Birlashgan Qirollikning to'lovga qodir emasligi to'g'risidagi qonun - United Kingdom insolvency law
Birlashgan Qirollikning to'lovga qodir emasligi to'g'risidagi qonun kompaniyalarini tartibga soladi Birlashgan Qirollik qarzlarini to'lay olmaydiganlar. Esa Buyuk Britaniyaning bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonuni qoidalariga tegishli jismoniy shaxslar, to'lov qobiliyatsizligi atamasi odatda ostida tashkil etilgan kompaniyalar uchun ishlatiladi 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun. "To'lov qobiliyatsizligi" qarzlarni to'lay olmaslik degan ma'noni anglatadi.[2] Beri Cork hisoboti 1982 yil,[3] Buyuk Britaniyaning to'lovga qodir emasligi to'g'risidagi qonunning zamonaviy siyosati qiyin ahvolda bo'lgan kompaniyani qutqarish, yo'qotishlarni minimallashtirish va jamoat, xodimlar, kreditorlar va boshqa manfaatdor tomonlar o'rtasida korxonalarning ishlamay qolishi natijasida kelib chiqadigan yuklarni adolatli taqsimlashga urinishdir. Agar kompaniyani saqlab qolish imkoni bo'lmasa, u "tugatiladi", shuning uchun aktivlar kreditorlarning ustuvorligi bo'yicha ularni to'lash uchun sotiladi. Huquqning asosiy manbalariga quyidagilar kiradi To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil, To'lovga layoqatsizlik qoidalari 1986 yil (Angliya va Uelsda 2017 yil 6 apreldan boshlab to'lov qobiliyatsizligi qoidalari bilan almashtirildi (Angliya va Uels) 2016 yil[4] - pastga qarang)), the Kompaniya direktorlarini diskvalifikatsiya qilish to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil, Ish bilan ta'minlash to'g'risidagi qonun 1996 yil XII qism, To'lov qobiliyatini tartibga solish (EC) 1346/2000 va sud amaliyoti. Boshqa ko'plab aktlar, qonuniy hujjatlar va tegishli ishlar mehnat, bank faoliyati, mulk va qarama-qarshi qonunlar shuningdek mavzuni shakllantirish.
Buyuk Britaniya qonunchiligi eng katta himoyani beradi banklar yoki a uchun shartnoma tuzadigan boshqa tomonlar xavfsizlik manfaatlari. Agar qimmatli qog'ozlar ma'lum bir aktivga nisbatan "belgilanadigan" bo'lsa, bu boshqa kreditorlar, shu jumladan ish haqi to'lanmagan kompaniya bilan savdo qilgan ishchilar va kichik biznes sub'ektlariga nisbatan to'lanishda ustuvor ahamiyatga ega. A "suzuvchi zaryad ", bu ko'plab mamlakatlarda ruxsat etilmagan va Buyuk Britaniyada munozarali bo'lib qolayotgan, kelajakdagi barcha aktivlarni yo'q qilishi mumkin, ammo egasi qonun bilan xodimlarning ish haqi va pensiya talablarining cheklangan miqdoriga, boshqa ta'minlanmaganlar uchun esa 20 foizga bo'ysunadi. kreditorlar. Xavfsizlik manfaatlari shaffoflik tijorat kreditorlariga shartnomani tuzishdan oldin kompaniyaning moliyaviy holatini tushunishda yordam beradi degan nazariya bo'yicha ommaviy ro'yxatdan o'tkazilishi kerak. Ammo qonun hali ham ruxsat beradi "unvonni saqlash qoidalari "va"Quistclose xavfsizlik kabi ishlaydigan, lekin ro'yxatdan o'tishlari shart bo'lmagan trestlar. Xavfsiz kreditorlar odatda to'lovga layoqatsizlik protseduralarida ustunlik qilishadi, chunki suzuvchi zaryad egasi tanlashi mumkin ma'mur uning tanlovi. Qonunda ma'murlar kompaniyani qutqarishga ustuvor ahamiyat berishlari kerak va barcha kreditorlar oldida qarzdor.[5] Amalda, ushbu majburiyatlar kamdan-kam hollarda buzilgan deb topiladi va eng odatiy natija shundaki, to'lovga layoqatsiz bo'lgan kompaniyaning aktivlari yangi xaridorga doimiy ravishda sotiladi, bu ko'pincha sobiq menejmentni o'z ichiga olishi mumkin: ammo kreditorlarning talablaridan ozod va potentsial ko'plab ish joylarini yo'qotish bilan. Boshqa mumkin bo'lgan protseduralarga "ixtiyoriy kelishuv ", agar kreditorlarning to'rtdan uch qismi ixtiyoriy ravishda kompaniyaga qarzni qirqishga, korxonalarning cheklangan miqdordagi turlarida qabul qilish huquqiga ega bo'lishga va kompaniyaning aktivlari nihoyat sotiladigan joyda tugatishga rozilik bildirishlari mumkin bo'lsa. To'lovni amalga oshirmayotganlar tomonidan ijro stavkalari pastligicha qolmoqda, ammo nazariy jihatdan ma'mur yoki tugatuvchi murojaat qilishi mumkin bitimlar past bahoda bekor qilinishi kerak yoki ba'zi bir kreditorlarga nisbatan adolatsiz imtiyozlar bekor qilinadi. Vazifani buzganlik uchun direktorlar sudga berilishi yoki diskvalifikatsiya qilinishi mumkin, shu jumladan beparvolik bilan savdo qilish to'lovga qodir emasligidan qochib qutula olmagan kompaniya.[6] To'lovga layoqatsizlik to'g'risidagi qonunning asosiy tamoyillari hanuzgacha jiddiy tortishuvlarga duch kelmoqda va uning qoidalari qarama-qarshi qarashlarning murosasini ko'rsatadi.
Tarix
Shilok Men qanday hukm qilishdan qo'rqaman va hech qanday gunoh qilmayman, sizlarning orangizda juda ko'p xaridlar bor qul Eshaklaringizni va itlaringizni va xachirlarni qashshoq qilsangiz ham, Siz ularni yomon va qul qismlarida ishlatasiz, chunki ularni sotib olgansiz; Sizga aytaymi, ular ozod bo'lsin, merosxo'rlaringizga uylaning? Nega ular og'irlik ostida ter to'kishadi? ularning ko'rpa-to'shaklari siz kabi yumshoq bo'lsin va ularning tanglaylari shunday viyandalar bilan mavsum o'tkazingmi? Siz javob berasiz: "Qullar biznikidir." Men sizga javob beraman: The funt go'sht Men undan talab qilyapman, juda qimmat sotib olingan; "Agar bu menga tegishli bo'lsa, men uni rad etaman. Agar siz meni inkor qilsangiz, qonuningizga voy bo'lsin! Farmonlarida hech qanday kuch yo'q. Venetsiya.
Men hukmni qo'llab-quvvatlayman: javob bering; menda bo‘ladimi?V Shekspir, Venetsiya savdogari (1598) IV akt, sahna i
Buyuk Britaniyada korporativ to'lovga layoqatsizlik to'g'risidagi qonunning zamonaviy tarixi 1844 yilda birinchi kompaniyalar qonunchiligidan boshlandi.[7] Biroq, to'lovga layoqatsizlikning ko'plab tamoyillari qadimgi davrlardan boshlab bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonunlarga asoslangan. Bankrotlikni tartibga solish har bir qonunchilik tizimining zaruriy qismi bo'lgan va quyidagi qoidalarda uchraydi Hammurapi kodeksi (Miloddan avvalgi 18-asr), O'n ikki jadval Rim respublikasi (miloddan avvalgi 450 yil), Talmud (Milodiy 200) va Corpus Juris Civilis (Milodiy 534).[8] Qadimgi qonunlarda zararni kreditorlar o'rtasida taqsimlashning turli usullari qo'llanilgan va qarzlarni qondirish odatda qarzdorning tanasidan kelib chiqqan. Qarzdor qamoqqa olinishi, qul qilinishi yoki o'ldirilishi yoki uchalasi ham bo'lishi mumkin. Angliyada Magna Carta 1215 9-bandda qarzlarni to'lash uchun odamlarning mol-mulki yoki pullari bo'lgan taqdirda, erlar tortib olinmasligi to'g'risidagi qoidalar belgilangan.[9] The Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonun 1542 ning zamonaviy tamoyilini joriy etdi pari passu (ya'ni mutanosib) zararni kreditorlar o'rtasida taqsimlash. Biroq, 1542 yilgi qonun hali ham qarzlarini to'lay olmaydigan odamlar jinoyatchilar degan qadimiy tushunchani aks ettirgan va qarzdorlarni qamoqqa olishni talab qilgan.[10] The 1571. Firibgarlikni tashish to'g'risidagi qonun qarzdor tomonidan "kreditorlarni va boshqalarning adolatli va qonuniy harakatlarini kechiktirish, to'sqinlik qilish yoki aldash maqsadida" har qanday operatsiyalar "aniq va mutlaqo bekor qilinishini" ta'minladi. Bankrotlarning qarzdorlarning umumiy irodasiga bo'ysunadigan ko'rinishi, ular tomonidan yaxshi ifodalanadi Shilok Shekspirnikida uning "funt go'shti" ni talab qilmoqda Venetsiya savdogari, taxminan 17-asrda susayishni boshladi. In Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonun 1705,[11] The Lord Kantsler bankrotliklarni barcha qarzlarni to'lash majburiyatidan ozod qilish huquqi berildi, barcha aktivlarni ochib berish va turli tartiblar bajarilgandan so'ng. Shunga qaramay, qarzdorlarning qamoqxonasi umumiy maqsad edi. Mahbuslardan tez-tez qamoqxona qo'riqchilariga to'lovlarni to'lash talab etilardi, bu ularni yanada qarzdor qilib qo'ydi, ular manevrlarga bog'lanib qolishlari mumkin zanjirlar va sanitariya sharoitlari yomon edi. 18-asrning boshlarida mojaro Tori deputatining do'sti qarzdorlik qamoqxonasida vafot etganidan keyin boshlandi va 1729 yil fevral oyida Gaols qo'mitasi yuqumli kasalliklar to'g'risida hisobot berdi. Shunga qaramay, asosiy qonunchilik sxemasi va axloqiy kayfiyat bir xil bo'lib qoldi. 1769 yilda, Uilyam Blekston "s Angliya qonunlariga sharhlar Savdogardan tashqari biron bir shaxs uchun "har qanday muhim qiymatdagi qarzlar bilan o'zini og'dirish" oqilona emasligini ta'kidladi.[12] Va asrning oxirida, Lord Kenyon Fowler v Padget "Bankrotlik jinoyat deb qaraladi va eski qonunlarda bankrot jinoyatchi deb ataladi" degan eski fikrni yana bir bor tasdiqladi.[13]
Beri Janubiy dengiz kompaniyasi va 1720 yilda fond bozoridagi falokat, mas'uliyati cheklangan jamiyatlar qonun bilan rasmiy ravishda taqiqlangan edi. Bu shuni anglatadiki, tijorat bilan savdo qiladigan odamlar, agar ishi yomonlashsa, hayotlari va sog'lig'i uchun katta xavf tug'diradi va ular qarzlarini to'lay olmaydilar. Biroq, bilan sanoat inqilobi kompaniyalar samarasiz va xavfli bo'lgan degan qarash,[14] o'zgaruvchan edi. Kanallar, suv kompaniyalari va temir yo'llarni qurish kabi korxonalar tobora keng tarqalgan. Biroq, tashkilotchilar iltimosnoma berishlari kerak edi Parlament a Mahalliy qonun. Amalda, investorning to'lovga layoqatsizligi sababli javobgarligini cheklash imtiyozi keng ishbilarmon jamoatchilik uchun mavjud emas edi. Bundan tashqari, sharoitlarning hayratlanarli darajada buzilishi qarzdorlar qamoqxonasi to'lovga layoqatsizlik to'g'risidagi qonun islohotini 19-asr qonunchilik kun tartibidagi eng qizg'in munozarali masalalardan biriga aylantirdi. 1831-1914 yillarda parlamentga 100 ga yaqin qonun loyihalari kiritildi.[15] Uzoq islohot jarayoni To'lovga qodir bo'lmagan qarzdorlar (Angliya) to'g'risidagi qonun 1813 yil. Shu bilan to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan qarzdorlarni ozod qilish bo'yicha maxsus sud tashkil etildi. Agar ularning aktivlari 20 funtdan oshmasa, ular qamoqdan ozod etilishi mumkin. Tirikchilik uchun savdo qilgan odamlar uchun Bankrotlik (Angliya) to'g'risidagi qonun 1825 yil qarzdorlarga kreditorlarning ruxsatisiz o'zlarining qarzlarini to'lash uchun sud ishlarini yuritishga ruxsat bergan. The Gaols qonuni 1823 yuborilgan ruhoniylarni yubordi va qarzdor bo'lgan qamoqxona zindonlarini davlatning ish haqi varag'iga qo'ydi, shuning uchun ular mahbuslardan to'lovlarni talab qilmadilar. Ostida Qamoqxonalar to'g'risidagi qonun 1835 qamoqxonalarning beshta inspektori ish bilan ta'minlandi. The To'lovga qodir bo'lmagan qarzdorlar to'g'risidagi qonun 1842 qarzlardan qutulish uchun savdogar bo'lmaganlarga bankrotlik protsedurasini boshlashga ruxsat berdi. Biroq, sharoitlar ijtimoiy norozilik ob'ekti bo'lib qoldi. Romanchi Charlz Dikkens, uning otasi qamoqda bo'lgan Marshalsea u bolaligida, ayniqsa, kitoblari orqali murakkablik va adolatsizlikka pillorlik qildi Devid Kopperfild (1850), Qattiq vaqt (1854) va Kichkina Dorrit (1857). Aynan shu davrda islohot boshlandi.
Bankrotlik protseduralarida jismoniy shaxslarning qarzdorlikdan xalos bo'lishidagi qiyinchiliklar va qarzdorlar qamoqxonasining dahshati zamonaviy kompaniyalar qonunchiligining joriy qilinishiga va umuman mavjud cheklangan javobgarlik, yana ham shoshilinch. Birinchi qadam bu edi Aksiyadorlik jamiyatlari to'g'risidagi qonun 1844 yil, bu kompaniyalarni emas, balki ro'yxatdan o'tish orqali yaratishga imkon berdi Qirollik xartiyasi. Bu bilan birga edi Aktsionerlik jamiyatlari to'g'risidagi qonun 1844 yil, bu kompaniyani tugatish va aktivlarni tugatish uchun alohida tartibni nazarda tutgan. Kompaniyalar yuridik shaxsni tashkil etuvchilardan ajratib turar edilar, lekin faqatgina Cheklangan javobgarlik to'g'risidagi qonun 1855 kompaniyaning sarmoyadorlari, odatda, kompaniyaning to'lovga qodirligi sababli qo'shimcha qarzlardan himoyalangan bo'larmidi. 1855 yilgi Qonun investorlarning mablag'larini ularning mablag'lari qo'ygan mablag'ga nisbatan javobgarligini cheklab qo'ydi, shuning uchun agar kimdir to'lovga qodir bo'lmaganligi sababli katta qarzdor bo'lgan kompaniyaning aktsiyalarini sotib olsa, aktsiyadordan u to'laganidan ko'proq narsani so'rash mumkin emas edi. Shunday qilib, qarzdorlarning qamoqxonasi qisqartirildi. Ko'p o'tmay, barcha qarzdorlar uchun islohotlar amalga oshirildi. The Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonun 1861 nafaqat savdogarlar, balki barcha odamlarga bankrotlik to'g'risida ariza berish huquqini beruvchi hujjat qabul qilindi. The Qarzdorlar to'g'risidagi qonun 1869 nihoyat qarz uchun qamoqni umuman bekor qildi. Shunday qilib, ushbu davrning qonunchilik sxemasi taxminan zamonaviy qonunga o'xshash bo'lib qoldi. Umumiy tamoyil saqlanib qoldi pari passu to'lovga layoqatsiz bo'lgan kompaniyaning kreditorlari orasida likvidatorlarning xarajatlari va ishchilarning ish haqi to'g'risidagi da'volari boshqa ta'minlanmagan kreditorlarga nisbatan qonuniy ustuvorlikka ega edi.[16] Biroq, shartnoma tuzgan har qanday kreditor xavfsizlik manfaatlari birinchi navbatda navbatda bo'ladi. To'lovga qarshi himoya yakunlandi Buyuk Britaniya kompaniyalari to'g'risidagi qonun etakchi ish, Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd.[17] Bu erda a Whitechapel botmaker o'z biznesini birlashtirgan edi, ammo iqtisodiy qiyinchiliklar tufayli u to'lovga qodir edi. The Kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 1862 kamida ettita aktsiyadorni talab qildi, shuning uchun u o'z xotinini va bolalarini nominal aktsiyador sifatida ro'yxatdan o'tkazdi, garchi ular bu biznesda unchalik katta bo'lmagan yoki umuman qatnashmagan bo'lsa ham. The tugatuvchi janob Salomonning kompaniyasi, boshqa aktsiyadorlar haqiqiy investor emasligini hisobga olib, cheklangan javobgarlikni himoya qilishni yo'qotishi kerakligi sababli, uni kompaniyasining to'lamagan qarzlarini shaxsan to'lashni talab qildi. Salomonning kreditorlari, ayniqsa Salomonning o'zi a suzuvchi zaryad, umuman olganda kompaniyaning hozirgi va kelgusi aktivlari va shu sababli uning kompaniyaga nisbatan qarzdorlik to'g'risidagi da'volari ularnikidan ustun edi. Lordlar palatasi, garchi kompaniya mohiyatan bir kishilik korxona bo'lgan bo'lsa-da, belgilangan tartibda ro'yxatdan o'tgan har qanday kishi to'lov qobiliyatsizligi holatida Kompaniya aktlarini himoya qilishiga ishonadi. Salohning ishi 19-asr islohotlarini samarali yakunladi, chunki har qanday odam, hatto eng kichik biznes ham, ish qobiliyatini yo'qotganidan keyin qashshoqlikdan himoya qilishi mumkin edi.
