erta bosqichdagi farmatsevtika yangiliklarini rag'batlantirish.[110]

2011 yil dekabr oyidan boshlab AQShning ushbu bitimga oid taklifida ko'rsatilgan deb da'vo qilingan patentlar va mualliflik huquqlarining ijro etilishi bilan bog'liq ba'zi qoidalar, Koreya-AQSh savdo shartnomasida ko'rsatilganidan tashqari, haddan tashqari cheklov sifatida tanqid qilindi. Kontrafaktga qarshi savdo shartnomasi (ACTA).[111][112]

The Elektron chegara fondi[112] mualliflik huquqi, savdo markalari va patentlarni qamrab olgan intellektual mulk to'g'risidagi fosh etilgan loyiha bobini juda tanqid qildi. AQShda ular bu AQSh mualliflik huquqi to'g'risidagi qonunning ziddiyatli tomonlarini yanada kuchaytirishi mumkinligiga ishonishdi (masalan Raqamli Mingyillik mualliflik huquqi to'g'risidagi qonun ) va Amerika fuqarolarining rivojlanib borayotgan intellektual mulk ehtiyojlarini va innovatsion texnologiyalar sektorini qondirish uchun Kongressning ichki qonunchilik islohotlari bilan shug'ullanish imkoniyatini cheklaydi. Boshqa imzolagan davlatlar tomonidan mualliflik huquqi qoidalarini standartlashtirish, shuningdek, boshqa mamlakatlarning mualliflik huquqi to'g'risidagi qonunlarida jiddiy o'zgarishlarni talab qiladi. EFF ma'lumotlariga ko'ra, bu mamlakatlar uchun kengayish majburiyatlarini o'z ichiga oladi mualliflik huquqi shartlari, cheklash adolatli foydalanish, mualliflik huquqini buzganlik uchun tijorat maqsadlarisiz amalga oshiriladigan jinoiy sanktsiyalarni qabul qilish (masalan, fayl almashish mualliflik huquqi bilan himoyalangan raqamli ommaviy axborot vositalariga) ko'proq javobgarlikni yuklang Internet vositachilari, himoya qilishni kuchaytirmoq raqamli qulflar va jurnalistlar va xabar tarqatuvchilar uchun yangi tahdidlar yaratish.[112]

Mualliflik huquqining muddatini kengaytirish ham, shikoyatsiz taklif ham (ya'ni vakolatli organlar rasmiy shikoyatga ehtiyoj sezmasdan qonuniy ish boshlashlari mumkin) ilgari Yaponiyada o'tib bo'lmadi, chunki ular juda ziddiyatli edi.[113] 2015 yil boshida "bir guruh rassomlar, arxivchilar, akademiklar va faollar ... Yaponiyada o'zlarining muzokarachilaridan IESda o'z mamlakatlarini talab qiladigan talablarga qarshi chiqishni [so'radilar] va qolgan 11 davlatdan beshtasi bu yashirin kelishuv bo'yicha muzokaralar olib borishdi, mualliflik huquqining shartlarini Qo'shma Shtatlarning mualliflik huquqining haddan tashqari ko'pligiga mos kelish uchun kengaytirish. "[113] The yakuniy kelishuv Shunga qaramay, mualliflik huquqi AQSh qonunchiligiga binoan mualliflik huquqining muddatini belgilaydi - muallifning umri va 70 yil.

Ken Akamatsu, yapon manga seriyasining yaratuvchisi Xinani seving va Mahou Sensei Negima!, kelishuv lotinni pasayishi mumkinligidan xavotir bildirdi djinshi (o'z-o'zini nashr etgan) Yaponiyada keng tarqalgan asarlar. Akamatsu IES "djjinshi lotinini yo'q qiladi" deb ta'kidladi. Natijada, butun kuch manga sanoat ham kamayib ketar edi. "[114]

Farmatsevtika

2015 yil may oyida Nobel Memorial mukofotiga sazovor bo'lgan iqtisodchi Pol Krugman IES patent qonunlarini qat'iylashtirishi va yirik farmatsevtika kompaniyalari va Gollivud kabi iste'molchilarga mukofotlarni ko'paytirish nuqtai nazaridan afzalliklarga ega bo'lishiga imkon berishidan va rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlarda yashovchilar dori-darmonlardan foydalana olmasliklaridan xavotir bildirdi. IES rejimi ostida.[115] Biroq, Amerika universiteti iqtisodiyot professori Uolter Parkning ta'kidlashicha, iqtisodiy tadqiqotlar davomida bu albatta yuz berishi aniq: giyohvand moddalarga nisbatan intellektual mulk huquqlarini aniqlashtirish, ba'zi rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlar uchun narxlarning oshishiga va ulardan foydalanish imkoniyatining pasayishiga olib kelmadi. giyohvand moddalar.[110] Park, mavjud adabiyotlarga asoslanib, IESdagi farmatsevtika vositalari rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlarda aloqador bo'lmagan litsenziyalashni kuchaytirishi, mahalliy o'rganishga hissa qo'shadigan texnologik transferlarga olib kelishi, ko'plab mamlakatlarda dori vositalarining yangi chiqarilishini rag'batlantirish, marketingni kengaytirish va tarqatish tarmoqlari va dastlabki bosqichdagi farmatsevtika yangiliklarini rag'batlantirish.[110] The Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi RES rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlarni chetlab o'tishga imkon beradigan "TRIPS va sog'liqni saqlash bo'yicha Doha deklaratsiyasiga mos keladi". Patent yaxshiroq foydalanish huquqlari muhim dorilar.[109]

Farmatsevtika kompaniyalari IESni intellektual mulk himoyasini juda yumshoq deb tanqid qildilar.[110][116][117][118]

2015 yil iyul oyida Nyu-England tibbiyot jurnali tomonidan xavotirlarni keltirib o'tdi Chegaralarni tabiblar sansir va Oxfam patentning uzaytirilishi natijasida dori-darmon narxlarining ko'tarilishi millionlab odamlarning hayotiga tahdid solishi mumkin.[119] "Ma'lumotlarning eksklyuzivligi" qoidalarini kengaytirish "kabi giyohvand moddalarni nazorat qiluvchi idoralarning oldini oladi Oziq-ovqat va dori-darmonlarni boshqarish ma'lum bir necha yil davomida giyohvandlikning umumiy versiyasini ro'yxatdan o'tkazishdan. "Maqolada aytilishicha, TPP nazariy jihatdan korporatsiyalarga millatning sog'lig'iga oid qoidalar natijasida har qanday" yo'qolgan foyda "uchun tovon puli to'lashni talab qilishi mumkin.[119] Maqolada umumiy dori-darmonlarga nisbatan IESdagi qoidalar to'g'ridan-to'g'ri qaratilganligi ta'kidlanadi Hindistonning farmatsevtika sanoati.[119] Chegarasiz shifokorlar 2015 yil noyabr oyida "xalqaro sog'liqni saqlash choralarini bekor qiladigan va millionlab odamlarning narxini pasaytiradigan umumiy dori-darmonlarga kirishni cheklaydigan xavfli qoidalar kiritilganidan juda xavotirda".[120][121] Avstraliya jamoat salomatligi assotsiatsiyasi (PHAA) 2014 yil fevral oyida "sog'liqni saqlashning yomon natijalari tufayli TPPA tomonidan kutilgan ba'zi iqtisodiy yutuqlarni buzish usullari va sog'liqni saqlashning ushbu yomon natijalari bilan bog'liq iqtisodiy xarajatlarni ta'kidlagan" media-nashrni e'lon qildi. "[122]

Qo'shma Shtatlar Kongressining bir qator a'zolari,[123] shu jumladan senator Berni Sanders[124] va vakillar Sander M. Levin, Jon Konyers, Jim McDermott va endi nafaqaga chiqqan Genri Vaksman, shu qatorda; shu bilan birga[125] Jon Lyuis, Charlz B. Rangel, Graf Blumenauer, Lloyd Doggett va keyin kongressmen Pit Stark,[126] tibbiyotdan foydalanish borasida xavotirlarini bildirdilar. Patentni uzaytirishni talab qiladigan IES shaklida intellektual mulkni himoya qilish orqali rivojlanayotgan dunyoda, xususan, Vetnamda bemorlarning arzon dori-darmonlardan foydalanishiga to'sqinlik qilishi mumkin.[123] Bundan tashqari, ular IES mavjud bo'lgan beg'araz dori-darmonlarni qoplash dasturlarini va a'zo davlatlarning turli xil sog'liqni saqlash tizimlarini qondirish uchun etarlicha moslashuvchan bo'lmasligidan xavotirdalar.[126] 2015 yil fevral oyida AQShning sobiq mehnat kotibi Robert Reyx U IESga qarshi chiqqani sababli, u narkotiklarning arzonroq umumiy versiyasini kechiktirishi va korporatsiyalarga "millat qonun-qoidalari natijasida topilgan har qanday yo'qotilgan foyda uchun tovon" to'lashni talab qilishi mumkin bo'lgan xalqaro sudlar uchun qoidalari tufayli.[127]

Investor-davlat arbitraji

IES shartnomasi an investor-davlat nizolarini hal qilish (ISDS) mexanizmi,[128] bu sarmoyadorlarga xorijiy hukumatlarni shartnomani buzganligi uchun sudga murojaat qilish huquqini beradi. Masalan, agar investor "A" mamlakatiga, savdo shartnomasining a'zosi va A mamlakatiga ushbu shartnomani buzgan bo'lsa, sarmoyador A mamlakat hukumatini buzganligi uchun sudga berishi mumkin.[129] ISDS xorijiy davlatlar investorlariga "kamsitilishdan xolilik", "mol-mulkni o'zboshimchalik bilan tortib olishdan himoya qilish", "odil sudlovni inkor etishdan himoya qilish" va "kapitalni o'tkazish huquqi" kabi asosiy himoya vositalarini taqdim etish uchun mo'ljallangan:[130][131]

  • Kamsitishlardan ozodlik: Chet elda biznes bilan shug'ullanadiganlar teng sharoitlarga duch kelishlari va mahalliy investorlar yoki boshqa mamlakatlar raqobatchilariga qaraganda kamroq munosabatda bo'lishlariga ishonch.
  • Mulkni kompensatsiya qilinmagan olib qo'yilishidan himoya qilish: investorlar mol-mulki hukumat tomonidan oddiy tovon puli olinmasligiga kafolat.
  • Adolatni rad etishdan himoya qilish: investorlarga jinoiy, fuqarolik yoki ma'muriy sud protsesslarida odil sudlov rad etilmasligiga ishonch.
  • Kapitalni o'tkazish huquqi: investorlarning investitsiyalariga tegishli kapitalni davlatning moslashuvchanligini ta'minlash kafolatlari, shu jumladan moliyaviy inqirozlarga javob berish va moliya tizimining yaxlitligi va barqarorligini ta'minlash kafolatlarini hisobga olgan holda erkin ravishda ko'chira olishiga ishonch.

