Valyuta urushi - Currency war

Braziliya moliya vaziri Gvido Mantega, a haqida signalni ko'targanida, kim sarlavhalarni yaratdi valyuta urushi 2010 yil sentyabr oyida.

Valyuta urushi, shuningdek, nomi bilan tanilgan raqobatdosh devalvatsiyalar, sharti xalqaro ishlar bu erda mamlakatlar boshqa mamlakatlarga nisbatan savdo ustunligini keltirib chiqarishga intilib valyuta kursi ularning valyuta boshqa valyutalarga nisbatan tushish. Mamlakat valyutasi kursining pasayishi bilan boshqa mamlakatlarda eksport raqobatbardosh bo'lib, mamlakatga import tobora qimmatlashmoqda. Ikkala ta'sir ham ichki sanoatga va shu bilan ish bilan ta'minlashga yordam beradi, bu ichki va tashqi bozorlardan talabni kuchaytiradi. Biroq, import qilinadigan tovarlar narxining ko'tarilishi (shuningdek, chet elga sayohat narxining oshishi) mashhur emas, chunki ular fuqarolarga zarar etkazmoqda sotib olish qobiliyati; va barcha mamlakatlar o'xshash strategiyani qabul qilganda, bu umumiy pasayishga olib kelishi mumkin xalqaro savdo, barcha mamlakatlarga zarar etkazish.

Tarixiy jihatdan raqobatbardosh devalvatsiyalar kamdan-kam uchraydi, chunki mamlakatlar odatda o'z valyutalari uchun yuqori qiymatni saqlashni afzal ko'rishadi. Mamlakatlar odatda bozor kuchlariga ishlashga ruxsat berdilar yoki boshqariladigan almashinuv kurslari tizimlarida qatnashdilar. Istisno 1930-yillarda valyuta urushi boshlanib, mamlakatlar undan voz kechganda yuz berdi oltin standart davomida Katta depressiya va ularning iqtisodiyotini rag'batlantirish maqsadida valyuta devalvatsiyasidan foydalanganlar. Bu chet elda ishsizlikni samarali ravishda kuchaytirayotganligi sababli, savdo sheriklari tezda o'zlarining qadrsizlanishlari bilan qasos olishdi. Ushbu davr barcha manfaatdorlar uchun noqulay vaziyat bo'lgan deb hisoblanadi, chunki valyuta kurslarining oldindan aytib bo'lmaydigan o'zgarishi umumiy xalqaro savdoni pasaytirdi.

Ga binoan Gvido Mantega, Braziliyaning sobiq moliya vaziri, 2010 yilda global valyuta urushi boshlandi. Bu fikrni dunyoning ko'plab boshqa hukumat amaldorlari va moliya jurnalistlari qo'llab-quvvatladilar. Boshqa yuqori martabali siyosatchilar va jurnalistlar "valyuta urushi" iborasini dushmanlik darajasini oshirib yuborishni taklif qilishdi. Mantega kabi bir qator istisnolardan tashqari, hatto 2010 yilda valyuta urushi bo'lganiga rozi bo'lgan sharhlovchilar odatda 2011 yil o'rtalariga kelib bu urush yuz berdi degan xulosaga kelishdi.

2010 yildan buyon yuzaga kelishi mumkin bo'lgan raqobatbardosh devalvatsiyani boshdan kechirayotgan davlatlar siyosat vositalaridan, shu jumladan hukumatning to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aralashuvidan foydalangan kapitalni boshqarish va bilvosita, miqdoriy yumshatish. Ko'pgina mamlakatlar o'zlarining valyuta kurslariga nisbatan istalmagan yuqori bosimni boshdan kechirgan va davom etayotgan bahslarda qatnashgan bo'lsalar-da, 2010-11 epizodning eng ko'zga ko'ringan o'lchovi AQSh va Xitoy o'rtasidagi valyutani baholash bo'yicha ritorik ziddiyat edi. yuan. 2013 yil yanvar oyida Yaponiya tomonidan e'lon qilingan va uning valyutasini qadrini pasaytirishi kutilayotgan choralar, ikkinchi 21-asrdagi valyuta urushi boshlanishidan xavotir uyg'otdi, bu safar tanglikning asosiy manbai Xitoyga qarshi AQShga emas, balki Yaponiyaga qarshi Evro hududiga bog'liq edi. Fevral oyi oxiriga kelib, valyuta urushining yangi boshlanishidan xavotirlar asosan keyinroq engillashtirildi G7 va G20 raqobatbardosh devalvatsiyani oldini olish majburiyatini olgan bayonotlar. Keyin Evropa Markaziy banki ning yangi dasturini ishga tushirdi miqdoriy yumshatish 2015 yil yanvar oyida yana valyuta urushi haqida munozaralar kuchaygan.

Fon

Yo'qligida valyuta bozoriga aralashish milliy hukumat idoralari tomonidan mamlakat valyutasining kursi, umuman olganda, ma'lum bir vaqtdagi talab va taklifning bozor kuchlari bilan belgilanadi. Hukumat organlari vaqti-vaqti bilan bozorga aralashishi mumkin, masalan, uni saqlab qolish kabi aniq siyosat maqsadlariga erishish uchun savdo balansi yoki eksportchilariga xalqaro savdoda raqobatbardosh ustunlik berish.

Qasddan qadrsizlanish sabablari

Kümülatif joriy hisob qoldiq 1980–2008 (milliard AQSh dollari) asosida Xalqaro valyuta fondi ma'lumotlar.

Devalvatsiya, uning salbiy oqibatlari bilan tarixan kamdan-kam hollarda afzal qilingan strategiya bo'lib kelgan. Iqtisodchining fikriga ko'ra Richard N. Kuper, 1971 yilda yozilgan, sezilarli devalvatsiya hukumat qabul qilishi mumkin bo'lgan eng "travmatik" siyosatdir - bu deyarli har doim g'azab va hukumatni almashtirishga chaqirgan.[1] Devalvatsiya fuqarolarning kamayishiga olib kelishi mumkin turmush darajasi ularnikidek sotib olish qobiliyati importni sotib olayotganda ham, chet elga sayohat qilishda ham kamayadi. Bundan tashqari, qo'shilishi mumkin inflyatsion bosim. Agar bu qarzlar chet el valyutasida bo'lsa, devalvatsiya xalqaro qarzlar bo'yicha foizlarni to'lashni qimmatroq qilishi mumkin va bu chet ellik investorlarni tushkunlikka solishi mumkin. Hech bo'lmaganda 21-asrga qadar kuchli valyuta odatda obro'-e'tibor belgisi sifatida qaraldi, devalvatsiya esa zaif hukumatlar bilan bog'liq edi.[2]

Biroq, mamlakat ishsizlikdan aziyat chekayotganida yoki eksportga asoslangan o'sish siyosatini olib borishni istaganida, valyuta kursining pastligi foydali deb qaralishi mumkin. 1980-yillarning boshlaridan boshlab Xalqaro valyuta fondi (XMF) devalvatsiyani eksportdan ko'ra ko'proq pul sarflaydigan rivojlanayotgan davlatlar uchun potentsial echim sifatida taklif qildi. Uy valyutasining past qiymati eksportni arzonlashtirganda, import narxini oshiradi.[3] Bu ish bilan bandlikni va yalpi ichki mahsulotni (YaIM) oshiradigan ko'proq mahalliy ishlab chiqarishni rag'batlantirishga intiladi. Bunday ijobiy ta'sir kafolatlanmagan, ammo masalan, ta'siridan kelib chiqqan holda Marshal-Lerner holati.[4] Devalvatsiya ishsizlikni jozibali echim sifatida ko'rib chiqilishi mumkin, masalan, davlat xarajatlari ko'payishi kabi boshqa variantlar, davlat qarzi yuqori bo'lganligi sababli chiqarib tashlansa yoki davlatda to'lov balansi defitsiti qaysi devalvatsiya tuzatishga yordam beradi. Rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlar orasida keng tarqalgan devalvatsiyani afzal ko'rishning sababi shundaki, nisbatan past kursni ushlab turish, ularga kelajakdagi moliyaviy inqirozlardan himoya qila oladigan valyuta zaxiralarini yaratishga yordam beradi.[5][6][7]

Devalvatsiya mexanizmi

Devalvatsiya qilishni xohlagan yoki hech bo'lmaganda o'z valyutasining qadrini tekshirishni istagan davlat amal qilayotgan cheklovlar doirasida ishlashi kerak. Xalqaro valyuta tizimi. 1930-yillarda mamlakatlar o'zlarining valyuta kurslari ustidan o'zlarining markaziy banklari harakatlari orqali nisbatan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri nazorat qilishgan. Qulashi ortidan Bretton-Vuds tizimi 1970-yillarning boshlarida bozorlar ta'sir kuchini sezilarli darajada oshirdi, bozor kuchlari asosan tobora ko'payib borayotgan mamlakatlar uchun valyuta kurslarini belgilab berdi. Biroq, shtat markaziy banki devalvatsiyani amalga oshirish uchun bozorlarga aralashishi mumkin - agar u boshqa valyutalarni sotib olish uchun o'z valyutasini sotsa[8] unda bu o'z valyutasi qiymatining pasayishiga olib keladi - a bo'lgan davlatlar uchun odatiy amaliyot boshqariladigan valyuta kursi rejimi. To'g'ridan-to'g'ri, miqdoriy yumshatish (2009 va 2010 yillarda keng tarqalgan), hatto Markaziy bank to'g'ridan-to'g'ri chet el aktivlarini sotib olmasa ham, valyuta qiymatining pasayishiga olib keladi.