20-asrda islohotlar uchta asosiy masalaga qaratildi. Birinchisi, turli xil kreditorlar talablari orasida adolatli ustuvorlik tizimini belgilash. Bu, birinchi navbatda, shartnoma bo'yicha kuchli kreditorlarning, xususan banklarning a olishga rozi bo'lish qobiliyatiga asoslangan xavfsizlik manfaatlari kompaniyaning mol-mulki ustidan, garovga olinmagan kreditorlarning talablarini qondirish uchun qolgan aktivlarsiz qoladi. Darhol keyin Salohning ishi va foydalanish bo'yicha yuzaga kelgan tortishuvlar suzuvchi zaryadlar, 1897 yilgi bankrotlikni o'zgartirish to'g'risidagi qonunda imtiyozli to'lovlar imtiyozli kreditorlar (xodimlar, tugatuvchi xarajatlari va soliqlar), shuningdek, suzuvchi to'lov egasidan ustunligini (hozirda) IA 1986 yil 175-qism). In Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil yana bir muhim o'zgarish, suzuvchi to'lovga tegishli aktivlarning taxminan 20 foizidan barcha ta'minlanmagan kreditorlar uchun halqali to'siq fondini yaratish edi.[18] Shu bilan birga, soliq to'lovchilarning da'volari uchun ustuvorlik bekor qilindi. O'shandan beri kelgusi islohotlar bo'yicha munozaralar suzuvchi to'lovni butunlay bekor qilish kerakmi yoki halqa bilan o'ralgan fondni olish kerakmi? qattiq xavfsizlik manfaatlar.[19] Islohotlarning ikkinchi muhim yo'nalishi hali ham hayotga tatbiq etilishi mumkin bo'lgan korxonalarni qutqarishga yordam berish edi. Keyingi Cork hisoboti 1982 yilda,[20] The To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil yaratgan ma'muriyat nochor korxonalar menejerlaridan kompaniyani qutqarishga urinishlarini va barcha kreditorlarning manfaatlari yo'lida harakat qilishlarini talab qiladigan (qog'ozda) protsedura. Keyin Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil bu deyarli to'liq o'rnini egalladi qabul qilish garovga qo'yilgan kreditorlar, barcha aktivlar bo'yicha o'zgaruvchan to'lov bilan, ta'minlanmagan kreditorlarning talablarini hisobga olmasdan, to'lovga layoqatsiz kompaniyani boshqarishi mumkin bo'lgan qoidalar. Islohotlarning uchinchi yo'nalishi to'lov qobiliyati yomonlashgan yoki undan foyda ko'rgan odamlar uchun javobgarlikka tegishli edi. Tomonidan tavsiya etilganidek Cork hisoboti, Kompaniya direktorlarining diskvalifikatsiya to'g'risidagi qonuni 1986 yil shuni anglatadiki, kompaniyaning qonuniy majburiyatlarini buzgan yoki firibgarlikka yo'l qo'ygan direktorlarning 15 yilgacha direktor sifatida ishlashiga to'sqinlik qilish mumkin. The To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 214-bo'lim uchun javobgarlik yaratildi noto'g'ri savdo. Agar direktorlar to'lovga layoqatsizlik muqarrarligini bilishlari kerak bo'lgan taqdirda, to'lovga layoqatsizlik protseduralarini boshlamagan bo'lsalar, ular uzoq muddatli savdolar natijasida kelib chiqqan qo'shimcha qarzlarni to'lashlari kerak edi. Bundan tashqari, firibgarlik bilan etkazib berish to'g'risidagi qoidalar kengaytirildi, shuning uchun har qanday bitimning qiymati pastligi yoki boshqa afzalligi (yomon niyatisiz) oldini olish va nochor kompaniya tomonidan ochilishi mumkin edi.
The 2007-2008 yillardagi moliyaviy inqiroz AQShda iste'molchilarning moliyaviy himoyasi etarli emasligi, manfaatlar to'qnashuvi kredit reyting agentligi sanoat va nuqsonli shaffoflik talablari hosilalar bozorlar,[21] korporativ to'lov qobiliyatsizligi miqdorining katta o'sishiga sabab bo'ldi. Zamonaviy munozaralar, xususan, bank sohasidagi, ortiqcha ish haqini sinchkovlik bilan tekshirib, to'lovga layoqatsizlikning oldini olishga o'tdi. manfaatlar to'qnashuvi moliyaviy xizmatlar institutlari orasida kapitalning etarliligi va haddan ziyod tavakkal qilish sabablari. The Bank to'g'risidagi qonun 2009 yil banklar uchun o'ta og'ir vaziyatlarda hukumat tasarrufiga olinishini nazarda tutuvchi maxsus rezolyutsiya rejimi deb nomlangan banklar uchun maxsus to'lovga qodir emaslik rejimini yaratdi.
Korporativ to'lov qobiliyati
Korxonalarning haddan tashqari qarzdorligi sababli korporativ to'lov qobiliyatsizligi yuz beradi. Ostida Buyuk Britaniya kompaniyalari to'g'risidagi qonun, kompaniya - bu alohida yuridik shaxs unga pul va ishchi kuchini sarflagan odamlardan va bu bir qator qiziqish guruhlarini vositachilik qiladi.[22] Har doim aksiyadorlar, direktorlar va ishchilar javobgarlik cheklangan ularning investitsiyalari miqdoriga, shuning uchun tijorat kreditorlariga qarshi ular aktsiyalar uchun to'lagan pullaridan yoki ish joylaridan ko'proq yo'qotishlari mumkin. To'lovga qodir emaslik har qanday munosabatlarda har doimgiday mumkin bo'ladi kredit va qarz tez-tez sodir bo'ladigan tarzda yaratiladi shartnomalar yoki boshqa majburiyatlar. Iqtisodiyot bo'limida qaerda raqobatbardosh bozorlar haddan tashqari mumkin bo'lgan har qanday joyda ishlang, to'lovga qodir emaslar. To'lov qobiliyatining ma'nosi shunchaki qaytarib berishga qodir emasligidir qarzlar, garchi qonun ikkita asosiy qo'shimcha ma'nolarni ajratib turadi. Birinchidan, sud tomonidan kompaniyani tugatishni buyurish (va uning aktivlari sotilishi) yoki ma'mur tayinlanishi (biznesni o'zgartirishga urinish) yoki turli xil operatsiyalardan qochish uchun pul muomalasi Odatda sinov qo'llaniladi: kompaniya qarzlarini to'lash muddati tugashi sababli to'lay olmasligi kerak. Ikkinchidan, kreditorlarga kompensatsiya berish uchun direktorlarni sudga berish yoki direktorlarni diskvalifikatsiya qilish uchun kompaniya o'z aktivlari bo'yicha majburiyatlarga qaraganda kamroq aktivlarga ega ekanligini ko'rsatishi kerak. balanslar varaqasi. Agar qarzlarni hammaga to'liq qaytarib berib bo'lmaydigan bo'lsa, kreditorlar, albatta, qolgan aktivlarning ulushi uchun o'zaro raqobatlashadilar. Shu sababli, ustuvorliklarning qonuniy tizimi har xil turdagi kreditorlar o'rtasida to'lovni amalga oshirish tartibini belgilaydi.
Kompaniyalar va kredit
Kompaniyalar yuridik shaxslar bo'lib, konstitutsiyani ro'yxatdan o'tkazish va badal to'lash yo'li bilan yaratilgan Kompaniyalar uyi. Jismoniy shaxs singari, kompaniya ham qonuniy majburiyatlarni o'z zimmasiga olishi va huquqlarga ega bo'lishi mumkin. Kompaniyaning hayoti davomida u boshliqlar kengashi, odatda yollaydi xodimlar. Bu odamlar kompaniyaning vakili va uning nomidan ish tuting. Ular foydalanishi va hal qilishi mumkin mulk, qilish shartnomalar, joylashish ishonchlar, yoki ehtimol ba'zi bir baxtsizliklar komissiyasi orqali jirkanch. Ushbu tadbirlarning barchasida kompaniya doimiy ravishda qarzdor bo'lib qoladi. Savdoda qarzlarning uchta asosiy turi, birinchidan, bozorda chiqarilgan qarzdorlik vositasi (masalan, a.) Orqali yuzaga keladigan qarzlardir korporativ obligatsiya yoki kredit notasi), ikkinchidan, kompaniyaga qaytarish shartlari bilan berilgan kredit krediti orqali (masalan, bank krediti yoki ipoteka) va uchinchidan, sotish krediti (masalan, kompaniya tovar yoki xizmatlarni olganda, lekin ular uchun hali to'lamagan bo'lsa).[23] Biroq, printsipi alohida yuridik shaxs umuman olganda, kompaniya majburiyatlarga ega bo'lgan birinchi "shaxs" ekanligini anglatadi. Kompaniyaning agentlari (direktorlar va xodimlar) odatda majburiyatlar bo'yicha javobgar emaslar, agar ular maxsus qabul qilinmasa.[24] Ko'pgina kompaniyalarda ham mavjud cheklangan javobgarlik investorlar uchun. Ostida To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 74-qism (2) (d) bu degani aktsiyadorlar odatda kompaniyaning majburiyatlari bo'yicha da'vo qilinishi mumkin emas. Ushbu tamoyil, tijorat tufayli qarz paydo bo'ladigan joyda, odatda, amal qiladi shartnoma. Lordlar palatasi "korporativ parda" "ko'tarilmasligini" tasdiqladi Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd. Bu erda botinkmeyker o'z kompaniyasining qarzlari uchun javobgar emas edi, garchi u aslida biznesni boshqargan va aktsiyalarga egalik qilgan yagona shaxs bo'lsa ham.[25] Tijorat bo'lmagan kreditorga nisbatan sud qarori bilan qarzdorlik yuzaga kelgan hollarda, cheklangan javobgarlik muammo bo'lib qoladi, chunki parvarish vazifasi qat'iy nazar qarzdor bo'lishi mumkin. Bu shunday bo'lishi kerak edi Chandler v Keyp plc, bu erda to'lovga layoqatsiz yordamchi kompaniyaning sobiq xodimi (shikast etkazuvchi) bosh kompaniyani shaxsiy jarohati uchun muvaffaqiyatli sudga bergan. Agar kompaniyada pul qolmasa va boshqa hech kim sudga tortilmasa, kreditorlar kompaniya boshqaruvini o'z zimmalariga olishlari mumkin. Kreditorlar odatda tayinlashadi to'lovga qodir emasligi bo'yicha amaliyotchi ma'muriy tartibni amalga oshirish (kompaniyani qutqarish va kreditorlarni to'lash uchun) yoki boshqa tugatishga kirish (aktivlarni sotish va kreditorlarga to'lash uchun). Moratoriyum har qanday kreditorning kompaniyaga nisbatan da'voni bajarishini oldini olish uchun kuchga kiradi. shuning uchun sudning nazorati ostida faqat to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan mutaxassis kreditorlarga taqsimotlarni amalga oshirishi mumkin.
Hech bo'lmaganda iqtisodiyotning bozor segmentidagi korporativ muvaffaqiyatsizlik sabablari, barchasi yaratilishidan boshlanadi kredit va qarz.[26] Ba'zan ortiqcha qarzlar kompaniyaning mol-mulkini to'g'ridan-to'g'ri o'g'irlash yoki tadbirkorlik bilan shug'ullanadigan odamlar tomonidan firibgarlik tufayli yuzaga keladi.[27] Xizmat vazifasini buzganligi sababli topilgan beparvolik bilan boshqarish ham ba'zida uchraydi.[28] Ko'pincha, to'lovlar kechiktirilganligi sababli kompaniyalar to'lovga qodir. Kompaniya kredit yoki ta'minotga tayanadigan boshqa biznes ham moliyaviy ahvolga tushib qolishi va bir qator muvaffaqiyatsizliklar kengroq qism bo'lishi mumkin. makroiqtisodiy depressiya.[29] Vaqti-vaqti bilan to'lov qobiliyatsizligi yuzaga keladi, chunki texnologiya o'zgarib, biznes yo'nalishlarini eskiradi. Biroq, ko'pincha, korxonalar raqobatbardosh bo'lganligi sababli to'lovga qodir emaslar. In iqtisodiyot atrofida tashkil etilgan bozor musobaqa va agar raqobat yutqazuvchilarni taxmin qilsa yoki ortiqcha narsani o'ylasa, to'lov qobiliyatsiz bo'lishi shart.[30] Korporativ nosozlik sabablarining xilma-xilligi shuni anglatadiki, qonun muayyan masalalarga turlicha javob berishni talab qiladi va bu to'lov qobiliyatsizligining huquqiy ma'nosida aks etadi.
To'lov qobiliyatining ma'nosi
To'lov qobiliyatining ma'nosi huquqiy qoida turi uchun muhimdir. Umuman olganda, to'lovga layoqatsizlik, dastlabki qonunchilikdan boshlab, qarzlarni to'lashga qodir emasligiga bog'liq.[31] Ushbu kontseptsiya To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 122-moddaning 1-qismi (f) ga binoan, sud kompaniyaga murojaat qilish to'g'risida iltimosnoma berishi mumkin yara agar "kompaniya o'z qarzlarini to'lay olmasa". Shu bilan birga, ushbu umumiy ibora, to'lov qobiliyatsizligi qoidalariga qarab, ma'lum ta'riflar berilgan. Birinchidan, "pul muomalasi "123 (1) (e) bo'limida keltirilgan to'lov qobiliyatsizligi testi shundan iboratki, agar kompaniya" qarzlarini to'lash muddati tugashi bilan to'lay olmasa ", u kompaniyaning to'lovga qodir emasligi. Bu ko'pgina qoidalar uchun ishlatiladigan asosiy sinov. U sudga rahbarlik qiladi. tugatish buyrug'ini berishda yoki ma'murni tayinlaydi.[32] Naqd pul oqimi testi, shuningdek, sud tomonidan kompaniya tomonidan amalga oshirilgan operatsiyalarni kam baholanganligi, noqonuniy ustunlik yoki etarli darajada ko'rib chiqilmaganligi uchun o'zgaruvchan to'lovni yaratganligi sababli qochish kerakligi to'g'risida e'lon qilishda ko'rsatma beradi.[33] Naqd pul oqimini sinash, qat'iy qonuniy nuqtai nazardan farqli o'laroq, to'lov qobiliyatsizligi to'g'risida "tijorat nuqtai nazariga" asoslangan deb aytiladi. Yilda Re Cheyne Finance plc,[34] o'z ichiga olgan a tuzilgan investitsiya vositasi, Briggs J sud yaqin kelajakda va, ehtimol, kelajakda to'lanishi mumkin bo'lgan qarzlarni hisobga olishi va bu qarzlarni to'lash ehtimoli bor-yo'qligini hisobga olgan. Biroq, kreditorlar avtoreferatda kompaniyaning qarzlarini to'lash muddati tugashi bilan to'lay olmasligini isbotlash qiyin bo'lishi mumkin. Shu sababli, 122 (1) (a) bo'limida to'lov qobiliyatsizligi uchun maxsus test mavjud. Agar kompaniya shubhasiz qarzdor bo'lsa qarz 750 funtdan ortiq kreditorga kreditor yozma ravishda talabnoma yuboradi, ammo uch hafta o'tgach, summa kelmaydi, bu kompaniyaning to'lovga layoqatsizligidan dalolat beradi. Yilda Cornhill Insurance plc v takomillashtirish xizmatlari Ltd[35] kichik korxona Cornhill Insurance tomonidan qarzdorligi shubhasiz bo'lgan. Advokatlar bir necha bor to'lovni talab qilishgan, ammo hech biri kelmagan. Ular Kantselyariya sudida kompaniya uchun ariza berishdi. Cornhill Insurance advokatlari ularning ko'p millionlik biznesida moliyaviy qiyinchiliklarga duch kelganligi to'g'risida umuman dalil yo'qligini ta'kidlab, sud qarorini qabul qilishga shoshilishdi. Harman J buyruqni davom ettirishdan bosh tortdi, agar sug'urta kompaniyasi to'lamaslikni "tanlagan" bo'lsa, kreditor qarz muhim sabablarga ko'ra tortishuvsiz bo'lgan taqdirda ham arizani taqdim etishni tanlash huquqiga ega.[36]
Ingliz qonunchiligi "qarz "123 (1) (e) bo'limiga binoan to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan pul oqimini tekshirish uchun tegishli bo'lgan va"javobgarlik ", ikkinchisiga mos keladigan"balanslar varaqasi "123 (2) bo'limiga binoan to'lovga layoqatsizlik testi. Qarz - bu qarzdorlik, uning miqdori esa pul yig'indisi bo'lib, hisobvaraq tuzish orqali osongina aniqlanadi. Aksincha, majburiyat miqdorini, masalan, a uchun da'vo qilish shartnomani buzish va undirilmagan zarar. Buxgalteriya balansi testida "kompaniyaning qiymati aktivlar uning miqdoridan kam majburiyatlar, uni hisobga olgan holda shartli va istiqbolli majburiyatlar. "[37] Jami aktivlar majburiyatdan kam bo'ladimi, bu pul oqimini sinash bilan bir xil qoidalar (bekor qilish buyrug'i, ma'muriyat va bekor qilinadigan operatsiyalar) uchun ham hisobga olinishi mumkin. Ammo, bu maqsadda ishlatiladigan yagona sinovdir noto'g'ri savdo qoidalar va direktorning diskvalifikatsiyasi.[38] Ushbu qoidalar potentsial ravishda direktorlarga kreditorlarga to'lanadigan javob sifatida javobgarlikni yuklaydi. Bu balansni dolzarb qiladi, chunki agar kreditorlar aslida hammasi to'lanadigan bo'lsa, direktorlarga javobgarlikni yuklash uchun asos (agar mavjud bo'lmasa) firibgarlik ) tushib ketadi. Shartli va istiqbolli majburiyatlar voqea sodir bo'lganda yuzaga keladigan kompaniyaning javobgarligini (masalan, kafillik shartnomasi bo'yicha favqulodda holat sifatida belgilanadi) yoki kelajakda yuzaga kelishi mumkin bo'lgan majburiyatlarni (masalan, qiynoq qurbonlarining ehtimoliy talablarini) anglatadi. Aktiv va passivlarni hisoblash usuli buxgalteriya amaliyotiga bog'liq. Ushbu amaliyotlar qonuniy ravishda farq qilishi mumkin. Biroq, qonunning umumiy talabi shundan iboratki, aktivlar va majburiyatlarni hisobga olish kompaniya moliya-sining "to'g'ri va adolatli ko'rinishini" aks ettirishi kerak.[39] To'lovga qobiliyatsizlikka yakuniy yondashuv Ish bilan ta'minlash to'g'risidagi qonun 1996 yil dan xodimlarga to'lanmagan ish haqi uchun da'vo beradigan 183-bo'lim (3) Milliy sug'urta fond. Asosan ob'ektiv kuzatiladigan hodisaning aniqligi uchun ushbu da'volarning paydo bo'lishi uchun kompaniya tugatilishi kerak, qabul qiluvchi yoki menejer tayinlanishi yoki ixtiyoriy kelishuv tasdiqlanishi kerak. Xodimlarning Milliy sug'urta jamg'armasiga kirishining asosiy sababi shundaki, ular ustuvor navbatdagi o'rnini hisobga olgan holda ish haqi to'lanmaslik xavfi katta.
