Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi - Joint Special Operations Command

"JSOC" bu erga yo'naltiriladi. Bu bilan aralashmaslik kerak JSpOC.

Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi
Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligining muhri (JSOC) .svg
Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligining emblemasi
Faol1980 yil 15-dekabr - hozirgi kunga qadar
Mamlakat Qo'shma Shtatlar
SadoqatAmerika Qo'shma Shtatlari
TuriSub-birlashtirilgan jangovar buyruq
RolMaxsus operatsion kuchlar
Hajmi4000 (taxmin)[1]
QismiAmerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi Insignia.svg Maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi
Garrison / shtabBragg Fort, Shimoliy Karolina
Taxallus (lar)JSOC
AmaliyotlarEagle Claw operatsiyasi
"Shoshilinch g'azab" operatsiyasi
"Faqatgina sabab" operatsiyasi
"Cho'l bo'roni" operatsiyasi
Operatsion qulaylikni ta'minlaydi
Gotik ilon operatsiyasi
Demokratiyani qo'llab-quvvatlash operatsiyasi
Bosniya urushi
Ittifoq kuchlari operatsiyasi
Terrorizmga qarshi urush
Veb-saythttps://www.socom.mil/Pages/jsoc.aspx
Qo'mondonlar
Qo'mondonGeneral-leytenant Scott A. Howell[2]
Katta maslahatchisiCSM Devid J. Bleyk

The Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi (JSOC) qo'shma komponent hisoblanadi buyruq ning Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi (USSOCOM) va o'qish uchun to'lov olinadi maxsus operatsiyalar birgalikda ishlashni va jihozlarni standartlashtirishni ta'minlash talablari va texnikasi; maxsus operatsion mashqlar va mashg'ulotlarni rejalashtirish va o'tkazish; qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar taktikasini ishlab chiqish; va butun dunyo bo'ylab maxsus operatsiyalarni bajarish. Tavsiyasi bilan 1980 yilda tashkil etilgan Polkovnik Charli Bekvit, muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchraganidan keyin Eagle Claw operatsiyasi.[3] Bu joylashgan Papa maydoni (Bragg Fort, Shimoliy Karolina ).

Umumiy nuqtai

JSOC "bu maxsus operatsiyalar talablari va texnikasini o'rganish; birgalikda ishlashni va jihozlarni standartlashtirishni ta'minlash; qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar mashg'ulotlarini va mashg'ulotlarini rejalashtirish va o'tkazish; qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar taktikasini ishlab chiqish uchun ishlab chiqilgan qo'shma shtab" dir.[4] Ushbu vazifa uchun Qo'shma aloqa bo'limi turli xil maxsus operatsion birliklarning aloqa tizimlari va standart operatsion protseduralarining muvofiqligini ta'minlash uchun topshirilgan.

Maxsus missiya bo'linmalari

Qo'shimcha ma'lumotlar: Maxsus missiya bo'limi

Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi ham nazorat qiladi The Maxsus missiya bo'linmalari ning AQSh maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi. Bular elita maxsus operatsiya kuchlari yuqori toifadagi faoliyatni amalga oshiruvchi birliklar.[5][6][7] Hozirga qadar faqat oltita SMU oshkor qilindi:

Razvedkani qo'llab-quvvatlash faoliyatining asosiy vazifasi DEVGRU va Delta Force-ni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun chuqur razvedka, razvedka ma'lumotlarini yig'ish maxsus missiyasi. Delta Force va DEVGRU - bu harbiylarning terrorizmga qarshi kurashning asosiy bo'linmalari, yo'q qilish yuqori qiymatli maqsadlar va ijro etish garovga olinganlarni qutqarish bilan birga ularning asosiy rollari maxsus razvedka va to'g'ridan-to'g'ri harakat topshiriqlar. 24-maxsus taktika otryadi tarkibni ushbu ikkita qismga yordamchi sifatida biriktiradi Urush nazorati ta'minlash uchun havo harakatini boshqarish va olovni qo'llab-quvvatlash, Pararescuemen ta'minlash uchun jangovar tibbiyot va jangovar qidiruv va qutqarish va Taktik havo nazorati partiyasi mutaxassislari muvofiqlashtirish yaqin havo qo'llab-quvvatlashi. The Qo'shma aloqa bo'limi aloqa imkoniyatlarini ta'minlaydi. Armiyaning 75-qo'riqchi polkidan bo'linmalar va 160-maxsus operatsion aviatsiya polki kabi JSOC Ishchi kuchlari tarkibiga kiritilganda JSOC tomonidan boshqariladi Tezkor guruh 121 va Maxsus guruh 145.[10][11][12]

