Bir zumda ovoz berish - Instant-runoff voting

Bir zumda ovoz berish (IRV) (shuningdek, ba'zan muqobil ovoz berish,[1] imtiyozli ovoz berish,[2][3] yoki ovoz berish (RCV),[4] garchi bu nomlar boshqa tizimlar uchun ham ishlatilsa.[5][6][7][8][9]) ning bir turi imtiyozli darajaga ega ovozlarni hisoblash usuli ikkitadan ortiq nomzod bilan bitta o'rinli saylovlarda foydalaniladi. IRV saylovlarida faqat bitta nomzodni qo'llab-quvvatlashini ko'rsatish o'rniga, saylovchilar nomzodlarni afzalliklari bo'yicha tartiblashlari mumkin. Dastlab saylov byulletenlari har bir saylovchining eng yaxshi tanlovi uchun hisoblanadi. Agar nomzod birinchi tanlov asosida ovozlarning yarmidan ko'piga ega bo'lsa, u nomzod g'olib chiqadi. Agar yo'q bo'lsa, unda eng kam ovoz olgan nomzod chiqarib tashlanadi. Mag'lub bo'lgan nomzodni birinchi tanlov sifatida tanlagan saylovchilar o'zlarining ovozlarini keyingi tanlovning umumiy soniga qo'shib qo'yishadi. Ushbu jarayon nomzod ovozlarning yarmidan ko'piga ega bo'lgunga qadar davom etadi. Maydon ikkiga qisqartirilganda, u eng yaxshi ikki nomzodni boshma-yuz taqqoslash imkonini beradigan "tezkor oqim" ga aylandi. Ga solishtirganda ko'pchilik ovoz berish, IRV ning ta'sirini kamaytirishi mumkin ovozlarni taqsimlash bir nechta nomzodlar hamfikrli saylovchilar tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanganda.

Bir zumda ovoz berish milliy saylovlarda hozirda qo'llaniladi (texnik jihatdan sakkizta)[eslatma 1] bir nechta mamlakatlar. Masalan, a'zolarini saylash uchun ishlatiladi Avstraliya Vakillar palatasi va barcha avstraliyaliklarning kamida bitta uyi davlat parlamentlari;[10] The Hindiston Prezidenti va a'zolari qonun chiqaruvchi kengashlar Hindistonda; The Irlandiya prezidenti;[11] Shtatidan AQSh vakillari Meyn;[12] va parlament Papua-Yangi Gvineya. Ushbu uslub butun dunyo bo'ylab mahalliy saylovlarda, shu jumladan, qo'llaniladi Nyu-York shahri boshlanadigan idoralar 2021.[13] U ko'plab siyosiy partiyalar tomonidan (partiyalar rahbarlarini va Prezident / Bosh vazir nomzodlarini saylash uchun ichki boshlang'ich saylovlar / saylovlar uchun) va xususiy uyushmalar tomonidan, masalan, turli xil ovoz berish maqsadlarida foydalaniladi. "Eng yaxshi film" uchun Oskar mukofoti. IRV-da tasvirlangan Robertning yangi tahrir qilingan tartib qoidalari imtiyozli ovoz berishga misol sifatida.[14]

IRV-ni bitta g'olib varianti deb hisoblash mumkin bitta o'tkaziladigan ovoz (STV) tizimi.

Terminologiya

Bir zumda o'tkaziladigan ovoz berish, o'z nomini saylov byulletenlarini hisoblash sanoqli qatorga o'xshash qator saylovlarni simulyatsiya qilish usulidan kelib chiqadi. ikki davrali tizim, bundan tashqari, davra oralig'ida saylovchilarning istaklari o'zgarmaydi.[15] Shuningdek, u muqobil ovoz berish, o'tkaziladigan ovoz berish, belgilangan ovoz berish (RCV), bitta o'ringa mo'ljallangan ovoz berish yoki imtiyozli ovoz berish deb ham nomlanadi.[16]

Britaniyaliklar va Yangi Zelandiyaliklar odatda IRVni "muqobil ovoz berish" (AV) deb atashadi,[17][18] Kanadada esa bu "reyting tanlovi" yoki "eng yaxshi tanlov ovozi" deb nomlanadi.[19] Yagona g'olib saylovlarida IRVdan foydalanadigan avstraliyaliklar IRVni "imtiyozli ovoz berish" deb atashadi. IRVni targ'ib qiluvchi Amerika tashkilotlari (masalan FairVote ) ba'zan IRVni "bir zumda ovoz berish" deb belgilaydi,[20] kabi IRV dan foydalanadigan yurisdiktsiyalar San-Fransisko, Kaliforniya; Meyn; va Minneapolis, MINNESOTA o'z qonunlarida "tartiblangan ovoz berish" atamasini kodlashdi.[21][22]

IRV vaqti-vaqti bilan uning ixtirochisi, amerikalikdan keyin Ware usuli deb nomlanadi Uilyam Robert Vare. Qachon bitta o'tkaziladigan ovoz (STV) usuli bitta g'olib bo'lgan saylovda qo'llaniladi, u IRVga aylanadi; Irlandiya hukumati IRVni "proportsional vakillik" deb atadi, chunki prezidentni IRV va parlament o'rinlarini STV saylash uchun bir xil saylov byulletenidan foydalaniladi, ammo IRV g'oliblikni qo'lga kiritgan saylov usuli hisoblanadi.[23] Shtat qonuni Janubiy Karolina[24] va Arkanzas[25] "zudlik bilan oqish" dan foydalanib, saylovda qatnashmaganlarning ayrim toifalari ovoz berishning birinchi bosqichidan oldin birinchi darajali saylovlarda qatnashishi va ushbu saylov byulletenlarini keyingi har qanday ikkinchi saylovlarda hisoblash amaliyotini tavsiflash uchun.

Boshqa ovoz berish usullari bilan taqqoslash

Mexanikani taqqoslash

Zudlik bilan ikkinchi darajali ovoz berish - bu ovoz berishning eng yaxshi usullaridan biri. Masalan, eng kam reytingga ega bo'lganlarni emas, balki eng so'nggi reytingga ega bo'lgan nomzodni chiqarib tashlash deyiladi. Kumblar usuli, va har bir darajaga raqamli qiymatlarning universal belgilanishi ishlatiladi Borda hisoblash usul. Maqoladagi jadval Schulze usuli turli darajadagi ovoz berish usullarini taqqoslaydi.

Post-post-post bilan taqqoslash

Da 2013 yil sentyabr oyida Avstraliya federal saylovlari, 150 dan 135 tasi Vakillar palatasi o'rindiqlar (yoki 90 foiz) birinchi imtiyozlarga binoan nomzod tomonidan qo'lga kiritildi. Qolgan 15 o'rinni (10 foiz) birinchi imtiyozlar bo'yicha ikkinchi o'rinni egallagan nomzod qo'lga kiritdi.[26]

O'zgarishlar

Ixtiyoriy imtiyozli byulletenga misol
Dan to'liq imtiyozli byulletenga misol Avstraliya Vakillar palatasi

Ovoz berish byulletenlarini tuzishda va saylovchilar imtiyozlarning to'liq ro'yxatini taqdim etishi shartligi yoki yo'qligida turli xil IRV usullari turli mamlakatlar va mahalliy hokimiyatlarda qo'llaniladi.

In ixtiyoriy imtiyozli ovoz berish tizimida saylovchilar istaganicha nomzodlarga ustunlik berishlari mumkin. Ular faqat bitta tanlov qilishlari mumkin, "deb nomlanuvchio'q bilan ovoz berish ", va ba'zi yurisdiktsiyalar birinchi ustunlik uchun" X "belgisini haqiqiy deb qabul qilishadi. Buning natijasida saylovchilarning barcha afzalliklari nomzod ko'pchilik ovozi bilan saylanishidan oldin bekor qilinadigan passiv byulletenlarga olib kelishi mumkin. Ixtiyoriy imtiyozli ovoz berish Irlandiya prezidenti va Yangi Janubiy Uels qonunchilik assambleyasi.

A to'liq imtiyozli ovoz berish Saylovchilar har bir nomzod uchun ustunlik belgilashlari shart.[27] Barcha nomzodlarning to'liq buyurtmasi bo'lmagan saylov byulletenlari ayrim yurisdiktsiyalarda ko'rib chiqilgan buzilgan yoki faqat ikkita nomzod turgan bo'lsa ham yaroqsiz. Bu ko'plab nomzodlar ishtirokidagi saylovlarda og'ir bo'lishi mumkin va "eshak ovoz berish ", unda ba'zi saylovchilar shunchaki tasodifiy yoki yuqoridan pastgacha tartibda nomzodlarni tanlaydilar yoki saylovchi o'z xohlagan nomzodlariga buyurtma berib, so'ngra qolgan qismini eshak asosida to'ldirishi mumkin. To'liq imtiyozli ovoz berish saylovchilar uchun saylovlarda qo'llaniladi Avstraliya federal parlamenti va ko'pchilik uchun Shtat parlamentlari.

