Khe Sanh jangi - Battle of Khe Sanh

Khe Sanh jangi
Qismi Vetnam urushi
Khe Sanh Bunkerlari va yonilg'i quyish uchun mo'ljallangan dump.jpg
Khe Sanhdagi minomyot hujumidan keyin yonib turgan yoqilg'i quyilishi
Sana21 yanvar - 9 iyul 1968 yil[1][2][3]
Manzil
16 ° 39′19,6 ″ N. 106 ° 43′42.9 ″ E / 16.655444 ° N 106.728583 ° E / 16.655444; 106.728583 (Khe Sanx)Koordinatalar: 16 ° 39′19,6 ″ N. 106 ° 43′42.9 ″ E / 16.655444 ° N 106.728583 ° E / 16.655444; 106.728583 (Khe Sanx)
Khe Sanh jangovar bazasi (Khe Sanx ), Quảng Trị viloyati, Vetnam Respublikasi – UTM Grid XD 852-418[4]
Natija

Qararsiz; ikkala tomon ham g'alabani da'vo qilishdi:[5]

  • Khe Sanh qamalini 6-aprel kuni quruqlikdagi kuchlar buzdi.[6]
  • Amerikaliklar Khe Sanh baza majmuasini yo'q qildilar va 1968 yil iyul oyida jang maydonidan chiqib ketishdi (1971 yilda qayta tiklangan).[7]
  • Shimoliy Vetnam armiyasi Amerika chiqib ketganidan keyin Khe Sanh mintaqasida nazoratni qo'lga kiritdi.[7][8]
  • Tugatish McNamara Line.[9] Shimoliy Vetnam aloqa liniyalari Janubiy Vetnamga yanada kengaytirildi.[10]
Urushayotganlar
 Qo'shma Shtatlar
 Janubiy Vetnam
Laos Laos Qirolligi		 Shimoliy Vetnam
Qo'mondonlar va rahbarlar
Qo'shma Shtatlar Uilyam Vestmoreland
(Teatr)
Qo'shma Shtatlar Ratvon M. Tompkins
(3-dengiz div)
Qo'shma Shtatlar Devid E. Lounds
(Mahalliy)		Võ Nguyên Giap
(Teatr)
Tran Quy Xay
(Mahalliy, harbiy)
Lê Quang Đạo
(Mahalliy, siyosiy)
Kuch

Jami ~ 45000[11]
~ Khe Sanhning jangovar bazasida 6000 dengiz piyodalari[7]
Pegasus operatsiyasi: ~ 20,000 (birinchi havo otliqlari va dengiz birliklari)

Arc Light va Niagara operatsiyasi: AQSh havo kuchlari

Khe Sanhdagi qamal: ~ 17200 (304 va 308-bo'lim)[12]

9-marshrutdagi mudofaa: ~ 16,900 (320 va 324-bo'lim)[12]
Yo'qotishlar va yo'qotishlar

Qo'shma Shtatlar AQSh yo'qotishlari:
Khe Sanhda:
274 kishi o'ldirilgan
2541 jarohat olgan (shu jumladan ARVN Ranger, RF / PF, 3-ekspluatatsiya bazasi - AQSh armiyasi va Laos qirollik armiyasining yo'qotishlari)[13]
Shotlandiya I operatsiyasi (1967 yil 1 noyabr - 1968 yil 31 mart) va Pegasus operatsiyasi (1968 yil 1–14 aprel):
730 kishi o'ldirilgan
2.642 jarohat olgan,
7 kishi bedarak yo'qolgan[13]
Shotlandiya II operatsiyasi (1968 yil 15 aprel - 1968 yil iyul):
485 kishi o'ldirilgan
2396 kishi yaralangan[1]
USAF xodimlarining zararlari:
5 ~ 20 kishi o'ldirilgan, yarador bo'lgan noma'lum[1]
Oxirgi evakuatsiya uchun Charli operatsiyasi (1968 yil 19 iyun - 5 iyul):
Kamida 11 dengiz piyodalari halok bo'ldi, yaradorlar noma'lum[1]Havodan etkazib berish paytida:1 KC-130, 3 C-123

Janubiy Vetnam ARVN yo'qotishlari: 229 kishi o'ldirilgan, 436 kishi yaralangan (CIDG, RF / PF va SOG yo'qotishlarni hisobga olmaganda)
CIDG yo'qotishlari: 1000 - 1500 o'ldirilgan yoki bedarak yo'qolgan, kamida 250 asirga olingan (Lang Vey shahrida), yaradorlar noma'lum[14]
Laos Laos Qirolligi: Noma'lum.[13]

Jami (21 yanvar - 9 iyul):

12,000+ qurbonlar
(2800–3500 kishi o'ldirilgan, 9000+ kishi yaralangan, 7 kishi bedarak yo'qolgan, 250+ asir olingan)[13][Izoh 1]

Noma'lum (1602 jasad hisoblangan, AQSh rasmiy jamoatchiligi taxminicha 10000-15000 KIA,[16][17] lekin MACV maxfiy hisobotida 5550 KIA taxmin qilingan[1])

Shimoliy Vetnam raqamlari:
1436 jarohat olgan (mart o'rtalaridan oldin)[18]
2469 KIA (1968 yil 20 yanvardan 20 iyulgacha).[1]

The Khe Sanh jangi (1968 yil 21 yanvar - 9 iyul) da bo'lib o'tdi Khe Sanx shimoli-g'arbiy maydoni Quảng Trị viloyati, Vetnam Respublikasi (Janubiy Vetnam), paytida Vetnam urushi. Himoyalanayotgan AQShning asosiy kuchlari Khe Sanh jangovar bazasi (KSCB) ikkitasi edi polklar ning Qo'shma Shtatlar dengiz piyoda korpusi elementlari tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadi Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasi va Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari havo kuchlari (USAF), shuningdek, oz sonli Vetnam Respublikasi armiyasi (ARVN) qo'shinlari. Bu ikkitadan uchtaga qarshi edi bo'linadigan kattalik elementlari Shimoliy Vetnam Vetnam xalq armiyasi (PAVN).

AQSh qo'mondoni Saygon dastlab 1967 yil davomida KSCB atrofidagi jangovar operatsiyalar chegara mintaqalarida PAVN-ning kichik miqdordagi hujumlarining bir qismi deb hisoblagan. Keyinchalik PAVN ushbu hududga katta kuchlarni olib kirayotgani aniqlanganda ushbu baho o'zgartirildi. Bunga javoban, AQSh kuchlari PAVN dengiz bazasini ajratmasdan oldin qurilgan. Baza qamalga olingandan so'ng, besh oy davomida bir qator harakatlar olib borildi. Shu vaqt ichida KSCB va uning atrofidagi tog'li postlar doimiy PAVNga bo'ysundirildi artilleriya, minomyot va raketa hujumlari va bir necha piyoda askarlar hujumi. Dengiz bazasini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun katta havo bombardimon kampaniyasi (Niagara operatsiyasi ) USAF tomonidan ishga tushirilgan. AQSh samolyotlari tomonidan 100 ming tonnadan ortiq bomba tashlandi va bazani himoya qilish uchun 158 mingdan ortiq artilleriya o'qi otildi. Kampaniya davomida AQSh kuchlari nishonga olish uchun PAVN kuchlarini topish uchun eng yangi texnologiyalarni qo'lladilar. Bundan tashqari, izolyatsiya qilinganidan keyin bazani qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun zarur bo'lgan moddiy-texnik harakatlar dengiz piyodalarini etkazib berish uchun boshqa taktik yangiliklarni amalga oshirishni talab qildi.

1968 yil mart oyida quruqlikdagi ekspeditsiya (Pegasus operatsiyasi) Dengiz kuchlari / ARVN qo'shma guruhi tomonidan ishga tushirildi va oxir-oqibat Khe Sanh dengiz piyodalariga o'tib ketdi. Amerikalik qo'mondonlar Khe Sanh mudofaasini muvaffaqiyatli deb hisobladilar, ammo qamal olib tashlanganidan ko'p o'tmay, kelajakda shunga o'xshash janglarni boshlash xavfi emas, balki bazani yo'q qilish to'g'risida qaror qabul qilindi. 1968 yil 19-iyunda KSCBni evakuatsiya qilish va yo'q qilish boshlandi. Kuchli snaryadlar ostida dengiz piyodalari evakuatsiya qilinganida qolganlarini yo'q qilishdan oldin qo'llaridan kelganlarini qutqarishga harakat qilishdi. Kichik hujumlar baza 5-iyul kuni rasmiy ravishda yopilgunga qadar davom etdi. Dengiz piyodalari 689-tepalik atrofida qolib ketishdi va yaqin atrofdagi janglar 11 iyulgacha davom etib, ular oxir-oqibat tortib olinib, jang oxiriga yetdi.

Buning ortidan Shimoliy Vetnamliklar Khe Sanhda g'alaba qozonganligini e'lon qilishdi, AQSh kuchlari esa chekingan deb da'vo qilishdi, chunki baza endi kerak emas edi. Tarixchilar Khe Sanh jangi Amerika va Janubiy Vetnam e'tiborini chalg'itishi mumkinligidan kuzatgan. Vietnam Kong (VC) kuchlari 1968 yil boshidan oldin janubda Tet Offensive. Shunga qaramay, jang paytida AQSh qo'mondoni general Uilyam Vestmoreland, Tetning asl niyati kuchlarni Khe Sanhdan chalg'itish ekanligini ta'kidladi.