ISDS hukumatlardan mahalliy qonunlarni bekor qilishni so'rashi mumkin emas (aksincha Jahon savdo tashkiloti savdo shartnomalarini buzgan,[101][132] ammo bunday qonunlar tomonidan salbiy ta'sir ko'rsatgan investorlarga moddiy zarar etkazishi mumkin.[133] Tomonidan ta'kidlanganidek Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi, ISDS muayyan shartnomalarni buzishni talab qiladi va korporatsiyalarga faqat "yo'qolgan foyda" bo'yicha sud ishlarini olib borishga ruxsat bermaydi.[131]

IES tamaki sanoatini ISDS jarayonidan maxsus ravishda chiqarib tashlaydi.[134] O'ymakorlik chekishga qarshi qonunlarga qarshi ISDS holatlari, shu jumladan xavotirlarga javob sifatida keltirilgan Filipp Morris - Urugvay.[135] Tamakining ISDSdan ozod qilinishi xalqaro savdo shartnomasi uchun birinchidir.[134]

Oqish asosida, iqtisodchilar Jozef Stiglitz va Adam S. Xersh TPP ning ISDS qoidalarini hukumatlarning jamoat zararini oldini olish qobiliyatiga aralashish uchun tanqid qilib, agar bugungi kunda asbest topilgan bo'lsa, hukumatlar ISDS da'vosiga asos yaratmasdan qoidalar o'rnatolmagan bo'lar edi.[136] Stiglitz, shuningdek, IES neft kompaniyalariga uglerod chiqindilarini kamaytirish bo'yicha harakatlari uchun hukumatlarni sudga berish huquqini berishini da'vo qildi. Global isish.[137]

2015 yil noyabr oyida Kolumbiya professori Jeffri Saks IESning ISDS tizimi investorlarga ulkan kuch beradi va barcha a'zo davlatlarning sud tizimlariga zarar etkazadi degan xulosaga keldi. U buni da'vo qilmoqda ISDS korporatsiyalar tomonidan foydalariga salbiy ta'sir ko'rsatadigan qoidalarni zaiflashtirish uchun hukumatlarni bezovta qilish uchun allaqachon ishlatilgan.[138] 2016 yil fevral oyida Kolumbiyaning Barqaror investitsiyalar markazidan Lise Jonson va Liza Saks va Jeffri Saks Yer institutining ta'kidlashicha, agar chora-tadbirlar (shu jumladan aholi salomatligi, milliy xavfsizlik, atrof-muhit, oziq-ovqat va giyohvand moddalar va iqtisodiy inqirozga qarshi choralar) ta'sir ko'rsatadigan bo'lsa, xorijiy korporatsiyalar hukumatning xatti-harakatlari bo'yicha milliy hukumatni sudga berishi mumkin. ularning foydalari va iqtisodiy manfaatlari.[139] Lori Uolach davlat fuqarosi Global savdo kuzatuvi IES bo'yicha muzokaralar olib borilayotgan paytda shunga o'xshash xavotirlarni ko'targan.[140]

2016 yil fevral oyida IESga qarshi, senator Elizabeth Uorren Misr TPP ning ISDS qoidalariga qarshi dalil sifatida eng kam ish haqini oshirganligi sababli Misrga qarshi sudga da'vo qilgan frantsuz kompaniyasining misolidan foydalandi.[141] Washington Post tahririyati ishning ushbu tavsifiga qarshi chiqdi va "Veoliya chiqindilarni boshqarish bo'yicha Frantsiya kompaniyasi ISDSni hukumati bilan tuzilgan shartnomani bajarish uchun chaqirdi Misr, Iskandariya, agar xarajatlar ko'paygan bo'lsa, tovon puli talab qilinishini aytadi; Kompaniya ish haqining oshishi ushbu ta'minotni keltirib chiqarganligini ta'kidlamoqda. Aytgancha, Veolia Aleksandriya bilan a Jahon banki - odamlarni ekspluatatsiya qilish uchun biron bir korporativ fitna emas, balki issiqxona gazlarini kamaytirish loyihasi qo'llab-quvvatlandi. Ushbu ish - bu eng ko'p ish haqini ag'darish emas, balki Veoliyaga beriladigan pul mukofotiga olib keladi - sud jarayonida qoladi. "[142]

The Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi ISDS "hukumatning suveren qobiliyati mehnat huquqlarini, atrof-muhitni yoki jamoat farovonligining boshqa masalalarini himoya qilishni istagan har qanday choralarni qo'llaydi" degan tushunchaga qarshi.[131] The Xalqaro advokatlar assotsiatsiyasi (IBA) ushbu his-tuyg'ularni aks ettiradi va "investitsiya shartnomalari davlatlarning o'zboshimchalik bilan yoki kamsituvchi muomalada bo'lish imkoniyatlarini cheklashiga qaramay, ular davlat manfaatlari yo'lida davlatning suveren huquqini cheklamaydi (va aslida, aniq himoya qiladi). adolatli, oqilona va kamsitilmaslik uslubi. "[132] The oq uy investitsiyalarni himoya qilish 3000 dan ortiq savdo shartnomalarining tarkibiy qismi ekanligini ta'kidlaydi, ularning aksariyati neytral arbitrajning biron bir shakliga ega.[143] Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari kamida 50 ta bunday shartnomaning ishtirokchisi bo'lib, faqatgina 13 ta ISDS holatiga duch kelgan va hech qachon ISDS holatini yo'qotmagan.[143] Oq uy IESning ISDS tarkibiy qismlari - bu boshqa savdo shartnomalarida ISDSni takomillashtirish va takomillashtirish deb ta'kidlaydi: TPP hukumatlarning jamoat manfaatlari (shu jumladan sog'liqni saqlash, xavfsizlik va atrof-muhit masalalari bo'yicha) tartibga solishi mumkinligini aniq ta'kidlaydi; IES engil arizalarni tezda rad etish va bunday da'voni to'xtatish uchun da'vogarga qarshi haq to'lash imkoniyatini o'z ichiga oladi; soxta korporatsiyalarga investitsiya himoyasidan foydalanishning oldi olinadi; va TPP bo'yicha hakamlik muhokamasi jamoatchilik uchun ochiq bo'lib, taraf bo'lmagan shaxslarning ma'lumotlarini olishga imkon beradi.[143]

The Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot instituti "IESdagi ISDS qoidalari avvalgi kelishuvlarga nisbatan sezilarli yaxshilanish" deb ta'kidlaydi.[101] PIIE IESda ISDS mexanizmi atrof-muhit, sog'liqni saqlash va xavfsizlikni tartibga solishga hurmat ko'rsatishini ta'kidlaydi; nizolarni ko'rib chiqishning shaffofligini ta'minlaydi; va yo'q qiladi forum xaridlari.[101] PIIE, TPP ning ISDS qoidalaridagi ba'zi yangiliklarni "odatda AQSh ishbilarmon doiralari yoqtirmaydi" deb ta'kidlamoqda.[101] PIIE claims that ISDS provisions are necessary, as they boost investment: "empirical evidence has shown that treaties including these provisions have a positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows between signatory countries."[144] PIIE challenges the claim that ISDS "arbitrators lack integrity", noting that arbitrators take an oath of impartiality and both sides of a case choose arbitrators.[101] PIIE agrees "that secrecy has gone too far" in many ISDS cases, but notes that "TPP negotiators heeded this criticism" and opened up ISDS cases to greater transparency.[101]

Ga ko'ra International Bar Association (IBA), states have won a higher percentage of ISDS cases than investors, and that around one-third of all cases end in settlement.[132] Claimant investors, when successful, recover on average less than half of the amounts claimed.[132] IBA notes that "only 8 per cent of ISDS proceedings are commenced by very large multinational corporations."[132] IBA challenges the notion that ISDS is biased against developing countries, noting that there is "no correlation between the success rates of claims against states and their income levels or development status."[132] IBA notes that ISDS is necessary even in countries with sophisticated domestic legal systems because those domestic courts rule according to domestic laws, not international law.[132] IBA notes that "increasingly, awards require the losing party to pay arbitration costs and legal fees to the winning party", which deters investors from initiating unmeritorious cases.[132]

Mehnat standartlari

Ga ko'ra Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari savdo vakolatxonasi, the TPP imposes "binding and fully enforceable obligations" on signatories to "protect the freedom to form unions and bargain collectively" and "eliminate exploitative child labor and forced labor protect against employment discrimination".[145] The obligations include "laws on acceptable conditions of work related to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health."[145] The USTR insists that if countries like Malaysia and Vietnam do not enforce provisions relating to forced labor, human trafficking and collective bargaining, they will cease to get the economic benefits of the TPP agreement.[146]

The Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot instituti asserts that "the TPP includes more protections of labor rights than any previous US free trade agreement."[147] 2016 yil yanvar oyida, Human Rights Watch tashkiloti said that the TPP side agreements with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei "are a unique and significant step in efforts to protect labor rights in trade agreements" but noted that enforcement of these rules remains to be seen: "gauging compliance will require subjective assessments by the US that may take years to carry out and face obstacles arising from foreign policy objectives, commercial interests, and other political considerations."[148]

Dartmouth economics Professor Emily J. Blanchard argues that while the TPP has been roundly criticized on the political left, progressives should actually be supportive of the TPP: "The TPP’s promise of a new progressive rule book – one that includes enforceable agreements against child labor and workplace discrimination, measures to punish illegal logging and trade in protected species, and protections against consumer fraud – would mark a substantial step forward in the progressive policy agenda on the global stage."[149]

In May 2015, U.S. congressman Sander Levin argued that it is difficult to enforce trade deals, as he questioned Vietnam's willingness to meet the labour standards of TPP.[150] A report by U.S. Senator Elizabeth Uorren said that there was a huge gap between the labor standards of past US free trade agreements and the actual enforcement of those provisions.[150] However, PIIE analysts note that research shows that the presence of "sticks" (a possible suspension of trade benefits) and "carrots" (technical assistance) in trade deals increase the likelihood that labor obligations in trade deals have a positive effect; there are both sticks and carrots present in TPP.[151]

Regulatory cooperation

Even though the TPP had not been passed, the agreement had already introduced forms of regulatory cooperation for agriculture beyond that found in the WTO.[152] This means that regulators in different TPP signatories have been engaging with each other and building trust.[152] Chad P. Bown, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, argues that this regulatory cooperation meant that the US poultry industry was not as hard-hit by the 2015 bird flu outbreak, as regulators in TPP countries cooperated and continued to accept US exports of poultry.[152]