Boshqa usullar afzalliklarni belgilashga imkon beradi, aksariyat hollarda saylovchilarning eng yaxshi ko'rgan uchta favoritining eng ko'pi uchun qisman imtiyozli ovoz berish.[28]

Kvinslend

"Ixtiyoriy imtiyozli ovoz berish" ba'zi saylovlar uchun ishlatiladi Kvinslend.[29][30]

Tarix

Ushbu usul Kondorset tomonidan 1788 yildayoq ko'rib chiqilgan, ammo saylovchilarning aksariyati afzal ko'rgan nomzodni yo'q qilish qobiliyati uchun uni faqat qoralash kerak edi.[31][32]

IRV ni maxsus holat sifatida ko'rish mumkin bitta o'tkaziladigan ovoz usuli, qaysi 1850-yillarda foydalanishni boshladi. Bu tarixiy sifatida tanilgan Ware usuli, STV 1871 yilda amalga oshirilganligi sababli Garvard kolleji Amerika tomonidan me'mor Uilyam Robert Vare, kim uni bir g'olib saylovlarda ham ishlatilishini taklif qildi.[33][34] Biroq, ko'p o'rinli saylovlarda o'tkaziladigan yagona ovoz berishdan farqli o'laroq, saylov byulletenlarini o'tkazib yuborilgan nomzodlarning qo'llab-quvvatlovchilaridan yagona.

Hukumat saylovlarida IRVga o'xshash usuldan birinchi ma'lum bo'lgan 1893 yilgi umumiy saylovlar ichida Kvinslend koloniyasi (hozirgi Avstraliyada).[35] Ushbu saylov uchun ishlatilgan variant "shartli ovoz berish ", unda birinchi davradagi ikkita nomzoddan tashqari barcha nomzodlar chiqarib tashlanadi. IRV o'zining asl shaklida birinchi bo'lib ishlatilgan G'arbiy Avstraliya, ichida 1908 yilgi shtat saylovi. The Xare-Klark tizimi uchun joriy qilingan Tasmaniya Assambleyasi uyi da 1909 yilgi shtat saylovi.

IRV Avstraliyada o'tkazilgan federal (umummilliy) saylovlar uchun joriy etildi Oqqushga qo'shimcha saylov 1918 yil oktyabrda, konservatorning ko'tarilishiga javoban Mamlakat partiyasi, kichik dehqonlar vakili. Mamlakat partiyasi nodavlat partiyalarniMehnat konservativ mamlakat hududlarida ovoz berish, Leyboristlar nomzodlariga ko'pchilik ovozsiz g'alaba qozonishga imkon berish. Ning konservativ hukumati Billi Xyuz IRV (Avstraliyada "imtiyozli ovoz berish" deb nomlanadi) ni raqobatlashishga imkon beruvchi vosita sifatida joriy qildi Koalitsiya partiyalar o'rindiqlarni xavf ostiga qo'ymasdan. Bu birinchi marta ishlatilgan Korangamitga qo'shimcha saylov 1918 yil 14-dekabrda va milliy darajada 1919 yilgi saylov.[36] IRV koalitsiyaga foyda keltirishga qadar davom etdi 1990 yilgi saylov, birinchi marta mehnat IRVdan sof foyda olganida.[37]

Saylov tartibi

Jarayon

IRV ovozlarini hisoblash uchun oqim sxemasi

Bir zumda o'tkaziladigan ovoz berishda, boshqa darajadagi saylov usullarida bo'lgani kabi, har bir saylovchi nomzodlar ro'yxatini afzalligi bo'yicha tartiblaydi. Umumiy ostida ovoz berish tartibi, saylovchi eng ko'p tanlangan nomzodning yonida '1', ikkinchisining ustunligi yonida '2' belgisini qo'yadi va hokazo ortib borayotgan tartib. Bu yuqoridagi Avstraliya ovoz berishining misolida ko'rsatilgan.

Saylovchilarning qancha nomzodlar qatoriga kiritilgani va qanchasi noma'lum bo'lishidan qat'i nazar, jarayon mexanikasi bir xil. Ba'zi dasturlarda saylovchi xohlaganicha yoki kamroq tanlovni belgilaydi, boshqa dasturlarda esa talab qilinadi yoki barcha nomzodlarni, yoki ularning belgilangan miqdorini saralash.

Dastlabki hisobda har bir saylovchining birinchi afzalligi hisoblanadi va nomzodlarga buyurtma berish uchun foydalaniladi. Har bir birinchi imtiyoz tegishli nomzod uchun bitta ovoz sifatida hisoblanadi. Barcha birinchi imtiyozlar hisoblangandan so'ng, bitta nomzod a ga ega bo'lsa ko'pchilik, o'sha nomzod g'olib chiqadi. Aks holda eng kam imtiyozlarga ega bo'lgan nomzod chiqarib tashlanadi. Agar ovozlar sonida so'nggi o'rin uchun aniq tenglik bo'lsa, har xil taqvim qoidalari qaysi nomzodni yo'q qilishini belgilaydi. Ba'zi yurisdiktsiyalar bir vaqtning o'zida barcha past martabali nomzodlarni yo'q qiladi, ularning umumiy ovozlari qolgan eng past nomzodlar olgan ovozlar sonidan kam.

Yo'q qilingan nomzodlarga berilgan byulletenlar har bir saylov byulletenida navbatdagi afzallik asosida qolgan nomzodlardan birining jami natijalariga qo'shiladi. Jarayon bir nomzod davom etayotgan nomzodlar uchun berilgan ovozlarning ko'pchiligiga ega bo'lgunga qadar takrorlanadi. Saylovchilarning barcha nomzodlari chiqarib tashlangan byulletenlar passiv bo'lib qoladi.

Avstraliyadagi saylovlarda imtiyozlarni taqsimlash ovoz berish kabinasida norasmiy ravishda samarali amalga oshiriladi. qaytib kelgan ofitser ehtimoliy ikki g'olibni oldindan e'lon qiling. (Agar qaytib kelgan ofitser noto'g'ri bo'lsa, ovozlarni qayta hisoblash kerak).[iqtibos kerak ]

Saylov byulletenida nomzodning buyrug'i

The Avstraliya saylov komissiyasi saylov byulleteniga nomzodlarning tartibini aniqlash uchun ko'r-ko'rona ovoz berish, 2004 yil

Nomzodlarni saylov byulleteniga yozishning umumiy usullari alfavit bo'yicha yoki tasodifiy qur'a tashlash usulidir. Ba'zi hollarda nomzodlar siyosiy partiyalar tomonidan ham guruhlanishi mumkin. Shu bilan bir qatorda, Robson rotatsiyasi har bir bosma nashr uchun nomzodlar tartibini tasodifiy o'zgartirishni o'z ichiga oladi.

Partiya strategiyalari

Yig'ilish yoki kengashni saylash uchun imtiyozli ovoz berishdan foydalanilsa, partiyalar va nomzodlar ko'pincha o'z tarafdorlariga o'zlarining past afzalliklari haqida maslahat berishadi, ayniqsa Avstraliyada saylovchi haqiqiy ovoz berish uchun barcha nomzodlarni saralashi kerak. Bu "imtiyozli bitimlar" ga olib kelishi mumkin, bu saylovlar oldidan savdolashuvning bir shakli bo'lib, unda kichik partiyalar g'olib chiqqan partiyadan kichik partiya uchun muhim bo'lgan masalalarda qo'llab-quvvatlash evaziga o'z saylovchilarini yo'naltirishga rozi bo'lishadi.[iqtibos kerak ] Bundan tashqari, ba'zida o'xshash platformalarga ega nomzodlar o'rtasida qo'shma tashviqot olib borilishi mumkin. Biroq, ushbu strategiyalar partiya yoki nomzodning tarafdorlari o'z byulletenidagi boshqa afzalliklar bo'yicha maslahatlarni qabul qilishlari mumkin degan taxminlarga asoslanadi.

Logistikani hisoblash

IRV saylovlarining aksariyati tarixiy ravishda qo'l bilan hisoblab chiqilgan, shu jumladan saylovlarga qadar Avstraliya Vakillar palatasi va aksariyat shtat hukumatlari. Zamonaviy davrda ovoz berish uskunalari yordamida hisoblashni qisman yoki to'liq o'tkazish uchun foydalanish mumkin.