Prelude

Khe Sanh qishlog'i Xen Xoa okrugining hukumati joylashgan edi, Bru hududi Montagnard Laos chegarasidan taxminan 11 km uzoqlikda joylashgan qishloqlar va kofe plantatsiyalari Marshrut 9, Janubiy Vetnamning eng shimoliy transvers yo'li. Yomon darajada yomonlashgan 9-marshrut qirg'oq mintaqasidan g'arbiy balandliklardan o'tib, keyin chegarani kesib o'tdi Laos. Jangovar bazaning kelib chiqishi qurilishda bo'lgan AQSh armiyasining maxsus kuchlari 1962 yil avgustida qishloq tashqarisidagi qadimgi frantsuz qal'asida joylashgan aerodrom.[19] Keyinchalik lager maxsus kuchlarning forpostiga aylandi Fuqarolik tartibsiz mudofaa guruhlari, uning maqsadi chegara bo'ylab PAVN infiltratsiyasini kuzatib borish va mahalliy aholini himoya qilish edi.[20][Izoh 2]

Jeyms Marinoning yozishicha, 1964 yilda AQShning Vetnamdagi qo'mondoni general Uestmoreland: "Khe Sanh Laosdan dushmanning kirib kelishini to'suvchi patrul bazasi bo'lib xizmat qilishi mumkin; Laosda ... dushmanni ta'qib qilish operatsiyalari uchun baza; aerodrom Ho Chi Minh yo'lini o'rganish uchun razvedka uchun; DMZ janubidagi mudofaa uchun g'arbiy langar; va kesish uchun quruqlikdagi operatsiyalar uchun pog'ona o'tish nuqtasi Xoshimin izi."[21] 1964 yil noyabrda Maxsus kuchlar o'z lagerlarini Khe Sanh jangovar bazasining kelajakdagi joyi bo'lgan Xom Cham platosiga ko'chirishdi.[22]

Shimoliy xaritasi Quảng Trị viloyati

1964 yil qish paytida Khe Sanh yuqori darajadagi tasniflanganlar uchun uchirish maydonchasi bo'ldi Harbiy yordam qo'mondonligi, Vetnam - Tadqiqotlar va kuzatuvlar guruhi (sayt dastlab qishloq yaqinida tashkil etilgan va keyinchalik Frantsiya qal'asiga ko'chirilgan).[23] U erdan Xosimin Trail nomi bilan tanilgan PAVN logistika tizimida (shuningdek, "Truong Son Strategic Supply Route" nomi bilan tanilgan) Shimoliy Vetnam askarlarini o'rganish va yig'ish uchun Laosga razvedka guruhlari ishga tushirildi.[22]

Marinoning so'zlariga ko'ra, "1966 yilga kelib, Vestmoreland Khe Sanxni katta strategiyaning bir qismi deb hisoblashni boshladi". Oxir-oqibat Xoshimin izini taqiqlash uchun Laos orqali avansni tasdiqlash uchun u "bazani ushlab turish juda zarur" deb qaror qildi va AQSh dengiz piyoda askarlariga Khe Sanh atrofida pozitsiyalarni egallashga buyruq berdi. Harbiy yordam qo'mondonligi, Vetnam keyinchalik Laosga kirib borishni rejalashtira boshladi va oktyabr oyida Khe Sanhda aerodrom qurilishi tugallandi.[21]

Yassi lageri doimiy ravishda 1967 yilda AQSh dengiz piyoda askarlari tomonidan boshqarilib, ular aeroport yonida post yaratgan. Ushbu baza Janubiy Vetnamning eng shimoliy beshta viloyati uchun taktik javobgarlikka ega bo'lgan dengiz piyoda qo'shinlari kuchlarining g'arbiy langari bo'lib xizmat qilishi kerak edi. Men korpus.[24][25] Dengizchilarning mudofaa tizimi quyida joylashgan Harbiy bo'lmagan hudud (DMZ) qirg'oqdan, 9-yo'l bo'ylab, Khe Sanhgacha. 1966 yil davomida muntazam maxsus kuchlar qo'shinlari platodan ko'chib o'tib, 9-marshrutda kichikroq lager qurdilar Lang Vey, Laos chegarasiga masofaning taxminan yarmi.[26]

Fon

Chegara janglari

Qo'shimcha ma'lumotlar: Dak To jangi

1967 yilning ikkinchi yarmida Shimoliy Vetnamliklar Janubiy Vetnamning chegara hududlarida bir qator harakatlarni qo'zg'atdilar. Ushbu hujumlarning barchasi polk kattalikdagi PAVN / VC bo'linmalari tomonidan amalga oshirilgan, ammo ilgari qo'llanilgan urish va yugurishning odatdagi taktikalaridan farqli o'laroq, ular doimiy va qonli ishlar edi.[27]

Oktyabr oyining boshlarida PAVN batalyon o'lchamidagi quruqlikdagi zondlarni kuchaytirdi va qarshi artilleriya otishmalarini davom ettirdi Kon Tien, shimoliy Kng Tru viloyatidagi DMZdan janubdagi dengiz piyoda mudofaasi chizig'ining markazidagi tepalikdagi qal'a.[28] Minomyot turlari, artilleriya snaryadlari va 122 mm raketalar tasodifiy, ammo tinimsiz ravishda bazaga tushdi. Sentyabr bombardimonlari kuniga 100 dan 150 gacha bo'lgan, maksimal darajada 1190 ta 25 sentyabrda bo'lgan.[29] Westmoreland bunga javoban "Neutralize" operatsiyasini, qamalni buzish uchun mo'ljallangan havo va dengiz bombardimon kampaniyasini boshladi. Etti hafta davomida Amerika samolyotlari 4000 ga yaqin havo hujumlarida 35000 dan 40.000 tonnagacha bomba tashladilar.[30]

Dak To atrofidagi janglarning eng qizg'in davri 875-tepalikdagi jang

27 oktyabrda PAVN polki an Vetnam Respublikasi armiyasi (ARVN) batalyoni Song Be Phc Long provinsiyasining poytaxti.[30] PAVN bir necha kun jang qildi, qurbonlar oldi va orqaga qaytdi. Ikki kundan keyin PAVN 273-polk chegara shaharchasi yaqinidagi Maxsus kuchlar lageriga hujum qildi Lok Nin, yilda Long viloyati.[30] AQSh qo'shinlari 1-piyoda diviziyasi tezda javob berishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi. O'n kunlik jangdan so'ng hujumchilar orqaga qaytarildi Kambodja. Aksiya davomida kamida 852 nafar PAVN askari halok bo'ldi, aksincha, 50 nafar amerikalik va janubiy vetnamlik halok bo'ldi.[30]

Eng og'ir harakatlar yaqinda bo'lib o'tdi Dak To, Kon Tum markaziy tog'li viloyatida. U erda PAVN borligi 1-divizion 22 kunlik jangga sabab bo'ldi, bu butun mojaroning eng yaqin atrofdagi janglari bo'lgan.[31] Amerika razvedkasi 1200 dan 1600 gacha bo'lgan PAVN qo'shinlari o'ldirilgan bo'lsa, AQShning 362 a'zosi 4-piyoda diviziyasi, 173-havo-desant brigadasi va ARVN Havodan elementlar harakatda o'ldirildi. Shunga qaramay, 4-piyoda askarlarning to'rtta batalonidan uchtasi va butun 173-jang jang paytida samarasiz bo'lib qoldi.[32]

Amerikalik razvedka tahlilchilariga dushmanning ushbu ketma-ket harakatlari juda hayron bo'ldi. Ular uchun PAVN / VC ning doimiy hujumlari ortida ittifoqchi kuchlarga ziyon etkazishdan boshqa mantiq sezilmadi. Ular buni uddalashdi, ammo Shimoliy Vetnamliklarning qurbonlari ular qo'lga kiritgan har qanday to'g'ridan-to'g'ri yutuqlarni inkor etgandek edi. Biroq, chegara janglari o'sha paytda baholanmagan ikkita muhim oqibatlarga olib keldi: ular Amerika qo'mondonligining e'tiborini chegaraoldi hududlariga qaratdilar va ular Amerika va ARVN kuchlarini qirg'oq bo'yidagi pasttekislik va shaharlardan uzoqlashtirdilar. Tet Offensive.[33]

Tepalik janglari

Qo'shimcha ma'lumotlar: Tepalik janglari
Khe Sanh vodiysi

1966 yilgacha Khe Sanh hududida ishlar tinch saqlanib qoldi. Shunga qaramay, Vestmoreland uni nafaqat dengiz piyodalari egallab olishini, balki uni kuchaytirishni ham talab qildi.[34] Unga general qattiq qarshilik ko'rsatdi Lyuis Uolt, I Corps dengiz piyoda qo'mondoni. Uolt amerikaliklarning harakatining asl maqsadi ichki hududlarda joylashgan PAVN / VC ni ta'qib qilmasdan, aholini tinchlantirish va himoya qilish bo'lishi kerak, deb qattiq ta'kidladi.[35] Biroq, Westmoreland g'alaba qozondi va 1-batalyon, 3-dengiz polki (1/3 dengiz piyodalari) 29 sentyabrda lager va aerodromni egallash uchun jo'natildi. 1967 yil yanvar oyining oxiriga kelib, 1/3 qismi Yaponiyaga qaytib keldi va Bravo kompaniyasi tomonidan bo'shatildi, 1-batalyon, 9-dengiz piyodalari (1/9 dengiz piyodalari). Bitta rota butun batalyonni almashtirar edi.[36]