Uchinchi usul - bu hokimiyat uchun shunchaki spekulyantlarni kelajakdagi o'sishga garov tikishga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun kelajakdagi harakatlariga ishora qilish orqali o'z valyutalarining qiymatini gapirib berishdir, ammo ba'zida bu unchalik sezilmas ta'sirga ega. Va nihoyat, markaziy bank o'zining asosiy foiz stavkasini pasaytirish orqali devalvatsiyani amalga oshirishi mumkin; ammo bu ba'zida cheklangan ta'sirga ega va Ikkinchi Jahon urushi tugaganidan beri aksariyat markaziy banklar o'zlarining asosiy stavkalarini o'zlarining ichki iqtisodiyoti ehtiyojlariga qarab belgilaydilar.[9][7]

Agar mamlakat ma'murlari valyuta ustidan bosim o'tkazayotgan bozor kuchlariga nisbatan qadrsizlanishni pasaytirishni yoki oldini olishni istasalar va odatdagidek foiz stavkalari ustidan nazoratni ushlab tursalar, ularga kerak bo'ladi kapitalni boshqarish joyida - tufayli yuzaga keladigan sharoitlar tufayli imkonsiz uchlik trilemmasi.[10]

Miqdoriy yumshatish

Miqdoriy yumshatish (QE) bu amaliyot bo'lib, unda a markaziy bank potentsial yoki dolzarblikni kamaytirishga harakat qiladi turg'unlik oshirish orqali pul ta'minoti uning ichki iqtisodiyoti uchun. Buni pulni bosib chiqarish orqali va uni ichki iqtisodiyotga kiritish orqali amalga oshirish mumkin ochiq bozor operatsiyalari. Inflyatsiyani oldini olish uchun iqtisodiyot yaxshilanganidan keyin har qanday yangi yaratilgan pullarni yo'q qilishga va'da berilishi mumkin.

Bunga javob sifatida miqdoriy yumshatish keng qo'llanilgan 2007 yilda boshlangan moliyaviy inqirozlar, ayniqsa, Qo'shma Shtatlar va Buyuk Britaniya tomonidan va ozgina bo'lsa ham Evro hududi.[11] The Yaponiya banki bunday siyosatdan foydalanganligini da'vo qilgan birinchi markaziy bank edi.[12][13]

Garchi AQSh ma'muriyati ularning valyutasini qadrsizlantirish ularning miqdoriy yumshatishni amalga oshirish maqsadlarining bir qismi ekanligini rad etgan bo'lsa-da, ushbu amaliyot mamlakat valyutasini ikki bilvosita yo'l bilan qadrsizlantirish uchun harakat qilishi mumkin. Birinchidan, bu chayqovchilarni valyuta qiymatining pasayishiga pul tikishga undashi mumkin. Ikkinchidan, ichki pul massasining katta o'sishi ichki foiz stavkalarini pasaytiradi, ko'pincha ular miqdoriy yumshatishni qo'llamaydigan mamlakatlarda foiz stavkalariga nisbatan ancha past bo'ladi. Bu a uchun sharoit yaratadi savdoni olib borish, bu erda bozor ishtirokchilari bir shakl bilan shug'ullanishlari mumkin hakamlik sudi, miqdoriy yumshatish amaliyotini amalga oshiradigan mamlakat valyutasida qarz olish va foiz nisbati nisbatan yuqori bo'lgan mamlakatda qarz berish. Xalqaro bozorlarda miqdoriy yumshatish uchun foydalanilayotgan valyutani samarali ravishda sotayotganliklari sababli, bu valyuta taklifini oshirishi va shuning uchun uning qiymatini pasaytirishi mumkin. 2010 yil oktyabr oyiga qadar bozorlarda AQSh, Buyuk Britaniya va Yaponiya tez orada QE ning ikkinchi bosqichiga o'tishi kutilgan edi, Evro hududining ularga qo'shilish istiqbollari esa unchalik aniq emas edi.[14]

2010 yil noyabr oyining boshlarida Qo'shma Shtatlar kutilgan miqdordagi yumshatilishning ikkinchi bosqichi bo'lgan QE2 ni ishga tushirdi. The Federal zaxira moliyaviy aktivlarni sotib olish uchun qo'shimcha 600 milliard dollarni tashkil etdi. Bu Xitoy, Germaniya va Braziliya tomonidan AQShning QE2 dan foydalanib, o'z valyutasini qadrsizlantirishga harakat qilayotgani, natijada rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlarga kapital oqimi ta'sirini inobatga olmasdan tanqid qilmoqda.[15][16][17]

Kabi tanqidiy mamlakatlarning ba'zi etakchi arboblari Chjou Xiaochuan, hokimi Xitoy Xalq banki, QE2 Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari oldida turgan muammolarni hisobga olgan holda tushunarli ekanligini ta'kidladilar. Xitoy moliya vaziri o'rinbosari Van Jun QE2 "global iqtisodiyotni tiklashga ulkan yordam berishi" mumkinligini aytdi.[18] Prezident Barak Obama QE2 ni himoya qildi va bu AQSh iqtisodiyotining o'sishiga yordam beradi, bu "butun dunyo uchun foydali" bo'ladi.[19] Yaponiya AQShga qaraganda kamroq bo'lsa-da, miqdoriy yumshatilishning ikkinchi bosqichini boshladi; Buyuk Britaniya va Evro hududi 2010 yilda qo'shimcha QE ni ishga tushirmadi.

Valyuta urushi uchun zarur bo'lgan xalqaro shartlar

Keng miqyosli valyuta urushi paydo bo'lishi uchun muhim iqtisodiyotlarning katta qismi o'z valyutalarini birdaniga qadrsizlantirishni xohlashlari kerak. Bu hozirgacha faqat global iqtisodiy tanazzul paytida yuz bergan.

Shaxsiy valyutaning devalvatsiyasi kamida bitta boshqa valyuta uchun qiymatning mos ravishda ko'tarilishini o'z ichiga olishi kerak. Tegishli o'sish odatda boshqa barcha valyutalarga tarqaladi[20] va shuning uchun agar devalvatsiya qiladigan mamlakat ulkan iqtisodiyotga ega bo'lmasa va sezilarli darajada qadrsizlanmasa, har qanday individual valyutaning o'rnini bosuvchi o'sishi kichik yoki hatto ahamiyatsiz bo'ladi. Oddiy vaqtlarda boshqa mamlakatlar ko'pincha o'z valyutalari qiymatining ozgina ko'tarilishini qabul qilishadi yoki eng yomoni unga befarq bo'lishadi. Ammo, agar dunyoning aksariyat qismi tanazzuldan aziyat chekayotgan bo'lsa, yoki past o'sishdan yoki qulay to'lov balansiga bog'liq bo'lgan strategiyalarni amalga oshirayotgan bo'lsa, u holda davlatlar qadrsizlanish uchun o'zaro raqobatlasha boshlashlari mumkin. Bunday sharoitda, ozgina davlatlar aralashishni boshlagach, ular o'zlarining eksport raqobatbardoshligini yanada yomonlashuviga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun boshqalarning tegishli aralashuvlarini boshlashlari mumkin.[21]

