1965–66 yillarda Indoneziyadagi ommaviy qotilliklar - Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66

1965–66 yillarda Indoneziyadagi ommaviy qotilliklar
Qismi Yangi tartibga o'tish
Anti PKI Literature.jpg
PKIga qarshi kitoblarda to'ntarishga urinishda PKI aybdor
ManzilIndoneziya
Sana1965–1966
MaqsadPKI a'zolar, hamdardlar, Gervani a'zolari, etnik Yava Abangan,[1] ateistlar, "kofirlar "va"etnik xitoylar "[2]
Hujum turi
Polititsid, ommaviy qotillik, genotsid[2]
O'limlar500,000[3]:3 1 000 000 gacha[3]:3[4][5][6]
JinoyatchilarIndoneziya armiyasi va turli xil o'lim guruhlari, Qo'shma Shtatlar va boshqa G'arb hukumatlari tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi va rag'batlantirildi[7][8][9][10]
Qismi bir qator ustida
Tarixi Indoneziya
Surya Majapahit Gold.svg VOC gold.svg Indoneziyaning milliy gerbi Garuda Pancasila.svg
Xronologiya
Indonesia.svg bayrog'i Indoneziya portali

The 1965–66 yillarda Indoneziyadagi ommaviy qotilliklar (Indoneziyadagi genotsid,[11][2][3]:4 Indoneziya kommunistik tozalash, Indoneziyadagi siyosiy qotillik,[12][13] yoki 1965 yil fojiasi) (Indoneziyalik: Pembunuhan Massal Indonesia va Pembersihan G.30.S / PKI) keng ko'lamli qotilliklar edi va fuqarolik tartibsizliklari sodir bo'lgan Indoneziya bir necha oy ichida, maqsadli Indoneziya Kommunistik partiyasi (PKI) partiya a'zolari, kommunistik xayrixohlar, Gervani ayollar, etnik yava Abangan,[1] etnik xitoylar va ko'pincha qurolli kuchlar va hukumat tashabbusi bilan da'vogar chapchilar. Bu boshlandi antikommunist tozalash bahsli urinishdan so'ng Davlat to'ntarishi tomonidan 30 sentyabr harakati. Eng ko'p nashr etilgan taxminlarga ko'ra 500 mingdan bir milliongacha odam o'lgan,[3]:3[4][5][6] yaqinda ba'zi taxminlarga ko'ra, ikki-uch millionga etadi.[14][15] Tozalash muhim voqea bo'ldi "yangi tartib" ga o'tish va global kuchga ta'sir qiladigan PKIni siyosiy kuch sifatida yo'q qilish Sovuq urush.[16] To'ntarishlar qulashiga olib keldi Prezident Sukarno va boshlanishi Suxarto uch o'n yillik avtoritar prezidentlik.

Kommunistlarning davlat to'ntarishiga urinish haqidagi da'volari jamoatchilik nafratlarini ozod qildi; bular tomonidan fanatlangan Indoneziya armiyasi, bu tezda PKIni aybladi. Kommunistlar siyosiy, ijtimoiy va harbiy hayotdan tozalandi, PKIning o'zi esa tarqatib yuborildi va taqiqlandi. Qirg'inlar 1965 yil oktyabrida, davlat to'ntarishiga urinishdan keyingi bir necha hafta ichida boshlandi va 1966 yilning dastlabki oylarida susayishdan oldin yilning qolgan davrida eng yuqori darajasiga etdi. Ular poytaxtda boshlandi, Jakarta va tarqaldi Markaziy va Sharqiy Java va keyinroq Bali. Minglab mahalliy hushyorlar va armiya bo'linmalari haqiqiy va taxmin qilingan PKI a'zolarini o'ldirdilar. Qotilliklar butun mamlakat bo'ylab sodir bo'ldi, eng yomoni PKI ning Markaziy Yava, Sharqiy Yava, Bali va shimoliy qal'alarida. Sumatra. Ehtimol, bir vaqtning o'zida milliondan ortiq odam qamoqqa tashlangan bo'lishi mumkin.

Sukarnoning muvozanatlashtiruvchi harakati "Nasakom " (millatchilik, din va kommunizm ) ochilgan edi. Uning eng muhim qo'llab-quvvatlash ustuni bo'lgan PKI, boshqa ikkita ustun - armiya va tomonidan samarali ravishda yo'q qilindi siyosiy Islom; armiya esa beg'araz hokimiyat yo'lida edi. 1967 yil mart oyida Indoneziyaning vaqtinchalik parlamenti tomonidan Sukarno qolgan hokimiyatdan mahrum qilindi va Suxarto tayinlandi Prezident vazifasini bajaruvchi. 1968 yil mart oyida Suxarto rasmiy ravishda prezident etib saylandi.

Qotilliklar Indoneziya tarixining aksariyat darsliklarida o'tkazib yuborilgan va Suxarto rejimi ostida bostirilganligi sababli indoneziyaliklar tomonidan ozgina o'rganib chiqilmagan. Zo'ravonlik ko'lami va g'azablanishi uchun qoniqarli tushuntirishlarni izlash olimlarni har xil mafkuraviy nuqtai nazardan qarshi oldi. Shunga o'xshash g'alayonlarga qaytish ehtimoli "Yangi tartib" ma'muriyatining siyosiy konservatizm va siyosiy tizimni qattiq nazorat qilish omili sifatida keltirilgan. Hushyorlik va isnod qabul qilingan kommunistik tahdidga qarshi Suxarto doktrinasining o'ziga xos xususiyati bo'lib qoldi va u bugungi kungacha ham amal qilmoqda.[17]

AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya hukumatlarining eng yuqori darajadagi kelishuviga qaramay, "Sukarno-ni tugatish" kerak bo'ladi, deyiladi. Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi 1962 yildagi memorandum,[18] va anti-kommunistik armiya zobitlari bilan keng aloqalarning mavjudligi AQSh harbiylari tashkil etish - 1200 dan ortiq zobitlarni, shu jumladan "katta harbiy shaxslarni" tayyorlash va qurol-yarog 'va iqtisodiy yordam[19][20] - Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi qotilliklardagi faol ishtirokini rad etdi. AQShning 2017 yildagi maxfiy hujjatlari oshkor etilgach, AQSh hukumati ommaviy qotilliklar to'g'risida boshidan batafsil ma'lumotga ega bo'lganligi va Indoneziya armiyasining harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlaganligi aniqlandi.[8][21][22] AQShning qotilliklardagi ishtiroki Indoneziyaga PKI rasmiylarining keng ro'yxatlarini taqdim etishni o'z ichiga olgan o'lim guruhlari,[28] ilgari tarixchilar va jurnalistlar tomonidan tashkil etilgan.[21][16] Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasining 1968 yildagi o'ta maxfiy hisobotida ushbu qirg'inlar "eng dahshatli voqealardan biri" sifatida qayd etilgan ommaviy qotilliklar bilan birga 20-asrning 1930-yillarning sovet tozalashlari, Natsistlarning ommaviy qotilliklari davomida Ikkinchi jahon urushi, va Maoistlarning qon to'kilishi 1950 yillarning boshlarida. "[29][30]

Fon

General-mayor Suxarto (o'ng tomonda, oldingi pog'onada) 1965 yil 5 oktyabrda o'ldirilgan generallar dafn marosimida qatnashadi

Qo'llab-quvvatlash Sukarno uning raisligi ostida "Boshqariladigan demokratiya "uning majburiy va beqarorligiga bog'liq"Nasakom "harbiylar, diniy guruhlar va kommunistlar o'rtasidagi koalitsiya. Ta'sir kuchayishi va jangariligi kuchaymoqda Indoneziya Kommunistik partiyasi (PKI) va Sukarnoning uni qo'llab-quvvatlashi jiddiy tashvish tug'dirdi Musulmonlar va harbiylar, va keskinlik 1960 yil boshlari va o'rtalarida barqaror ravishda o'sib bordi.[31] Dunyodagi uchinchi yirik kommunistik partiya,[32] PKIda taxminan 300000 kishi bo'lgan kadrlar va ikki million atrofida to'liq a'zolik.[33] Partiyaning er islohotini tezlashtirish bo'yicha qat'iyatli harakatlari erni nazorat qilayotganlarni qo'rqitdi va musulmon ruhoniylarining ijtimoiy mavqeiga tahdid soldi.[34] Sukarno hukumat xodimlaridan uning Nasakom tamoyillari bilan bir qatorda marksistik nazariyani o'rganishni talab qildi. U bilan uchrashgan edi Chjou Enlai, Premer Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi va ushbu uchrashuvdan so'ng u shaxsan o'zi boshqarishni niyat qilgan Beshinchi Kuch deb nomlangan militsiya tuzishga qaror qildi. Sukarno ushbu Beshinchi kuchni jihozlash uchun Xitoydan qurol-aslaha buyurdi. U nutqida inqilobiy guruhlarni millatchi, diniy yoki kommunistik bo'lishidan qat'i nazar, qo'llab-quvvatlashini e'lon qildi va "Men kommunistlarning do'stiman, chunki kommunistlar inqilobiy odamlardir".[35] U dedi a Qo'shilmaslik harakati sammit yig'ilishi Qohira 1964 yil oktyabrda uning hozirgi maqsadi Indoneziyaning barcha siyosatini chap tomonga surish va shu bilan inqilob uchun xavfli bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan armiyadagi "reaktsion" elementlarni zararsizlantirish edi.[36] Sukarnoning xalqaro siyosati uning nutqini tobora ko'proq aks ettirdi.

