Yadro qurollari va Isroil - Nuclear weapons and Israel

Isroil davlati
Yadro dasturining boshlanish sanasi	Noma'lum (taxminiy 1948 yoki 1949)[1][2][3]
Birinchi yadro quroli sinovi	Noma'lum (1960 yilgi frantsuz sinovlarida sherik bo'lgan[1] mahalliy Isroil 1963 yilda o'tkazilgan yer osti sinovlari haqida xabar berdi[1] Isroilning sinovi haqida xabar berdi Vela hodisasi 1979)[a]
Birinchi termoyadroviy qurol sinovi	Noma'lum
Oxirgi yadro sinovi	Noma'lum
Eng katta hosil sinovi	Noma'lum
Jami testlar	Noma'lum
Hozirgi zaxira	Noma'lum (taxmin qilingan 80-400 jangovar kallaklar)[5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]
Amaldagi strategik qurol	Noma'lum
Kümülatif strategik arsenal megatonnage	Noma'lum
Maksimal raketa masofasi	Noma'lum (taxminan 11500 km gacha)[b]
NPT ziyofat	Yo'q

Yadro qurollari
Fon
Tarix Urush Dizayn Sinov Yetkazib berish Yo'l bering Effektlar va taxmin qilingan megadeathlar ning portlashlar Qish Ishchilar Axloq qoidalari "Arsenal" Qurol poygasi Ayg'oqchilik Ko'payish Qurolsizlanish Terrorizm Qarama-qarshilik
Yadro qurolli davlatlar
NPT tan olingan Qo'shma Shtatlar Rossiya Birlashgan Qirollik Frantsiya Xitoy Boshqalar Hindiston Isroil  (e'lon qilinmagan) Pokiston Shimoliy Koreya Avvalgi Janubiy Afrika Belorussiya Qozog'iston Ukraina

The Isroil davlati egalik qilishiga keng ishoniladi yadro qurollari. Isroilning zaxiralari taxminan 80 dan 400 gacha yadroviy kallaklar,^{[6][7][8][19][2][10]} va mamlakat ularni bir necha usulda, shu jumladan samolyotlar orqali etkazib berish qobiliyatiga ega deb ishoniladi; kabi dengiz osti kemalari uchiradigan qanotli raketalar; va Erixo oraliq to qit'alararo masofadagi ballistik raketalar.^[20][21] Uning birinchi etkazib beriladigan yadro quroli 1966 yil oxiri yoki 1967 yil boshida tugatilgan deb o'ylashadi; buni amalga oshiradigan oltinchi mamlakat dunyoda ularni rivojlantirgan.^[22][2][23]

Biroq, Isroil siyosatini olib bormoqda qasddan noaniqlik, hech qachon rasmiy ravishda yadro qurolini rad etmaydi yoki tan olmasligini, aksincha "Isroil yadro qurolini birinchi bo'lib joriy qilgan mamlakat bo'lmaydi Yaqin Sharq ".^[24][25][26] Isroil ham imzolashdan bosh tortdi Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma (NPT), buni amalga oshirishga qaratilgan xalqaro bosimga qaramay, bu uning milliy xavfsizlik manfaatlariga zid bo'ladi.^[27]

Bundan tashqari, Isroil Doktrinani boshlang ning qarshi tarqalish va profilaktik ish tashlashlar, boshqa mintaqaviy aktyorlarga o'zlarining yadro qurollarini olish imkoniyatini rad etish. The Isroil havo kuchlari o'tkazildi Opera operatsiyasi va Orchard operatsiyasi, yo'q qilish Iroq va Suriyaning atom reaktorlari navbati bilan 1981 va 2007 yillarda va Stuxnet zararli dastur qattiq shikastlangan Eron yadro inshootlari 2010 yilda Isroil tomonidan ishlab chiqilgan deb o'ylashadi. 2019 yildan boshlab Isroil Yaqin Sharqdagi yadro quroliga ega bo'lgan yagona mamlakat bo'lib qolmoqda.^[23] The Samson opsiyasi Isroilnikiga tegishli oldini olish strategiyasi ning katta qasos harbiy kuchlari Isroilning ko'p qismini bosib olgan va / yoki yo'q qilgan mamlakatga qarshi "so'nggi chora" sifatida yadro qurollari bilan.^[28]

Isroil undan ko'p o'tmay yadro maydonini tekshirishni boshladi mustaqilligini e'lon qildi 1948 yilda va frantsuz hamkorligi bilan yashirincha bino qurishni boshladi Shimon Peres Negev yadro tadqiqot markazi,^[c] yaqinidagi muassasa Dimona uy-joy a yadro reaktori va qayta ishlash zavodi 1950 yillarning oxirlarida. Qurol-yarog 'dasturining dastlabki keng tafsilotlari 1986 yil 5-oktyabrda paydo bo'ldi va ommaviy axborot vositalarida vahiylar yoritildi Mordaxay Vanunu, ilgari markazda ishlagan texnik. Tez orada Vanunu o'g'irlab ketilgan Mossad va Isroilga qaytarib olib kelindi, u erda 18 yilga ozodlikdan mahrum qilindi xiyonat va josuslik.^[29][30]

Rivojlanish tarixi

Dimonadan oldin, 1949–1956 yy

Isroil birinchi Bosh Vazir Devid Ben-Gurion oldini olish uchun yadro qurolini olish bilan "deyarli ovora" edi Holokost takrorlanmasdan. U: "Nima Eynshteyn, Oppengeymer va Teller, ulardan uchtasi yahudiylardir, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari uchun ishlab chiqarilgan, shuningdek, o'z xalqi uchun Isroil olimlari tomonidan amalga oshirilishi mumkin ".^[31] Ben-Gurion yahudiy olimlarini chet ellardan yollashga qaror qildi 1948 yil Arab-Isroil urushi Isroil mustaqilligini o'rnatgan. U va boshqalar, masalan, bosh Weizmann Ilmiy Instituti va mudofaa vazirligi olimi Ernst Devid Bergmann, Oppenheimer va Teller kabi yahudiy olimlari Isroilga yordam berishiga ishongan va umid qilgan.^[32]

1949 yilda Isroil mudofaa kuchlari Tomonidan tanilgan Ilmiy Korpus Ibroniycha qisqartmasi HEMED GIMMEL, ikki yillik boshladi geologik tadqiqotlar ning Negev. Dastlabki tadqiqotlar dastlab mish-mishlarga sabab bo'lgan neft dalalar, ikki yil davom etgan tadqiqotning bir maqsadi manbalarni topish edi uran; undirilishi mumkin bo'lgan oz miqdordagi mablag'lar topildi fosfat depozitlar.^[21] O'sha yili Xemed Gimmel oltita Isroil fizikasi aspirantini chet elda o'qish uchun moliyalashtirgan, shu jumladan bitta talaba o'qish uchun Chikago universiteti va ostida o'qish Enriko Fermi, dunyodagi birinchi sun'iy va o'zini o'zi ta'minlashga rahbarlik qilgan yadro zanjiri reaktsiyasi.^[33] 1952 yil boshida Xemed Gimmel IDFdan to Mudofaa vazirligi va tadqiqot va infratuzilma bo'limi (EMET) sifatida qayta tashkil etildi. O'sha iyun oyida Bergmann Ben-Gurion tomonidan birinchi rais etib tayinlandi Isroil atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiyasi (IAEC).^[34]

Xemed Gimmel transfer paytida Machon 4 deb o'zgartirildi va Bergmann tomonidan IAECning "bosh laboratoriyasi" sifatida foydalanilgan; 1953 yilga kelib Machon 4, izotoplarni tadqiq qilish bo'limi bilan hamkorlikda Weizmann instituti, Negevdagi fosfatdan uran ajratib olish qobiliyatini va mahalliy ishlab chiqarishning yangi texnikasini ishlab chiqdi. og'ir suv.^[21][35] Texnikalar Amerika harakatlariga qaraganda ikki yil ilgari edi.^[32] Frantsuzlar bilan yadroviy hamkorlikni kengaytirishdan manfaatdor bo'lgan Bergmann, ikkala patentni ham sotib yubordi Komissariyat à l'énergie atomique (CEA) 60 million frank uchun. Garchi ular hech qachon tijoratlashtirilmagan bo'lsa-da, bu kelajak uchun muhim qadam edi Frantsiya-Isroil hamkorligi.^[36] Bundan tashqari, isroillik olimlar, ehtimol G-1 plutonyum ishlab chiqarish reaktori va UP-1 qayta ishlash zavodini qurishda yordam berishgan. Marcoule. Frantsiya va Isroil ko'plab sohalarda yaqin munosabatlarga ega edi. Frantsiya yangi yahudiy davlati uchun asosiy qurol etkazib beruvchisi edi va beqarorlik Shimoliy Afrikadagi frantsuz mustamlakalari orqali tarqalib ketganda, Isroil aloqalar natijasida olingan qimmatli ma'lumotni taqdim etdi. Sefardi yahudiylari o'sha mamlakatlarda.^[1] Shu bilan birga Isroil olimlari ham kuzatib borishdi Frantsiyaning o'z yadro dasturi va faqat chet ellik olimlar Markouldagi yadro inshootida "o'z xohishiga ko'ra" sayr qilishga ruxsat berishgan.^[37] Isroil va frantsuz yahudiy va yahudiy bo'lmagan tadqiqotchilar o'rtasidagi munosabatlarga qo'shimcha ravishda, frantsuzlar Isroil bilan hamkorlik ularga xalqaro yahudiy yadroshunos olimlari bilan tanishish imkoniyatini berishi mumkin deb hisoblashgan.^[32]

Keyin AQSh prezidenti Duayt Eyzenxauer e'lon qildi Tinchlik uchun atomlar tashabbusi bilan, Isroil (Turkiyadan keyin) imzolagan ikkinchi mamlakat bo'ldi va 1955 yil 12-iyulda AQSh bilan tinchlikparvar yadroviy hamkorlik shartnomasini imzoladi.^[38][32] Bu 1957 yil 20 martda "kichik suzish havzasi tadqiqot reaktorini qurish uchun ommaviy imzolash marosimi bilan yakunlandi. Nachal Soreq ", bu frantsuzlar bilan juda katta ob'ekt qurilishini kafanlash uchun ishlatilishi mumkin edi Dimona.^[39]