JSOC bilan operatsion aloqalar mavjud Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi "s Maxsus tadbirlar markazi (SAC).[13]SAC Maxsus Operatsiyalar Guruhi (SOG) ko'pincha JSOC SMU xodimlaridan yollanadi.[14]

Murakkab kuch operatsiyalari

Advanced Force Operations (AFO) - tomonidan ishlatiladigan atama AQSh Mudofaa vazirligi xodimlarni o'z ichiga olgan maxsus guruhni tavsiflash Delta Force, Polk razvedka kompaniyasi (RRC) va SEAL Team Six. Ko'pgina joylarda uchta o'zaro ishlashga qodir kichik guruh bo'lib birgalikda ishlaydigan operatorlarning aralashmasi bo'ladi. Ko'pgina hollarda Delta Force operatorlarining ma'lum bir to'plamini tavsiflash uchun ishlatiladigan atama bo'lsa ham, keyinchalik "AFO" atamasi uzoq masofali RECCE / uzoq masofali maqsadli taqiqlash operatsiyalarini va boshqalarni bajaradigan aralash maxsus missiya elementlarini tavsiflash uchun ishlatilgan. uni o'tkazgan general Maykl Repassga Iroq urushi va uning Afg'onistonda ishlatilishi bilan juda yaxshi tanish edi ", - dedi AFO AQSh mudofaa vaziri kabi harbiy operatsiyalarni tasdiqlagan yashirin operatsiyalar. Bu mantiqiy ravishda Battlespace operatsion tayyorgarligining (OPB) tarkibiy qismidir, bu quyidagilar Jang maydonini aql bilan tayyorlash, AQShda taniqli kontseptsiya va NATO doktrinasi, OPB kamdan-kam hollarda SOF kanallaridan tashqarida ishlatiladi. OPB AQSh maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi tomonidan "oldin amalga oshirilgan razvedkadan tashqari faoliyat Kun, H-soat, ehtimoliy yoki mumkin bo'lgan ish joylarida, o'qitish va keyingi harbiy operatsiyalarga tayyorgarlik ko'rish ".[15]

Iroq urushida birinchi bo'lib buyruq bergan Repass 10-maxsus kuchlar guruhi, qo'shma boshqaruvni o'z qo'liga oldi An'anaviy bo'lmagan urush AFO o'tkazish uchun 5 va 10 guruhlardan foydalangan Tezkor guruh. AFO birliklari katta jalb qilingan Anakonda operatsiyasi va Viking Hammer operatsiyasi.

JSO to'plami / rotatsion guruh

Qo'shma Shtatlar maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligining Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar to'plami / rotatsion guruhi 1-darajali va 2-darajali AQSh qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi bo'linmalaridan iborat bo'lib, ular birgalikda tayyorlanadi va joylashadi.[iqtibos kerak ] Barcha 1-darajali va 2-darajali bo'linmalar o'zlarining bo'linmalarida uchta alohida operativ guruhni olib boradilar (misol tariqasida 75-qo'riqchi polkining 1, 2 va 3-batalyonlari).[16] Ushbu guruhlar asosan bir xil va o'zlarining tegishli JSOC paketlarida joylashadilar. Aylanish tsikli odatda uch oyga to'g'ri keladi. Bu bir guruhni chet elda, ikkinchisini 18 soatlik butun dunyo bo'ylab favqulodda vaziyatlar to'g'risida ogohlantirishda, oxirgi guruh esa mashg'ulotlar, harbiy maktablarda qatnashish yoki "blokirovka ta'tilida" bo'lishga imkon beradi. 1-darajali va 2-darajali birliklar o'zlarining tegishli JSOC to'plami doirasida ta'tilga chiqishadi. Ushbu atama blokirovka ta'tili deb nomlanadi. JSOC-ning urush davridagi vazifasini hisobga olgan holda, hozirda qo'shimcha tarqatish to'plami yaratilmoqda. Bu ushbu bo'linmalarda kamroq operatsion zo'riqishlarga imkon beradi.