1958 yildayoq G'arb davlatlari, xususan, AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya Indoneziya armiyasini PKI va chap tomonga qarshi kuchli harakatlarni rag'batlantiradigan siyosat olib borishdi, bu Sukarno va uning obro'siga putur etkazish uchun yashirin tashviqot kampaniyasini o'z ichiga oldi. PKI va armiyadagi antikommunistik rahbarlarni harbiy va moliyaviy qo'llab-quvvatlash bilan birga maxfiy kafolatlar.[3]:83

30 sentyabr

1965 yil 30 sentyabr kuni kechqurun bir guruh jangarilar 30 sentyabr harakati, Indoneziyaning oltita eng yaxshi general generallarini asirga oldi va qatl etdi. Harakat o'zini Sukarnoning himoyachilari deb e'lon qildi va mumkin bo'lgan voqeani oldini olish uchun oldindan zarba berdi to'ntarish "anti-Sukarno" tomonidan G'arbparast generallar kengashi tomonidan.

Generallar qatl etilgandan so'ng, harakat kuchlari ishg'ol qilindi Merdeka maydoni yilda Jakarta va prezident saroyi. Ko'p o'tmay, ammo Prezident Sukarno bu harakatni o'z zimmasiga olishdan bosh tortdi, chunki bu harakat uning ko'plab sarkardalarini qo'lga oldi va o'ldirdi. Kechasi davom etar ekan, uning bir-biriga mos kelmaydigan radio xabarlaridan boshlab, uning zaif rahbariyati o'zini ko'rsata boshladi. Harakat asosan asosiy telekommunikatsiya binosini egallashga qaratilgan; ammo, maydonning joylashgan sharqiy tomoniga e'tibor bermadi Kostrad, qurolli kuchlarning strategik zaxirasi. O'sha paytda general-mayor Suxarto zaxirani nazorat qilar edi va egallab olish haqidagi xabarni eshitgach, u tezda harakatning kuchsiz tomonlaridan foydalanib, maydonni qarshiliksiz boshqarishni tikladi.[37] Taslim bo'lgandan so'ng, harakat qo'shinlari qo'shimcha choralar ko'rmadilar. Shu bilan birga, Sukarno susayganligi sababli Indoneziya harbiy kuchlari asta-sekin o'z ta'siriga ega bo'ldi va bir necha kun ichida hukumat Suxartoning nazorati ostida edi. U zudlik bilan qo'shinlarni joylashtirdi va harakatni tarqatib yubordi, shu bilan birga harakatning harakatlarini millat uchun "xavf" deb aytdi.

Bilan bog'lash uchun harbiy tashviqot kampaniyasi to'ntarish Suxarto va harbiylar tomonidan uyushtirilgan PKI bilan urinish mamlakatni 5 oktabr, Qurolli Kuchlar kunida (o'ldirilgan barcha oltita generalning davlat dafn marosimining kuni) boshladi. Qatl qilingan, qiynoqqa solingan va hattoki kastr qilingan generallarning grafik tasvirlari va tavsiflari mamlakat bo'ylab tarqalishni boshladi. Soxtalashtirilgan ma'lumotlarga qaramay, kampaniya muvaffaqiyatli o'tdi va Indoneziya hamda xalqaro auditoriyani qotilliklar PKIning Sukarno prezidentligi davrida hukumatni buzishga urinishi ekanligiga ishontirdi. PKI o'z ishtirokini rad etgan bo'lsa-da, yillar davomida vujudga kelgan keskinlik va nafrat ozod qilindi.[37]

30 sentyabr harakati 12 kishini o'ldirgan bo'lsa ham, Suxarto uni oxir-oqibat ommaviy qotillikni uyushtiruvchi fitna sifatida taqdim etdi. PKI bilan bog'liq bo'lgan millionlab odamlar, hattoki olis qishloqlardan kelgan savodsiz dehqonlar ham harakatning qotillari va sheriklari sifatida namoyish etildilar. 1966 yil boshida indoneziyalik ikkita mutaxassis Kornell universiteti, Benedikt Anderson va Rut Makvi, ularni kuzatgan Cornell qog'ozi Suxarto armiyasi antikommunistik kampaniyani 30-sentabr harakati qulab tushgandan keyin yaxshi boshlaganligi. Harakat tugagan va armiyani ommaviy hibsga olishlar boshlangan lahzalar orasida, uch hafta o'tdi, unda armiyaning o'zi ham aytganidek, zo'ravonlik va fuqarolar urushi izlari bo'lmagan. Sukarno tozalashga doimiy ravishda norozilik ko'rsatib, armiya "kalamushni o'ldirish uchun uyni yoqib yuborayotganini" aytdi, ammo u Suxarto armiyani qattiq ushlab turishga buyruq bergani uchun u kuchsiz edi.[38]

Siyosiy tozalash

Armiya PKIga xayrixoh deb o'ylagan yuqori darajadagi fuqarolik va harbiy rahbarlarni chetlashtirdi.[39] The parlament va kabinet Sukarno sodiqlaridan tozalangan. PKIning etakchi a'zolari zudlik bilan hibsga olingan, ba'zilari qisqacha bajarilgan.[40] Jakartada armiya rahbarlari namoyishlar uyushtirishdi[40] 8 oktyabrda Jakartaning PKI shtab-kvartirasi yoqib yuborildi.[41] Anti-kommunistik yoshlar guruhlari, shu jumladan armiya tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan Indoneziya talabalari harakati fronti (KAMI ), Indoneziya yoshlari va talabalarining harakat fronti (KAPPI) va Indoneziya universiteti bitiruvchilari harakatlari fronti (KASI).[42] Jakartada va G'arbiy Yava, 10000 dan ortiq PKI faollari va rahbarlari hibsga olingan, shu jumladan taniqli yozuvchi Pramoedya Ananta Toer.[42]

Dastlabki o'limlar armiya va PKI o'rtasida uyushgan to'qnashuvlar paytida yuz berdi, shu qatorda kommunizmga xayrixoh bo'lgan va general Suxartoning qatag'oniga qarshilik ko'rsatayotgan Indoneziya qurolli kuchlarining ayrim qismlari. Masalan, Dengiz kuchlari, havo kuchlari va politsiyaning katta qismi Ko'chma brigada korpusi PKI tomonidan qo'mondon darajasiga qadar kirib borgan.[43] Oktyabr oyining boshlarida Strategik qo'mondonlik kuchlari (Suxartoning) Kostrad) va polkovnik boshchiligidagi RPKAD para-komandolari Sarwo Edhie Wibowo PKI tomonidan kuchli qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan mintaqa Markaziy Yavaga jo'natildi, ammo sodiqligi aniq bo'lmagan qo'shinlar buyurtma qilindi.[42] Shu bilan birga, Silivangi divizioni Jakartani qo'riqlash uchun joylashtirilgan va G'arbiy Yava, ikkalasi ham Markaziy va Sharqiy Yavodan farqli o'laroq, ommaviy qotillikka nisbatan nisbatan immunitetni saqlab qolishgan.[44] Markaziy Yava tog'larida va atrofida dastlabki janglar Madiun PKI ushbu mintaqalarda markazlashgan raqib rejimini o'rnatishi mumkinligini taklif qildi. Biroq, Suxarto tomonidan yuborilgan kuchlar nazoratni qo'lga olganligi sababli, Qo'shma Shtatlar va Xitoy tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan guruhlar o'rtasida fuqarolar urushidan qo'rqish tez tarqalib ketdi.[43] Ko'plab isyonchilar qo'mondonlari Suxartoga joylashtirilgan kuchlar etib kelgani sababli jang qilmaslikni tanladilar, ammo qarshilik General kabi ba'zi birlariga qarshi keldi Supardjo, yana bir necha hafta davomida.

Sukarno prezidentligi buzila boshlaganda va Suxarto quyidagilarni o'z nazoratini talab qila boshladi to'ntarish tashabbusi bilan, PKI ning yuqori milliy rahbariyati ov qilindi va hibsga olindi, ba'zilari esa qatl etildi. Oktyabr boshida PKI raisi Dipa Nusantara Aidit uchib ketgan edi Markaziy Java, qaerda to'ntarish tashabbusi chapdagi ofitserlar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi Yogyakarta, Salatiga va Semarang.[40] O'rtoq PKI katta etakchisi Njoto 6 noyabr atrofida, Aidit 22 noyabrda va PKI raisining birinchi o'rinbosari tomonidan otib tashlangan M.H. Luqmon bundan ko'p o'tmay o'ldirilgan.[45]

Qirg'inlar

Kommunistlar, qizil hamdardlar va ularning oilalari minglab odamlar tomonidan qatl qilinmoqda. Ma'lumotlarga ko'ra, Backlands armiyasi bo'linmalari uzoq qamoqxonalarda so'roq qilingandan so'ng minglab kommunistlarni qatl etgan. Paranglar deb nomlangan keng pichoqli pichoqlar bilan qurollangan Musulmon guruhlari tunda kommunistlarning uylariga kirib, butun oilalarni o'ldirishdi va jasadlarini sayoz qabrlarga ko'mishdi ... Qotillik kampaniyasi Sharqiy Yava qishlog'ida shu qadar ayovsiz bo'lib qoldiki, Musulmon guruhlari joylashtirdilar. qurbonlarning boshlarini ustunlar ustiga qo'yishdi va ularni qishloqlar bo'ylab parad qilishdi. Qotillik shu qadar keng miqyosda bo'ldiki, jasadlarni yo'q qilish Sharqiy Yava va Shimoliy Sumatrada nam havo parchalanib ketgan tana go'shtini ko'taradigan jiddiy sanitariya muammosini keltirib chiqardi. Ushbu hududlardan kelgan sayohatchilar tom ma'noda jasadlar bilan tiqilib qolgan kichik daryo va daryolar haqida gapirishadi.[46]

—Vaqt, 1965 yil 17-dekabr.