Tepalik janglari

1967 yil 24 aprelda Bravo kompaniyasidan patrul 861-tepalikning shimolida noma'lum kattalikdagi PAVN kuchlari bilan ish boshladi. Ushbu harakat Khe Sanhni olishga qaratilgan PAVN hujumini muddatidan oldin qo'zg'atdi. PAVN kuchlari asosiy hujumni boshlashdan oldin baland erlarni egallash jarayonida edilar.[37] The 2-chi va 3-batalyonlar ning 3-dengiz polki Polkovnik Jon P. Laniganning buyrug'i bilan KSCB-ni kuchaytirdi va PAVNni 861, 881 Shimoliy va 881 Janubiy tepaliklaridan haydash vazifasini oldilar. PAVN kuchlari 940 talafot ko'rganlaridan keyin Khe Sanh atrofidan haydab chiqarildi. Dengiz piyoda askarlari 155 ta jangda o'ldirilgan va 425 kishi yaralangan.[38] Aerodromdagi asosiy bazani PAVN tomonidan kuzatishni oldini olish uchun (va ularni o'tin bazasi sifatida ishlatish mumkin), atrofdagi Khe Sanh vodiysidagi tepaliklarni doimiy ravishda alohida dengiz elementlari egallab turishi va himoya qilishi kerak edi.[39]

Tepalikdagi janglar ortidan, Khe Sanx atrofida PAVN faoliyatida sustlik yuz berdi. May oyining oxiriga kelib dengiz kuchlari yana ikkita batalyondan biriga, ya'ni 1-batalyon, 26-dengiz piyodalari.[40] General-leytenant Robert E. Kushman, kichik iyun oyida Uolt III MAF qo'mondoni lavozimidan ozod etildi.[41]

14 avgust kuni polkovnik Devid E. Lounds qo'mondoni sifatida ish boshladi 26-dengiz polki. Yaqinda yozning oxiri va kuzning boshlarida sporadik harakatlar amalga oshirildi, ulardan eng jiddiylari 9-marshrutdagi ta'minot karvonining pistirmasi edi. Bu keyingi martga qadar Khe Sanh uchun zaxirani etkazib berishga qilingan so'nggi quruq harakat edi.[42] Dekabr va yanvar oyi boshlarida Khe Sanh hududida PAVN qo'shinlari va harakatlarini ko'p marta ko'rishgan, ammo sektor nisbatan jim bo'lib qoldi.[43]

Qarorlar

Keyin Amerikaning yuqori qo'mondonligi tomonidan qaror qabul qilinishi kerak edi: yoki I korpusidagi cheklangan ishchi kuchining ko'pini Khe Sanhni himoya qilish uchun sarflang yoki bazadan voz keching.[44][3-eslatma] Westmoreland bu tanlovni juda oddiy deb hisobladi. O'zining xotiralarida u davomli sa'y-harakatlarning sabablarini sanab o'tdi

Khe Sanx 9-yo'l bo'ylab Laosdan dushmanning kirib kelishini blokirovka qilish uchun patrul bazasi bo'lib xizmat qilishi mumkin edi; Laosdagi dushmanni ta'qib qilish uchun SOG operatsiyalari uchun tayanch sifatida; Xoshimin izini o'rganayotgan razvedka samolyotlari uchun aeroport sifatida; DMZ janubidagi mudofaa uchun g'arbiy langar sifatida; Ho Chi Minh yo'lini kesish uchun quruqlikdagi operatsiyalar uchun pog'ona nuqtasi sifatida.[45][4-eslatma]

Biroq, etakchi dengiz zobitlari hammasi bir xil fikrda emas edilar. Yangi III MAF qo'mondoni Kushman Westmorelandni qo'llab-quvvatladi (ehtimol Uolt ketganidan keyin Armiya / Dengizchilik munosabatlarini tuzatmoqchi).[48] Ko'tarilgan boshqa xavotirlarga I korpus uchun haqiqiy xavf to'g'ridan-to'g'ri tahdid bo'lganligi haqidagi da'vo kiritilgan Quảng Trị Shahar va boshqa shahar joylari; PAVN qo'shinlari Khe Sanhni osongina chetlab o'tishlari sababli, mudofaa infiltratsiyaga tahdid sifatida ma'nosiz bo'ladi; baza juda izolyatsiya qilinganligi va dengiz piyoda askarlari "na vertolyot resurslari, na qo'shinlari va na bunday operatsiyalarni o'tkazish uchun moddiy-texnika bazalariga ega bo'lishgan". Bundan tashqari, Shore "ob-havo yana bir hal qiluvchi omil bo'ldi, chunki musson mavsumiga tashrif buyuruvchilarning ko'rinishi pastligi va pastligi bunday operatsiyalarni xavfli qildi", deb ta'kidlaydi.[49] Brigada generali Louell English (komandir yordamchisi 3-dengiz bo'limi ) izolyatsiya qilingan postni himoya qilish kulgili bo'lganidan shikoyat qildi. "Khe Sanhda bo'lganingizda, siz haqiqatan ham biron bir joyda emassiz. Siz uni yo'qotishingiz mumkin va siz haqiqatan ham la'natni yo'qotmaysiz."[50]

Westmorelandga kelsak, u bilishi kerak bo'lgan narsa, PAVN ko'p sonli qo'shinlarni belgilangan jang uchun to'plagan. Istiqbolni yanada jozibador qilish, bu baza odamlar yashamaydigan joylarda bo'lib, u erda Amerikaning o't o'chirish kuchlari fuqarolar qurbonlarisiz to'liq ishlatilishi mumkin edi. Belgilangan pozitsiyaga o'tayotgan ilgari qo'lga olinmagan dushmanni jalb qilish va yo'q qilish imkoniyati misli ko'rilmagan darajada g'alabani va'da qildi.[50]

Jang

Perimetrga hujumlar

Birinchi to'qnashuvlar

1967 yil dekabr boshida PAVN general-mayor lavozimiga tayinlandi Tran Quy Xay Khe Sanh atrofidagi harakatlar uchun mahalliy qo'mondon sifatida, Le Quang Dyu uning siyosiy komissari sifatida. Yaqin kunlarda Sap Lit atrofida saylov kampaniyasi shtabi tashkil etildi.[51] Ikki bo'linma 304-chi va 325-chi, operatsiyaga tayinlandi: 325-chi shimol atrofidagi mas'uliyat, 304-chi esa janubiy sektor uchun javobgarlikni o'z zimmasiga oldi.[52] PAVN niyatlarini aniqlashga urinish chog'ida dengiz razvedkasi bir haftadan ko'proq vaqt ichida 325-bo'lim baza yaqiniga ko'chib o'tganligini va yana ikkita bo'lim qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan masofada joylashganligini tasdiqladi. 324-bo'lim, DMX hududida Khe Sanhdan shimoldan 10-15 milya (16–24 km) masofada joylashgan edi. 320-divizion shimoli-sharqqa osonlikcha mustahkamlanadigan masofada edi.[53] Ular yaqin atrofdagi Xoshimin yo'lidan moddiy jihatdan qo'llab-quvvatlandi. Ushbu razvedka natijasida KSCB 13-dekabr kuni 9-dengiz polkining 1-bataloni tomonidan kuchaytirildi. Rasmiy PAVN tarixiga ko'ra, 1967 yil dekabrgacha Shimoliy Vetnamliklar o'z o'rnida yoki qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan masofada joylashgan edi: 304, 320, 324-chi va 325-piyoda diviziyalari, mustaqil 270-piyoda polki; beshta artilleriya polki (16, 45, 84, 204 va 675-chi); uchta AAA polklar (208, 214 va 228); to'rtta tank kompaniyasi; bitta muhandis polki va bitta mustaqil muhandis batalyoni; bitta signal bataloni; va bir qator mahalliy kuch birliklari.[54]

Qarama-qarshi kuchlarning tasarruflari, 1968 yil yanvar

881-tepalikning g'arbiy qismida va Co Roc tizmasining shimolida (16 ° 33′40 ″ N 106 ° 37′55 ″ E / 16.561 ° N 106.632 ° E / 16.561; 106.632), PAVN Laos chegarasi bo'ylab artilleriya, raketa va minomyot pozitsiyalarini o'rnatdi, ulardan bazaga otishma hujumlarini uyushtirish va uning quruqlikdagi harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlash. PAVN 130 mm va 152 mm artilleriya qismlari va 122 mm raketalar, 105 mm va 155 mm gubitsa bo'lgan dengiz artilleriyasining qo'llab-quvvatlashiga qaraganda uzoqroq masofaga ega edi. Ushbu intervalgacha haddan tashqari foydalanish PAVN tomonidan oldini olish uchun ishlatilgan batareyaga qarshi yong'in.[55][56] Qishgi mussonning yomon ob-havosi davom etishi ularga o'z joylarini almashtirish ishlarida yordam berdi.[57]

1968 yil 2-yanvarning yomg'irli kechasi paytida, qora tanli forma kiygan olti erkak asosiy postning himoya simidan tashqarida tinglash posti a'zolari tomonidan ko'rildi. Chaqiriqqa javob berolmagach, ular o'qqa tutildi va beshtasi to'g'ridan-to'g'ri o'ldirildi, oltinchisi yaralangan bo'lsa ham, qochib qutuldi.[5-eslatma] Ushbu voqea Cushmanni Lownds-ni qolganlari bilan mustahkamlashga undadi 2-batalyon, 26-dengiz piyodalari. Bu 26-dengiz polkining uchta batalonining birinchi marta jangovarlikda birgalikda harakat qilganligi Ivo-Jima jangi Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida.[59] Qoplash uchun buzmoq Rao Quan daryosi yaqinida, 2/26 dan to'rtta kompaniya darhol 558-tepalikni egallash uchun jo'natildi, boshqa tepalik 861A tepaligi bilan.[60]