Tarixiy obzor

1930 yilgacha

Ming yillar davomida hech bo'lmaganda orqaga qaytish Klassik davr, hukumatlar ko'pincha o'z valyutalarini pasaytirish orqali qadrsizlantirishdi ichki qiymat.[22] Tangalar tarkibidagi oltin foizini kamaytirish yoki kamroq qimmatbaho metallarni oltinga almashtirish usullariga kiritilgan. Biroq, 19-asrga qadar,[23] davlatlar o'rtasida sodir bo'lgan jahon savdosining ulushi juda past edi, shuning uchun valyuta kurslari umuman tashvishga soladigan narsa emas edi.[24] Eksport qiluvchilarga yordam berish vositasi sifatida ko'rilgandan ko'ra, valyutaning pasayishi ichki pul massasini va hukmron hokimiyatning boyligini ko'paytirish istagi bilan yuzaga keldi. senyoraj, ayniqsa, ular urushlarni moliyalashtirish yoki qarzlarni to'lash kerak bo'lganda. Davomida sezilarli devalvatsiya sodir bo'ldi Napoleon urushlari. Xalqlar iqtisodiy jihatdan raqobatlashishni xohlaganlarida, ular odatda mashq qilishardi merkantilizm - bu hali ham eksportni kuchaytirishga, importni cheklashga urinishlarni o'z ichiga olgan, ammo kamdan-kam hollarda devalvatsiya orqali.[25] Qulay usul edi uy sanoatini himoya qilish foydalanish joriy hisob kabi boshqaruv elementlari tariflar. 18-asr oxiridan va ayniqsa 19-asrning ko'p qismida dunyodagi eng yirik iqtisodiyot bo'lgan Buyuk Britaniyada merkantilizm raqib nazariyasi bilan tobora obro'sizlana boshladi. erkin savdo Bu farovonlikni rag'batlantirishning eng yaxshi usuli savdo-sotiqning hukumat tomonidan o'rnatilgan nazoratisiz amalga oshishiga imkon berish deb hisoblagan. Pulning ichki qiymati a bilan rasmiylashtirildi oltin standart Taxminan 1870-1914 yillarda keng qabul qilingan, shuning uchun jahon iqtisodiyoti raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya yuzaga kelishi uchun etarlicha integratsiyalashgan paytda imkoniyat juda kam edi. Birinchi Jahon urushi tugaganidan so'ng, AQShdan tashqari ko'plab mamlakatlar tanazzulni boshdan kechirdilar va bir nechtasi zudlik bilan oltin standartga qaytishdi, shuning uchun valyuta urushi uchun bir nechta shartlar mavjud edi. Biroq, valyuta urushi yuz bermadi, chunki Buyuk Britaniya o'z valyutasining qiymatini urushdan oldingi darajasiga ko'tarishga harakat qilib, bozorga qarshi qadrsizlanishni istagan mamlakatlar bilan samarali hamkorlik qildi.[26]1920-yillarning o'rtalariga kelib oltin standartning ko'plab sobiq a'zolari birlashdilar va standart urushgacha bo'lgan qadar muvaffaqiyatli ishlamagan bo'lsa-da, keng tarqalgan raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya bo'lmadi.[27]

Buyuk depressiyada valyuta urushi

Davomida Katta depressiya 1930-yillarning aksariyat mamlakatlari oltin standartidan voz kechishdi. Keng tarqalgan ishsizlik darajasi bilan devalvatsiya odatiy holga aylandi, bu siyosat tez-tez "qo'shningizga tilanchilik qiling ",[28] go'yoki qaysi mamlakatlarda ishsizlikni eksport qilishda raqobatlashadi. Biroq, devalvatsiya oqibatlari tez orada tegishli devalvatsiya va ko'p hollarda javob tariflari yoki savdo sheriklarining boshqa to'siqlari bilan qoplanishi sababli, kam sonli davlatlar doimiy ustunlikka ega bo'lishadi.

1930-yillarning valyuta urushining aniq boshlanish sanasi bahslashish uchun ochiq.[21] Uchta asosiy partiya Angliya, Frantsiya va AQSh edi. 1920-yillarning aksariyat qismida uch kishi bir-biriga mos keladigan manfaatlarga ega edi; AQSh ham, Frantsiya ham Britaniyaning Sterlingning bozor munosabatlariga nisbatan qiymatini oshirish bo'yicha harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatladilar. Hamkorlikka xalqlarning markaziy bankirlari, ayniqsa, Angliya o'rtasidagi shaxsiy do'stlik yordam berdi Montagu Norman va Amerika Benjamin Kuchli 1928 yilda ikkinchisining erta o'limigacha. Ko'p o'tmay 1929 yildagi Wall Street halokati, Frantsiya Sterlingga qiymat manbai sifatida ishonchini yo'qotdi va uni bozorlarda katta sotishni boshladi. Angliya nuqtai nazaridan Frantsiya ham, AQSh ham endi oltin standart qoidalariga amal qilmaydilar. Oltin tushumiga pul ta'minotini ko'paytirishga imkon berish o'rniga (bu iqtisodiyotni kengaytirishi, ammo savdo profitsitini kamaytirishi mumkin edi) Frantsiya va AQSh sterilizatsiya qilish tushumlar, oltin zaxiralarini yig'ish. Ushbu omillar 1931 yildagi Sterling inqiroziga sabab bo'ldi; o'sha yilning sentyabrida Angliya sezilarli darajada qadrsizlanib, funtni oltin standartdan olib tashladi. Ushbu global savdodan keyin bir necha yil davomida raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya va javob tariflari buzilgan. 1930 yillardagi valyuta urushi odatda bilan tugagan deb hisoblanadi 1936 yildagi uch tomonlama pul shartnomasi.[21][29][30][31][32][33]

Bretton-Vuds davri

Ikkinchi Jahon urushi oxiridan taxminan 1971 yilgacha Bretton-Vuds tizimi yarim sobit valyuta kurslari raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya variant emasligini anglatar edi, bu tizim me'morlarining dizayn maqsadlaridan biri edi. Bundan tashqari, ushbu davrda global o'sish odatda juda yuqori edi, shuning uchun valyuta urushi uchun iloji bo'lsa ham, unchalik rag'batlantirilmadi.[34]

1973 yildan 2000 yilgacha

Ushbu davr mobaynida valyuta urushiga yo'l qo'yadigan ba'zi bir shartlar mavjud bo'lganida, mamlakatlar odatda qarama-qarshi ustuvor yo'nalishlarga ega edilar va hech qachon valyuta urushi boshlanishi uchun qadrsizlanishni istagan davlatlar etarli bo'lmagan.[35] Bir necha marta mamlakatlar devalvatsiyaga olib kelmaslik uchun emas, balki uning oldini olish uchun jon kuydirishdi. Shunday qilib, davlatlar boshqa mamlakatlarga emas, balki o'z valyutalariga past darajada bosim o'tkazayotgan bozor kuchlariga qarshi harakat qilishdi. Bunga misollar kiradi Buyuk Britaniya davomida Qora chorshanba davomida turli xil yo'lbars iqtisodiyotlari 1997 yilgi Osiyo inqirozlari. 1980-yillarning o'rtalarida Qo'shma Shtatlar sezilarli darajada qadrsizlanishni xohlardilar, ammo boshqa yirik iqtisodiyotlarning bu bilan hamkorligini ta'minlay oldilar. Plaza Accord. 1990-yillar davomida erkin bozor ta'sirlari avj pallasiga yaqinlashganda, rivojlangan iqtisodiyotlar va tobora rivojlanib borayotgan va hattoki rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlar o'z iqtisodiyotlarini bozorga qoldirish va amaldagi hisobot defitsitini to'g'irlash uchun ham aralashmaslik eng yaxshisi degan fikrga o'tdilar. .[36][34]