Iqtisodiy ta'sir

The U.S. International Trade Commission, Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot instituti, Jahon banki and the Office of the Chief Economist at Global Affairs Canada found that the final agreement would, if ratified, lead to net positive economic outcomes for all signatories, while a heterodoks analysis by two Tufts universiteti economists found that the agreement would adversely affect the signatories.[153][13][154][16]

Effects on economic equality

2013 yilda, Nobel Memorial prize-winning economist Jozef Stiglitz warned that, based on leaked drafts of the TPP, it "serves the interests of the wealthiest."[155][156] Organised labour in the U.S. argued, during the negotiations, that the trade deal would largely benefit corporations at the expense of workers in the manufacturing and service industries.[157] The Iqtisodiy siyosat instituti va Iqtisodiy va siyosiy tadqiqotlar markazi have argued that the TPP could result in job losses and declining wages.[158][159]

Economists Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer challenge the view that TPP will primarily benefit the wealthy. Their analysis finds that "the gains from TPP appear to be fairly distributed—labour will gain relative to capital, and cost reductions will favour low-income households. Some workers will need to change jobs, but they constitute a small fraction of normal job churn in any given year, and the national benefits argue for generous compensation for their adjustment costs. The agreement will also benefit workers in TPP's poorest member countries."[160] Research by Harvard economist Robert Z. Lawrence finds that the "percentage gains for labor income from the TPP will be slightly greater than the gains to capital income. Households in all quintiles will benefit by similar percentages, but once differences in spending shares are taken into account, the percentage gains to poor and middle-class households will be slightly larger than the gains to households at the top."[161][162] An opinion piece by Ed Gerwin in the Wall Street Journal argues that the TPP agreement benefits small businesses in the US.[88]

Iqtisodchilar Devid Avtor, David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson, who have extensively studied US labor markets adjustments to trade competition shocks caused by China,[163] support TPP.[164] They argue that TPP "would promote trade in knowledge-intensive services in which U.S. companies exert a strong comparative advantage", note that "killing the TPP would do little to bring factory work back to America" and argue that it would pressure China to raise regulatory rules and standards to those of TPP members.[164]

Ga ko'ra U.S. International Trade Commission, the TPP will have positive effects on the U.S. economy as a whole, with unskilled labor reaping 25% of the gains, skilled workers 41% and business owners 34%.[165]

Makroiqtisodiyot

World Bank report

Jahon banki found that if ratified by signatories, the TPP "agreement could raise GDP in member countries by an average of 1.1 percent by 2030. It could also increase member countries' trade by 11 percent by 2030, and represent a boost to regional trade growth, which had slowed to about 5 percent, on average, during 2010-14 from about 10 percent during 1990-07."[153] The World Bank finds that the agreement will raise real wages in all signatories: "In the United States, for example, changes in real wages are expected to be small as unskilled and skilled wages increase by 0.4 and 0.6 percent, respectively, by 2030. In contrast, in Vietnam, TPP could increase the real wages of unskilled workers by more than 14 percent by 2030, as production intensive in unskilled labor (e.g. textiles) shifts to Vietnam."[153]

U.S. International Trade Commission estimate

The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that "TPP would have positive effects, albeit small as a percentage of the overall size of the U.S. economy".[13] There will be 128,000 more full-time jobs.[165] By 2032, U.S. annual real income would increase by 0.23%, real GDP would be $42.7 billion or 0.15% higher, employment would be 0.07% higher, US exports would increase 1%, and imports would increase 1.1%.[13] The report added, "TPP would generally establish trade-related disciplines that strengthen and harmonize regulations, increase certainty, and decrease trade costs for firms that trade and invest in the TPP region."[13] Vietnam is often seen as the biggest beneficiary of TPP.[166][167][23] The U.S. International Trade Commission identifies the following US industries as net beneficiaries of TPP: Passenger cars; Apparel, Dairy production; Retailers and Wholesalers; and Business services; and as net losers: Auto parts; Textiles; Soybean production; Transportation and tourism; and Chemicals and drugs.[13][168]

Office of the Chief Economist at Global Affairs Canada report

According to a report by the Office of the Chief Economist at Global Affairs Canada, ratification of TPP would increase Canada's GDP by $4.3 billion by 2040.[17][169] This is primarily due to the preferential access it would receive to markets in the Asia-Pacific rim.[17][169] According to the report, ratification by the other TPP signatories but a failure by Canada to ratify the agreement would lead Canada to face estimated GDP losses of $5.3 billion by 2040.[17][169]

Peterson Institute for International Economics report

Economists Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer of the Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot instituti project that the TPP would increase incomes in the U.S. by $131 billion annually, or 0.5 percent of GDP. Exports from the U.S. would increase by $357 billion annually, or 9.1 percent, as a result of the agreement.[154] Biroq, ikkitasi Tufts universiteti economists argue that the research by Petri relies on unrealistic assumptions such as full employment: lost jobs will be immediately replaced in other industrial sectors.[16] According to Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, "Petri and Plummer assume that labor markets are sufficiently flexible that job losses in adversely affected parts of the economy are necessarily offset by job gains elsewhere. Unemployment is ruled out from the start – a built-in outcome of the model that TPP proponents often fudge."[18] Rodrik notes that "the Petri-Plummer model is squarely rooted in decades of academic trade modeling, which makes a sharp distinction between microeconomic effects (shaping resource allocation across sectors) and macroeconomic effects (related to overall levels of demand and employment). In this tradition, trade liberalization is a microeconomic "shock" that affects the composition of employment, but not its overall level."[18]

Tufts University report

Tufts universiteti researchers project the TPP would have a negative impact on employment: 450,000 US jobs, 75,000 Japanese jobs, 58,000 Canadian jobs and 5,000 New Zealand jobs would be lost by 2025.[16] According to the report, 771,000 jobs would be lost in total and positive economic effects would be negligible for participating countries.[16][170]

Garvard iqtisodchisi Robert Z. Lourens says that the model used by the Tufts researchers "is simply not suited for credibly predicting the effects of the TPP" and argues that the model used by Petri and Plummer is superior.[19] Lawrence argues that the model used by the Tufts researchers "does not have the granularity that allows it to estimate variables such as exports, imports, foreign direct investment, and changes in industrial structure. As a result, its predictions ignore the benefits to the TPP economies that occur through increased specialization, the realization of scale economies, and improved consumer choice."[19] Lawrence also notes that the model used by the Tufts researchers finds that the TPP will cause GDP to fall by 5.24% in non-TPP developing countries, such as China, India, and Indonesia, which Lawrence is highly skeptical of: "It is not believable that a trade agreement of this magnitude could cause the rest of the world to plummet into recession."[19] Garvard iqtisodchisi Dani Rodrik, a well-known skeptic of globalization, says that the Tufts researchers do "a poor job of explaining how their model works, and the particulars of their simulation are somewhat murky... the Capaldo framework lacks sectoral and country detail; its behavioral assumptions remain opaque; and its extreme Keynesian assumptions sit uneasily with its medium-term perspective."[18]

Fredrik Erixon and Matthias Bauer of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) write that the Tufts analysis has such serious flaws "that its results should neither be regarded reliable nor realistic."[20] They write that Tufts model is "by and large a demand-driven model that does not make efforts to capture the supply-side effects of trade, which are the effects that are proven to be the core positive effects of trade liberalisation. Equally problematic, the model is not designed to assess the effect on trade from trade agreements – in fact, the model is profoundly ill suited for such an exercise. No trade economist, regardless what school of thought he or she comes from, has ever used this model to make estimates of trade. The reason is simple: if a model cannot predict the effects on the flows and profile of trade as a consequence of trade liberalisation, it is of no use at all."[20] They add, "In Capaldo’s analysis, structural change and the emergence of new industries do not play a role at all. Capaldo implicitly assumes that an economy with its labour and capital does not respond and adjust to new circumstances. New competition only leads to new unemployment. In addition, the impact of lower barriers on international commerce on product and process innovation is neglected. Finally, Capaldo does not account for the impact of competition on the cost of production and final consumer prices."[20]

According to the Congressional Research Service, "The Tufts study has drawn particular criticism as an unconventional framework for analyzing trade agreements, whereas Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, such as that used in the Peterson study are standard in trade policy analysis."[21] Fabio Ghironi, Professor in Economics at the Vashington universiteti, describes the models used by the World Bank and the Peterson Institute in more favorable terms than the Tufts analysis.[22]

Effects on the European Union

The EU is trying to form trade agreements with each country that is part of the TPP: since 2013, there have been talks of a free trade agreement between the EU and Japan, and in 2015 the EU presented its new strategy to improve trade in the Asia-Pacific entitled "Trade for All."[171]

Liberalizatsiya

According to an analysis by the Cato Institute of the chapters of the TPP, 15 chapters have a liberalizing impact, 5 have a protectionist impact, and 2 have a neutral impact.[172] Considered as a whole, the terms of the TPP are net liberalizing.[172]

There have been conflicting arguments on whether or not the TPP aims to increase the liberalization of trade. For arguments that propose that the TPP succeeds at liberalizing trade among the participating nations, there is a question of whether or not this causes a positive or a negative net change. Some scholars argue that participatory members of the TPP believe that such membership is a utilitarian and practical method toward new trade liberalization.[173] Scholars Peter Petri and Michael Plummer describe the TPP as a "dynamic process - and example of competitive liberalization," and this liberalization described can result in a new type of governance for the Asia-Pacific, as well as transnational trade.[174]

According to analyst and economist B.R. Williams, the United States has a large role in the reduction of trade barriers and increased U.S. investment. Williams explains that the U.S. aims to create a "broader platform for trade liberalization, particularly throughout the Asia-Pacific region."[175] Scholars C. Li and J. Whalley explore a numerical approach in explaining the liberalizing effects of the TPP. Li and Whalley uses a quantitative equilibrium simulation to explore the effects of the TPP on the liberalization of trade and new markets.[176]

Xitoy

According to a 2020 study, the TPP pushed Xitoy to introduce its own internal liberal market reforms. Reform-minded elites in China used the TPP to justify reform.[177]

In May 2020, Chinese Premier Li Ketsyan said that China has a positive and open attitude toward joining the CPTPP.[178]

In November 2020, China and fourteen Asia-Pacific nations signed a trade deal, the Mintaqaviy keng qamrovli iqtisodiy sheriklik.[179]

Geosiyosat

TPP increases the likelihood that Japan will undertake economic reforms to revive its economy, which coupled with potential South-Korean accession to the TPP, might have an economic impact on China. By making the Chinese economy less competitive and Chinese leadership less likely to write the rules of trade in East and Southeast Asia, the Chinese government will be under great internal and external pressure to liberalize its economy.[24] Japan's prime minister, Sindzo Abe, believes that future Chinese accession to TPP would have a major pacifying impact on the Asia-Pacific region.[25] AQSh savdo vakili Maykl Froman has said that a failure to ratify TPP would give China the opportunity to boost its exports and set labor and environmental standards in the fast-growing Asia Pacific region through the Mintaqaviy keng qamrovli iqtisodiy sheriklik (RCEP).[180]

