Kantokuen - Kantokuen

Kantokuen
Qismi Tinch okeani urushi ning Ikkinchi jahon urushi
Yaponiyaning SSSRga qarshi dastlabki hujumlari aks etgan xarita; final maqsadi g'arbiy yonbag'ridan o'tuvchi chiziq edi Katta Xingan tizmasi.
Operatsion doirasi	Strategik
Manzil	Manchuriya, Mo'g'uliston, SSSR
Rejalashtirilgan	1941 yil sentyabr[1]
Rejalashtirilgan	Yapon Imperatorning bosh shtabi
Maqsad	Uzoq sharqiy SSSRni bosib olish
Natija	1941 yil 9-avgustda bekor qilingan

Kantokuen (Yapon: 関 特 演, 関東軍 特別 演習 dan, Kantogun Tokubetsu Enshu, "Kvantung armiyasining maxsus manevralari"^[2]) edi operatsion reja tomonidan yaratilgan Yaponiya imperatorlik armiyasining bosh shtabi bosqini va ishg'oli uchun uzoq sharqiy mintaqa ning Sovet Ittifoqi, boshlanishidan kapitalizatsiya Sovet-Germaniya urushi 1941 yil iyun oyida. Yettita yaponni jalb qilish qo'shinlar shuningdek, imperiyaning dengiz va havo kuchlarining asosiy qismi, bu eng katta harbiy kuch edi birlashtirilgan qo'llar Yaponiya tarixidagi operatsiya va barcha davrlarning eng kattalaridan biri.^[3]

Reja qisman tomonidan tasdiqlangan Imperator Xirohito 7 iyul kuni va uch bosqichli tayyorgarlik bosqichini, so'ngra olti oydan ko'p bo'lmagan vaqt ichida sovet himoyachilarini ajratish va yo'q qilish uchun uch bosqichli hujumni o'z ichiga olgan.^[4] Hujumga bir vaqtning o'zida tayyorgarlik ko'rish bilan to'qnashuv kuchayganidan keyin Janubi-Sharqiy Osiyoda talablari bilan birgalikda Ikkinchi Xitoy-Yaponiya urushi Germaniyaning tez g'alabasi uchun xiralashgan istiqbollar Evropa, Kantokuen foydadan tusha boshladi Imperatorning bosh shtabi va oxir-oqibat tomonidan kengaytirilgan sanktsiyalar quyidagi tark etildi Qo'shma Shtatlar va uning ittifoqchilari 1941 yil iyul oyi oxiri va avgust oyi boshlarida.^[5] Shunga qaramay, katta yapon kuchlarining mavjudligi Manchuriya uzoq vaqtdan beri ushbu yo'nalishdagi hujumni kutgan Sovetlarni, Ikkinchi Jahon urushi davrida juda ko'p harbiy resurslarni kutib turishga majbur qildi.^[6]

Fon

Ildizlari Sovetlarga qarshi Imperialist Yaponiyada kayfiyat Sovet Ittifoqi tashkil etilishidan oldin boshlangan. Rossiyaning Sharqiy Osiyodagi ta'sirini yanada cheklashni istaydi Rus-yapon urushi (1904-05) va tarqalishini o'z ichiga oladi Bolshevizm, Yaponlar joylashtirilgan tarkibida 1918 yildan 1922 yilgacha Sibirga 70 ming qo'shin Sibir aralashuvi tomonida Oq harakat, egallab olish Vladivostok va sharqdagi Uzoq Sharqiy Rossiyadagi ko'plab muhim fikrlar Baykal ko'li.^[7][8] Rossiya hududidan xalqaro miqyosda chiqib ketgandan so'ng, Yaponiya imperatorlik armiyasi SSSRning harbiy kuch sifatida potentsialini hisobga olgan holda va an'anaviy konvensiya dushmani sifatida Rossiya konventsiyasiga rioya qilgan holda Sovet Ittifoqi bilan urush uchun favqulodda vaziyat rejalarini tuzdi. Avvaliga ular hujumni o'z zimmalariga olishdi Qizil Armiya Yaponiyaning qarshi hujumi bilan ta'minlanadigan Xitoy hududiga Koreya; hal qiluvchi jang maydoni janubda bo'ladi Manchuriya.^[9] Keyingi Yaponlarning Manjuriyaga bosqini va 1931 yilda unga qo'shib olingan Yaponiya va Sovet qo'shinlari birinchi marta minglab kilometr uzunlikdagi chegara bo'ylab o'zaro to'qnash kelishdi. Yaponlarni himoya qilish uchun Manchukuo qo'g'irchoq davlat va tashabbusni qo'lga kiritish uchun IJA chegara bo'ylab Sovet Ittifoqining ilgarilashini to'xtatish va Sibirdagi urushning katta qismiga qarshi kurash siyosatini olib bordi - bu Yaponiya strategik fikrida "o'zgarishlarni amalga oshiruvchi davr", bu esa hujumkor rejalashtirishga olib keldi. Vaqt o'tishi bilan Yaponiyaning operatsion rejalari kichik operatsiyalardan oldin Vladivostokka va oxir-oqibat Sovet Uzoq Sharqining Baykaligacha bo'lgan butunligiga qarshi qaratilgan ko'p bosqichli hujum harakatlariga aylandi.^[10]

1937 va undan keyingi yillar

Vujudga kelishidan oldin Ikkinchi Xitoy-Yaponiya urushi 1937 yil iyulda, Sovet-yapon munosabatlari tez yomonlasha boshladi.^[11] The Kvantun armiyasi ilgari kichik garnizon qo'mondonligidan bosh shtab darajasigacha ko'tarilgan Manjuriyani boshqarish uchun mas'ul bo'lib, shimoliy qo'shnisiga nisbatan tobora ayanchli bo'lib qoldi. Armiya Tokiodagi markaziy hukumatdan deyarli mustaqil ravishda "o'zini o'zi boshqaradigan, avtonom" tashkilot sifatida harakat qila boshladi. Ushbu xatti-harakatlar bilan tegishli ravishda o'sish yuz berdi Sovet-yapon chegara mojarolari, bilan yakunlandi Kanchatzu orolidagi voqea unda sovet daryo qurolli qayig'i Yaponiyaning qirg'oq batareyalari tomonidan cho'ktirilib, 37 xodim halok bo'ldi.^[12] Bu, boshqa epizodlar va ikkala tomonning o'zaro siyosiy va harbiy buzg'unchiligi (Yaponiya yollashi) Oq rus agentlar va Sovetlar moddiy yordam yuborish Yaponiyaga qarshi urushdan oldin va undan oldin Xitoyga) ikkala tomonning raqamlarini kelajakdagi urush, hatto Kvantung armiyasidagi ba'zi odamlar xavotirga soladigan bo'lsa ham, muqarrar degan xulosaga keldi.^[13][14]

1937 yil iyul oyida Xitoy va Yaponiya o'rtasida urush boshlangandan so'ng, Manjuriya uchun yapon variantlari juda cheklangan bo'lib qoldi. Sovetlar ushbu zaiflikdan imzo chekish orqali foydalanganlar hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi bitim Xitoy bilan va ularni qurol va uskunalar bilan ta'minlash. "Pravda" '1938 yil 13-fevraldagi nashrida ta'kidlanganidek

... taxminan 1200000 kishi, 2000 ta samolyot, 1800 ta tank va 4500 ta og'ir artilleriya kuchiga ega bo'lgan Yaponiya armiyasi Xitoyda 1 000 000 ga yaqin qo'shin va qurollarining katta qismini o'z zimmasiga oldi.

— "Pravda"^[15]

Yaponlarning qiyin ahvoli ularga SSSRga qarshi urush rejalarini tuzishda davom etishlariga to'sqinlik qilmadi; ularning 1937 yildagi operatsion rejasi, garchi xomashyo va logistika nuqtai nazaridan nuqsonli bo'lsa-da, 1944 yilgacha barcha keyingi rivojlanish uchun asos yaratdi.^[16][a] Reja (va undan keyin boshqalari) Sovetga to'satdan dastlabki hujumni talab qildi 'Dengizchilik viloyati "tomonga qarab tinch okeani (shuningdek, "Primorye" deb nomlanadi), shimol va g'arbda aktsiyalarni o'tkazish bilan birlashtirilgan. Agar birinchi bosqich muvaffaqiyatli o'tadigan bo'lsa, boshqa jabhalar ham qo'shimcha kuchlar kelganidan keyin hujumga o'tishlari kerak edi.^[17]