2000 yildan 2008 yilgacha

Davomida 1997 yil Osiyo inqirozi bir qator Osiyo iqtisodiyotlari xorijiy zaxiralarda juda past darajada ish olib borishdi va ularni XVJning qattiq shartlarini qabul qilishga majbur qilishdi va ko'pincha aktivlarini majburiy sotish uchun past narxlarni qabul qilishdi. Bu rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlar o'rtasida erkin bozor fikrlashiga bo'lgan ishonchni buzdi va taxminan 2000 yildan boshlab ular o'z valyutalarining qiymatini past ushlab turish uchun aralashishga kirishdilar.[37] Bu ularning eksportga olib boruvchi o'sish strategiyasini amalga oshirish qobiliyatini oshirdi va shu bilan birga tashqi zaxiralarni ko'paytirdi, shunda ular keyingi inqirozlardan yaxshi himoya qilinadi. Valyuta urushi olib kelmadi, chunki butun rivojlangan iqtisodiyotlar ushbu strategiyani qabul qildilar - qisqa muddatda bu arzon import sotib olib, shu bilan yuqori moddiy turmush darajasidan bahramand bo'la oladigan o'z fuqarolari uchun bir muncha foyda keltirdi. The joriy hisob AQSh defitsiti sezilarli darajada o'sdi, ammo taxminan 2007 yilgacha erkin bozor iqtisodchilari va siyosat ishlab chiqaruvchilari o'rtasida konsensus nuqtai nazarlari paydo bo'ldi. Alan Greinspan, keyin Federal rezerv raisi va Pol O'Nil, AQSh moliya vaziri, defitsit tashvishlanishning asosiy sababi emas edi.[38][39]

Bu hech qanday mashhur tashvish bo'lmagan degani emas; Masalan, 2005 yilga kelib, AQSh rahbarlarining xor guruhi va kasaba uyushmalari va o'rta darajadagi hukumat amaldorlari Xitoy tomonidan adolatsiz savdo amaliyoti deb bilgan narsalar haqida gapirishgan.[40]Tez orada bu tashvishlar qisman bartaraf etildi. Jahon iqtisodiyoti yaxshi rivojlanayotgan bir paytda Xitoy 2005 yilda dollar qozig'idan voz kechib, 2007 yilga qadar yuanni sezilarli darajada qadrlashiga imkon berdi va shu bilan birga eksport hajmini oshirdi. Keyinchalik moliyaviy inqiroz Xitoyning eksport buyurtmalarini kamaytira boshlagach, dollar qozig'i tiklandi.

Maykl P. Duli, Piter M. Garber va Devid Folkerts-Landau kabi iqtisodchilar rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlar va AQSh o'rtasidagi yangi iqtisodiy munosabatlarni quyidagicha ta'rifladilar: Bretton-Vuds II.[41][42]

2009 yildan keyingi raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya

Dunyo bo'yicha etakchi sifatida Zaxira valyutasi AQSh dollari 2010-2011 yillarda valyuta urushi boshlanishida markaziy o'rinni egalladi.

2009 yilga kelib, valyuta urushi uchun zarur bo'lgan ba'zi bir shartlar qaytib keldi va jiddiy iqtisodiy tanazzulga uchraganligi sababli, o'sha yili jahon savdosi taxminan 12% ga kamaydi. Iqtisodiyoti rivojlangan mamlakatlar orasida ularning defitsitlari hajmi to'g'risida keng tashvish mavjud edi; ular tobora rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlarga qo'shilib, eksportni o'sishni o'zlarining ideal strategiyasi deb bildilar. 2009 yil mart oyida, xalqaro hamkorlik eng yuqori darajaga ko'tarilishidan oldin ham 2009 yil G-20 London sammiti, iqtisodchi Ted Truman raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya xavfidan birinchilardan bo'lib ogohlantirdi. U bu iborani ham yaratgan raqobatbardosh bo'lmagan taqdir.[43][44][45]

2010 yil 27 sentyabrda Braziliya moliya vaziri Gvido Mantega dunyo "xalqaro valyuta urushi avjida" ekanligini e'lon qildi.[46][47]Ko'plab moliyaviy jurnalistlar Manteganing fikriga qo'shilishdi, masalan Financial Times ' Alan Bitti va Telegrafniki Ambrose Evans-Pritchard. Jurnalistlar Mantega e'lonini so'nggi paytlarda Xitoy, Yaponiya, Kolumbiya, Isroil va Shveytsariya kabi valyuta kurslarini pasaytirmoqchi bo'lgan turli davlatlarning aralashuvlari bilan bog'lashdi.[48][49][50][51][52]

Goldman Sach's kabi boshqa tahlilchilar Jim O'Nil valyuta urushidan qo'rqish haddan tashqari oshirib yuborilganligini ta'kidladi.[53]Sentabr oyida, masalan, yuqori darajadagi siyosatchilar Dominik Stross-Kan, keyin XVFning boshqaruvchi direktori va Tim Geytner AQSh moliya vazirining xabar berishicha, haqiqiy valyuta urushi boshlanish ehtimoli past; ammo oktyabr oyining boshlarida Strauss-Kan valyuta urushi xavfi haqiqatan ham borligini ogohlantirdi. Shuningdek, u XVJ savdo balansidagi muvozanatni bartaraf etishda yordam berishi mumkinligini aytdi casus belli valyuta bahosidagi ziddiyatlar uchun. Janob Strauss-Kanning aytishicha, valyutalarni qurol sifatida ishlatish "bu yechim emas [va] u hatto juda yomon ahvolga olib kelishi mumkin. Global muammoga ichki echim yo'q".[54]

Miqdorni yumshatish dasturlari tufayli AQSh va Xitoyga katta e'tibor qaratildi.[55][56]2009 va 2010 yillarning aksariyat qismida Xitoy AQSh tomonidan yuanning qadrini ko'tarish uchun bosim o'tkazdi. 2010 yil iyun va oktyabr oylari oralig'ida Xitoy 2 foizga qadrlashga imkon berdi, ammo G'arb kuzatuvchilarining ta'kidlashicha, Xitoy faqat og'ir bosim ostida bo'lganida aralashuvni yumshatgan. Belgilangan qoziq Iyun G20 yig'ilishidan oldin qoldirilmadi, shundan so'ng yuan taxminan 1% ga ko'tarildi, faqat sekin qadrsizlanib, AQShning sentyabrdagi bosimiga qadar, AQSh sentabr oyida AQSh Kongressi sentyabr oyida yana nisbatan keskin ko'tarilib qayta baholashni majburlash choralarini muhokama qilish bo'yicha tinglovlar.[57]

Reuters Xitoy ham, AQSh ham valyuta urushida "g'olib" bo'lib, Evro, Yen va ko'plab rivojlanayotgan iqtisodiyotlarning valyutalari qiymatini ko'tarishda o'z valyutalarini ushlab turishni taklif qildi.[58]

Martin Wolf, bilan iqtisodiy etakchi yozuvchi Financial TimesSo'nggi yillarda raqobatbardosh devalvatsiyani eng katta tatbiq etgan Xitoyga nisbatan qarama-qarshilikli yondashuvni g'arb iqtisodiyotida afzalliklari bo'lishi mumkin. Garchi u savdo urushini qo'zg'atishi mumkin bo'lgan protektsionistik choralarni qo'llashdan ko'ra, yuanning qadrsizlanishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun Xitoyga qarshi maqsadli kapital nazoratidan foydalanish yaxshiroq taktika bo'lishi kerak edi Daniel Gros, Direktori Evropa siyosatini o'rganish markazi.[59][60]

Qarama-qarshi nuqtai nazar 19-oktabr kuni e'lon qilindi, xitoylik iqtisodchi tomonidan yozilgan maqola Xuang Yiping AQSh Yaponiya bilan so'nggi "valyuta urushida" g'alaba qozonmaganligini ta'kidlab,[61] va Xitoyga qarshi imkoniyat bundan ham kamroq; ammo buning o'rniga noyabrda kengroq "tarkibiy tuzatishlar" ga e'tibor qaratish lozim 2010 yil G-20 Seul sammiti.[62]

Valyuta urushi va nomutanosiblik masalalari bo'yicha bahslar hukmronlik qildi 2010 yil G-20 Seul sammiti, ammo muammoni hal qilishda ozgina yutuqlarga erishildi.[63][64][65][66][67]

2011 yilning birinchi yarmida tahlilchilar va moliyaviy matbuot valyuta urushi tugaganligi yoki hech bo'lmaganda tinchlanib qolgani haqida keng xabar berishdi,[68][69][70][71] Garchi 2011 yil iyul oyida Gvido Mantega so'zlaganida Financial Times mojaro hali ham davom etayotganligi.[72]