South Korea did not participate in TPP "largely out of a concern to maintain balance in its economic relations with China and the United States" but has shown greater interest in joining TPP after Japan, its biggest economic competitor, decided to participate.[23] Also, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan have reportedly been considering and implementing various domestic reforms to improve their prospects for eventually joining.[181]

Since formal TPP negotiations began in 2010, China's attitude towards TPP has:

swung from disdain to suspicion to cautious embrace... Conclusion of a TPP agreement in early October has sparked a lively debate in Beijing, with the weight of elite opinion seeming to tilt toward eventual membership; for example, the head of the Chinese-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Jin Liqun, announced his support during a speech in Washington shortly after the TPP deal was announced.[23]

The TPP may give renewed impetus to trade negotiations among China, Japan, and Korea, and increase the likelihood of Mintaqaviy keng qamrovli iqtisodiy sheriklik (RCEP) which could provide a possible pathway to a erkin savdo maydoni of the Asia-Pacific.[23]

In January 2016, the Milliy ishlab chiqaruvchilar assotsiatsiyasi announced its support for TPP, saying "without such an agreement, the United States would be ceding economic leadership to other global powers, letting them set the rules of economic engagement in the region".[182]

2016 yilgi tadqiqot Merilend universiteti political scientists Todd Allee and Andrew Lugg suggests that if the TPP becomes standard legal text, it will shape future trade cooperation and agreements.[85]

An October 2016 survey of xalqaro munosabatlar scholars showed that the overwhelming majority supported the TPP.[183]

United States considerations

The original TPP was thought by some to likely bring China's neighbours closer to the United States and reduce their dependence on Chinese trade.[166][167][23][24][25][184][185][26][186][187] If ratified, the TPP would have strengthened American influence on future rules for the global economy. AQSh Mudofaa vaziri Ash Karter claimed the passage of the TPP to be as valuable to the United States as the creation of another aircraft carrier.[23] President Obama has argued "if we don't pass this agreement—if America doesn't write those rules—then countries like China will".[188] According to the Congressional Research Service, "many Asian policymakers—correctly or not—could interpret a failure of TPP in the United States as a symbol of declining U.S. interest in the region and inability to assert leadership... failure to conclude TPP could, in effect, allow China to shape regional rules of commerce and diplomacy through its own trade and investment initiatives, potentially creating regional rules and norms less beneficial for U.S. interests."[21] Maykl J. Yashil and Matthew P. Goodman argue that "history will be unforgiving if TPP fails... If Congress rejects TPP, trying to negotiate a similar arrangement in Asia would reopen demands on the United States—and in the meantime, would likely give impetus to alternative arrangements like RCEP that exclude the United States. Momentum behind the U.S.-led international order would shift to momentum against it. Future generations of historians will take note of U.S. leadership at this moment."[23] Dan Ikenson, director of Cato's Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, argued in July 2016 that the "failure of Congress to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership this year would do more to subvert U.S. regional and global interests than anything China is capable of doing."[181] Stiven M. Uolt, professor of international relations at Harvard University, writing after the Trump Administration abandoned the TPP, described the TPP as "a key institution that would have bound a number of Asian countries more tightly to the United States".[186]

Non-TPP party opinions

On 30 January 2015 Filipp Xammond, sobiq Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, described the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as "potentially important liberalising steps forward".[189]

The European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), a think tank on European policies, predicted in 2012 that the TPP would be a "deadly threat to European exporters of agricultural products in TPP countries".[190]

ECIPE has said in 2014 that TPP "will be the first 'competing' iqtisodiy integratsiya that is large enough to have a considerable negative impact on Europe. In the long-term, the negative effects will come from dynamic impact, e.g. on investment, productivity and competitiveness".[191]Paskal Lami called the TPP "the last of big old-style trade agreements".[191]:2

Rossiya Bosh vaziri Dmitriy Medvedev was reportedly critical of the TPP, saying that "the WTO is being encroached upon" and this might lead to the "destruction of world trade".[iqtibos kerak ]

Tanqid

Nobel Memorial Prize-winning economist Pol Krugman has said that "there isn't a compelling case for this deal, from either a global or a national point of view."[192]

2016 yil fevral oyida, Birlashgan Millatlar ' human rights expert Alfred de Zayas argued that the TPP was fundamentally flawed and was based on an outdated model of trade pacts, and that governments should not sign or ratify the TPP.[193] According to de Zayas, the international human rights regime imposes binding legal obligations on countries, including the Fuqarolik va siyosiy huquqlar to'g'risidagi xalqaro pakt va Iqtisodiy, ijtimoiy va madaniy huquqlar to'g'risidagi xalqaro pakt, and trade must be done under the human rights regime. Under the ISDS in the TPP, investors can sue a government, while a government cannot sue investors. De Zayas argued that this asymmetry made the system unfair. He added that international law, including accountability and transparency, must prevail over trade pacts.

Currency manipulation

Some critics and even supporters of the TPP wanted the deal to contain measures that would crack down on nations who engage in alleged valyuta manipulyatsiyasi, notably China.[194] Biroq, Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University, has argued that the trade deal was never likely to include restrictions on currency manipulation, as it would have restricted U.S. monetary policy.[195] Garvard iqtisodchisi Jeffri Frankel has argued that the inclusion of currency manipulation language in TPP would be a mistake.[196] Frankel noted that currency manipulation would be hard to enforce (in part because it is impossible to tell whether a currency is overvalued or undervalued); "currency manipulation" can often be legitimate; China, often alleged to be a major currency manipulator, is not party to the TPP; currency manipulation accusations are often meritless; and because it would restrict U.S. monetary policy.[196]

Length and complexity

Donald Tramp has criticized the TPP agreement for being too long and complicated, saying, "[i]t’s 5,600 pages long, so complex that nobody’s read it."[197] Senator Berni Sanders has charged that the "TPP is much more than a ‘free trade’ agreement."[198]

Biroq, Jorjtaun universiteti Professor Marc L. Busch and McGill universiteti Professor Krzysztof J. Pelc note that modern trade deals are long and complex because they often tackle savdo-sotiqdagi tarifsiz to'siqlar, such as different standards and regulations, in addition to tariflar. Due to steadily decreasing tariff barriers since WWII, countries have become increasingly likely to enact trade barriers in the form of non-tariff barriers. National firms often lobby their own governments to enact regulations that are designed to keep out foreign firms. The TPP addresses many of these "disguised restrictions on trade" by, for instance, "basing these measures on agreed-upon science; making the process of formulating regulations more transparent; and giving foreign exporters opportunities to offer substantive input in the formulation of these measures."[199]

Secrecy of negotiations

As with many trade agreements[iqtibos kerak ], until being finalized, negotiations for the TPP were conducted with significant secrecy. Drafts of the agreement were kept classified during negotiations, and access to the working text was significantly restricted even for government officials and business representatives involved in the talks.[200] Despite this, some sections of TPP drafts were leaked to the public by WikiLeaks, which published an intellectual property chapter draft in 2013,[201][202] an environmental chapter draft in 2014,[203] and the final intellectual property chapter in 2014.[204]

In 2012, critics such as Public Citizen's Global savdo kuzatuvi, a consumer advocacy group, called for more open negotiations in regard to the agreement. U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk responded that he believes the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) conducted "the most engaged and transparent process as we possibly could", but that "some measure of discretion and confidentiality" are needed "to preserve negotiating strength and to encourage our partners to be willing to put issues on the table they may not otherwise."[205] He dismissed the "tension" as natural and noted that when the Amerika qit'asining erkin savdo zonasi drafts were released, negotiators were subsequently unable to reach a final agreement.[205]

On 23 May 2012, U.S. Senator Ron Vayden, Democrat of Oregon, introduced S. 3225, which would have required the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to disclose its TPP documents to all members of Congress.[206] Had it passed, Wyden said that the bill would increase Congressional access to information about USTR activity.[207]

Maykl R. Vessel, former commissioner on the U.S. Trade Deficit Review Commission claimed in May 2015 that "cleared advisors" like himself were "prohibited from sharing publicly the criticisms we’ve lodged about specific proposals and approaches". He claimed that only portions of the text had been provided, "to be read under the watchful eye of a USTR official", that access on secure government-run website did not contain the most-up-to-date information, and that for cleared advisors to get that information, he had "to travel to certain government facilities and sign in to read the materials" and "even then, the administration determines what we can and cannot review and, often, they provide carefully edited summaries rather than the actual underlying text, which is critical to really understanding the consequences of the agreement."[208]

In June 2015, U.S. Senator Rand Pol, Republican of Kentucky, opposed the bill to fast-track the congressional ratification of the TPP on the basis of the trade agreement's secrecy.[209]

Sanoat ta'siri

AQSh senatori Elizabeth Uorren, Democrat of Massachusetts, has alleged that corporations and industry exert disproportionate influence on U.S. trade negotiators.[210] She asserted in July 2016 that 85% of seats on U.S. trade advisory committees were held by "senior corporation executives or industry lobbyists", and that the members of the committees "whisper in the ear" of negotiators.[210]

Michelle Ye Hee Lee, a fact-checker for Washington Post, wrote that Warren used "misleading language" in describing the TPP. While Warren implied that "28 trade advisory committees were formed" specifically to influence the TPP, the advisory committees were actually created as part of the 1974 yilgi savdo qonuni; only the membership of the trade committees had changed during the Obama administration and the early phases of the TPP. Regarding Warren's claim that trade advisers secretly "whisper in the ear of our trade negotiators", Lee wrote: "while the direct meetings take place in private, committees still have to submit written reports to Congress and provide written recommendations and advice that are made public."[210] Furthermore, Lee wrote, "it is true that industry representatives make up a large number of the total membership, but it is worth noting that there is a labor committee in the second tier, labor representatives in the first tier and that the industry groups have a narrow focus (to give technical advice)."[210]

In response to criticisms about transparency and the large representation from industry representatives, USTR announced it would create a Public Interest Trade Advisory Committee.[210]

Raqobatdan tashqari band

Din Beyker argued that Article 18.78, under which countries should ensure that they protect savdo sirlari and impose criminal procedures for violators, could be used to enforce non-compete agreements.[211] Baker points out that Kaliforniya 's success can partly be attributed to the fact that the state did not allow for the enforcement of non-compete agreements, making it easy for tech workers to quit their jobs and start to work for another company.[211]

Criticisms from politicians and activists

In 2014, linguist and political activist Noam Xomskiy warned that the TPP is "designed to carry forward the neoliberal project to maximize profit and domination, and to set the working people in the world in competition with one another so as to lower wages to increase insecurity."[212] Senator Berni Sanders (Men -VT ) argues that trade agreements like the TPP "have ended up devastating working families and enriching large corporations."[213] Professor Robert Reyx contends that the TPP is a "Trojan horse in a global race to the bottom."[214][215][216]