20-yanvar kuni 325-divizionning PAVN leytenanti La Thanh Ton, PAVNning bir qator hujumlari rejasini tuzib chiqdi.[61] Xuddi o'sha kuni kechqurun 881-sonli tepaliklar va 861-sonli asosiy bazaga hujum uyushtiriladi. 21-yanvar soat 00:30 da 861-tepalikka 300 ga yaqin PAVN qo'shinlari hujum qildi, ammo dengiz piyoda askarlari tayyorlandi. PAVN piyoda qo'shinlari, garchi artilleriya otishidan tutashgan bo'lsalar-da, mudofaaning perimetri bo'ylab o'tishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi va faqat yaqin atrofdagi qattiq janglardan so'ng orqaga qaytarildi.[62]

Keyin asosiy baza kuchli minomyot va raketa otishmalariga uchradi. Yuzlab minomyot dumaloqlari va 122 mm raketalar bazaga urilib, yer usti inshootlarining aksariyatini tekislashdi. Dushmanning birinchi snaryadlaridan biri asosiy o'q-dorilar omborida portlashni uyushtirdi. Axlatxonada saqlangan ko'plab artilleriya va minomyot qurollari havoga tashlangan va baza ta'sirida portlatilgan. Ko'p o'tmay, yana bir qobiq keshga urildi ko'z yoshartuvchi gaz, bu butun maydonni to'yingan.[63] 21 yanvar kuni bo'lib o'tgan janglar va o'q otish natijasida 14 dengiz piyodasi halok bo'ldi va 43 kishi yaralandi.[64] Bombardimon to'xtaganidan bir necha soat o'tgach, baza hali ham xavf ostida edi. Soat 10:00 atrofida yong'in ko'p miqdorda portlovchi moddalarni yoqib yubordi va bazani yana bir qator portlashlar bilan silkitdi.[65]

KSCB-da artilleriya bombardimon qilinishi bilan bir vaqtda Khe Sanh qishlog'iga qarshi hujum uyushtirildi. Xon Xoa tumani. Bazadan 3 km janubda joylashgan qishloqni 160 mahalliy Bru qo'shinlari va 15 amerikalik maslahatchilar himoya qildilar. 21-yanvar kuni tongda unga 300 kishilik PAVN batalyoni hujum qildi. D, 1/26 dengiz piyoda askarlaridan bir vzvod bazadan jo'natildi, ammo yuqori PAVN kuchlari oldida qaytarib olindi. ARVN 256-sonidan kuchaytirish Mintaqaviy kuch (RF) kompaniyasi to'qqizta kemaga jo'natildi UH-1 282-chi hujum vertolyotlari vertolyotlari, ammo ular PAVN tomonidan ishg'ol qilingan Frantsiya qal'asi / sobiq FOB-3 yaqinida qo'nishdi, u ko'plab RF qo'shinlarini va 4 amerikalikni, shu jumladan podpolkovnik Jozef Seymoeni Quang Tri maslahatchisi o'rinbosari o'ldirdi. Viloyat va qolgan vertolyotlarni missiyani tark etishga majbur qilish. 22 yanvar kuni ertalab Lownds qishloqdagi qolgan kuchlarni evakuatsiya qilishga qaror qildi, aksariyat amerikaliklar vertolyot bilan evakuatsiya qilindi, ikki maslahatchisi esa omon qolgan mahalliy kuchlarni jangovar bazaga olib borishdi.[18][66]

Ularning qanotidagi har qanday tahdidni bartaraf etish uchun PAVN quyidagi manzilda joylashgan Laos Battalion BV-33 ga hujum qildi. Ban Xuey Sane, Laosdagi 9-marshrutda. Batalyon 23 yanvarga o'tar kechasi uchta tank PAVN tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlangan uchta batalon tomonidan hujumga uchradi. Laosliklarni bosib olishdi va ko'pchilik Lang Veydagi maxsus kuchlar lageriga qochib ketishdi. The Ban Xuey Sanening jangi Uch haftadan so'ng Lang Veydagi hujum emas, PAVN birinchi marta zirhli bo'linmani jangga topshirgan edi.[18]

PAVN artilleriyasi birinchi marta 21 yanvarda asosiy bazaga tushdi. Bir necha tur ham 881-tepalikka tushdi.[67] 304-diviziyaning kelishi sababli KSCB 22-yanvar kuni 1-batalyon, 9-dengiz polki tomonidan yanada mustahkamlandi. Besh kundan so'ng, yakuniy qo'shimcha kuchlari shaklida keldi 37-ARVN qo'riqchilar batalyoni taktik sabablarga ko'ra ko'proq siyosiy sabablarga ko'ra joylashtirilgan.[68] Dengiz piyodalari va ARVN qazib olishdi va yaqinlashib kelishiga umid qilishdi Tết sulh (29-31 yanvar kunlari rejalashtirilgan) biroz muhlat beradi. Ammo 29-yanvar kuni tushdan keyin 3-dengiz diviziyasi Khe Sanxga sulh bekor qilinganligi to'g'risida xabar berdi. Tet hujumi boshlanishiga oz qoldi.[69][70]

Vestmorlendning yadro qurolidan foydalanish rejasi

Tet hujumi boshlanishidan to'qqiz kun oldin, PAVN Khe Sanh jangini ochdi va DMZ janubida AQSh kuchlariga hujum qildi. Yashirilgan hujjatlar shuni ko'rsatadiki, bunga javoban Westmoreland yadro qurolidan foydalanishni o'ylaydi. 1970 yilda Harbiy-havo kuchlari tarixi idorasi o'sha paytdagi "o'ta maxfiy" ma'lumotlarni e'lon qildi, ammo hozirda maxfiylashtirilmagan, 106 sahifali hisobot, Janubi-sharqiy Osiyodagi havo kuchlari: Bombing Halt tomon, 1968 y. Jurnalist Richard Ehrlichning yozishicha, hisobotga ko'ra, "yanvar oyi oxirida general Uestmoreland DMZ yaqinidagi va Khe San shahridagi vaziyat keskin yomonlashsa, yadroviy yoki kimyoviy qurol ishlatilishi kerakligi to'g'risida ogohlantirgan". Xabarda aytilishicha, "bu havo kuchlari shtabi boshlig'i general Jon Makkonellni JCS (shtab boshliqlari birlashgan) vakolatxonasidan Tinch okeani qo'mondonligidan past rentabellikdagi yadro qurolidan foydalanish rejasini tayyorlashni iltimos qilishini so'rab, muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lishiga qaramay majbur qildi. AQSh dengiz bazasini halokatli yo'qotishining oldini olish. "[71]

Shunga qaramay, oxir-oqibat yadroviy variant harbiy rejalashtiruvchilar tomonidan arzonlashtirildi. AQSh Mudofaa vaziri xabar bergan maxfiy memorandum Robert Maknamara, AQSh prezidentiga yuborilgan Lyndon B. Jonson 1968 yil 19 fevralda, 2005 yilda deklaratsiyadan chiqarilgan. Bu narsa taktik yadroviy qurol samaradorligini pasaytiradigan Janubiy Vetnamga xos bo'lgan relyefni hisobga olgan holda yadroviy variant chegirmali ekanligini ko'rsatmoqda. MakNamara shunday yozgan edi: "relyefi va Janubiy Vetnamdagi operatsiyalarimizga xos boshqa sharoitlar tufayli u erda Vetnam Kongiga ham, Shimoliy Vetnam kuchlariga qarshi ham yadro qurolidan foydalanish tavsiya etilishi mumkin emas". Maknamaraning fikrlashiga uning yordamchisi Devid Morrisro (keyinchalik MakNamara keyinchalik ishonchli shaxs bo'lib ishlagan Cal Tech-da VP) ta'sir qilgan bo'lishi mumkin, uning ukasi Maykl Morrisro (1960 yilda Nyu-York shtatining shaxmat bo'yicha chempioni) xizmat qilgan.[72]

Niagara operatsiyasi

Portlash kampaniyasi haqida qo'shimcha ma'lumot: Niagara operatsiyasi
Elektron sensor tizimi haqida qo'shimcha ma'lumot: Igloo White operatsiyasi

Yanvar oyida yaqinda o'rnatilgan elektron datchiklar Muscle Shoals operatsiyasi Laosning janubi-sharqida sinov va baholashdan o'tayotgan (keyinchalik "Igloo White" deb o'zgartirildi), Janubiy Vetnamning shimoli-g'arbiy burchagi qarshisidagi Xoshimin yo'li bo'ylab PAVN faolligi haqida ogohlantirildi. Ushbu tadbirlarning tabiati va KSCBga etkazgan tahlikasi tufayli Vestmoreland Khe Sanh vodiysi yaqinidagi PAVN faoliyati bo'yicha razvedka ma'lumotlarini yig'ish bo'yicha "Niagara I" operatsiyasiga buyruq berdi.[73]

AQSh harbiy-dengiz kuchlari OP-2E Neptun VO-67, Muscle Shoals missiyasi uchun maxsus ishlab chiqilgan dengiz patrul bombardimonchi va dengiz osti urush samolyotining variantidir.