Avgust oyi boshida investorlarning global iqtisodiy istiqbolga bo'lgan ishonchi pasayganligi sababli, Bloomberg valyuta urushi yangi bosqichga o'tdi deb taxmin qildi. Buning ortidan AQSh tomonidan mumkin bo'lgan miqdoriy yumshatilishning uchinchi bosqichi va avgust oyining dastlabki uch kunida Shveytsariya va Yaponiya o'z valyutalari qiymatini pasaytirishga qaratilgan intervensiyalar haqida yangitdan gaplashildi.[73][74]

Sentyabr oyida uning ochilish nutqi doirasida Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining 66-munozarasi, shuningdek, uchun maqolada Financial Times, Braziliya prezidenti Dilma Russeff valyuta urushi o'zgaruvchan valyutalardan foydalanishning ko'payishi va yirik iqtisodiyotlar o'rtasida katta hamkorlik va hamjihatlik bilan yakunlanishiga, valyuta siyosati alohida davlatlar o'zlari uchun ustunlikka erishishga intilish o'rniga, barchaning manfaati yo'lida belgilanishi kerak.[75][76]

2012 yil mart oyida Ruseff Braziliya hali ham o'z valyutasiga nisbatan istalmagan bosimni boshdan kechirayotganini aytdi, uning moliya vaziri Gvido Mantega o'z mamlakati endi "ahmoq o'ynamaydi" va boshqalarga raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya bilan qutulishga yo'l qo'yishini aytib, cheklashga qaratilgan yangi choralarni e'lon qildi. uchun yanada minnatdorchilik Haqiqiy.[77]Ammo iyun oyiga qadar Haqiqiy ga qarshi eng yuqori cho'qqisidan ancha pastga tushgan edi Dollarva Mantega minnatdorchilikka qarshi choralarini yumshata boshladi.[78]

2013 yilda valyuta urushi

2013 yil yanvar oyining o'rtalarida Yaponiya markaziy banki ienani qadrini pasaytirishi mumkin bo'lgan ochiq obligatsiyalarni sotib olish dasturini boshlash niyatida edi. Bu qisqa muddatli, ammo valyuta urushining yangi bosqichi xavfi to'g'risida ogohlantiruvchi davrni keltirib chiqardi.

Ko'p sonli markaziy bankirlar va moliya vazirlari ommaviy ogohlantirishlar berishdi, birinchisi - Rossiya markaziy banki raisining birinchi o'rinbosari Aleksey Ulyukayev. Keyinchalik unga ko'plab boshqalar qo'shildi, shu jumladan Park Chje Van, Janubiy Koreyaning moliya vaziri va Jens Vaydman, prezidenti Bundesbank. Vaydman 2009–11 yillardagi intervensiyalar raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya deb hisoblash uchun etarli darajada kuchli bo'lmagan, ammo haqiqiy valyuta urushi endi haqiqiy imkoniyat bo'lib qoldi degan fikrda.[79] Yaponiya iqtisodiyot vaziri Akira Amari Yaponiya bankining obligatsiyalarni sotib olish dasturi yenni susaytirmaslik uchun emas, balki deflyatsiyaga qarshi kurashish uchun mo'ljallanganligini aytdi.[80]

Fevral oyining boshlarida ECB prezidenti Mario Draghi bu kengaytiruvchiga rozi bo'ldi pul-kredit siyosati kabi QE ataylab devalvatsiyani keltirib chiqaradigan majburiyatlarni olmagan. Draghi-ning bayonotida, ECB, agar Evro qadr ko'rishda davom etsa, chora ko'rishi mumkinligi va bu Evropa valyutasining qiymati sezilarli darajada pasayganligini ko'rsatdi.[81] Fevral oyi o'rtalarida G7 bayonotida rivojlangan iqtisodiyotlar valyuta urushidan qochish majburiyati tasdiqlandi. Dastlab uni bozorlar Yaponiyaning xatti-harakatlarini tasdiqlash sifatida o'qidilar, ammo keyinroq aniqlik kiritilishicha, AQSh Yaponiyani o'z tilining bir qismini ohangga aylantirishini xohlaydi, xususan QE kabi siyosatni Yenning qadrini pasaytirish istagi bilan bog'lamaydi.[82] Aksariyat sharhlovchilarning ta'kidlashicha, raqobatbardosh devalvatsiyaning yangi bosqichi yuzaga kelsa, bu global iqtisodiyot uchun zararli bo'ladi. Ammo ba'zi tahlilchilar Yaponiyaning rejalangan harakatlari butun dunyo manfaatlari uchun uzoq muddatli istiqbolga javob berishi mumkin; xuddi 2010–11 yilgi voqeada bo'lgani kabi, iqtisodchi Barri Eyxengrenning ta'kidlashicha, boshqa ko'plab mamlakatlar o'z valyutalariga qarshi aralashishni boshlasalar ham, bu butun dunyo bo'ylab o'sishni kuchaytirishi mumkin, chunki bu ta'sirlar yarim muvofiqlashtirilgan global pul kengayishiga o'xshaydi. Boshqa tahlilchilar urush boshlanishi xavfi borligiga shubha bilan qarashdi Mark Chandler, bosh valyuta strategisti Jigarrang birodarlar Harriman, bunga maslahat berib: "Haqiqiy valyuta urushi uzoq ehtimol bo'lib qolmoqda."[83][84][85][86]

15-fevral kuni Moskvada bo'lib o'tgan G20 moliya vazirlari va markaziy bank rahbarlarining yig'ilishidan berilgan bayonotda Yaponiya rejalashtirilgan pul-kredit siyosati uchun yuqori darajadagi xalqaro tanqidlarga duch kelmasligi tasdiqlandi. Xalqaro valyuta jamg'armasi boshqaruvchi direktori, AQSh Fed raisi Ben Bernanke tomonidan tasdiqlangan so'zida Kristin Lagard Yaqinda yuzaga kelishi mumkin bo'lgan valyuta urushi haqidagi xavotirlar "haddan tashqari ko'paygan".[87] Pol Krugman Eichhengrenning markaziy bankning fikri bilan takrorlandi noan'anaviy pul-kredit siyosati valyuta urushi sifatida emas, balki o'sishni oshirish uchun umumiy tashvish sifatida yaxshi tushuniladi. Goldman Sachs strategisti Kamakshya Trivedi qimmatli qog'ozlar bozorining ko'tarilishi, bozor ishtirokchilari, odatda, Markaziy bankning harakatlari raqobatbardosh devalvatsiya emas, balki pul yumshatish deb yaxshi tushunilishiga rozi bo'lishlarini anglatadi. Boshqa tahlilchilar, valyuta urushi va hattoki savdo urushi hali ham katta xavf tug'dirishi bilan valyutani baholash bo'yicha davom etayotgan keskinliklar saqlanib qolmoqda, deb ta'kidlamoqdalar. Yangi Zelandiya va Shveytsariyadan tortib to Xitoygacha bo'lgan Markaziy bank amaldorlari o'z valyutalariga qarshi mumkin bo'lgan intervensiyalar to'g'risida yangi bayonotlar berishdi.[88][89][90][91]

Tahlillar valyuta strateglari tomonidan e'lon qilingan RBS, o'z valyutalarini zaiflashtirishga nisbatan nisbiy niyatlarini va buning uchun ularning imkoniyatlarini o'lchab, intervensiyani amalga oshirish potentsiali bo'yicha mamlakatlarni skorlash. Reytinglar mamlakat iqtisodiyotining ochiqligi, eksportning o'sishi va real samarali valyuta kursini (REER) baholash, shuningdek mamlakat o'z iqtisodiyotiga zarar etkazmasdan o'z valyutasini zaiflashtirishi kerak bo'lgan doiraga asoslangan. 2013 yil yanvar holatiga ko'ra, Indoneziya, Tailand, Malayziya, Chili va Shvetsiya aralashishga eng tayyor va qodir, Buyuk Britaniya va Yangi Zelandiya esa eng pastlar qatoriga kiradi.[92]

2013 yil mart oyidan boshlab valyuta urushidan xavotirlar susaydi, biroq noyabr oyida bir nechta jurnalistlar va tahlilchilar yangi epidemiya haqida ogohlantirdilar. Ehtimol, keskinlikning asosiy manbai yana bir bor o'zgarib ketdi, bu safar AQShga qarshi Xitoy yoki Evro hududi Yaponiyaga qarshi emas, balki AQSh Germaniyaga qarshi edi. Oktyabr oyi oxirida AQSh g'aznachilik amaldorlari Germaniyani joriy operatsiyalar hisobvarag'ining haddan tashqari katta profitsiti bilan ish yuritayotgani va shu bilan global iqtisodiyotni tortib olayotgani uchun tanqid qildilar.[93][94]