Avstraliyada endi qaytib kelgan ofitser odatda har bir o'ringa ega bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan ikkita nomzodni e'lon qiladi. Har bir nomzodning tekshiruvchilari tomonidan kuzatiladigan saylov uchastkasida har doim ovozlar qo'l bilan hisoblanadi. Hisoblashning birinchi qismi barcha nomzodlar uchun birinchi tanlovni yozib olishdir. Ikkala ehtimoliy g'oliblardan boshqa nomzodlar uchun ovozlar ularga ikkinchi o'tish paytida ajratiladi. Ovozlarni qo'lda hisoblash va imtiyozlarni taqsimlashning barcha jarayoni odatda saylovlar kechasi ikki soat ichida yakunlanib, 2010 yilda bitta saylovchiga 7,68 dollar miqdorida mablag 'sarflanadi.[38]

(Qaytgan ofitserning deklaratsiyasi shunchaki hisoblash jarayonini optimallashtirish uchun. Qaytgan ofitser noto'g'ri bo'lsa va uchinchi nomzod g'olib chiqsa, u holda ovozlarni uchinchi marta hisoblash kerak bo'ladi.)[39]

Irlandiya o'zining prezidentlik saylovlarida mamlakat bo'ylab bir necha o'nlab hisoblash markazlariga ega. Har bir markaz o'z yakunlari bo'yicha hisobot beradi va markaziy idoradan qaysi nomzodni oxirgi o'rinda ekanligiga qarab, hisoblashning navbatdagi bosqichida qaysi nomzod yoki nomzodlarni yo'q qilish to'g'risida ko'rsatmalar oladi. Hisoblash 1997 yildagidek, odatda saylovdan bir kun keyin yakunlanadi.[40]

Qo'shma Shtatlarda ushbu formatdan foydalanadigan deyarli barcha yurisdiktsiyalar o'xshash Meyn va shunga o'xshash shaharlar Oklend va San-Fransisko, ovoz berish mashinalarida IRV saylovlarini o'tkazing, optik skanerlash moslamalarida imtiyozlarni yozib oling va dasturlar IRV algoritmini ovozlarni yig'ish bilanoq hisoblang.[41] IRVni 2009 yilda birinchi marta ishlatishda, Minneapolis, Minnesota, saylov uchastkalarida optik skanerlash uskunalari bo'yicha birinchi tanlov natijalari aniqlandi, so'ngra IRV hisob-kitobi uchun markaziy hisoblagich ishlatildi, ammo shu vaqtdan beri saylovlarni qo'l hisob-kitobisiz o'tkazmoqda.[42] Portlend, Men 2011 yilda saylov uchastkalarida birinchi bo'lib ovoz berish uchun odatiy ovoz berish mashinalaridan foydalangan, so'ngra IRV hisob-kitobi zarur bo'lsa, turli jihozlar bilan markaziy skanerlash.[43]

Taktik ovoz berishga qarshilik

The Gibbard - Sattertvayt teoremasi faqat saylovchilarning imtiyozli reytinglaridan foydalangan holda biron bir (deterministik, diktatorliksiz) ovoz berish usuli taktik ovoz berishdan butunlay xoli bo'lmasligini namoyish etadi. Bu IRV ba'zi hollarda taktik ovoz berishga moyilligini anglatadi.

Tadqiqot natijalariga ko'ra, IRV nazariyachi bilan eng kam manipulyatsiya qilinadigan ovoz berish usullaridan biri hisoblanadi Nikolay Tideman "muqobil ovoz berish strategiyaga ancha chidamli" ekanligini ta'kidlab[44] va avstraliyalik siyosiy tahlilchi Antoniy Yashil taktik ovoz berish takliflarini rad etish.[45] Jeyms Green-Armytage to'rtta tanlov usulini sinab ko'rdi va alternativ ovozni taktik ovoz berishga nisbatan ikkinchi darajali deb topdi, garchi AV-Condorcet duragaylari sinfi tomonidan mag'lubiyatga uchragan bo'lsa-da, nomzodlar tomonidan strategik ravishda chiqib ketishga qarshilik ko'rsatmadi. .[46]

Monotonlik, Kondorset g'olibi va ishtirok etish mezonlariga javob bermasdan, IRV saylovchilar boshqa saylovchilarning afzalliklari to'g'risida etarli ma'lumotga ega bo'lganda taktik ovoz berish shakllariga ruxsat beradi, masalan, aniq saylov oldidan ovoz berish.[47] FairVote monotonlik muvaffaqiyatsizlikka olib kelishi mumkin bo'lgan vaziyatlarni keltirib chiqarishi mumkinligini ta'kidlaydi "birinchi navbatda ko'proq nomzodga ega bo'lish [nomzod], ularning g'olib bo'lishdan yutqazuvchiga aylanishiga olib kelishi mumkin".[48] Ushbu baho to'g'ri, garchi bu faqat muayyan vaziyatlarda sodir bo'lsa ham. Quyi nomzodlarning o'zgarishi muhim: ovozlar etakchi nomzodga o'tkaziladimi, chekka nomzodga o'tkaziladimi yoki umuman bekor qilinadimi, ahamiyati yo'q.

IRV-dagi taktik ovoz berish dastlabki turlarda chiqarib yuborish tartibini o'zgartirishga, so'nggi g'olibga kuchliroq raqib tomonidan g'olib bo'lishiga ishonch hosil qilish uchun harakat qiladi. Masalan, uch tomonlama saylovlarda chap va o'ng tomon saylovchilari "dushman" nomzodining g'olib bo'lishini to'xtatish uchun markazchi nomzodni afzal ko'rishganda, o'z nomzodini tanlashdan ko'ra "dushman" ni engish haqida ko'proq o'ylaydigan saylovchilar taktikani taklif qilishlari mumkin. markazchi nomzodga birinchi ustun ovoz berish.

2009 yil mer saylovi yilda Burlington, Vermont strategiya nazariy jihatdan ish berishi mumkin bo'lgan, ammo amalda bu ehtimoldan yiroq bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan misolni keltiradi. O'sha saylovda ikkinchi o'rinni egallagan nomzodning aksariyat tarafdorlari (birinchi tanlovda etakchi bo'lgan respublikachi) ustunlikni afzal ko'rishdi Kondorset g'olib, demokrat, IRV g'olibiga, Progressive Party nomzodiga. Agar Respublikachilar nomzodini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi 2951 kishidan 371 nafari (12,6%) (demokratni Demokratik partiyani merga progresiv nomzoddan ustun qo'yganlar) samimiyatsiz ravishda demokratni ikkinchi tanlovidan birinchi darajasiga ko'targan bo'lsa (o'z reytinglarini eng past darajaga nisbatan o'zgartirmagan). Demokrat eng sevimli nomzod - "Progressive", so'ngra so'nggi turga (ularning favoritlari o'rniga) o'tib, har qanday raqibini mag'lubiyatga uchratgan va IRV saylovlarida g'alaba qozongan bo'lar edi.[47] Bu o'zlarining eng yaxshi ko'rgan nomzodlarini chin dildan birinchi o'ringa qo'ygan ushbu saylovchilar o'zlarining eng sevimli nomzodlarini saylanishiga sabab bo'lganliklaridan keyin bilib olishlari, bu esa ovoz berish taktikasini keltirib chiqarishi mumkinligi sababli potentsial saylovchilarning afsuslanishining namunasidir murosa qilish. Respublikachilar birinchi tanlovda etakchilik qilgani va so'nggi bir zumda o'tgan saylovni ozgina yo'qotganligi sababli, uning tarafdorlari bunday strategiyani amalga oshirishi ehtimoldan yiroq emas edi.

Spoyler ta'siri

Spoyler effekti, saylov byulletenida (taxmin qilingan holda) yutqazadigan nomzod borligi sababli kutilgan saylov natijalari bilan farq qilishdir. Ko'pincha, siyosiy jihatdan o'xshash ikki yoki undan ortiq nomzodlar siyosiy spektrning yanada ommalashishi uchun ovozlarni ajratganda. Ya'ni, har bir kishi spektrning yoqimsiz uchida bitta raqibga qaraganda kamroq ovoz oladi, aksariyat saylovchilar uni yoqtirmaydi, ammo bu yoqimsiz tomonda ularga qarshilik ko'rsatilmaydi.

IRV tarafdorlari IRV spoyler ta'sirini yo'q qiladi,[49][50][51][52] IRV marginal partiyalarga halol ovoz berishni xavfsizligini ta'minlagani uchun: ko'plik usuli bo'yicha, marginal nomzodga eng yoqimli bo'lgan saylovchilar, aksincha, bir xil printsiplarga ega bo'lgan mashhurroq nomzodga ovoz berishga da'vat etiladi, chunki bu nomzod saylanish ehtimoli va marginal nomzod uchun ovoz berish marginal nomzodning saylanishiga olib kelmaydi. IRV usuli bu muammoni kamaytiradi, chunki saylovchi marginal nomzodni birinchi, asosiy nomzodni ikkinchi o'rinni egallashi mumkin; ehtimol nomaqbul nomzod yo'q qilingan taqdirda, ovoz bekorga sarflanmaydi, balki ikkinchi ustunlikka o'tkaziladi.