Niagara I yanvarning uchinchi haftasida qurib bitkazildi va keyingi bosqich, Niagara II 21-da ishga tushirildi.[74] birinchi PAVN artilleriya otishma kuni.[67] Dengiz piyodalari Havoni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri qo'llab-quvvatlash markazi (DASC), KSCBda joylashgan bo'lib, havo hujumlarini artilleriya o'qlari bilan muvofiqlashtirish uchun javobgardir. Havodagi jang maydonini boshqarish va boshqarish markazi a FZR 130 kirib kelayotgan zarba beradigan samolyotlar yo'naltirilgan oldinga havo boshqaruvi (FAC) spotter samolyotlari, ular o'z navbatida ularni o'zlari joylashgan yoki er usti bo'linmalari tomonidan radioaktiv maqsadlarga yo'naltirgan.[75] Ob-havo sharoiti FAC yo'naltirilgan zarbalarni taqiqlaganida, bombardimonchilar dengiz piyodalari tomonidan maqsadlariga yo'naltirilgan AN / TPQ-10 KSCBda yoki Air Force Combat Skyspot MSQ-77 stantsiyalarida radar o'rnatish.[76]

Shunday qilib Jon Marokash tomonidan "urush tarixidagi eng ko'p konsentratsiyali havo kuchini qo'llash" deb ta'riflangan narsa boshlandi.[77] O'rtacha bir kunda 350 ta taktik qiruvchi-bombardimonchi, 60 ta B-52 va 30 yorug'lik kuzatuvchi yoki razvedka samolyoti baza yaqinidagi osmonda ishlagan.[78] Westmoreland allaqachon dengiz hujumiga yordam berish uchun yangi paydo bo'lgan Igloo White operatsiyasini buyurgan edi.[73] 22-yanvar kuni birinchi datchik tomchilari bo'lib o'tdi va oyning oxiriga kelib, 31 ta akustik va seysmik datchiklar 44 ta torga tashlandi.[79] Datchiklarni maxsus dengiz otryadlari joylashtirdilar, Oltmish yettita kuzatuv otryad (VO-67). KSCBdagi dengiz piyoda askarlari o'zlarining yong'inni qo'llab-quvvatlash muvofiqlashtirish markazida mavjud bo'lgan aql-zakovatning 40 foizini sensorlarga berishdi.[80]

Jangning oxiriga kelib, USAF aktivlari 9691 taktik parvozni amalga oshirdi va 14223 tonna bomba Khe Sanh hududidagi nishonlarga tashlandi. Dengiz Korpusining aviatorlari 7098 ta missiyani bajarib, 17015 tonnani ozod qildilar. Ko'pchilik yo'naltirilgan dengiz harbiy ekipajlari Rolling Thunder operatsiyasi Shimoliy Vetnamga qarshi zarbalar berdi, 5337 marta parvoz qildi va 7,941 tonna o'q-dorilarni ushbu hududga tashladi.[81] Keyinchalik Westmoreland shunday deb yozgan edi: "Vashington bularning bir qismi matbuotga etib borishi uchun shunchalik qo'rqdiki, men to'xtab turishni buyurdim va bu qanday oqibatlarga olib kelishi mumkinligi haqida siyosiy masala bilan javob berdim."[82]

Milliy xavfsizlik bo'yicha maslahatchi Uolt Rostov Prezidentni ko'rsatmoqda Lyndon B. Jonson Khe Sanh hududining modeli, 1968 yil 15 fevral

Shu bilan birga, shtab-kvartirada xizmatlararo siyosiy kurash bo'lib o'tdi Phu Bai jangovar bazasi, Saygon va Pentagon Amerikaning Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyodagi barcha harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlaydigan aviatsiya aktivlarini kim nazorat qilishi kerakligi to'g'risida.[83] Westmoreland o'zining havo harakatlari bo'yicha qo'mondonining o'rinbosari, havo kuchlari generalini bergan edi Uilyam V. Momyer, KSCB-ni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun operatsiya davomida barcha havo aktivlarini muvofiqlashtirish uchun javobgarlik. Bu o'zlarining yaqin havo qo'llab-quvvatlash doktrinasi ostida ishlaydigan o'z aviatsiya otryadlariga ega bo'lgan Dengiz qo'mondonligi uchun muammolarni keltirib chiqardi. Dengiz piyodalari havo kuchlari generaliga o'z samolyotlari ustidan hokimiyatdan voz kechishni juda istamadilar.[84] Keyinchalik Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyoda mavjud bo'lgan buyruq va boshqaruv tartibi yagona havo menejeri kontseptsiyasida ilgari surilgan Havo Kuchlari doktrinasiga qarshi chiqdi. Bitta shtab barcha havo aktivlarini ajratib, muvofiqlashtirar, ularni eng zarur deb topilgan joylariga taqsimlab, so'ngra ularni talab qilingan holatga o'tkazar edi. Samolyotlari va doktrinasi ularning faoliyati uchun ajralmas bo'lgan dengiz piyodalari bunday markazlashtirilgan nazorat ostida emas edi. 18-yanvar kuni Vestmoreland havo kuchlarini qo'mondonlik zaxirasini boshqarish haqidagi iltimosini qabul qildi CINCPAC Honolulida.[85]

Westmoreland o'rtasida qizg'in munozaralar bo'lib o'tdi, Dengiz kuchlari qo'mondoni Leonard F. Chapman, kichik va armiya shtabi boshlig'i Garold K. Jonson. Jonson armiyaning havo aktivlarini Havo Kuchlari kooperatsiyasidan himoya qilishdan xavotirga tushgani sababli Dengiz pozitsiyasini qo'llab-quvvatladi.[86] Westmoreland taktik vaziyatga shunchalik berilib ketganki, agar uning xohish-istaklari bajarilmasa, iste'foga chiqish bilan tahdid qilgan.[87] Natijada, 7 mart kuni Vetnam urushi paytida birinchi marta havo operatsiyalari bitta menejer nazorati ostiga olindi.[78] Westmoreland bir necha oy davomida butun Tet hujumi, shu jumladan, Saygon shahar markaziga qilingan hujumlarni va shu bilan Shimoliy Vetnamning asl maqsadi Khe Sanh ekanligini obsesif ravishda tasdiqlaganini ta'kidladi.[88]

Lang Veining qulashi

Asosiy maqola: Lang Vei jangi

Tet Offensive 30 yanvarda ba'zi hududlarda muddatidan oldin boshlangan. Keyingi kechada PAVN / VC hujumlarining katta to'lqini Khe Sanhdan tashqari hamma joyda Janubiy Vetnam bo'ylab tarqaldi. Hozirgacha to'qnashuvda eng katta dushman hujumining boshlanishi Vestmorelandning e'tiborini Khe Sanhdan uzoqlashtirmadi. Ertasi kuni Tet balandligida tayyorlangan (ammo hech qachon chiqarilmagan) press-reliz uni chalg'itmoqchi emasligini ko'rsatdi. "Dushman bu masalani chalkashtirib yubormoqchi ... Menimcha, u hammaning diqqatini eng katta tahlikali hudud - I Korpusning shimoliy qismidan chalg'itishga urinmoqda. Barchangizni chalkashtirib yubormaslik uchun ehtiyot bo'ling."[89][90]

Lang Vey shahrida joylashgan A-101 otryadining maxsus kuchlari va ularning to'rtta Bru CIDGs kompaniyalari uchun jang paytida (patrul xizmati bundan mustasno) juda ko'p harakat sodir bo'lmadi. So'ngra, 6 fevral kuni ertalab PAVN Lang Vey qarorgohiga minomyotlardan o'q uzib, sakkizta Lager Strike Force askarlarini yaraladi.[91] Soat 18: 10da PAVN ertalabki minomyot hujumini 152 mm gaubitsadan artilleriya zarbasi bilan davom ettirib, lagerga 60 ta o'q otdi. Bu zarba natijasida yana ikki zarba berish kuchlari askarlari yaralangan va ikkita bunkerlar zarar ko'rgan.[91]

7 fevral kuni erta tongda vaziyat tubdan o'zgardi. Amerikaliklar BAV-33 lageridan kelgan Laos qochqinlaridan ushbu hududda PAVN zirhlarini ogohlantirishgan. SOG razvedka guruhlari, shuningdek, Co Roc tog'ini o'rab turgan hududda tank izlarini topganliklari haqida xabar berishdi.[92] Garchi PAVN ikkita zirhli polkga ega ekanligi ma'lum bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, u hali ham Janubiy Vetnamda zirhli bo'linmani joylashtirmagan edi va bundan tashqari, amerikaliklar ularni Khe Sanhga havo razvedkasi tomonidan sezilmasdan pastga tushirish imkonsiz deb hisoblashgan.[93]

Lang Veydagi 12 ta tank ularning lageriga hujum qilganida, bu maxsus kuchlar askarlari uchun hali ham shok bo'ldi. Sovet qurgan PT-76 203-zirhli polkning amfibiya tanklari 304-diviziyaning ikkala elementi bo'lgan 7-batalon, 66-polk va 24-polkning 4-bataloni tomonidan piyoda hujumi bilan qo'llab-quvvatlanib, mudofaani ag'darib tashladi. Quruqlikdagi qo'shinlar hujum uchun torbalar, ko'zdan yosh oqizuvchi gaz va olov otish moslamalari bilan maxsus jihozlangan edi. Garchi lagerning asosiy mudofaasi atigi 13 daqiqada bosib olingan bo'lsa-da, janglar bir necha soat davom etdi va maxsus kuchlar va Bru CIDG jangarilari kamida beshta tankni nokaut qilishga muvaffaq bo'lishdi.[94]

Khe Sanhdagi dengiz piyoda askarlari xuddi shunday kutilmagan vaziyatda quruqlikdagi kuchlarni ta'minlash rejasini tuzgan edilar, ammo Lownds PAVN pistirmasidan qo'rqib, uni amalga oshirishni rad etdi. Uy egalari, shuningdek, tirik qolganlarni vertolyot bilan qazib olishni boshlash taklifini rad etishdi.[95] Ertasi kuni ertalab soat 07:00 da Da Nangda bo'lib o'tgan uchrashuvda Vestmoreland va Kushman Loundsning qarorini qabul qilishdi. Armiya podpolkovnigi Jonatan Ladd (qo'mondon, 5-maxsus kuchlar guruhi ) Xe Sanhdan endigina uchib kelgan "xabar berishicha," hech kimni tashlab ketmaslikdan faxrlanadigan dengiz piyoda askarlari barcha yashil beretlarni hisobdan chiqarishga tayyor va Lang Veyning qulashiga shunchaki ahamiyat bermaydilar ".[95]