2015 yilda valyuta urushi

Evropa Markaziy banki tomonidan oyiga 60 milliard evro miqdoridagi yumshatish dasturi 2015 yil yanvar oyida boshlangan. Evroning qiymatini pasaytirish dasturning rasmiy maqsadlariga kirmasa-da, yangi Q.E. valyuta urushining, ayniqsa, valyuta bozorlarida ishlaydigan tahlilchilarning eskalatsiyasini anglatadi. Devid Vu masalan, boshqaruvchi direktor Bank of America Merrill Lynch Bozor ishtirokchilari o'rtasida davlatlar haqiqatan ham yashirin valyuta urushini olib borayotgani to'g'risida "tobora ortib borayotgan kelishuv" mavjudligini ta'kidladilar. Biroq Financial Times tahririyati valyuta urushi haqidagi ritorika yana yanglishgan deb da'vo qilmoqda.[95][96]

2015 yil avgust oyida Xitoy qisman oldingi oyda -8,3% eksport ko'rsatkichlarining zaiflashishi sababli yuanni 3 foizdan ozgina pasaytirdi.[97]Eksportning pasayishi boshqa yirik eksport mamlakatlariga, shu jumladan Yaponiyaga va Germaniyaga qarshi raqobatbardoshlikni yo'qotishidan kelib chiqadi, bu erda oldingi miqdoriy yumshatish operatsiyalari davomida valyuta keskin ravishda qadrsizlangan edi. Bu Osiyo valyutalari, jumladan, Vetnam dongi va Qozog'iston tangasi o'rtasida yangi qadrsizlanishni keltirib chiqardi.[98]

1932 va 21-asrdagi valyuta urushlarini taqqoslash

Migrant ona tomonidan Doroteya Lange (1936). Etti nafar farzandi bo'lgan 32 yoshli fermer ishchisining ushbu portreti qiyinchiliklarga dosh bermaslikning ramzi bo'lgan ramziy fotosuratga aylandi. Valyuta urushi 30-yillarning butun dunyo bo'ylab iqtisodiy qiyinchiliklariga hissa qo'shdi Katta depressiya.

1930-yillarda ham, 2009 yilda boshlangan raqobatbardosh devalvatsiyaning boshlanishi ham global iqtisodiy tanazzul paytida yuz berdi. 2010 yilgi muhim farq shundaki, xalqaro savdogarlar o'zlarining ta'sirlarini valyuta kurslari o'zgaruvchanligiga qarshi himoya qilish imkoniyatiga ega, chunki moliyaviy bozorlar yanada rivojlangan. Ikkinchi farq shundan iboratki, keyingi davrdagi devalvatsiya har doim millatlar o'zlarining pul ta'minotini chet el valyutasini sotib olish uchun pul yaratish, to'g'ridan-to'g'ri aralashuvlar yoki o'zlarining ichki iqtisodiyotiga miqdorini yumshatish bilan pul mablag'larini yaratish yo'li bilan kengaytirishi natijasida yuzaga keldi. Agar barcha davlatlar bir vaqtning o'zida qadrsizlanishga harakat qilsalar, valyuta kurslariga aniq ta'sir bekor qilinishi va ularni deyarli o'zgarishsiz qoldirishi mumkin, ammo interventsiyalarning kengaytiruvchi ta'siri saqlanib qoladi. Hamkorlik niyati bo'lmagan, ammo Berkli kabi ba'zi iqtisodchilar Barri Eichengreen va Goldman Sachs-ning Dominik Uilsonning ta'kidlashicha, aniq ta'sir jahon iqtisodiyotiga yordam beradigan yarim muvofiqlashtirilgan pul kengayishiga o'xshaydi.[49][99][100]Jeyms Jan Savdo va taraqqiyot bo'yicha Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining konferentsiyasi (UNCTAD), ammo 2010 yil oktyabr oyida valyuta kurslarining o'zgarishi allaqachon korporatsiyalarning xalqaro investitsiyalarini kengaytirishga olib kelishi haqida ogohlantirdi.[101]

2010 yilgi vaziyatni 30-yillardagi valyuta urushi bilan taqqoslab, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard ning Daily Telegraph suggested a new currency war may be beneficial for countries suffering from trade deficits. He noted that in the 1930s, it was countries with a big surplus that were severely impacted once competitive devaluation began. He also suggested that overly-confrontational tactics may backfire on the US by damaging the status of the dollar as a global reserve currency.[102]

Ben Bernanke, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, also drew a comparison with competitive devaluation in the interwar period, referring to the sterilizatsiya of gold inflows by France and America, which helped them sustain large trade surpluses but also caused deflationary pressure on their trading partners, contributing to the Katta depressiya. Bernanke stated that the example of the 1930s implies that the "pursuit of export-led growth cannot ultimately succeed if the implications of that strategy for global growth and stability are not taken into account."[103]

2013 yil fevral oyida, Gavyn Davies uchun Financial Times emphasized that a key difference between the 1930s and the 21st-century outbreaks is that the former had some retaliations between countries being carried out not by devaluations but by increases in import tariflar, which tend to be much more disruptive to international trade.[33][104]

Boshqa maqsadlar

The term "currency war" is sometimes used with meanings that are not related to competitive devaluation.

In the 2007 book, Currency Wars by Chinese economist Song Hongbing, the term is sometimes used in a somewhat contrary sense, to refer to an alleged practice where unscrupulous bankers lend to emerging market countries and then speculate against the emerging state's currency by trying to force it down in value against the wishes of that states' government.[105][106]

In another book of the same name, John Cooley uses the term to refer to the efforts of a state's monetary authorities to protect its currency from forgers, whether they are simple criminals or agents of foreign governments trying to devalue a currency and cause excess inflation against the home government's wishes.[107]

Jim Rickards, in his 2011 book "Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis," argues that the consequences of the Fed's attempts to prop up economic growth could be devastating for American national security.[108] Although Rickard's book is largely concerned with currency war as competitive devaluation, it uses a broader definition of the term, classing policies that cause inflation as currency war. Such policies can be seen as metaphorical warfare against those who have monetary assets in favor of those who do not, but unless the effects of rising inflation on international trade are offset by a devaluation, inflationary policies tend to make a country's exports Kamroq competitive against foreign countries.[33] In their review of the book, Publishers Weekly said: "Rickards's first book is an outgrowth of his contributions and a later two-day war game simulation held at the Applied Physics Laboratory's Warfare Analysis Laboratory. He argues that a financial attack against the U.S. could destroy confidence in the dollar. In Rickards's view, the Fed's policy of quantitative easing by lessening confidence in the dollar, may lead to chaos in global financial markets."[109] Kirkus sharhlari said: "In Rickards' view, the world is currently going through a third currency war ("CWIII") based on competitive devaluations. CWII occurred in the 1960s and '70s and culminated in Nixon's decision to take the dollar off the gold standard. CWI followed World War I and included the 1923 German hyperinflation and Roosevelt's devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933. Rickards demonstrates that competitive devaluations are a race to the bottom, and thus instruments of a sort of warfare. CWIII, he writes, is characterized by the Federal Reserve's policy of quantitative easing, which he ascribes to what he calls "extensive theoretical work" on depreciation, negative interest rates and stimulation achieved at the expense of other countries. He offers a view of how the continued depreciation and devaluation of the dollar will ultimately lead to a collapse, which he asserts will come about through a widespread abandonment of a worthless inflated instrument. Rickards also provides possible scenarios for the future, including collaboration among a variety of currencies, emergence of a world central bank and a forceful U.S. return to a gold standard through an emergency powers–based legal regime. The author emphasizes that these questions are matters of policy and choice, which can be different."[110]

Historically, the term has been used to refer to the competition between Japan and China for their currencies to be used as the preferred tender in parts of Asia in the years leading up to Ikkinchi Xitoy-Yaponiya urushi.[111]