Biroq, uchinchi tomon nomzodi raqobatbardoshroq bo'lganda, ular IRV ostida buzg'unchilik vazifasini bajarishi mumkin,[53][54][55][56][57][58] bu nomzod yo'q bo'lgunga qadar ko'proq asosiy nomzoddan birinchi tanlov ovozlarini olib tashlash, keyin esa nomzodning ikkinchi tanlovi ko'proq yoqtirilmagan nomzodning g'olib bo'lishiga yordam berish orqali. Ushbu stsenariylarda, uchinchi tomon saylovchilari uchun ularning nomzodi umuman qatnashmagan bo'lsa (buzg'unchi effekti) yoki ular insofsiz ovoz berib, birinchi o'rniga sevgan soniyasini (sevgan xiyonati) o'rniga qo'yganlarida yaxshi bo'lar edi.[59][60]

Masalan, 2009 yil Berlington, Vermont merini saylash, agar yakuniy tezkor saylovda yutqazgan respublikachi nomzod qatnashmagan bo'lsa, Demokratik nomzod g'olib bo'lgan Progressive nomzodini mag'lub etgan bo'lar edi. Shu ma'noda, Respublikachilar nomzodi birinchi tanlovni qo'llab-quvvatlashda etakchi bo'lishiga qaramay, spoyler edi.[47][61]

The Tideman alternativ usuli oldin barcha nomzodlarni chiqarib tashlash orqali bunga yo'l qo'ymaydi Smit o'rnatdi yoki Shvarts o'rnatdi, keyin IRVning aynan bir turini bajarib, bu jarayonni Kondorset nomzodi paydo bo'lguncha takrorlang. Kondorsetning boshqa usullari ham turli xil qoidalar yordamida ushbu to'plamlardan tanlanadi; Tideman's IRVga o'xshash funktsionaldir.

Amalda, IRV nomzodlarni rad etmayotganga o'xshaydi. Masalan, 2007 yilda Avstraliyaning Vakillar palatasidagi saylovlarda bir okrugda o'rtacha nomzodlar soni etti kishini tashkil etgan va har bir okrugda kamida to'rt nomzod qatnashgan; Avstraliyada faqat ikkita yirik siyosiy partiyalar borligiga qaramay. Har bir o'rindiq ko'pchilik ovoz bilan qo'lga kiritildi, shu qatorda ko'pchilik ovoz berish natijasida natijalar har xil bo'lishi mumkin edi.[62] Saylov byulletenlari ma'lumotlarini o'rganish natijasida Kaliforniyadagi to'rtta Bay-Bayt shahrida bo'lib o'tgan 138 RCV saylovining barchasi Kondorset g'olibi bo'lganligi, shu jumladan nomzodlarning katta maydonlariga ega bo'lganlarning ko'pligi va g'olibni aniqlash uchun bir necha turda hisoblash zarur bo'lganligi aniqlandi.[63]

Proportionallik

IRV proportsional ovoz berish usuli emas. Barcha g'oliblarni qabul qilish usullari singari, IRV ham eng katta partiyalar qo'lga kiritgan o'rindiqlar sonini oshirib yuborishga intiladi; biron bir saylov okrugida ko'pchilikni qo'llab-quvvatlamagan kichik partiyalar qonun chiqaruvchi hokimiyatdan joy olishlari ehtimoldan yiroq emas, garchi ularning tarafdorlari eng kuchli ikki nomzod o'rtasida yakuniy tanlovning bir qismi bo'lishi ehtimoli ko'proq.[64] IRV simulyatsiyasi 2010 yil Buyuk Britaniyadagi umumiy saylov tomonidan Saylovni isloh qilish jamiyati saylov uchta asosiy partiyalar orasidagi o'rinlar muvozanatini o'zgartirgan bo'lar edi, ammo kichik partiyalar qo'lga kiritgan o'rindiqlar soni o'zgarishsiz qolishi mumkin edi degan xulosaga keldi.[65]

IRV-ni qonun chiqaruvchi organlarni saylashda foydalanishda uzoq yillik tajribaga ega bo'lgan Avstraliya o'zining parlamentida o'z vakolatiga ega bo'lib, kutganiga o'xshashdir. ko'plik usullari. O'rtacha partiyalar, masalan Avstraliya milliy partiyasi, bilan birgalikda mavjud bo'lishi mumkin koalitsiya kabi sheriklar Avstraliya Liberal partiyasi va ovozlarning bo'linishi sababli boshqa partiyalarga o'rinlardan mahrum bo'lishdan qo'rqmasdan unga qarshi raqobatlashishi mumkin, garchi odatda amalda bu ikki partiya faqat koalitsiyaning o'tirgan a'zosi parlamentni tark etganda o'zaro raqobatlashadi.[66] IRV biron bir partiyaning mutlaq ko'pchilik o'ringa ega bo'lmagan qonunchilik organlariga olib kelishi ehtimoli katta (a osilgan parlament ),[iqtibos kerak ] lekin odatda uchun ishlatilgan to'liq mutanosib usul sifatida parchalangan qonun chiqaruvchi organni ishlab chiqarmaydi Niderlandiyaning Vakillar palatasi, bu erda ko'pchilik uchun ko'plab kichik partiyalarning koalitsiyalari zarur.

Xarajatlar

IRV uchun saylov byulletenlarini bosib chiqarish va hisoblash xarajatlari bir xil texnologiyadan foydalangan holda boshqa usullardan farq qilmaydi. Ammo murakkabroq hisoblash tizimi amaldorlarni yanada zamonaviy texnologiyalarni, masalan, dasturiy ta'minot hisoblagichlari yoki elektron ovoz berish mashinalarini joriy etishga undashi mumkin. Pirs okrugi, Vashington, saylovlar bo'yicha rasmiylar IRVni 2008 yilda bo'lib o'tadigan saylovlari uchun dasturiy ta'minot va uskunalar, saylovchilarni o'qitish va test sinovlarini o'tkazish uchun 857 ming dollar miqdoridagi bir martalik xarajatlarni belgilab berishdi.[67]

Buning uchun ikkita alohida ovoz kerak emasligi sababli, IRV arzonroq narxga ega deb hisoblanadi ikki davra asosiy / umumiy yoki umumiy / ikkinchi bosqich saylovlari usullari.[68] Biroq, 2009 yilda auditor Pirs okrugi tizimning doimiy xarajatlari aksariyat okrug idoralari uchun oqimlarni yo'q qilish xarajatlari bilan mutanosib bo'lmasligi kerakligi haqida xabar berdi, chunki bu saylovlar IRV tomonidan tanlanmagan boshqa idoralar uchun kerak bo'lishi mumkin.[69] Boshqa yurisdiktsiyalar zudlik bilan xarajatlarni tejash to'g'risida xabar berishdi.[70]

Avstraliyadagi saylovlar qo'l bilan hisoblanadi. 2010 yilgi federal saylovlar bir saylovchiga jami 7,68 dollarni tashkil etdi, shundan faqat ozgina qismi ovozlarni haqiqiy sanashdan iborat.[38] Endi sanab chiqish, odatda, yuqorida aytib o'tilganidek, saylov uchastkasida bitta o'tish joyida amalga oshiriladi.

IRV usulini tatbiq etish uchun sarf qilingan xarajatlar yoki tejash odatda tarafdorlar va tanqidchilar tomonidan qo'llaniladi. 2011 yilda Buyuk Britaniyada muqobil ovoz berish bo'yicha referendumda YO'Q kampaniya ushbu usulni qo'llash 250 million funt sterlingga tushishini da'vo qilgan holda boshlandi; sharhlovchilarning ta'kidlashicha, ushbu sarlavha ko'rsatkichi referendumning o'zi uchun sarflangan xarajatlar uchun 82 million funt sterlingni, shuningdek, vazirlar ovoz berish tizimining yo'qligini tasdiqlaganida, Buyuk Britaniyada elektron ovoz berish tizimlarini joriy qilishi kerak degan taxmin bilan yana 130 million funtni o'z ichiga olgan holda oshirilgan. saylov natijalari qanday bo'lishidan qat'i nazar, bunday texnologiyani amalga oshirish niyati.[71] Ovozlarni avtomatlashtirilgan tarzda hisoblash, ba'zilarning fikricha, saylovlarni soxtalashtirish uchun ko'proq imkoniyatga ega;[72] IRV tarafdorlari ushbu da'volarga tavsiya etilgan auditorlik protseduralari bilan qarshi,[73] yoki avtomatlashtirilgan hisoblash usul uchun umuman talab qilinmasligini unutmang.