Afzalliklar
"Kompaniyani tugatishda va ma'muriyatda (kompaniyani yoki uning biznesini saqlab qolishga urinish haqida gap ketmasa), to'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun hujjatlari ta'siri (hozirgi 1986 yilgi Qonun va To'lovga qodir emaslik qoidalari ...), talqin qilingan va sudlar tomonidan kengaytirilgan, shundan iboratki, kompaniya aktivlarini to'lashning ustuvorligi quyidagicha:
(1) Ruxsat etilgan to'lovli kreditorlar;
(2) to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan ish yuritish xarajatlari;
(3) imtiyozli kreditorlar;
(4) O'zgaruvchan kreditorlar;
(5) ta'minlanmagan qarzlar;
(6) qonuniy foizlar;
(7) tasdiqlanmaydigan majburiyatlar; va
(8) Aksiyadorlar. "
Re Nortel GmbH [2013] UKSC 52, [39], Lord Neuberger
Beri Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonun 1542 to'lov qobiliyatsizligi to'g'risidagi qonunning asosiy printsipi shundan iboratki, zararlar kreditorlar o'rtasida mutanosib ravishda taqsimlanadi. Xuddi shu sinfga kiradigan kreditorlar zararni mutanosib ravishda bo'lishadi (masalan, har bir kreditor qarzdor bo'lgan har bir funt uchun 50 pens oladi). Biroq, bu pari passu printsipi faqat kreditorlar o'rtasida qonun bilan belgilangan ustuvorlikning qat'iy toifalari doirasida ishlaydi.[40] Birinchidan, qonun kreditorlar bilan ishlashga ruxsat beradi shartnomalar to'lovga layoqatsiz bo'lishidan oldin kompaniya bilan xavfsizlik manfaatlari kompaniya mulki ustidan. Agar qimmatli qog'ozlar ma'lum bir aktivga tegishli bo'lsa, ushbu "belgilangan to'lov" egasi qarzni to'lash uchun aktivni boshqalarning manfaatlaridan ozod qilishi mumkin. Agar bitta mulk bo'yicha ikkita zaryad hosil qilinsa, birinchisiga ega zaryad egasi birinchi kirish huquqiga ega bo'ladi. Ikkinchidan To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 176ZA bo'limida ma'muriyatni olib boradigan yoki tugatadigan to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan amaliyotchining barcha to'lovlari va xarajatlari alohida ahamiyatga ega. Amaliyotchining xarajatlari har qanday ish haqi uchun to'lanadi mehnat shartnomasi amaliyotchi qabul qilishni tanlaydi.[41] Ammo munozarali ravishda Apellyatsiya sudi yilda Krasner - McMath bunga binoan rahbariyatning jamoaviy ishdan bo'shatish bo'yicha maslahatlashmaganligi uchun kompensatsiya to'lash to'g'risidagi qonuniy talabni o'z ichiga olmaydi.[42] Uchinchidan, ular saqlanib qolmagan taqdirda ham, xodimlarning ish haqi 800 funtgacha va xodimlarning pensiyalari hisobiga to'lanadigan summalar 175-bo'limga muvofiq to'lanadi. To'rtinchidan, ma'lum miqdordagi pulni "halqa bilan o'ralgan fond" sifatida ajratish kerak. 176A bo'limiga binoan xavfsizligi bo'lmagan barcha kreditorlar uchun. Bu qonuniy vosita tomonidan maksimal 600000 funt sterling yoki qolgan qiymatning 20 foizi yoki 10.000 funtdan past bo'lgan har qanday narsaning qiymatining 50 foizi sifatida o'rnatiladi. Ushbu imtiyozli toifalarning barchasi (to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan mutaxassislar, xodimlar va kafolatlanmagan kreditorlar uchun cheklangan miqdordagi mablag ') birinchi o'ringa ega. suzuvchi zaryad.
Beshinchidan, suzuvchi zaryad egalarining egalariga pul to'lash kerak. Belgilangan to'lov singari, suzuvchi to'lov ham to'lov qobiliyatsiz bo'lishidan oldin kompaniya bilan tuzilgan shartnoma asosida yaratilishi mumkin. Belgilangan to'lov bilan bo'lgani kabi, bu odatda a dan olingan kredit evaziga amalga oshiriladi bank. Ammo belgilangan to'lovdan farqli o'laroq, suzuvchi to'lov kompaniyaning ma'lum bir aktiviga ishora qilishi shart emas. U butun biznesni qamrab olishi mumkin, shu jumladan bugungi kunda sotiladigan aktivlarning o'zgaruvchan qismi yoki kelajakda kompaniya oladigan aktivlar. Imtiyozli toifalar qonun bilan kafolatlangan kreditorlarning barcha aktivlarni olib qo'yishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun yaratilgan. Bu kuchning nuqtai nazarini aks ettirdi shartnoma erkinligi xodimlarni, kichik korxonalarni yoki iste'molchilarni himoya qilish uchun cheklangan bo'lishi kerak teng bo'lmagan savdolashish kuchi.[43] Barcha imtiyozli guruhlar va suzuvchi to'lov egasini to'lash uchun mablag 'olib qo'yilgandan so'ng, qolgan mablag'ni garovsiz kreditorlar tufayli. 2001 yilda tiklanish stavkalari garovga qo'yilgan kreditorlar uchun qarzdorlikning 53 foizini, imtiyozli kreditorlar uchun 35 foizni, ammo ta'minlanmagan kreditorlar uchun o'rtacha 7 foizni tashkil etgan.[44] Ettinchidan, tugatish jarayonida tasdiqlangan qarzlar uchun foizlar uchun har qanday pul keladi. Sakkizinchi o'rinda aktsiyalarni sotib olish shartnomasi bo'yicha kompaniya a'zolariga tegishli pul. To'qqizinchi - imtiyozli huquqlarga ega bo'lgan a'zolar uchun qarzlar. Va o'ninchi, oddiy aktsiyadorlar qoldiq aktivlarga ega bo'lish huquqiga ega.
Prioritet tizim sud amaliyoti bilan mustahkamlangan bo'lib, uning printsipi kreditorlarning qonuniy rejimdan tashqari shartnoma tuza olmasligini ta'minlashdir. Buni ba'zan "mahrum qilishga qarshi qoida "Ga muvofiq umumiy printsip Mellish LJ yilda Re Jeavons, Mackayning sobiq ishtirokchisi[46] shundan iboratki, "inson uni o'z qismiga aylantira olmaydi shartnoma bankrot bo'lgan taqdirda, u mol-mulkni bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonunlar asosida taqsimlanishiga to'sqinlik qiladigan qo'shimcha afzalliklarga ega bo'lishi kerak. "Shunday qilib, Jeavons Brown & Co-ga zirh plitalariga patent berish to'g'risida shartnoma tuzdi va buning evaziga Jivonlar gonorar olishlari mumkin edi. Jivonlar ham Brown & Co kompaniyasidan qarz olishdi, ular gonorarning yarmi qarzni to'lashga rozi bo'lishdi, ammo agar Jeavons to'lovga qodir bo'lsa, Brown & Co hech qanday gonorar to'lamasligi kerak edi. Apellyatsiya sudi uning yarmini ushlab turdi gonorarni to'lashga to'g'ri keladi, chunki bu Brown & Co uchun faqat to'lovga qodir bo'lgan holda paydo bo'lgan maxsus huquq edi, agar kreditorga qarzdor bo'lgan bo'lsa. tomonidan to'lovga layoqatsiz kompaniya, shuningdek kreditorning o'zi ham qarzdor ga shirkat, Forster va Uilson[47] kreditor tomonidan amalga oshirilishi mumkin jo'nash qarz va faqat farqni to'lashi kerak. Kreditor kompaniyaga barcha qarzlarini to'lashi shart emas, keyin boshqa ta'minlanmagan kreditorlar bilan kutib bo'lmaydigan qaytarilishini kutishi kerak. Biroq, bu kreditorlar ixtiyorida bo'lgan hisob-kitob summalariga bog'liq. Yilda British Eagle International Air Lines Ltd v Compaigne Nationale Air France kompaniyasi,[48] orqali bir qator aviakompaniyalar Xalqaro havo transporti assotsiatsiyasi bor edi to'r bir-birlariga etkazilgan barcha xarajatlarni samarali ravishda hal qilish tizimi. Barchasi umumiy jamg'armaga to'lashdi, so'ngra har oyning oxirida summalar birdaniga hisob-kitob qilindi. Britaniya burguti to'lovga layoqatsiz bo'lib qoldi va umuman ushbu sxema bo'yicha qarzdor edi, ammo Air France unga qarzdor edi. Air France aviakompaniyasi British Eagle-ni to'lamasligi kerakligini aytdi, to'r sxemasiga to'lashi shart edi va u erda mablag 'aniqlandi. Lordlar palatasi, bu to'lov qobiliyati rejimidan qochishga ta'sir qiladi, deb aytdi. IATA sxemasining ustun maqsadi yaxshi biznes sabablari bo'lishi muhim emas edi. Shunga qaramay, bu bo'sh edi. Belmont Park Investments Pty Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd va Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc umumiy tamoyil ikki subruldan iborat - mahrum etishga qarshi qoida (ilgari "bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonun bilan firibgarlik" deb nomlangan) va pari passu turli xil buzuqliklarga qaratilgan qoida - va chegara holatlarida, vijdonan qilingan tijorat maqsadlarida tuzilgan bitim birinchi qoidani buzmaslik uchun qabul qilinmasligi kerak. Qochishning oldini olish bo'yicha ushbu barcha qoidalar, kreditorlar birinchi navbatga o'tish imkoniyatini saqlab qolish uchun juda katta istisnolardan kelib chiqqan holda, xavfsizlik manfaatlari.
Kafolatlangan kreditlash
Buyuk Britaniyaning to'lovga qodir emasligi to'g'risidagi qonun ustuvor tartibni belgilagan bo'lsa-da, har bir kreditor sinfida aktivlarni taqsimlash mutanosib yoki pari passu, kreditorlar ustuvor zinapoyadan "sakrab o'tishlari" mumkin shartnomalar. A uchun shartnoma xavfsizlik manfaatlari, an'anaviy ravishda a yaratish sifatida kontseptsiya qilingan mulk huquqi uchinchi shaxslarga nisbatan tatbiq etiladigan narsa, odatda, agar qarzni to'lashga qodir bo'lmagan holda, garovga qo'yilgan kreditorga boshqa kreditorlarning raqobat talablaridan xoli aktivlarni olib qo'yishga imkon beradi. Bu a ning birinchi va asosiy vazifasi xavfsizlik manfaatlari: kreditorning to'lov qobiliyatsizligi navbatidagi o'rnini oshirish. Xavfsizlikning ikkinchi vazifasi kreditorga ruxsat berishdir iz the value in an asset through different people, should the property be wrongfully disposed of. Third, security assists independent, out-of-court enforcement for debt repayment (subject to the statutory moratorium on insolvency), and so provides a lever against which the secured lender can push for control's over the company's management.[49] However, given the adverse distributional impact between creditors, the economic effect of secured lending is a tashqi tashqi ta'sir qarshi non-adjusting creditors.[50] With an ostensibly private contract between a secured lender and a company, assets that would be available to other creditors are diminished without their consent and without them being manfaatdor to the bargain. Nevertheless, security interests are commonly argued to facilitate the raising of capital and hence economic development, which is argued to indirectly benefits all creditors.[51] UK law has, so far, struck a compromise approach of enforcing all "fixed" or "specific" security interests, but only partially enforcing suzuvchi zaryadlar that cover a range of assets that a company trades with. The holders of a floating charge take subject to preferential creditors and a "ring fenced fund" for up to a maximum of £600,000 reserved for paying unsecured creditors.[52] The law requires that details of most kinds of security interests are filed on the register of charges kept by Kompaniyalar uyi. However this does not include transactions with the same effect of elevating creditors in the priority queue, such as a unvonni saqlab qolish clause or a Quistclose ishonch.[53]
Qarzlar
In commercial practice the term "debenture" typically refers to the document that evidences a secured debt, although in law the definition may also cover unsecured debts (like any "IOU ").[54] The legal definition is relevant for certain tax statutes, so for instance in British India Steam Navigation Co v IRC[55] Lindli J held that a simple "acknowledgement of indebtedness" was a debenture, which meant that a paper on which directors promised to pay the holder £100 in 1882 and 5% interest each half year was enough, and as a result subject to pay duty under the Stamp Act 1870. The definition depends on the purpose of the statutory provision for which it is used. It matters because debenture holders have the right to company accounts and the director's report,[56] because debenture holders must be recorded on a company register which other debenture holders may inspect,[57] and when issued by a company, debentures are not subject to the rule against "clogs on the sotib olishning tengligi ". This old equitable rule was a form of common law iste'molchilar huquqlarini himoya qilish, which held that if a person contracted for a mortgage, they must always have the right to pay off the debt and get full title to their property back. The mortgage agreement could not be turned into a sale to the lender,[58] and one could not contract for a perpetual period for interest repayments. However, because the rule limited on contractual freedom to protect borrowers with weaker bargaining power, it was thought to be inappropriate for companies. Yilda Kreglinger v New Patagonia Go'sht va Sovuq Saqlash MChJ[59] the House of Lords held that an agreement by New Patagonia to sell sheepskins exclusively to Kreglinger in return for a £10,000 loan secured by a floating charge would persist for five years even after the principal sum was repaid. The contract to keep buying exclusively was construed to not be a clog on redeeming autonomy from the loan because the rule's purpose was to preclude unconscionable bargains. Subsequently, the clog on the equity of redemption rule as a whole was abolished by what is now section 739 of the Companies Act 2006. In Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd v Byorn[60] the House of Lords applied this so that when Knightsbridge took a secured loan of £310,000 from Mr Byrne and contracted to repay interest over 40 years, Knightsbridge could not then argue that the contract should be void. The deal created a debenture under the Act, and so this rule of equity was not applied.
Ro'yxatdan o'tish
While all records of all a company's debentures need to be kept by the company, debentures secured by a "charge" must additionally be registered under the 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun section 860 with Kompaniyalar uyi,[61] along with any charge on land, negotiable instruments, uncalled shares, book debts and floating charges, among other things. The purpose of registration is chiefly to publicise which creditors take priority, so that creditors can assess a company's risk profile when making lending decisions. The sanction for failure to register is that the charge becomes void, and unenforceable. This does not extinguish the debt itself, but any advantage from priority is lost and the lender will be an unsecured creditor. Yilda Milliy viloyat banki v Charnli[62] there had been a dispute about which creditor should have priority after Mr Charnley's assets had been seized, with the Bank claiming its charge was first and properly registered. Giving judgment for the bank Atkin LJ held that a charge, which will confer priority, simply arises through a contract, "where in a transaction for value both parties evince an intention that property, existing or future, shall be made available as security for the payment of a debt, and that the creditor shall have a present right to have it made available, there is a charge". This means a charge simply arises by virtue of contractual freedom. Legal and equitable charges are two of four kinds of security created through consent recognised in English law.[63] A legal charge, more usually called a ipoteka, is a transfer of legal title to property on condition that when a debt is repaid title will be reconveyed.[64] An equitable charge used to be distinct in that it would not be protected against bona fide purchasers without notice of the interest, but now registration has removed this distinction. In addition the law recognises a garov, where a person hands over some property in return for a loan,[65] and a possessory lien, where a lender retains property already in their possession for some other reason until a debt is discharged,[66] but these do not require registration.
Fixed and floating charges
While both need to be registered, the distinction between a fixed and a floating charge matters greatly because floating charges are subordinated by the To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil to insolvency practitioners' expenses under section 176ZA,[67] preferential creditors (employees' wages up to £800 per person, pension contributions and the EU coal and steel levies) under section 175 and Schedule 6 and unsecured creditors' claims up to a maximum of £600,000 under section 176A. The suzuvchi zaryad was invented as a form of security in the late nineteenth century, as a concept which would apply to the whole of the assets of an undertaking. The leading company law case, Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd,[17] exemplified that a floating charge holder (even if it was the director and almost sole shareholder of the company) could enforce their priority ahead of all other persons. Sifatida Lord MacNaghten said, "Everybody knows that when there is a winding-up debenture-holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is." Parliament responded with the 1897 yilgi bankrotlikni o'zgartirish to'g'risidagi qonunda imtiyozli to'lovlar, which created a new category of preferential creditors - at the time, employees and the tax authorities - who would be able to collect their debts after fixed charge holders, but before floating charge holders. In interpreting the scope of a floating charge the leading case was Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association Ltd[68] where a receiver contended an instrument was void because it had not been registered. Romer LJ agreed, and held that the hallmarks of a floating charge were that (1) assets were charged present and future and (2) change in the ordinary course of business, and most importantly (3) until a step is taken by the charge holder "the company may carry on its business in the ordinary way".[69] A floating charge is not, technically speaking, a true security until a date of its "crystallisation", when it metaphorically descends and "fixes" onto the assets in a business' possession at that time.
Businesses, and the banks who had previously enjoyed uncompromised priority for their security, increasingly looked for ways to circumvent the effect of the insolvency legislation's scheme of priorities. A floating charge, in order for its value to be ascertained, must have "crystallised" into a fixed charge on some particular date, usually set by agreement.[70] Before the date of crystallisation (given the charge merely "floats" over no particular property) there is the possibility that a company could both charge out property to creditors with priority,[71] or that other creditors could set-off claims against property subject to the (uncrystallised) floating charge.[72] Furthermore, other security interests (such as a contractual lien ) will take priority to a crystallised floating charge if it arises before in time.[73] But after crystallisation, assets received by the company can be caught by the charge.[74] One way for companies to gain priority with floating charges originally was to stipulate in the charge agreement that the charge would convert from "floating" to "fixed" automatically on some event before the date of insolvency. According to the default rules at common law, floating charges impliedly crystallise when a receiver is appointed, if a business ceases or is sold, if a company is would up, or if under the terms of the debenture provision is made for crystallisation on reasonable notice from the charge holder.[75] However an automatic crystallisation clause would mean that at the time of insolvency - when preferential creditors' claims are determined - there would be no floating charge above which preferential creditors could be elevated. The courts held that it was legitimate for security agreements to have this effect. Yilda Qayta Brightlife Ltd[76] Brightlife Ltd had contracted with its bank, Norandex, to allow a floating charge to be converted to a fixed charge on notice, and this was done one week before a voluntary winding up resolution. Against the argument that public policy should restrict the events allowing for crystallisation, Hoffmann J held that in his view it was not "open to the courts to restrict the contractual freedom of parties to a floating charge on such grounds." Parliament, however, intervened to state in the To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil section 251 that if a charge was created as a floating charge, it would deem to remain a floating charge at the point of insolvency, regardless of whether it had crystallised.