Qotilliklar 1965 yil oktyabr oyida Jakartada boshlanib, Markaziy va Sharqiy Yavaga, so'ngra Baliga tarqaldi va boshqa orollarning ba'zi joylarida, shu jumladan kichikroq hujumlar sodir bo'ldi Sumatra.[47][48] O'rnatilgan jamoaviy ziddiyatlar va nafratlar kommunistlarni yovuz odam sifatida tavsiflovchi armiya rahbariyati tomonidan o'ynaldi va qotillikda ko'plab indoneziyalik tinch aholi qatnashdi.[49] Eng dahshatli qirg'inlar Aceh, Bali, Markaziy va Sharqiy Yavada sodir bo'ldi[50] bu erda PKI ko'magi eng kuchli bo'lgan. Vaziyat mamlakat bo'ylab turlicha edi va armiyaning roli hech qachon to'liq tushuntirilmagan.[51] Ba'zi hududlarda armiya fuqarolik guruhlari va mahalliy militsiyalarni uyushtirdi, rag'batlantirdi, o'qitdi va ta'minladi.[48] Boshqa sohalarda, jamoat hushyorligi harakatlari armiyadan oldinroq bo'lgan, garchi aksariyat hollarda harbiy qismlar ko'rsatmalar yoki misollar bilan zo'ravonlik sanksiyasidan oldin qotillik boshlangan emas.[52] Qotillikning dastlabki bosqichlarida PKI bilan to'qnashuvda armiyaning bevosita ishtiroki sodir bo'lgan.[43] Oktyabr oyi oxiriga kelib, dindor musulmonlar guruhlari kommunistlarni tozalashga qo'shilishdi va Indoneziyani ateizmdan tozalash o'zlarining burchlari deb ta'kidladilar.[43]

Ba'zi hududlarda fuqarolik militsiyasi taniqli kommunistlar va ularning tarafdorlarini qaerdan topishni bilar edi, boshqalarda armiya kommunistlarning ro'yxatlarini qishloq rahbarlaridan talab qildi.[53] PKIga a'zolik bilan bog'liq hech qanday niqob yo'q edi va ko'pchilik gumon qilinuvchilarni jamoalar ichida aniqlash oson edi.[54] The AQSh elchixonasi Jakartada Indoneziya armiyasini 5000 ga qadar gumon qilingan kommunistlarning ro'yxatlari bilan ta'minladi.[23][25][26] Ba'zi PKI filiallari qarshilik va qasoskor qotilliklarni uyushtirgan bo'lsalar ham, aksariyati passiv ravishda o'zlarining o'limlariga o'tishdi.[55] Barcha qurbonlar PKI a'zolari emas edi. Ko'pincha "PKI" yorlig'i chap tomonda bo'lganlarni kiritish uchun ishlatilgan Indoneziya milliy partiyasi (PNI).[56] Boshqa holatlarda jabrlanganlar kommunistlardan gumon qilinishgan yoki shunchaki da'vo qilingan [42] yoki ozgina siyosiy sabablarsiz shikoyatlarni hal qilish qurbonlari bo'lgan.[57][1] Kommunizmga qarshi qotilliklar keyinchalik yoshlar tomonidan qo'zg'atilib, ularga armiya yordam berdi.[58] Jabrlanganlarning aksariyati yirik siyosiy arboblar bo'lmagan va ular asosan kambag'allar va o'rtaholning past qatlamlari orasida bo'lganlar, masalan dehqonlar, plantatsiyalar ishchilari, fabrika ishchilari, talabalar, o'qituvchilar, rassomlar va davlat xizmatchilari. Ular tez-tez nishonga olinishgan, chunki ular yoki do'stlari yoki oila a'zolari singari ular tanish bo'lganlar PKI yoki unga aloqador tashkilotlarga qo'shilishgan.[3]:122

Juda ozgina istisnolardan tashqari, qotilliklar o'z-o'zidan emas, balki yuqori darajadagi tashkilot bilan amalga oshirilgan. Qurbonlarning aksariyati, shuningdek, qotilliklarni sodir etgan Indoneziya armiyasining hibsga olinganlaridir qisqacha qatllar.[3]:123 Qotilliklar xuddi "yuzma-yuz" amalga oshirildi Ruanda yoki Kambodja, tomonidan ishlatiladigan o'ldirishning mexanik usullaridan farqli o'laroq Natsistlar Germaniyasi.[59][3]:123 Mexanik bo'lmagan zo'ravonlik va o'ldirish usullari orasida otish, tiriklayin qismlarga ajratish, pichoqlash, yo'q qilish, kastratsiya, yaponcha uslubda mixlash, bo'g'ib o'ldirish samuray qilichlari.[5][60][61] Otashin qurollar va avtomatik qurollar cheklangan miqyosda ishlatilgan, qotilliklarning aksariyati pichoqlar, o'roqlar, tayotlar, qilichlar, muzqaymoqlar, bambuk nayzalar, temir tayoqchalar va boshqa vaqtinchalik qurollar bilan amalga oshirilgan.[3]:123 Islomiy ekstremistlar tez-tez tikan ustida kesilgan boshlarini parad qilishdi.[62] Jasadlar ko'pincha daryolarga tashlanar edi va bir paytlar amaldorlar armiyasiga shaharga oqib tushadigan tiqilib qolgan daryolar haqida shikoyat qilar edilar. Surabaya jasadlar tufayli. Kabi sohalarda Kediri Sharqiy Yavada, Nahdlatul Ulama yoshlar qanoti (Ansor yoshlar harakati ) a'zolari kommunistlarni safga qo'shib, tomoqlarini kesib, jasadlarni daryolarga tashlashdi.[63] Qolgan penisning qatorlari qolganlarga eslatib turish uchun ko'pincha orqada qolardi.[64] Qotilliklar qishloqlarning butun qismini bo'sh qoldirdi, qurbonlar yoki internirlanganlarning uylari talon-taroj qilindi va ko'pincha harbiylarga topshirildi.[56]

Mahalliy Xitoy indoneziyaliklar ba'zi hududlarda o'ldirilgan va xitoylarga qarshi irqchilik natijasida mol-mulklari talon-taroj qilingan va yoqib yuborilgan D.N. Aidit PKIni Xitoyga yaqinlashtirgan edi.[56] Xristianlar asosan orollarda Nusa Tenggara, Nasroniy ruhoniylari va o'qituvchilari musulmon yoshlarning qo'lidan azob chekishdi.[51]

1969 yilgacha vaqti-vaqti bilan va yakka alangalanishlar bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, qotilliklar asosan 1966 yil martga qadar susaygan,[65] gumon qilinuvchilar yo'q bo'lganda yoki hokimiyat aralashdi.[57] Yakkaxon aholining aytishicha, 1966 yil mart oyida juda katta toshqin Yakkaxon daryo Yava tomonidan sirli deb hisoblanib, qotilliklar tugaganligidan dalolat berdi.[57]

Java

Regentning minnatdorchilik guvohnomasi Sleman PKIni yo'q qilishga moliyaviy xayr-ehsonlar uchun

Yilda Java, qotillikning katta qismi birga bo'lgan aliran (madaniy oqim) sodiqlik; armiya dalda berdi santri (ko'proq dindor va pravoslav musulmonlar) orasida Yava orasida PKI a'zolarini izlash abangan (kamroq pravoslav) yava.[1] 1963 yilda musulmonlar partiyasi o'rtasida paydo bo'lgan ziddiyat Nahdlatul ulama (NU) va PKI oktyabr oyining ikkinchi haftasida qotillikka aylandi.[42] Musulmon guruhi Muhammadiya 1965 yil noyabr oyining boshlarida "Gestapu / PKI" ni yo'q qilish Muqaddas urushni tashkil etganligini e'lon qildi ("Gestapu" "30 sentyabr harakati" ning harbiy nomi), bu pozitsiyani Java va Sumatradagi boshqa islomiy guruhlar qo'llab-quvvatladilar. Ko'p yoshlar uchun kommunistlarni o'ldirish diniy burchga aylandi.[66] Markaziy va Sharqiy Yavada kommunistik markazlar bo'lgan joyda, o'zlarini kommunistik tajovuz qurbonlari sifatida ko'rsatadigan musulmon guruhlar qotilliklarni uyg'otish orqali oqlashdi. Madiun ishi 1948 yil[56] Rim katolik talabalar Yogyakarta viloyati hibsga olingan kommunistlarning yuk mashinalarini qatl qilishda ishtirok etish uchun kechalari yotoqxonalarini tark etishdi.[57]

Garchi, mamlakatning aksariyat qismi uchun qotillik 1966 yilning birinchi oylarida pasaygan bo'lsa-da, Sharqiy Yava qismlarida qotillik yillar davomida davom etgan. Yilda Blitar, partizan harakati omon qolgan PKI a'zolari tomonidan 1967 va 1968 yillarda mag'lubiyatga uchraguncha saqlanib qoldi.[67] Tasavvuf Mbah Suro uning kommunistlar singdirgan an'anaviy tasavvufiga bag'ishlanganlar bilan birgalikda qo'shin qurdi, ammo Suro va uning sakson nafar izdoshi Indoneziya armiyasiga qarshi qarshilik urushida halok bo'ldi.[67]