Shuningdek qarang

Izohlar

  1. ^ The Tufts University working paper used the United Nations Global Policy Model to evaluate TPP; sources for the Tufts paper:[14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22]
  2. ^ The official title of the document is: Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement [1]

Adabiyotlar

  1. ^ "Trans-Pacific free trade deal agreed creating vast partnership". BBC yangiliklari. 5 oktyabr 2015 yil. Olingan 5 oktyabr 2015.
  2. ^ Handley, Paul (5 October 2015). "12 Pacific countries seal huge free trade deal". Yahoo! Yangiliklar. AFP. Olingan 7 oktyabr 2015.
  3. ^ "AQSh va 11 davlat Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimini imzoladi". Financial Times. IES hali ham har bir mamlakat rahbari tomonidan rasmiy ravishda imzolanishi va ularning parlamentlari tomonidan tasdiqlanishi kerak(obuna kerak)
  4. ^ "Here's What Needs to Happen in Order for the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Become Binding". Diplomat.
  5. ^ Riley, Charles (23 January 2017). "Trampning IESni o'ldirish qarori Xitoy uchun eshiklarni ochiq qoldirdi". CNN. Olingan 23 yanvar 2017.
  6. ^ Trump, Donald J. (25 January 2017). "Withdrawal of the United States From the Trans- Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement". Federal reestr.
  7. ^ Shaffer, Sri Jegarajah, Craig Dale, Leslie (21 May 2017). "TPP nations agree to pursue trade deal without US". CNBC. Olingan 21 may 2017.
  8. ^ hermesauto (21 May 2017). "Saving the Trans-Pacific Partnership: What are the TPP's prospects after the US withdrawal?". Bo'g'ozlar vaqti. Olingan 21 may 2017.
  9. ^ Ming, Cheang (9 March 2018). "Global trade just had a 'one step forward, one step back' day". CNBC. Olingan 10 mart 2018.
  10. ^ "Australia and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: what we do and don't know". Guardian. 6 oktyabr 2015 yil.
  11. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sheriklik shartnomasining qisqacha mazmuni". USTR. 4 oktyabr 2015 yil. Olingan 16 oktyabr 2015.
  12. ^ "What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership?". Vox. Olingan 2 iyul 2015.[doimiy o'lik havola ]
  13. ^ a b v d e f "Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Likely Impact on the U.S. Economy and on Specific Industry Sectors" (PDF). Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining xalqaro savdo komissiyasi.
  14. ^ "Potential Macroeconomic Implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership" (PDF). Jahon banki. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi (PDF) 2016 yil 12 fevralda.
  15. ^ Hufbauer, Gary Clyde (5 February 2016). "Why the Trans-Pacific Partnership isn't a bum deal". PBS. Olingan 7 fevral 2016.
  16. ^ a b v d e Trading Down:Unemployment, Inequality and Other Risks of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement J. Capaldo and A. Izurieta, Global Development and Environment Institute, Working Paper No. 16–1 Jan (2016)
  17. ^ a b v d Xodimlarning yozuvchilari. "Trans-Pacific Partnership would boost GDP by $4.3 billion: study". Olingan 10 sentyabr 2016.
  18. ^ a b v d Rodrik, Dani (10 February 2016). "The Trade Numbers Game". Project Syndicate. Olingan 22 may 2016.
  19. ^ a b v d "Studies of TPP: Which Is Credible? | PIIE". piie.com. 2016 yil 30-yanvar. Olingan 22 may 2016.
  20. ^ a b v d ""Splendid Isolation" as Trade Policy: Mercantilism and Crude Keynesianism in "the Capaldo Study" of TTIP - ECIPE". Olingan 10 avgust 2016.
  21. ^ a b v d "The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief" (PDF). Kongress tadqiqot xizmati.
  22. ^ a b "TPP is a structural reform: Let's evaluate it with structural models". VoxEU.org. 2016 yil 3-iyul. Olingan 3 iyul 2016.
  23. ^ a b v d e f g h Green, Michael J.; Goodman, Matthew P. (2 October 2015). "After TPP: the Geopolitics of Asia and the Pacific". Vashington kvartali. 38 (4): 19–34. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2015.1125827. ISSN  0163-660X.
  24. ^ a b v "What Will the TPP Mean for China?". Tashqi siyosat. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  25. ^ a b v Perlez, Jane (6 October 2015). "U.S. Allies See Trans-Pacific Partnership as a Check on China". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  26. ^ a b Magnusson, Earl Anthony Wayne, Oliver. "The Death of TPP: The Best Thing That Ever Happened to China". Milliy qiziqish. Olingan 31 yanvar 2017.
  27. ^ "Trans Pacific Partnership trade deal signed in Auckland". BBC yangiliklari. 2016 yil 4-fevral.
  28. ^ "Canada Joins Trans-Pacific Partnership Round" (Matbuot xabari). Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. 2012 yil 3-dekabr. Olingan 13 dekabr 2012. Canada formally joined the TPP on October 8, 2012.
  29. ^ "Tramp IESdan chiqish buyrug'ini imzoladi, abort qilish bo'yicha" Mexiko siyosati "ni tiklaydi". CNN.com. 23 yanvar 2017 yil.
  30. ^ "Trumpning buyrug'i TPP savdo bitimini bekor qildi". BBC yangiliklari. 23 yanvar 2017 yil. Olingan 23 yanvar 2017.
  31. ^ "Trump to reconsider TPP trade pact". BBC yangiliklari. 2018 yil 13 aprel - www.bbc.com orqali.
  32. ^ "Trump yirik TPP-ning orqaga qaytishini bekor qildi". news.com.au. 12 aprel 2018 yil.
  33. ^ "Avstraliyalik fermerlar dahshatga tushishdi, ammo yangiliklarga ehtiyotkorlik bilan munosabatda bo'lishmoqda Tramp IESga" yana bir qarash "ni xohlamoqda". abc.net.au. 13 aprel 2018 yil.
  34. ^ Pramuk, Yoqub (2018 yil 13-aprel). "'Kulgili bir teskari ': Tramp bilan savdo tarafdorlari bo'lgan TPP harakatlari. cnbc.com.
  35. ^ Nishikava, Yoko (2010 yil 13-noyabr). "Janubiy Koreya AQSh boshchiligidagi IES savdo tashabbusini ko'rib chiqmoqda: hisobot". Reuters. Olingan 15 noyabr 2010.
  36. ^ "AQSh Koreyani mintaqaviy FTAga qo'shilishini so'raydi". Donga-A Ilbo. 2010 yil 18-dekabr.
  37. ^ "Seul Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi muzokaralariga qo'shilishga tayyor". Hankyoreh. 2013 yil 4 oktyabr. Olingan 6 oktyabr 2013.
  38. ^ Fifield, Anna (2015 yil 15-aprel). "Janubiy Koreya Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimiga qo'shilishni so'raydi. Vashington bunchalik tez emas". Vashington Post. Olingan 13 may 2015.
  39. ^ "Tayvan maqsadi Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi: vazir". 2010 yil 10-noyabr. Olingan 13 noyabr 2010.
  40. ^ "Prezident Akvino Nyu-York shahrining Xalqaro aloqalar kengashidagi nutqi". 23 sentyabr 2010 yil. Olingan 2 noyabr 2010.
  41. ^ "Kolumbiya IES muzokaralariga qo'shilishga umid qilmoqda". 19 mart 2010 yil. Arxivlangan asl nusxasi 2013 yil 15-dekabrda. Olingan 22 yanvar 2014.
  42. ^ "Tailandning TPPAga qo'shilishga intilishi" qarshiliklarni kuchaytiradi'". Olingan 4 fevral 2013.
  43. ^ "AQSh-ASEAN ishbilarmonlari IESda Indoneziyani lobbi qilishadi". Jakarta Post. 25 iyun 2013 yil.
  44. ^ Sobhan, Md Abus (2013 yil 15 sentyabr). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi oldinga siljish". Dakka tribunasi. Olingan 19 sentyabr 2013.
  45. ^ Kumar, Arun (2013 yil 2-avgust). "'Hindistonning IESga qabul qilinishi iqtisodiy to'ntarish bo'ladi'". Biznes standarti. Olingan 19 sentyabr 2013.
  46. ^ Xukvey, Jeyms; Brereton-Fukui, Natasha (2013 yil 28-iyun). "Sharqiy Osiyoda savdo-sotiq ham ta'sirning kalitidir". Wall Street Journal. Olingan 14 may 2015.
  47. ^ Mireya, Solis (2001 yil 30-noyabr). "Qamalayganlarning qulashi: Xitoy va IES". Brukings instituti. Olingan 26 iyun 2014.
  48. ^ Needham, Vikki (2013 yil 17 sentyabr). "Xitoyning Osiyo-Tinch okeani savdo bitimiga qo'shilishga qiziqishi ortmoqda". TheHill.com. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2013 yil 20 sentyabrda.
  49. ^ Devadason, Evelyn S. (2014 yil 17-yanvar). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi (TPP): Xitoy istiqboli". Zamonaviy Xitoy jurnali. 23 (87): 462–479. doi:10.1080/10670564.2013.843890.
  50. ^ a b Vashingtondagi France-Presse agentligi (2015 yil 27 oktyabr). "Indoneziya Trans-Tinch okeani hamkorligiga qo'shiladi, deydi Jokovi Obamaga | Dunyo yangiliklari". Guardian. Olingan 18 noyabr 2015.
  51. ^ "Kolombo Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligiga kirishni o'ylamoqda: Samaraweera". Hind. 2016 yil 26-fevral. ISSN  0971-751X. Olingan 27 fevral 2016.
  52. ^ "Hukumat GSP + ga, TPPga a'zo bo'lishni talab qilmoqda - doktor Xarsha | Daily News". dailynews.lk. Olingan 27 fevral 2016.
  53. ^ "Hukumat GSP + ga, TPPga a'zo bo'lishni talab qilmoqda - doktor Xarsha | Daily News". dailynews.lk. Olingan 27 fevral 2016.
  54. ^ "Buyuk Britaniya CPTPPga qo'shilishni xohlaydi. Bu Yaponiya uchun yaxshi yangilik". thediplomat.com.
  55. ^ "Xitoy Trans-Tinch okeani savdo paktiga qo'shilishga tayyor". www.thestar.com.my.
  56. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani SEP kelishuvi tarixi P4". mfat.govt.nz. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2013 yil 10 fevralda.
  57. ^ "TRANS-PACIFIC STRATEJIK IQTISODIY HAMKORLIK SHARTNOMASI" (PDF). mfat.govt.nz. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi (PDF) 2015 yil 14 mayda. Olingan 5 oktyabr 2015.
  58. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani strategik iqtisodiy sheriklik to'g'risidagi bitim" (PDF). NZ Tashqi ishlar va savdo vazirligi. 2005. Arxivlangan asl nusxasi (PDF) 2015 yil 14 mayda. Olingan 28 yanvar 2012.