1986 yilda Frensis Perrin, Atom energiyasi bo'yicha frantsuz oliy komissari 1951 yildan 1970 yilgacha 1949 yilda Isroil olimlari ushbu tadbirga taklif qilinganligini ochiq e'lon qildilar Saclay yadro tadqiqot markazi, bu hamkorlik frantsuz va isroil olimlari o'rtasida bilim almashish, shu jumladan bilimlarni biladiganlar bilan birgalikda baham ko'rishga olib keladi Manxetten loyihasi.^[1][2][3] Podpolkovnik Uorner D. Farrning xabar berishicha USAF qarshi tarqatish markazi Frantsiya ilgari yadroviy tadqiqotlarda etakchi bo'lgan "Isroil va Frantsiya urushdan so'ng xuddi shunday tajribaga ega edilar va Isroil olimlari Frantsiya harakatlariga katta hissa qo'shishlari mumkin edi. Frantsiya va Isroilda yadro fanlari va texnologiyalaridagi taraqqiyot butun vaqt davomida chambarchas bog'liq bo'lib qoldi ellikinchi yillarning boshlarida. " Bundan tashqari, Farrning so'zlariga ko'ra, "Frantsiyaning yadroviy sinovlarida bir nechta isroillik kuzatuvchilar bo'lgan va isroilliklar" Frantsiya yadro sinovlari portlashi ma'lumotlariga cheklovsiz kirish huquqiga ega bo'lganlar. "^[1]

Dimona, 1956-1965

Muzokaralar

Frantsuzlar Isroilga yadroviy reaktor berish to'g'risidagi qarorini bu bejiz emasligini da'vo qilish bilan oqlashdi. 1955 yil sentyabrda Kanada Hindiston hukumatiga og'ir suvli tadqiqot reaktorini qurishda yordam berishini ochiq e'lon qildi CIRUS reaktori, "tinch maqsadlar uchun".^[40] Misr prezidenti qachon Gamal Abdel Noser milliylashtirildi Suvaysh kanali, Frantsiya Isroilni Misrga hujum qilishni taklif qildi va Sinayga bostirib kirishni Frantsiya va Angliya "tinchlikparvar" sifatida ko'rsatib, Suvaysh kanalini egallab olish niyatida (qarang) Suvaysh inqirozi ). Buning evaziga Frantsiya yadro reaktorini Isroilning yadro quroli dasturiga asos qilib beradi. Shimon Peres, yadro reaktoridagi imkoniyatni sezgan holda qabul qilindi. 1956 yil 17 sentyabrda Peres va Bergmann taxminiy kelishuvga erishdilar Parij CEA uchun Isroilga kichik tadqiqot reaktorini sotish. Buni Peres yana bir bor tasdiqladi Sevr protokoli oktyabr oyi oxirida Dimona yaqinida quriladigan reaktorni sotish va uran yoqilg'isini etkazib berish bo'yicha konferentsiya.^[41][32]

Bu vaqt ichida Isroil g'ayrioddiy Isroil tarafdori bo'lgan Frantsiya hukumatidan foyda ko'rdi.^[32] Suvaysh inqirozidan keyin tahdid paydo bo'ldi Sovet interventsiya va inglizlar va frantsuzlar AQSh bosimi ostida chekinishga majbur edilar, Ben-Gurion Peresni yubordi va Golda Meyr Frantsiyaga. Ularning muhokamalari davomida Frantsiya uchun kattaroq yadro reaktori va kimyoviy qayta ishlash zavodi qurilishi uchun zamin yaratildi va Bosh vazir Gay Mollet, do'stiga bo'lgan sadoqatini tark etganidan uyaldi sotsialistlar go'yoki Isroilda yordamchiga: "Men ularga bomba qarzdorman", deb aytgan^[42] general Pol Eli esa Mudofaa shtabining boshlig'i, "Biz ularga bu ularning xavfsizligini kafolatlash uchun berishimiz kerak, bu juda muhim" dedi. Molletning vorisi Moris Burj-Maunuri "Yahudiy xalqiga boshqa Holokost tushishini oldini olish va Isroil Yaqin Sharqdagi dushmanlariga duch kelishi uchun men sizlarga [isroillarga] bomba berdim".^[32]

Frantsiya-Isroil munosabatlari 1957 yil 3 oktyabrda yakunlandi, ikkita mazmuni sir saqlanib qolgan shartnomalarda:^[32] Loyihani tinchlik maqsadlarida deb e'lon qilgan va boshqa qonuniy majburiyatlarni ko'rsatgan siyosiylardan biri va 24-ni tavsiflovchi texniklardan biri megavatt EL-102 reaktori. Haqiqatdan ham qurilishi ikki-uch baravar katta bo'lishi kerak edi^[43] va 22 ishlab chiqarishga qodir kilogramm ning plutonyum yil.^[44] Reaktor Isroilga kelganida, Bosh vazir Ben-Gurion maqsadi yiliga bir milliard galon dengiz suvini tuzsizlantirish va cho'lni "qishloq xo'jaligi jannatiga" aylantirish uchun nasos stantsiyasini ta'minlash ekanligini e'lon qildi. Isroil atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiyasining etti a'zosidan oltitasi zudlik bilan iste'foga chiqdilar va reaktor "dunyoni bizga qarshi birlashtiradigan siyosiy avanturizm" ning kashshofi bo'lganiga norozilik bildirdilar.^[45]

Qazish

Qurilish boshlanishidan oldin loyihaning ko'lami EMET va IAEC guruhi uchun juda katta ekanligi aniqlandi, shuning uchun Shimon Peres polkovnikni yolladi. Manes Pratt, keyin Isroil harbiy attashe Birmada, loyiha rahbari bo'lish uchun. Qurilish 1957 yil oxiri yoki 1958 yil boshida yuzlab frantsuz muhandislari va texniklarini jalb qilgan holda boshlandi Beersheba va Dimona maydoni.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Bundan tashqari, minglab yangi ko'chib kelganlar Sefardi yahudiylari qazish ishlariga jalb qilingan; qat'iylikni chetlab o'tish mehnat qonunchiligi, ular bir kunlik dam olish bilan ajratilgan holda 59 kunlik bosqichda ishga qabul qilindi.^[46]

LEKEMni yaratish

1950-yillarning oxiriga kelib Shimon Peres yangi razvedka xizmatini tashkil qildi va tayinladi, u yer sharini qidirish va dastur uchun zarur bo'lgan texnologiyalar, materiallar va jihozlarni zarur bo'lgan har qanday usul bilan yashirin ravishda himoya qilish uchun tayinlangan. Oxir-oqibat yangi xizmat nomini oldi LEKEM (LAKAM talaffuzi, "Ilmiy aloqa byurosi" ibroniycha qisqartmasi). Peres bu vazifani bajarish uchun IDF Ichki xavfsizlik boshlig'i Benjamin Blumbergni tayinladi. LEKEM rahbari sifatida Blumberg butun dunyo bo'ylab agentlarni muvofiqlashtiruvchi va dasturning muhim tarkibiy qismlarini ta'minlaydigan Isroil razvedka hamjamiyatida muhim shaxsga aylanadi.^{[47][48][49][50]}

Isroil va Frantsiya o'rtasidagi kelishmovchilik

Qachon Sharl de Goll bo'ldi Frantsiya Prezidenti 1958 yil oxirida u Frantsiya-Isroilning yadroviy hamkorligini to'xtatmoqchi edi va agar zavod xalqaro inspektorlar uchun ochilmasa, tinchlik e'lon qilinmasa va hech qanday plutonyum qayta ishlanmasa, u Isroilni uran bilan ta'minlamasligini aytdi.^[51] Kengaytirilgan muzokaralar natijasida Shimon Peres tashqi ishlar vaziri bilan murosaga keldi Maurice Couve de Murville ikki yildan keyin frantsuz kompaniyalari o'zlarining shartnoma majburiyatlarini bajarishda davom etishlari mumkin edi va Isroil loyihani tinch deb e'lon qildi.^[52] Shu sababli Frantsiyaning yordami 1966 yilgacha tugamadi.^[53] Ammo uran yoqilg'isi etkazib berish oldinroq, 1963 yilda to'xtatilgan.^[54] Shunga qaramay, frantsuz uran kompaniyasi joylashgan Gabon 1965 yilda Isroil uranini sotgan bo'lishi mumkin. AQSh hukumati tekshiruv o'tkazdi, ammo bunday savdo amalga oshirilganligini aniqlay olmadi.^[55]

1963 yil Isroil va AQSh o'rtasidagi ziddiyat

Kennedi va Ben-Gurion 1961 yilda.

Isroil gazetasi Haaretz 2019 yilda 1963 yil bahor va yoz oylari davomida AQSh va Isroil rahbarlari - Prezident haqida xabar berishdi Jon F. Kennedi va Bosh vazirlar Devid Ben-Gurion va Levi Eshkol - Isroilning yadroviy dasturi bo'yicha irodali janglarda qatnashgan. Ziddiyatlar ikki mamlakat jamoatchiligiga ko'rinmas edi va vaziyatning og'irligidan har ikki tomonning bir necha yuqori lavozimli mulozimlarigina xabardor edilar. Ga binoan Yuval Neeman, Eshkol, Ben-Gurionning vorisi va uning sheriklari Kennediga Isroilga haqiqiy ultimatum taqdim etayotganini ko'rishdi. Neemanning so'zlariga ko'ra, Isroil harbiy-havo kuchlarining sobiq qo'mondoni general-mayor (rez.) Dan Tolkovskiy, Kennedi AQSh havo-desant qo'shinlarini yuborishi mumkin degan qo'rquvni jiddiy ravishda qondirdi Dimona, uy Isroilning yadro kompleksi.^[56]

1963 yil 25 martda Prezident Kennedi va Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi direktori Jon A. Makkon Isroil yadro dasturini muhokama qildi. Makkonening so'zlariga ko'ra, Kennedi "Isroilning yadroviy qobiliyatiga ega bo'lish masalasini" ko'targan va Makkon Kennediga Kentning Isroilni yadroviylashtirishning kutilayotgan salbiy oqibatlarini taxmin qilish. Makkonening so'zlariga ko'ra, keyinchalik Kennedi milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha maslahatchiga ko'rsatma bergan McGeorge Bandi davlat kotibiga rahbarlik qilish Din Rask, Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi direktori va AEC raisi bilan hamkorlikda "zikr etilgan favqulodda vaziyatlardan himoya qilish uchun qandaydir xalqaro yoki ikki tomonlama AQSh kafolatlari qanday o'rnatilishi mumkinligi to'g'risida" taklif yuborish. Bu shuni anglatadiki, "Isroil reaktori kompleksining navbatdagi norasmiy tekshiruvi [zudlik bilan amalga oshirilishi kerak va ... iloji boricha puxta bo'lishi kerak".^[56]