Shuningdek qarang

Izohlar va iqtiboslar

  1. ^ Cooper 1971, 3-bet
  2. ^ Kirshner 2002, p.264
  3. ^ Owen 2005, 3-bet
  4. ^ See also this 2018 FT article about recent devaluations typically not helping exporters.
  5. ^ Sloman 2004, pp. 965–1034
  6. ^ Wolf 2009, pp. 56, 57
  7. ^ a b Owen 2005, pp. 1–5, 98–100
  8. ^ In practice this chiefly means purchasing assets such as government bonds that are denominated in other currencies
  9. ^ Wilmott 2007, p. 10
  10. ^ Burda 2005, pp. 248, 515, 516
  11. ^ James Mackintosh (28 September 2010). "Currency War". Financial Times. Olingan 11 oktyabr 2010.
  12. ^ To practice quantitative easing on a wide scale it helps to have a reserve currency, as do the United States, Japan, UK, and Eurozone, otherwise there is a risk of market speculators triggering runaway devaluation to a far greater extent than would be helpful to the country.
  13. ^ Theoretically, money could be shared out among the entire population, though, in practice, the new money is often used to buy assets from financial institutions. The idea is that the extra money will help banks restore their balance sheets, and will then flow from there to other areas of the economy where it is needed, boosting spending and investment. As of November 2010 however, credit availability has remained tight in countries that have undertaken QE, suggesting that money is not flowing freely from the banks to the rest of the economy.
  14. ^ Gavyn Davies (4 October 2010). "The global implications of QE2". Financial Times. Olingan 4 oktyabr 2010.
  15. ^ Alan Beattie in Washington; Kevin Brown in Singapore; Jennifer Hughes in London (4 November 2010). "Backlash Against Fed's $600bn Easing". Financial Times. Olingan 8 noyabr 2010.
  16. ^ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (1 November 2010). "QE2risks Currency Wars and the End of Dollar Hegemony". Daily Telegraph. London. Olingan 1 noyabr 2010.
  17. ^ Michael Forsythe (8 November 2010). China Says Fed Easing May Flood World With 'Hot Money'. Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 9-noyabr 2010.
  18. ^ Alan Beattie in Washington; Kathrin Hille in Beijing; Ralph Atkins in Frankfurt (7 November 2010). "Asia Softens Criticism of U.S. Stance". Financial Times. Olingan 8 noyabr 2010.
  19. ^ Ed Luce and James Lamont in New Delhi (8 November 2010). "Obama Defends QE2 ahead of G20". Financial Times. Olingan 8 noyabr 2010.
  20. ^ Though not necessarily evenly: in the late 20th and early 21st century countries would often devalue specifically against the dollar, so while the devaluing currency would lower its exchange rate against all currencies, a corresponding rise against the global average might be confined largely just to the dollar and any currencies currently governed by a dollar peg. A further complication is that the dollar is often affected by such huge daily flows on the valyuta that the rise caused by a small devaluation may be offset by other transactions.
  21. ^ a b v Joshua E Keating (14 October 2010). "Why do currency wars start". Foreign Policy magazine. Olingan 21 aprel 2011.
  22. ^ Philip Coggan, ed. (2011). "passim, see esp Introduction". Paper Promises: Money, Debt and the New World Order. Allen Leyn. ISBN  1-84614-510-4.
  23. ^ Despite global trade growing substantially in the 17th and 18th centuries
  24. ^ Ravenhill 2005, p.7
  25. ^ Devaluation could however be used as a last resort by mercantilist nations seeking to correct an adverse trade balance – see for example chapter 23 of Keynes' Umumiy nazariya
  26. ^ This was against the interests of British workers and industrialists who preferred devaluation, but was in the interests of the financial sector, with government also influenced by a moral argument that they had the duty to restore the value of the pound as many other countries had used it as a reserve currency and trusted GB to maintain its value.
  27. ^ Ravenhill 2005, pp. 7–22, 177–204
  28. ^ Rothermund 1996, 6-7 betlar
  29. ^ Ravenhill 2005, pp. 9–12, 177–204
  30. ^ Mundell 2000, p. 284
  31. ^ Ahamed 2009, esp chp1; pp. 240, 319–321; chp 1–11
  32. ^ Olivier Accominotti (23 April 2011). "China's Syndrome: The "dollar trap" in historical perspective". Voxeu.org. Olingan 27 aprel 2011.
  33. ^ a b v Gavyn Davies (3 February 2013). "Who is afraid of currency wars?". Financial Times. Olingan 4 fevral 2013.
  34. ^ a b Ravenhill 2005, pp. 12–15, 177–204
  35. ^ Though a few commentators have asserted the Nikson shok was in part an act of currency war, and also the pressure exerted by the United States in the months leading up to the Plaza accords.
  36. ^ Though developing economies were encouraged to pursue export led growth – see Vashington konsensusi.
  37. ^ Some had been devaluing from as early as the 1980s, but it was only after 1999 that it became common, with the developing world as a whole running a CA surplus instead of a deficit from 1999. (e.g. see Wolf (2009) p31 – 39)
  38. ^ There were exceptions to this: Kennet Rogoff va Maurice Obstfeld began warning that the developing record imbalances was a major issue from as early as 2001, joined by Nouriel Roubini 2004 yilda.
  39. ^ Reinhart 2010, pp. 208–212
  40. ^ Neil C. Hughes (1 July 2005). "A Trade War with China". Tashqi ishlar. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  41. ^ Dooley, Michael P.; Folkerts‐Landau, David; Garber, Peter (2004). "The Revived Bretton Woods System". International Journal of Finance and Economics. 9 (4): 307–313. doi:10.1002/ijfe.250.
  42. ^ Michael P. Dooley; David Folkerts-Landau; Peter Garber (February 2009). "Bretton Woods II Still Defines the International Monetary System". Milliy iqtisodiy tadqiqotlar byurosi.
  43. ^ Jigarrang 2010 yil, p. 229
  44. ^ Tim Geithner (6 October 2010). "Treasury Secretary Geithner on IMF, World Bank Annual Meetings". Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari G'aznachilik vazirligi. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2011 yil 4 yanvarda. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  45. ^ Ted Truman (6 March 2009). "Message for the G20: SDR Are Your Best Answer". Voxeu.org. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  46. ^ Martin Wolf (2010 yil 29 sentyabr). "Currencies clash in new age of beggar-my-neighbour". Financial Times. Olingan 29 sentyabr 2010.
  47. ^ Tim Webb (28 September 2010). "World gripped by 'international currency war'". The Guardian. London. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  48. ^ Jonathan Wheatley in São Paulo and Peter Garnham in London (27 September 2010). "Brazil in 'currency war' alert". Financial Times. Olingan 29 sentyabr 2010.
  49. ^ a b Alan Beattie (27 September 2010). "Hostilities escalate to hidden currency war". Financial Times. Olingan 29 sentyabr 2010.
  50. ^ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (29 September 2010). "Capital controls eyed as global currency wars escalate". Daily Telegraph. London. Olingan 29 sentyabr 2010.
  51. ^ West inflates EM 'super bubble'. Financial Times. 2010 yil 29 sentyabr. Olingan 29 sentyabr 2010.
  52. ^ Russell Hotten (7 October 2010). "Currency wars threaten global economic recovery". BBC. Olingan 17 noyabr 2010.
  53. ^ Jim O'Neill (economist) (21 November 2010). "Time to end the myth of currency wars". Financial Times. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2015 yil 7 mayda. Olingan 14 yanvar 2011.
  54. ^ "Currency Tensions May Be Curbed With IMF Help, Strauss-Kahn Says". Bloomberg L.P. 9 oktyabr 2010 yil. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  55. ^ "Possible "currency war" to hamper int'l economy recovery". xinhua. 2010 yil 17 oktyabr. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  56. ^ Bagchi, Indrani (14 November 2010). "US-China currency war a power struggle". The Times of India. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  57. ^ James Mackintosh (27 September 2010). Deep pockets support China's forex politics. Financial Times. Olingan 11 oktyabr 2010.
  58. ^ "Who's winning the currency wars?". Reuters. 11 oktyabr 2010. Arxivlangan asl nusxasi 2011 yil 28 fevralda. Olingan 9 yanvar 2011.