1939 yilgacha suratga olingan 3-darajali komissar Lyushkov

1936 yilda Sovet rahbari Jozef Stalin boshladi Buyuk tozalash oppozitsiya, shu jumladan Qizil Armiya ofitserlari korpusi, o'n minglab yuqori martabali shaxslarni o'ldirgan yoki qamoqqa olgan, ko'pincha soxta yoki uydirma ayblovlar bilan. Qizil Armiyaning jangovar qudrati keskin zaiflashdi, kuzatuv aftidan uning nisbatan yomon namoyishlari bilan tasdiqlandi Xasan ko'li jangi 1938 yilda va Qish urushi 1940 yilda Finlyandiyaga qarshi.^[18] Qo'rquv odamlarni qusur qilishga yoki chet elga qochishga olib keldi; 1938 yil 13-iyunda, Genrix Lyushkov Uzoq Sharq bo'limi boshlig'i NKVD (Sovet maxfiy politsiyasi), Manjuriya chegarasini kesib o'tib, IJAga topshirildi va shu bilan Sovet Ittifoqining mintaqadagi harbiy kuchlari va kayfiyatlari to'g'risida juda ko'p maxfiy hujjatlarni olib keldi. Lyushkovning qochib ketishi Yaponiya uchun katta razvedka to'ntarishi bo'ldi va u SSSRga qarshi harakatini yo'qolguniga qadar davom etdi Sovetlarning Manjuriyaga bosqini 1945 yil avgustda.^[19]

Hachi-Go rejalari

1938–39 yillarda yillik rejalashtirishdan mustaqil ravishda Yaponiya Armiyasi Bosh shtabining Operatsion byurosi va Kvantung armiyasi "8-sonli operatsion reja" yoki "Hachi-Go" rejasi ostida soyabon ostida bir nechta tegishli kutilmagan holatlarda hamkorlik qildi. . Ushbu "A" va "B" tushunchalari bilan belgilangan ikkita sxema 1943 yildan boshlab Sovet Ittifoqi bilan butunlay urush qilish imkoniyatini o'rganib chiqdi.^[20] Ikkalasi ham ilgari yaponlar tomonidan o'ylab topilgan narsalardan ancha kattaroq edi, chunki Sovet Ittifoqining Xitoydan va Xitoydan bosqichma-bosqich etkazib berilishi kutilgan 60 ga qarshi 50 ta IJA bo'linmasi majburiyatini nazarda tutgan edi. Uy orollari. Garchi A kontseptsiyasi g'arbda ushlab turganda Sharq va Shimolga hujum qilishga chaqirgan odatiy tuzilishga amal qilgan bo'lsa, B kontseptsiyasi birinchi bo'lib keng dashtga zarba berish imkoniyatini o'rganib chiqdi. Buyuk Xingan tog'lari va Baykal ko'li erta nokaut urish umidida - shunday qilib himoyachilarni mag'lubiyatga uchratdi Primorye va Vladivostokni batafsil mag'lub etish.^[21] Amaliyotlar ko'lami juda katta edi: ikkala kuch taxminan 5000 kilometr uzunlikdagi (3100 milya) uzunlikdagi frontga qarshi kurashgan bo'lar edi, Yaponiyaning so'nggi maqsadlari Sovet hududiga 1200 km (750 mil) chuqurlikda joylashgan edi. Masofa jihatidan Hachi-Go kontseptsiyasi B hatto mitti ham edi Barbarossa, 1941 yil iyun oyida fashistlar Germaniyasining SSSRga bostirib kirishi.^[b]

Hachi-Go kontseptsiyasi B^[22]

Bu qog'ozda qanchalik ta'sirli bo'lsa ham, yaponlar yaqin kelajakda Hachi-Go-ni amalga oshirishga to'sqinlik qiladigan bir nechta qattiq haqiqatlarni tan olishga majbur bo'lishdi. Xususan, B kontseptsiyasiga kelsak, Manchuriyadagi temir yo'l tarmog'i etarlicha kengaytirilmagan edi, chunki bunday keng qamrovli hujumni ta'minlash va mamlakatda mavjud bo'lgan zaxiralar talab qilinadigan darajadan ancha past edi. Bundan tashqari, Xitoyda davom etayotgan urush, Yaponiyaning bu erdagi sa'y-harakatlarini jiddiy ravishda susaytirmasdan, rejalashtirilgan 50 ta bo'linishni kontsentratsiyasini oldini oldi. Bundan tashqari, Imperatorlik Bosh shtab-kvartirasi Baykalga chiqishni davom ettirish uchun 200 mingga yaqin yuk mashinalaridan iborat park kerak bo'ladi, degan xulosaga keldi.^[23] butun Yaponiya harbiylari har qanday vaqtda ega bo'lgan narsadan ikki baravar katta.^[24] IJA doiralarida B kontseptsiyasini ommabop qo'llab-quvvatlash 1939 yildan keyin tarqaldi Xalxin Gol jangi eng yaqin temir yo'l boshlaridan uzoqroq masofada ham nisbatan cheklangan miqyosda barqaror harbiy majburiyatni ta'minlashning katta muammolarini namoyish etdi. O'sha paytdan boshlab Yaponiyaning SSSRga nisbatan hujumni rejalashtirish asosan Shimoliy va Sharqiy jabhalarga qaratilgan bo'lib, G'arbdagi har qanday yutuqlar Buyuk Xingan tizmasining uzoq yonbag'ridagi nisbatan mo''tadil yutuqlar bilan cheklangan.^[25]

Qaror 1941 yil

Junbi Jin va "xurmo"

Sovet rahbari Stalin va Germaniya elchisi Ribbentrop qo'l siqish, 1939 yil 23-avgust

Umrining oxiriga kelib, Adolf Gitler xabar berishicha: "Yaponlarning biz bilan birga Sovet Rossiyasiga qarshi urushga kirishmaganligi juda achinarli. Agar shunday bo'lgan bo'lsa, Stalin qo'shinlari hozirda yo'q edi qurshovda bo'ling Breslau Sovetlar esa u erda turmas edi Budapesht. Biz birgalikda 1941 yil qishidan oldin bolshevizmni yo'q qilgan bo'lardik. "^[26] Yaponiya nuqtai nazaridan Germaniyaning 1939–41 yillarda SSSRga qarshi hamkorlikka bo'lgan munosabati ambiventlik, hattoki ikkiyoqlama edi.^[27] Xalxin Goldagi mag'lubiyatdan so'ng, Germaniyaning to'satdan tugashi Molotov - Ribbentrop pakti Yaponiyada Stalin bilan tajovuz qilmaslik shok va g'azab bilan kutib olindi, ular bu harakatni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri buzilish deb hisoblashdi Kominternga qarshi pakt va ularning umumiy manfaatlariga xiyonat qilish. Binobarin, 1941 yil aprel oyida Yaponiya erkin xulosa qildi Sovetlar bilan o'zining betaraflik shartnomasi, G'arb bilan keskinlik sifatida, ayniqsa Qo'shma Shtatlar, yaponlar ustiga o'rnatila boshladi (Vichy) frantsuz hindokitoyining ishg'oli oldingi yil. Ittifoqdoshlarning iqtisodiy sanktsiyalari Yaponiyani siqib chiqara boshlagach, janubda urush xavfining kuchayishi va shimolda "osoyishtalik" hissi yaponlarning e'tiborini uzoq vaqtdan beri rejalashtirilgan kampaniyalaridan chalg'itishga intildi. Sibir.^[28][29] Shift ayniqsa tomonidan mamnuniyat bilan kutib olindi Dengiz kuchlari, an'anaviy ravishda siyosatini ma'qullagan Nanshin-ron (janubga qarab kengayish), aksincha Sovet Ittifoqiga qarshi ogohlantiruvchi vositani saqlab qoldi Xokushin-ron (shimol tomon kengayish), qaysi tomonidan ma'qullandi Armiya.^[30]

Yosuke Matsuoka, 1932 yilda suratga olingan

Shunday qilib, Yaponiya hukumati 1941 yil iyun oyida Gitlerning Sovet Ittifoqiga bostirib kirishi Barbarossa operatsiyasi haqidagi xabarni katta hayrat va hayrat bilan kutib oldi. Yaponiya Bosh vaziri Fumimaro Konoe, Yaponiyadagi ushbu "ikkinchi xiyonat" tufayli o'limga duchor bo'ldi, hatto undan voz kechishni qisqacha o'ylab ko'rdi Uch tomonlama pakt. Boshqa tomondan, tashqi ishlar vaziri Yosuke Matsuoka darhol SSSR bilan betaraflik shartnomasidan voz kechishni targ'ib qila boshladi (o'zi me'mor bo'lgan) va Germaniyani qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun hujum qilishni talab qildi.^[31] Matsuokaning fikrlarini Kvantun armiyasi ham, IJA Bosh shtabi ham qo'llab-quvvatladilar, ular "tezkor qaror" ga intilishdi.^[32] Bosqindan oldin, iyun oyining boshida Yaponiya hukumati "moslashuvchan javob "shimolga yoki janubga hujum qilish zarurati tug'ilganda tayyorlikni o'rnatish siyosati" deb nomlanadi.Junbi Jin Taisei"(" Tayyorgarlik shakllanishini sozlash "). Ostida Junbi Jin kontseptsiyasi, Sovet-Germaniya urushi bo'lgan taqdirda aralashish haqida o'ylardi, lekin voqealar Yaponiya uchun qulay burilish yasagan paytdagina. Garchi bu har doim ham aniq bo'lmagan bo'lsa-da, ushbu falsafa oxir-oqibat 1941 yil davomida Yaponiyaning strategik fikrlashini aniqladi.^[33]