Minority of the Loreburn Committee, Kompaniya qonunchiligini o'zgartirish bo'yicha qo'mitaning hisoboti (1906) Cd 3052, 28
Especially as automatic crystallisation ceased to make floating charges an effective form of priority, the next step by businesses was to contract for fixed charges over every available specific asset, and then take a floating charge over the remainder. It attempted to do this as well over kitob qarzlari that a company would collect and trade with. In two early cases the courts approved this practice. Yilda Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd[77] it was said to be done with a stipulation that the charge was "fixed" and the requirement that proceeds be paid into an account held with the lending bank. Yilda Re New Bullas Trading Ltd.[78] the Court of Appeal said that a charge could purport to be fixed over uncollected debts, but floating over the proceeds that were collected from the bank's designated account. However the courts overturned these decisions in two leading cases. Yilda Re Brumark Investments Ltd[79] the Privy Council advised that a charge in favour of Westpac bank that purported to separate uncollected debts (where a charge was said to be fixed) and the proceeds (where the charge was said to be floating) could not be deemed separable: the distinction made no commercial sense because the only value in uncollected debts are the proceeds, and so the charge would have to be the same over both.[80] Yilda Qayta Spectrum Plus Ltd.,[81] the House of Lords finally decided that because the hallmark of a floating charge is that a company is free to deal with the charged assets in the ordinary course of business, any charge purported to be "fixed" over book debts kept in any account except one which a bank restricts the use of, must be in substance a floating charge. Lord Skott emphasised that this definition "reflects the mischief that the statutory intervention... was intended to meet and should ensure that preferential creditors continue to enjoy the priority that section 175 of the 1986 Act and its statutory predecessors intended them to have."[82] Qaror Qayta Spectrum Plus Ltd. created a new debate. On the one hand, John Armour argued in response that all categories of preferential would be better off abolished, because in his view businesses would merely be able to contract around the law (even after Qayta Spectrum Plus Ltd.) by arranging loan agreements that have the same effect as security but not in a form caught by the law (giving the examples of invoice discounting yoki faktoring ).[83] Boshqa tarafdan, Roy Gud and Riz Mokal have called for the floating charge simply to be abandoned altogether, in the same way as was recommended by the Minority of the Loreburn Report 1906 yilda.[84]
Equivalents to security
Aside from a contract that creates a security interest to back repayment of a qarz, creditors to a company, and particularly trade creditors may deploy two main equivalents security. The effect is to produce proprietary rights which place them ahead of the general body of creditors. First, a trade creditor who sells goods to a company (which may go into insolvency) can contract for a unvonni saqlab qolish band. This means that even though the seller of goods may have passed possession to a buyer, until the price of sale is paid, the seller has never passed property. The company and creditor agree that title to the property is retained by the seller until the date of payment. Etakchi holatda, Aluminium Industrie Vaassen BV va Romalpa Aluminium Ltd[85] a Dutch company making alyuminiy folga stipulated in its contract with Romalpa Aluminium Ltd that when it supplied the foil, ownership would only passed once the price had been paid, and that any products made by Romalpa would be held by them as bailees. When Romalpa went insolvent, another creditor claimed that its floating charge covered the foil and products. The Court of Appeal held, however, that property in the foil had never become part of Romalpa's estate, and so could not be covered by the charge. Furthermore, the clause was not void for want to registration because only assets belonging to the company and then charged needed to be registered. In later cases, the courts have held that if property is mixed during a manufacturing process so that it is no longer identifiable,[86] or if it is sold onto a buyer,[87] then the retention of title clause ceases to have effect. If the property is something that can be mixed (such as oil) and the clause prohibits this, then the seller may retain a percentage share of the mixture as a tenant in common. But if the clause purports to retain title over no more than a part of the property, Re Bond Uert Ltd held that the clause must take effect in equity, and so requires registration.[88] The present requirements in the 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun section 860 continue not to explicitly cover retention of title clauses, in contrast to the registration requirements in the US Yagona tijorat kodeksi article 9. This requires that anything with the same effect as a security interest requires registration, and so covers retention of title provision.
A second main equivalent to a security interest is a "Quistclose trust" named after the case Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd.[89] Here a company named Rolls Razor Ltd had promised to pay a dividend to its shareholders, but had financial difficulty. Already in debt to its bank, Barclays, for £484,000 it agreed to take a loan from Quistclose Investments Ltd for £209,719. This money was deposited in a separate Barclays account, for the purpose of being paid out to shareholders. Unfortunately, Rolls Razor Ltd entered insolvency before the payment was made. Barclays claimed it had a right to set off the Quistclose money against the debts that were due to it, while Quistclose contended the money belonged entirely to it, and could not be used for the satisfaction of other creditors. The House of Lords unanimously held that a trust had been created in favour of Quistclose, and if the purpose of the payment (i.e. to pay the shareholders) failed, then the money would revert to Quistclose's ownership. Esa Quistclose ishonch cases are rare, and their theoretical basis has remained controversial (particularly because the trust is for a purpose and so sits uncomfortably with the abadiylikka qarshi hukmronlik qilish ), trusts have also been acknowledged to exist when a company keeps payments by iste'molchilar in a separate fund. Yilda Re Kayford Ltd a mail order business, fearing bankruptcy and not wanting pre-payments by its customers to be taken by other creditors, acted on its solicitors' advice and placed their money in a separate bank account. Megarry J held this effectively ensured other creditors would not have access to this cash. Beri To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil reforms, it is probable that section 239, which prohibits transactions that desire to give a preference to one creditor over others, would be argued to avoid such an arrangement (if ever a company does in fact seek to prefer its customers in this way). The position, then, would be that while banks and trade creditors may easily protect themselves, consumers, employees and others in a weaker bargaining position have few legal resources to do the same.
Jarayonlar
As a company nears insolvency, UK law provides four main procedures by which the company could potentially be rescued or wound down and its assets distributed. Birinchidan, a kompaniyaning ixtiyoriy kelishuvi,[90] allows the directors of a company to reach an agreement with creditors to potentially accept less repayment in the hope of avoiding a more costly administration or liquidation procedure and less in returns overall. However, only for small private companies is a statutory moratorium on debt collection by secured creditors available. Second, and since the Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil the preferred insolvency procedure, a company which is insolvent can go under ma'muriyat. Here a qualified insolvency practitioner will replace the board of directors and is charged with a public duty of rescuing the company in the interests of all creditors, rescuing the business through a sale, getting a better result for creditors than immediate liquidation, or if nothing can be done effecting an orderly winding up and distribution of assets. Uchinchidan, ma'muriy qabul qilish is a procedure available for a fixed list of eight kinds of operation (such as public-private partnerships, utility projects and protected temir yo'l kompaniyalari[91]) where the insolvency practitioner is appointed by the holder of a suzuvchi zaryad that covers a company's whole assets. This stems from common law qabul qilish qaerda to'lovga qodir emasligi bo'yicha amaliyotchi 's primary duty was owed to the creditor that appointed him. Keyin To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil it was increasingly viewed to be unacceptable that one creditor could manage a company when the interests of her creditor might conflict with those holding unsecured or other debts. Fourth, when none of these procedures is used, the business is yara and a company's assets are to be broken up and sold off, a tugatuvchi tayinlangan. All procedures must be overseen by a qualified to'lovga qodir emasligi bo'yicha amaliyotchi.[92] While liquidation remains the most frequent end for an insolvent company, UK law since the Cork hisoboti has aimed to cultivate a "rescue culture" to save companies that could be viable.
Kompaniyaning ixtiyoriy kelishuvi
Because the essential problem of insolvent companies is excessive indebtedness, the To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil sections 1 to 7 contain a procedure for companies to ask creditors to reduce the debt they are owed, in the hope that the company may survive. For instance, directors might propose that each creditor accepts 80 per cent of the money owed to each, and to spread repayments out over five years, in return for a commitment to restructure the business' affairs under a new marketing strategy. Ostida 11-bob AQSh Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi kodeks this kind of debt restructuring is usual, and the so-called "siqil " procedure allows a court to approve a plan over the wishes of creditors if they will receive a value equivalent to what they are owed.[94] However, under UK law, the procedure remains predominantly voluntary, except for small companies. A company's directors may instigate a voluntary arrangement with creditors, or if already appointed, an administrator or liquidator can also propose it.[95] Importantly, secured and preferential creditors' entitlements cannot be reduced without their consent.[96] The procedure takes place under the supervision of an to'lovga qodir emasligi bo'yicha amaliyotchi, to whom the directors will submit a report on the company's finances and a proposal for reducing the debt.
When initially introduced, the CVA procedure was not frequently used because a single creditor could veto the plan, and seek to collect their debts. This changed slightly with the Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil. Under a new section 1A of the To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil, small companies may apply for a moratorium on debt collection if it has any two of (1) a turnover under £6.5m (2) under £3.26m on its balance sheet, or (3) fewer than 50 employees.[97] After an arrangement is proposed creditors will have the opportunity to vote on the proposal, and if 75 per cent approve the plan it will bind all creditors.[98] For larger companies, voluntary arrangements remain considerably under-used, particularly given the ability of administrators to be appointed out of court. Still, compared to the individual ixtiyoriy kelishuv available for people in bankruptcy, company voluntary arrangements are rare.
Ma'muriyat
Keyin Cork hisoboti in 1982 a major new objective for UK insolvency law became creating a "rescue culture" for business, as well as ensuring transparency, accountability and collectivity.[99] The hallmark of the rescue culture is the administration procedure in the To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil, Schedule B1 as updated by the Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil. Under Schedule B1, paragraph 3 sets the primary objective of the administrator as "rescuing the company as a going concern", or if not usually selling the business, and if this is not possible realising the property to distribute to creditors. Once an administrator is appointed, she will replace the directors.[100] Under paragraph 40 all creditors are precluded by a statutory moratorium from bringing enforcement procedures to recover their debts. This even includes a bar on secured creditors taking and or selling assets subject to security, unless they get the court's permission.[101] The moratorium is fundamental to keeping the business' assets intact and giving the company a "breathing space" for the purpose of a restructure. It also extends to a moratorium on the enforcement of criminal proceedings. Shunday qilib Atrof-muhit agentligi v Klark[102] Apellyatsiya sudi sud qaroriga binoan Atrof muhitni muhofaza qilish agentligi ifloslantiruvchi kompaniyaga qarshi prokuratura qo'zg'atish uchun sudning roziligi kerak edi, ammo sharoitda ta'til berildi. Guidance for when leave should be given by the court was elaborated in Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc (№ 1).[103] In this case, the company in administration had sublet computers that were owned by a set of banks who wanted to repossess them. Nicholls LJ held leave to collect assets should be given if it would not impede the administration's purpose, but strong weight should be given to the interests of the holder of property rights. Here, the banks were given permission because the costs to the banks were disproportionate to the benefit to the company.[104] The moratorium lasts for one year, but can be extended with the administration.[105]
The duties of an administrator in Schedule B1, paragraph 3 are theoretically meant to be exercised for the benefit of the creditors as a whole.[106] However the administrator's duties on paper lie in tension with how, and by whom, an administrator is appointed. A egasi suzuvchi zaryad, which covers substantially all of a company's property (typically the company's bank ), has an almost absolute right to select the administrator. Under Schedule B1, paragraph 14, it may appoint the administrator directly, and can do so out of court. The company need not be technically insolvent, so long as the terms of the floating charge allow appointment. The directors or the company may also appoint an administrator out of court,[107] but must give five days' notice to any floating charge holder,[108] who may at any point intervene and install his own preferred candidate.[109] The court can, in law, refuse the floating charge holder's choice of administrator because of the 'particular circumstances of the case', though this will be rare. Typically banks wish to avoid the spotlight and any effect on their reputation, and so they suggest that company directors appoint the administrator from their own list.[110] Other creditors may also apply to court for an administrator to be appointed, although once again, the floating charge holder may intervene.[111] In this case, the court will grant the petition for appointment of an administrator only if, first, the company "is or is likely to become unable to pay its debts" (identical to IA 1986 yil section 123) and "the administration order is reasonably likely to achieve the purpose of administration."[112] Yilda Re Harris Simons Construction Ltd Hoffmann J, "administratsiya maqsadiga erishish ehtimoli" testdan pastroq degani edi ehtimolliklar balansi va shunga o'xshash, muvaffaqiyatning "haqiqiy istiqboli" yoki buning uchun "yaxshi bahsli ish" mavjudmi. Shunday qilib, bu erda kompaniyaga ma'muriy buyruq berildi, bu uning yirik kreditoriga to'rtta qurilish shartnomasini davom ettirish uchun mablag 'ajratishga olib keldi.[113]
Once in place, the first task of an administrator is to make proposals to achieve the administration objectives. These should be given to the registrar and unsecured creditors within 10 weeks, followed by a creditor vote to approve the plans by simple majority.[114] Agar kreditorlar ma'qullamasa, sud o'z xohishiga ko'ra qaror chiqarishi mumkin.[115] However, before then under Schedule B1, paragraph 59 the administrator can do 'anything necessary or expedient for the management of the affairs, business and property of the company'.[116] Yilda Re Transbus International Ltd Lourens Kollinz J ma'muriyat to'g'risidagi qoidalar "tugatishga nisbatan ancha moslashuvchan, arzonroq va qiyosiy norasmiy alternativa" bo'lishi kerakligini ta'kidladi va shuning uchun maqsadga muvofiq bo'lgan ishlarni amalga oshirishda "sudga kam sonli murojaat qilish kerak. yaxshiroq ".[117] This means that an administrator can sell the whole assets of a company immediately, making the eventual creditors' meeting redundant.[118] Because of this and out of court appointments, since 2002, "pre-packaged administrations " became increasingly popular. Typically the company directors negotiate with their bank, and a prospective administrator, to sell the business to a buyer immediately after entering administration. Often the company's directors are the buyers.[119] 1980-yillarda Qo'shma Shtatlarda paydo bo'lgan ushbu amaliyotning afzalliklari,[120] advokatlarni jalb qilmasdan va rasmiylik bilan vaqt yoki tijorat aktivlarini sarf qilmasdan tezkor savdo, ish yuritish va xodimlarni o'z ish joylarida ushlab turish uchun amalga oshirilishi mumkin. The potential downside is that because a deal is already agreed among the controlling interested parties (directors, insolvency practitioners and the major secured creditor) before broader consultation, unsecured creditors are given no voice, and will recover almost none of their debts.[121] Yilda Re Kayley Vending Ltd sudda tayinlangan ma'murga tegishli bo'lgan,[122] HH Judge Cooke held that a court will ensure that applicants for a prepack administration provide enough information for a court to conclude that the scheme is not being used to unduly disadvantage unsecured creditors. Bundan tashqari, ma'muriyatga kirishdan oldin paketni tashkil qilish xarajatlari ma'murning xarajatlari uchun hisobga olinadigan bo'lsa, agar korxona sobiq rahbariyatga sotilsa, unday bo'lmaydi. Bu erda sigareta sotadigan avtomatlarni sotish kompaniyaning raqobatchilariga tegishli edi va shu sababli bitim hech qanday tashvish tug'dirmaslik uchun etarlicha "qo'lning uzunligi" edi. Apellyatsiya sudi uchrashuvlarni o'tkazishda aniq ko'rsatib o'tdi Daromadlar va bojxona komissiyalari v Maksvell suddan tashqari tayinlangan ma'murlar garovsiz kreditorlarga nisbatan muomala usullarini sinab ko'rishadi. Bu erda ma'mur Daromadni kompaniya menejmentini sotib olish taklifiga qarshi etarli ovozga ega deb hisoblamagan, ammo sud o'z qarorini o'zgartirib, ruxsat berilgan ovozlar soni yig'ilish arafasida voqealarni hisobga olishi kerakligini, shu jumladan bu holda Daromadning menejerlarning maqsadli jamg'armalariga va ssudalarga qonunga xilof ravishda soliq imtiyozlari bo'yicha tuzatilgan da'vo.[123]
Ma'murning kompaniyani boshqarish bo'yicha ushbu keng vakolati 3 (3) - (4) bandlarida ham o'z aksini topgan, bunda ma'mur qaysi natijani (kompaniyani tejash, biznesni sotish yoki tugatish) "o'zi o'ylaydi" o'rtasida tanlashi mumkin. sub'ektiv ravishda eng mos keladi. Bu ma'murni kompaniya direktoriga o'xshash holatda joylashtiradi.[124] Similarly, further binding duties allow a broad scope for the administrator to exercise good biznes bo'yicha qaror. Ma'mur o'z vazifalarini "tezkor va samarali ravishda oqilona" bajarishi shart,[125] va shuningdek, kreditorning manfaatlariga "adolatsiz ravishda zarar etkazadigan" harakatlar qilmasligi kerak. Yilda Qayta Charnley Davies Ltd (№ 2) ma'mur to'lovga layoqatsiz kompaniyaning biznesini go'yoki kam baholangan narxda sotgan, bu esa kreditorlar ularga nohaq zarar etkazmaslik majburiyatini buzgan deb taxmin qilishgan.[126] Millett J parvarish standarti buzilmagan va parvarishlash standarti xuddi shunday bo'lgan professional beparvolik "oddiy, malakali amaliyotchi" holatlari.Uning ta'kidlashicha, sudlar foyda keltiradigan darajada maqbul bo'lmagan qarorlarni chiqarmasliklari kerak orqaga qarash. Bu erda narx sharoitda eng yaxshi bo'lgan. Bundan tashqari, ichida Oldxem va Kirris kreditorlar ma'murlarni to'g'ridan-to'g'ri o'zlarining huquqlari bo'yicha sudga berishlari mumkin emas, chunki bu majburiyat kompaniyaga tegishli.[127] Shunday qilib, a-ning sobiq xodimi Burger King to'lanmagan ish haqi uchun 270 ming funt sterling miqdorida teng to'lov bilan franchayzing ma'murni qonuniy standart shartlaridan tashqari to'g'ridan-to'g'ri sudga berolmadi, agar unga bevosita javobgarlik yuklanmagan bo'lsa.[128]
Qabul qilish
Qaerda joylashgan korxonalar uchun suzuvchi zaryadlar 2003 yildan oldin va sakkiz turdagi korporativ to'lov qobiliyatsizligi bo'yicha tuzilgan To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil, 72B dan 72GA gacha bo'lgan bo'limlar, ma'muriy qabul qilishning eski tartibi mavjud bo'lib qolmoqda. Ushbu kompaniyalar kapital bozori investitsiyalar; davlat-xususiy sheriklik huquqqa qadam qo'yish bilan; kommunal loyihalar; shahar regeneratsiyasi loyihalar; katta qadamlar bilan loyihani moliyalashtirish;[129] moliyaviy bozor, tizim va garov xavfsizligi uchun to'lovlar; Ro'yxatga olingan ijtimoiy mulkdorlar; va temir yo'l va suv kompaniyalari. Gacha Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil, bilan shartnoma tuzgan kreditorlar xavfsizlik manfaatlari boshqa kreditorlar oldida minimal majburiyatlar evaziga kompaniya aktivlarini hibsga olish va olib qo'yish uchun butun bir kompaniya o'z vakilini tayinlashi mumkin edi. Dastlab bu oddiy mulk huquqiga asoslangan huquq edi. The 1925 yilgi mulk to'g'risidagi qonun har qanday ipoteka egasiga, vakolat amalga oshirilgandan so'ng, garovga qo'yilgan mulkni sotish uchun tasodifiy vakolat berdi. Qabul qiluvchilarni tayinlash va olib qo'yish mumkin bo'lgan va faqat garov oluvchining agenti bo'lgan.[130] Kompaniyalarda, garovga olingan kreditorlar suzuvchi zaryad kompaniyaning barcha aktivlari bo'yicha, shuningdek, to'lovni to'lash qobiliyati yo'qligi sababli biznesni boshqarish huquqi bilan shartnoma tuzgan: tayinlangan shaxs "qabul qiluvchi va menejer "yoki an"ma'muriy qabul qiluvchi ".[131] The To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil ma'muriy oluvchining vazifalarini kodlash va oshirish uchun qonunga o'zgartishlar kiritdi. Barcha qabul qiluvchilar hisobvaraqlarini yuritishlari va ko'rsatishlari shart edi,[132] va ma'muriy oluvchilar garovga olinmagan kreditorlarni xabardor qilishlari va hisobot topshirishlari kerak edi Kompaniyalar uyi.[133] Odatiy bo'lib, u biznesni boshqarayotganda qabul qilgan shartnomalar uchun shaxsan javobgar bo'ladi.[134] Mehnat shartnomalari bo'yicha u javobgarlikdan tashqari shartnoma tuza olmadi va agar u ishchilarni 14 kundan ortiq ushlab tursa ish haqini to'lashi kerak edi.[135] Shu bilan birga, ma'muriy qabul qiluvchiga har doim ushbu xarajatlarni kompaniya aktivlari hisobidan qoplash mumkin edi,[136] va u suzuvchi zaryad egasining manfaati uchun kompaniyani boshqarish uchun deyarli mutlaq boshqaruv vakolatiga ega bo'lar edi.