Saylovoldi tashviqoti

Jon Russo, Oklend shahrining advokati Oakland Tribune 2006 yil 24 iyulda "Bir zumda o'tkaziladigan ovoz berish salbiy tashviqot kasalligiga qarshi vositadir. IRV San-Frantsiskoda nomzodlarni yanada kooperatsiya olib borishiga olib keldi. Usulga binoan ularning nomzodlari salbiy tashviqot olib borish ehtimoli kamroq edi, chunki bunday taktikalar saylovchilarni chetlashtirishga olib kelishi mumkin edi. "hujumga uchragan" nomzodlarni "qo'llab-quvvatlovchi saylovchilar, ikkinchi yoki uchinchi tanlov sifatida tajovuzkorni qo'llab-quvvatlash imkoniyatini kamaytiradi.[74][75]

2013–2014 yillarda Rutgers-Eagleton Poll tomonidan o'tkazilgan mahalliy saylovlardan so'ng 21 ta shaharda 4800 dan ziyod saylovchilar o'rtasida so'rov o'tkazildi - ularning yarmi IRV saylovlari o'tkazilgan shaharlarda va 14 ta loyiha rahbarlari tomonidan tanlangan shaharlarda Kerolin Tolbert Ayova universiteti va G'arbiy Vashington universiteti Todd Donovan. Topilmalar orasida IRV shaharlaridagi respondentlarning ta'kidlashicha, nomzodlar IRVdan foydalanmagan shaharlarga qaraganda raqiblarini tanqid qilishga kam vaqt sarflashgan. Masalan, 2013 yilgi so'rovda respondentlarning 5% i nomzodlar bir-birlarini "juda ko'p vaqt" ni tanqid qilishdi, aksincha IRV bo'lmagan shaharlarda 25%. Nomzodlar bilan olib borilgan so'rovda shunga o'xshash topilmalar haqida xabar berilgan.[76]

Xalqaro miqyosda Benjamin Reyli bir zumda o'tkaziladigan ovoz berish bo'lingan jamiyatlarda etnik mojaroni yumshatishni taklif qiladi.[77] Bu xususiyat nima uchun etakchi dalil edi Papua-Yangi Gvineya bir zumda ovoz berishni qabul qildi.[78] Biroq, lord Aleksandrning Britaniya mustaqil komissiyasining Ovoz berish tizimi hisoboti bo'yicha xulosalariga e'tirozlari[79] Avstraliyaning misolini keltiradi "ularning siyosatchilari, bizning siyosatimiznikidan ko'ra, ko'proq ochiq va oshkora bo'lishadi".

Ko'p ovoz berish

IRVning ayrim tanqidchilari ba'zi saylovchilar boshqa saylovchilarga qaraganda ko'proq ovoz oladi, degan fikrni noto'g'ri tushunishadi. Yilda Ann Arbor, Michigan Masalan, IRVga oid gazetalarga yo'llangan xatlardagi tortishuvlarga IRV "ozchilik nomzodlarga saylovchilarga ikki ovoz beradi" degan ishonch kiritilgan, chunki ba'zi saylovchilarning byulletenlari birinchi turda birinchi, keyinroq esa ozroq tanlovni hisoblashi mumkin.[80] IRV vakili bo'lgan dalil ko'plikdagi ovoz berish ba'zan usulning "adolatliligi" bo'yicha tortishuvlarda ishlatiladi va Qo'shma Shtatlarda bir nechta huquqiy muammolarga olib keldi. Har bir holatda, shtat va federal sudyalar ushbu dalilni rad etishdi.

Ushbu dalil 1975 yilda Michigan sudi tomonidan ko'rib chiqilgan va rad etilgan; yilda Stivenson - Shahar kanvasserlari Ann Arbor kengashi, sud "ko'pchilik uchun imtiyozli ovoz berish" ni o'tkazdi (IRV o'sha paytlarda ma'lum bo'lgan) Michigan va Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari konstitutsiyalariga muvofiq bo'lib, quyidagilarni yozdi:[81]

"M.P.V. Tizimi" ga binoan, hech kim yoki saylovchi bitta idora uchun bir nechta samarali ovozga ega emas. Bitta nomzod uchun biron bir saylovchining ovozi hisoblanishi mumkin emas. Yakuniy tahlilda biron bir saylovchiga o'z ovozida boshqa saylovchining ovoziga nisbatan ko'proq og'irlik berilmaydi, ammo buni tushunish uchun "MPV System" ning ta'siri ikkinchi davra natijalariga o'xshashligini kontseptual tushunishni talab qiladi. saylov. Ann Arbor shahrining merini saylashda ko'pchilikning imtiyozli ovoz berish shakli bir kishining bitta ovozli mandatini buzmaydi va hech kimni Michigan yoki Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari konstitutsiyalariga muvofiq teng himoya qilish huquqidan mahrum qilmaydi.

Xuddi shu dalil Meyndagi IRVga qarshi bo'lib o'tdi. Hokim Pol LePage 2018 yilgi asosiy saylovlar oldidan IRV "aksincha," bir kishi, besh ovoz "ga olib keladi" deb da'vo qildibitta kishi, bitta ovoz ".[82] Natijalari bo'yicha sud jarayonlarida Meynning 2-kongress okrugi uchun 2018 yilgi saylov, Vakil Bryus Poliquinning ta'kidlashicha, IRV raqiblariga "bitta saylovda uch xil nomzod uchun ovoz berishga" ruxsat bergan.[83] Federal sudya Lens Uolker bu da'voni rad etdi va 1-tuman sudi Poliquinning favqulodda apellyatsiya shikoyatini rad etdi, natijada Poliquin o'z da'vosini bekor qildi.[84]

Yaroqsiz byulletenlar va to'liq bo'lmagan byulletenlar

Byulleteni belgilash ancha murakkab bo'lganligi sababli buzilgan byulletenlarning ko'payishi mumkin. Avstraliyada saylovchilar har bir nomzodning yoniga raqam yozishlari shart,[85] buzilgan byulletenlar darajasi ko'plikdagi saylovlarga qaraganda besh baravar yuqori bo'lishi mumkin.[86] Avstraliyada ovoz berish majburiy bo'lganligi sababli, qancha byulleten ataylab buzilganligini aniqlash qiyin.[87] To'liq reyting talab qilinmasa, saylov byulletenidagi biron bir tanlov keyingi bosqichga o'tmasa, saylov byulleteni passiv bo'lib qolishi mumkin.

IRV-ning aksariyat yurisdiktsiyalari to'liq reytinglarni talab qilmaydi va raqamlar o'rniga ustunlikni ko'rsatish uchun ustunlardan foydalanishi mumkin. IRV bilan o'tkazilgan Amerika saylovlarida saylovchilarning 99% dan ko'prog'i to'g'ri ovoz berishdi.[88]

IRV-dan foydalangan AQShdagi to'rtta mahalliy saylovlarni 2015 yilda o'rganish shuni ko'rsatdiki, passiv byulletenlar har birida etarlicha tez-tez sodir bo'lgan, har bir saylov g'olibi birinchi bosqichda berilgan ovozlarning ko'pchiligini ololmagan. Har bir saylovda passiv byulletenlarning stavkasi eng past 9,6% dan yuqori va 27,1% gacha bo'lgan.[89] Taqqoslashning bir nuqtasi sifatida, 1994 yildan 2016 yilgacha AQSh Uyi va AQSh Senati uchun muntazam ravishda rejalashtirilgan 190 ta birlamchi takroriy saylovlarda berilgan ovozlar soni boshlang'ich boshlang'ich saylovidan o'rtacha 39% ga kamaydi, deyiladi FairVote.[90]

Robertning tartib qoidalari

Qo'shma Shtatlarda IRV tomonidan qo'llaniladigan ketma-ket yo'q qilish usuli tasvirlangan Robertning yangi tahrir qilingan tartib qoidalari[14] misol sifatida imtiyozli ovoz berish:

Imtiyozli ovoz berish atamasi bir nechta ovoz berish usullarini nazarda tutadi, bunda bitta saylov byulletenida ikkitadan ortiq tanlov mavjud bo'lganda, saylovchilarning ikkinchi yoki kamroq afzal qilingan tanlovlari hisobga olinishi mumkin, agar biron bir nomzod yoki taklifga javob bermasa. ko'pchilik. Umumiy foydalanishdagi boshqa ovoz berish usullariga qaraganda ancha murakkab va ko'pchilik ovoz olguncha takroriy ovoz berishning odatdagi tartibini o'rnini bosa olmasa-da, imtiyozli ovoz berish, ayniqsa, pochta orqali o'tkazilgan saylovda foydalidir va adolatli bir nechta byulleten. Bunday hollarda, ko'pchilik ovoz berishi kerak bo'lgan qoidadan ko'ra ko'proq vakillik natijasini beradi ... Imtiyozli ovoz berish juda xilma-xil. Bitta usul bu erda tasvirlash orqali tasvirlangan.[91]

So'ngra tezkor ovoz berish usuli batafsil bayon qilinadi.[92]Robertning qoidalari davom etadi:

Yuqorida aytib o'tilgan imtiyozli ovoz berish tizimidan bitta nomzod yoki taklif ko'pchilik ovozini olguniga qadar takroriy ovoz berishning odatiy tartibiga rioya qilish mumkin bo'lgan hollarda foydalanilmasligi kerak. Ushbu turdagi imtiyozli byulletenlar ko'plik bilan saylovlardan afzalroq bo'lishiga qaramay, takroriy ovoz berishga qaraganda kamroq tanlov erkinligini beradi, chunki bu saylovchilarga avvalgi ovoz berish natijalariga ko'ra ikkinchi yoki kamroq tanlovlarini asoslash imkoniyatini rad etadi va nomzod yoki taklif oxirgi o'rinda avtomatik ravishda yo'q qilinadi va shu bilan murosali tanlov bo'lishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik mumkin.[93]