Junbi Jin 24 iyun kuni SSSRdagi vaziyatni hisobga olgan holda yangi milliy siyosatni o'rnatish uchun armiya va dengiz floti rahbarlarining favqulodda yig'ilishi shaklida o'zining birinchi jiddiy sinoviga duch keldi. Ushbu konferentsiya davomida armiya Sibirga qarshi kuch ishlatilishini qat'iyan ta'kidladi, dengiz kuchlari esa bunga qarshi chiqdi. Oxir-oqibat kelishuvga erishildi, agar vaziyat imkon bersa, armiyaning SSSRga qarshi aralashuviga ruxsat berilishi mumkin edi, ammo bunga tayyorlik janubda urushni bir vaqtda rejalashtirishga xalaqit bermaydi.^[34] Garchi bu kelishuv printsipial jihatdan qabul qilingan bo'lsa-da, armiya "shimoliy savol" ni qanday hal qilish borasida va shuningdek, bunday qarorni qabul qilish muddati to'g'risida hali ham kelishmovchiliklar mavjud edi. Asosiy to'qnashuvni "." Degan mashhur metafora bilan umumlashtirish mumkin xurmo, "armiya bosh shtabi (AGS) va Kvantung armiyasi, agar meva" hali ham yashil "bo'lsa ham (ya'ni SSSR Germaniyaga qarshi halokatli halokatga uchramagan bo'lsa ham) hujum uchun bahslashganda va ularning raqiblari Yaponiyaning yanada kengroq strategik mavqeini hisobga olgan holda, Manchuriya jabhasiga kamroq zudlik berishni tayinlash, ko'proq konservativ yondashuv.^[35] AGS nuqtai nazaridan, agar Yaponiya 1941 yilda jangovar harakatlarni boshlamoqchi bo'lsa, Sibir va Shimoliy Manchuriyaning achchiq iqlimini yodda tutib, janglar oktyabr oyining o'rtalarida tugashi shart edi. Operatsion tayyorgarlikni tugatish uchun 60-70 kun, Manjuriya va Tinch okeani oralig'idagi Sovetlarni tor-mor etish uchun yana 6-8 hafta kerak bo'lganligi sababli, harakat oynasi juda cheklangan edi. Bunga javoban Armiya Bosh shtabi iloji boricha ko'proq vaqtni "tarash" uchun rejalashtirish uchun "halokat jadvali" ni taklif qildi:^[36]

• 28 iyun: safarbarlik to'g'risida qaror qabul qiling
• 5 iyul: safarbarlik buyruqlarini chiqaring
• 20 iyul: qo'shinlarning konsentratsiyasini boshlang
• 10 avgust: Harbiy harakatlar to'g'risida qaror qabul qiling
• 24 avgust: to'liq tayyorlik holati
• 29 avgust: Shimoliy Xitoydan ikkita bo'linishni Manjuriyada to'plang va ularning soni 16 ga etdi
• 5 sentyabr: Vatandan yana to'rtta bo'linishni jamlang, ularning soni 22 ga etdi; to'liq jangovar pozitsiya
• 10 sentyabr (eng kechi): jangovar operatsiyalarni boshlash
• 15 oktyabr: Urushning birinchi bosqichini yakunlang

Umuman olganda, AGS 22 ni chaqirdi bo'linmalar 80050 tonna yuk tashish tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan 850 ming kishi (yordamchi birliklarni o'z ichiga olgan holda) Sovetlar bilan urush boshlanishi kerak.^[37] Ammo umuman urush vazirligi armiya bilan kelishilmagan edi "qirg'iylar". Ular shimolni kuchaytirish tushunchasini qo'llab-quvvatlagan bo'lsalar-da, ular boshqa joylardagi ustuvorliklar nuqtai nazaridan Kvantung va Koreya armiyalari o'rtasida atigi 16 ta bo'linishning juda mo''tadil chegarasini afzal ko'rishdi - Kvantun armiyasining fikriga ko'ra "imkonsiz" bo'ladigan kuch. Sovetlarni jalb qilish. Xabar aniq edi: Yaponiya qizil armiyaga qarshi harakat qilishdan oldin xurmo pishib, yiqilib tushguncha kutib turardi.^[38]

KANTOKUEN

"Maxsus manevralar" davom etmoqda, 1941 yil

IJA-ning urush vazirligidagi dastlabki muvaffaqiyatsizliklari tufayli, hech bo'lmaganda printsipial ravishda qasos olishlari kerak edi. 1941 yil 5 iyuldagi shaxsiy tashrifi paytida "general-mayor Shinichi Tanaka, AGS operatsiyalari boshlig'i va (Matsuoka bilan birgalikda) hamraisi"Shimolga zarba bering "Tokiodagi fraksiya, urush vazirini ishontirishga muvaffaq bo'ldi Hideki Tojo Armiya Bosh shtabining Manjuriyani kuchaytirishning "to'g'riligi" va "hayotiyligi" to'g'risida fikrlarini qo'llab-quvvatlash. General Tanaka va uning tarafdorlari Urush vazirligi tomonidan afzal ko'rilgan atigi 16 ta bo'linmaning tayyor holatini o'rnatish niqobi ostida, hattoki Armiyaning 1941 yil iyun rejasidan ham ko'proq - jami 25 tagacha bo'linishni o'z zimmasiga olishga majbur bo'lishdi. Tanakaning rejasi ikki bosqichni o'z ichiga olgan edi: qurish va tayyorlik bosqichi (№ 100 o'rnatish), so'ngra hujum pozitsiyasi (101 va 102-sonli o'rnatishlar), undan keyin Kvantung armiyasi hujum qilish buyrug'ini kutib turardi. Butun jarayon "KANTOKUEN" qisqartmasi bilan (Kantogun Tokubetsu Enshu), yoki Kvantung armiyasining maxsus manevralari. Tojoning Kantokuenni qo'llab-quvvatlashi bilan, qattiqqo'llar 7 iyulda generalga qarshi urush vazirligini chetlab o'tdilar Xajime Sugiyama Hirohitoning bino uchun rasmiy sanktsiyasini talab qilish uchun Imperator saroyiga tashrif buyurdi. Kvantung armiyasi qo'shimcha yordam olgandan keyin o'z tashabbusi bilan hujum qilmaydi degan generalning ishonchidan so'ng, imperator to'xtadi.^[39]

Ussuri jabhasiga Yaponiyaning kirib borishi rejalashtirilgan bo'lib, sovetlarning mustaxkamlanishiga javoban sanalar qo'shilgan

Amaliy jihatdan Kantokuen 1940 yilgi urush rejasi bilan bir xil edi,^[40] qisqartirilgan kuch tuzilmasi bilan bo'lsa ham (25 ta 43 ta bo'linma) Sovet Ittifoqining Germaniya bilan ziddiyatni hisobga olgan holda Uzoq Sharqni kuchaytira olmaganligi sababli bank ishi. Ammo majburiyat darajasi hali ham juda katta edi - Yaponiya armiyasi tarixidagi eng buyuk safarbarlik.^[41] Operatsiyani engillashtirish uchun juda ko'p miqdordagi jangovar va moddiy-texnik mavjud tuzilish ustiga aktivlarni Manjuriyaga jo'natish kerak edi. Xususan, Yaponiyaning afzalliklaridan foydalanish ichki chiziqlar Sovetlarga nisbatan shimol va sharqdagi temir yo'llar hujumga qarshi urush ko'taradigan og'ir yukni ko'tarish uchun kengaytirilishi kerak edi.^[42] Qo'shimcha ravishda, port inshootlari, harbiy uylar va kasalxonalar shuningdek, ko'paytirilishi kerak edi.^[43] Keyinchalik tuzilgan oldingi tushunchalar singari Nomonhan voqeasi, Kantokuen birinchi marta katta zarba berish bilan boshlanadi Ussuri Oldin Primoryega qarshi, shimolga qarshi yana bir hujumni davom ettirdi Blagoveshchensk va Kuybyshevka.^[44] Soyabon tashkiloti ostida Birinchi hudud armiyasi, yaponlar Uchinchidan va Yigirmanchi Tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan armiyalar 19-bo'lim ning Koreya armiyasi, chegaradan janubga kirib borishi kerak edi Xanka ko'li asosiy Sovet mudofaa chizig'ini engib o'tish va Vladivostokga tahdid qilish maqsadida. Bir vaqtning o'zida Beshinchi armiya Imondan janubga (hozirgi kunga) uriladi Dalnerechensk ), dengiz viloyatining izolyatsiyasini yakunlash, kesib tashlash Trans-Sibir temir yo'li va shimoldan keladigan barcha qo'shimcha vositalarni to'sib qo'yish; bu guruhlar 20 tagacha bo'linishni o'z ichiga oladi, ularning ekvivalenti kichikroq birliklarda bir nechta.^[45] Shimoliy Manjuriyada To'rtinchi armiya to'rt divizion bilan dastlab ushlab turardi Amur daryosi Blagoveshchenskga qarshi hujumga o'tishdan oldin chiziq.^[46][47] Shu bilan birga, Kantokuen kuchlari tarkibidan tashqarida Yaponiya qo'shinlarining ikkita kuchaytirilgan bo'linmasi Shimolga qarshi operatsiyalarni boshlashi kerak edi Saxalin ikkala quruqlikdan va dengiz qirg'og'idan himoyachilarni qistirma harakati bilan yo'q qilish maqsadida.^[48] Ikkinchi bosqichning boshqa maqsadlari qo'lga olishni o'z ichiga olgan Xabarovsk, Komsomolsk, Skovorodino, Sovetskaya Gavan va Nikolayevsk, qarshi amfibiya operatsiyalari Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy va boshqa qismlari Kamchatka yarim oroli o'ylangan.^[49][50]