1963 yil 2 aprelda Elchi Barbour Bosh vazir Ben-Gurion bilan uchrashdi va Amerikaning "mayda va noyabr oylarida Dimonaga yarim yillik tashriflariga rozilik berishini, ushbu zavoddagi barcha qismlarga va asboblarga malakali mutaxassislar tomonidan to'liq kirish huquqi bilan" Amerikaning iltimosini taqdim etdi. AQSh olimlari. " Aftidan ajablanib bo'lgan Ben-Gurion bunga javoban bu masala o'sha yili 15 aprelda tugagan Fisih bayramiga qadar qoldirilishi kerakligini aytdi. Ikki kundan so'ng, davlat kotibining yordamchisi Talbot Isroil elchisini chaqirdi Harman Davlat departamentiga topshirdi va unga tekshiruvlar to'g'risida diplomatik demarche taqdim etdi. Ben-Gurionga ushbu xabar "Isroil yadro dasturi bo'yicha Amerika-Isroilning eng qattiq qarama-qarshiligiga" aylanishi mumkin bo'lgan birinchi qutqaruv bo'ldi.^[56]

1963 yil 26 aprelda AQShning Dimonaga bo'lgan dastlabki talabidan uch hafta o'tgach, Ben-Gurion Isroil xavfsizligi va mintaqaviy barqarorlikning keng masalalariga bag'ishlangan etti sahifali xat bilan Kennediga javob qaytardi. Isroil misli ko'rilmagan tahdidga duch keldi, deb da'vo qilib, Ben-Gurion "navbatdagi Xolokost" ni keltirib chiqardi va Isroilning xavfsizligi Qo'shma xavfsizlik kafolatlari bilan himoyalanishi va AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqi tomonidan kengaytirilishini talab qildi. Biroq Kennedi Ben-Gurionning mavzuni o'zgartirishiga yo'l qo'ymaslikka qat'iy qaror qildi. 1963 yil 4-mayda u bosh vazirga javob berib, "biz arab dunyosidagi voqealarni diqqat bilan kuzatmoqdamiz", deb aytganda, Ben-Gurionning qo'shma super kuchlar deklaratsiyasi haqidagi taklifiga kelsak, Kennedi uning amaliy va siyosiy jihatdan ham rad etdi donolik. Kennedi "erta arablar hujumi" dan juda xavotirda emas edi, "siz aytgandek, mavjud vositalar bilan hal qilib bo'lmaydigan ilg'or hujum tizimlarining muvaffaqiyatli rivojlanishi".^[56]

Kennedi Dimonadan qaytmasdi va kelishmovchiliklar uning uchun "bo'ynidagi og'riq" bo'lib qoldi Robert Komer keyinchalik yozgan. Davlat departamenti Kennedining so'nggi xatini 15-iyun kuni Tel-Aviv elchixonasiga elchi Barbur tomonidan Ben-Gurionga zudlik bilan etkazish uchun yuborganida, Isroil bilan qarama-qarshilik avj oldi. Xatda Kennedi har ikki yilda bir marta tashrif buyurishni qat'iy texnik shartlar to'plami bilan ta'kidladi. Maktub ultimatumga o'xshash edi: agar AQSh hukumati Dimona loyihasining holati to'g'risida "ishonchli ma'lumot" ololmasa, Vashingtonning "Isroilga sodiqligi va qo'llab-quvvatlashi" "jiddiy xavf ostida qolishi" mumkin. Ammo xat hech qachon Ben-Gurionga taqdim etilmagan. Kennedining maktubi bilan telegramma Ben-Gurionning iste'foga chiqishi haqida e'lon qilishidan bir kun oldin, 15 iyun, shanba kuni Tel-Avivga etib keldi, bu qaror uning mamlakatini va butun dunyoni hayratda qoldirdi. Ben-Gurion uni iste'foga chiqishiga nima sabab bo'lganini yozma yoki og'zaki ravishda "shaxsiy sabablar" dan tashqari hech qachon tushuntirmagan. U o'zining bu harakati har qanday aniq siyosiy masalalar bilan bog'liqligini rad etdi, ammo Kennedining Dimona bosimi qay darajada rol o'ynaganligi haqidagi savol hozirgi kunga qadar muhokama uchun ochiq bo'lib qolmoqda.^[56]

5-iyul kuni Levi Eshkol Ben-Gurionni bosh vazir etib tayinlaganidan 10 kun o'tmay, elchi Barbur unga prezident Kennedining birinchi xatini topshirdi. Maktub deyarli 15 iyunda Ben-Gurionga yuborilmagan xatning nusxasi edi.^[57] Yuval Neman ta'kidlaganidek, Eshkol va uning maslahatchilari darhol Kennedining talablari ultimatumga o'xshashligi va shu bilan amalga oshirilishdagi inqirozni anglatishi aniq edi. Hayratda qolgan Eshkol, o'zining birinchi va oraliq javobida, 17-iyul kuni, mavzuni o'rganish va maslahat olish uchun ko'proq vaqt talab qildi. Bosh vazir AQSh-Isroil do'stligi uning nazorati ostida o'sib borishiga umid qilar ekan, "Isroil o'zining milliy xavfsizligi va suveren huquqlarini himoya qilish uchun nima qilish kerak bo'lsa, buni amalga oshirishini" ta'kidladi. Barbur, aftidan, xatning dag'alligini yumshatmoqchi bo'lgan, Eshkolni Kennedining so'zlari "haqiqat" ekaniga ishontirdi: AQSh va Isroilning kuchli aloqalarini tanqid qilayotganlar, agar Dimona nazoratsiz qolsa, diplomatik munosabatlarni murakkablashtirishi mumkin.^[56]

19 avgust kuni, kamida sakkizta turli xil loyihalarni ishlab chiqqan olti haftalik maslahatlashuvlardan so'ng, Eshkol Kennedining talablariga Barbourga yozma javobini topshirdi. Bu Ben-Gurionning Dimonaning maqsadi tinch ekanligi haqidagi avvalgi ishonchlarini takrorlash bilan boshlandi. Kennedining iltimosiga kelsak, Eshkol ikki mamlakat o'rtasidagi o'zaro munosabatlarni inobatga olgan holda u Dimona saytiga AQSh vakillarining doimiy tashriflariga ruxsat berishga qaror qilganligini yozgan. Jadvalning aniq masalasida Eshkol, Ben-Gurionning Kennediga yozgan so'nggi xatida bo'lgani kabi, 1963 yil oxirlari birinchi tashrif uchun vaqt bo'lishini taklif qildi: O'sha paytgacha u "frantsuz guruhi reaktorni topshirgan bo'ladi Bizga topshiring va u umumiy sinovlarni va fizik parametrlarini nol quvvat bilan o'lchashni amalga oshiradi. "^[56]

Eshkol taklif qilingan tashriflar chastotasi bo'yicha noaniq edi. Eshkol Kennedining iltimosiga qarshi kurashdan qochib, Kennedining ikki yilda bir marotaba ekskursiyalar o'tkazish talabini inobatga olmadi. "Ushbu talabni ko'rib chiqib, kelgusi tashriflar jadvali bo'yicha kelishuvga erishamiz deb o'ylayman", deb yozgan Eshkol. Xulosa qilib aytganda, bosh vazir farqni ikkiga bo'lib tashladi: qarama-qarshilikni to'xtatish uchun u AQSh olimlarining "muntazam tashriflariga" rozi bo'ldi, ammo u Kennedining tezkor tashrifi g'oyasini qabul qilmadi va ikki yilda bir marta o'tkaziladigan tekshiruvlar to'g'risida aniq majburiyat olishdan qochdi. Kennedining minnatdor javobida ushbu kelishmovchiliklar haqida so'z yuritilmagan, ammo "muntazam tashriflar" bo'yicha asosiy kelishuvga erishilgan.^[56]

Eshkolning maktubidan so'ng, Dimonaga uzoq vaqtdan beri izlanib kelayotgan muntazam tekshiruv tashriflarining birinchisi 1964 yilning yanvar oyi o'rtalarida, ikki oy o'tgach bo'lib o'tdi. Kennedining o'ldirilishi. Isroilliklar amerikalik mehmonlarga reaktor bir necha hafta oldin juda muhim bo'lganini aytdi, ammo bu da'vo aniq emas edi. Isroil bir necha yil o'tgach, Dimona reaktori Kennedi ma'muriyati dastlab o'z zimmasiga olganidek, 1963 yil o'rtalarida ish boshlaganini tan oldi.^[56]

Ma'lum bo'lishicha, Kennedining Dimonaga ikki yilda bir marta tashrif buyurish haqidagi talablari uning o'limidan keyin amalga oshmagan. AQSh hukumati rasmiylari bunday jadvalga qiziqish bildirishdi va Prezident Lyndon B. Jonson Eshkol oldida bu masalani ko'targan, ammo u hech qachon Kennedi kabi bu borada qattiq bosim o'tkazmagan.^[56]

Oxir oqibat, prezident Kennedi va Isroilning ikki bosh vaziri o'rtasidagi qarama-qarshilik natijasida 1964-1969 yillarda yiliga bir marta Amerikaning Dimona yadro majmuasini bir necha bor tekshirishlari o'tkazildi. Ular hech qachon Kennedining o'z maktublarida ko'rsatilgan qat'iy sharoitlarda o'tkazilmadi. . Kennedining vorisi yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik masalasida sodiq qolgan va Amerikaning Dimonadagi inspektsion tashriflarini qo'llab-quvvatlagan bo'lsa-da, u isroilliklarni Kennedining shartlariga rioya qilish haqida juda kam tashvishlanardi. Orqaga qarab, ushbu munosabat o'zgarishi Isroil yadro dasturini saqlab qolgan bo'lishi mumkin.^[56]