Xavfsizlikni qo'llab-quvvatlash

JSOC ichki huquqni muhofaza qilish idoralariga yuqori darajadagi yoki yuqori xavfli hodisalar paytida yordam ko'rsatdi Olimpiada, Jahon kubogi, siyosiy partiyalar qurultoylari va Prezidentning inauguratsiyasi. Garchi AQShda huquqni muhofaza qilish maqsadida harbiy xizmatdan foydalanish odatda tomonidan taqiqlangan bo'lsa ham Posse Comitatus qonuni, 10-sarlavha AQSh kodeksi Mudofaa kotibiga harbiy xizmatchilarga Federal, shtat va mahalliy fuqarolik huquqni muhofaza qilish organlari xodimlarini jihozlardan foydalanish va ularga texnik xizmat ko'rsatishni o'rgatish uchun tayyor bo'lishiga aniq ruxsat beradi; va huquqni muhofaza qilish idoralarining mansabdorlariga mutaxassislarning maslahati bilan ta'minlash.[17] Bundan tashqari, fuqarolik va harbiy huquqshunoslar bir nechta federal qonunlar, jumladan 2000 yilgi Moliya yili Mudofaa vazirligining avtorizatsiya to'g'risidagi qonuni, 106-65-sonli davlat qonuni, mudofaa vaziriga harbiy kuchlarga fuqarolik idoralarini, shu jumladan, Federal tergov byurosi, milliy favqulodda vaziyatlarda, ayniqsa yadro, kimyoviy yoki biologik qurol bilan bog'liq har qanday vaziyatda.[18]

2005 yil yanvar oyida xavfsizlikni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun komandolarning kichik guruhi tarqatildi Prezident inauguratsiyasi. Gumon qilinishicha, ular terrorizmga qarshi maxfiy dastur asosida joylashtirilgan Quvvatli geyser. The Nyu-York Tayms yuqori martabali harbiy amaldorning so'zlariga ko'ra: "Ular tez-tez potentsial WMD voqealari atrofida joylashgan noyob harbiy va texnik imkoniyatlarga ega", - deydi muxbir tomonidan dastur haqida aytilgan fuqarolik erkinliklari himoyachisi, dasturga ta'riflanganidek hech qanday e'tirozi yo'qligini aytdi. chunki uning ko'lami faqat fuqarolik hokimiyatining aksilterror harakatlarini qo'llab-quvvatlash bilan cheklangan ko'rinadi.[18]

Operatsion tarixi

Ning bir qismi sifatida Terrorizmga qarshi urush, JSOC butun dunyodagi ko'plab mamlakatlarda, xususan muvaffaqiyatsiz va muvaffaqiyatsiz davlatlarda jihodchilarning xavfsiz boshpana topishini to'xtatish maqsadida operatsiyalarni amalga oshiradi, bu operatsiyalar ikkita ijro buyrug'i ostida amalga oshiriladi - 2004 y. Al-Qoida tarmog'i Buyurtmani bajaradi: bu JSOCga Qo'shma Shtatlar hozirda urush olib bormaydigan / bo'lmagan o'ndan ortiq mamlakatda ishlashga imkon berdi (ulardan ba'zilari quyidagilarni o'z ichiga oladi: Livan, Liviya, Mali, Nigeriya, Peru va Somali ); va 2009 yil Qo'shma noan'anaviy urushlar bo'yicha maxsus guruh buyruqni bajaradi: bu JSOC-ga AQSh harbiy xizmatiga ehtiyoj sezilishi mumkin bo'lgan mamlakatlarda oldindan kuch, razvedka va inson razvedkasi operatsiyalarini o'tkazishga ruxsat berdi.[19]

"Doimiy Ozodlik" operatsiyasi - Afg'oniston

Davomida 2001 yil Afg'onistonga bostirib kirish, qismi sifatida Qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalarni tezkor guruhi (CJSOTF) generalning umumiy rahbarligi ostida Tommi Franks, Koalitsiya kuchlari qo'mondoni (CENTCOM),[20] JSOC to'g'ridan-to'g'ri qo'mondonligi ostida "Task Force Sword" deb nomlanuvchi maxsus operatsiyalar bo'yicha maxsus guruh tashkil etildi. Bu edi qora SOF bo'limi, uning asosiy maqsadi yuqori rahbariyatni va ikkalasida ham HVTni qo'lga olish yoki o'ldirish edi al-Qoida va Toliblar. TF Qilich dastlab operatorlarning ikki eskadron komponenti atrofida tuzilgan Delta Force (Ishchi guruh Yashil) va DEVGRU (Task Force Blue), a tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadi Ranger himoya kuchlari guruhlari (Vazifa kuchi qizil) va ISA tutish va kuzatuv operatorlari signallari (Task Force Orange) va 160-SOAR (Ishchi guruh Brown). Inglizlar Maxsus qayiq xizmati to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Qilichlar tarkibiga kiritilgan; ba'zi boshqa koalitsiyalar maxsus operatsiyalarni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun TF qilichiga biriktirilgan.[21]