Urushning eng muhim bosqichi bo'lgan bu muvaffaqiyatni ta'minlash uchun Kantokuen katta kuchlarni ishga solishga chaqirdi: Sharqiy hujum uchun 23-24 bo'limlarda 1 200 000 kishi, 35000 yuk mashinalari, 500 ta tank, 400000 ot va 300000 ishchi. va faqat Shimoliy jabhalar.^[51] Biroq, bu G'arbiy front oldida turgan degani edi Mo'g'uliston va Trans-Baykal mintaqani faqat 1 dan 2 gacha bo'linmalar va yana bir nechta chegara qo'shinlari ekvivalenti himoya qilishi mumkin edi.^[c] Darhaqiqat, operatsiyalarning dastlabki bosqichida Yaponiya oltinchi armiyasi faqat ajratilgan 23-divizion Ikki yil oldin Xalxin Golidagi jang qatnashchilari va 8-chegara qo'shinlari.^[53] Yaponiya armiyasining asosiy qismi Sharqda bo'lgan paytda Sovet Ittifoqining G'arbdagi qarshi hujumidan kelib chiqadigan xavfni minimallashtirish uchun IJA kechikish harakatlarining bepoyon kengliklari bilan birlashishiga umid qildi. Gobi sahrosi^[54] va Hailar Oddiy^[55] asosiy strategiya g'arbiy tomon to'planishidan oldin Qizil Armiya Manchuriya qalbiga jiddiy muammo tug'dirishiga to'sqinlik qiladigan "strategik tamponlar" bo'lib xizmat qiladi. Yapon qo'shinlarining yakuniy maqsadi o'tayotgan chiziq edi Skovorodino va Buyuk Xingan tog'larining g'arbiy yon bag'irlari, ular bo'ylab qolgan sovet kuchlarini mag'lub etib, mudofaa pozitsiyasiga o'tishadi.^[56]

Har qanday zamonaviy harbiy operatsiyada bo'lgani kabi, havo kuchi Kantokuen rejasida hal qiluvchi rol o'ynadi. Kasallik paydo bo'lishidan oldin Tinch okeani urushi Yaponlar Manchuriyada mavjud bo'lgan 600-900 samolyotni kuchaytirish uchun 3 ta havo bo'linmasiga 1200 dan 1800 gacha samolyot jo'natmoqchi edilar,^[57] Sovet Uzoq Sharq havo kuchlariga harbiy harakatlar boshlanishida havoda ham, yerda ham "to'satdan", "yo'q qiluvchi" hujumni boshlash uchun 350 ga yaqin dengiz kuchlari samolyotlari bilan hamkorlik qilish kerak edi. Agar ular muvaffaqiyatga erishgan bo'lsalar, Yaponiya aviatsiya bo'linmalari o'z kuchlarini taktik darajadagi quruqlikdagi kuchlarni qo'llab-quvvatlashga yo'naltirgan bo'lar edi. aloqa liniyalari va ta'minot (ayniqsa Amur va Trans-Baykal mintaqalar) va Evropadan havo kuchlarini to'sib qo'yish.^[58]

Umuman olganda, Mo'g'ulistondan Saxalinga SSSRga qarshi operatsiyalarda qatnashgan yapon va eksa kuchlari taxminan 1,5 million kishini tashkil qilgan bo'lar edi,^[d] 40,000 yuk mashinalari,^[e] 2000 ta tank,^[f] 2,100–3,100 samolyot,^[61] 450 ming ot,^[g] va juda ko'p miqdorda artilleriya qurollari.^[h]

Jang maydoni va harakatlar teatri

Uzoq Sharqda bo'lajak har qanday urushga tayyorgarlik ko'rishda Yaponiya (va Sovet) strategik rejalashtirishida ikkita asosiy geosiyosiy haqiqat hukmronlik qildi:^[63][64]

1.) Sovet Uzoq Sharq va Mo'g'uliston Xalq Respublikasi to'rt yarim ming kilometrdan oshiq uzunlikdagi chegara bo'ylab Manchuriya atrofida taqa hosil qildi va

2.) Sovet Uzoq Sharqi iqtisodiy va harbiy jihatdan qaram bo'lgan Evropa Rossiya singl orqali Trans-Sibir temir yo'li.

Uzoq Sharq va Manchuriyadagi yirik temir yo'llarning ma'lumot xaritalari^[65]

Ushbu ikkinchi kuzatuv, ehtimol, hatto birinchi kuzatuvdan ham ko'proq, uning asosini tashkil etdi Uzoq Sharqiy Rossiya (FER) ning Yaponiyaga qarshi urushdagi zaifligi. Uzoq Sharq aholisi kam edi, atigi 6 millionga yaqin fuqaro,^[66] ularning nisbatan yuqori foizi sanoat sharoitida emas, balki shaharlarda emas, balki shaharlarda to'plangan.^[67] Binobarin, dehqonlarning etishmasligi, fuqarolar va askarlar uchun oziq-ovqat ishlab chiqarishda etishmovchilik, shuningdek, potentsial zaxirada bo'lganlarning kichik guruhi bo'lishi mumkin edi.^[68] Ostida katta mablag 'ajratilganiga qaramay Jozef Stalin Ikkinchi va Uchinchi Besh yillik rejalar (1933-1942), jiddiy kamchiliklar hali ham saqlanib qoldi. Garchi Sovetlar an'anaviy tanqislikni bartaraf etish uchun ishchi kuchi, oziq-ovqat va xom ashyoni sharq tomon jo'natishda Trans-Sibir temir yo'liga ishongan bo'lsalar-da (ba'zan hattoki bo'shatilgan askarlarni Sibirga majburan ko'chirishgan),^[69] bu yana bir muammo tug'dirdi, shu bilan ushbu temir yo'lning cheklangan quvvati, shuningdek, Yaponiyaga olib kelinadigan har qanday qizil armiya kuchlarining maksimal hajmini cheklab qo'ydi, bu yaponlarning taxminiga ko'ra 55 dan 60 gacha diviziya.^[70]

Shunday qilib, Trans-Sibir temir yo'lining har qanday uzoq davom etadigan buzilishi oxir-oqibat FER uchun ham, Sovet Ittifoqining uni himoya qilishga urinishi uchun ham halokatli bo'lar edi, chunki bu yo'l Yaponiya tomonidan juda osonlikcha boshqarilardi, chunki yo'llar chegara bilan parallel ravishda minglab kilometr masofani bosib o'tdi, ba'zan hatto Manchuriya chegarasining artilleriya chegarasiga yaqinlashdi. Bundan tashqari, SSSR va Mo'g'ulistonni o'rab turgan geografiyasi Qizil Armiyaga Manjuriyani strategik ravishda qamrab olish imkoniyatini berish orqali (1941 yildagi harbiy imkonsizligi) tajovuzkor sharoitda nazariy jihatdan foydali bo'lgan bo'lsa ham,^[73] mudofaada chetlatilgan rus guruhlari yanada ixcham raqibning qo'lida izolyatsiya va qismlarga bo'linish bilan himoyasiz bo'lar edi. Sovet Ittifoqi ushbu zaiflikni bartaraf etish uchun birgalikda harakatlarni amalga oshirgan bo'lsa ham, masalan, Trans-Sibir temir yo'lini 4000 km ga uzaytirish bo'yicha ishni boshlash, BAM liniyasi, asosiy kuchsizlikni tuzatish uchun bularning o'zi etarli emas edi.^[74]

Trans-Sibir temir yo'lining cheklanganligi va FERning uzoqligi ikkala tomon uchun ham baraka, ham la'nat bo'ldi. Garchi u Qizil Armiyani ko'p sonli askarlarni Yaponiya bosqinchiligiga qarshi to'plash va etkazib berishga to'sqinlik qilsa-da va ikkinchisiga hududni Evropaning Rossiyasidan ajratib turishning samarali vositasini taqdim etgan bo'lsa-da, bu faqat Yaponiyaning hech qachon Sovet Ittifoqiga hal qiluvchi mag'lubiyat keltira olmasligini ta'minladi. ikkinchisining asosiy harbiy va iqtisodiy boyliklari zararsiz bo'lib qoladi.^[75] IJA Bosh shtabining xulosasiga ko'ra, faqat ikki jabhada, Evropa va Osiyoda, hujum SSSRning muhim sanoat markazlariga ta'sir ko'rsatdi va uning siyosiy irodasini buzishga qaratilgan bo'lib, uni yo'q qilishga muvaffaq bo'ldi.^[76]