Britaniya va Norvegiya yordami

Britaniyaning o'ta maxfiy hujjatlari^[58][59] tomonidan olingan BBC Newsnight Angliya 1950 va 1960 yillarda Isroilga cheklangan materiallarni yuzlab maxfiy jo'natmalarini amalga oshirganligini ko'rsating. Bularga qayta ishlash uchun maxsus kimyoviy moddalar va bo'linadigan materiallar namunalari kiritilgan.uran-235 1959 yilda va 1966 yilda plutoniy, shuningdek yuqori darajada boyitilgan lityum-6, bu bo'linish bombalarini kuchaytirish va vodorod bombalarini yoqilg'isi uchun ishlatiladi.^[60] Tergov shuni ko'rsatdiki, Buyuk Britaniya 20 tonna jo'natgan og'ir suv to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Isroilga 1959 va 1960 yillarda boshlash uchun Dimona reaktor.^[61] Ushbu operatsiya Norvegiyaning chaqirilgan oldingi kompaniyasi orqali amalga oshirildi Noratom, bu bitim bo'yicha 2% komissiya oldi. Angliya Xalqaro Atom Energiyasi Agentligida og'ir suv shartnomasi fosh bo'lganidan keyin unga qarshi chiqdi Newsnight 2005 yilda Buyuk Britaniya tashqi ishlar vaziri Kim Xauells buni Norvegiyaga sotish deb da'vo qildi. Ammo avvalgi Britaniya razvedkasi O'sha paytda bitimni tekshirgan ofitser bu haqiqatan ham Isroilga sotuv ekanligini va Noratom shartnomasi shunchaki charade ekanligini tasdiqladi.^[62] The Tashqi ishlar vazirligi nihoyat 2006 yil mart oyida Angliya boradigan joy Isroil ekanligini bilishini tan oldi.^[63] Isroil 1963 yildan beri Norvegiyaning og'ir suvlari bilan Dimona reaktorini ishlatayotganini tan oldi. Dimonani qurishda yordam bergan frantsuz muhandislari isroilliklar tajribali operator bo'lganligini aytishadi, shuning uchun reaktor birinchi marta ishga tushirilganidan beri yillar davomida suvning nisbatan kichik qismi yo'qolgan.^[64]

Tanqidiylik

1961 yilda Isroil Bosh vaziri Devid Ben-Gurion haqida ma'lumot berdi Kanada bosh vaziri John Diefenbaker Dimonada plutoniyni ajratuvchi tajriba zavodi qurilishi haqida. Britaniya razvedkasi ushbu va boshqa ma'lumotlardan "bu faqat Isroil yadro qurolini ishlab chiqarish niyatida ekanligini anglatishi mumkin" degan xulosaga keldi.^[58] Dimonadagi atom reaktori tanqidiy chiqdi 1962 yilda.^[1] Ma'lum qilinishicha, Isroil Frantsiya bilan uzilgandan so'ng, Isroil hukumati Argentinaga murojaat qilgan. Argentina hukumati Isroilni sotishga rozi bo'ldi sariq kek (uran oksidi).^[55][65] 1963 yildan 1966 yilgacha taxminan 90 tonna sariq pirojnoe Argentinadan yashirincha Isroilga yuborilgan.^[54] 1965 yilga kelib Isroilning qayta ishlash zavodi qurib bitkazildi va reaktorni konvertatsiya qilishga tayyor bo'ldi yonilg'i tayoqchalari ichiga qurol darajasidagi plutonyum.^[66]

Xarajatlar

Isroil yadro dasturini qurish uchun aniq xarajatlar noma'lum, ammo keyinchalik Peres reaktor 1960 yilda 80 million dollarga tushgan,^[67] uning yarmi xorijiy yahudiy donorlari, shu jumladan ko'plab amerikalik yahudiylar tomonidan ko'tarilgan. Ushbu donorlarning ayrimlariga 1968 yilda Dimona majmuasi bo'ylab ekskursiya qilingan.^[68]

Qurol ishlab chiqarish, 1966 yil - hozirgi kunga qadar

Dimona majmuasi AQSh tomonidan ko'rinib turibdi Corona sun'iy yo'ldoshi 1968 yil 11-noyabrda

Isroil 1967 yildan so'ng to'liq hajmda yadro qurollarini ishlab chiqarishni boshlagan deb ishoniladi Olti kunlik urush, birinchi operatsion yadro qurolini 1966 yil dekabrgacha qurgan bo'lsa ham.^[13] A Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi (Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi) 1967 yil boshidagi hisobotda Isroilda olti-sakkiz hafta ichida bomba qurish uchun materiallar borligi aytilgan^[69] va ba'zi mualliflarning ta'kidlashicha, Isroilda urush paytida foydalanishga tayyor bo'lgan ikkita xom bomba bo'lgan.^[1] AQSh jurnalistining so'zlariga ko'ra Seymur Xers, hozirda hamma narsa ishlab chiqarishga tayyor edi, buning uchun rasmiy buyruqdan tashqari. 1967 yil may oyida olti kunlik urush arafasida Isroil yadro chegarasini kesib o'tdi. "[Bosh vazir Levi] Eshkol, bir qator Isroil manbalariga ko'ra, Dimona [yadro reaktori] olimlariga yashirincha ikkita xom yadro moslamasini yig'ishni buyurdi. U ularni Isroil Mudofaa vazirligining ilmiy-tadqiqot ishlari boshlig'i brigada generali Yitsak Yaakov qo'mondonligi ostiga qo'ydi, rasmiylardan biri ushbu operatsiyani "O'rgimchak" deb atashgan, chunki yadroviy qurilmalar qo'shimchalar tashqariga chiqadigan nafis qarama-qarshiliklar, xom atom bombalari esa Arab kuchlari Isroil mudofaasini mag'lubiyatga uchratgan taqdirda, portlash uchun Misr chegarasiga yugurishi mumkin bo'lgan yuk mashinalariga joylashishga tayyor ".^[70]

Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining 1968 yildagi yana bir hisobotida "Isroil yaqin bir necha yil ichida yadro quroli dasturini amalga oshirishi mumkin" deyilgan.^[71] Moshe Dayan, keyin mudofaa vaziri, yadro quroli Isroilning odatiy kuchlarini abadiy ko'paytirgandan ko'ra arzonroq va amaliyroq deb hisoblar edi.^[72] U buni ishontirdi Mehnat partiyasi moliya vaziri Pinchas Sapir 1968 yil boshida Dimona saytiga ekskursiya qilish orqali dasturni boshlash qiymati va ko'p o'tmay Dayan har yili to'rtdan beshta yadro kallaklarini to'liq ishlab chiqarishni boshlashga buyruq berish huquqiga ega ekanligiga qaror qildi. Xersning so'zlariga ko'ra, keng tarqalgan "Hech qachon "ingliz va ibroniy tillarida dastlabki jangovar korpusga payvandlangan.^[73]

Plutoniy ishlab chiqarish uchun isroilliklar katta miqdordagi zaxiraga muhtoj edilar uran rudasi. 1968 yilda Mossad dan 200 tonna sotib oldi Union Minière du Haut Katanga, a Belgiyalik italyan kimyo kompaniyasi uchun uni sotib olish bahonasida tog'-kon kompaniyasi Milan. Bir marta uran jo'natildi Antverpen u dengizda Isroil yuk tashuvchisiga o'tkazildi va Isroilga keltirildi. Uranning uyushtirilgan g'oyib bo'lishi Plumbat operatsiyasi, 1978 yil kitobining mavzusiga aylandi Plumbat ishi.^[74]

1960-yillarning oxiridan beri Isroil qancha jangovar kallaklar ishlab chiqarganligi, asosan ishlab chiqarilishi mumkin bo'lgan bo'linadigan materiallar miqdori va Isroil yadroviy texnikasi ma'lumotlari asosida har xil bo'lgan. Mordaxay Vanunu.

Mordaxay Vanunu fotosurati a Negev yadro tadqiqot markazi namunaviy bomba yig'ilishida yadro materiallarini o'z ichiga olgan qo'lqop qutisi, keyinchalik u Britaniya matbuotiga bergan 60 ga yaqin fotosuratlardan biri

1969 yilga kelib, AQSh mudofaa vaziri Melvin Laird o'sha yili Isroil yadro quroliga ega bo'lishi mumkinligiga ishongan.^[75][76] O'sha yili, AQSh prezidenti Richard Nikson Isroil Bosh vaziri bilan uchrashuvda Golda Meyr Isroilni "yadroviy qurolni ko'rinmas ravishda kiritmaslik yoki o'z zimmasiga olishga majbur qilish uchun" bosim o'tkazdi yadro sinovi dastur ", shuning uchun yadroviy noaniqlik siyosatini saqlab qolish.^[77] Oldin Yom Kippur urushi, Peres, shunga qaramay, Isroildan arablarning hujumini to'xtatish uchun o'zining yadroviy qobiliyatini namoyish etishini istadi va Isroilning yadroviy qurolidan qo'rqish urush paytida arablarning harbiy strategiyasini iloji boricha tajovuzkor bo'lishiga to'sqinlik qilgan bo'lishi mumkin.^[1]

Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Isroilning birinchi bombalari shu bilan qilingan bo'lishi mumkin deb hisoblar edi yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran dan 1960-yillarning o'rtalarida o'g'irlangan AQSh dengiz kuchlari tomonidan boshqariladigan yadro yoqilg'isi zavodi Yadro materiallari va uskunalari korporatsiyasi, bu erda sust materiallarni hisobga olish o'g'irlikni yashirgan bo'lar edi.^[78][79]

1974 yilga kelib AQSh razvedka hamjamiyati Isroil oz miqdordagi zaxiralarni to'plaganiga ishongan bo'linadigan qurollar,^[80] 1979 yilga kelib, ehtimol yanada rivojlangan kichkintoyni sinab ko'rish imkoniyati mavjud edi taktik yadro quroli yoki termoyadro quroli trigger dizayni.^[81]

Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Isroilning yadro qurollari soni 1974 yildan 1980 yillarning boshigacha 10 dan 20 gacha bo'lgan deb hisoblar edi.^[21] Vanununing 1986 yil oktyabrdagi ma'lumotlariga ko'ra, 150 megavatt quvvatli ishlaydigan reaktor va yiliga 40 kg plutonyum ishlab chiqarish asosida Isroilda 100 dan 200 tagacha yadro qurilmalari bo'lgan. Vanunu 1980 yildan 1986 yilgacha Isroil qurish qobiliyatiga ega bo'lganligini aniqladi termoyadro qurollari.^[29] 2000-yillarning o'rtalariga kelib, Isroil qurol-yarog'ining taxminiy baholari 75 dan 400 gacha yadro kallaklaridan iborat edi.^[21][82]

Isroilda ba'zi bir xabarlar borligi haqida bir nechta xabarlar paydo bo'ldi uranni boyitish Dimona-da qobiliyat. Vanunu buni tasdiqladi gaz santrifüjlari Machon 8-da ishlagan va Machon 9-da lazer bilan boyitish zavodi ishlagan (Isroil 1973 yildagi patentga ega izotoplarni lazer bilan ajratish ). Vanununing so'zlariga ko'ra, ishlab chiqarish miqyosidagi zavod 1979–80 yillarda ishlaydi.^[83][84] Agar yuqori darajada boyitilgan uran juda ko'p miqdorda ishlab chiqarilmoqda, keyin Isroilning yadroviy arsenali faqat plutonyum ishlab chiqarish hisobiga qaraganda ancha katta bo'lishi mumkin.^[85]