Amerikalik parlament protsedurasiga oid yana ikkita kitob xuddi shunday pozitsiyani egallaydi, ko'pchilik ovoz berishni ma'qullamaydi va imtiyozli ovoz berishni variant sifatida tavsiflaydi, agar qonun hujjatlarida tasdiqlangan bo'lsa, takroriy ovoz berish maqsadga muvofiq emas: Parlament protsedurasining standart kodeksi[94] va Riddikning protsedura qoidalari.[95]

Global foydalanish

Shunga o'xshash usullar

Ovoz berishning ikkinchi bosqichi

Atama tezkor ovoz berish Ikkinchi ovoz berish deb nomlangan ovoz berish usullari sinfining nomidan kelib chiqqan. Saylovning ikkinchi bosqichida saylovchilar nomzodlarni bitta byulletendagi ustunlik tartibiga ko'ra belgilamaydilar. Buning o'rniga shunga o'xshash effekt bir nechta ovoz berish turlaridan foydalanish orqali erishiladi. Ikki bosqichli ovoz berishning barcha usullari saylovchilarga har bir turda o'z qarorlarini ta'sir qilish uchun oldingi tur natijalarini hisobga olgan holda o'z afzalliklarini o'zgartirishga imkon beradi. IRVda bu mumkin emas, chunki ishtirokchilar bir martagina ovoz berishadi va bu ba'zi bir shakllarini taqiqlaydi taktik ovoz berish bu "standart" ikkinchi bosqich ovoz berishida keng tarqalgan bo'lishi mumkin.

To'liq ovoz berish

IRV ga yaqin usul bu to'liq saylov byulleteni. Ushbu usulda - televizion shou muxlislariga tanish American Idol - har bir turdan keyin bitta nomzod chiqarib tashlanadi va faqat ikkita emas, balki ko'plab ovoz berish turlaridan foydalaniladi.[96] Ovoz berishning ko'plab turlarini alohida kunlarda o'tkazish odatda qimmatga tushganligi sababli, keng qamrovli ommaviy saylovlarda to'liq byulleten ishlatilmaydi.

Ikki bosqichli usullar

Ikkinchi bosqichda ovoz berishning eng oddiy shakli bu ikki davrali tizim, odatda birinchi bosqichdan keyin nomzodlarni bosqichma-bosqich chiqarib tashlash o'rniga, ikkitadan tashqari barcha nomzodlarni chiqarib tashlaydi. Oxirgi ikki nomzodni tanlash uchun imtiyozli ovoz berishga ruxsat berilmasdan yoki qo'llanilmasdan olib tashlash mumkin. Ovoz berishning ikkinchi bosqichi yoki hisoblash faqat biron bir nomzod ovozlarning ko'pchiligini ololmagan taqdirdagina zarur. Ushbu usul Frantsiyaning Mali shahrida va Finlyandiya va Sloveniya prezidentlik saylovlarida qo'llaniladi.

Shartli ovoz berish

Top-IRV

The shartli ovoz berish, shuningdek, nomi bilan tanilgan Top-IRV, yoki ommaviy uslubda, IRV bilan bir xil, faqat biron bir nomzod ovozlarning birinchi turida ko'pchilikni qo'lga kirita olmasa, eng ko'p ovoz olgan ikkala nomzoddan tashqari barchasi chiqarib tashlanadi va bu byulletenlarning ikkinchi afzalliklari hisoblanadi. IRVda bo'lgani kabi, faqat bitta ovoz berish davri mavjud.

Da ishlatiladigan shartli ovoz berish variantiga ko'ra Shri-Lanka va uchun saylovlar London meri in the United Kingdom, voters rank a specified maximum number of candidates. Londonda Supplementary Vote allows voters to express first and second preferences only. Sri Lankan voters rank up to three candidates uchun Shri-Lanka prezidenti.

While similar to "sequential-elimination" IRV, top-two can produce different results. Excluding more than one candidate after the first count might eliminate a candidate who would have won under sequential elimination IRV. Restricting voters to a maximum number of preferences is more likely to exhaust ballots if voters do not anticipate which candidates will finish in the top two. This can encourage voters to vote more taktik jihatdan, by ranking at least one candidate they think is likely to win.

Conversely, a practical benefit of 'contingent voting' is expediency and confidence in the result with only two rounds. Particularly in elections with few (e.g., fewer than 100) voters, numerous ties can destroy confidence. Heavy use of tie-breaking rules leaves uncomfortable doubts over whether the winner might have changed if a recount had been performed.

Larger runoff process

IRV may also be part of a larger runoff process:

  • Some jurisdictions that hold runoff elections allow absentee (only) voters to submit IRV ballots, because the interval between votes is too short for a second round of absentee voting. IRV ballots enable absentee votes to count in the second (general) election round if their first choice does not make the runoff. Arkanzas, Janubiy Karolina va Sprinfild, Illinoys ushbu yondashuvni qabul qiling.[97] Louisiana uses it only for members of the United States Service or who reside overseas.[98]
  • IRV can quickly eliminate weak candidates in early rounds of an to'liq saylov byulleteni runoff, using rules to leave the desired number of candidates for further balloting.
  • IRV allows an arbitrary victory threshold in a single round of voting, e.g., 60%. In such cases a second vote may be held to confirm the winner.[99]
  • IRV elections that require a majority of cast ballots but not that voters rank all candidates may require more than a single IRV ballot due to exhausted ballots.
  • Robert's Rules recommends imtiyozli ovoz berish for elections by mail and requiring a majority of cast votes to elect a winner, giving IRV as their example. For in-person elections, they recommend repeated balloting until one candidate receives an absolute majority of all votes cast. Repeated voting allows voters to turn to a candidate as a compromise who polled poorly in the initial election.[14]

The common feature of these IRV variations is that one vote is counted per ballot per round, with rules that eliminate the weakest candidate(s) in successive rounds. Most IRV implementations drop the requirement for a ko'pchilik of cast ballots.[100]


Voting method criteria

Scholars rate voting methods using mathematically-derived ovoz berish usuli mezonlari, bu usulning kerakli xususiyatlarini tavsiflovchi. No ranked-preference method can meet all of the criteria, because some of them are mutually exclusive, as shown by statements such as Okning mumkin emasligi teoremasi va Gibbard - Sattertvayt teoremasi.

Many of the mathematical criteria by which voting methods are compared were formulated for voters with ordinal preferences. If voters vote according to the same ordinal preferences in both rounds, criteria can be applied to ikki davrali tizimlar of runoffs, and in that case, each of the criteria failed by IRV is also failed by the ikki davrali tizim as they relate to automatic elimination of trailing candidates. Partial results exist for other models of voter behavior in the two-round method: see the two-round system article's criterion compliance section qo'shimcha ma'lumot olish uchun.

Satisfied criteria

Kondorsetni yo'qotish bo'yicha mezon

The Condorcet loser mezonda "agar nomzod yutqazsa a head-to-head competition against every other candidate, then that candidate must not win the overall election". IRV (like all voting methods with a final runoff round) meets this criterion, since the Condorcet loser cannot win a runoff, however IRV can still elect the "second-worst" candidate, when the two worst candidates are the only ones remaining in the final round.[101] However, this is unlikely.

Klonlar mustaqilligining mezonlari

The klonlar mezonining mustaqilligi states that "the election outcome remains the same even if an identical candidate who is equally preferred decides to run." IRV meets this criterion.[102]

Keyinchalik zararli bo'lmagan mezon

The keyinchalik - zarari yo'q criterion states that "if a voter alters the order of candidates lower in his/her preference (e.g. swapping the second and third preferences), then that does not affect the chances of the most preferred candidate being elected".

Ko'pchilik mezonlari

The ko'pchilik mezonlari states that "if one candidate is preferred by an absolute majority of voters, then that candidate must win".

O'zaro ko'pchilik mezonlari

The mutual majority criterion states that "if an absolute majority of voters prefer every member of a group of candidates to every candidate not in that group, then one of the preferred group must win". Note that this is satisfied because when all but one candidate that a mutual majority prefer is eliminated, the votes of the majority all flow to the remaining candidate, in contrast to FPTP, where the majority would be treated as separate small groups.

Qayta tiklanish mezonlari

The resolvability criterion states that "the probability of an exact tie must diminish as more votes are cast".

Non-satisfied criteria

Diagrams showing the non-monotonicity of IRV compared to plurality voting, as well as ovoz berish va Kondorset usullari (both of which give similar results to the first column); Each point represents the winner of a simulated election with the center of opinion at that point; In IRV, shifting the center of opinion towards a candidate can make that candidate lose, while shifting away from a candidate can make that candidate win.

Kondorset g'olibi mezoni

The Kondorets g'olibi mezonda "agar nomzod g'alaba qozonsa a head-to-head competition against every other candidate, then that candidate must win the overall election". It is incompatible with the later-no-harm criterion, so IRV does not meet this criterion.