Sovet javobi

Sovet Ittifoqi ta'kidlashicha, 1930-yillarda 1940-yillarning 40-yillari boshigacha Yaponiyaga qarshi harbiy rejalari mudofaa xarakteriga ega bo'lib, asosan Rossiyaning Uzoq Sharq va kommunistik Mo'g'uliston ustidan nazoratini saqlab qolish uchun mo'ljallangan. Shu maqsadda vositalar, umuman passiv bo'lmaydi. Nemis bosqindan keyin ham, 1942 yilda ham, STAVKA chegara zonasini har tomonlama himoya qilishni va og'irlikni himoya qildi qarshi hujumlar butun front bo'ylab, IJA ning har qanday Sovet hududini egallashiga yo'l qo'ymaslik va ularni Manjuriyaga qaytarib berish. Tomonidan ishlatiladigan tajovuzkor til Boris Shaposhnikov 1938 yilda 45 kunlik muddatdan so'ng shimoliy Manjuriyada "hal qiluvchi harakatlar" to'g'risida^[77] 1941 yilga qadar bosqinchilarning "birinchi eshelonini yo'q qilish" va "barqarorlik holatini yaratish" uchun moderatsiya qilingan.^[78] Qizil Armiya hech qachon cheklangan hujum maqsadlaridan butunlay voz kechmagan. Yaponlar, Manjuriya chegarasi va Tinch okeani o'rtasida o'tish mumkin bo'lgan erlarning kamligi, Amur va Primorye mintaqalarida Trans-Sibir temir yo'lining zaifligi bilan bir qatorda, ularni mustahkamlash uchun katta mablag 'sarflaganiga qaramay, ularni bunday pozitsiyani egallashga majbur qildi. mudofaa urushi uchun maydon.^[79]

1941 yil davomida Sovet Uzoq Sharqida joylashgan Qizil Armiyaning asosiy kuchlari Uzoq Sharq va Trans-Baykal jabhalari, generallar qo'mondonligi ostida Iosif Apanasenko va Mixail Kovalyov,^[80][men] navbati bilan.^[81][82] To'qqiz diviziya (shu jumladan ikkita zirhli), mexanizatsiyalashgan brigada va a mustahkam mintaqa Skovorodino yaqinidagi Oldoy daryosining g'arbiy qismida joylashgan hududni himoya qilish vazifasi yuklatilgan bo'lsa, Uzoq Sharq fronti 23 diviziya (shu jumladan uchta zirhli), to'rtta brigada (zenitlardan tashqari) va 11 ta mustahkamlangan mintaqalar bilan sharqda erni qo'riqlashdi, shu jumladan hal qiluvchi Vladivostok dengiz porti. Ikkala jabhada 650 ming kishi, 5400 tank, 3000 samolyot, 57000 avtoulov, 15000 artilleriya va 95000 ot bor edi. Urushgacha bo'lgan FERda ishchi kuchi va jihozlarning taqsimlanishi quyidagicha edi^[83]

Sovet harbiy kemasining ushbu 12-dyuymli (305 mm) qurollariga o'xshash ikkita joy Parizhskaya Kommuna 1934 yilda Vladivostok portini himoya qilish uchun barpo etilgan.

1942 yilga kelib Vladivostok mudofaa sektori, shuningdek, 75 donadan 356 mm gacha bo'lgan 150 ta artilleriya quroliga ega bo'lib, ular 50 ta akkumulyatorga birlashtirilgan. Ulardan eng ko'p bo'lganlari 130 mm B-13 20 ta batareyani (90 ta qurol) tashkil etdi.^[84][85] Germaniya istilosidan so'ng Uzoq Sharqdagi Sovet kuchlari tubdan o'zgarishga kirishdi. Barbarossa ochilishidan oldin ham, Qizil Armiya erkaklar va materillarni g'arbiy tomon Evropaga doimiy ravishda ko'chirishni boshladi. 1941 yil 22-iyunga qadar yuqoridagi ko'rsatkichlar 57000 kishi, 670 ta artilleriya va 5 ta diviziyadan 1070 ta tank kamaygan;^[86] 22 iyun va 1 dekabr kunlari fashistlar oqimini to'xtatish uchun oldinga yana 2209 ta texnika jo'natildi.^[87] Bundan tashqari, o'sha davrda yana 13 ta bo'lim^[88][j] Uzoq Sharqdan 122000 kishi, 2000 ta qurol va minomyot, 1500 ta traktor va 12000 ga yaqin avtomobil bilan Yaponiyaning 1800 ta samolyoti taxmin qilgan.^[89] Umuman olganda, 1941 yil 22 iyundan 1945 yil 9 maygacha Uzoq Sharq va Trans-Baykal frontlaridan jami 344 676 kishi, 2286 ta tank, 4757 ta qurol va minomyot, 11903 ta avtotransport vositalari va 77929 ta otlar olib tashlandi. ga qarshi umidsiz kurash Vermaxt,^[90] ularning aksariyati 1943 yil boshidan oldin kelgan.^[91]

Sovet 14 dyuymli (356 mm) TM-1-14 temir yo'l qurol; uchtasi 1933–1934 yillarda Vladivostokda o'rnatildi.

Materiel kuchining sezilarli darajada pasayishiga qaramay, Sovetlar o'zlarining qo'shinlari sonini ko'paytirishga qaratilgan harakatlarni amalga oshirdilar, bu Yaponiyaning Manjuriyadagi ulkan qurilishiga parallel ravishda kengaytirildi, bu uning katta hajmi tufayli sovet va xitoylik kuzatuvchilar tomonidan osongina kuzatildi.^[92] Tomonidan buyurilgan umumiy safarbarlikka muvofiq GKO 1941 yil 22-iyulda Uzoq Sharq va Trans-Baykal frontlarining umumiy kuchi 2-avgustga qadar 1 milliondan oshishi kerak edi.^[93] 20 dekabrga qadar ishchi kuchining haqiqiy darajasi 1 161 202 kishini tashkil etdi, ulardan 1 129 630 nafari oddiy ofitserlar yoki xizmatga jalb qilingan odamlar, qolganlari kursantlar yoki kurs tinglovchilari edi. Bundan tashqari, otlar soni 94 607 dan 139 150 ga o'sdi.^[94] Uzoq Sharqdagi aholi sonining cheklanganligiga qaramay, faol kadrlarning kengayishiga Ural, O'rta Osiyo va Sibirdan zahiradagi askarlarni qo'shish orqali erishildi. Harbiy okruglar allaqachon qo'lida bo'lganlarning ustiga.^[95] Bundan tashqari, NKVD ning mustahkamligi va Sovet dengiz floti shuningdek, ko'paytirildi: 1941 yil 22 iyundan 15 noyabrgacha Uzoq Sharqdagi dengiz kuchlari ishchi kuchi Admiral Yumashev 94,199dan ko'tarildi^[k] 169,029 gacha,^[l][96] NKVD chegara qo'shinlari (urushdan oldin 34 mingdan ozroq ro'yxat bilan)^[97] agar bu nisbat mavjud bo'lsa, xuddi shu tarzda ularning kuchini 60 mingdan oshgan bo'lar edi. Va nihoyat Mo'g'ullar, og'ir qurollari yo'qligiga qaramay, ilgari yaponlarga qarshi o'zini isbotlagan Xalxin Gol 1945 yil avgustda Sovet Ittifoqining Manjuriyaga bostirib kirishida ishtirok etishadi. Sovetlarga tajriba va tashkilotchilik etishmasa ham, ularning soni 80 mingga yaqinlashdi.^[98]

Umuman olganda, 1941 yil avgust oyi oxiri yoki sentyabr oyi boshlarida urush boshlangan bo'lsa, SSSR va MPR Mo'g'ulistondan taxminan 10000 kishi, 2000 samolyot, 3200 tank, 51000 avtoulov, 117000 ot va 14000 artilleriya chaqirishi mumkin edi. Saxalin Yaponlarga qarshi turish uchun.^[m] Ulardan taxminan uchdan ikki qismi (shu jumladan, butun dengiz floti) Amur-Ussuri-Saxalin frontida, qolgan qismi esa Mo'g'uliston va Trans-Baykal mintaqasini himoya qiladi; Ikkala guruh o'rtasida uskunalar ancha teng taqsimlandi.^[99]

Suifenhe va Mutanchiang o'rtasidagi qishloq; chegaraning har ikki tomonida ham tekislik tekislik bilan ta'minlangan tog'li relyef.