Bali

O'tgan asrning 50-yillari va 1960-yillarning boshlarida Indoneziya bo'ylab ijtimoiy bo'linishlarning kengayishini aks ettiradi Bali an'anaviy tarafdorlari o'rtasida ziddiyatni ko'rdi Bali kast tizimi va ushbu an'anaviy qadriyatlarni rad etuvchilar, xususan PKI. Kommunistlar orolning madaniyati, dini va fe'l-atvorini yo'q qilishga qaratilgan ishlarda ayblanib, balinilar, yava kabi, PKIni yo'q qilishga da'vat etilgan. Sukarno prezidentligining so'nggi yillarida hukumatdagi ish joylari, mablag'lar, biznesdagi ustunlik va boshqa mansablar kommunistlarga berilgan edi.[68] PKI "bir tomonlama harakatlarni" targ'ib qilganda erlar va ijarachilarning huquqlari to'g'risidagi nizolar erlarni egallab olish va o'ldirishga olib keldi.[69] Indoneziyaning hindulardan iborat bo'lgan yagona oroli sifatida Balida Yavada islomiy kuchlar bo'lmagan va PKI a'zolarini yo'q qilishni qo'zg'atgan yuqori tabaqa PNI uy egalari edi.[1] Oliy hind ruhoniylari o'tmishdagi qurbonlik va ijtimoiy buzuqlikdan g'azablangan ruhlarni qondirish uchun qurbonlik qilishga chaqirishdi.[57] Bali hindulari etakchisi Ida Bagus Oka hindlarga: "Bizning inqilobimiz dushmanlari ham dinning ashaddiy dushmanlari ekanligi va ularni yo'q qilish va yo'q qilish kerakligiga shubha yo'q".[70] Sharqiy Yavaning ba'zi qismlari singari, Bali ham yaqin vaziyatni boshdan kechirdi Fuqarolar urushi kommunistlar qayta birlashganda.[56]

Kuchlar muvozanati 1965 yil dekabrida Armiya Para-komando polkining va 5-Brawijaya harbiy okrugining shaxsiy tarkibi Java-da qotilliklarni amalga oshirgandan so'ng Baliga etib kelganida, antikommunistlar foydasiga o'zgartirildi. Suxartoning asosiy muammo bartaraf etuvchisi Sarvo Edxi Vibovo boshchiligida Yava harbiy qo'mondonlari Balin otryadlariga o'tirishga ruxsat berdilar.[71] Armiya odamlarni "Gestapu" ni o'ldirishga da'vat etgan Markaziy Yavadan farqli o'laroq, Balining o'ldirishga bo'lgan ishtiyoqi shu qadar ulkan va o'z-o'zidan paydo bo'lganki, dastlab moddiy yordam ko'rsatib, armiya tartibsizlikning oldini olish uchun oxir-oqibat harakat qilishga majbur bo'ldi.[72] Sukarno Balining viloyat gubernatorini tanlashi, Suteja, lavozimidan chaqirib olindi va kommunistik qo'zg'olonni tayyorlashda ayblandi va uning qarindoshlari ta'qib qilinib o'ldirildi.[73] Markaziy va Sharqiy Yavada o'ldirishlariga o'xshash qator qotilliklar qora tanli PNI yoshlari tomonidan boshqarilgan. Bir necha oy davomida militsiya o'lim guruhlari gumondorlarni tutib olib ketishgan qishloqlar bo'ylab yurishgan.[56] Repressal salib yurishidan bir hafta o'tib, kommunistlarga va ularning qarindoshlariga tegishli yuzlab uylar yoqib yuborildi, ular uylaridan qochib ketayotganda yo'lovchilar so'yildi. Dastlabki hisob-kitoblarga ko'ra, faqatgina ushbu operatsiya davomida 50 ming kishi, shu jumladan ayollar va bolalar o'ldirilgan. 1965 yil so'nggi oylarida bir necha Bali qishloqlari aholisi ikki baravar kamaydi.[74] Hammasi Xitoy shaharlaridagi do'konlar Singaraja va Denpasar vayron qilingan va "Gestapu" ni moliyaviy qo'llab-quvvatlagan degan ko'plab egalari o'ldirilgan.[74] 1965 yil dekabrdan 1966 yilgacha bo'lgan davrda taxminlarga ko'ra 80 ming Bali o'ldirilgan, o'sha paytda orol aholisining taxminan 5 foizi va Indoneziyaning boshqa joylaridan mutanosib ravishda ko'proq.[75]

Boshqa orollar

PKI tomonidan tashkil etilgan xorijiy biznesga qarshi harakatlar va kampaniyalar Sumatra plantatsiyalar, to'ntarishga urinishdan so'ng, kommunistlarga qarshi tezkor jazolarni keltirib chiqardi. Yilda Aceh, 40,000 ga yaqin odam o'ldirilgan, ehtimol Sumatra bo'ylab 200,000 o'limining bir qismi.[40] Yavalik etnik muhojirlar ommaviy ravishda qirg'in qilindi Janubiy Sumatra.[76] 1950 yillarning oxiridagi mintaqaviy qo'zg'olonlar Sumatradagi voqealarni murakkablashtirdi, chunki ko'plab sobiq isyonchilar Indoneziya Respublikasiga sodiqligini isbotlash uchun o'zlarini kommunistik tashkilotlarga qo'shilishga majbur bo'lishdi. 1950 yilgi qo'zg'olonlar va 1965 yildagi qotilliklarni bostirish aksariyat Sumatrans tomonidan "Yava ishg'oli" sifatida qaraldi.[40] Yilda Lampung, qotillikning yana bir omili bo'lganga o'xshaydi Yava immigratsiyasi.[51] Yilda G'arbiy Kalimantan, 1967 yilda qotilliklardan so'ng mahalliy butparastlar tugadi Dayaks 45000 etnik xakkalik xitoylarni qishloq joylaridan quvib chiqarib, 2000-5000 kishini o'ldirgan.[51] Xakka xitoylar o'zlarini "o'zga yurtda mehmon" deb bilganlari uchun kurashishdan bosh tortdilar, faqat savdo qilish niyatida.[77][78][79]

Diniy va etnik omillar

Islom Java-da ikkiga bo'lingan Abangan, Islomni shunga o'xshash boshqa dinlar bilan aralashtirgan Hinduizm va mahalliy diniy amaliyotlar va Santri, kim ergashdi standart pravoslav Islom. Ko'plab Abanganlar Kommunistik partiyaning tarafdorlari edilar,[80][81][82] va ularning manfaatlari shu tariqa PKI tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi.[83] Keyinchalik ular qotillikda o'ldirilgan odamlarning aksariyatini tashkil qildilar.[84][85] Abanganlar Ansor, yoshlar qanoti tomonidan hujumlarga uchragan Nahdlatul ulama va Santri Indoneziya armiyasining yordami bilan.[86][87] Abean va kommunistlar toifasiga kirmaslik uchun, Abangan musulmonlari Indoneziya hukumati tomonidan hinduizmga o'tishga va Nasroniylik qirg'in natijasida.[88][89][90][91]

Sumatrada Yavaga qarshi bo'lgan Sumatraning yoshlari etnikni qirg'in qildilar Yava Shimoliy Sumatra bo'ylab plantatsiya ishchilari va PKI a'zolari.[92]

Lombok aholisi butun dunyo bo'ylab asosan etnik balinlarni o'ldirdilar Lombok.[76]

The etnik xitoyliklarni nishonga olish deb nomlangan Sumatra va Kalimantandagi qotillikda muhim rol o'ynagan genotsid. Charlz A. Koppel G'arb ommaviy axborot vositalari va akademiklar an oqibatiga duch kelishni istamayotganini ko'rgan ushbu tavsifni keskin tanqid qilmoqda antikommunist ular tasdiqlagan kun tartibi,[93] Buning o'rniga Indoneziya irqchiligini aybdor deb topib, yuz minglab yoki millionlab xitoyliklarning o'ldirilgan ekstravagant va yolg'on da'volariga berilib ketmoqdalar.[94] Charlz Koppel buzilgan qamrov haqida quyidagi maqolada yozgan edi: "Hech qachon bo'lmagan genotsid: Indoneziyadagi xitoylarga qarshi qirg'inlar haqidagi afsonani tushuntirish, 1965–66". Coppel xuddi shu noto'g'ri fikrni yoritishda ko'radi 1998 yil may oyidagi tartibsizliklar Insoniyat uchun ko'ngilli guruh o'ldirilganlarning aksariyatini xitoylik bo'lmagan talonchilar tashkil etganini qayd etdi.[95] Uning dissertatsiyasi munozaralarga sabab bo'lmoqda.[96]

Hisob-kitoblarga ko'ra, 2000 ga yaqin xitoylik indoneziyaliklar o'ldirilgan (taxminan 500,000 dan 3 milliongacha bo'lgan o'limlar sonidan), hujjatli qatliomlar sodir bo'lgan. Makassar va Medan va orolida Lombok.[97] Robert Kribb va Charlz A.Koppel ta'kidlashlaricha, xitoyliklar aslida "nisbatan kam" xitoyliklar o'ldirilgan, o'lganlarning aksariyati mahalliy indoneziyaliklar bo'lgan.[98] Xitoyliklarning o'limi minglab, mahalliy indoneziyaliklarning o'limi esa yuz minglab edi. Etnik Bali va Yava qirg'in qilingan odamlarning katta qismini tashkil etdi.[94]