IRV is more likely to elect the Condorcet winner than ko'pchilik ovoz berish va traditional runoff saylovlar. The California cities of Oakland, San Francisco and San Leandro in 2010 provide an example; there were a total of four elections in which the plurality-voting leader in first-choice rankings was defeated, and in each case the IRV winner was the Condorcet winner, including a San Francisco election in which the IRV winner was in third place in first choice rankings.[103]

Systems which fail Condorcet but pass mutual majority can exclude voters outside the mutual majority from the vote, essentially becoming an election between the mutual majority.[iqtibos kerak ] IRV demonstrates this exclusion of up to 50% of voters, notably in the 2009 yil Berlington, Vermont merini saylash where the later rounds became a runoff between the mutual majority of voters favoring Andy Montroll and Bob Kiss. This can takrorlash: if a mutual majority exists within the mutual majority, then the majority becomes a collegiate over the minority, and the inner mutual majority solely decides the votes of this collegiate.

Muvofiqlik mezoni

The izchillik criterion states that if dividing the electorate into two groups and running the same election separately with each group returns the same result for both groups, then the election over the whole electorate should return this result. IRV, like all preferential voting methods which are not pozitsion, does not meet this criterion.

Muvofiq bo'lmagan alternativalar mezonining mustaqilligi

The ahamiyatsiz alternativalarning mustaqilligi mezonga ko'ra, "g'alaba qozona olmagan nomzod qatnashishga qaror qilgan taqdirda ham saylov natijalari bir xil bo'lib qoladi". In the general case, instant-runoff voting can be susceptible to strategik nominatsiya: whether or not a candidate decides to run at all can affect the result even if the new candidate cannot themselves win.[104] This is much less likely to happen than under plurality.[iqtibos kerak ]

Monotonlik mezonlari

The monotonlik criterion states that "a voter can't harm a candidate's chances of winning by voting that candidate higher, or help a candidate by voting that candidate lower, while keeping the relative order of all the other candidates equal." Allard[105] claims failure is unlikely, at a less than 0.03% chance per election. Ba'zi tanqidchilar[106] argue in turn that Allard's calculations are wrong and the probability of monotonicity failure is much greater, at 14.5% under the xolis madaniyat election model in the three-candidate case, or 7–10% in the case of a chap-o'ng spektr. Lepelli va boshq. find a 2%–5% probability of monotonicity failure under the same election model as Allard.[107] The diagram shows the non-monotonicity of IRV, where moving the center of opinion away from a candidate can help that candidate win, and moving the center of opinion towards a candidate can cause that candidate to lose.

Ishtirok etish mezonlari

The ishtirok etish criterion states that "the best way to help a candidate win must not be to abstain".[108] IRV does not meet this criterion: in some cases, the voter's preferred candidate can be best helped if the voter does not vote at all.[109] Depankar Ray finds a 50% probability that, when IRV elects a different candidate than Plurality, some voters would have been better off not showing up.[110]

Reversal symmetry criterion

The reversal simmetriya criterion states that "if candidate A is the unique winner, and each voter's individual preferences are inverted, then A must not be elected". IRV does not meet this criterion: it is possible to construct an election where reversing the order of every ballot paper does not alter the final winner.[109]


Misollar

Some examples of IRV elections are given below. The first two (fictional elections) demonstrate the principle of IRV. The others offer examples of the results of real elections.

Five voters, three candidates

A simple example is provided in the accompanying table. Three candidates are running for election, Bob, Bill and Sue. There are five voters, "a" through "e". The voters each have one vote. They rank the candidates first, second and third in the order they prefer them. To win, a candidate must have a majority of vote; that is, three or more.

In Round 1, the first-choice rankings are tallied, with the results that Bob and Sue both have two votes and Bill has one. No candidate has a majority, so a second "instant runoff" round is required. Since Bill is in bottom place, he is eliminated. The ballot from any voter who ranked Bill first (in this example solely voter "c" ) gets modified as follows: the original 2nd choice candidate for that voter becomes their new 1st choice, and their original 3rd choice becomes their new 2nd choice. This results in the Round 2 votes as seen below. This gives Sue 3 votes, which is a majority.

1-tur2-tur
NomzodabvdeOvozlarabvdeOvozlar
Bob123122122122
Sue312312211213
Bill231231

Tennessee capital election

Most instant-runoff voting elections are won by the candidate who leads in first-choice rankings[iqtibos kerak ], choosing the same winner as post-the-post ovoz berish. As an example Australia the 1972 yilgi federal saylov had the highest proportion of winners who would not have won under first past the post - with only 14 out of 125 seats not won by the plurality candidate.[111]

Some IRV elections are won by a candidate who finishes second after the first-round count. In this case, IRV chooses the same winner as a ikki davrali tizim if all voters were to vote again and maintain their same preferences. A candidate may also win who is in third place or lower after the first count, but gains majority support (among the non-eliminated candidates) in the final round. In such cases, IRV would choose the same winner as a multi-round method that eliminated the last-place candidate before each new vote, assuming all voters kept voting and maintained their same preferences. Here is an example of this last case.

Tennessi va uning to'rtta yirik shahri: janubi-g'arbiy qismida Memfis; Markazda Nashvill, janubda Chattanooga va sharqda Noksvill

Buni tasavvur qiling Tennessi uning joylashgan joyi bo'yicha saylov o'tkazmoqda poytaxt. Tennesi shtati aholisi shtat bo'ylab tarqalgan to'rtta yirik shahar atrofida to'plangan. Ushbu misol uchun, deylik saylovchilar bu to'rtta shaharda yashaydi va har kim imkon qadar poytaxtga yaqin joyda yashashni xohlaydi.

Poytaxtga nomzodlar:

  • Memfis, shtatning eng katta shahri, saylovchilarning 42 foizi ishtirok etgan, ammo boshqa shaharlardan uzoqda joylashgan
  • Neshvill, saylovchilarning 26% ishtirokida, shtat markaziga yaqin
  • Noksvill, saylovchilarning 17% ishtirok etdi
  • Chattanuga, 15% saylovchilar bilan

Saylovchilarning afzalliklari quyidagicha taqsimlanadi:

Saylovchilarning 42%
(Memfisga yaqin)
26% saylovchilar
(Nashvillga yaqin)
15% saylovchilar
(Chattanuga yaqinida)
Saylovchilarning 17%
(Noksvillga yaqin)
  1. Memfis
  2. Neshvill
  3. Chattanuga
  4. Noksvill
  1. Neshvill
  2. Chattanuga
  3. Noksvill
  4. Memfis
  1. Chattanuga
  2. Noksvill
  3. Neshvill
  4. Memfis
  1. Noksvill
  2. Chattanuga
  3. Neshvill
  4. Memfis

It takes three rounds to determine a winner in this election.

TN-round1.svg

1-tur – In the first round no city gets a majority:

Votes in round/
City Choice
1-chi
Memfis42%
Neshvill26%
Noksvill17%
Chattanuga15%

If one of the cities had achieved a majority vote (more than half), the election would end there. If this were a first-past-the-post election, Memphis would win because it received the most votes. But IRV does not allow a candidate to win on the first round without having an absolute majority of the vote. While 42% of the electorate voted uchun Memphis, 58% of the electorate voted qarshi Memphis in this first round.

TN-round2.svg

2-tur – In the second round of tabulation, we remove the city with the least first-place support from consideration. Chattanooga received the lowest number of votes in the first round, so it is eliminated. The ballots that listed Chattanooga as first choice are added to the totals of the second-choice selection on each ballot. Everything else stays the same.

Chattanooga's 15% of the total votes are added to the second choices selected by the voters for whom that city was first-choice (in this example Knoxville):

Votes in round/
City Choice
1-chi2-chi
Memfis42%42%
Neshvill26%26%
Noksvill17%32%
Chattanuga15%

In the first round, Memphis was first, Nashville was second and Knoxville was third. With Chattanooga eliminated and its votes redistributed, the second round finds Memphis still in first place, followed by Knoxville in second and Nashville has moved down to third place. This example however makes the unlikely assumption that all voters who selected a certain city first would rank the subsequent cities in the same order. In reality, some first-choice supporters of Chattanooga may have had Nashville as their second choice rather than Knoxville, resulting in Knoxville's elimination in Round 3.

TN-round3.svg

3-tur – No city yet has secured a majority of votes, so we move to the third round with the elimination of Nashville, and it becomes a contest between Memphis and Knoxville.

As in the second round with Chattanooga, all of the ballots currently counting for Nashville are added to the totals of Memphis or Knoxville based on which city is ranked next on that ballot. In this example the second-choice of the Nashville voters is Chattanooga, which is already eliminated. Therefore, the votes are added to their third-choice: Knoxville.

The third round of tabulation yields the following result:

Votes in round/
City Choice
1-chi2-chi3-chi
Memfis42%42%42%
Neshvill26%26%
Noksvill17%32%58%
Chattanuga15%

Natija: Knoxville, which was running third in the first tabulation, has moved up from behind to take first place in the third and final round. The winner of the election is Noksvill. However, if 6% of voters in Memphis were to put Nashville first, the winner would be Nashville, a preferable outcome for voters in Memphis. This is an example of potential tactical voting, though one that would be difficult for voters to carry out in practice. Also, if 17% of voters in Memphis were to stay away from voting, the winner would be Nashville. This is an example of IRV failing the participation criterion.