Evropada vaziyat og'ir bo'lsa ham, Sovet rejalashtiruvchilari FER va Manchuriyadagi operatsiyalar uchun urushdan oldingi kontseptsiyaga amal qilishni davom ettirdilar. Stavka 170149 va 170150-sonli ko'rsatmalar 1942 yil 16 martda generallar Apanasenko va Kovalyovga yuborilgan.^[100] Ushbu strategiya asosida, jangovar harakatlar boshlangan kunlarda Uzoq Sharq jabhasi (shtab-kvartirasi bilan) Xabarovsk ) bilan birga Tinch okean floti Yaponlarning SSSR hududiga kirishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik va Blagoveshchensk, Iman (Dalnerechensk) va Primoriyani to'liq "har qanday narxda" ushlab turmaslik uchun chegarani har tomonlama himoya qilishni buyurdi. Asosiy mudofaa harakatlari tomonidan o'rnatilishi kerak edi 1-chi va 25-chi Qo'shinlar (avvalgi Vladivostokda joylashgan) Tinch okeani va Xanka ko'li o'rtasida shimoliy-janubiy o'qda, 35-armiya Imonni qazib olardi. Shimolga, 15-chi va 2-qizil bayroq Qo'shinlar, asoslangan Birobidjan va Blagoveshchensk, qudratli Amur daryosining narigi qirg'og'idan Yaponiyaning barcha hujumlarini qaytarishga harakat qilar edi. Ayni paytda Sovetlar Saxalini ushlab turishga harakat qilishadi, Kamchatka va Tinch okeanining qirg'oqlari, inkor qilishni xohlaydilar Oxot dengizi IJNga. Ushbu harakatga yordam berish uchun Qizil Armiya bir necha yillar davomida "Tochkas" (ochkolar) deb nomlangan xandaklar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan yuzlab qattiqlashtirilgan jangovar pozitsiyalarni qurishni o'z ichiga olgan Manjuriya bilan chegaralar bo'ylab aniq mustahkamlash dasturini amalga oshirdi.^[101] There were three types of Tochkas, DOTs (permanent fire points), SOTs (disappearing fire points), and LOTs (dummy fire points). The most common form of DOT built by the Soviets in the Far East was hexagonal in shape, with an interior diameter of 5–6 m (16–20 ft) for the smaller bunkers and up to 10 m (33 ft) for larger ones. They protruded approximately two meters above ground level, with the outer wall facing the front made of solid concrete 1 m (3.3 ft) or more thick. The backbone of the Soviet defenses, DOTs usually contained two or three machine guns; some were equipped with one or two 76 mm guns. The Soviets arranged their DOTs into belts: depending on the terrain, the strongpoints were spaced out over 400–600 m (440–660 yd) intervals and positioned in two to four rows 300–1,000 m (330–1,090 yd) deep from one another; by late 1941, the Tochkas were distributed between 12 fortified regions quyidagicha:^[102]

Fortified regions in the Amur, Ussuri, and Trans-Baikal sectors

Map of Soviet fortified areas in the Far East and Ussuri region in particular, 1945

A Tochka (DOT), typical of those found in Soviet fortified regions during World War II

The Fortified Regions were well sited: since there were a limited number of roads crossing the hilly, forested frontier, the Soviets could be confident that each avenue of approach was covered by prepared defenses that would have to be overcome via costly frontal hujum, delaying the enemy and forcing him to pay heavily in manpower and equipment.^[103] To counter the Tochkas, the Japanese were forced to keep considerable quantities of heavy artillery near the border, ranging from more modern Type 45 240 mm howitzers and 300 mm howitzers to antiquated 28 sm gabarit L / 10 from the Russo-Japanese War. As an added precaution, in the aftermath of the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, the IJA distributed a special one-ton shell with a range of only 1,000 meters to its Type 7 30 cm Howitzers ^[n] meant to pulverize an enemy strongpoint in a single hit.^[105] Despite the advantages conferred on them by the border terrain and Tochka belt, the Red Army did not intend solely to hunker down and outlast a Japanese assault. By the fifth day of war, STAVKA ordered the troops of the 15th and 35th Armies (minus the 66-o'qchilar diviziyasi ) bilan birga Amur Red Banner Military Flotilla and any available reserves to defeat the Japanese-Manchu units opposite them, force the Amur and Ussuri, and launch a counter-offensive coordinated against both sides of the Sungari daryosi in Manchurian territory. The final objectives of the Sungari Front groups were designated as the cities of Fujin and Baoqing, to be reached on the 25th day of hostilities. The object of this attack was to stabilize the front and relieve pressure on the Ussuri Railway and Khabarovsk areas.^[106] Similarly, all along the front the remaining Soviet forces would also begin short counterblows "in the tactical depth,"^[107] in keeping with the Soviet doctrine that defensive action cannot be successful without the coordination of position defense and counterattack.^[108] Simultaneously, on the opposite side of Manchuria, the 17-chi va 36-chi Armies of the Trans-Baikal Front (with its headquarters at Mount Shirlova in the Yablonovy Range ) were ordered to hold and then counterattack after a period of three days, advancing to Lakes Buir va Xulun by the tenth day of the war.^[109] Undoubtedly as a consequence of the USSR's desperate situation at the time, in both cases, East and West, reinforcements from the hinterland were relatively small: just four tank brigades, five artillery regiments, six guards mortar regiments, and five armored train divisions were allocated to both Fronts put together.^[110]

With the aim of supporting the Red Army's struggle on the ground, the Havo kuchlari and Navy were also to have an active role in opposing the Japanese invasion. In the case of the air force, the foremost objective was the destruction of enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground, followed by tactical ground-attack missions against Japanese troops to assist the progress of the Sungari Offensive. Other objectives included the destruction of railways, bridges, and airfields in both Manchuria and Korea, as well as the interception of both troop transports and warships in the Sea of Japan in coordination with the Pacific Fleet. Strategic bombing was to be limited to a mere 30 DB-3s, to be sent in groups of 8 to 10 aircraft against targets in Tokio, Yokosuka, Maizuru va Ominato. Concurrently, Soviet Naval forces would strive to immediately close the mouth of the Amur, mine the Tatar bo‘g‘ozi, and defend the Pacific Coast from any potential landing, thus freeing up the 25th Army in Primorye from coast defense duty. Submarine patrols would begin in the Sariq dengiz, Sea of Okhotsk, and Sea of Japan with the aim of preventing the transport of troops from the Japanese Home Islands to the Asian Mainland, as well as disrupting their maritime communications. The Soviet submariners were ordered not to approach the Japanese coast, but rather to operate relatively close to home territory in order to protect the shores.^[111]

Strengths and weaknesses of the combatants

30 cm Type 7 short (foreground) and long-barreled howitzers positioned to smash Soviet strongpoints

Both of the prospective belligerents faced an array of difficulties that might have impeded the attainment of their goals. In the Japanese case, although their then four-year war in China had provided them with a wealth of combat experience, their understanding and application of concepts such as modern military logistics and massed firepower still lagged behind the Red Army. Vaqtida Nomonhan voqeasi the IJA regarded distances of 100 kilometers as "far" and 200 trucks as "many," while Zhukov's corps of over 4,000 vehicles supplied his Army Group on a 1,400 kilometer round trip from the nearest railheads.^[112] To make up for their lack of numbers and limited resources, the Japanese relied on intangible factors such as fighting spirit and elan to overcome the foe, but this alone was insufficient.^[113] Although the IJA's appreciation of these 20th Century military realities improved in the months and years after the fact and the Kvantun armiyasi 's material strength was vastly upgraded during the build up of 1941,^[114] their fundamental reliance on spirit to bring victory in battle never changed,^[115] sometimes even at the expense of logical thinking and common sense.^[116] Often, traditionalism and unwillingness to change actively impeded improvements to both technology and doctrine, to the point where those who spoke up about the matter were accused of "faintheartedness" and "insulting the Imperial Army."^[117] Oxirigacha Tinch okeanidagi urush the pendulum began to swing in the opposite direction, with Japanese leaders grasping at 'wonder weapons ' kabi reaktiv qiruvchilar, and a so-called "death ray" in the hope of reversing their fortunes.^[118]

Outline of the Soviet operational plan in the event of war, early 1942

The Soviets, on the other hand, operated under the shadow of the raging war with Germany. Although the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts had access to a formidable array of weaponry, the demands of the fighting in Europe meant that strength was siphoned away by the week. Moreover, the state of those vehicles that remained was often mixed: prior to the beginning of transfers westward in 1941 some 660 tanks^[119] and 347 aircraft^[120] were inoperable due to repair needs or other causes. Because the Soviets only possessed a limited offensive capability on the Primorye and Trans-Baikal directions, they could never hope to achieve a decisive victory over the Kwantung Army, even if they succeeded in slowing or stopping them.^[121] Furthermore, attacking into the teeth of a prepared enemy, especially one with his own fortified regions and heavy concentrations of troops immediately opposite the border, was "the hardest kind of offensive," requiring "overwhelming numbers and massive means of assault" to succeed,^[122] neither of which the Soviets possessed.^[123]

Soviet forces in the Far East were dispersed over a vast arc from Mongolia to Vladivostok. Without the ability to capitalize on this deployment by striking deep into Manchuria from multiple axes, their strength would be fatally diluted and prone to piecemeal destruction at the hands of the Japanese, who could maneuver freely on their interior lines, concentrating their power at will while the immobile Red Army was fixed in place.^[124] The only saving grace for the Soviets was that the remoteness of the Far East from European Russia meant that Japan alone could never hope to deal a mortal blow to the USSR, for which the former would be reliant on Germany.^[125]

Organizationally, although Soviet forces in the Far East on paper amounted to some 32 division-equivalents by December 1941,^[126] they were regarded as only barely sufficient for defensive operations. Compared to a typical Japanese division, pre-war Red Army units possessed slightly less manpower, but had greater access to long-range, higher caliber artillery. After the German invasion, however, the Red Army was reorganized so that each division had scarcely half the manpower and a fraction of the olov kuchi of either its German or Japanese counterpart. Hence, to achieve superiority on the battlefield the Soviets would have to concentrate several divisions to counter each of the opponent's.^[127]

Chi-Has and Ha-Gos of the Chiba Tank School during exercises (1940)

The IJN's Mitsubishi A6M "Zero" fighter was superior to anything in the Soviet inventory.