O'lim va qamoq

Voqealarning umumiy sxemasi ma'lum bo'lsa-da, qotillik haqida ko'p narsa noma'lum,[48] va o'lganlarning aniq va tasdiqlangan sonini hech qachon bilib bo'lmaydi.[99] O'sha paytda Indoneziyada G'arb jurnalistlari yoki akademiklari kam edi, harbiylar kam sonli ma'lumot manbalaridan biri edi, sayohat qiyin va xavfli bo'lib, qotillikni ma'qullagan va nazorat qilgan rejim o'ttiz yil davomida hokimiyatda qoldi.[100] O'sha paytdagi Indoneziya ommaviy axborot vositalari "Boshqaruv demokratiyasi" va 1966 yil oktabrda "Yangi tartib" ni egallashi bilan cheklangan cheklovlar tufayli buzilgan edi.[101] G'arbning qo'rquvi avjiga chiqqan qotilliklar bilan Kommunizm davomida Sovuq urush, xalqaro miqyosda ozgina tergov olib borildi, bu G'arbning Suxarto va "Yangi tartib" ni PKI va "Eski tartib" dan ustun qo'yishini murakkablashtirishi mumkin edi.[102]

Qotillikdan keyingi dastlabki 20 yil ichida o'lim sonini 39 ta jiddiy taxmin qilishga urinishgan.[72] Qotilliklar tugamasdan, Indoneziya armiyasi 78,500 kishi o'ldirilgan,[103] PKI esa bu ko'rsatkichni ikki millionga etkazgan.[72] Keyinchalik Indoneziya armiyasi[qachon? ] o'ldirilganlar sonini million deb taxmin qilgan.[67] 1966 yilda, Benedikt Anderson qurbonlar sonini 200 ming deb belgilagan edi. 1985 yilga kelib u jami 500000 dan 1 milliongacha odam o'ldirilgan degan xulosaga keldi.[72] Aksariyat olimlarning fikriga ko'ra, kamida yarim million kishi o'ldirilgan,[104] Indoneziya tarixidagi boshqa voqealarga qaraganda ko'proq.[1] Qurolli kuchlar xavfsizlik qo'mondonligi[qaysi? ] 1976 yil dekabr oyidagi hisob-kitoblarga ko'ra ularning soni 450,000 dan 500,000 gacha.[57] Robert Kribb eng aniq raqamni 500000 deb ta'kidlamoqda, ammo o'ldirilgan odamlarning aniq sonini aniqlash juda qiyin.[105] Biroq, Suxartoning ishonchli odamlaridan biri bo'lgan Jan Valenduv 1,2 millionga yaqin indoneziyaliklar o'ldirilganligini tan oldi.[3]:121

Tozalashdan keyin hibsga olish va qamoq o'n yil davom etdi.[1] 1977 yil Xalqaro Amnistiya Hisobotda "bir millionga yaqin" PKI kadrlari va partiyaning ishtiroki aniqlangan yoki gumon qilingan boshqa shaxslar hibsga olingani aytilgan.[72] 1981-1990 yillarda Indoneziya hukumati jamiyatda "ozodlikda" 1,6 dan 1,8 milliongacha bo'lgan sobiq mahbuslar borligini taxmin qildi.[106] Ehtimol, 70-yillarning o'rtalarida 100000 kishi hanuzgacha sudsiz qamoqqa tashlangan.[107] Taxminan 1,5 millionga yaqin kishi u yoki bu bosqichda qamoqqa tashlangan deb o'ylashadi.[108] O'ldirilmagan yoki qamalmagan PKI a'zolari yashirinishga kirishdi, boshqalari esa o'tmishlarini yashirishga urinishdi.[1] Hibsga olinganlar orasida etakchi siyosatchilar, rassomlar va yozuvchilar bor Pramoedya Ananta Toer va dehqonlar va askarlar. Keng qamoqxonalar tarmog'ida saqlanayotganlar va kontslagerlar "g'ayrioddiy g'ayriinsoniy sharoitlarga" duch keldi.[5] Ko'pchilik hibsga olishning birinchi davridan omon qolishmadi, to'yib ovqatlanmaslik va kaltaklanishdan o'lishdi.[67] Odamlar yashirin kommunistlarning ismlarini oshkor qilganlarida, ko'pincha ostida qiynoq, qamoqdagi raqamlar 1966-68 yillarda o'sgan. Qiynoq usullari orasida elektr kabeli va katta yog'och bo'laklari kabi vaqtinchalik materiallar bilan qattiq urish, barmoqlaringizni sindirish, stol va stullarning oyoqlari ostiga barmoqlaringizni va oyoqlaringizni ezish, tirnoqlarni tortib olish, elektr toki urishi va eritilgan kauchuk yoki sigaret bilan yoqish kiradi. Ba'zida hibsga olingan shaxslar boshqalarning, jumladan, turmush o'rtog'i yoki bolalari kabi qarindoshlarining qiynoqlarini tomosha qilishga yoki tinglashga majbur edilar. Erkaklar ham, ayollar ham hibsda bo'lganlarida jinsiy zo'ravonliklarga duchor bo'lishgan, shu jumladan jinsiy zo'rlash va jinsiy a'zolarni elektr toki bilan urish.[3]:215–216 Ozod bo'lganlar ko'pincha ostiga joylashtirilardi uy qamog'i, muntazam ravishda harbiy xizmatga borishlari kerak edi yoki ularning farzandlari singari hukumat tomonidan ishlash taqiqlandi.[67]

Natijada

Ta'sir

Sukarnoning muvozanatlashtiruvchi "Nasakom" harakati (millatchilik, din, kommunizm) echilgan edi. Uning eng muhim qo'llab-quvvatlash ustuni bo'lgan PKI, boshqa ikkita ustun - armiya va siyosiy Islom tomonidan samarali ravishda yo'q qilindi; armiya esa bemalol hokimiyat sari borar edi.[109] Ko'plab musulmonlar endi Sukarnoga ishonmay qolishdi va 1966 yil boshlarida Suxarto Sukarnoga qarshi ochiqchasiga qarshi tura boshladi, bu siyosat ilgari armiya rahbarlari tomonidan chetlab o'tilgan edi. Sukarno hokimiyatga yopishib olishga va armiyaning yangidan paydo bo'lgan ta'sirini yumshatishga urinib ko'rdi, garchi u Suxarto talab qilganidek davlat to'ntarishi uchun PKIni aybdor deb topolmasa ham.[110] 1966 yil 1 fevralda Sukarno Suxartoni general-leytenant unvoniga ko'targan.[111] The Supersemar 1966 yil 11 martdagi farmon bilan Sukarno parlament va armiya ustidan katta vakolatni Suxartoga topshirdi,[112] go'yo Suxartoga tartibni tiklash uchun kerak bo'lgan hamma narsani qilishga imkon beradi. 1967 yil 12 martda Indoneziyaning vaqtinchalik parlamenti tomonidan Sukarno qolgan hokimiyatdan mahrum qilindi va Suxarto tayinlandi Prezident vazifasini bajaruvchi.[113] 1968 yil 21 martda Vaqtinchalik Xalq maslahat kengashi rasman Suxartoni prezident etib sayladi.[114]

Chet elga sayohat qilayotgan bir necha yuz yoki minglab indoneziyalik chapchilar o'z vataniga qaytolmadilar.[115] Masalan, Javot, Xitoydagi elchi, chaqirib olinishdan bosh tortdi va butun umrini Indoneziyadan tashqarida o'tkazdi.[116] Ushbu surgunlarning ba'zilari, kasb-hunar yozuvchilari, yozishni davom ettirdilar. Bu Indoneziya surgun adabiyoti yangi hukumatga nafrat bilan to'lgan va oddiy iste'mol uchun yozilgan, ammo xalqaro miqyosda nashr etilishi shart.[117]

1965 yil dekabrda AQShning Jakartadagi elchixonasi telegramma yubordi Vashington qo'zg'olonsiz "chet el neft kompaniyalarining olib tashlanishi aniq bo'lar edi" deb ta'kidladi. 1968 yil oxirida Indoneziya uchun Milliy razvedka smetasida: "Suxarto hukumati iqtisodiy dasturining muhim qismi ... xorijiy kapitalni Indoneziyaga qaytarish edi. Hozirga qadar 25 ga yaqin Amerika va Evropa firmalari konlar, mulklar, va Sukarno asosida milliylashtirilgan boshqa korxonalar.Liberal qonunchilik yangi xususiy xorijiy investitsiyalarni jalb qilish uchun qabul qilingan ... Nikel, mis, boksit va yog'ochning nisbatan foydalanilmagan manbalarida katta miqdordagi xorijiy investitsiyalar mavjud.Ushbu istiqbolli sanoat ... neftdir. . "[118]

Qotilliklar to'g'ridan-to'g'ri namuna bo'lib xizmat qildi genotsid bosqin va kasb ning Sharqiy Timor. Xuddi shu generallar har ikki holatda ham qotillikni nazorat qilib, bir xil shafqatsiz usullarni jazosiz qoldirib rag'batlantirdilar.[119]