Lang Veyga hujum

Ladd va SOG birikmasi qo'mondoni (uning odamlari va lagerlari KSCB mudofaasiga kiritilgan), agar dengiz piyodalari vertolyotlar bilan ta'minlasalar, SOG razvedkachilari tirik qolganlarni olib ketish uchun o'zlari kirib borishlarini taklif qilishdi.[96] Dengiz piyodalari operatsiyasi, Westmoreland aslida Cushman-ga qutqaruv operatsiyasini davom ettirishga ruxsat berish to'g'risida buyruq berishga majbur bo'lmaguncha, qarshilik ko'rsatishda davom etdi.[97] Yordam choralari soat 15:00 ga qadar ishga tushirilmadi va bu muvaffaqiyatli bo'ldi. Lang Veydagi 500 ta CIDG qo'shinlaridan 200 nafari o'lgan yoki bedarak yo'qolgan, 75 nafari yaralangan. Of the 24 Americans at the camp, 10 had been killed and 11 wounded.[98][6-eslatma]

Lownds infuriated the Special Forces personnel even further when the indigenous survivors of Lang Vei, their families, civilian refugees from the area, and Laotian survivors from the camp at Ban Houei Sane arrived at the gate of KSCB. Lownds feared that PAVN infiltrators were mixed up in the crowd of more than 6,000, and lacked sufficient resources to sustain them. Overnight, they were moved to a temporary position a short distance from the perimeter and from there, some of the Laotians were eventually evacuated, although the majority turned around and walked back down Route 9 toward Laos.[100]

The Lao troops were eventually flown back to their homeland, but not before the Laotian regional commander remarked that his army had to "consider the South Vietnamese as enemy because of their conduct."[101] The Bru were excluded from evacuation from the highlands by an order from the ARVN I Corps commander, who ruled that no Bru be allowed to move into the lowlands.[102] Ladd, back on the scene, reported that the Marines stated, "they couldn't trust any gooks in their damn camp."[103] There had been a history of distrust between the Special Forces personnel and the Marines, and General Ratvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, described the Special Forces soldiers as "hopped up ... wretches ... [who] were a law unto themselves."[104] At the end of January, Tompkins had ordered that no Marine patrols proceed more than 500 meters from the Combat Base.[68] Regardless, the SOG reconnaissance teams kept patrolling, providing the only human intelligence available in the battle area. This, however, did not prevent the Marine tanks within the perimeter from training their guns on the SOG camp.[103]

Logistics and supporting fire

Lownds estimated that the logistical requirements of KSCB were 60 tons per day in mid-January and rose to 185 tons per day when all five battalions were in place.[105] The greatest impediments to the delivery of supplies to the base were the closure of Route 9 and the winter monsoon weather. For most of the battle, low-lying clouds and fog enclosed the area from early morning until around noon, and poor visibility severely hampered aerial resupply.[57]

A C-130 delivering supplies with LAPES

Making matters worse for the defenders, any aircraft that braved the weather and attempted to land was subject to PAVN antiaircraft fire on its way in for a landing. Once the aircraft touched down, it became the target of any number of PAVN artillery or mortar crews. The aircrew then had to contend with antiaircraft fire on the way out. As a result, 65% of all supplies were delivered by paradrops delivered by C-130 aircraft, mostly by the USAF, whose crews had significantly more experience in airdrop tactics than Marine air crews.[106] The most dramatic supply delivery system used at Khe Sanh was the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System, in which palletized supplies were pulled out of the cargo bay of a low-flying transport aircraft by means of an attached parachute. The pallet slid to a halt on the airstrip while the aircraft never had to actually land.[56] The USAF delivered 14,356 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by air (8,120 tons by paradrop). 1-dengiz samolyotlari qanoti records claim that the unit delivered 4,661 tons of cargo into KSCB.[107]

Super Gaggle: CH-46 dengiz ritsari helicopters with sling loads (top) and A-4 Skyhawk provided suppressive fire.

The resupply of the numerous, isolated hill outposts was fraught with the same difficulties and dangers. The fire of PAVN antiaircraft units took its toll of helicopters that made the attempt. The Marines found a solution to the problem in the "Super Gaggle" concept. A group of 12 A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bombers provided flak suppression for massed flights of 12–16 helicopters, which would resupply the hills simultaneously. The adoption of this concept at the end of February was the turning point in the resupply effort. After its adoption, Marine helicopters flew in 465 tons of supplies during February. When the weather later cleared in March, the amount was increased to 40 tons per day.[108]

As more infantry units had been assigned to defend KSCB, artillery reinforcement kept pace. By early January, the defenders could count on fire support from 46 artillery pieces of various calibers, five tanks armed with 90-mm guns, and 92 single or Ontos -mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles.[109] The base could also depend on fire support from US Army 175-mm guns located at Lager Kerrol, east of Khe Sanh. Throughout the battle, Marine artillerymen fired 158,891 mixed rounds.[110][111][112] In addition, over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped until mid-April by aircraft of the USAF, US Navy and Marines onto the area surrounding Khe Sanh.[113] This equates to roughly 1,300 tons of bombs dropped daily — 5 tons for every one of the 20,000 PAVN soldiers initially estimated to have been committed to the fighting at Khe Sanh.[114] Marine analysis of PAVN artillery fire estimated that the PAVN gunners had fired 10,908 artillery and mortar rounds and rockets into Marine positions during the battle.[115]

Communications with military command outside of Khe Sanh was maintained by an U.S. Army Signal Corps team, the 544th Signal Detachment from the 337th Signal Company, 37th Signal Brigade in Danang. Eng so'nggi microwave/tropospheric scatter technology enabled them to maintain communications at all times. The site linked to another microwave/tropo site in Xuế manned by the 513th Signal Detachment. From the Huế site the communication signal was sent to Danang headquarters where it could be sent anywhere in the world. The microwave/tropo site was located in an underground bunker next to the airstrip.[116]

Attacks prior to relief of the base

On the night of the fall of Lang Vei, three companies of the PAVN 101D Regiment moved into jump-off positions to attack Alpha-1, an outpost just outside the Combat Base held by 66 men of Company A, 1st Platoon, 1/9 Marines. At 04:15 on 8 February under cover of fog and a mortar barrage, the PAVN penetrated the perimeter, overrunning most of the position and pushing the remaining 30 defenders into the southwestern portion of the defenses. For some unknown reason, the PAVN troops did not press their advantage and eliminate the pocket, instead throwing a steady stream of grenades at the Marines.[103] At 07:40, a relief force from Company A, 2nd Platoon set out from the main base and attacked through the PAVN, pushing them into supporting tank and artillery fire.[117] By 11:00, the battle was over, Company A had lost 24 dead and 27 wounded, while 150 PAVN bodies were found around the position, which was then abandoned.[118]

The Khe Sanh perimeter, 28 February 1968: A white dotted line indicates a PAVN trench just 200 m from 37th ARVN Rangers along the southern perimeter of Khe Sanh.

On 23 February, KSCB received its worst bombardment of the entire battle. During one 8-hour period, the base was rocked by 1,307 rounds, most of which came from 130-mm (used for the first time on the battlefield) and 152-mm artillery pieces located in Laos.[119] Casualties from the bombardment were 10 killed and 51 wounded. Two days later, US troops detected PAVN trenches running due north to within 25 m of the base perimeter.[120] The majority of these were around the southern and southeastern corners of the perimeter, and formed part of a system that would be developed throughout the end of February and into March until they were ready to be used to launch an attack, providing cover for troops to advance to jumping-off points close to the perimeter.[56] These tactics were reminiscent of those employed against the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, particularly in relation to entrenching tactics and artillery placement, and the realization assisted US planners in their targeting decisions.[121][122]

Nevertheless, the same day that the trenches were detected, 25 February, 3rd Platoon from Bravo Company 1st Battalion, 26th Marines was ambushed on a short patrol outside the base's perimeter to test the PAVN strength. The Marines pursued three enemy scouts, who led them into an ambush. The platoon withdrew following a three-hour battle that left six Marines dead, 24 missing, and one taken prisoner.[120]

An Army 175-mm M107 at Camp Carroll provides fire support for ground forces
Marine Corps sniper team searches for targets in the Khe Sanh Valley

In late February, ground sensors detected the 66th Regiment, 304th Division preparing to mount an attack on the positions of the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter.[123] On the night of 28 February, the combat base unleashed artillery and airstrikes on possible PAVN staging areas and routes of advance. At 21:30, the attack came on, but it was stifled by the small arms of the Rangers, who were supported by thousands of artillery rounds and air strikes. Two further attacks later in the morning were halted before the PAVN finally withdrew. The PAVN, however, were not through with the ARVN troops. Five more attacks against their sector were launched during March.[123]

By mid-March, Marine intelligence began to note an exodus of PAVN units from the Khe Sanh sector.[123] The 325C Divisional Headquarters was the first to leave, followed by the 95C and 101D Regiments, all of which relocated to the west. At the same time, the 304th Division withdrew to the southwest. That did not mean, however, that battle was over. On 22 March, over 1,000 North Vietnamese rounds fell on the base, and once again, the ammunition dump was detonated.[124]

On 30 March, Bravo Company, 26th Marines, launched an attack toward the location of the ambush that had claimed so many of their comrades on 25 February. Following a rolling barrage fired by nine artillery batteries, the Marine attack advanced through two PAVN trenchlines, but the Marines failed to locate the remains of the men of the ambushed patrol. The Marines claimed 115 PAVN killed, while their own casualties amounted to 10 dead, 100 wounded, and two missing.[125] At 08:00 the following day, Operation Scotland was officially terminated. Operational control of the Khe Sanh area was handed over to the US Army's 1-havo otliq diviziyasi for the duration of Operation Pegasus.[115]