2001 yil 19 oktyabrda TF qilichidan Delta Force eskadrilyasi ma'lum bo'lgan vazifani bajargan Maqsad Gecko uning maqsadi Tolibon rahbarini o'ldirish yoki qo'lga olish edi Mulla Umar, ular HVT-ni topa olmadilar va Reynjersni qo'llab-quvvatladilar - kuchli otishmada qatnashdilar va o'nlab talafot ko'rgan paytda 30 tolib jangarisini o'ldirdilar. M squad SBS operatorlari TF qilich tarkibida bir nechta topshiriqlarni bajarishdi; sifatida Tora Bora jangi Pokiston chegara skautlari, JSOC va Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi a'zolari yordam bergani taxmin qilinib, 17 dekabr kuni chegaradan o'tib, 300 nafar chet ellik jangarini qo'lga oldilar. 2002 yil 17 martda Anakonda operatsiyasining so'nggi kunlari, DEVGRU operatorlari (shu jumladan biriktirilgan SBS operatori) va TF 11 dan Rangers (ilgari TF Qilich nomi bilan tanilgan - 2002 yil yanvarida o'zgartirilgan) mumkin bo'lgan Al-Qoida HVT yukini olib ketayotgan konvoyni ushlab qolishdi, ular 18 al-Qoida jangarisini o'ldirishdi va qo'lga olishdi. Keyinchalik 2002 yilda CJSOTF keng ko'lamli CJTF-180 tarkibidagi yagona integral qo'mondonga aylandi, u AQShning "Doimiy Ozodlik-Afg'oniston" operatsiyasiga tayinlangan barcha kuchlariga qo'mondonlik qildi. To'g'ridan-to'g'ri CJTF-180 buyrug'i ostida bo'lmagan kichik JSOC elementi (ilgari Task Force Sword / 11) CJSOTF tarkibiga kiritilgan, uni buyruqni aylantirgan qo'shma SEAL va Ranger elementi boshqargan. Bu to'g'ridan-to'g'ri emas edi ISAF qo'mondonlik, garchi u NATO operatsiyalarini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun ishlagan bo'lsa ham.[22][23]

Mamlakatdagi JSOC ishchi guruhi, Task Force 11 - Ranger kompaniyasining DEVGRU eskadrilyasi tomonidan boshqarilgan va 160-SOAR kompaniyasi qo'llab-quvvatlagan, vaqti-vaqti bilan garovga olinganlarni qutqarish vazifalarini bajargan. 2005 yil sentyabr oyida Britaniyaning xavfsizlik bo'yicha pudratchisini Tolibon isyonchilari o'g'irlab ketishdi Farax viloyati, JSOC Ishchi guruhi u qaerda saqlanayotganini topishga muvaffaq bo'ldi - Bala Boluk yaqinidagi tog'li hududda - ammo JSOC Ishchi guruhi (DEVGRU tomonidan amalga oshirilgan qutqaruv harakati) uni toliblar o'ldirgan. 2006 yilda JSOC Ishchi guruhiga biriktirilgan 75-qo'riqchi polkidan olti kishilik RRD (Regimental Recovery-Detachment) jamoasi Hindu Kush razvedka ma'lumotlariga ko'ra, isyonchilar boshlig'i Xoqani Pokistondan Afg'onistonga kirib kelishini ko'rsatganidan keyin. Tashkil etganidan keyin OP dengiz sathidan deyarli 4000 m balandlikda joylashgan RRD jamoasi o'z maqsadlarini kutishdi va kutishdi, chunki isyonchilar hududga etib kelishganida, Ranger guruhi ko'rilgan va o'qqa tutilgan. Bunga javoban, RRD biriktirilgan JTAC orbitada chaqirilgan B-1B strategik bombardimonchi isyonchilarni "pummel" qilish uchun, taxminan 100 kishi havo hujumlarida o'ldirilgan, ammo ular orasida Haqqoniy yo'q edi.[24]