Global reaktsiya

G'arbiy hukumatlar uchun qotillik va tozalashlar avjiga chiqqan kommunizm ustidan g'alaba deb qaraldi Sovuq urush. G'arb hukumatlari va G'arbning ko'plab ommaviy axborot vositalari PKI va tobora chapga aylanib borayotgan "Eski tartib" dan ko'ra Suxarto va "Yangi tartib" ni afzal ko'rishdi.[120] Britaniya elchisi, Endryu Gilxrist, Londonga shunday deb yozgan edi: "Men Indoneziyadagi ozgina otishma samarali o'zgarishlarga muhim asos bo'ladi degan ishonchimni sizdan hech qachon yashirmaganman".[121] Qirg'in haqidagi xabar G'arb razvedka idoralari tomonidan ehtiyotkorlik bilan nazorat qilingan. Indoneziyaga kirishga to'sqinlik qilgan jurnalistlar G'arb elchixonalarining rasmiy bayonotlariga tayanishdi. Jakartadagi Buyuk Britaniyaning elchixonasi Singapurdagi razvedka shtab-kvartirasiga yangiliklarni qanday taqdim etish kerakligi to'g'risida maslahat berdi: «Muvofiq tashviqot mavzular bo'lishi mumkin: generallarni o'ldirishda PKI shafqatsizligi, ... PKI Indoneziyani chet el kommunistlarining agentlari sifatida ag'darish. ... Britaniyaning ishtiroki ehtiyotkorlik bilan yashirilishi kerak. "[122]

Sarlavha AQSh yangiliklari va dunyo hisoboti o'qing: "Indoneziya: Umid ... u erda ilgari hech kim yo'q edi".[123] Avstraliya bosh vaziri Garold Xolt izoh berdi The New York Times "" 500 mingdan 1 million kommunistik xayrixohlarni mag'lubiyatga uchratish bilan, menimcha, yo'nalish o'zgargan deb taxmin qilish mumkin. "[124][3]:177 O'ng qanotli neftchi H. L. Xant Sovuq urushda AQSh uchun yagona yorqin nuqta sifatida Indoneziyani e'lon qildi va Sukarnoning quvib chiqarilishini "Ikkinchi Jahon Urushining so'nggi hal qiluvchi jangidan beri ozodlik uchun eng katta g'alaba" deb atadi.[118] Vaqt ning bostirilishini tasvirlab berdi PKI "G'arbning Osiyodagi yillardagi eng yaxshi yangiliklari"[125] va Suxarto rejimini "ehtiyotkorlik bilan konstitutsiyaviy" deb maqtadi.[126] "Bu G'arb uchun g'alaba edi tashviqot, "BBCning ushbu mintaqadagi muxbiri Robert Challis keyinroq aks etdi.[126] G'arbiy ommaviy axborot vositalarining aksariyati Indoneziya armiyasining qatorini takrorlab, armiyaning mas'uliyatini va ommaviy qotillikning oqilona, ​​uyushgan xususiyatini pasaytirdi. Ular buning o'rniga tinch aholining rolini ta'kidladilar sharqshunos indoneziyaliklarning ibtidoiy va zo'ravonlik kabi stereotipi. A Nyu-York Tayms journalist wrote an article titled "When a Nation Runs Amok" explaining that the killings were hardly surprising since they occurred in "violent Asia, where life is cheap."[127]

In recalling the attitudes of US government officials regarding the killings, State Department intelligence officer Howard Federspiel said that "no one cared, as long as they were Communists, that they were being butchered."[128] Within the United States, Robert F. Kennedi was one of the only prominent individuals to condemn the massacres. In January 1966 he said: "We have spoken out against the inhuman slaughters perpetrated by the Nazis and the Communists. But will we speak out also against the inhuman slaughter in Indonesia, where over 100,000 alleged Communists have not been perpetrators, but victims?"[129]

SSSR "s Andrey Saxarov called the killings a 'tragic event' and described it as "an extreme case of reaction, racism and militarism", but otherwise the Soviet response was relatively muted.[129] It was likely in response to the PKI siding with China in the Xitoy-Sovet bo'linishi.[3]:23 Other Communist states issued sharp criticism of the killings. The Chinese government stated they were "heinous and diabolical crimes ... unprecedented in history."[129] China also offered refuge to Indonesian leftists fleeing the violence.[3]:185 Bittasi Yugoslaviya diplomat commented that "even assuming the guilt of the politburo [PKI leadership], which I do not, does this justify genocide? Kill the Central Committee, but do not kill 100,000 people who do not know and had no part in it [the 30 September Plot]."[129] The Suharto government was condemned as a "military fascist regime" by the government of Shimoliy Koreya.[129]

The Birlashgan Millatlar avoided commenting on the killings. When Suharto returned Indonesia to the UN, kommunistik Albaniya was the only member state to protest.[129]

Xorijiy ishtirok

Shuningdek qarang: CIA activities in Indonesia § Anti-communist purge
It really was a big help to the army. They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.[23]

—Robert J. Martens, political officer at the US Embassy in Jakarta, who provided lists of communists to the Indonesian military.

While the exact role of the United States government during the massacres remains obscured by still-sealed government archives[130] on Indonesia for this period, it is known that "at a minimum," the US government supplied money and communications equipment to the Indoneziya armiyasi that facilitated the mass killings, gave fifty million rupiya to the KAP-Gestapu death squad, and provided targeted names of thousands of alleged PKI leaders to the Indonesian Army.[130] Robert J. Martens, political officer at the US Embassy in Jakarta from 1963 to 1966, told journalist Kathy Kadane in 1990 that he led a group of State Department and CIA officials who drew up the lists of roughly 5,000 Communist Party operatives, which he provided to an army intermediary.[23][3]:202–203 Kadane asserts that approval for the release of names came from top U.S. Embassy officials, including US Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Yashil, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters, who all later denied involvement.[131] Martens claimed he acted without approval to avoid red tape at a critical time.[131] The State Department volume Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, which the CIA attempted to suppress in 2001, acknowledges that the U.S. Embassy provided lists of communist leaders to Indonesians involved in the purges, and notes that Marshall Green stated in a 1966 avigramma to Washington, which was drafted by Martens and approved by Masters, that the lists of communists were "apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership."[134] Scholars have also corroborated the claim that U.S. Embassy officials provided lists of communists to Suharto's forces, who, according to Mark Aarons, "ensured that those so named were eliminated in the mass killing operations."[29][26][30][135] Geoffrey B. Robinson, professor of history at UCLA, asserts that U.S. government officials, among them Marshall Green, "published memoirs and articles that sought to divert attention from any possible US role, while questioning the integrity and political loyalties of scholars who disagreed with them."[3]:11

Robert Cribb, writing in 2002, claims "there is considerable evidence that the U.S. encouraged the killings, by both providing funds to anti-communist forces and supplying the Indonesian army with the names of people whom it believed were PKI members. There is no evidence, however, that U.S. intervention significantly increased the scale of the killings."[136] Mark Aarons contends that Marshall Green is "long seen as one of the principal officials involved in encouraging the slaughter."[29] Kai Thaler asserts that declassified documents show that "U.S. officials were accessories to this mass murder" and "helped create the conditions for the killings."[137] Bredli Simpson, Indoneziya / Sharqiy Timor hujjatlari loyihasi direktori Milliy xavfsizlik arxivi,[138] contends that "Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia."[9][139] He claims that documents[140] show "the United States was directly involved to the extent that they provided the Indonesian Armed Forces with assistance that they introduced to help facilitate the mass killings," which included the CIA providing small arms from Tailand, and the U.S. government providing monetary assistance and limited amounts of communications equipment, medicine and a range of other items, including shoes and uniforms, to the Indonesian military.[141][142] Geoffrey B. Robinson posits that, based on documentary evidence, powerful foreign states, in particular the United States, Great Britain and their allies, were instrumental in facilitating and encouraging the Indonesian army's campaign of mass killing, and without such support, the killings would not have happened.[3]:22 He elaborates in his 2018 book Qotillik fasli:

The United States and other Western states have steadfastly denied any responsibility for the terrible violence that followed the alleged coup of October 1, 1965. That violence, they have maintained, was the product of domestic political forces over which outside powers had little, if any, influence. That claim is untrue. There is now clear evidence that in the crucial six months after the alleged coup, Western powers encouraged the army to move forcefully against the Left, facilitated widespread violence including mass killings, and helped to consolidate the political power of the army, In doing so, they helped to bring about the political and physical destruction of the PKI and its affiliates, the removal of Sukarno and his closest associates from political power, their replacement by an army elite led by General Suharto, and a seismic shift in Indonesia's foreign policy towards the West and the capitalist model it advanced.[3]:177

Western support for the Indonesian Army solidified as it demonstrated its "resolve" through the mass killing campaigns.[3]:179, 204 AQSh prezidenti Lyndon B. Jonson 's Security Advisor McGeorge Bandi reported to the president that the events since 1 October had been "a striking vindication of US policy towards Indonesia in recent years: a policy of keeping our hand in the game for the long-term stakes despite recurrent pressure to pull out" and that it was made clear to the Indonesian army via US Embassy's deputy chief of mission, Frensis Jozef Galbrayt, that "Embassy and the USG generally sympathetic with and admiring of what Army doing."[30][3]:183

The United States, along with Great Britain and Australia, also played an active role in "black propaganda operations" during the killings, which included clandestine radio broadcasts being transmitted into the country that repeated Indonesian Army propaganda as part of a psixologik urush campaign designed to encourage support for the killings and to discredit the PKI.[130]