Cumulative friendly casualties for Operation Scotland, which began on 1 November 1967, were: 205 killed in action, 1,668 wounded, and 25 missing and presumed dead.[126] These figures do not include casualties among Special Forces troops at Lang Vei, aircrews killed or missing in the area, or Marine replacements killed or wounded while entering or exiting the base aboard aircraft. As far as PAVN casualties were concerned, 1,602 bodies were counted, seven prisoners were taken, and two soldiers defected to allied forces during the operation. American intelligence estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 PAVN troops were killed during the operation, equating to up to 90% of the attacking 17,200-man PAVN force.[115][126] The PAVN acknowledged 2,500 men killed in action.[127] They also reported 1,436 wounded before mid-March, of which 484 men returned to their units, while 396 were sent up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to hospitals in the north.[18]

President Johnson orders that the base be held at all costs

The fighting at Khe Sanh was so volatile that the Joint Chiefs and MACV commanders were uncertain that the base could be held by the Marines. In the US, the media following the battle drew comparisons with the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu, which proved disastrous for the French.[128][129] Nevertheless, according to Tom Johnson, President Johnson was "determined that Khe Sanh [would not] be an 'American Dien Bien Phu'". He subsequently ordered the US military to hold Khe Sanh at all costs. As a result, "B-52 Arc Light strikes originating in Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand bombed the jungles surrounding Khe Sanh into stubble fields" and Khe Sanh became the major news headline coming out of Vietnam in late March 1968.[130]

Relief and retreat from Khe Sanh

Operation Pegasus (1–14 April 1968)

Planning for the overland relief of Khe Sanh had begun as early as 25 January 1968, when Westmoreland ordered General Jon J. Tolson, commander, First Cavalry Division, to prepare a contingency plan. Route 9, the only practical overland route from the east, was impassable due to its poor state of repair and the presence of PAVN troops. Tolson was not happy with the assignment, since he believed that the best course of action, after Tet, was to use his division in an attack into the Shau ​​vodiysi. Westmoreland, however, was already planning ahead. Khe Sanh would be relieved and then used as the jump-off point for a "hot pursuit" of enemy forces into Laos.[131]

On 2 March, Tolson laid out what became known as Operation Pegasus, the operational plan for what was to become the largest operation launched by III MAF thus far in the conflict. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (2/1 Marines) and the 2/3 Marines would launch a ground assault from Ca Lu jangovar bazasi (16 km east of Khe Sanh) and head west on Route 9 while the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Cavalry Division, would air-assault key terrain features along Route 9 to establish fire support bases and cover the Marine advance. The advance would be supported by 102 pieces of artillery.[132] The Marines would be accompanied by their 11th Engineer Battalion, which would repair the road as the advance moved forward. Later, the 1/1 Marines and 3rd ARVN Airborne Task Force (the 3rd, 6th, and 8th Airborne Battalions) would join the operation.[133]

Soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division moving towards Khe Sanh Combat Base during Operation Pegasus

Westmoreland's planned relief effort infuriated the Marines, who had not wanted to hold Khe Sanh in the first place and who had been roundly criticized for not defending it well.[134] The Marines had constantly argued that technically, Khe Sanh had never been under siege, since it had never truly been isolated from resupply or reinforcement. Cushman was appalled by the "implication of a rescue or breaking of the siege by outside forces."[135]

Regardless, on 1 April, Operation Pegasus began.[136] Opposition from the North Vietnamese was light and the primary problem that hampered the advance was continual heavy morning cloud cover that slowed the pace of helicopter operations. As the relief force made progress, the Marines at Khe Sanh moved out from their positions and began patrolling at greater distances from the base. Things heated up for the air cavalrymen on 6 April, when the 3rd Brigade encountered a PAVN blocking force and fought a day-long engagement.[137]

On the following day, the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry captured the old French fort near Khe Sanh village after a three-day battle. The link-up between the relief force and the Marines at KSCB took place at 08:00 on 8 April, when the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment entered the camp.[138] The 11th Engineers proclaimed Route 9 open to traffic on 11 April. On that day, Tolson ordered his unit to immediately make preparations for Delaver operatsiyasi, an air assault into the A Shau Valley.[137] At 08:00 on 15 April, Operation Pegasus was officially terminated.[139] Total US casualties during the operation were 92 killed, 667 wounded, and five missing. Thirty-three ARVN troops were also killed and 187 were wounded.[140] Because of the close proximity of the enemy and their high concentration, the massive B-52 bombings, tactical airstrikes, and vast use of artillery, PAVN casualties were estimated by MACV as being between 10,000 and 15,000 men.[141]

Lownds and the 26th Marines departed Khe Sanh, leaving the defense of the base to the 1st Marine Regiment. He made his final appearance in the story of Khe Sanh on 23 May, when his regimental sergeant major and he stood before President Johnson and were presented with a Prezident bo'limi ma'lumotnomasi on behalf of the 26th Marines.[142][143]

Shotlandiya II operatsiyasi

Asosiy maqola: Shotlandiya II operatsiyasi

On 15 April, the 3rd Marine Division resumed responsibility for KSCB, Operation Pegasus ended, and Operation Scotland II began with the Marines seeking out the PAVN in the surrounding area.[139] Operation Scotland II would continue until 28 February 1969 resulting in 435 Marines and 3304 PAVN killed.[144]

Author Peter Brush details that an "additional 413 Marines were killed during Scotland II through the end of June 1968".[1] He goes on to state that a further 72 were killed as part Operation Scotland II throughout the remainder of the year, but that these deaths are not included in the official US casualty lists for the Battle of Khe Sanh. Twenty-five USAF personnel who were killed are also not included.[1]

Operation Charlie: evacuation of the base

3/4 Marines memorial service at the base

The evacuation of Khe Sanh began on 19 June 1968 as Operation Charlie.[145] Useful equipment was withdrawn or destroyed, and personnel were evacuated. A limited attack was made by a PAVN company on 1 July, falling on a company from the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, who were holding a position 3 km to the southeast of the base. Casualties were heavy among the attacking PAVN, who lost over 200 killed, while the defending Marines lost two men.[146] The official closure of the base came on 5 July after fighting, which had killed five more Marines. The withdrawal of the last Marines under the cover of darkness was hampered by the shelling of a bridge along Route 9, which had to be repaired before the withdrawal could be completed.[7]

Following the closure of the base, a small force of Marines remained around Hill 689 carrying out mopping-up operations.[7] Further fighting followed, resulting in the loss of another 11 Marines and 89 PAVN soldiers, before the Marines finally withdrew from the area on 11 July.[1] According to Brush, it was "the only occasion in which Americans abandoned a major combat base due to enemy pressure" and in the aftermath, the North Vietnamese began a strong propaganda campaign, seeking to exploit the US withdrawal and to promote the message that the withdrawal had not been by choice.[1]

The PAVN claim that they began attacking the withdrawing Americans on 26 June 1968 prolonging the withdrawal, killing 1,300 Americans and shooting down 34 aircraft before "liberating" Khe Sanh on 15 July. The PAVN claim that during the entire battle they "eliminated" 17,000 enemy troops, including 13,000 Americans and destroyed 480 aircraft.[147]

Regardless, the PAVN had gained control of a strategically important area, and its lines of communication extended further into South Vietnam.[10] Once the news of the closure of KSCB was announced, the American media immediately raised questions about the reasoning behind its abandonment. They asked what had changed in six months so that American commanders were willing to abandon Khe Sanh in July. The explanations given out by the Saigon command were that "the enemy had changed his tactics and reduced his forces; that PAVN had carved out new infiltration routes; that the Marines now had enough troops and helicopters to carry out mobile operations; that a fixed base was no longer necessary."[148]

While KSCB was abandoned, the Marines continued to patrol the Khe Sanh plateau, including reoccupying the area with ARVN forces from 5–19 October 1968 with minimal opposition.[149] On 31 December 1968, the 3-razvedka batalyoni was landed west of Khe Sanh to commence Operation Dawson River West, on 2 January 1969 the 9th Marines and 2nd ARVN Regiment were also deployed on the plateau supported by the newly established Fire Support Bases Geiger and Smith; the 3-week operation found no significant PAVN forces or supplies in the Khe Sanh area.[150] From 12 June to 6 July 1969, Task Force Guadalcanal comprising 1/9 Marines, 1-batalyon, 5-piyoda polki and 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 2nd ARVN Regiment occupied the Khe Sanh area in Yuta Mesa operatsiyasi.[151] The Marines occupied Tepalik 950 overlooking the Khe Sanh plateau from 1966 until September 1969 when control was handed to the Army who used the position as a SOG operations and support base until it was overrun by the PAVN in June 1971.[152][153] The gradual withdrawal of US forces began during 1969 and the adoption of Vetnamlashtirish meant that, by 1969, "although limited tactical offensives abounded, US military participation in the war would soon be relegated to a defensive stance."[154]

According to military historian Ronald Spektor, to reasonably record the fighting at Khe Sanh as an American victory is impossible.[7] With the abandonment of the base, according to Thomas Ricks, "Khe Sanh became etched in the minds of many Americans as a symbol of the pointless sacrifice and muddled tactics that permeated a doomed U.S. war effort in Vietnam".[155]

Natijada

Termination of the McNamara Line

Commencing in 1966, the US had attempted to establish a barrier system across the DMZ to prevent infiltration by North Vietnamese troops. Nomi bilan tanilgan McNamara Line, it was initially codenamed "Project Nine" before being renamed "Dye Marker" by MACV in September 1967. This occurred just as the PAVN began the first phase of their offensive, launching attacks against Marine-held positions across the DMZ. These attacks hindered the advancement of the McNamara Line, and as the fighting around Khe Sanh intensified, vital equipment including sensors and other hardware had to be diverted from elsewhere to meet the needs of the US garrison at Khe Sanh. Construction on the line was ultimately abandoned and resources were later diverted towards implementing a more mobile strategy.[9]