  59. ^ Daniel, Kris (2008 yil 10-fevral). "Erkin savdoni kengaytirish uchun birinchi qadam". Yangi Zelandiya Herald. Olingan 9 fevral 2008.
  60. ^ Shintaro Xamanaka (2014 yil yanvar). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi va mintaqaviy keng qamrovli iqtisodiy sheriklik: a'zolikni nazorat qilish va kun tartibini belgilash" (PDF).
  61. ^ Ishiguro, Kaoru (2016 yil 20-iyun). "IESning muzokaralari va Yaponiyaning ijroiya siyosatini ishlab chiqishda siyosiy iqtisodiyotni isloh qilish: ikki darajali o'yin tahlili". Osiyo-Tinch okeanining xalqaro aloqalari. 17 (2): 171–201. doi:10.1093 / irap / lcw010.
  62. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi (TPP) kelishuvining ichki protseduralarini yakunlash to'g'risida xabarnoma". Tashqi ishlar vazirligi (Yaponiya). 20 yanvar 2017 yil. Olingan 22 yanvar 2017.
  63. ^ "Bill Ingliz savdo muzokaralari uchun Yaponiyaga borishi bilan hukumat IESni ratifikatsiya qildi". Mahsulotlar. Olingan 11 may 2017.
  64. ^ "Ardern IES o'zgarishini talab qilmoqda". Yangi Zelandiya radiosi. 21 oktyabr 2017 yil. Olingan 30 oktyabr 2017.
  65. ^ "Donald Tramp Trans-Tinch okeani hamkorligini prezident sifatida bekor qilishga va'da berdi, NAFTA ni ogohlantiradi". Washington Times. Olingan 15 noyabr 2016.
  66. ^ "IESning o'limi Amerikaning o'rta sinfiga yordam bermaydi". Atlantika. 2016 yil 15-noyabr. Olingan 22 yanvar 2017.
  67. ^ "Tramp: AQSh ish boshlagan birinchi kunida TPP savdo bitimidan voz kechadi". BBC yangiliklari. 2016 yil 21-noyabr. Olingan 21 noyabr 2016.
  68. ^ Shir, Maykl D .; Devis, Julie Xirshfeld (2016 yil 21-noyabr). "Tramp, YouTube'da, ish o'rinlari yaratishga va'da berdi". The New York Times. Olingan 22 noyabr 2016.
  69. ^ "Tramp NPTAga indamay TPP kelishuvidan chiqishga va'da berdi". Globe and Mail. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2017 yil 19-yanvarda. Olingan 22 yanvar 2017.
  70. ^ Calmes, Jackie (2016 yil 11-noyabr). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini dafn etish bilan nima yo'qotadi?". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Olingan 15 noyabr 2016.
  71. ^ "Trumpning buyrug'i TPP savdo bitimini bekor qildi". BBC yangiliklari. Olingan 23 yanvar 2017. Janob Trampning IES to'g'risidagi buyrug'i asosan ramziy ma'noga ega, chunki kelishuv hech qachon bo'linib ketgan AQSh Kongressi tomonidan ratifikatsiya qilinmagan.
  72. ^ "AQSh AQShning Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligidan chiqib ketishi bilan Xitoy imkoniyatni ko'zlamoqda". Bloomberg / Sidney Morning Herald. 2017 yil 24-yanvar. Olingan 23 yanvar 2017.
  73. ^ "Trampning TPPdan chiqishiga reaktsiya partiyalar qatoriga to'g'ri kelmaydi". Business Insider. Olingan 31 oktyabr 2017.
  74. ^ Inc., Gallup. "AQShda tashqi savdoga nisbatan ijobiy munosabat yuqori bo'lib qoladi". Gallup.com. Olingan 23 aprel 2018.
  75. ^ "Amerikaliklar IESni ma'qullashadi, ammo boshqa mamlakatlarga qaraganda kamroq". Pew tadqiqot markazi. 23 iyun 2015 yil. Olingan 2 aprel 2018.
  76. ^ Blendon, Robert J. (2017 yil aprel). "Jamoatchilik fikri va Trampning ish joylari va savdo siyosati". Qiyinchilik. 60 (3): 228–244. doi:10.1080/05775132.2017.1308763.
  77. ^ Drezner, Daniel V. "Perspektiv | Tramp ma'muriyatining yoyi ahmoqlikka egiladi" - www.washingtonpost.com orqali.
  78. ^ "AQSh chiqqandan keyin Osiyo davlatlari IES savdo bitimini saqlab qolishga harakat qilmoqda". Reuters. 2017 yil 24-yanvar. Olingan 24 yanvar 2017.
  79. ^ hermesauto (2018 yil 23-yanvar). "CPTPP trans-Tinch okeani savdo shartnomasi to'g'risida bilishingiz kerak bo'lgan 6 narsa". Bo'g'ozlar vaqti. Olingan 23 yanvar 2018.
  80. ^ "TPP11: to'xtatib qo'yilgan qoidalarni echish". Osiyo savdo markazi. Olingan 23 yanvar 2018.
  81. ^ "Buyuk Britaniya Brexitdan keyin Tinch okeanining savdo guruhiga qo'shilish niyatida". Financial Times. Olingan 2 yanvar 2018.
  82. ^ Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi matni, Yangi Zelandiya Tashqi ishlar va savdo vazirligi, 2015 yil 5-noyabr, olingan 5 noyabr 2015
  83. ^ "Oqib chiqqan: Obamaning savdo bitimida nima bor?". Kun tartibi. Olingan 5 noyabr 2015.
  84. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligining potentsial makroiqtisodiy oqibatlari" (PDF). Global iqtisodiy istiqbol. 2016 yil yanvar.
  85. ^ a b Alli, Todd; Lugg, Endryu (2016 yil 1-iyul). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi qoidalarini kim yozgan?". Tadqiqot va siyosat. 3 (3): 2053168016658919. doi:10.1177/2053168016658919. ISSN  2053-1680.
  86. ^ Brud, Tomer; Haftel, Yoram Z.; Tompson, Aleksandr (2017 yil 1-iyun). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi va tartibga solish maydoni: Shartnoma matnlarini taqqoslash". Xalqaro iqtisodiy huquq jurnali. 20 (2): 391–417. doi:10.1093 / jiel / jgx016. ISSN  1369-3034.
  87. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov". Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 27-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  88. ^ a b v Ed Gervin (2015 yil 27-noyabr). "Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimida katta ulushga ega bo'lgan kichik biznes". The Wall Street Journal.
  89. ^ Granville, Kevin (2016 yil 26-iyul). "Trans-Tinch okeanidagi sheriklik savdo kelishuvi tushuntirildi". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Olingan 27 iyul 2016.
  90. ^ a b v d "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov". Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 27-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  91. ^ Morin, Jan-Frederik va Giyom Baumier, IESning atrof-muhitga oid majburiyatlari: AQShning qonuniy va Evropa Ittifoqining tarmoq yondashuvlarini birlashtirish, ICTSD, 2016, http://www.chaire-epi.ulaval.ca/sites/chaire-epi.ulaval.ca/files/publications/tpp_environmental_commitments.pdf
  92. ^ Ibrohim Balxiy (2013 yil 9-dekabr). "Obamaning Trans-Tinch okeani bilan sherikligi jamoat salomatligini, atrof-muhitni va Internetni birdan buzishi mumkin". Huffington Post. Qabul qilingan 10 yanvar 2014 yil.
  93. ^ Xovard, Brayan Klark (2014 yil 17-yanvar). Yashil guruhlarning 4 yo'li Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi atrof-muhitga zarar etkazadi deyishadi. National Geographic. Qabul qilingan 23 yanvar 2014 yil.
  94. ^ Shuayxua Uolles Cheng (2015 yil 23 oktyabr). "Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimi barqaror rivojlanish maqsadlari bilan uyg'unlashishi kerak". YaleGlobal Online. Olingan 18 noyabr 2015.
  95. ^ Metyu Rimmer. "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi barqaror rivojlanishga jiddiy tahdid solmoqda". Avstraliya bilan suhbat. Olingan 18 noyabr 2015.
  96. ^ Cam Walker (2015 yil 2-oktabr). "IES va barqaror rivojlanish maqsadlari bo'yicha brifing | Yerning do'stlari Avstraliya". Yerning do'stlari Avstraliya. Olingan 18 noyabr 2015.
  97. ^ Rowena Dela Rosa Yoon (2015 yil 6-oktabr). "IES BMTning barqaror rivojlanish maqsadlari bilan murosasiz, deydi tanqidchilar". Osiyo muxbiri. Olingan 18 noyabr 2015.
  98. ^ "Ular nima deyishadi: atrof-muhit himoyachilari bizning okeanlarni, o'rmonlarni va yovvoyi tabiatni muhofaza qilishning tarixiy imkoniyati sifatida Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini ko'rsatmoqdalar". whitehouse.gov. 2015 yil 31 mart.
  99. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi". Oq uy. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 15-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  100. ^ "IES va atrof-muhit | PIIE". piie.com. 2016 yil 22 aprel. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  101. ^ a b v d e f g "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini baholash, 1-jild: bozorga kirish va tarmoq muammolari | PIIE". piie.com. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  102. ^ a b Lilliston, Ben (sentyabr 2016). Erkin savdoning iqlim qiymati: IES va savdo bitimlari Parijning iqlim kelishuviga qanday putur etkazadi (PDF). Minneapolis, MN, AQSh: Qishloq xo'jaligi va savdo siyosati instituti (IATP). Olingan 25 sentyabr 2016.
  103. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov". Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 27-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  104. ^ a b v "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov". Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 27-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  105. ^ a b v d "Obamaning IES va Malayziya inson huquqlari bo'yicha da'vosini tekshirish". Olingan 7 avgust 2016.
  106. ^ a b "Tramp omili og'irlashmoqda, chunki Vetnam dissidentlarga qarshi kurashni kuchaytirmoqda". Reuters. 2017. Olingan 3 avgust 2017.
  107. ^ a b Karlos A. Primo Braga (2016 yil 24 mart). "IES: Savdo shartnomalarida intellektual mulkni himoya qilishning yangi oltin standarti?". Huffington Post. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  108. ^ Kler Reyli (2015 yil 5-noyabr). "Raqamli huquqlarning diqqat markazida Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligining to'liq matni paydo bo'ldi". Tarmoq. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  109. ^ a b "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov". Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 27-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  110. ^ a b v d "IES va farmatsevtika himoyasi: juda kuchli, juda zaifmi yoki shunchaki to'g'rimi?". 2016 yil 25-may. Olingan 17 iyul 2016.