Of all countries, Swedish arms supplies seem to have been the most substantial. According to a report by an Indonesian refugee in Japan, from early December 1965, Indonesia signed "a contract with Sweden for an emergency purchase of $10,000,000 worth of small arms and ammunition to be used for annihilating elements of the PKI." The Swedish Embassy's concerns about the slaughter did grow some months later, with Sweden's ambassador openly critical of the campaign of violence, but apparently after the fact.[143][3]:185

Hujjatli film yaratuvchisi Joshua Oppengeymer, direktori Qotillik akti (2012) va Sukunatning ko'rinishi (2014), called on the U.S. to account for its role in the killings during a screening of the former for U.S. Congress members.[144] On 10 December 2014, the same day Sukunatning ko'rinishi was released in Indonesia, Senator Tom Udal (D-NM) introduced a "Sense of the Senate Resolution" which condemned the killings and called for the declassification of all documents pertaining to US involvement in the events, noting that "the U.S. provided financial and military assistance during this time and later, according to documents released by the State Department."[145][146]

Declassified documents released by the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in October 2017 show that the U.S. government had detailed knowledge of the massacres from the start and specifically refer to mass killings ordered by Suharto. The documents also reveal that the U.S. government actively encouraged and facilitated the Indonesian Army's massacres to further its geopolitical interests in the region and that U.S. officials and diplomats at the embassy kept detailed records of which PKI leaders were being killed.[8][147] US officials, dismayed at Indonesia's shift towards the left, were "ecstatic" over the seizure of power by right-wing generals who proceeded to exterminate the PKI, and were determined to avoid doing anything that might thwart the efforts of the Indonesian Army. The U.S. also withheld credible information which contradicted the Indonesian Army's version of events regarding the abortive coup by junior officers on 30 September 1965, which triggered the killings. On 21 December 1965, the Embassy's first secretary, Mary Vance Trent, sent a cable to the State Department which provided an estimate of 100,000 people killed, and referred to the events as a "fantastic switch which has occurred over 10 short weeks."[148] Bradley Simpson said these previously secret cables, telegrams, letters, and reports "contain damning details that the US was willfully and gleefully pushing for the mass murder of innocent people."[149]

Meros

Tarixnoma

Qismi bir qator kuni
Ommaviy qotilliklarni rad etish
Rad etish holatlari
Ommaviy qotilliklar haqidagi ilmiy munozaralar
Tegishli mavzular

Discussion of the killings was heavily tabooed in Indonesia and, if mentioned at all, usually called peristiwa enam lima, the incident of '65.[150] Inside and outside Indonesia, public discussion of the killings increased during the 1990s and especially after 1998 when the New Order government collapsed. Jailed and exiled members of the Sukarno regime, as well as ordinary people, told their stories in increasing numbers. Foreign researchers felt more empowered to publish on the topic, with the end of intimidation by the military regime.[150][151]

The killings are skipped over in most Indonesian histories and have received little introspection by Indonesians as well as comparatively little international attention.[152] Indonesian textbooks typically depict the killings as a "patriotic campaign" that resulted in less than 80,000 deaths. In 2004, the textbooks were briefly changed to include the events, but this new curriculum discontinued in 2006 following protests from the military and Islamic groups.[153] The textbooks which mentioned the mass killings were subsequently kuygan,[153] by order of Indonesia's Attorney General.[154] John Roosa's Pretext for Mass Murder (2006) was initially banned by the Attorney General's Office.[155] The Indonesian parliament set up a truth and reconciliation commission to analyse the killings, but it was suspended by the Indonesian High Court. An academic conference regarding the killings was held in Singapur 2009 yilda.[153] A hesitant search for mass graves by survivors and family members began after 1998, although little has been found. Over three decades later, great enmity remains in Indonesian society over the events.[151]

The Supardjo Document is a copy of the personal notes of General Supardjo regarding the 30 September Movement. It is one of the few primary sources of this event and gives insight into the movement from a military perspective, including Supardjo's opinion on what may have caused the movement to fail.

Satisfactory explanations for the scale and frenzy of the violence have challenged scholars from all ideological perspectives. One view attributes the communal hatreds behind the killings to the forcing of parliamentary democracy onto Indonesian society, claiming that such changes were culturally unsuitable and unnecessarily disruptive in the post-independence 1950s. A contrasting view is that when Sukarno and the military replaced the democratic process with authoritarianism, competing interests—i.e., the army, political Islam, and Communism—could not be openly debated. They were suppressed instead and could only be expressed through violence.[110] Conflict resolution methods have broken down, and Muslim groups and the military adopted an "us or them attitude", and that when the killings were over, many Indonesians dismissed as something the Communists had deserved.[110] The possibility of a return to similar upheavals is cited as a factor in the "New Order" administration's political conservatism and tight control of the political system.[51] Vigilance against a Communist threat remained a hallmark of Suharto's three-decade presidency.[156]

Although mostly unknown in the West compared to the Vetnam urushi va turli xil right-wing coups in Latin America, the massacres and Suharto's rise to power are considered by historians to be a significant turning point in the Sovuq urush.[16] The massacres were also crucial to the expansion of kapitalizm Indoneziyada,[157] with Suharto rapidly implementing the economic policies of the "Berkli mafiyasi ", whose training had been funded by the Ford jamg'armasi, to liberalise the economy.[158] Given US foreign policy goals of stopping the spread of communism and bringing nations into its sphere of influence, the bloody purge which decimated the PKI, the third-largest Communist Party in the world at the time, was considered a huge victory. After viewing declassified documents released in 2017, historian John Roosa notes that much "of the U.S. foreign policy establishment viewed it as a great victory that they were able to sort of 'flip' Indonesia very quickly." He also asserts that the US did not simply "stand by" and allow the killings to happen, stating "it's easy for American commentators to fall into that approach, but the U.S. was part and parcel of the operation, strategizing with the Indonesian army and encouraging them to go after the PKI."[16]

Geoffrey B. Robinson asserts that while there is no consensus on the matter, some scholars have described the mass killings as a genocide.[3]:4 Jess Melvin claims the 1965–66 massacre constitutes genotsid under the legal definition as particular religious and ethnic groups were targeted collectively for their relations to the PKI.[2] She cites Matthew Lippman and David Nersessian stating ateistlar are covered under the genocide convention and argues the Indonesian military prescribed the elimination of "atheists" and "unbelievers" collectively for their association with communism and the PKI, and thus these killings would constitute genotsid.[2] Melvin also emphasises the extermination of the PKI as an act of genocide by pointing out that the PKI themselves identified with a particular religious denomination known as "Red Islam" that mixed Islam with communism.[2] She further argues the killings constitute genocide because the PKI constitute an ideologically based "national group."[2]

International People's Tribunal 1965

In November 2015, the International People's Tribunal on 1965 Crimes Against Humanity in Indonesia, presided over by seven international judges, was held in Gaaga, Niderlandiya. It was formally established in 2014 by human rights activists, academics, and Indonesian exiles in response to an "absence of an official domestic process of transitional justice based on truth finding."[10] In July 2016, chief judge Zak Yakoob publicly read the tribunal's findings, which called the state of Indonesia directly responsible for the events and guilty of insoniyatga qarshi jinoyatlar, blamed Suharto for spreading false tashviqot and laying the grounds for the massacres, and concluded that the massacres "intended to annihilate a section of the population and could be categorised as genotsid ".[159] The report also highlighted other allegations which the panel found to be well-founded, including enslavement in labour camps, ruthless torture, systematic sexual violence and majburiy yo'qolish.[10][159] Indonesia rejected the tribunal's ruling; Security Minister Luhut Panjaitan said the killings were "none of their business, they are not our superiors and Indonesia has its own system."[160] The court has no legal authority to issue binding decisions or rulings.[161]

Judge Yacoob stated that "the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia were all complicit to differing degrees in the commission of these crimes against humanity."[162] The judges conclude that the US supported the Indonesian military "knowing well that they were embarked upon a programme of mass killings," which included providing lists of alleged communist party officials to the Indonesian security forces with a "strong presumption that these would facilitate the arrest and/or the execution of those that were named", whereas the UK and Australia repeated false propaganda from the Indonesian Army, even after it became "abundantly clear that killings and other crimes against humanity were taking place."[10][162] Australia's foreign affairs ministry rejected the conclusion of the tribunal, which it described as a "human rights NGO", and denies the country was in any way complicit in the killings. The US and the UK have not responded to the tribunal's findings.[161] Indonesian human-rights lawyer Nursyahbani Katjasungkana(Indonez tili) called on all three countries to admit their complicity, stating that it had been proved from their various diplomatic communications and could no longer be denied.[159]

Filmlar va hujjatli filmlar

We shoved wood in their anus until they died. We crushed their necks with wood. We hung them. We strangled them with wire. We cut off their heads. We ran them over with cars. We were allowed to do it. And the proof is, we murdered people and were never punished.[163]

—Adi Zulkadry, death squad leader quoted in The Act of Killing.