Qabul qiluvchining asosiy vazifasi - bu qiymatni anglash edi suzuvchi zaryad egasi, ammo barcha imtiyozli qarzlar yoki ustuvor qarzlarni to'lash kerak edi.[137] Boshqa ta'minlanmagan kreditorlar uchun pulni tiklash imkoniyati uzoq edi. Suzib yuruvchi boshqa kreditorlar oldida oluvchini tayinlash vaqtiga nisbatan hech qanday qarzdor emas edi, hatto bu biznesni qayta moliyalashtirish bo'yicha muzokaralarga ta'sir qilishi mumkin edi.[138] Qabul qiluvchining qarzdorliklarni amalga oshirish maqsadlari uchun emas, balki ba'zi bir g'arazli maqsadlar uchun harakat qilish majburiyati borligi qabul qilindi. Yilda Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corp Ltd.,[139] bir kompaniya ikkita bankka suzuvchi to'lovlarni bergan (Westpac birinchi, va birinchi City Corp ikkinchi). Boshqaruvda do'stona shaxsni o'rnatishni istagan rejissyorlar Westpac-dan o'zlarining suzuvchi to'lovlarini o'z do'sti janob Rasselga topshirishni so'rashdi, u biznesni 500 ming dollar miqdorida yo'qotish bilan olib bordi va ular taklif qilsalar ham, boshqaruvni First City Corp-ga o'tkazishni rad etishdi. birinchi qarzdorlik bo'yicha barcha qarzlarni kompaniyadan bo'shatish. Maxfiy Kengash janob Rassel ma'muriy qabul qiluvchi sifatida ushbu bitimni rad etib, noo'rin maqsadda harakat qilgan deb maslahat berdi. Vazifani buzish bo'yicha yana bir holat sodir bo'ldi Medfort - Bleyk[140] bu erda ma'muriy qabul qiluvchi cho'chqa fermasi cho'chqa ovqatiga haftasiga 1000 funt sterling miqdorida chegirmalarni olish to'g'risida sobiq egasining maslahatini e'tiborsiz qoldirdi. Natijada, katta miqdordagi qarzlar tugadi. Ser Richard Skott VC buni to'g'ri tekshirishni amalga oshirishning adolatli burchini buzgan deb hisoblaydi. Biroq, kreditorlar oldidagi umumiy majburiyat qat'iyan cheklangan va umumiy javobgarlik professional beparvolik borligi rad etildi. Yilda Silven Properties Ltd - Shotlandiya Qirollik banki[141] ko'chmas mulk korxonasi oluvchisi, ularning qiymatini sezilarli darajada oshirishi mumkin bo'lgan uylarni rejalashtirish uchun ruxsat olish uchun ariza topshirmagan va ularni sotishdan oldin bo'sh turgan binolarga ijarachilarni topmagan. Savdolarning qiymati past bo'lgan deb da'vo qilingan, ammo Apellyatsiya sudi qabul qiluvchining sotish vakolatlarini ortiqcha xarajatlarsiz amalga oshirishi mumkin deb hisoblagan. Hammasi qabul qiluvchiga yaxshi narxni anglash majburiyatiga bo'ysungan.[142] Shu munosabat bilan ma'mur hech bo'lmaganda qonun bo'yicha boshqa kreditorlarni e'tiborsiz qoldirishga qodir emas. Ma'muriy qabul qilishni qisman bekor qilishning sabablaridan biri, qabul qiluvchining suzuvchi to'lov egasi uchun aktivlarni realizatsiya qilish vazifasini bajarganidan so'ng, kompaniyada boshqa kreditorlar uchun juda oz qiymat qoldirilganligi edi, chunki u samarali balanslash uchun kamroq imtiyozlarga ega edi. kreditorlarning barcha manfaatlari.[143] Odatda, qabul qiluvchining ishi tugagandan so'ng, kompaniya tugatilishi kerak edi.
Tugatish
Likvidatsiya - bu to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan oxirgi, eng tez-tez va eng asosiy protsedura. Ro'yxatdan o'tgan kompaniyalar investitsiya qiluvchi omma uchun ochiq bo'lganligi sababli Aktsionerlik jamiyatlari to'g'risidagi qonun 1844 yil va uning barcha vorislari kompaniyaning hayotini tugatish marshrutini o'z ichiga olgan. Tugatishning asosiy maqsadi kompaniya faoliyatini yakunlash va aktivlarni sotish (ya'ni "tugatish", tovarlarni "aylantirish")likvid aktivlar "yoki pul) kreditorlarga yoki biron bir qiymat qolsa, aktsiyadorlarga to'lash uchun. Yoki kompaniya (uning aktsiyadorlari yoki direktorlari) jarayonni" ixtiyoriy tugatish "orqali boshlashi mumkin, yoki kreditorlar uni" majburiy tugatish "orqali majburlashlari mumkin. holatlar, a vaqtincha tugatish buyurtma, shuningdek, agar kompaniya aktivlarini yo'q qilish uchun jiddiy tahdid mavjud bo'lsa, berilishi mumkin: bu holda kompaniya haqida xabar berilmasligi mumkin.[144] Aksincha, ixtiyoriy tugatish, agar kompaniya a'zolari 75 foiz bilan tugatishga ovoz bergan bo'lsa, boshlanadi maxsus qaror.[145] Agar direktorlar kompaniyaning to'lovga layoqatli ekanligi to'g'risida qonuniy deklaratsiya qilishlari mumkin bo'lsa, direktorlar yoki aktsiyadorlar nazorat ostida qoladilar,[146] ammo agar kompaniya to'lovga layoqatsiz bo'lsa, kreditorlar ixtiyoriy ravishda yopilishini nazorat qilishadi.[147] Aks holda, "majburiy tugatish" ni direktorlar, kompaniya, ayrim aksiyadorlar yoki kreditorlar tashabbusi bilan sudga yuborishlari mumkin.[148] Printsipial ravishda deyarli har qanday a'zolar (bu odatda aktsiyadorlar, lekin kompaniyaning a'zolari ro'yxatida ro'yxatdan o'tgan har qanday shaxs ham bo'lishi mumkin), agar ular aktsiyalarni olti oydan ortiq ushlab tursalar yoki bitta bittagina bo'lsa, tugatish to'g'risida ariza yuborishi mumkin. aktsiyador.[149] Yilda Re Peveril Gold Mines Ltd[150] Lord Lindli janob kompaniya ikkita direktor roziligini yoki aktsiyadorning ustav kapitalining 20 foizidan ko'prog'iga ega bo'lishini talab qilib, a'zolarning ariza berish huquqiga to'sqinlik qila olmaydi, deb hisoblaydi. A'zoning iltimosnoma berish huquqini kompaniya konstitutsiyasi o'zgartira olmaydi. Biroq, ichida Re Rica Gold Washing Co.[151] Apellyatsiya sudi, ariza berishdan oldin a'zoning etarli miqdordagi mablag '(75 funt sterling etarli bo'lmagan) bo'lishi kerakligi to'g'risidagi qonundan tashqari talabni ixtiro qildi.[152] Kreditorlar iltimosnoma bilan murojaat qilishlari uchun, kreditorning qarzdorligini tasdiqlovchi hujjat bo'lishi kerak qarz bu kerak. Yilda Mann va Goldstein[153] kiritilgan sartaroshxona va parik do'konlar bilan biznes Pinner va Haverstock tepaligi, Ikki turmush qurgan juftlikning akrimoniyasi buzildi. Goldshteyn va uning kompaniyasi to'lamagan rejissyorlar uchun to'lovlar va parikni etkazib berish uchun to'lashni talab qilish uchun ariza yozishdi, ammo Mann Goldshteyn to'lovlarni vaqtincha to'lovlar orqali olganligini va boshqa bir kompaniya parik uchun pul qarzdorligini ta'kidladi. Yo'qotilgan Tomas J yakunlangan arizani qarzni haqiqatan ham hal qilish uchun joy emasligini aytdi va bu shunday bo'lar edi jarayonni suiiste'mol qilish davom ettirish.[154]
Kompaniya yoki kreditorlarning iltimosnomalaridan tashqari, ma'mur, agar uni qutqarish urinishlari tugagan bo'lsa, aktivlarni sotishni amalga oshiradigan kompaniyani tugatishga olib borishga qodir.[155] Agar tugatuvchi ma'mur bo'lmasa, u sud tomonidan odatda kreditorlarning ko'pchiligining taklifiga binoan tayinlanadi.[156] Tugatuvchini bir xil guruhlar olib tashlashi mumkin.[157] Joylashtirilgandan so'ng, tugatuvchi o'zining asosiy vazifasi uchun 160, 165-bo'limlarda va 4-jadvalda ko'rsatilgan har qanday narsani qilishga qodir. Bunga kompaniyaga tegishli qonuniy da'volarni kiritish kiradi. Bu kompaniyaning qiymatini anglash va aktivlarni taqsimlashdir. Aktivlar har doim qonun ustuvorligi tartibida taqsimlanishi kerak: qat'iy belgilangan foizli foiz egalarining talablarini qondirish, imtiyozli kreditorlarga to'lovlarni amalga oshirish (tugatuvchining xarajatlari, ishchilari va pensiyalari va ta'minlanmagan kreditorlar uchun to'siqli fondi),[158] suzuvchi to'lov egasi, ta'minlanmagan kreditorlar, kechiktirilgan qarzlar va nihoyat aktsiyadorlar.[159] Ushbu asosiy vazifalarni bajarishda tugatuvchi o'z vazifalarini shaxsiy kreditorlar yoki aktsiyadorlar uchun emas, balki kompaniyaning oldida qarzdor qiladi.[160] O'z vazifalarini buzganlik uchun ular noto'g'ri maqsadlarda vakolatlarni amalga oshirish orqali javobgar bo'lishlari mumkin (masalan, kreditorlarga pulni to'g'ri tartibda tarqatmaslik,[161]) va beparvoligi uchun qo'shimcha ravishda sudga berilishi mumkin.[162] Ishonchli mavqega ega bo'lgan shaxs sifatida u manfaatlar to'qnashuviga ega bo'lmasligi yoki yashirin foyda keltirishi mumkin. Shunga qaramay, likvidatorlar (ma'murlar va ba'zi bir qabul qiluvchilar kabi) odatda tugatishni o'tkazish bo'yicha keng miqyosli ixtiyorga ega deb aytish mumkin. Ular kreditorlarga tarqatish uchun mol-mulkni tushunishlari kerak va ular yangi sud jarayonlarini boshlash orqali yoki to'lovga layoqatsiz kompaniya tomonidan tuzilgan bitimlarning oldini olish yoki sobiq direktorlarni sudga berish orqali ularni maksimal darajada oshirishga urinishlari mumkin.
Aktivlarni ko'paytirish
Agar kompaniya to'lovga layoqatsizlik protsedurasiga kirgan bo'lsa, ma'murlar yoki tugatuvchilar kreditorlarga tarqatish uchun aktivlarning eng katta miqdorini amalga oshirishni maqsad qilishlari kerak.[163] Buning ta'siri pravoslav xususiy qonun qoidalarini o'zgartirishga qaratilgan ko'rib chiqish, yaratish xavfsizlik va cheklangan javobgarlik. The shartnoma tuzish erkinligi har qanday kishi uchun ko'rib chiqish, etarli yoki yo'q,[164] bitimlar past bahoga amalga oshirilganda yoki u tugatilgan iltimosnoma taqdim etilgandan keyin kelganda cheklanadi.[165] Shartnoma tuzish erkinligi xavfsizlik manfaatlari[166] shuningdek, cheklangan, chunki kompaniyaning bir kreditorga boshqasidan ortiqcha imtiyoz berishga urinishi, xususan, yangi pul uchun suzuvchi to'lov yoki ro'yxatdan o'tmagan har qanday to'lovni bekor qilish mumkin.[167] Beri Cork hisoboti Direktorlarning javobgarligini oshirishga urg'u berish, amaliyotchilar, ayniqsa, vazifalarni buzganliklari uchun direktorlarni qisqacha tartibda sudga berishlari mumkin beparvolik yoki manfaatlar to'qnashuvi. Bundan tashqari, cheklangan javobgarlik va alohida shaxsga tajovuz qilish,[168] to'lovga layoqatsizligi bilan bog'liq aniq da'vo 1986 yilda tuzilgan noto'g'ri savdo Shunday qilib, agar direktor kompaniyani to'lovga layoqatsizlik protsedurasiga kiritolmasa va qo'shimcha qarzdorlik tug'dirsa, oqilona direktorga ega bo'lsa, u kompaniya aktivlariga hissa qo'shishi uchun javobgar bo'lishi mumkin. Qasddan qilingan huquqbuzarlik va firibgarlik qat'iy ravishda ko'rib chiqiladi, ammo a ning isboti erkaklar rea oldini olish manfaati uchun keraksizdir asossiz boyitish ba'zi kreditorlarning mablag'larini boshqalar hisobiga va huquqbuzarliklarni oldini olish uchun.
Bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan operatsiyalar
Mumkin bo'lgan bitimlarni echish uchun uchta asosiy da'vo mavjud nohaq boyitmoq ba'zi kreditorlar boshqalar hisobiga. Birinchidan, To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 127-bo'lim, agar sud tomonidan tasdiqlanmagan bo'lsa, ariza berilgandan keyin kiritilgan har qanday bitim bekor deb e'lon qilinadi. Yilda Re Gray's Inn Construction Co.Ltd[169] Buckley LJ sudlar odatdagidek tuzilgan kompaniya uchun foydali bo'lgan barcha shartnomalarni ma'qullashi kerak yaxshi niyat oddiy biznes jarayonida. Ta'minotning asosiy maqsadi kafolatlanmagan kreditorlarning xuruj qilmasligi va kompaniya aktivlari asossiz ravishda tugamasligini ta'minlashdir. Biroq, ichida Re Gray's Inn chunki kompaniya banki tomonidan taqdim etilgan va yopilgan ariza o'rtasida ortiqcha hisobvarag'ida o'tkazilgan ko'plab operatsiyalar amalga oshirilganligi sababli, bu foydasiz savdolarni anglatardi. Shunday qilib, bitimlar bekor qilindi.[170] Yilda Hollicourt (Kontraktlar) Ltd v Irlandiya Banki Apellyatsiya sudi, ortiqcha to'lovlarni amalga oshirishga imkon beradigan bankning o'zi, keyinchalik operatsiyalar bekor deb topilgan taqdirda, ikkinchi darajali kreditorlar oldida javobgar bo'lmaydi deb ta'kidladi. Bank bunday emas degan fikrni oldi nohaq boyitilgan, o'z xizmatlari uchun har qanday to'lovlarga qaramay, bank olishi mumkin.[171] Ikkinchidan, ostida IA 1986 yil 238-bo'lim, maqsadidan qat'i nazar, qiymatni past bo'lgan operatsiyalardan qochish mumkin, ammo to'lov qobiliyatsizligi boshlanishidan ikki yil oldin.[172] Masalan, ichida Fillips v Brewin Dolphin Bell Lawrie Ltd[173] to'lovga layoqatsiz bo'lgan "AJ Bekhor Ltd" kompaniyasining tugatuvchilari, aktsiyalarini investitsiya boshqaruvi tomonidan sotib olingan sho'ba korxonaga aktivlarni o'tkazishni bekor qilishni talab qilishdi. Brewin delfin 1 funt evaziga. Brewin Dolphin tomonidan berilgan yagona e'tibor - bu kompyuterlar uchun ijara shartnomasini tuzish va'dasi edi. Lordlar palatasi bitimning kam baholanganligi yoki yo'qligi to'g'risida qaror qabul qilish uchun ulangan bitimlarning umumiy to'plamini hisobga olish mumkin deb hisoblaydi va bu shunday deb hisoblaydi.
Asl nusxa 1571. Firibgarlikni tashish to'g'risidagi qonun[174]
Beri amal qilgan uchinchi harakat 1571. Firibgarlikni tashish to'g'risidagi qonun, agar bankrot tomonidan tuzilgan bitimlar, agar ular kreditorlar uchun boshqa aktivlar mavjud bo'lsa, ular haddan tashqari kamayib ketishi yoki ma'lum bir kreditorlar bo'lishiga olib keladigan bo'lsa, bekor qilinishi mumkinmi? nohaq boyitilgan.[175] Dastlab faqat kreditorlarni aktivlaridan mahrum qilish yoki tarqatish tartibining ustuvor yo'nalishlarini buzish maqsadida qilingan bitimlar zaif bo'lib, zamonaviy uslub To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil bitimlarni ochib beradigan ko'plab qoidalarni o'z ichiga oladi, chunki ularning ta'siri kreditorlar uchun mavjud bo'lgan aktivlardan mahrum qilishdir. 1571 yilgi qonunni eslatib turadi To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 423-bo'limga binoan, kompaniya mol-mulkni, agar ular narsaning "qiymatidan sezilarli darajada past "ligi evaziga to'langan bo'lsa, qaytarib olishi mumkin va bu" boshqa kreditorlarning manfaatlariga zarar etkazish "maqsadida qilingan. Yilda Arbuthnot Leasing International Ltd va Havelet Leasing Ltd (№ 2)[176] Skott J kompaniyaning yoki uning direktorlarining maqsadi ahamiyatsiz deb hisoblagan, shu sababli Havelet Leasing Ltd advokatlari ularning boshqa kompaniyani ochish va unga aktivlarni o'tkazish sxemasi qonuniy bo'lishini maslahat bergan (juda noto'g'ri), chunki sxemaning maqsadi aktivlarni boshqa kreditorlar hisobidan chiqarish uchun buzilgan 423-bo'lim.