  111. ^ Flinn, Shon; Kaminski, Margot E.; Beyker, Bruk K .; Koo, Jimmi H. (2011 yil 6-dekabr). "IP-bo'lim uchun AQSh TPP taklifining jamoatchilik manfaatlarini tahlili". Axborot odil sudlov va intellektual mulk bo'yicha dastur.
  112. ^ a b v "Trans-Tinch okeanining sheriklik shartnomasi". Olingan 13 may 2015.
  113. ^ a b "Yaponiya tashkilotlarining katta koalitsiyasi IESning mualliflik huquqi qoidalariga qarshi kampaniyalar". Olingan 13 may 2015.
  114. ^ "Negima's Akamatsu Yaponiyaning mualliflik huquqi to'g'risidagi qonunini o'zgartirishdan ogohlantirmoqda", Anime News Network, 2011 yil 31-oktabr. 2011 yil 10-noyabrda olingan
  115. ^ "Savdo va ishonch" Pol Krugman, The New York Times, 2015 yil 22-may
  116. ^ DoniBloomfield, Anna Edney, Anna Donni Bloomfield. "Dori-darmon ishlab chiqaruvchilari sarmoyani to'xtatish uchun Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimini aytishmoqda". Bloomberg.com. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  117. ^ Li, Timoti B. (5 oktyabr 2015). "Hozirda yakunlangan Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi shartnomasi, tushuntirdi". Vox. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  118. ^ "IESning farmatsevtika bo'yicha ko'rsatmalari sanoat, yordam agentliklari tomonidan tanqidni keltirib chiqarishi mumkin". Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  119. ^ a b v Kapchinski, Emi (2015 yil 16-iyul). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi - bu sizning sog'lig'ingizga zarar etkazadimi?". Nyu-England tibbiyot jurnali. 373 (3): 201–203. doi:10.1056 / NEJMp1506158. PMID  26061752.
  120. ^ "MSF tomonidan Trans-Tinch okeani bilan sheriklik savdo shartnomasining to'liq matnini rasmiy e'lon qilish to'g'risida bayonot". Chegarasiz shifokorlar. 5 Noyabr 2015. Arxivlangan asl nusxasi 2015 yil 7-noyabrda. Olingan 6 noyabr 2015.
  121. ^ Gudman, Emi; Gonsales, Xuan; Valax, Lori (2015 yil 6-noyabr), IES savdo bitimining to'liq matni oshkor bo'ldi - va tanqidchilar bu ularning fikridan ham battarroq deyishadi, Demokratiya hozir, olingan 6 noyabr 2015
  122. ^ "TPPAda avstraliyaliklarning sog'lig'ini himoya qilish". Mustaqil yangiliklar to'plami. 2014 yil 18-fevral. Olingan 18 fevral 2014.
  123. ^ a b "Aholining sog'lig'i va dori-darmonlarga ega bo'lishiga putur etkazishi mumkin bo'lgan" IP siyosatini muhokama qilish uchun yig'ilishni so'ragan 10 vakilning xati."" (PDF). infojustice.org. 2011 yil 3-avgust. Olingan 30 yanvar 2012.
  124. ^ "Senator Sandersning AQSh savdo vakili Ron Kirkga maktubi" (PDF). keionline.org. 2011 yil 1-dekabr. Olingan 30 yanvar 2012.
  125. ^ "Vakillar Levin, Vaksman, MakDermott va Konyerlarning AQSh savdo vakili Ron Kirkga maktubi" (PDF). 2011 yil 19 oktyabr. Olingan 30 yanvar 2012.
  126. ^ a b "Vakillar Lyuis, Stark, Rangel, Blumenauer va Doggettlarning 10 maydagi kelishuv dori-darmonlarga kirish uchun" kelishib bo'lmaydigan boshlang'ich nuqta "bo'lib xizmat qilishini so'ragan maktubi" (PDF). 2011 yil 8 sentyabr. Olingan 30 yanvar 2012.
  127. ^ Robert Reyx: Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi halokatli bo'ladi. Salon.com, 2015 yil 5-fevral
  128. ^ "IESning yakuniy matni 9-bob investitsiya" (PDF). Olingan 17 yanvar 2016.
  129. ^ Hernando Otero va Omar Garsiya-Bolivar, "Chet ellik investorlar va qabul qiluvchi davlatlar o'rtasidagi xalqaro arbitraj" Hauser Global yuridik fakulteti dasturi. Nyu-York, 2011 yil dekabr. 2014 yil 14-dekabrda qabul qilindi
  130. ^ "HAQIDA MA'LUMOT: Investor-davlat bilan nizolarni hal qilish (ISDS) | Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining savdo vakili". ustr.gov. Olingan 22 may 2016.
  131. ^ a b v "ISDS: Muhim savollar va javoblar | Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining savdo vakili". ustr.gov. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  132. ^ a b v d e f g h "Investor-davlat nizolarini hal qilish: ma'lumotli, faktlarga asoslangan munozaraning ahamiyati". Xalqaro advokatlar assotsiatsiyasi.
  133. ^ Kler Provost va Mett Kennard (2015 yil 10-iyun). "Korporatsiyalarga mamlakatlarni sudga berishga imkon beradigan tushunarsiz huquqiy tizim". Guardian. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  134. ^ a b "IES tamaki mahsulotlaridan istisno savdoda yangi qoidalar mavjudligini isbotlaydi". Xalqaro aloqalar bo'yicha kengash. Olingan 17 iyun 2016.
  135. ^ Tomas J. Bolliki (2016 yil 13-fevral). "Tamakiga qarshi urush uni IESning erkin savdo bitimiga aylantiradi". Newsweek. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  136. ^ Stiglitz, Jozef; Hersh, Adam S. (2015 yil 5-oktabr), Fikr: Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi charade: TPP umuman "erkin" savdo haqida emas, MarketWatch, olingan 28 oktyabr 2015
  137. ^ Gudman, Emi; Stiglitz, Jozef (2015 yil 27 oktyabr), Jozef Stiglitz: IESga ko'ra, ifloslantiruvchilar AQShga uglerod chiqindilarining chegaralarini belgilash uchun da'vo qilishi mumkin, olingan 27 oktyabr 2015
  138. ^ Kongressda "Ha" ovozi berish uchun nima uchun IES juda kamchiliklarga duch kelmoqda? J. Saks, Huffington Post, 2015 yil 11-noyabr
  139. ^ IESdagi haqiqiy xavf L. Jonson, L. Saks va J. Saks, CNN, 2016 yil 19-fevral
  140. ^ Wallach, Lori (2012 yil 16-iyul). "Steroidlar bo'yicha NAFTA". Millat. Olingan 10 iyul 2014.
  141. ^ Uorren, Yelizaveta (2015 yil 25-fevral). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi to'g'risidagi band har kim qarshi chiqishi kerak". Washington Post. ISSN  0190-8286. Olingan 1 avgust 2016.
  142. ^ Kengash, tahririyat (2015 yil 11 mart). "Savdo shartnomasi signalizmini sotib olmang". Washington Post. ISSN  0190-8286. Olingan 1 avgust 2016.
  143. ^ a b v "Investor-davlat nizolarini hal qilish (ISDS) bo'yicha savollar va javoblar". 2015 yil 26-fevral. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  144. ^ "Investorlar bilan davlat nizolarini hal qilish to'g'risidagi nizom va to'g'ridan to'g'ri investitsiyalar o'rtasidagi munosabatlar to'g'risida ma'lumotlar nima deyishadi? | PIIE". piie.com. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  145. ^ a b "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov". Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi @ USTR.gov. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 27-iyulda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  146. ^ Vakil, U. S. Trade (2015 yil 5-noyabr). "IES yuqori mehnat standartlarini ilgari suradimi?". O'rta. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2016 yil 29 iyunda. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  147. ^ "IESdagi mehnat standartlari | PIIE". piie.com. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  148. ^ "Savol-javob: Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi". Human Rights Watch tashkiloti. 2016 yil 12-yanvar. Olingan 22 may 2016.
  149. ^ Blanchard, Emili J. "Nima uchun ilg'orlar TPP savdo bitimini qutqarishi kerak". Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  150. ^ a b Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi Osiyodagi ishchilar huquqlarini yaxshilamaydi, deya ogohlantiradi tanqidchilar S. Greenhouse, Guardian, 2015 yil 21-may
  151. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini baholash, 2-jild: Savdo qoidalaridagi yangiliklar | PIIE". piie.com. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  152. ^ a b v "O'tgan yili osmon AQSh parrandachilik sanoatiga tushdi. Ammo NAFTA va TPP AQSh eksportini himoya qilishga yordam berishdi". Vashington Post. Olingan 30 avgust 2016.
  153. ^ a b v "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligining potentsial makroiqtisodiy oqibatlari" (PDF). Jahon banki.
  154. ^ a b Xufbauer, Gari Klayd (2016 yil 5-fevral). "Ustun: Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi nima uchun dabdabali bitim emas". PBS. Olingan 7 fevral 2016.
  155. ^ Stiglitz, Jozef E. (2014 yil 15 mart). "Globallashuvning noto'g'ri tomonida". The New York Times. Olingan 17 mart 2014.
  156. ^ "Maxfiylik Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi muzokaralari atrofida". Sidney Morning Herald. 2013 yil 9-dekabr. Olingan 9 dekabr 2013.
  157. ^ "Ishchilar huquqlarini himoya qilish uchun IES bilan kurashish". Ed shou. 11-dekabr 2013. Qabul qilingan 17-dekabr 2013-yil.
  158. ^ "Savdo bitimlaridan ish yo'q: Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi haddan tashqari giped qilingan Koreys kelishuvidan ko'ra yomonroq bo'lishi mumkin". Iqtisodiy siyosat instituti. 2013 yil 18-iyul
  159. ^ "Savdo daromadlari? Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi to'g'risidagi bitimning AQSh ish haqiga aniq ta'siri". Iqtisodiy va siyosiy tadqiqotlar markazi. 2013 yil sentyabr
  160. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi iqtisodiyoti: tarqatish ta'siri". VoxEU.org. Olingan 22 may 2016.