Xabarlarga ko'ra, faqat 1991 yilda Sovet Ittifoqi tarqalib ketgach, 20 ga yaqin yahudiy sovet olimlari Isroilga hijrat qilishgan, ularning ba'zilari atom elektr stantsiyalarini boshqarish va sovet reaktorlarining keyingi avlodini rejalashtirish bilan shug'ullangan. 1992 yil sentyabr oyida Germaniya razvedkasining 40 yahudiy sovet yadroshunos olimlari 1989 yildan buyon Isroilga ko'chib ketganligi haqida matbuotda yozilgan.^[86]

2010 yilgi intervyusida Isroilning Atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiyasining sobiq rahbari Uzi Eilam Isroil gazetasiga Maariv Dimonadagi yadro reaktori keng ko'lamli yangilanishlar va yangilanishlardan o'tgan va hozirda yangi bo'lib ishlaydi, xavfsizligi bilan bog'liq muammolar yo'q yoki atrofdagi muhit yoki mintaqa uchun xavf tug'dirmaydi.^[87]

Yadro sinovlari

Podpolkovnik Uorner D. Farrning xabar berishicha AQSh Havo Kuchlariga qarshi qarshi kurash markazi "1960 yilda Frantsiyaning yadroviy sinovi ikkita emas, ikkita yadroviy kuchga aylandi - bu hamkorlik chuqurligi" va "isroilliklar frantsuz yadro sinovi portlashi to'g'risidagi ma'lumotlarga cheklovsiz kirish huquqiga ega bo'lishgan", deb ta'kidladilar. , "erta Isroil sinovlarini o'tkazishga bo'lgan ehtiyojni minimallashtirish, garchi ushbu hamkorlik Frantsiya sinovlari muvaffaqiyatidan keyin salqinlashgan bo'lsa ham.^[1]

1976 yil iyun oyida G'arbiy Germaniya armiyasi jurnali, Vehrtexnik ("harbiy texnologiya"), G'arb razvedkasi hisobotlarida Isroil 1963 yilda Negevda yer osti sinovini o'tkazganligi haqida hujjat berilgan. Yaqin Sharqdagi yadroviy qurol: o'lchovlar va javobgarlik Taysir Nashif 1966 yil 2-noyabrda mamlakat nolga teng rentabellikga ega deb taxmin qilingan yadroviy bo'lmagan sinovni amalga oshirgan bo'lishi mumkinligi haqidagi boshqa xabarlarni keltiradi. implosion tabiatda Isroilda Negev cho'l^[21][1]

1979 yil 22-sentabrda Isroil mumkin bo'lgan yadro bombasini sinovdan o'tkazishda ishtirok etgan bo'lishi mumkin Vela hodisasi, Hind okeanining janubida. O'sha paytdagi AQSh qoshida qo'mita tuzilgan edi. professor boshchiligidagi prezident Jimmi Karter Jek Ruina ning MIT. Qo'mita a'zolarining aksariyati Janubiy Afrika dengiz floti kemalari suzib ketgan deb taxmin qilishdi Simonstaun port, yaqin Keyptaun, Hind okeanidagi maxfiy joyga, ular yadro sinovini o'tkazdilar. Qo'mita sinovdan o'tgan yadro qurilmasini ixcham va ayniqsa toza, ozgina radioaktiv yiqilishni keltirib chiqaradi, shuning uchun uni aniqlash deyarli mumkin emas. Qo'mitaning yana bir baholashicha, zambarak yadro artilleriyasi snaryadini otdi va aniqlangan sinov kichik taktik yadro quroliga qaratildi. Keyin yadro quroli dasturidan voz kechish Janubiy Afrikada atigi oltita yirik, ibtidoiy, samolyotda etkazib beriladigan atom bombalari, ettinchisi qurilgani aniqlandi, ammo artilleriya po'stining o'lchamidagi murakkab miniatyura qurilmalari yo'q edi.^[88]Professor Avner Koen, professor Middlebury Xalqaro tadqiqotlar instituti va Ta'lim dasturining direktori va Jeyms Martinning Qurolni tarqatmaslikni o'rganish markazining katta xodimi Vela hodisasi to'g'risida "Endi 40 yil o'tgach, bu yadroviy sinov bo'lganligi haqida ilmiy va tarixiy kelishuv mavjud. isroillik bo'lish. "^[89]Ular "Olti kunlik urushning so'nggi siri" deb nomlagan narsada, The New York Times 1967 yildan oldingi kunlarda xabar bergan Olti kunlik urush Isroil vertolyotda parashyutchilar guruhini kiritishni rejalashtirgan Sinay Bosh vazir va harbiy qo'mondonlikning buyrug'iga binoan yadroviy bombani o'rnatish va masofadan turib portlatish, urushayotgan atrofdagi davlatlarga ogohlantirish sifatida. Biroq, Isroil urushni o'rnatmasdan ham urushda g'alaba qozondi. Isroilning iste'fodagi brigadir generali Itjak Yaakov ushbu operatsiyani Isroil deb atadi Samson opsiyasi.^[90]

Kashshof amerikalik yadro quroli dizayneri Teodor Teylor kichik bo'linadigan qurollarni ko'paytirish jarayonidagi noaniqliklar va Vanunida ko'rilgan termoyadro konstruktsiyalari haqida izoh berdi. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, ushbu dizaynlar qurollarning ishlashiga to'liq ishonch uchun nazariy tahlillardan ko'proq narsani talab qiladi. Shu sababli Teylor Isroil ilgari surilgan miniatyura qilingan yadro qurilmasini "aniq" sinovdan o'tkazdi degan xulosaga keldi.^[91]

Vahiylar

Negev yadro tadqiqot markazi (Dimona)

Isroil yadro dasturi birinchi bo'lib 1960 yil 13 dekabrda a Vaqt jurnal maqolasi,^[92] deb aytdiKommunistik, bo'lmaganNATO mamlakat "atom rivojlanishini" amalga oshirdi. 16 dekabr kuni Daily Express Londonda ushbu mamlakat Isroil ekanligi aniqlandi va 18-dekabr kuni AQSh Atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiyasi rais Jon Makkon paydo bo'ldi Matbuot bilan tanishing Isroilning yadro reaktori qurilishini rasman tasdiqlash va iste'foga chiqishini e'lon qilish.^[93] Ertasi kuni The New York Times, Makkonening yordami bilan Frantsiya Isroilga yordam berayotganini aniqladi.^[94]

Ushbu xabar Ben-Gurionni Isroil Bosh vazirining Dimona haqidagi yagona bayonotini berishga undadi. 21 dekabr kuni u Knesset hukumat "sanoat, qishloq xo'jaligi, sog'liqni saqlash va ilm-fan ehtiyojlariga xizmat qiladigan" 24 megavattli reaktorni qurayotgani va u "faqat tinchlik maqsadlarida ishlab chiqarilgani".^[95] 1954 yildan 1966 yilgacha Isroil atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiyasining raisi bo'lgan Bergmann, ammo "tinchlik maqsadlarida yoki urushqoq maqsadlarda atom energetikasi o'rtasida farq yo'q" dedi.^[96] va "Bizni hech qachon qo'zichoq singari so'yishga olib bormaydilar".^[97]

Qurol ishlab chiqarish

Isroilning yadro salohiyatini birinchi marta oshkor qilish (rivojlanish dasturidan farqli o'laroq) kelib chiqdi NBC News 1969 yil yanvar oyida Isroil ikki yil oldin "yadro qurolini ishlab chiqarish bo'yicha avariya dasturini boshlash to'g'risida" qaror qabul qilgani va ular bunday qurilmaga ega bo'lganligi yoki yaqin orada egalik qilishi haqida xabar bergan.^[98] Bu dastlab Isroil va AQSh rasmiylari tomonidan rad etilgan, shuningdek, maqolasida The New York Times. Faqat bir yil o'tib, 18 iyul kuni, The New York Times birinchi marta jamoatchilikka ma'lum qildi AQSh hukumati Isroil yadro quroliga ega yoki "qisqa vaqt ichida atom bombalarini yig'ish qobiliyatiga ega" deb ishongan.^[99] Xabarlarga ko'ra, Isroil davomida 13 ta bomba yig'gan Yom Kippur urushi Umumiy mag'lubiyatdan so'nggi himoya sifatida va ularni urushdan keyin foydalanishda davom etdi.^[72]

Qurol dasturining birinchi keng tafsilotlari Londonda paydo bo'ldi Sunday Times on October 5, 1986, which published information provided by Mordaxay Vanunu, a technician formerly employed at the Negev yadro tadqiqot markazi yaqin Dimona. For publication of state secrets Vanunu was o'g'irlab ketilgan tomonidan Mossad in Rome, brought back to Israel, and sentenced to 18 years in prison for xiyonat va josuslik.^[30] Although there had been much speculation prior to Vanunu's revelations that the Dimona site was creating nuclear weapons, Vanunu's information indicated that Israel had also built termoyadro qurollari.^[29]

Teodor Teylor, a former U.S. weapon designer leading the field in small, efficient nuclear weapons, reviewed the 1986 leaks and photographs of the Israeli nuclear program by Mordechai Vanunu in detail. Taylor concluded that Israel's thermonuclear weapon designs appeared to be "less complex than those of other nations," and as of 1986 "not capable of producing yields in the megaton or higher range." Nevertheless, "they may produce at least several times the yield of fission weapons with the same quantity of plutonium or highly enriched uranium." In other words, Israel could "boost" the yield of its nuclear fission weapons. According to Taylor, the uncertainties involved in the process of boosting required more than theoretical analysis for full confidence in the weapons' performance. Taylor therefore concluded that Israel had "unequivocally" tested a miniaturized nuclear device. The Mudofaa tahlillari instituti (IDA) concluded after reviewing the evidence given by Vanunu that as of 1987, "the Israelis are roughly where the U.S. was in the fission weapon field in about 1955 to 1960." and would require supercomputers or parallel computing clusters to refine their hydrogen bomb designs for improved yields without testing, though noting they were already then developing the computer code base required.^[2] Israel was first permitted to import US built supercomputers beginning in November 1995.^[91]

According to a 2013 report by the Atom olimlari byulleteni, which cited US Mudofaa razvedkasi agentligi sources, Israel began the production of nuclear weapons in 1967, when it produced its first two nuclear bombs. According to the report's calculations, Israel produced nuclear weapons at an average rate of two per year, and stopped production in 2004. The report stated that Israel has 80 nuclear warheads and has enough fissile material to produce 190 more.^[100][101] In 2014, former US president Jimmi Karter stated that "Israel has, what, 300 or more, nobody knows exactly how many" nuclear weapons.^[7]