Lastly, the quality of both personnel and equipment in the respective armies cannot be ignored. As the Soviets drained their best, most well-trained divisions to fight in the west, the overall standard of the forces in the east correspondingly diminished, forcing the STAVKA to rely more heavily on its fortified regions in defensive operations.^[137] Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army opposite them then constituted "the cream of the entire Japanese armed forces,"^[138] and was receiving reinforcements by the day. A large proportion of its units were elite Type A divisions,^[q] many of which had seen extensive service in China. The quality of the Japanese officer corps was also very high, as many figures who would go on to have notable careers in the Pacific War including Tomoyuki Yamashita (head of the Kwantung Defense Command and later First Area Army), Isamu Yokoyama (1-divizion, keyinroq 4-armiya ), Mitsuru Ushijima (11-divizion ),^[140] va Tadamichi Kuribayashi (1-otliqlar brigadasi, Mo'g'uliston Garrison armiyasi )^[141] held commands there. While both sides primarily relied on murvatli miltiqlar and light automatic weapons as the backbone of the infantry, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged by the heavy Soviet guns at Khalkhin Gol, to the point where the IJA felt compelled to move their 15 cm howitzers closer to the front in order to bring them to bear, even at the expense of cover.^[142] Even though the Japanese managed to disable a considerable number of Soviet guns through counterbattery fire,^[143] their lack of range at extreme distances and shortage of ammunition left them at a distinct disadvantage against the Red Army.^[144]

The ML-20 152 mm heavy howitzer-gun was capable of out-ranging most Japanese pieces, and fired a shell weighing 43.6 kg.

Tanks presented a mixed picture as well: although the most modern machine available to the Kwantung Army in 1941, the 97 Chi-Xa yozing, had thicker armor (up to 33 mm)^[145] compared to the Soviet BT va T-26, its low-velocity 57 mm gun common to medium tanks of the era was outmatched by the long-barreled 45 mm weapons mounted on its opposite numbers, while the 37 mm gun used on the Ha-Go va Te-Ke had an effective range of less than a kilometer.^[146] In general, while the "handcrafted, beautifully polished" Japanese tanks were more survivable thanks to their diesel engines (the gasoline powerplants used by the Russians were especially fireprone^[147]), their lesser numbers meant that each loss was more damaging to the IJA than each destroyed "crudely finished," "expendable" BT or T-26 was to the Red Army.^[148] The balance in the air would have been strongly in favor of the Japanese. Although the most modern fighter in the Soviet Air Force arsenal available in the Far East, the Polikarpov I-16, was a firm opponent of the Nakajima Ki-27,^[149][r] the majority of planes in-theater were considerably older. Furthermore, the Soviets had no answer to either the Mitsubishi A6M, which had been fighting in China since 1940,^[150] or the high-speed Ki-21 bomber, which could fly faster and farther than its contemporary, the SB-2.^[151][152] Japanese pilots were also highly experienced, with IJNAS airmen averaging roughly 700 hours of flight time by late 1941, and IJAAF aviators averaging 500. Many of these fliers had already tasted combat against China or the VVS in previous battles.^[153] Solishtirganda, Nemis pilots received about 230 hours of flying time and Soviet pilots even less.^[154]

Xulosa

Support for KANTOKUEN fades

US President Franklin D. Roosevelt enacted a crippling series of sanctions on Japan, undermining its capacity for aggression.

The IJA's hostility toward the Soviet Union and Japanese imperialism in general did not exist inside a vacuum. Even as the build up stage of the Kantokuen Plan was underway, external conflicts with outside powers, one military against China and the other economic against the United States and its allies, continued to drag on. Because of this reality, the need to prepare for a potential war with the Western countries together with the demands of the fight against the resistance of the Chinese loomed large in the minds of Japanese strategic planners. By mid-July 1941 Matsuoka's continued insistence for immediate war with the USSR ended with his dismissal and replacement with Admiral Teijiro Tono as Foreign Minister, dealing a blow to the 'Strike-Northers.'^[155] Further damaging the anti-Soviet cause, although General Hideki Tojo and Emperor Hirohito both supported the reinforcement of Manchuria as called for by the AGS, neither was ready to commit to hostilities. Hirohito in particular continued to express worry over the volatility of the Kwantung Army and the negative image the "special maneuvers" created abroad. These concerns were not unfounded: as late as October 1941, G-2, apprehensive over the rapid increase of Japanese strength in Manchuria, recommended the US provide direct military aid to both the Soviet and Chinese armies in an effort to check Axis expansion in the East and keep the USSR in the war against Germany.^[156] Nevertheless, despite the objections of General Shunroku Xata – who opposed the weakening of his Xitoy ekspeditsiya armiyasi for the sake of Manchuria – and the incoming Korea Army qo'mondon Seishiro Itagaki along with the relatively high manpower levels of the Soviet Far East forces, Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama was still able to persuade the monarch to reaffirm his support for the build up during an audience on 1 August.^[157] Events, however, had already begun to overtake them. In response to the Japanese occupation of key points in southern Frantsuz Hind-Xitoy on 24 July, US President Franklin D. Ruzvelt, citing an "unlimited national emergency," issued an executive order freezing all of Japan's assets in the United States and controlling all trade and monetary transactions involving Japanese interests. When Britain and the Dutch government in exile followed America's example, it effectively ended all trade between Japan and those three nations.^[158]

Even more calamitous, on August 1, the same day Sugiyama appeared before the Emperor, the United States further sanctioned Japan by enacting a total embargo on oil. Since US exports accounted for 80 percent of Japan's oil supply and most of the rest came from the Dutch East Indies (which also refused to sell), the Japanese war machine was virtually cut off; without replenishment it would soon collapse.^[159][lar] The oil embargo proved to be the final nail in the coffin for Kantokuen: scarcely a week later on 9 August 1941, the Army General Staff was finally forced to bow to the War Ministry as plans for the seizure of the resource rich countries of Southeast Asia were given top priority.^[161] Grounded in 'sheer opportunism,' the IJA's cherished adventure in Siberia could never compete with the grim realities of national survival. In accordance with the agreement, the Kantokuen build up was to be halted at only 16 divisions, which were to "stand guard" against any provocation, facilitate diplomacy with Stalin's government, or potentially take advantage of a sudden collapse should the opportunity present itself.^[162] All in all, reinforcements to Manchuria totalled 463,000 men, 210,000 horses, and 23,000 vehicles, bringing totals there to 763,000, 253,000, and 29,000, respectively. At the same time, Korea Army was expanded by a further 55,000 men, 16,000 horses, and 650 vehicles.^[163] Throughout Northeast Asia, the total number of IJA personnel stationed in territories on the periphery of Soviet Russia numbered more than 1 million.^[164]

"Go South" triumphant

With Kantokuen aborted halfway and Japan plunging toward self-destruction in the Pacific, the Kwantung Army found itself in the midst of a '180-degree turn' in national policy. As a harbinger of things to come, the 51-bo'lim was actually withdrawn from its jurisdiction in September to join the 23-armiya in China, leaving a total of 710,000 men remaining in Manchuria.^[165] In the face of this, Kwantung Army still clung to the hope of a "golden opportunity" for an attack on the USSR, continuing operational preparations and examining the possibility of an offensive northward before the Spring thaw of 1942, i.e., an invasion of Siberia in the winter.^[166] Although the logistical difficulties of such a move were quickly comprehended, hardliners in the Operations Division refused to hear it: when a logistics colonel complained to the Army General Staff that the Kwantung Army lacked the proper billeting to endure the bitter winter cold near the Siberian frontiers, General Tanaka, father of the Kantokuen Plan, became infuriated, yelled at the colonel not to say such "nonsensical things," and slapped him. In the aftermath of this episode, common sense prevailed, and the Kwantung Army withdrew from the borders to wait out the winter. A further 88,000 men were transferred out of Manchuria to join the impending campaign to the South, lowering the strength to 620,000 men.^[167]

Japanese expansion in Asia and the Pacific, 1937–42

When Japan finally struck the Allies and launched its multistage invasion of Southeast Asia in December 1941, the weakened Kwantung Army played only a limited role. Even though most of the units dispatched south beforehand were scheduled to return to Manchuria following the successful completion of the operation, the timing of their return would hinge on the outcome of the battles with the opposing ground forces.^[168] In the meantime, Kwantung Army was ordered to ensure the security of Manchuria and avoid conflict with the USSR,^[169] which was itself hard-pressed as German troops neared Moscow.