For comparison, note that traditional post-the-post ovoz berish would elect Memphis, even though most citizens consider it the worst choice, because 42% is larger than any other single city. As Nashville is a Condorcet winner, Kondorset usullari would elect Nashville. A two-round method would have a runoff between Memphis and Nashville where Nashville would win, too.

1990 yil Irlandiya prezidentlik saylovi

Irish presidential election, 1990[112]
Nomzod1-tur2-tur
Meri Robinson612,265(38.9%)817,830(51.6%)
Brayan Lenixan694,484(43.8%)731,273(46.2%)
Ostin Kurri267,902(16.9%)
Charchagan byulletenlar9,444(0.6%)34,992(2.2%)
Jami1,584,095(100%)1,584,095(100%)

Natijasi 1990 yil Irlandiya prezidentlik saylovi provides an example of how instant-runoff voting can produce a different result from post-the-post ovoz berish. The three candidates were Brayan Lenixan of the traditionally dominant Fianna Fayl ziyofat, Ostin Kurri ning Nozik Gael va Meri Robinson nomzodi Mehnat partiyasi va Ishchilar partiyasi. After the first round, Lenihan had the largest share of the first-choice rankings (and hence would have won a first-past-the-post vote), but no candidate attained the necessary majority. Currie was eliminated and his votes reassigned to the next choice ranked on each ballot; in this process, Robinson received 82% of Currie's votes, thereby overtaking Lenihan.

2014 Prahran election (Victoria)

A real-life example of IRV producing a result which differs from what would be expected under a birinchi o'tgan yoki two-round voting system is the result for the seat of Prahran ichida 2014 yil Viktoriya shtatidagi saylov. In this instance, it was the candidate who initially finished uchinchi (Yashillar nomzod Sem Xibbins ) in the primary vote went on to win the seat on the back of favourable preferences from the other two minor parties and independents, narrowly beating the second-ranked candidate (Mehnat candidate Neil Pharaoh) by 31 votes, and the first-ranked candidate (Liberal nomzod Klem Nyuton-Braun ) by 277 votes. It was not until the final round of counting that one of the two remaining candidates (Hibbins) had more than 50% of the total vote.[113]

Nomzod[113]Primary VoteBirinchi davraIkkinchi davraUchinchi turTo'rtinchi turBeshinchi turOltinchi tur
Klem Nyuton-Braun (LIB )16,58244.8%16,59216,64416,72616,84317,07618,36349.6%
Neil Pharaoh (ALP )9,58625.9%9,5939,6399,6909,7589,948
Sem Xibbins (GRN )9,16024.8%9,1719,2189,3109,4039,97918,64050.4%
Eleonora Gullone (AJP )8372.3%860891928999
Alan Uoker (FFP )2820.8%283295
Jason Goldsmith (IND )2470.7%263316349
Steve Stefanopoulos (IND )2270.6%241
Alan Menadue (IND )820.2%
Jami37,003100%

2009 yil Berlington shahar meri saylovi

Burlington mayoral election, 2009 (Round by round analysis of votes)
Nomzodlar1-tur2-tur3-tur
NomzodPartiyaOvozlar±Ovozlar±Ovozlar±
Bob KissProgressiv2585+25852981+3964313+1332
Kurt RaytRespublika2951+29513294+3434061+767
Andy MontrollDemokrat2063+20632554+4910−2554
Dan SmitMustaqil1306+13060−1306
Jeyms SimpsonYashil35+350−35
Yozish36+360−36
EXHAUSTED PILE4+4151+147606+455
JAMI[114]8980+8980

Unlike Burlington's first IRV mayoral election in 2006, the IRV winner in 2009 (Bob Kiss) was neither the same as the ko'plik winner (Kurt Wright) nor the Kondorset winner (Andy Montroll).[115][116][117][118] Because of the post-election controversy,[119] IRV was repealed in 2010 by a vote of 52% to 48%.[120][121]

Tashkilot FairVote, which advocates for IRV, claimed the election as a success, citing three reasons (1) it prevented the election of the presumed winner under a plurality system by avoiding the effect of ovozlarni taqsimlash between the other candidates, (2) 99.99% of the ballots were valid suggesting that voters handled the system without difficulty, and (3) "contributed to producing a campaign among four serious candidates that was widely praised for its substantive nature."[122] However, the election was considered a failure by advocates of the Kondorets g'olibi, who point out that "in a head to head election, Andy Montroll should have beaten Bob Kiss by a 7.8% margin".[116][117][123]

In this case, a mutual majority causes a lock-out of a sufficiently-large (eg plurality) minority. In examples where a smaller minority would break the lock-out va would change the winner in their favor, the participation criterion is violated. Wright voters were 40%, versus voters who placed Montroll and Kiss above Wright at 51.5%. That means a lot of Wright voters would have had to stay home for their demographic to matter at all, causing a participation criterion failure. If Wright voters preferred Montroll over Kiss, it would have been more advantageous to abstain or not give Wright their first preference; this would then result in Montroll reaching the final runoff and beating Kiss (54% to 46%), as opposed to the actual final runoff between Wright and Kiss

Burlington mayoral election, 2009 (Summary analysis)
PartiyaNomzodMaksimal
Dumaloq
Maksimal
Ovozlar
Baham ko'ring
Maksimal
Dumaloq
Maksimal ovozlar
Birinchi davra ovozlariOvozlarni o'tkazish


ProgressivBob Kiss34,31348.0%
RespublikaKurt Rayt34,06145.2%
DemokratikAndy Montroll22,55428.4%
MustaqilDan Smit11,30614.5%
YashilJeyms Simpson1350.4%
Yozish1360.4%
Exhausted votes6066.7%

Shuningdek qarang

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  115. ^ Bouricious, Terry (2009 yil 13 mart). "Nuqta / qarama-qarshi nuqta: Terri professor Gierzinskiyni yirtib tashlamoqchi bo'lgan zo'r urinishlar - ovoz berishdagi ziddiyatli zudlik bilan yangisini yangisini (endi Gierzinskiyning barcha yangi yangilanishlari bilan!)". Vermont kundalik brifingi. Arxivlandi asl nusxasi 2015 yil 19 oktyabrda. Olingan 27 sentyabr 2017. 2009 yilgi saylovlar nafaqat "to'sqinlik qilingan ko'pchilik" yoki Kondorset paradoksidan, balki "namoyishsiz paradoks" dan ham aziyat chekdi, chunki Rayt saylovchilari Montrolni Kissdan afzal ko'rgan (ya'ni Montroll 2-o'rinni olgan) uyda qolish yaxshiroq bo'lar edi va umuman ovoz bermaslik.
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  117. ^ a b Olson, Brayan (2009). "2009 yil Berlington shahar hokimi IRVda muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan".. bolson.org. Olingan 1 oktyabr 2017. Bu IRV ishlamay qoldi. IRV natijasi aniq odamlar xohlagan narsa emas. Aksincha, Montrollni o'pish orqali boshqalarga qaraganda yoqdi, ammo IRV yutqazuvchini tanladi.
  118. ^ Sheldon-hess, Dale (2009 yil 16 mart). "IRV o'z hovlisida muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchradi". Hamma yomonliklarning eng ozi. Olingan 27 sentyabr 2017. Monrol yakkama-yakka saylovda boshqa har qanday nomzodni mag'lub etgan bo'lar edi.
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  122. ^ Buricius, Terri (2009 yil 17 mart). "Burlington IRV saylovining noto'g'ri tahliliga javob". FairVote.org. Olingan 1 oktyabr 2017. ehtimol ko'plik qoidalari bo'yicha g'alaba qozongan, ammo ikkinchi bosqichda boshqa eng yaxshi ishtirokchilarga yutqazgan nomzodning saylovini muvaffaqiyatli to'xtatdi.
  123. ^ "Burlingtonning 2009 yilgi mer saylovi: IRV saylovchilarni muvaffaqiyatsiz qoldirdimi?". Integral psixoz. 2009 yil 16 mart. Olingan 1 oktyabr 2017. Montroll "Beats-All" g'olibi edi (aka "Kondorset g'olibi"), chunki u Raitni (56% dan 44% gacha) va Kissni (54% dan 46% gacha) mag'lubiyatga uchratgan bo'lar edi va buni namoyish etdi u ko'pchilik saylovchilar tomonidan afzal ko'rilgan nomzod edi.

Izohlar

  1. ^ AQSh shtatlari Alyaska va Meyn ikkalasi ham o'zlarining prezidentlik saylovlari uchun zudlik bilan ikkinchi bosqichni (yoki eng yaxshi tanlovni) ovoz berishni qabul qilishadi (Meyn 2020 yilgi AQSh saylovlarida o'z saylovlarini boshlaydi, Alyaska esa 2022 yilgi Alyaskada bo'lib o'tadigan saylovlarda foydalanishni boshlaydi). Qolgan 48 ta shtatdan foydalanishda davom etadi Postdan oldingi ovoz berish.

Tashqi havolalar

Amaliyot

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