Mumkin bo'lmagan imtiyozlar
The To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 238-bo'limda faqat bitta kreditorni boshqalar hisobiga afzal ko'rish o'rniga, kompaniyaning jami aktivlari tugashi aniqlanadi.[177] Ushbu masalani hal qilish uchun 239-bo'lim, bir kreditorni boshqasiga nisbatan "afzal ko'rish istagi" ni keltirib chiqaradigan qochish imtiyozlarini beradi. Ushbu testni bajarish qiyin. Yilda Re MC Bacon Ltd, kompaniya Natwest bankiga overdraftning davomi evaziga uning ishi pasayib ketganligi sababli suzuvchi to'lovni taqdim etdi. Millett J Kompaniya bankni afzal ko'rishni xohlamagan edi. Uning bankiga nisbatan o'ziga xos mehri yo'q edi va faqat biznesning umrini uzaytirish uchun to'lovga rozi bo'ldi.[178] Aksincha, ichida Re Agriplant Services Ltd[179] Jonathan Parker J, Agriplant Services Ltd kompaniyasining yerga ko'chirish uskunalari uchun lizing shartnomasi tufayli 20000 funt to'lashni noqonuniy afzalligi deb bildi. Buning sababi, asosan, Agriplantning yirik aktsiyadori Sagar Agriplantning javobgarligini kafolatlaganligi va shu sababli qaytarilishi Sagarning boshqa kreditorlardan yuqori bo'lgan majburiyatlarini bekor qilganligi edi. Xuddi shunday Re Conegrade Ltd,[180] Lloyd J kompaniyasining fikriga ko'ra, kichik muhandislik kompaniyasining ikkita direktori kompaniyani 125 ming funt evaziga mol-mulkini sotishga majbur qilganida, keyin ularni Conegrade Ltd-ga ijaraga berishga majbur qilganda, ustun maqsad ularni kreditorlar sifatida boshqalardan ustun qo'yish edi. Shunday qilib, uni oldini olish mumkin edi.
Qattiq rejim mavjud suzuvchi zaryadlar ostida IA 1986 yil To'lovga qobiliyatsizlik davrida boshqa kreditorlarga zarar etkazishi mumkin bo'lgan 245-bo'lim. Har qanday suzuvchi zaryad To'lov qobiliyatsizligi boshlanishidan bir yil oldin yaratilgan bo'lsa, kompaniyada uning o'rniga yangi pul o'tkazilmagan bo'lsa, kompaniya misolida uni oldini olish mumkin. Shunday qilib, kompaniya hech bo'lmaganda "bir vaqtning o'zida" berilmasa, ushbu kreditor tomonidan o'tgan avanslarni ta'minlash uchun kreditorga suzuvchi to'lovni to'lay olmaydi. Yilda Re Shoe Lace Ltd Hoffmann J aprel va may oylarida 350 ming funt sterling ilgari "bir vaqtning o'zida" ko'rib chiqilishi uchun iyulda yaratilgan suzuvchi zaryadga etarlicha yaqin emasligini ta'kidladi.[182] O'zgaruvchan to'lov bu miqdorlarni ta'minlay olmadi. Qonunchilik konteksti ishbilarmonlik nuqtai nazaridan bo'lganligi sababli va suzuvchi to'lovlar ularni yaratilganidan keyin 21 kundan keyin ro'yxatga olinishi mumkinligi sababli, bir necha oy juda uzoq edi. Ikkinchidan, 245 faqat to'lovni bekor qiladi, lekin qarzning o'zi emas, bu avvalgidek kuchga kiradi. Shunga qaramay, kreditor ta'minotsiz bo'lib, boshqa kreditorlar qatorida turadi.[183] Overdraftda kompaniyalar uchun hisob-kitoblarni yurituvchi banklar bu jihatdan afzalliklarga ega. Qayta Yeovil Glove Co.[181] agar qarzning umumiy darajasi bir xil bo'lsa, suzuvchi to'lov paydo bo'lgunga qadar va keyin, shuningdek, agar kompaniyaning to'lovlari va pul mablag'lari evaziga pul aylansa, bankning kreditni uzaytirishi doimiy ravishda ularning suzib yuruvchi to'lovlarini doimiy ravishda "qattiqlashtiradi". . Yeovil Glove Co Ltd suzuvchi zaryad yaratilishidan oldin har doim bankka qarzdor bo'lgan va to'lov qobiliyatsiz bo'lganida qarzdor bo'lgan, chunki u ko'proq mablag 'kiritgan va olib qo'ygan, ammo bankning suzib yuruvchi to'lovi ishonchli deb hisoblangan.[184] Va nihoyat 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 874-bo'limda qayd etilmagan har qanday to'lov, shu jumladan, suzuvchi to'lov ham bekor hisoblanadi. Ushbu sodda shart, hech bo'lmaganda kreditorlar reestrni tekshirishga qodir bo'lsa, xavfsizlik manfaatlari shaffofligini rag'batlantiradi.
Direktorlarning vazifalari
Ostida To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 212-bo'lim,[185] tugatuvchi yoki ma'mur da'vo bilan murojaat qilishi mumkin xulosa direktor nomidan kompaniyaga qarzdorlikni buzganligini tasdiqlash uchun kompaniya nomidagi qaror. Bu degani direktorlarning vazifalari topilgan 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 171 dan 177 gacha bo'lgan bo'limlar, xususan, direktorning o'z vakolatlari doirasida harakat qilish vazifasi parvarish vazifasi va har qanday imkoniyatdan qochish vazifasi manfaatlar to'qnashuvi. "Direktor" bu ma'noda keng ko'lamda berilgan va o'z ichiga oladi de-yure rasmiy ravishda tayinlangan direktorlar, amalda rasmiy tayinlashsiz direktor rolini bajaradigan direktorlar va soya direktorlari, uning direktorlari ostida rasmiy direktorlar harakat qilishga odatlangan.[186] De-fakto yoki soya direktorlariga nomzodlar odatda o'z kreditlarini himoya qilish uchun kompaniyalarni boshqarish bilan shug'ullanadigan banklar, bosh kompaniyalar yoki kompaniyani qutqarishga uringanlar (to'lovga qodir bo'lmaganlar amaliyotidan tashqari). Yilda Gollandiya - HMRC Oliy sudning aksariyati korporativ direktor direktori vazifasini bajarish, agar ular ixtiyoriy ravishda yordamchi kompaniya uchun javobgarlikni o'z zimmasiga olmasa, kimnidir amalda direktorga aylantira olmaydi, deb hisoblashgan.[187] Xuddi shunday soya direktori bo'lish uchun, deydi Millett J Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd[188] shunchaki bosh kompaniyaning boshqaruv kengashida bo'lish etarli emas.
Vazifalarning standart kodlangan ro'yxatiga e'tibor sifatida va hozirda aks ettirilgan 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 172-moddaning 4-qismida, odatdagi qonunchilikka binoan direktorlar kreditorlarning manfaatlarini hisobga olish majburiyati kompaniya to'lovga layoqatsiz davlatga yaqinlashganda ortadi. Odatda, direktorning vazifasi a'zolarning manfaati uchun kompaniyaning muvaffaqiyatini targ'ib qilishdir,[189] to'lovga layoqatsizlik yaqinida direktorning harakatlari kreditorlar tashkilotining moliyaviy manfaatlariga eng katta ta'sir qiladi.[190]
Xatoliklar to'g'risidagi nizom kompaniyaga tegishli bo'lgan harakatlarning sabablarini aks ettirganligi sababli, undirilgan har qanday pul kreditorlarning odatiy navbatdagi tartibida to'lashi uchun ushlab turiladi. Yilda Angliya-Avstriya matbaa va nashriyot uyushmasi[191] bu shuni anglatadiki, direktorlarni 7000 funt sterlingga qarshi muvaffaqiyatli sudga bergan likvidator mablag'larni hali to'liq to'lanmagan qarzdorlar guruhiga topshirishi kerak edi, shuning uchun aktivlarni garovsiz kreditorlar foydasiga qo'llash uchun hech qanday ixtiyor yo'q. Potentsial foyda shundaki, harakat sabablari kompaniyaga tegishli bo'lgani uchun, ular bo'lishi mumkin tayinlangan tugatuvchi yoki ma'mur ustidan sud ishlarini olib borish xavfi va mukofotini olishni afzal ko'rishi mumkin bo'lgan uchinchi shaxslarga.[192] Ushbu xususiyatlar firibgarliklar va noqonuniy savdolarning qonuniy asosli sabablari orqali qaytarib olinadigan pulning teskari tomonidir.
Noqonuniy savdo
Kompaniya rasmiy ravishda to'lovga layoqatsizlik protsedurasiga kirishdan oldin, uchta asosiy qoidalar direktorlarning xatti-harakatlarini kreditorlar hisobiga keraksiz qarzlarni to'lashga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun tartibga soladi. Birinchidan, rejissyorlar (haqiqiy bo'lsin, amalda, yoki soya direktorlari) a majburiyatini oladi jinoiy javobgarlik agar ular insofsiz kreditorlarni aldash uchun kompaniyaning ishlashini davom ettiring. Ostida "firibgar savdo" To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 213-bo'lim,[193] standartiga binoan rejissyor aslida insofsiz bo'lishini talab qiladi R v Ghosh:[194] rejissyor oddiy me'yorlar bo'yicha insofsiz ish tutgan va buni tan olgan bo'lishi kerak.[195] Rejissyor huquqbuzarlik uchun to'lashi kerak bo'lgan mablag 'o'zi jazoga tortilmaydi, aksincha u o'z kompaniyasini vijdonan ushlab turgan davrda etkazilgan zararni qoplaydi. Yilda Morfitlar va Bernaskoni[196] Chadvik LJ parlamentning 213-bo'limiga binoan zararni qoplash uchun jazo elementini joriy etish niyatida emasligiga qaror qildi. Buning o'rniga, ostida 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 993-bo'limda firibgarlikning alohida o'ziga xos jinoyati mavjud bo'lib, u 10 000 funt sterlinggacha jarima soladi.[197] Direktorlardan tashqari, bila turib firibgarlikning tarafi bo'lgan har bir kishi ham javobgar bo'ladi. Kimdir firibgarlikning aksessuari bo'lishidan oldin, direktorning noto'g'ri ish qilganligi to'g'risida dastlabki xulosa yoki da'vo bo'lishi kerak.[198] Shunday qilib Re Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd[199] Hoffmann J ga qarshi firibgarlik bilan savdo qilish uchun likvidatorning da'vosini chiqarib tashladi Ispaniya sharob Barnett & Sonning ota-onasi bo'lgan Rumasa SA ishlab chiqaruvchisi, chunki u o'zining sho'ba korxonasining qarzlari uchun tasalli yozgan bo'lsa-da, va sho''ba korxonaga hanuzgacha da'vo qilinmagan firibgar savdo ayblovi kelib chiqishi mumkinligi to'g'risida maslahat bergan bo'lsa-da. Soxta savdo kimgadir tegishli bo'lgan "haqiqiy axloqiy ayb" ga bog'liq.[200]
Aksincha, noto'g'ri savdo rejissyorlar harakat qilganda paydo bo'ladigan harakat sababidir beparvolik bilan. The To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil 214-bo'limda deyiladi rejissyorlar (shu jumladan amalda va soya direktorlari[203]), agar ular "kompaniyaning tugashi boshlanishidan bir muncha vaqt oldin, o'sha shaxs kompaniyaning to'lov qobiliyatsiz bo'lishidan qochish uchun oqilona istiqbol yo'q degan xulosaga kelganda, ular savdo qilishni davom ettirsalar, noqonuniy savdo uchun aybdor. tugatish "Kimdir buni xulosa qilishi kerakmi yoki yo'qligini aniqlash uchun direktor o'z lavozimiga ega bo'lishi kerak bo'lgan mahoratga va agar direktor maxsus mahoratga ega bo'lsa (masalan, buxgalteriya malakasi) yuqori darajaga qarab baholanadi. Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd (№ 2)[201] Ispaniya va Kiprning to'lovga qodir emasligini ikki direktor boshqargan apelsin va limon biznes. Biri buxgalteriya hisobida tajribaga ega edi. Noks J, kichik kompaniyalarda yozuvlarni yuritish protseduralari va uskunalari yirik kompaniyalarnikiga qaraganda kamroq bo'lishiga qaramay, 214-bo'limga binoan "ma'lum minimal standartlarga erishilishi kerak" deb hisoblarni oqilona aniq saqlashi kerak. Bu erda hisob-kitoblar qarzlar ko'payib ketganda ham kech amalga oshirildi. Noqonuniy savdo uchun direktorlar tomonidan to'lanadigan kompensatsiyaning asosiy o'lchovi direktorning to'lov qobiliyatsizligi muqarrar bo'lgan vaqtdan boshlab etkazadigan zarariga qarab baholanadi. Biroq, sud barcha tegishli omillarni hisobga olish huquqiga ega. Yilda Qayta Brian D Pierson (Pudratchilar) Ltd Hazel Uilyamson QC, a direktorlari golf maydonchasi biznes noqonuniy savdo uchun aybdor edi, ammo ularning hissasini 30 foizga kamaytirdi, chunki ob-havo yomonligi daromadli golf biznesini odatdagidan ko'ra qiyinlashtirdi.[204]
Noqonuniy savdo qoidalarining cheklashlaridan biri shundan iboratki, qonun buzilishi tartibini ko'rib chiqishdan farqli o'laroq, nizom bo'yicha faqat tugatuvchiga yoki ma'murga murojaat qilish huquqiga ega. Ikkala harakatni bir vaqtning o'zida ta'qib qilish mumkin bo'lsa-da,[206] firibgar yoki noqonuniy savdo ishi uchinchi shaxsga berilishi mumkin emas. Yilda Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd[207] kompaniyaning sobiq direktorlari noqonuniy savdo da'vosini ko'rib chiqishga urinishgan, chunki tugatuvchi ularni sudga berish huquqini "London Wall Claims" maxsus sud firmasiga sotgan. Apellyatsiya sudi bunday topshiriq eski umumiy qonun taqiqiga zid deb hisobladi gipertrofik sabablari, yoki tomonlar hech qanday qiziqishi bo'lmagan taqdirda to'lovni sud jarayoniga jalb qilishlari mumkin. Ushbu yondashuvning zararli tomoni shundaki, likvidatorlar yoki ma'murlar da'volarni ilgari surishda juda ehtiyot bo'lishlari mumkin, qachonki mutaxassis firma ularga murojaat qilishi mumkin bo'lsa.
Mehnat qonuni
Aksariyat korporativ nochor holatlarda, ehtimol, ko'p sonli odamlar ish joylari doimiy biznesga tayanadi. Shunga ko'ra, Buyuk Britaniyaning mehnat qonuni korporativ to'lov qobiliyatiga uchta asosiy usul bilan ta'sir qiladi. Birinchidan, mehnat shartnomalarini o'zgartirish mumkin emas, faqat tegishli iqtisodiy, texnik yoki tashkiliy sabablar mavjud bo'lganda Tashkilotni topshirish (bandlikni himoya qilish) to'g'risidagi qoidalar 2006 yil. Bu, ayniqsa, biznes aktivlarini sotishda muhim ahamiyatga ega. Ikkinchidan, maxsus qoidalar ma'mur yoki boshqa to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan mutaxassis tomonidan xodimlarning shartnomalarini qabul qilish bilan bog'liq, ammo, ehtimol, omon qolgan majburiyatlarning turli chegaralari mavjud. Uchinchidan, xodimlar va ularning pensiyalari boshqa kreditorlarning huquqlaridan ustun bo'lgan imtiyozli talablarga ega va agar bu tugagan bo'lsa, qarzdorlardan pul talab qilishi mumkin Milliy sug'urta jamg'armasi yoki Pensiyani himoya qilish jamg'armasi.
Ko'pincha biznes o'tkazmalari kompaniya tushib ketganda amalga oshiriladi to'lov qobiliyatsizligi protsedura. Agar kompaniya biznesni tugatish va aktivlarni sotishni maqsad qilgan tugatishga kirsa, TUPER 2006 8 (7) -qoidada pul o'tkazish qoidalari qo'llanilmasligi aytilgan.[208]
Agar ma'mur tayinlanganidan keyin xodimlar 14 kundan ortiq saqlansa, 99-bandga binoan ma'mur ularning shartnomalarini qabul qilish uchun javobgar bo'ladi. Shartnomalar bo'yicha javobgarlik "ish haqi" bilan cheklangan.[209] Bunga ish haqi, ta'til uchun to'lovlar, kasallar uchun ish haqi va kasb-hunar pensiya badallari kiradi, ammo ishdan bo'shatilgan ishlarning kompensatsiyasi hisobga olinmaydi,[210] noqonuniy ishdan bo'shatish,[211] yoki himoya mukofotlari[212] Ishdan bo'shatilishidan oldin ishchilar bilan maslahatlashmaslik uchun.[213] Agar biznesni qutqarish oxir-oqibat muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan bo'lsa, unda bunday pulga tegishli xodimlar turli xil kreditorlarning talablari orasida "o'ta ustuvor" maqomga erishadilar.
Xodimlarning ish haqi va pensiyalari imtiyozli maqomga ega, ammo atigi 800 funt sterlinggacha, bu 1986 yildan beri o'zgarishsiz qolmoqda.[214] Kreditorlar orasida ustuvor bo'lgan xodimlar, garchi qat'iy belgilangan xavfsizlik egalaridan yuqori bo'lmasa ham, 1897 yildan boshlab,[215] va xodimlar, ayniqsa, banklardan farqli o'laroq, o'zlarining xavf-xatarlarini diversifikatsiya qilishga qodir emasligi va XMT talablaridan birini tashkil etishi bilan asoslanadi. Ishchilarning da'volarini himoya qilish (ish beruvchining to'lovga qodir emasligi) to'g'risidagi konventsiya.[216] Ko'pincha bu cheklangan imtiyoz etarli emas va uni amalga oshirish uzoq vaqt talab qilishi mumkin. Aks ettirish To'lov qobiliyatini himoya qilish bo'yicha yo'riqnoma[217] ostida ERA 1996 yil 166-bo'lim har qanday xodim[218] da'vo bilan murojaat qilishi mumkin Milliy sug'urta Ajratilgan ish haqi uchun mablag '. Ostida ERA 1996 yil 182-bo'lim da'vo qilinadigan miqdor, 8 haftalik cheklov bilan ishdan bo'shatilgan ish haqi bilan bir xil (2010 yilda 350 funt). Agar xodim uzoq vaqt davomida maosh olmasa, u eng foydali 8 haftani tanlashi mumkin.[219]
The Pensiya to'g'risidagi qonun 2004 yil orqali pensiya talablarini himoya qilishning alohida tizimini boshqaradi Pensiyani himoya qilish jamg'armasi. Bu barcha pensiya da'volarini to'liq sug'urtalashga qaratilgan.[220] Ish haqi kafolatlari minimal ish haqi to'lovlari bilan birgalikda arzimagan yostiqni shakllantiradi, bu esa odamlar ishsiz qolganda muntazam ravishda qo'shimcha qo'shimchani talab qiladi.