After the initial phase of the Southern Offensive was brought to a successful close in the spring of 1942, IGHQ, conscious of the Kwantung Army's weakened state and with a budget increase allocating more funds for spending, decided to strengthen and re-organize its troops in Manchuria.^[170] This rejuvenation of combat power in the north, while bringing the Kwantung Army closer to its past goals from an organizational standpoint, still did not reflect an intention to go to war with the USSR; indeed, logistics specialists were convinced that a full year would be needed to repair the damages of the earlier redeployments and raise capabilities to the level where a serious offensive could be undertaken.^[171] Nevertheless, it was during this time that the Kwantung Army reached the absolute peak of its power, attaining a strength of 1,100,000 men and 1,500 aircraft^[172] in 16 divisions, two brigades, and 23 garrison units; Korea Army added another 120,000 personnel to this figure. Though the Kwantung Army briefly benefited from this momentary 'pivot' to the north, the changing tide of the War in the Pacific would soon permanently force Japan's attention back southward. Over the next three years, Kwantung Army would go on to oversee an 'exodus' of combat units from Manchuria, setting in motion a terminal decline that would ultimately be its death knell.^[173]

The end of the Kwantung Army

With the Allied counteroffensive in the Pacific both larger and earlier than expected, Japanese forces on hand in the Southern Areas were insufficient to contain its momentum. Because it lacked a real strategic reserve in the Home Islands, the IJA was forced to divert troops from the Asian mainland to bolster the Empire's crumbling frontiers.^[174] Keyin 20-chi, 41-chi, 52-chi, 51-chi, 32-chi, 35-chi va 43-chi^[t] divisions were withdrawn from China and Korea, Japan could only count on the Kwantung Army – the last major grouping not actively involved in combat operations – as a pool of ready manpower. Although minor dispatches to the south from Manchuria had already started in 1943,^[175] the first wholesale movement of divisions began in February 1944 with the transfer of the 14-chi va 29-chi Divisions to Guam va Palau, where they would later be annihilated in battle.^[176]

Japanese soldiers on the "Tokio Express "ichida Solomons, 1942

When the US, having bypassed the fortress atoll of Truk, decided to strike directly against the Marianas and decisively defeated the IJN's counterattack in the Filippin dengizidagi jang, the inner perimeter of the Japanese Empire was threatened. Having still done little to strengthen its reserves, in June and July 1944 IGHQ sent seven divisions, the 1-chi, 8-chi, 10-chi, 24-chi, 9-chi, 28-chi va 2-zirhli, into the fray, joined by an eighth, the 23-chi (veterans of the Khalkhin Gol fighting in 1939), in October. Of the above, all except the 9th, bypassed on Formosa, and the 28th, on Miyako Jima, avoided being devastated by battle, starvation, and disease during the brutal combat in the Filippinlar va Okinava. The decision to reinforce Formosa was of particular consequence for Japan: recognizing that island's strategic importance with regard to the flow of vital raw materials to the mainland, Tokyo resolved at all costs to prevent it from falling into Allied hands. Thus, in December 1944 and January 1945 the 12-chi va 71-chi Divisions were ordered there from Manchuria to reinforce the two division garrison recently augmented by the Kwantung 9th Division that had arrived via Okinawa. The loss of the 9th Division was seen as nothing less than a body blow for Okinawa's 32-armiya qo'mondon, general-leytenant Mitsuru Ushijima, who warned: "If the 9th Division is detached and transferred, I cannot fulfil my duty of defending this island." In the end, because of the US's 'orolda sakrash ' strategy, none of the five divisions (including three from the Kwantung Army) would ever fire a shot in anger against an American invasion and were left to wither on the vine.^[177]

Even before the 71st Division departed in January 1945, Kwantung Army found itself reduced to a paltry 460,000 men in just nine remaining divisions. Not a single division was left to defend Korea, and there were just 120 operable aircraft in all of Manchuria.^[178] Worse still, those divisions that stayed behind were effectively ruined by transfers of men and equipment: some infantry companies were left with only one or two officers, and entire artillery regiments completely lacked guns. Although the Kwantung Army held little illusions about its miserable state of affairs (its own "exhaustive studies" concluding that it had been weakened "far beyond estimation" and that the new divisions formed to counterbalance the withdrawals, though quickly raised, possessed only a "fraction" of the fighting power of the originals), senior leaders continued to rationalize. In an audience with Hirohito on February 26, Tojo attempted to placate the Emperor by noting that the Soviets had earlier done exactly the same thing, characterizing the strength of the Soviet Far East forces and the Kwantung Army as being "in balance."^[179] The next month, with the American juggernaut at last nearing the Home Islands and with none of the multitude of new formations hastily raised in their defense to be fully ready until summer, the Kwantung Army was called on yet again as the 11-chi, 25-chi, 57-chi va 1-zirhli Divisions were recalled to Japan while the 111-chi, 120-chi va 121-chi Divisions were sent to South Korea to pre-empt a possible Allied incursion.^[180] This "hemorrhage" of equipment and manpower from what was once the most prestigious outfit in the Japanese Army only stopped on 5 April 1945, when the USSR announced that it would not renew its Neytrallik shartnomasi Yaponiya bilan.^[181]

Depth of Soviet penetration into Manchuria as of 15 August 1945 (Credit: JM-154, 1954.)

As the Kwantung Army's fighting power diminished, it had to amend its operational plans against the Soviets accordingly. While the strategy for 1942 was the same as it had been in 1941,^[182] by 1943 this had been abandoned in favor of only one attack – either on the Eastern Front against Primorye or in the north against Blagoveshchensk – which itself soon gave way to a holding action on all fronts, attempting to check the Red Army at the borders.^[183] As the Kwantung Army continued to weaken, it became apparent that even this would be too much, and so a final operational plan was adopted on 30 May 1945 in which the IJA would only delay the Soviet advance in the border zones while beginning a fighting retreat to fortifications near the Korean border, centered around the city of Tongxua – a move that, in effect, surrendered the majority of Manchuria to the opponent as a matter of course.^[184][185] Although by August 1945 Kwantung Army manpower had been boosted to 714,000^[186] in 24 divisions and 12 brigades thanks to the exhaustion of local reserves, cannibalization of guards units and transfers from China, privately its officers and men were in despair.^[187] Most of the new formations, staffed by the old, the infirm, civil servants, colonists, and students^[188] were at barely 15% combat effectiveness^[189] and heavily lacking in weapons; out of 230 serviceable combat planes, only 55 could be considered modern. It was even briefly recommended that Army Headquarters be pre-emptively evacuated from Changchun, but this was rejected on security, political, and psychological grounds.^[190] After the war, colonel Saburo Hayashi admitted: "We wanted to provide a show of force. If the Russians only knew the weakness of our preparations in Manchuria, they were bound to attack us."^[191]

Simultaneously, Japanese intelligence watched helplessly as Soviet strength opposite them began to soar: honoring his promise at Yaltada to enter the war in the Pacific within three months of Germany's defeat, Joseph Stalin ordered the transfer from Europe to the Far East of some 403,355 crack troops, along with 2,119 tanks and assault guns, 7,137 guns and mortars, 17,374 trucks, and 36,280 horses.^[192] These men and their commanders were specially picked because of past experience dealing with certain types of terrain and opposition during the war with Germany that would be beneficial for the approaching campaign.^[193] By the beginning of August the IJA pegged Red Army forces in Siberia at 1,600,000, with 4,500 tanks and 6,500 aircraft in 47 division-equivalents;^[194] the actual totals were 1,577,725, 3,704, and 3,446, respectively.^[195][u] The Soviets were very deliberate in their preparations: in order to prevent the Japanese from shifting forces to block an attack on a single axis, it was determined that only an all-axes surprise offensive would be sufficient to surround the Kwantung Army before it had a chance to withdraw into the depths of China or Korea.^[197] Aware that the Japanese knew the limited capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway would mean that preparations for an attack would not be ready until autumn and that weather conditions would also be rather unfavorable before that time, Soviet planners enlisted the help of the Allies to deliver additional supplies to facilitate an earlier offensive. Because of this, the Japanese were caught unprepared when the Soviets attacked in August.^[198] Despite the impending catastrophe facing Japan on all fronts, the Kwantung Army commander, General Yamada, and his top leadership, continued to live 'in a fool's paradise.'^[199] Hatto obliteration of Hiroshima on 6 August, there was no sense of crisis and special war games (expected to last for five days and attended by a number of high-ranking officers) were conducted near the borders, while Yamada flew to Dairen to dedicate a shrine. Therefore, Army Headquarters was taken by complete surprise when the Soviets launched their general offensive at midnight on August 8/9 1945.^[200] Although the Japanese offered vicious resistance when they were allowed to stand and fight, such as at Mutanchiang, almost without exception they were overwhelmed and pushed back from the front. After just about a week of combat, reacting to the Soviet declaration of war and the destruction of Nagasaki by a second atomic bomb, Emperor Hirohito overrode his military and ordered the capitulation of Japan to the Allied nations in accordance with the Potsdam deklaratsiyasi. After some clarifications and a second rescript reaffirming Japan's surrender, General Yamada and his staff abandoned the plan to withdraw to Tongxua, even though his command was still mostly intact; the Kwantung Army officially laid down its arms on 17 August 1945 with some sporadic clashes persisting until the end of the month.^[201][v] The final casualties on both sides numbered 12,031 killed and 24,425 wounded for the Soviets^[204] and 21,389 killed and about 20,000 wounded for the Japanese.^[205][w] In the end, as Foreign Minister Shigemitsu signed the unconditional Yaponiyaning taslim bo'lishi bortda USS Missuri in Tokyo Bay, the men of the vaunted Kantogun, having once dreamed of riding into Siberia as conquerors, instead found themselves trudging there as prisoners of war.

Izohlar

Adabiyotlar

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