South African documents

2010 yilda, The Guardian Isroilning yadroviy arsenalini tasdiqlaganligi taxmin qilingan Janubiy Afrika hukumatining hujjatlarini e'lon qildi. According to the newspaper, the documents are minutes taken by the South African side of alleged meetings between senior officials from the two countries in 1975. The Guardian alleged that these documents reveal that Israel had offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons that year. The documents appeared to confirm information disclosed by a former South African naval commander Diter Gerxardt – jailed in 1983 for spying for the Soviet Union, who said there was an agreement between Israel and South Africa involving an offer by Israel to arm eight Jericho missiles with atomic bombs.^[102][103] Waldo Stumpf—who led a project to dismantle Janubiy Afrikaning yadro quroli dasturi^[104]—doubted Israel or South Africa would have contemplated a deal seriously, saying that Israel could not have offered to sell nuclear warheads to his country due to the serious international complications that such a deal could entail. Shimon Peres, then Defense Minister (later Israeli President), rejected the newspaper's claim that the negotiations took place. He also asserted that The Guardian 's conclusions were "based on the selective interpretation of South African documents and not on concrete facts".^[105]

Avner Cohen, author of Israel and the Bomb va Eng yomon sir - Isroilning Bomba bilan savdosi, said "Nothing in the documents suggests there was an actual offer by Israel to sell nuclear weapons to the regime in Pretoriya."^[106]

US pressure

The United States was concerned over possible Israeli nuclear proliferation. US intelligence began to notice the Dimona reactor shortly after construction began, when American U-2 spy planes overflew the reactor,^[107] leading to a diplomatic clash. In 1960, the outgoing Eyzenxauer administration asked the Israeli government for an explanation for the mysterious construction near Dimona. Israel's response was that the site was a future textile factory, but that no inspection would be allowed. When Ben-Gurion visited Washington in 1960, he held a series of meetings with Davlat departamenti officials, and was bluntly told that for Israel to possess nuclear weapons would affect the balance of power in the region.^[45] Keyin Jon F. Kennedi took office as US President in 1961, he put continuous pressure on Israel to open the plant to American inspection. Reportedly, every high-level meeting and communication between the US and Israeli governments contained a demand for an inspection of Dimona. To increase pressure, Kennedy denied Ben-Gurion a meeting at the oq uy – when they met in May 1961, it was at the Waldorf Astoria mehmonxonasi Nyu-Yorkda. The meeting itself was dominated by this issue. Ben-Gurion was evasive on the issue for two years, in the face of persistent US demands for an inspection. Finally, in a personal letter dated May 18, 1963, Kennedy threatened Israel with total isolation unless inspectors were allowed into Dimona. However, Ben-Gurion resigned as Prime Minister shortly afterward. Uning vorisi, Levi Eshkol, received a similar letter from Kennedy.^[108]

Israel eventually accepted an inspection, and Kennedy made two concessions – the US would sell Israel qirg'iy anti-aircraft missiles after having refused to sell Israel any major weapon systems for years. In addition, the US government agreed to the Israeli demand that the inspections would be carried out by an all-American team which would schedule its visits weeks in advance, rather than the IAEA.

In 1964, the US government tried to prevent Argentina's sale of sariq kek to Israel, with no success.^[109]

Allegedly, because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to disguise the true purpose of the reactor. The inspectors eventually reported that their inspections were useless, due to Israeli restrictions on what parts of the facility they could investigate. According to British writer and intelligence expert Gordon Tomas, avvalgi Mossad agent Rafi Eitan told him how the inspectors were fooled:

A bogus control center was built over the real one at Dimona, complete with fake control panels and computer-lined gauges that gave a credible impression of measuring the output of a reactor engaged in an irrigation scheme to turn the Negev into a lush pastureland. The area containing the "heavy" water smuggled from France and Norway was placed off-limits to the inspectors "for safety reasons". The sheer volume of heavy water would have been proof the reactor was being readied for a very different purpose.^[45]

In 1968, the CIA stated in a top-secret National Intelligence Estimate that Israel had nuclear weapons. This assessment was given to President Lyndon B. Jonson. The basis for this claim was the CIA's belief, although never proven, that the uranium that went missing in the Apollo Affair had been diverted to Israel (Seymour Hersh claims that during the plant decommissioning nearly all of the missing uranium was recovered trapped in the facility pipes or accounted for.),^[110] as well as evidence gathered from NSA electronic eavesdropping on Israeli communications, which proved that the Isroil havo kuchlari had engaged in practice bombing runs that only made sense for the delivery of nuclear weapons.^[107]

In 1969, the year Richard Nikson became President, the US government terminated the inspections. According to US government documents declassified in 2007, the Nixon administration was concerned with Israel's nuclear program, worrying that it could set off a regional nuclear arms race, with the Sovet Ittifoqi possibly granting the Arab states a nuclear guarantee. In a memorandum dated July 19, 1969, National Security Adviser Genri Kissincer warned that "The Israelis, who are one of the few peoples whose survival is genuinely threatened, are probably more likely than almost any other country to actually use their nuclear weapons." However, Kissinger warned that attempting to force Israel to disarm could have consequences, writing that "Israel will not take us seriously on the nuclear issue unless they believe we are prepared to withhold something they very much need" (Kissinger was referring to a pending sale of F-4 Phantom fighter jets to Israel). Kissinger wrote that "if we withhold the Phantoms and they make this fact public in the United States, enormous political pressure will be mounted on us. We will be in an indefensible position if we cannot state why we are withholding the planes. Yet if we explain our position publicly, we will be the ones to make Israel's possession of nuclear weapons public with all the international consequences this entails." Among the suggestions Kissinger presented to Nixon was the idea of the United States adopting a policy of "nuclear ambiguity", or pretending not to know about Israel's nuclear program.^[111]

According to Israeli historian Avner Cohen, author of Israel and the Bomb, historical evidence indicates that when Nixon met with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meyr at the White House in September 1969, they reached a secret understanding, where Israel would keep its nuclear program secret and refrain from carrying out nuclear tests, and the United States would tolerate Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and not press it to sign the Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi Shartnoma.^[111]

Ombor

The State of Israel has never made public any details of its nuclear capability or arsenal. The following is a history of estimates by many different sources on the size and strength of Israel's nuclear arsenal. Estimates may vary due to the amount of material Israel has on store versus assembled weapons, and estimates as to how much material the weapons actually use, as well as the overall time in which the reactor was operated.

• 1948 – Israel begins recruiting Jewish nuclear scientists and forming scientific institutes during war of independence for a nuclear weapons program.^[112]
• 1949 – Israeli scientists invited to participate in French nuclear program.^[1][2][3]
• 1957 – Dimona nuclear facility construction begins with French assistance.^[1]
• 1960 – First French nuclear tests, Israel scientists participated alongside French with access to all test data;^[1] Sharl de Goll begins to disconnect French program from Israeli^[113]
• 1961 – Dimona nuclear facility operational.^[1]
• 1963 – Alleged underground nuclear test in the Negev desert.^[1][21][114]
• 1966 – Alleged underground nuclear test in the Negev desert, possibly zero yield or implosion turi;^[115] first fully weaponized fission designed for aircraft delivery available for activation.^[116]
• 1967 – (Olti kunlik urush ) – 2 bombs;^[117][118] 13 bombs.^[119]
• 1969 – 5–6 bombs of 19 kilotons yield each.^[120]
• 1973 – (Yom Kippur urushi ) – 13 bombs;^[72] 20 nuclear missiles, a suitcase bomb.^[121]
• 1974 – 3 capable artillery battalions each with twelve 175 mm tubes and a total of 108 jangovar kallaklar;^[122][123] 10 bombs.^[124]
• 1976 – 10–20 nuclear weapons.^[d]
• 1979 – Vela hodisasi, satellite detects possible advanced miniaturized and very clean nuclear test in Indian Ocean often attributed to Israel.^[88]
• 1980 – 100–200 bombs.^[126][127]
• 1984 – 12–31 atomic bombs;^[128] 31 plutoniy bomba va 10 uranium bombs.^[129]
• 1985 – At least 100 nuclear bombs.^[130][131]
• 1986 – 100 to 200 fission bombs va bir qator fusion bombs;^[132] Vanunu leaks Dimona facility secrets, at US's level in fission and boosted weapons as of 1955 to 1960, it would require supercomputers to improve their "less complex" hydrogen bombs without nuclear tests, they had "unequivocally" tested a miniaturized nuclear device.^[91]
• 1991 – 50–60 to 200–300.^[133]
• 1992 – more than 200 bombs;^[131] estimated 40 top nuclear weapons scientists immigrated to Israel from ex-USSR.^[86]
• 1994 – 64–112 bombs (5 kg/warhead);^[134] 50 nuclear-tipped Jericho missiles, 200 total;^[135] 300 nuclear weapons.^[136]
• 1995 – 66–116 bombs (at 5 kg/warhead);^[134] 70–80 bombs;^[137] "a complete repertoire" (neytron bombalari, nuclear mines, chamadon bombalari, submarine-borne).^[138]
• 1996 – 60–80 plutonium weapons, maybe more than 100 assembled, ER variants, variable yields.^[139]
• 1997 – More than 400 deliverable thermonuclear and nuclear weapons.^[82]
• 2002 – Between 75 and 200 weapons.^[140]
• 2004 – 82.^[141]
• 2006 – More than 185: the British parliament's Mudofaani tanlash qo'mitasi reported that Israel possessed more warheads than the UK's 185.^[142]
• 2006 – Amerika olimlari federatsiyasi believes that Israel "could have produced enough plutonium for at least 100 nuclear weapons, but probably not significantly more than 200 weapons".^[21]
• 2008 – 150 or more nuclear weapons.^[143]
• 2008 – 80 intact warheads, of which 50 are qayta kirish vositalari for delivery by ballistik raketalar, and the rest bombs for delivery by aircraft. Total military plutonium stockpile 340–560 kg.^[144]
• 2009 – Estimates of weapon numbers differ sharply with plausible estimates varying from 60 to 400.^[145]
• 2010 – According to Jeynning mudofaasi haftaligi, Israel has between 100 and 300 nuclear warheads, most of them are probably being kept in unassembled mode but can become fully functional "in a matter of days".^[146]
• 2010 – "More than 100 weapons, mainly two-stage thermonuclear devices, capable of being delivered by missile, fighter-bomber, or submarine"^[31] After extensive renovations, Dimona facility now functioning as new^[87]
• 2014 – Approximately 80 nuclear warheads for delivery by two dozen missiles, a couple of squadrons of aircraft, and perhaps a small number of sea-launched cruise missiles.^[6]
• 2014 – "300 or more" nuclear weapons.^[7]
• 2015 – "Israel has 200, all targeted on Tehran."^[8][147]