- Evropa Parlamenti va 2008 yil 22 oktyabrdagi Kengashning 2008/94 / EC-sonli 2008 yil 22 oktyabrdagi Direktori ish beruvchining to'lovga layoqatsizligi holatida xodimlarni himoya qilish to'g'risida.
- Ish bilan ta'minlash to'g'risidagi qonun 1996 yil ss 166-170 va 182-190, bu ish beruvchini to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan va ish haqini to'lay olmagan taqdirda haftasiga 400 funtgacha tovon puli to'lashga imkon beradi.
- FZR 125/97 Regeling v Bestur Van de Bedrifsvereiniging Voor de Metallnijverheid [1999] IRLR 379
- FZR 278/05 Robins - mehnat va pensiya masalalari bo'yicha davlat kotibi [2007] IRLR 270
Xalqaro to'lov qobiliyatsizligi
Sifatida Buyuk Britaniya kompaniyalari biznesi tobora kengayib bormoqda globallashgan va Buyuk Britaniyada chet el korxonalari soni tobora ko'payib bormoqda, turli xil qonunlarga ega bo'lgan turli mamlakatlardagi bir nechta protsesslar bitta to'lovga qodir bo'lishi mumkin. Buni tartibga solish uchun Yevropa Ittifoqi, To'lov qobiliyatini tartibga solish (EC) 1346/2000 o'tdi. Bu mohiyatan a qarama-qarshi qonunlar choralar ko'radi va odatda a'zo davlatlarni o'zlarining to'lovga layoqatsizligi to'g'risidagi ishlarning mazmuni va ustuvor yo'nalishlarini aniqlash uchun erkin qoldiradi. Biroq, bu bitta yurisdiktsiya asosiy yurisdiktsiya ekanligi aniqlanadi, qolganlari esa ikkinchi darajali.
Buyuk Britaniya ham buni amalga oshirdi Chegaralararo to'lovga qodir emasligi to'g'risida UNCITRAL namunaviy qonuni ga muvofiq Chegaralararo to'lovga layoqatsizlik to'g'risidagi qoidalar 2006 yil.[221]
- Re Olympic Airlines SA [2015] UKSC 27, kuni Reglament 1346/2000 2-modda (h) va pensiya jamg'armasining defitsiti 16 mln.
- Jetivia SA - Bilta (Buyuk Britaniya) Limited (tugatilmoqda) [2015] UKSC 23
Nazariya
To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonunning izchil asoslarini topish, uni tushunish uchun bir qator printsiplarni ishlab chiqish va to'lovga qodir emaslik to'g'risidagi qonun qanday bo'lishi kerakligi to'g'risida fikr yuritish uchun juda ko'p turli xil nazariyalar ishlab chiqilgan. 1970-yillardan boshlab, ayniqsa davridan boshlab 1978 yilgi bankrotlik islohoti to'g'risidagi qonun Qo'shma Shtatlarda va bundan buyon To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil Buyuk Britaniyada ikkita keng fikr doirasi paydo bo'ldi. Birinchi va juda ko'zga ko'ringan qarash, asosan, ishdan kelib chiqadi Tomas H. Jekson va Duglas Baird "kreditorlar savdosi modeli" sifatida tanilgan.[222] Mualliflar (metodologiyani ko'rinadigan tarzda moslashtirdilar) Adolat nazariyasi (1971) tomonidan Jon Rols ) agar kimdir eng yaxshi bankrotlik qoidalarini aniqlashni xohlasa, gipotetik ravishda garovga olingan va ta'minlanmagan barcha kreditorlar o'tirib, aktivlarning qanday taqsimlanishi to'g'risida kelishuvga erishishi mumkinligini tasavvur qilish orqali aniqlanishi mumkin. Jekson, Baird va boshqa hammualliflar zamonaviy to'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun erishadigan asosiy (va deyarli faqat) yaxshi narsa kreditorlar o'rtasida kollektiv qarzlarni undirish mexanizmini yaratishdir, deb ta'kidladilar. Agar qonunda jamoat qobiliyatsizligi qoidalari bo'lmagan taqdirda nima bo'lishini tasavvur qilsak, individual kreditorlar to'lovni to'lashni ta'minlashga urinishganligi sababli xarajatlarning sezilarli darajada oshishi, ya'ni (1) o'z huquqini talab qilish uchun sudga chiqish paytida noaniqlik xarajatlari va har bir kreditor tomonidan kompaniya to'lovga qodir bo'lishidan oldin har bir kreditor tomonidan kuzatilgan harajatlarning shuncha yuqori, takrorlanganligi (2) kompaniyaning birma-bir demontaj qilinishi xavfi, birgalikda harakat qilganda kreditorlar kompaniyani doimiy hayot tarzida saqlash yoki sotish mumkinligi to'g'risida kelishib oladilar va ( 3) kollektiv protsedura vaqt va pulni tejashga imkon beradigan bo'lsa, qarzlarni yakka tartibda undirish bo'yicha yuqori ma'muriy xarajatlar.[223] Bunday individual harakatlar ikkala iqtisodiy modelga misol bo'la oladi mahbuslar dilemmasi (chunki boshqa shaxs nima qilayotganini bilmasdan yoki unga ishonmasdan, hamma guruh uchun yomon natijalarga erishishi mumkin) va jamoat fojiasi (chunki individual harakatlar umumiy resurslar havzasining tezroq tükenmesine va tükenmesine olib keladi, aksincha kelajakda foydalanish uchun aktivlarni saqlab qolish uchun jamoaviy rejalashtirish). Gipotetik ravishda, barcha kreditorlar o'zaro manfaatdorlik to'g'risida jamoaviy protsedura o'rnatishga rozilik berib kelishadilar. Haqiqatda, tranzaksiya xarajatlari va ushlab turish muammolari o'zaro kelishuvlarning oldini olish. Ammo keyinchalik qonun bunday real dunyo xarajatlari bo'lmagan taqdirda kelishilgan narsalarni taqlid qilishi kerak. Jekson va Baird qo'shimcha ravishda faraziy kreditorlar ham tanlaydi deb ta'kidlaydilar pari passu tarqatish, shuningdek, bu "kelishilgan holda kelishilgan asosiy taxmin xavfsizlik manfaatlari have aggregate efficiencies". The law protecting security interests should be inviolable, because it increases the amount of credit available to a company, which through the continuation of business indirectly benefits all creditors.[224] Any other groups of creditor, if they lose out from this insolvency model, ought to be protected by labour, tort or social insurance laws outside the scope of insolvency law. Deviating from Jackson and Baird's simplified law of debt collection mechanisms and priority rules would bring undue costs, because it is not what would have been agreed.[225] This would mean that insolvency law should have no requirement that a company should be rescued (unless creditors agree to it) and should have no classes of preferential creditor (except for unlimited security interests).
A comprehensive challenge to Jackson and Baird's theory, which more closely resembles actual legal policy, came initially from Elizabeth Uorren. Warren argued that Jackson and Baird's model is dangerously oversimplified, and based on untested hypothetical assertions about behaviour.[226] First, every system of insolvency law must necessarily make choices about how losses are distributed among creditors with multiple interest.[227] Among these diverse interests include weaker creditors, particularly employees, who are less capable than others at diversifying the risks of insolvency. There is a distinct community interest in companies that survive, and no good reason why only creditors with provable proprietary interests in a company's winding up should be taken into account. This means it is reasonable to give preference to more vulnerable creditors, and to expect secured creditors take on some additional risk to ensure businesses survive for the greater good.[228] The Baird and Jackson view essentially amounts to "single-value economic rationality, an excuse to impose a distributional scheme without justifying it, and, incidentally, a way to work in a damn good deal for secured creditors."[229] Qo'shimcha ravishda, Lucian Bebchuk has argued that the institution of xavfsizlik manfaatlari operates as a partially unjustified tashqi tashqi ta'sir against unsecured creditors. It is not clear, argues Bebchuk, that security interests are in fact efficient, and they are capable of subsidising their activities by diverting wealth from unsecured creditors to themselves without any agreement.[230] Buyuk Britaniyada, Roy Gud argues that banks usually take security interests, not because they would otherwise charge a higher interest rate (and so increasing credit to businesses for the benefit of all creditors) but because they calculate the market will bear it. The taking of security depends, not on efficiency, but on kelishuv kuchi.[231] Riz Mokal, also deeply critical of the creditors' bargain model, suggests that if one were to follow Baird and Jackson's methodology but in a truly value neutral way, one would ask what creditors would hypothetically agree to if they did not know who they were at all (i.e. whether they were voluntary or involuntary creditors, secured or unsecured). This would likely lead to a result where secured credit was not inviolable, and insolvency law could take account of diverse interests, including corporate rescue.[232]
In the UK, the theories underpinning actual insolvency law policy generally stem from the To'lovga layoqatsizlik qonuni va amaliyoti bo'yicha ko'rib chiqish qo'mitasining hisoboti[233] produced by committee chaired by Kennet Cork in 1982. The central argument of the report was that too many companies were simply left to fail when they could be revived, saved or brought to a close in a more orderly way. Cork advocated that the law should encourage a "rescue culture", to restore companies back to profitability, which would be in the longer term interests of creditors. Moreover, the Report suggested that insolvency law should "recognise that the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of the insolvent and his creditors, but that other interests of society or other groups in society are vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome."[234] This largely reflected the previous common law position, which rejected debt collection as being the sole aim, and viewed insolvency to be a matter of public interest.[235] The Cork Report was followed by a White Paper in 1984, A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law[236] ga olib kelgan To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil.
2017 yilda to'lovga layoqatsizlik to'g'risidagi qonunlarga kiritilgan o'zgarishlar
In an attempt to modernise insolvency rules in the UK, on 6 April 2017 To'lovga qobiliyatsiz xizmat [237] rolled out extensive changes to the insolvency industry in England and Wales. The updated rules (called the Insolvency Rules (England and Wales) 2016) replaced the Insolvency Rules 1986 and all their 28 subsequent amendments. The changes were developed by working with insolvency professionals and have been approved by the Insolvency Rules Committee. Some of the more notable changes in modernising the laws have been made to reflect modern business practices and make the insolvency process more efficient. Some notable changes include:
- The use of electronic communications to all creditors
- Removing the requirement to hold physical creditors meetings (Creditors can still request meetings)
- Creditors can opt out of further correspondence
- Small dividends are paid by the office holder without requiring creditors to raise a formal claim.[237]
Shuningdek qarang
- Qo'shma Shtatlardagi bankrotlik va 11-bob
- Yagona tijorat kodeksi art 9
- Buyuk Britaniya kompaniyalari to'g'risidagi qonun
- Buyuk Britaniyaning mehnat qonuni
- Sole Trader Insolvency (Buyuk Britaniya)
- Tashkilotni topshirish (bandlikni himoya qilish) to'g'risidagi qoidalar 2006 yil
- Korxona to'g'risidagi qonun 2002 yil
- Noto'g'ri savdo (s 214 To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil )
- Faktoring (moliya) va invoice discounting
Boshqa mamlakatlarda ham shunday dasturlar
- For similar programs in Australia, and New Zealand, see Ma'muriyat (qonun)
- For a similar program in Ireland see Imtihon
- For a similar program in Italy see Concordato preventivo
- For similar programs in Canada see Kanadaning to'lovga layoqatsizligi to'g'risidagi qonun
Izohlar
- ^ Insolvency Service, 'Statistics Release: Insolvencies in the Fourth Quarter 2012' (2013 yil 1-fevral )
- ^ To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil s 122(1)(f)
- ^ To'lovga layoqatsizlik qonuni va amaliyoti bo'yicha ko'rib chiqish qo'mitasining hisoboti (1982) Cmnd 8558
- ^ SI 2016/1024
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 3
- ^ 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, ss 170-177, CDDA 1986 s 6 and IA 1986 yil s 212-214
- ^ Ga qarang Aksiyadorlik jamiyatlari to'g'risidagi qonun 1844 yil va Aktsionerlik jamiyatlari to'g'risidagi qonun 1844 yil.
- ^ Qarang Hammurapi kodeksi §§115-118; Talmud, Kethuboth, x. 4, 93a.; Corpus Juris Civilis, Institutes, Book ii, I 9, I.
- ^ Magna Carta 1215 cl 9, "Neither we nor our bailiffs shall seize any land or rent for any debt, so long as the chattels of the debtor are sufficient to repay the debt; nor shall the sureties of the debtor be distrained so long as the principal debtor is able to satisfy the debt; and if the principal debtor shall fail to pay the debt, having nothing wherewith to pay it, then the sureties shall answer for the debt; and let them have the lands and rents of the debtor, if they desire them, until they are indemnified for the debt which they have paid for him, unless the principal debtor can show proof that he is discharged thereof as against the said sureties"
- ^ See generally, I Treiman, 'Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages' (1927) 43 Qonunni har chorakda ko'rib chiqish 230, 233
- ^ 3 Anne, c.17, passed in fact on 19 March 1706
- ^ (1769) vol II no 5, 473
- ^ (1798) 101 ER 1103; 7 Term Rep 509
- ^ eg A Smith, Xalqlar boyligi (1776) Book V, Ch 1, para.107
- ^ M Lester, Victorian Insolvency (Clarendon 1995)
- ^ The Aksiyadorlik jamiyatlari to'g'risidagi qonun 1856 yil s 104 and then the Kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 1862 ss 44, 110, extended liquidators’ priority to all insolvency procedures. The Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonun 1869 s 32 gave priority for wages, as well as taxes.
- ^ a b [1897] AC 22
- ^ Qarang IA 1986 yil s 176A and Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 (SI 2003/2097)
- ^ See R Goode, ‘The Case for the Abolition of the Floating Charge’ in J Getzler and J Payne, Company Charges: Spectrum and Beyond (OUP 2006) and LA Bebchuk and JM Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857–934. A proposal for a ring fenced fund of fixed security was made in Germany by the Kommission Für Insolvenzrecht, Erster Bericht der Kommission für Insolvenzrecht (1985)
- ^ Kenneth Cork, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558
- ^ Qarang Jon C. Qahva, ‘What went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1
- ^ See generally, R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2011) 2-16, "values to be protected that go beyond the interests of those with accrued rights... [include] ... the interest of the workforce in preserving its investment of labour, expertise and loyalty to the enterprise, and... that of the community at large, for example, in the continuance of the business or the payment of clean-up costs of pollution."
- ^ See R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (2011) 1-03.
- ^ Qarang Uilyams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. [1998] UKHL 17
- ^ [1897] AC 22; cf DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets LBC [1976] 1 WLR 852
- ^ See R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (2011) 1-09, The causes of insolvency.
- ^ masalan Malik va BCCI SA [1997] UKHL 23 and Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Homan [1994] EWCA Civ 33
- ^ masalan Re Barings plc (№ 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433 and London Ltd kompaniyasining Re D'Jan [1994] 1 BCLC 561
- ^ masalan Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22
- ^ cf JS Mill, Siyosiy iqtisod tamoyillari (1848) Book IV, ch 6, "I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress." J Schumpeter, Kapitalizm, sotsializm va demokratiya (1943) Part II, ch 7, 'The Process of Creative Destruction'
- ^ See originally CA 1862 s 80(4). This contrasts to "bankruptcy" which depended on committing an "act of bankruptcy".
- ^ IA 1986 yil, Sch B1, paras 11 and 35(2)
- ^ IA 1986 yil ss 240(2)(a) and 245(4)(a)
- ^ [2008] BCC 182, [2007] All ER (D) 25
- ^ [1986] 1 WLR 114
- ^ The debt was then paid. Shuningdek qarang Taylors Industrial Flooring Ltd v M&H Plant Hire (Manchester) Ltd [1990] BCLC 216 (honest dispute of a debt is not of itself a substantial ground). Goode (2011) 117, notes creditors who seek quick payment will often prefer to press for a summary judgment, or will apply under IA 1986 s 123(1)(e) so they do not have to wait for the 3 week period to expire.
- ^ BNY Corporate Trustees Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL plc [2013] UKSC 28
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 214 and CDDA 1986 s 6
- ^ Qarang 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, ss 393 and 464
- ^ See Riz Mokal, 'Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth' (2001) 60(3) Cambridge Law Journal 581
- ^ cf Re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd [1970] Ch 465 and Byuxler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9
- ^ [2005] EWCA Civ 1072. An action in tort could be open, however, against the management directly.
- ^ Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, per Lord MacNaghten, "Everybody knows that when there is a winding-up debenture-holders generally step in and sweep off everything; and a great scandal it is."
- ^ Association of Business Recovery Professionals’ 9th Survey (2001) 18, noted in Riz Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law - Theory and Application (OUP 2005) ch 6
- ^ Kethuboth, x. 4, 93a, quoted in L Levinthal, ‘The Early History of Bankruptcy Law’ (1918) 66(5) U of Penn LR 223, 234. To give a simple example, if creditor A is owed 10, B is owed 30 and C is owed 60, and there is only 50 left, A would get 10, B would get 20 and C would get 20.
- ^ (1873) LR 8 Ch App 643
- ^ (1843) 152 ER 1165
- ^ [1975] 1 WLR 758
- ^ See PL Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (8th edn Sweet and Maxwell 2009) 1161
- ^ See LA Bebchuk and JM Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857–934
- ^ TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, nonbankruptcy and the creditors’ bargain’ (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 857, 868
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 176A reserves 50% of the first £10,000 and 20% of assets above that value, up to a limit of £600,000 for unsecured creditors from assets subject to a floating charge. The consequence is that if a company has assets worth more than £3m under a floating charge, unsecured creditors receive a quickly diminishing percentage at that point.
- ^ 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun ss 860-874
- ^ 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, s 738, and see Levy v Abercorris Slate and Slab Co (1887) 37 Ch D 260, Chitty J, ‘a debenture means a document which either creates a debt or acknowledges it, and any document which fulfils either of these conditions is a "debenture".’
- ^ (1881) 7 QBD 165
- ^ 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun ss 431-432
- ^ 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, ss 744-748 va 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, s 860(7)(c)
- ^ Qarang Vernon va Bethel (1762) 28 ER 838
- ^ [1913] UKHL 1
- ^ [1940] AC 613
- ^ Tomonidan kiritilgan Companies Act 1900 s 14 (followed by CCA 1908 s 93).