  161. ^ "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini sozlash va daromadlarni taqsimlash ta'siri | PIIE". piie.com. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  162. ^ "Nima uchun IES ishchilar uchun o'z xarajatlaridan ustun bo'lgan imtiyozlarga ega". Jahon iqtisodiy forumi. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  163. ^ Avtor, Devid X.; Dorn, Dovud; Hanson, Gordon H. (2016). "Xitoy zarbasi: mehnat bozoridagi o'zgarishlar va savdo-sotiqdagi katta o'zgarishlarga o'rganish" (PDF). Iqtisodiyotning yillik sharhi. 8 (1): 205–240. doi:10.1146 / annurev-iqtisodiyot-080315-015041.
  164. ^ a b "Nima uchun Obamaning Osiyo bilan asosiy savdo bitimi aslida amerikalik ishchilar uchun yaxshi bo'lar edi". Vashington Post. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  165. ^ a b Porter, Eduardo (2016 yil 26-iyul). "Nima uchun Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini bekor qilish yomon g'oya bo'lishi mumkin". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Olingan 27 iyul 2016.
  166. ^ a b muallifi, Jon Budro. "IES savdo bitimining eng katta g'olibi Vetnam bo'lishi mumkin". Bloomberg.com. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  167. ^ a b Diplomat, Dien Luong, The. "Nima uchun Vetnam Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini yaxshi ko'radi". Diplomat. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  168. ^ Mauldin, Uilyam. "Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimidan o'nta yutuqli va yo'qotuvchi sanoat". WSJ. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  169. ^ a b v "IESga qo'shilmaslik Kanadaning milliardlab iqtisodiy o'sishiga olib keladi: hisobot". Olingan 10 sentyabr 2016.
  170. ^ Iqtisodchilar savdo bitimining ta'siridan keskin ravishda bo'linib ketishdi J. Kalmes, The New York Times, 2016 yil 1-fevral
  171. ^ Krisztina Binder (2016 yil may). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi (TPP) mintaqaviy va global ta'sir ko'rsatishi mumkin" (PDF).
  172. ^ a b "Erkin treyderlar Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligini qo'llab-quvvatlashi kerakmi? Amerikaning eng yirik imtiyozli savdo shartnomasini baholash". 2016 yil 12 sentyabr. Olingan 13 sentyabr 2016.
  173. ^ Lyuis, Meredit (2011). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi: yangi paradigma yoki qo'y kiygan bo'ri?". Boston kolleji xalqaro va qiyosiy huquqni ko'rib chiqish. 34. SSRN  1908411.
  174. ^ Petri, Piter; Plummer, Maykl (2012). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi va Osiyo-Tinch okeani integratsiyasi: siyosatning ta'siri". Peterson xalqaro iqtisodiyot siyosati qisqacha ma'lumot instituti.
  175. ^ Uilyams, B.R. (2013). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi (TPP) mamlakatlari: qiyosiy savdo-iqtisodiy tahlil". Vashington, Kolumbiya: Kongress tadqiqot xizmati.
  176. ^ Li, C; Whalley, J (2014). "Xitoy va Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi: ta'sirlarni raqamli simulyatsiyasi baholash". Jahon iqtisodiyoti. 37 (2): 169–192. doi:10.1111 / twec.12123.
  177. ^ Lin, Aleks Yu-Ting; Katada, Saori N. (7 avgust 2020). "Buyuklikka intilish: maqomga intilish, ritorik tuzoq va ichki islohotlar". Xalqaro siyosiy iqtisod sharhi. 0 (0): 1–38. doi:10.1080/09692290.2020.1801486. ISSN  0969-2290.
  178. ^ Bermingem, Finbarr (8 iyul 2020). "Xitoyning trans-Tinch okeanidagi savdo bitimiga qiziqishi, muzokarada yordam berganlar tomonidan shubha bilan qaraldi".. South China Morning Post.
  179. ^ Business, Jill Disis va Laura He, CNN. "Xitoy 14 ta mamlakat bilan Osiyo-Tinch okeanining ulkan savdo shartnomasini imzoladi". CNN.
  180. ^ "IESni o'ldirish Xitoyga" qal'a kalitlarini "topshiradi: AQSh savdo vakili". Reuters. 2016 yil 29-iyul. Olingan 29 iyul 2016.
  181. ^ a b "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi mintaqaviy tinchlik va global farovonlik uchun muhimdir". 2016 yil 14-iyul. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  182. ^ Nidxem, Vikki. "Obamaning savdo-sotiq bitimini katta tasdiqlash". Tepalik. Olingan 4 yanvar 2016.
  183. ^ "TRIP Data Viewer". trip.wm.edu. Olingan 26 oktyabr 2016.
  184. ^ "Savdo - bu milliy xavfsizlikning muhim omili - Garvard - Belfer ilmiy va xalqaro aloqalar markazi". belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  185. ^ Yuklash, Maks. "Savdoning geosiyosiy zaruriyati".
  186. ^ a b "Bu Realpolitik emas. Bu havaskorlar soati". Tashqi siyosat. Olingan 4 may 2017.
  187. ^ "Trumpni IES ruhi ta'qib qiladi". Tashqi siyosat. Olingan 22 noyabr 2017.
  188. ^ Calmes, Jackie (2015 yil 5-noyabr). "Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi matni chiqarildi, munozara uchun yashil bayroq ko'tarildi". The New York Times. ISSN  0362-4331. Olingan 24 may 2016.
  189. ^ Xammond, P., "Tashqi ishlar vazirining Buyuk Britaniyaning Osiyo Tinch okeanidagi nutqi" Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Buyuk Britaniya, 30 yanvar 2015 yil, 8 oktyabr 2015 yil
  190. ^ Messerlin, Patrik, IES va Evropa Ittifoqining Sharqiy Osiyodagi siyosati, ECIPE Siyosat Xulosa, № 11/2012, Evropa Xalqaro Siyosiy Iqtisodiyot Markazi, ISSN  1653-8994.
  191. ^ a b Matias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Martina Ferrakane va Xosuk Li-Makiyama TRANS-PACIFIC HAMKORLIK: Evropaga qarshi kurash Arxivlandi 2016 yil 15 mart Orqaga qaytish mashinasi ECIPE siyosat ma'lumotlari, №9 / 2014, 1-13 bet, Evropa Xalqaro Siyosiy Iqtisodiyot Markazi, ISSN  1653-8994
  192. ^ Krugman, Pol (2014 yil 27-fevral). "Katta bitim yo'q". The New York Times. Olingan 28 fevral 2014.
  193. ^ BMT mutaxassisi Tinch okean bo'yidagi mamlakatlarni inson huquqlari va taraqqiyotiga sodiq qolmasdan TPPni imzolamaslikka chaqiradi OHCHR, 2016 yil 2-fevral
  194. ^ "AQSh o'z savdo bitimlarini muhokama qilar ekan, Xitoyning ta'siri katta". Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  195. ^ "Hillari Klinton Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi to'g'risida haqmi?". Vashington Post. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  196. ^ a b ""Savdo shartnomalari valyuta manipulyatsiyasini qamrab olmasligining eng yaxshi o'nta sababi "| ekonbruser". econbrowser.com. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  197. ^ "Donald Trump xafa". Wall Street Journal. 2015 yil 13-noyabr. ISSN  0099-9660. Olingan 2 avgust 2016.
  198. ^ FeelTheBern.org. "Berni Sanders savdo to'g'risida". Olingan 2 avgust 2016.
  199. ^ "Ha, IES shartnomasi 5000 sahifadan ortiq. Bu nima uchun yaxshi narsa". Vashington Post. Olingan 2 avgust 2016.
  200. ^ Edvard-Isaak Dovere (2015 yil 4-may). "Obamaning savdo shartnomasini qo'llab-quvvatlashni yo'qotadigan o'ta maxfiylik". Politico. Olingan 22 iyul 2016.
  201. ^ "Yashirin Trans-Tinch okeani sheriklik shartnomasi (TPP)". WikiLeaks. 2013 yil 13-noyabr. Olingan 13 noyabr 2013.
  202. ^ Musil, Stiven (2013 yil 12-noyabr). "WikiLeaks Trans-Tinch okeani hamkorligining maxfiy bob loyihasini e'lon qildi". The Guardian (Buyuk Britaniya). Olingan 15 noyabr 2013.
  203. ^ "Yashirin Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi to'g'risidagi bitim (TPP) - atrof-muhit bobi" (Matbuot xabari). WikiLeaks. 14 yanvar 2014 yil. Olingan 11 yanvar 2014.
  204. ^ "Press-reliz - Yangilangan maxfiy Trans-Tinch okeani sheriklik shartnomasi (TPP) - IP-bob (ikkinchi nashr)". WikiLeaks. 26 oktyabr 2014 yil.
  205. ^ a b Palmer, Dag (2012 yil 13-may). "Savdo muzokaralarida ba'zi maxfiylik zarur: Ron Kirk". Reuters.
  206. ^ 112-Kongress (2012) (2012 yil 23-may). "S. 3225 (112-chi)". Qonunchilik. GovTrack.us. Olingan 30 may 2012. Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Savdo vakili Kongress a'zolari va ularning xodimlariga savdo muzokaralariga oid hujjatlarni iltimosiga binoan va boshqa maqsadlarda taqdim etishni talab qiladigan qonun loyihasi.
  207. ^ 2012 Kongress yozuvlari, Vol. 158, sahifaS3517 (2012 yil 23-may)
  208. ^ Maykl Vessel Obamaning savdo bitimini o'qidim. Elizabeth Uorren tashvishlanishga haqlidir. Politico.com 19 may 2015 yil, 8 oktyabr 2015 yil kirilgan
  209. ^ Shabad, Rebekka (2015 yil 6-iyun). "Rand Pol Oq uydan savdo bitimining matnini zudlik bilan chiqarilishini talab qilmoqda". Tepalik.
  210. ^ a b v d e "Uorrenning maslahat-qo'mitalari Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi loyihasini tuzishda" tuzilgan "degan da'vosi". Vashington Post. Olingan 20 iyul 2016.
  211. ^ a b Trans-Tinch okeani sherikligi Silikon vodiysini Detroytga aylantiradimi? D. Beyker, Huffington Post, 2016 yil 9-may
  212. ^ Zak Karter va Rayan Grim (2014 yil 13-yanvar). "Noam Xomskiy: Obamaning tijorat muomalasi korporativ" hukmronlik "ga erishish uchun" neoliberal hujum ". Huffington Post. Qabul qilingan 13 yanvar 2014 yil.
  213. ^ "AQShning barcha ishchilari uchun zarur bo'lgan IESning oldini olish". Ed shou, 16-yanvar, 2014-yil 23-yanvar kuni olindi.
  214. ^ "Robert Reyx Trans-Tinch okeani hamkorligini o'z zimmasiga oldi" (Video yuklash). YouTube-da MoveOn.org. 2015 yil 29-yanvar. Olingan 5 fevral 2015.
  215. ^ Robert Reyx (2015 yil 6-yanvar). "Robert Reyx: Siz hech qachon eshitmagan eng yirik, eng halokatli savdo bitimi". Muqobil. Muqobil. Olingan 5 fevral 2015.
  216. ^ "IESni savdo shartnomasi deb atashni to'xtating - unday emas". 2015 yil 27 may.

Tashqi havolalar