During Suharto's regime, the media was heavily influenced and censored to show a 'certain' history of the 1965 incident: a history which purely and undoubtedly blamed the PKI for this political tragedy. However, in recent articles such as by 'The Jakarta Post', a more in-depth and complex story is recognised by the media offering conflicting views on whom the blame should really fall.[164] A film supporting the New Order's version of events, Pengxianatan G30S / PKI (Betrayal of Indonesia Communist Party) was broadcast annually on the government television station TVRI every 30 September. This version was the only one allowed in open discourse in the country.[165] After Suharto's removal from power, many people, including those involved, told other versions of the events in various books and films. One, the documentary film Qotillik akti, included interviews with individuals who had participated in the mass killings,[166] and its companion piece Sukunatning ko'rinishi follows one grieving family trying to understand why it happened and exposes how those behind the massacres still revel in their crimes 50 years on, including boasting on camera how they dismembered, eviscerated, castrated and beheaded alleged communists.[167][168] Film Xavfli yashash yili, based around events leading up to the killings, internationally released in 1982, was banned in Indonesia until 2000.[169]

Books and novels

The killings inspired many novelists to write their own rendition of the event, either on a more local, socio-cultural level, or on a national, political level. Books that were written in Indonesia during the time of the New Order often faced censorship of certain concepts, while books written and published abroad were banned from the country.

John Roosa's Pretext for Mass Murder traces a historical path through the 1965 event, painting a scenario of explanations for what preceded, caused and followed the coup. It focuses on several aspects of the coup such as the incoherence of facts and the incompetence of coup organisers to provide four main interpretations of the coup:(1) the movement as an attempted coup d'état by the PKI,[170] (2) the movement as a mutiny of junior officers,[171] (3) the movement as an alliance of army officers and the PKI,[172] and (4) the movement as a frame-up of the PKI.[173] It also looks at material previously left unexplored in traditional discussions of the incident to give a reconstruction of the chaos that surrounds this period in Indonesian history.

Ahmad Tohari 's trilogy novel Raqqos (Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk) depicts a village community caught in a revolution, giving readers a perspective less acknowledged in the more popular account of the massacres. By having its two main characters, Srintil and Rasus, on opposite ends of the revolution, the novel sketches not only the circumstances that could have drawn the greater rural public into communist practices but also the mindset of the people who were tasked with carrying out the killings. As the novel was published in 1981, certain aspects were censored by the New Order, but all the same, the trilogy provides valuable insight into the grass-root level of the anti-communist coup and the tragedies that followed.

The nights at the beginning of the dry season of 1966 were very cold, and there was widespread anxiety amongst the people. Wild dogs roamed the area, savage, aroused by the smell of blood and corpses that had not been buried properly. The southeasterly breeze carried the smell of rotting carrion. The stillness of the nights was broken by the sounds of the heavy footfalls of boots and the occasional reports of gunshots.

— Ahmad Tohari in his novel Raqqos [174]

Eka Kurniavan "s Beauty is a Wound (2002) weaves history into satire, tragedy and the supernatural to depict the state of the nation before, during and after 1965. There is less focus on the military aspect of the coup, but a good deal of focus on the communists themselves through the form of interpersonal relationships and communist ghosts who could not find peace. Without meaning to, perhaps, the novel also gives readers a glimpse of the economy of Indonesia at the time using the example of a flourishing prostitute business and a temporary swimsuit business, among others. Kurniawan projects his feelings about the revolution and coup by constructing a story of theatrical characters around it and delivers a history of the nation all the way from Dutch occupation to Suharto.

Revolution is nothing more than a collective running amok, organized by one particular party.

— Eka Kurniawan in his novel, Beauty is a Wound [175]

Luiza Doughty Qora suv (2016) deals with the 1965 event by exploring them from a European viewpoint. Shifting between California and Indonesia as settings for the novel, the book is written from the perspective of a single man working as an operative for an international company. The novel focuses more on foreign reactions to the coup rather than the coup itself, especially from the foreign journalist community.

Shuningdek qarang

Izohlar

  1. ^ a b v d e f g h Riklefs (1991), p. 288.
  2. ^ a b v d e f g Melvin, Jess (2017). "Ommaviy qotillik mexanikasi: Indoneziyadagi qotilliklarni genotsid deb tushunish uchun masala". Genotsid tadqiqotlari jurnali. 19 (4): 487–511. doi:10.1080/14623528.2017.1393942.
  3. ^ a b v d e f g h men j k l m n o p q r s t siz v Robinson, Geoffrey B. (2018). The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66. Prinston universiteti matbuoti. ISBN  978-1-4008-8886-3.
  4. ^ a b Melvin, Jess (2018). The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: Mechanics of Mass Murder. Yo'nalish. p. 1. ISBN  978-1-138-57469-4.
  5. ^ a b v d Mark Aarons (2007). "Justice Betrayed: Post-1945 Responses to Genocide." In David A. Blumenthal and Timothy L. H. McCormack (eds). Nürnberg merosi: tsivilizatsiya ta'siri yoki institutsional intiqom? (International Humanitarian Law). Martinus Nijxof nashriyoti. ISBN  9004156917 p.80.
  6. ^ a b The Memory of Savage Anticommunist Killings Still Haunts Indonesia, 50 Years On, Vaqt
  7. ^ Robinson, Geoffrey B. (2018). The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965–66. Prinston universiteti matbuoti. 206–207 betlar. ISBN  978-1-4008-8886-3. In short, Western states were not innocent bystanders to unfolding domestic political events following the alleged coup, as so often claimed. On the contrary, starting almost immediately after October 1, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several of their allies set in motion a coordinated campaign to assist the army in the political and physical destruction of the PKI and its affiliates, the removal of Sukarno and his closest associates from political power, their replacement by an army elite led by Suharto, and the engineering of a seismic shift in Indonesia's foreign policy towards the West. They did this through backdoor political reassurances to army leaders, a policy of official silence in the face of the mounting violence, a sophisticated international propaganda offensive, and the covert provision of material assistance to the army and its allies. In all these ways, they helped to ensure that the campaign against the Left would continue unabated and its victims would ultimately number in the hundreds of thousands.
  8. ^ a b v Melvin, Jess (20 October 2017). "Telegrams confirm scale of US complicity in 1965 genocide". Indonesia at Melbourne. Melburn universiteti. Olingan 21 oktyabr 2017. The new telegrams confirm the US actively encouraged and facilitated genocide in Indonesia to pursue its own political interests in the region, while propagating an explanation of the killings it knew to be untrue.
  9. ^ a b Simpson, Bradley (2010). Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968. Stenford universiteti matbuoti. p. 193. ISBN  978-0-8047-7182-5. Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia. Bu juda muhim terror edi neoliberal G'arb Sukarno ag'darilgandan keyin Indoneziyaga tatbiq etishga urinayotgan siyosat.
  10. ^ a b v d Perry, Juliet (21 July 2016). "Tribunal Indoneziyani 1965 yilgi genotsidda aybdor deb topdi; AQSh va Buyuk Britaniyaning sheriklari". CNN. Olingan 5 iyun 2017.
  11. ^ Robert Cribb (2004). "The Indonesian Genocide of 1965–1966 "In Samuel Totten (ed). Teaching about Genocide: Approaches, and Resources. Axborot asri nashriyoti, pp. 133–143. ISBN  159311074X
  12. ^ Roosa, John. "The 1965–66 Politicide in Indonesia: Toward Knowing Who Did What to Whom and Why". Stenford.
  13. ^ "The Indonesian Politicide of 1965–66: How Could it Have Happened?". Maastrixt universiteti.
  14. ^ Indoneziyaning qotillik dalalari. Al-Jazira, 21 December 2012. Retrieved 24 January 2016.
  15. ^ Salom, Robert; Kiernan, Ben (2003 yil iyul). Genotsid spektri: Tarixiy nuqtai nazardan ommaviy qotillik. Kembrij universiteti matbuoti. pp.290–291. ISBN  0-521-52750-3. Olingan 19 oktyabr 2015.
  16. ^ a b v d Bevins, Vincent (20 October 2017). "What the United States Did in Indonesia". Atlantika. Olingan 21 oktyabr 2017.
  17. ^ Varagur, Krithika (23 October 2017). "Indonesia Revives Its Communist Ghosts". AQSh yangiliklari va dunyo hisoboti. Olingan 23 oktyabr 2017.
  18. ^ Allan & Zeilzer 2004, p. ??.
    Westad (2005, pp. 113, 129) notes that, prior to the mid-1950s—by which time the relationship was in definite trouble—the US actually had, via the CIA, developed excellent contacts with Sukarno.
  19. ^ "[Hearings, reports and prints of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs] 91st: PRINTS: A-R". hdl:2027/uc1.b3605665. Iqtibos jurnali talab qiladi | jurnal = (Yordam bering)
  20. ^ Macaulay, Scott (17 February 2014). The Act of Killing Wins Documentary BAFTA; Director Oppenheimer’s Speech Edited Online. Kinorejissyor. Qabul qilingan 12 may 2015 yil.
  21. ^ a b "Fayllar AQSh Indoneziyani kommunizmga qarshi tozalash to'g'risida batafsil ma'lumotga ega ekanligini ko'rsatmoqda". Associated Press The Guardian orqali. 17 oktyabr 2017 yil. Olingan 18 oktyabr 2017.
  22. ^ Dwyer, Colin (18 October 2017). "Declassified Files Lay Bare U.S. Knowledge Of Mass Murders In Indonesia". Milliy radio. Olingan 21 oktyabr 2017.
  23. ^ a b v d Kadane, Kathy (21 May 1990). "AQSh rasmiylari ro'yxati 60-yillarda Indoneziyada qon to'kilishiga yordam berdi".. Washington Post. Olingan 6 iyul 2017.
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