- ^ [1924] 1 KB 431
- ^ Umuman ko'ring Re Cosslett Contractors Ltd [1997] EWCA Civ 2229, [1998] Ch 495
- ^ Qarang 1925 yilgi mulk to'g'risidagi qonun ss 85-86
- ^ masalan. Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40, [2004] 1 AC 816
- ^ masalan. Allen va G'arbiy Afrikaning Oltin riflari Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656
- ^ Shuningdek qarang Byuxler v Talbot [2004] UKHL 9
- ^ [1903] 2 Ch 284
- ^ Affirmed by the House of Lords on appeal in Illingvort va Xuldsvort [1904] AC 355
- ^ Evans v British Granite Quarries Ltd [1910] 2 KB 979, per Buckley LJ
- ^ Re Castell and Brown Ltd [1898] 1 Ch 315. By contrast in Re Benjamin Cope & Sons Ltd [1914] 1 Ch 800 it was held that a floating charge cannot be created over all the same property in priority, because the first in time prevails when equities are equal. Creation of priority is possible if the second floating charge only covers part, Re Automatic Bottle Makers Ltd [1926] Ch 412.
- ^ Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 Ch 93
- ^ George Barker Ltd v Eynon [1974] 1 WLR 462, where possession of meat goods subject to a (possessory) lien took place after the crystallisation of a charge, but still took priority because the contract was first in time.
- ^ N W Robbie & Co Ltd v Witney Warehouse Co Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 1324
- ^ Qarang Re Panama, New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1870) 5 Ch App 318, Re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd [1986] Ch 366, Re Real Meat Co Ltd [1996] BCLC 254.
- ^ [1987] 1 Ch 200
- ^ [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep 142
- ^ [1994] 1 BCLC 485
- ^ [2001] UKPC 28
- ^ [2001] UKPC 28, [46]
- ^ [2005] UKHL 41
- ^ [2005] UKHL 41, [111]
- ^ J Armour, 'Should we redistribute in insolvency?' (2006) EGCI ish qog'ozi
- ^ Roy Gud, 'Is the Law too Favourable to Secured Creditors?' (1983) 8 Canadian Business Law Journal 53, suggesting the law goes too far to promote secured creditors' interests over unsecured creditors. Riz Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005) ch 6
- ^ [1976] 1 WLR 676
- ^ Qayta Peachdart Ltd [1984] Ch 131
- ^ 1979 yil tovarlarni sotish to'g'risidagi qonun s 25(1) and the Omillar to'g'risidagi qonun 1889 s 2 (1)
- ^ [1980] Ch 228
- ^ [1970] AC 567
- ^ IA 1986 yil ss 1-7
- ^ Qarang EA 2002 s 249 and IA 1986 yil ss 72A-72GA.
- ^ Qarang IA 1986 yil ss 45(2) and 230 (administrative receivers and liquidators) and Sch B1, para 6 (administrators).
- ^ [2004] EWCA Civ 655, [2005] 1 BCLC 66
- ^ Ga qarang US Bankruptcy Code §1129(b)(2)
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 1
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 4
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 1A, Sch A1 para 3(2) and 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, s 382(3)
- ^ Qarang Insolvency Rules, SI 1986/1925 Rule 1.19
- ^ See E McKendrick, Tijorat huquqi bo'yicha Goode (4th edn Penguin 2010) 928 va Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003] BCC 885, "qutqarish madaniyati" to'g'risida.
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 67
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, paras 40-44
- ^ [2001] Ch 57
- ^ [1992] Ch 505
- ^ [1992] Ch 505, 539-540
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 76
- ^ Shuningdek IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 5 makes the administrator an officer of the court.
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 22
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 25
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 36
- ^ R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2011) 389 and 418
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, paras 12 and 36
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 11
- ^ Shuningdek qarang Re AA Mutual International Insurance Co Ltd [2004] EWHC 2430, [2005] 2 BCLC 8, Lyuis Jon 11 (a) xatboshidagi qarzlar bo'yicha sinovni o'tkazgan "ehtimoldan ko'ra ko'proq", 11 (b) banddagi maqsadlarga erishish uchun esa "haqiqiy istiqbol" edi .
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, paras 49, 51 and 53
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 55
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, paras 60-66 give a list of specific powers, further set out in Schedule 1. Administrators may replace directors, call creditor meetings, apply to court for directions, control company officers, and distribute assets to creditors in accordance with statutory priorities or to fulfil the administration's purpose.
- ^ [2004] EWHC 932, [9], referring to the judgment of Neuberger J in T&D Industries plc [2000] BCC 956. Shuningdek qarang Royal Trust Bank - Buchler [1989] BCLC 130.
- ^ Qismi Nagib Saviris ' telecomms group, the to'plamdan oldingi ma'muriyat of a subsidiary of Shamol shamollari was approved by Lewison J in Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch). He remarked a pre-pack will not usually be an abuse of an administrator's powers.
- ^ cf ning ta'rifi Xavfli buxgalterlar instituti, "SIP 16" nomi bilan tanilgan, 16-sonli to'lovga layoqatsizlik amaliyoti to'g'risidagi bayonot, 1-band
- ^ Umuman olganda, V Finch, "Oldindan qadoqlangan ma'muriyatlar: To'lov qobiliyatsizligi soyasida savdolashuvmi yoki soya savdosi?" [2006] JBL 568, 569
- ^ S Frisby, ‘A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-packaged Administrations: Report to R3—The Association of Business Recovery Professionals ’ (London, R3, 2007) 57-58, in 88% of cases, unsecured creditors get nothing, and in 3% of cases they get over 25% of what they are owed. This compares to 83% of business sales where unsecured creditors get nothing.
- ^ [2009] EWHC 904 (Ch), [2009] BCC 578
- ^ [2010] EWCA Civ 1379
- ^ cf 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun s 172, masalan Buyuk Britaniya kompaniyalari to'g'risidagi qonun
- ^ IA 1986 yil Sch B1, para 4
- ^ Yoki o'sha paytdagi nizomda aytilganidek, "xurofot" IA 1986 yil s 27
- ^ Yana qarang Hague v Nam Tai Electronics [2008] UKPC 13. The counterpart in Buyuk Britaniya kompaniyalari to'g'risidagi qonun topilgan Peskin va Anderson [2001] BCC 87C yoki Persival va Rayt
- ^ [2003] EWCA Civ 1506, [2004] BCC 111
- ^ Feetum v Levy [2006] Ch 585
- ^ 1925 yilgi mulk to'g'risidagi qonun, ss 101 and 109. The mortgagee can take a maximum of 5% of assets in fees.
- ^ See now IA 1986 s 29(2). This is materially identical to a "qualifying floating charge holder" for administration, under IA 1986 Sch B1, para 14.
- ^ Smiths Ltd v Middleton [1979] 3 All ER 842
- ^ IA 1986 s 48
- ^ Parsons v Sovereign Bank of Canada [1913] AC 160 a company must novate before a receiver incurs personal liability.
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 42(2)-(2D) and Powdrill va Watson [1995] 2 AC 394
- ^ IA 1986 s 44 and Sch 1
- ^ IA 1986 ss 40, 175, 176A, 386 and Sch 6
- ^ Shamji v Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd [1986] BCLC 278
- ^ [1993] AC 295
- ^ [2000] Ch 86
- ^ [2003] EWCA Civ 1409
- ^ cf R (Glatt) v Sinclair [2011] EWCA Civ 1317, where a duty was admitted when a receiver sold a house, and then an estate agent immediately sold it again for 38% more money.
- ^ Riz Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law (2005) 212-6, summarising empirical research that administrative receivership consumed an average of around 25% of estate, against 4.7% costs under US Chapter 11, which compares to the UK's current administration procedure
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 135 and Revenue & Customs v Rochdale Drinks Distributors Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1116
- ^ IA 1986 s 84(1)(b)
- ^ IA 1986 ss 89
- ^ IA 1986 ss 90 and 96
- ^ IA 1986 s 124
- ^ IA 1986 s 124(2)
- ^ [1898] 1 Ch 122
- ^ (1879) 11 Ch D 36
- ^ Yana qarang Charles Forte Investments Ltd v Amanda [1964] Ch 240. The Jenkins Committee (1962) Cmnd 1749, para 503(h) recommended this restriction be scrapped.
- ^ [1968] 1 WLR 1091
- ^ Shuningdek qarang Stonegate Securities Ltd v Gregori [1980] Ch 576, where Mr Gregory's claim for £33,000 for buying shares was contingent on gaining planning permission for a development.
- ^ IA 1986 Sch B1, paras 83–84
- ^ IA 1986 ss 91 (company appoints in solvent voluntary winding up), 100 (creditors appoint in insolvent voluntary winding up) and 139 (court appoints in compulsory winding up on nomination of creditors).
- ^ IA 1986 ss 171–172
- ^ IA 1986 ss 176ZA (insolvency practitioner expenses), 175 (preferential creditors: employees and pensions) and 175A (ring fence fund)
- ^ IA 1986 s 74(2)(f)
- ^ Noulz - Skott [1891] 1 Ch 717, Romer J
- ^ Qarang Re Home and Colonial Insurance Co Ltd [1930] 1 Ch 102 and Pulsford - Devenish [1903] 2 Ch 625, Farwell J.
- ^ Re Windsor Steam Coal Co (1901) Ltd [1928] Ch 609, a liquidator settled a claim when it was liable for nothing.
- ^ a b masalan To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil Sch B1, para 3(1)(c)
- ^ Chappell & Co Ltd v Nestle Co Ltd [1960] AC 87
- ^ IA 1986 s 238 (transactions at an undervalue) and IA 1986 s 127 (post-winding up transactions.
- ^ Milliy viloyat banki v Charnli [1924] 1 KB 431
- ^ IA 1986 s 239 (voidable preference), IA 1986 s 245 (voidable floating charge), and Companies Act 2006, s 890 (charges void without registration)
- ^ IA 1986 s 74(2)(d) and Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22
- ^ [1980] 1 WLR 711
- ^ R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency (2005) 11.128 argues in Re Gray’s Inn there was no disposition of company property if at all times the account was overdrawn. So ‘the bank used its own moneys to meet the company’s cheques for what were presumably payments to suppliers and other creditors in the normal course of business, so that in relation to such payments the bank became substituted as creditor for the persons to whom they were made’.
- ^ [2000] EWCA Civ 263
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 240, setting out the "relevant time"
- ^ [2001] UKHL 2, [2001] 1 BCLC 145
- ^ Endi To'lov qobiliyati to'g'risidagi qonun 1986 yil section 423.
- ^ Shuningdek qarang Alderson v Temple (1768) 96 ER 384, where Lord Mensfild held the Act extended beyond merely "conveyances" to preferences to achieve the policy of equality intended by the law.
- ^ [1990] BCC 36
- ^ Qarang Re MC Bacon Ltd [1990] BCLC 324
- ^ [1990] BCLC 324
- ^ [1997] 2 BCLC 598
- ^ [2002] EWHC 2411 (Ch)
- ^ a b [1965] Ch 148
- ^ [1994] 1 BCLC 111
- ^ Re Parkes Garage (Swadlincote) Ltd [1929] 1 Ch 139
- ^ This follows from the rule in Clayton’s case, yoki Devayns - Nobl (1816) 1 Mer 572
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 212
- ^ 2006 yilgi kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun, s 251
- ^ [2010] UKSC 51. An analogy is typically drawn to a trustee de son tort.
- ^ [1994] 2 BCLC 180
- ^ Qarang Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304, 306 and Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258, Dillon LJ held there was no duty to creditors present or future when the company is solvent.
- ^ Qarang Kinsela & Am v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 395, Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 1512, West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250 and Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd [2003] BCC 885
- ^ [1985] 2 Ch 891
- ^ Qarang Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 493
- ^ Tomonidan kiritilgan Kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 1948 yil.
- ^ [1982] EWCA Crim 2
- ^ R v Grantham [1984] QB 675, cf Twinsectra Ltd v Yardli [2002] 2 AC 164
- ^ [2003] EWCA Civ 289, [2003] 2 WLR 1521
- ^ Formerly found in the Kompaniyalar to'g'risidagi qonun 1985 yil section 458
- ^ cf Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] UKPC 4
- ^ [1986] BCLC 170
- ^ Qarang Re a Company (No 001418 of 1988) [1990] BCC 526, where Mr Barford, as director, continued paying himself a higher salary as the company continued to run up debts.
- ^ a b [1989] BCLC 520
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 214
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 214(7)
- ^ [1999] BCC 26
- ^ Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd [1995] 2 BCLC 493
- ^ Qayta Purpoint Ltd [1991] BCLC 491
- ^ [1995] 2 BCLC 493
- ^ cf Savdo va sanoat bo'yicha davlat kotibi v Slater [2007] IRLR 928 and Oklend v Vellsvud (Yorkshir) MChJ [2009] EWCA Civ 1094, [2010] IRLR 82
- ^ IA 1986 yil s 19 and Sch B1 para 99
- ^ Re Allders do'konlar do'konlari [2005] BCC 289
- ^ Leeds United AFC Ltd [2008] BCC 11
- ^ Bethan Darwin (16 June 2014). "Betan Darvin, Deloitte kometa xodimlari bilan etarli darajada maslahatlashmaganligi sababli ish bilan ta'minlash bo'yicha sud qarorini bekor qildi". Uels Onlayn. Olingan 23 iyun 2014.
- ^ Krasner - McMath [2005] EWCA Civ 1072, [2005] IRLR 995
- ^ Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986 (SI 1986/1996)
- ^ Qarang Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 and the 1897 yilgi bankrotlikni o'zgartirish to'g'risidagi qonunda imtiyozli to'lovlar s 2
- ^ ILO Convention No 173 (1992)
- ^ 2008/94/EC, replacing 80/987/EC and 2002/74/EC
- ^ Qarang McMeechan v Ish bilan ta'minlash bo'yicha davlat kotibi [1997] ICR 549, holding an agency worker could claim; Buchan va Ivey v Savdo va sanoat bo'yicha davlat kotibi [1997] IRLR 80, holding the purpose of the fund did not allow managing directors to claim, but cf Savdo va sanoat bo'yicha davlat kotibi v Botril [2000] EWCA Civ 781, holding a director who was essentially without any autonomy in a group did deserve protection.
- ^ Qarang Mann v Ish bilan ta'minlash bo'yicha davlat kotibi [1999] IRLR 566 and Regeling v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsveren of metaalnijverheid uchun ovoz. (1999) C-125/97, [1999] IRLR 379
- ^ Qarang Robins - mehnat va pensiya masalalari bo'yicha davlat kotibi (2007) C-278/05, [2007] ICR 779, held that 20% insurance was not enough.
- ^ SI 2006/1030)
- ^ See originally, TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, nonbankruptcy and the creditors’ bargain’ (1982) 91 Yel huquqi jurnali 857-907
- ^ (1982) 91 Yel huquqi jurnali 857, 860-867
- ^ (1982) 91 Yel huquqi jurnali 857, 868, footnote 52
- ^ See DG Baird and TH Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 51(1) University of Chicago Law Review 97
- ^ See also, E Warren and JL Westbrook, ‘Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention’ (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 1197, criticised using theoretical constructs without any attempt to verify by empirical evidence any of the premises. cf RK Rasmussen, ‘Empirically Bankrupt’ (2007) Col Bus LR 179, arguing that the empirically study was fundamentally flawed. Responded to in E Warren and JL Westbrook, ‘The Dialogue Between Theoretical and Empirical Scholarship’ U of Texas Law and Econ Research Paper, No 88; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No 137
- ^ E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775-814, 777, ‘I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with a debtor’s multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of different actors. Bankruptcy encompasses a number of competing – and sometimes conflicting – values in their distribution. As I see it, no one value dominates, so that bankruptcy policy becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the question, how shall the losses distributed?’
- ^ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775, 790-791
- ^ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 775, 803
- ^ LA Bebchuk and JM Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857–934
- ^ R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2011) 2-18, 76-77
- ^ Riz Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractariansim, Creditors’ Bargain, and Corporate Liquidation’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400. See also, Riz Mokal, ‘On Fairness and Efficiency’ (2003) 66 Modern Law Review 452-467
- ^ (1982) Cmnd 8558
- ^ (1982) Cmnd 8558, para 192
- ^ In re Paget [1927] 2 Ch 85, 87-88, per Lord Hanworth MR
- ^ Cmnd 9175 (1984)
- ^ a b Modernised insolvency rules commence in April 2017, "The Insolvency Service", 25 October 2016
Adabiyotlar
| To'lov qobiliyatsizligi |
|---|
| To'lovga qodir bo'lmagan jarayonlar |
| Rasmiylar |
| Da'vogarlar |
| Qayta qurish |
| Qochish rejimlari |
| Jinoyatlar |
| Xavfsizlik |
| Xalqaro |
| Mamlakatlar bo'yicha |
| Boshqalar |
- Kitoblar
- V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (Cambridge University Press 2009)
- R Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (2005)
- A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law (Longman 2008)
- Riz Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law - Theory and Application (OUP 2005)
- L Sealy va Sarah Worthington, Company law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2007)
- Maqolalar
- J Armour, 'Should we redistribute in insolvency?' (2006) EGCI ish qog'ozi
- JC Coffee, ‘What went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis’ (2009) 9(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 1
- V Finch, ‘Reinvigorating Corporate Rescue’ [2003] Journal of Business Law 527
- RM Goode, 'The Modernisation of Personal Property Security Law' (1984) 100 LQR 234
- L Levinthal, "Bankrotlik to'g'risidagi qonunning dastlabki tarixi" (1918) 66 (5) Pensilvaniya universiteti yuridik sharhi 223
- L Levinthal, "Ingliz bankrotligining dastlabki tarixi" (1919) 67 (1) Pensilvaniya universiteti yuridik sharhi 1
- G Makkormak, 'Shishma korporativ aktivlari' [2006] Korporativ huquqni o'rganish jurnali 39
- Riz Mokal, "Agentlik xarajatlari va noto'g'ri savdo" (2000) 59 CLJ 335
- F Oditah, "Aktivlar va to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan talablarni ko'rib chiqish" (1992) 108 LQR 459
- I Treiman, 'O'rta asrlarda kreditordan qochish' (1927) 43 Qonunni har chorakda ko'rib chiqish 230
- R Shulte, ‘Direktorlar uchun odob-axloq me’yori va kreditorlar uchun vosita sifatida noto‘g‘ri savdoni kuchaytirish: korporativ to‘lovga qodir bo‘lmaslik holati’ (1999) 20-sonli Qonun 80
- Hisobotlar
- Loreburn hisoboti (1906)
- K Qorqiz, To'lovga layoqatsizlik qonuni va amaliyoti bo'yicha ko'rib chiqish qo'mitasining hisoboti (1982) Cmnd 8558
- To'lovga qodir emaslik to'g'risidagi qonun uchun qayta ko'rib chiqilgan asos (1984) Cmnd 9175
Tashqi havolalar
- Buyuk Britaniyaning to'lovga qodir bo'lmagan davlat xizmati
- To'lovga qodir bo'lmagan amaliyotchilar uyushmasi veb-sayti
- To'lovga layoqatsizlik qoidalari 1986 yil
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