Baholash

The precise nature of Hanoi's strategic goal at Khe Sanh is regarded as one of the most intriguing unanswered questions of the Vietnam War. According to Gordon Rottman, even the North Vietnamese official history, Victory in Vietnam, is largely silent on the issue.[156] This question, known among American historians as the "riddle of Khe Sanh" has been summed up by John Prados and Ray Stubbe: "Either the Tet Offensive was a diversion intended to facilitate PAVN/VC preparations for a war-winning battle at Khe Sanh, or Khe Sanh was a diversion to mesmerize Westmoreland in the days before Tet."[157] In assessing North Vietnamese intentions, Peter Brush cites the Vietnamese theater commander, Võ Nguyên Giap 's claim "that Khe Sanh itself was not of importance, but only a diversion to draw U.S. forces away from the populated areas of South Vietnam".[158] This has led other observers to conclude that the siege served a wider PAVN strategy; it diverted 30,000 US troops away from the cities that were the main targets of the Tet Offensive.[159]

Whether the PAVN actually planned to capture Khe Sanh and whether the battle was an attempt to replicate the Việt Minh triumph against the French at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu has long been a point of contention. Westmoreland believed that the latter was the case and this belief was the basis for his desire to stage "Dien Bien Phu in reverse".[160] Those who agree with Westmoreland reason that no other explanation exists as to why Hanoi would have committed so many forces to the area instead of deploying them for the Tet Offensive. The fact that the North Vietnamese only committed about half of their available forces to the offensive (60–70,000), the majority of whom were VC, is cited in favor of Westmoreland's argument. Other theories argued that the forces around Khe Sanh were simply a localized defensive measure in the DMZ area, or that they were serving as a reserve in case of an offensive American end run in the mode of the American invasion at Inchon davomida Koreya urushi. However, North Vietnamese sources claim that the Americans did not win a victory at Khe Sanh, but they were forced to retreat to avoid destruction. The PAVN claimed that Khe Sanh was "a stinging defeat from both the military and political points of view": Westmoreland was replaced two months after the end of the battle and his successor explained the retreat in different ways.[7]

General Wallace Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps (l), Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, III MAF Commander (c), and General William Westmoreland (r)

Umumiy Kreyton Abrams has also suggested that the North Vietnamese may have been planning to emulate Dien Bien Phu. He believed that the PAVN's actions during Tet proved it.[161] He cited the fact that it would have taken longer to dislodge the North Vietnamese at Hue if the PAVN had committed the three divisions at Khe Sanh to the battle there (although the PAVN did commit three regiments to the fighting from the Khe Sanh sector), instead of dividing their forces.[162]

Another interpretation was that the North Vietnamese were planning to work both ends against the middle. This strategy has come to be known as the Option Play. If the PAVN could take Khe Sanh, all well and good for them. If they could not, they would occupy the attention of as many American and South Vietnamese forces in I Corps as they could to facilitate the Tet Offensive.[163] This view was supported by a captured (in 1969) North Vietnamese study of the battle. According to it, the PAVN would have taken Khe Sanh if they could, but the price they were willing to pay had limits. Their main objectives were to inflict casualties on US troops and to isolate them in the remote border regions.[164]

Another theory is that the actions around Khe Sanh (and the other border battles) were simply a feint, a ruse meant to focus American attention (and forces) on the border. General and historian Dave Palmer accepts this rationale: "General Giap never had any intention of capturing Khe Sanh ... [it] was a feint, a diversionary effort. And it had accomplished its purpose magnificently."[165][7-eslatma]

Marine General Rathvon M. Tompkins, commander of the 3rd Marine Division, has pointed out that had the PAVN actually intended to take Khe Sanh, PAVN troops could have cut the base's sole source of water, a stream 500 m outside the perimeter of the base. Had they simply contaminated the stream, the airlift would not have provided enough water to the Marines.[127] Marine Lieutenant General Viktor Krulak seconded the notion that there was never a serious intention to take the base by also arguing that neither the water supply nor the telephone land lines were ever cut by the PAVN.[167][168]

Khe Sanh airstrip, December 2006

One argument leveled by Westmoreland at the time (and often quoted by historians of the battle) was that only two Marine regiments were tied down at Khe Sanh compared with several PAVN divisions.[169] At the time Hanoi made the decision to move in around the base, though, Khe Sanh was held by only two (or even just one) American battalions. Whether the destruction of one battalion could have been the goal of two to four PAVN divisions was debatable. Yet, even if Westmoreland believed his statement, his argument never moved on to the next logical level. By the end of January 1968, he had moved half of all US combat troops—nearly 50 maneuver battalions—to I Corps.[170]

Use during Operation Lam Son 719

On 30 January 1971, the ARVN and US forces launched Dewey Canyon II operatsiyasi, which involved the reopening of Route 9, securing the Khe Sanh area and reoccupying of KSCB as a forward supply base for Lam Son 719. On 8 February 1971, the leading ARVN units marched along Route 9 into southern Laos while the US ground forces and advisers were prohibited from entering Laos. US logistical, aerial, and artillery support was provided to the operation.[171][172] Following the ARVN defeat in Laos, the newly re-opened KSCB came under attack by PAVN sappers and artillery and the base was abandoned once again on 6 April 1971.[173][174]

Adabiyotlar

Izohlar

  1. ^ Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 – U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. The low figure often cited for US casualties (205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing) does not take into account U.S. Army or Air Force casualties or those incurred during Operation Pegasus.[15]
  2. ^ For a succinct overview of the creation of the CIDG program and its operations.[20]
  3. ^ Only nine US battalions were available from Hue/Phu Bai northward.[44]
  4. ^ Westmoreland had been forwarding operational plans for an invasion of Laos since 1966. First there had been Operation Full Cry, the original three-division invasion plan. This was superseded by the smaller contingency plans Southpaw va High Port (1967). With Operation El Paso the General returned to a three-divisional plan in 1968. Another plan (York) envisioned the use of even larger forces.[46][47]
  5. ^ A myth has grown up around this incident. The dead men have been described as wearing Marine uniforms; that they were a regimental commander and his staff on a reconnaissance; and that they were all identified, by name, by American intelligence.[58]
  6. ^ The official North Vietnamese history claimed that 400 South Vietnamese troops had been killed and 253 captured. It claimed, however, that only three American advisors were killed during the action.[99]
  7. ^ This is also the position taken in the official PAVN history, but which offers no further explanation of the strategy.[166]

Iqtiboslar

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  165. ^ Palmer, p. 219.
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  167. ^ Krulak, p. 218.
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  169. ^ Pisor, p. 240.
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Manbalar

Nashr qilinmagan davlat hujjatlari

  • AQSh harbiy yordam qo'mondonligi, Vetnam, Buyruq tarixi 1965 yil, Ilova N. Saygon, 1966 yil.
  • AQSh harbiy yordam qo'mondonligi, Vetnam, Buyruq tarixi 1966 yil, M. Saygon, 1967 yil.

Nashr qilingan davlat hujjatlari

  • Xinh, Nguyen Duy (1979). Lam Sơn operatsiyasi 719. Vashington, Kolumbiya: Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasining harbiy tarix markazi. OCLC  227845251.
  • Vetnam harbiy tarix instituti (2002). Vetnamdagi g'alaba: Vetnam Xalq armiyasining tarixi, 1954–1975. trans. Pribbenov, Merle. Lourens KS: Kanzas universiteti matbuoti. ISBN  0-7006-1175-4.
  • Nalti, Bernard C. (1986). Havo quvvati va Khe Sanh uchun kurash (PDF). Vashington, Kolumbiya: Havo kuchlari tarixi idorasi. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi (PDF) 2003 yil 10 aprelda. LCC  DS557.8.K5 N34 1986 yil
  • Pearson, Willard (2013) [1975]. Shimoliy provintsiyalardagi urush 1966-1968 yy. Vetnam tadqiqotlari. Vashington, Kolumbiya: Armiya departamenti. ISBN  978-0-16-092093-6.
  • Shore, Moyars S. III (1969). Khe Sanh jangi. Vashington, DC: AQSh dengiz piyodalari korpusining tarixiy bo'limi. OCLC  923350777.
  • Shulimson, Jek; Blaisol, Leonard; Smit, Charlz R.; Douson, Devid (1997). AQSh dengiz piyodalari Vetnamda: 1968 yil, hal qiluvchi yil. Vashington, DC: Tarix va muzeylar bo'limi, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining dengiz piyodalari korpusi. ISBN  0-16-049125-8.
  • Telfer, Gari L.; Rojers, Leyn; Fleming, V. Keyt (1984). AQSh dengiz piyodalari Vetnamda: 1967 yil, Shimoliy Vetnamliklar bilan kurash. Vashington, DC: Tarix va muzeylar bo'limi, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining dengiz piyodalari korpusi. LCC  DS558.4 .U55 1977 yil
  • Van Staaveren, Jakob (1993). Janubiy Laosdagi taqiq, 1961-1968. Vashington, DC: Havo kuchlari tarixi markazi. LCC  DS558.8 .V36 1993 yil

Avtobiografiyalar

Ikkilamchi manbalar

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Tashqi havolalar

Vetnam urushi vaqt jadvali
DRV Bosh kotib: Lê Duẩn / Prezident: Xoshimin
Bosh kotib: Lê Duẩn / Prezident: Tôn Đức Thắng
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