Yetkazib berish tizimlari

Israeli military forces possess land, air, and sea-based methods for deploying their nuclear weapons, thus forming a yadro uchligi that is mainly medium to long ranged, the backbone of which is submarine-launched qanotli raketalar and medium and qit'alararo ballistik raketalar, bilan Isroil havo kuchlari long range strike aircraft on call to perform nuclear interdiction and strategic strikes.^[148] 2008 yil davomida Jericho III ICBM became operational, giving Israel extremely long range nuclear strike abilities.^[149][150]

Raketalar

Israel is believed to have nuclear ikkinchi ish tashlash abilities in the form of its submarine fleet and its nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that are understood to be buried deeply enough that they would survive a oldindan yadroviy zarba.^[31][151] Ernst Devid Bergmann was the first to seriously begin thinking about ballistic missile capability and Israel test-fired its first Shavit II sounding rocket in July 1961.^[152][153] In 1963 Israel put a large-scale project into motion, to jointly develop and build 25 qisqa masofali raketalar with the French aerospace company Dassault. The Israeli project, codenamed Project 700, also included the construction of a missile field at Hirbat Zacharia, a site west of Jerusalem.^[154] The missiles that were first developed with France became the Jericho I system, first operational in 1971. It is possible that the Jericho I was removed from operational service during the 1990s. In the mid-1980s the Jericho II o'rta masofaga mo'ljallangan raketa, which is believed to have a range of 2,800–5,000 km, entered service.^{[155][156][1]} It is believed that Jericho II is capable of delivering nuclear weapons with a superior degree of accuracy.^[157] The Shavit three stages solid fuel space launch vehicle produced by Israel to launch many of its satellites into low earth orbit since 1988 is a civilian version of the Jericho II.^[158] The Jericho III ICBM, became operational in January 2008^[159][160] and some reports speculate that the missile may be able to carry MIRVed jangovar kallaklar.^[161] The maximum range estimation of the Jericho III is 11,500 km with a payload of 1,000–1,300 kg (up to six small nuclear warheads of 100 kt each or one 1 megaton nuclear warhead),^[162][163] and its accuracy is considered high.^[159]

In January 2008 Israel carried out the successful test launch of a long-range, ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead from the reported launch site at the Palmachim aviabazasi Tel-Avivning janubida.^[164] Israeli radio identified the missile as a Jericho III and the Hebrew YNet news Web site quoted unnamed defence officials as saying the test had been "dramatic"^[165][166] and that the new missile can reach "extremely long distances", without elaborating.^[167] Soon after the successful test launch, Isaac Ben-Israel, a retired army general and Tel-Aviv universiteti professor, told Israeli Channel 2 TV:

Everybody can do the math and understand that the significance is that we can reach with a rocket engine to every point in the world

The test came two days after Ehud Olmert, then Israel's Prime Minister, warned that "all options were on the table to prevent Tehron from acquiring nuclear weapons" and a few months later Israel bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear facility built with extensive help from North Korea.^[168] At the same time, regional defense experts said that by the beginning of 2008, Israel had already launched a programme to extend the range of its existing Jericho II ground attack missiles.^[160] The Jericho-II B missile is capable of sending a one ton nuclear payload 5,000 kilometers.^[1] The range of Israels' Jericho II B missiles is reportedly capable of being modified to carry nuclear warheads no heavier than 500 kg over 7,800 km, making it an ICBM.^[169] It is estimated that Israel has between 50 and 100 Jericho II B missiles based at facilities built in the 1980s.^[170] Soni Jericho III missiles that Israel possesses is unknown.

Samolyot

Israel's fighter aircraft have been cited as possible nuclear delivery systems.^[171] Isroil Havodan yonilg'i quyish fleet of modified Boeing 707s and the use of external and konformali yonilg'i baklari gives Israeli F-15, F-15I va F-16 fighter bombers strategic reach, as demonstrated in "Yog'och oyoq" operatsiyasi.^{[172][173][174]}

Dengiz osti kemalari

The Isroil dengiz kuchlari operates a fleet of five modern German-built Delfin- sinf osti kemalari^{[iqtibos kerak ]} with a further three planned,^{[175][176][177]} and various reports indicate that these dengiz osti kemalari bilan jihozlangan Popeye Turbo cruise missiles that can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with extremely high accuracy.^[157][178]

The proven effectiveness of cruise missiles of its own production may have been behind Israel's recent acquisition of these submarines which are equipped with torpedo tubes suitable for launching long-range (1,500–2,400 km) nuclear-capable cruise missiles^[179][180] that would offer Israel a ikkinchi ish tashlash qobiliyat.^[181] Israel is reported to possess a 200 kg nuclear warhead, containing 6 kg of plutonium, that could be mounted on cruise missiles.^[179] The missiles were reportedly test launched in the Hind okeani yaqin Shri-Lanka in June 2000, and are reported to have hit their target at a range of 1,500 km.

In June 2002, former State Department and Pentagon officials confirmed that the US Navy observed Israeli missile tests in the Indian Ocean in 2000, and that the Dolphin-class vessels have been fitted with nuclear-capable cruise missiles of a new design. It is believed by some to be a version of Rafael Armament Development Authority's Popeye turbo cruise missile while some believe that the missile may be a version of the Gabriel 4LR that is produced by Israel Aircraft Industries. However, others claim that such a range implies an entirely new type of missile.^{[182][183][184]} During the second half of the 1990s, Israel asked the United States to sell it 50 Tomaxavk land-attack cruise missiles to enhance its deep-strike capabilities. Washington rejected Israel's request in March 1998, since such a sale would have violated the Raketa texnologiyasini boshqarish rejimi guidelines, which prohibit the transfer of missiles with a range exceeding 300 km. Shortly after the rejection, an Israeli official told Mudofaa yangiliklari: "History has taught us that we cannot wait indefinitely for Washington to satisfy our military requirements. If this weapon system is denied to us, we will have little choice but to activate our own defense industry in pursuit of this needed capability." In July 1998, the Air Intelligence Center warned the US Congress that Israel was developing a new type of cruise missile.^[185]

According to Israeli defense sources, in June 2009 Israeli Dolphin-class submarine sailed from the O'rta er dengizi uchun Qizil dengiz orqali Suvaysh kanali during a drill that showed that Israel can access the Hind okeani, and the Persian Gulf, far more easily than before.^[186] Isroil mudofaa kuchlari (IDF) sources said the decision to allow navy vessels to sail through the canal was made recently and was a definite "change of policy" within the service. Israeli officials said the submarine was surfaced when it passed through the canal. In the event of a conflict with Iran, and if Israel decided to involve its Dolphin-class submarines, the quickest route would be to send them through the Suez Canal.^[187]

The Israeli fleet was expanded after Israel signed a €1.3 billion contract to purchase two additional submarines from ThyssenKrupp's sho''ba korxonasi Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft in 2006. These two U212s are to be delivered to the Isroil dengiz kuchlari in 2011 and are "Dolphin II" class submarines.^[188] The submarines are believed to be capable of launching cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads, despite statements by the German government in 2006, in confirming the sale of the two vessels, that they were not equipped to carry nuclear weapons.^[189] The two new boats are an upgraded version of the old Dolphins, and equipped with an havodan mustaqil harakatlanish system, that allow them to remain submerged for longer periods of time than the three nuclear arms-capable submarines that have been in Israel's fleet since 1999.^[151][190] In October 2009 it was reported that the Israeli navy sought to buy a sixth Dolphin class submarine.^[181]

On June 4, 2012, Der Spiegel published an investigative article stating that Israel has armed its newest submarines with nuclear missiles.^[191] Numerous Israeli and German officials were quoted testifying to the nuclear capabilities of the submarines and the placement of nuclear missiles aboard the ships. In response to the article, officials from both Germany and Israel refused to comment.^[192] Several papers have stated the implications of Israel attaining these nuclear weapon carrying submarines are increased due to the threat of attacks upon Iran by Israel.^[193]

Boshqalar

It has been reported that Israel has several other nuclear weapons capabilities:

• Chamadon bombasi: Seymur Xers reports that Israel developed the ability to miniaturize warheads small enough to fit in a suitcase by the year 1973.^[194]
• Taktik yadro quroli: Israel may also have 175 mm and 203 mm self-propelled artillery pieces, capable of firing nuclear shells. There are three battalions of the 175mm artillery (36 tubes), reportedly with 108 nuclear shells and more for the 203mm tubes. If true, these low yield, tactical nuclear artillery rounds could reach at least 25 miles (40 km), while by some sources it is possible that the range was extended to 45 miles (72 km) during the 1990s.^[1]
• EMP strike capabilities: Israel allegedly possesses several 1 megaton bombs,^[195][196] which give it a very large EMP attack ability.^[197] For example, if a megaton-class weapon were to be detonated 400 kilometers above Omaha, Nebraska, US, nearly the entire continental United States would be affected with potentially damaging EMP experience from Boston ga Los Anjeles va dan Chikago ga Yangi Orlean.^[198] A similar high-altitude airburst above Iran could cause serious damage to all of the electrical systems in the Middle East, and much of Europe.^[199]
• Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW): Israel also is reported to have an unknown number of neutron bombs.^[1]
• Yadro qurilishi minasi: Israel supposedly has deployed multiple defensive nuclear land mines in the Golan balandliklari.^{[28][200][201][202]}

Siyosat

Israel's deliberately ambiguous policy to confirm or deny its own possession of nuclear weapons, or to give any indication regarding their potential use, make it necessary to gather details from other sources, including diplomatic and intelligence sources and 'unauthorized' statements by its political and military leaders. Alternatively, with the Doktrinani boshlang, Israel is very clear and decisive regarding the country's policy on potential developments of nuclear capability by any other regional adversaries, which it will not allow.