  59. ^ Martin Wolf (2010 yil 5 oktyabr). "How to fight the currency wars with stubborn China". Financial Times. Olingan 6 oktyabr 2010.
  60. ^ Daniel Gros (23 September 2010). "How to Level the Capital Playing Field in the Game with China". CEPS. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi on 9 October 2010. Olingan 6 oktyabr 2010.
  61. ^ Huang classes the conflicting opinions over the relative valuations of the US dollar and Japanese yen in the 1980s as a currency war, though the label was not widely used for that period.
  62. ^ Yiping Huang (19 October 2010). "A currency war the US cannot win". Voxeu.org. Olingan 27 dekabr 2010.
  63. ^ Chris Giles; Alan Beattie; Christian Oliver in Seoul (12 November 2010). "G20 shuns US on trade and currencies". Financial Times. Olingan 12 noyabr 2010.
  64. ^ EVAN RAMSTAD (19 November 2010). "U.S. Gets Rebuffed at Divided Summit". The Wall Street Journal. Olingan 13 noyabr 2010.[doimiy o'lik havola ]
  65. ^ Mohamed A. El-Erian (17 November 2010). "Three Reasons Global Talks Hit Dead End: Mohamed A. El-Erian". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 19 noyabr 2010.
  66. ^ Michael Forsythe; Julianna Goldman (12 November 2010). "Obama Sharpens Yuan Criticism After G-20 Nations Let China Off the Hook". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 19 noyabr 2010.
  67. ^ Andrew Walker and other BBC staff (12 November 2010). "G20 to tackle US-China currency concerns". BBC. Olingan 17 noyabr 2010.
  68. ^ "Currency Wars Retreat as Fighting Inflation Makes Emerging Markets Winners". Bloomberg L.P. 2011 yil 28 fevral. Olingan 12 aprel 2010.
  69. ^ Steve Johnson (6 March 2011). "Currency war deemned over". Financial Times. Olingan 13 may 2011.
  70. ^ Stefan Wagstyl (13 April 2011). "Currency wars fade as inflation hits emerging world". Financial Times. Olingan 16 aprel 2011.
  71. ^ Alan Beattie (13 May 2011). "TBig guns muffled as currency wars enter a lull". Financial Times. Olingan 13 may 2011.
  72. ^ Chris Giles; John Paul Rathbone (7 July 2011). "Currecny wars not over, says Brazil". Financial Times. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2011 yil 8-iyulda. Olingan 7 may 2011.
  73. ^ Shamim Adam (4 August 2011). "Currency Intervention Revived as Odds of Federal Reserve Easing Escalate". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 4 avgust 2011.
  74. ^ Lindsay Whipp (4 August 2011). "Japan intervenes to force down yen". Financial Times. Olingan 4 avgust 2011.
  75. ^ Dilma Russeff (21 September 2011). "2011 opening Statement by Dilma Rousseff to the UN General Assembly". Birlashgan Millatlar. Olingan 27 sentyabr 2011.
  76. ^ Dilma Russeff (21 September 2011). "Time to end the Currency War / Brazil will fight back against the currency manipulators". Financial Times. Olingan 27 sentyabr 2011.
  77. ^ Samantha Pearson (15 March 2012). "Brazil launches fresh 'currency war' offensive". Financial Times. Olingan 23 mart 2012.
  78. ^ Alan Beattie; Richard McGregor (17 June 2012). "Temperature drops in currency wars for G20". Financial Times. Olingan 18 iyun 2012.
  79. ^ "Jens Weidmann warns of currency war risk". Reuters. Daily Telegraph. 2013 yil 21-yanvar. Olingan 28 yanvar 2013.
  80. ^ Jeff Black; Zoe Schneeweiss (28 January 2013). "Yi Warns on Currency Wars as Yuan Close to 'Equilibrium'". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 29 yanvar 2013.
  81. ^ Michael Steen; Alice Ross (7 February 2013). "Draghi move fuels currency war fears". Financial Times. Olingan 9 fevral 2013.
  82. ^ Robin Harding (13 February 2013). "Currency farce reveals US-Japan dispute". Financial Times. Olingan 14 fevral 2013.
  83. ^ Kelley Holland (24 January 2013). "Currency War? Not Just Yet, Expert Says". CNBC. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2013 yil 15 fevralda. Olingan 28 yanvar 2013.
  84. ^ Mohamed A. El-Erian (24 January 2013). "Currency war could cause lasting damage to world economy". The Guardian. Olingan 28 yanvar 2013.
  85. ^ Peter Koy (24 January 2013). "The Surprising Upside to Japan's 'Currency War'". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 28 yanvar 2013.
  86. ^ Niall Fergyuson (2013 yil 25-yanvar). "Currency wars are best fought quietly". Financial Times. Olingan 28 yanvar 2013.
  87. ^ Alice Ross in London; Charles Clover in Moscow; Robin Harding in Washington (15 February 2013). "G20 finance chiefs take heat off Japan". Financial Times. Olingan 17 fevral 2013.
  88. ^ Kristine Aquino; Candice Zachariahs (20 February 2013). "Currency Rhetoric Heats Up as Wheeler Warns on Kiwi". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 24 fevral 2013.
  89. ^ Peter Koy (4 March 2013). "Currency War Turns Stimulus War as Brazil Surrenders". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 7 mart 2013.
  90. ^ Humayun Shahryar (19 February 2013). "Guest post: Forget currency wars, we are in the middle of a trade war". Financial Times. Olingan 7 mart 2013.
  91. ^ Louisa Peacock (2 March 2013). "Jens China 'fully prepared' for currency war". Daily Telegraph. Olingan 7 mart 2013.
  92. ^ Peter Garnham (16 January 2013). "Currency wars: a handy guide". Euromoney.
  93. ^ James Mackintosh (1 November 2013). "Germany feels US ire over war on currencies". Financial Times. Olingan 11 noyabr 2013.
  94. ^ Emma Charlton; John Detrixhe (11 November 2013). "Race to Bottom Resumes as Central Bankers Ease Anew: Currencies". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 11 noyabr 2013.
  95. ^ Editorial (23 January 2015). "No need for hostilities in the phoney currency war" ((ro'yxatdan o'tish talab qilinadi)). Financial Times. Olingan 12 fevral 2015.
  96. ^ David Keohane (5 February 2015). "All currency war, all the time" ((ro'yxatdan o'tish talab qilinadi)). Financial Times. Olingan 12 fevral 2015.
  97. ^ "China devaluation raises spectre of currency wars". Financial Times. 2015 yil 11-avgust.
  98. ^ "Kazakhstan and Vietnam weaken currencies". Financial Times. 2015 yil 19-avgust.
  99. ^ Alan Beattie (11 October 2010). "G20 currency fist fight rolls into town". Financial Times. Olingan 13 oktyabr 2010.
  100. ^ Not all economists agree that further expansionary policy would help even if it is co-ordinated, and some fear it would cause excess inflation.
  101. ^ Jonathan Lynn (14 October 2010). "UPDATE 2-Currency war risk threatens investment recovery-UN". Reuters. Olingan 21 aprel 2011.
  102. ^ Ambrose Evans-Pritchard (10 October 2010). "Currency wars are necessary if all else fails". Daily Telegraph. London. Olingan 13 oktyabr 2010.
  103. ^ Scott Lanman (19 November 2010). "Bernanke Takes Defense of Monetary Stimulus Abroad, Turns Tables on China". Bloomberg L.P. Olingan 29 noyabr 2010.
  104. ^ Barri Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin (3 July 2009). "The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?" (PDF). NBER. Dartmut kolleji. Olingan 4 fevral 2013.
  105. ^ Neither the book nor its sequel Currency War 2 are available yet in English, but are best sellers in China and South East Asia.
  106. ^ McGregor, Richard (25 September 2007). "Chinese buy into conspiracy theory". Olingan 29 mart 2009.
  107. ^ John Cooley (2008). Currency Wars. Konstable. ISBN  978-1-84529-369-7.
  108. ^ Jim Rickards (2011). Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis. suman Portfolio/Penguin. ISBN  978-1-59184-449-5.
  109. ^ http://www.publishersweekly.com/9781591844495 Review of Currency Wars, Publishers Weekly. 2011 yil 24 oktyabr
  110. ^ http://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/james-rickards/currency-wars-next-global-crisis/ Kirkus Reviews: Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis, 15 October 2011.
  111. ^ Shigru Akita; Nicholas J. White (2009). The International Order of Asia in the 1930s and 1950s. Ashgate. p. 284. ISBN  0-7546-5341-2.

Adabiyotlar

  • Robert A. Mundell; Armand Clesse (2000). The Euro as a stabilizer in the international economic. Springer. ISBN  0-7923-7755-9.
  • James R Owen (2005). Currency devaluation and emerging economy export demand. Ashgate nashriyoti. ISBN  0-7546-3963-0.

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