Egalik

Although Israel has officially acknowledged the existence of the reactor near Dimona since Ben-Gurion's speech to the Knesset in December 1960, Israel has never officially acknowledged its construction or possession of nuclear weapons.^[203] In addition to this policy, on May 18, 1966, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol told the Knesset that "Israel has no atomic weapons and will not be the first to introduce them into our region," a policy first articulated by Shimon Peres to AQSh prezidenti Jon F. Kennedi 1963 yil aprel oyida.^[204] In November 1968, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Ijak Rabin haqida ma'lumot berdi AQSh Davlat departamenti that its understanding of "introducing" nuclear weapons meant testing, deploying or making them public, while merely possessing the weapons did not constitute "introducing" them.^[205][206] Avner Cohen defines this initial posture as "nuclear ambiguity", but he defines the stage after it became clear by 1969 that Israel possessed nuclear weapons as a policy of amimut,^[31] or "nuclear opacity".^[207]

In 1998, former Prime Minister Shimon Peres said that Israel "built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Xirosima lekin Oslo ".^[208] The "nuclear option" may refer to a nuclear weapon or to the nuclear reactor near Dimona, which Israel claims is used for scientific research. Peres, in his capacity as the Director General of the Ministry of Defense in the early 1950s, was responsible for building Israel's nuclear capability.^[209]

In a December 2006 interview, Isroil Bosh vaziri Ehud Olmert stated that Iran aspires "to have a nuclear weapon as America, France, Israel and Russia".^[210] Olmert's office later said that the quote was taken out of context; in other parts of the interview, Olmert refused to confirm or deny Israel's nuclear weapon status.^[211]

Ta'lim

Israel's nuclear doctrine is shaped by its lack of strategic depth: a subsonic fighter jet could cross the 72 kilometres (39 nmi) from the Iordan daryosi uchun O'rtayer dengizi in just 4 minutes. It additionally relies on a reservist-based military which magnifies civilian and military losses in its small population. Israel tries to compensate for these weaknesses by emphasising aql-idrok, maneuverability and firepower.^[28]

As a result, its strategy is based on the premise that it cannot afford to lose a single war, and thus must prevent them by maintaining deterrence, including the option of imtiyoz. If these steps are insufficient, it seeks to prevent escalation and determine a quick and decisive war outside of its borders.^[28]

Strategically, Israel's long-range missiles, nuclear-capable aircraft, and possibly its submarines present an effective ikkinchi ish tashlash deterrence against unconventional and conventional attack, and if Israel's defences fail and its population centers are threatened, the Samson opsiyasi, an all-out attack against an adversary, would be employed. Its nuclear arsenal can also be used tactically to destroy military units on the battlefield.^[28]

Although nuclear weapons are viewed as the ultimate guarantor of Israeli security, as early as the 1960s the country has avoided building its military around them, instead pursuing absolute conventional superiority so as to forestall a last-resort nuclear engagement.^[28]

According to historian Avner Cohen, Israel first articulated an official policy on the use of nuclear weapons in 1966, which revolved around four "red lines" that could lead to a nuclear response:^[212]

1. A successful military penetration into populated areas within Israel's post-1949 (pre-1967) borders.
2. Ning yo'q qilinishi Isroil havo kuchlari.
3. The exposure of Israeli cities to massive and devastating air attacks or to possible kimyoviy yoki biologik hujumlar.
4. The use of nuclear weapons against Israeli territory.

Joylashtirish

Seymour Hersh alleges weapons were deployed on several occasions. On October 8, 1973, just after the start of the Yom Kippur urushi, Golda Meyr and her closest aides decided to put eight nuclear armed F-4s da Tel Nof havo bazasi on 24-hour alert and as many nuclear missile launchers at Sedot Mikha Airbase operational as possible. Seymour Hersh adds that the initial target list that night "included the Egyptian and Syrian military headquarters near Qohira va Damashq ".^[213] This nuclear alert was meant not only as a means of precaution, but to push the Sovetlar to restrain the Arab offensive and to convince the US to begin sending supplies. One later report said that a Sovet razvedkasi officer did warn the Egyptian chief of staff, and colleagues of US National Security Advisor Genri Kissincer said that the threat of a nuclear exchange caused him to urge for a massive Israeli resupply.^[214] Hersh points out that before Israel obtained its own satellite capability, it engaged in josuslik against the United States to obtain nuclear targeting information on Soviet targets.^[215]

Keyin Iroq bilan Isroilga hujum qildi Skud raketalari 1991 yil davomida Ko'rfaz urushi, Israel went on full-scale nuclear alert and mobile nuclear missile launchers were deployed.^[216] In the buildup to the United States 2003 yil Iroqqa bostirib kirish, there were concerns that Iraq would launch an unconventional weapons attack on Israel. After discussions with President Jorj V.Bush, the then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned "If our citizens are attacked seriously — by a ommaviy qirg'in quroli, chemical, biological or by some mega-terror attack act — and suffer casualties, then Israel will respond." Israeli officials interpreted President Bush's stance as allowing a nuclear Israeli retaliation on Iraq, but only if Iraq struck before the U.S. military invasion.^[217]

Israeli military and nuclear doctrine increasingly focused on oldingi urush against any possible attack with conventional, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or even a potential conventional attack on Israel's weapons of mass destruction.^[1][218]

Louis René Beres, who contributed to Project Daniel, urges that Israel continue and improve these policies, in concert with the increasingly preemptive nuclear policies of the United States, as revealed in the Qo'shma yadro operatsiyalari uchun doktrina.^[219]

Maintaining nuclear superiority

Alone or with other nations, Israel has used diplomatic and military efforts as well as covert action to prevent other Middle Eastern countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.^[220]

Iroq

Mossad agents triggered explosions in April 1979 at a French production plant near Toulon, damaging two reactor cores destined for Iraqi reactors.^[221] Mossad agents may also have been behind the assassinations of an Egyptian nuclear engineer in Paris as well as two Iraqi engineers, all working for the Iraqi nuclear program.^[222]

On June 7, 1981, Israel launched an air strike destroying the selektsioner reaktor da Osirak, Iraq, in Opera operatsiyasi.^[223][224]

Mossad may have also assassinated professor Jerald Bull, an artillery expert, who was leading the Bobil loyihasi supergun uchun Saddam Xuseyn in the 1980s, which was capable of delivering a tactical nuclear payload.^[225][226]

Suriya

On September 6, 2007, Israel launched an air strike dubbed Orchard operatsiyasi against a target in the Deir ez-Zor region ning Suriya. While Israel refused to comment, unnamed US officials said Israel had shared intelligence with them that Shimoliy Koreya was cooperating with Syria on some sort of nuclear facility.^[227] Both Syria and North Korea denied the allegation and Syria filed a formal complaint with the United Nations.^[228][229] The Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi concluded in May 2011 that the destroyed facility was "very likely" an undeclared nuclear reactor.^[230] Jurnalist Seymur Xers speculated that the Syrian air strike might have been intended as a trial run for striking alleged Iranian nuclear weapons facilities.^[231]

Eron

2007 yil 7 yanvarda, Sunday Times reported that Israel had drawn up plans to destroy three Eron yadro inshootlari.^[232] Israel swiftly denied the specific allegation and analysts expressed doubts about its reliability.^[233] Also in 2007 Israel pressed for United Nations economic sanctions against Eron,^[234] and repeatedly threatened to launch a military strike on Iran if the United States did not do so first.^{[31][235][236]}

Israel is widely believed to be behind the assassination of a number of Iranian nuclear scientists.^{[237][238][239][240]} The death of the Iranian fizik Ardeshir Hassanpour, who may have been involved in the nuclear program, has been claimed by the intelligence group Stratfor to have also been a Mossad assassination.^[241]

2010 yil Stuxnet zararli dastur is widely believed to have been developed by Israel and the United States. It spread worldwide, but appears to have been designed to target the Natanz Enrichment Plant, where it reportedly destroyed up to 1,000 centrifuges.^{[242][243][244]}

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and United Nations' Resolutions

Israel was originally expected to sign the 1968 Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi Shartnoma (NPT) and on June 12, 1968, Israel voted in favor of the treaty in the BMT Bosh assambleyasi.

Ammo, qachon Chexoslovakiyani bosib olish in August by the Soviet Union delayed ratification around the world, Israel's internal division and hesitation over the treaty became public.^[245] The Jonson ma'muriyati attempted to use the sale of 50 F-4 fantomlari to pressure Israel to sign the treaty that fall, culminating in a personal letter from Lindon Jonson to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. But by November Johnson had backed away from tying the F-4 sale with the NPT after a stalemate in negotiations, and Israel would neither sign nor ratify the treaty.^[246] After the series of negotiations, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security Paul Warnke was convinced that Israel already possessed nuclear weapons.^[247] In 2007 Israel sought an exemption to non-proliferation rules in order to import atomic material legally.^[248]

1996 yilda Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Bosh assambleyasi passed a resolution^[249] calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.^[250] Arab nations and annual conferences of the Xalqaro atom energiyasi agentligi (IAEA) repeatedly have called for application of IAEA safeguards and the creation of a nuclear-free Middle East. Arab nations have accused the United States of practicing a double standard in criticizing Iran's nuclear program while ignoring Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.^{[251][252][253]} According to a statement by the Arab Ligasi, Arab states will withdraw from the NPT if Israel acknowledges having nuclear weapons but refuses to open its facilities to international inspection and destroy its arsenal.^[254]

In a statement to the May 2009 preparatory meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the US delegation reiterated the longstanding US support for "universal adherence to the NPT", but uncharacteristically named Israel among the four countries that have not done so. An unnamed Israeli official dismissed the suggestion that it would join the NPT and questioned the effectiveness of the treaty.^[255] Washington Times Ushbu bayonot AQSh va Isroil o'rtasida imzolangan 40 yillik maxfiy kelishuvni Isroilning yadro quroli dasturini xalqaro nazoratdan himoya qilish to'g'risida tahdid qilgani haqida xabar berdi.^[256] Avner Koenning so'zlariga ko'ra, Isroilda atom qurollari borligini aytmasdan, AQSh bu mamlakatni yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi qonunni buzgani uchun sanktsiya berishdan saqlaydi.^[257] Koen, muallifi Isroil va bomba, o'zining yadroviy dasturini tan olish Isroilga yadro qurolini boshqarish bo'yicha harakatlarda konstruktiv ishtirok etishiga imkon beradi, deb ta'kidladi.^[258]

2010 yilgi NPTni ko'rib chiqish konferentsiyasining yakuniy hujjati, 1995 yilda NPTni ko'rib chiqish bo'yicha konferentsiyasining ommaviy qirg'in qurollaridan xoli Yaqin Sharq zonasini tashkil etishga qaratilgan rezolyutsiyasini amalga oshirish uchun 2012 yilda konferentsiya o'tkazishni talab qildi. Qo'shma Shtatlar Yakuniy hujjat bo'yicha xalqaro konsensusga qo'shildi, ammo Yaqin Sharq rezolyutsiyasidagi bo'limni Isroilni mintaqadagi yagona NPT tomoni bo'lmagan davlat sifatida alohida tanlaganligi uchun tanqid qildi va shu bilan birga Eronning "uzoq vaqtdan beri buzib kelinayotgan qoidalarini buzmoqda" NPT va BMT Xavfsizlik Kengashining qarorlari. "^[259]

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