2007 yil may oyida ISA guruhi va JSOC Tolibon etakchisini kuzatib borishdi Mulla Dadulloh Bahram Chah yaqinidagi binoga, Hilmand viloyati. ISA uning o'sha erda ekanligini tasdiqladi va Britaniyaning SBS razvedka elementi bu kashfiyotni amalga oshirdi, bu Dadullohni kamida 20 nafar isyonchi himoya qilganligini ko'rsatdi. 2007 yil 12 mayda ISA nishonni kuzatgan holda, SBS otryadining SBS qo'shilishi RAF CH-47D Chinooks Dadullulani ko'kragiga va boshiga o'q uzib o'ldirgan.[25]

2009 yil 9 sentyabrda JSOC UAV Buyuk Britaniyaning SBS va SFSG qutqarishda Nyu-York Tayms jurnalist Stiven Farrell Tolibon tomonidan qo'lga olingan va Tolibonning xavfsiz uyida saqlangan Char-Dara tumani, Qunduz viloyati.[26]

2010 yil boshida brigada generali Scott Miller Afg'onistonga CJSOTF-Afg'onistonga qo'mondonlik qilish uchun yuborilgan, u ziddiyatli qadamni qo'ydi (bilan Stenli Makkristal teatrdagi deyarli barcha SOFni ALP / VSO dasturi (Afg'oniston mahalliy politsiyasi / qishloq barqarorligi operatsiyalari) deb nomlanuvchi yangi qo'zg'olonga qarshi rolga tayinlash. Afg'oniston kuchlari va JSOC Ishchi guruhi (11-ishchi guruh) bilan ishlaydigan ma'lum sheriklik guruhlari bundan ozod qilingan.[27]

2013 yilda chiqarilgan tasniflanmagan SOCOMda JSOC Tezkor guruhining (11-sonli ishchi guruh) roli "Afg'onistonda Tolibon, al-Qoida va Haqqani tarmoqlari GIRoA (Afg'oniston Islom Respublikasi hukumati) va AQShning barqarorligi va suverenitetiga tahdid soladigan operatsion jihatdan muhim joylarni tashkil etishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun. "Ko'p yillar davomida 11-maxsus guruhning nishonlari al-Qoida va al-Qoida bo'lib qoldi. Haqani tarmog'i kabi aloqador guruhlar, al-Qoida nishonlarini ovlash bo'yicha transchegaraviy operatsiyalar bilan bir qatorda JSOC Ishchi guruhi ham Afg'onistondagi Tolibon rahbariyatini nishonga olgan.[28]

Filmga ko'ra Nopok urushlar, tomonidan Jeremy Scahill, JSOC Afg'onistondagi qator reydlar uchun javobgar edi. Ulardan biri bo'lib o'tdi Gardez, dastlab tomonidan xabar qilingan Jerom Starki ammo keyinchalik boshqa ommaviy axborot vositalarida ham. O'sha paytda amaldagi qo'mondon Uilyam Makreven zarar ko'rgan oilaga tashrif buyurib, ularga qo'yni qaytarib berishni taklif qildi va voqea uchun uzr so'radi.[29] Hodisada,[30] AQShda o'qitilgan politsiya qo'mondoni va yana bir erkak, erkaklar yordamiga ketayotganda, 3 nafari ayol, 2 nafari homilador bo'lgan o'ldirildi.

Bu vaqt ichida yana qancha reydlar bo'lgan va bundan oldin va undan beri JSOC faqat Oq Uyga javob beradi, qolgan harbiylar emas.[iqtibos kerak ] Bosqinlar soni haqidagi maxfiylikni ular boshlaganidan beri yuzlab hisoblash mumkin edi, ammo Scahillning so'zlariga ko'ra, Gardezdagi voqea haqida juda oz sonli hujjatlashtirilgan.[31][32]

Iroq ozodligi operatsiyasi

Shuningdek qarang: Iroq urushidagi qo'shma maxsus operatsiyalar qo'mondonligi tezkor guruhi

Davomida 2003 yil Iroqqa bostirib kirish, JSOCs Task Force 20 koalitsiyaning Afg'onistonga bostirib kirishi paytida Task Force 11 / Qilich asosida tuzilgan va g'arbiy Iroqqa tayinlangan. TF asosan tarkib topgan Qora JSOC dan SOF birliklari: B eskadron Delta Force va 75-qo'riqchi polkining barcha 3 batalyoni; ning batalyon kuch elementi 82-havo-desant diviziyasi, QRF va qo'shimcha sifatida xizmat qilish; va a HIMARS; keyinchalik C Company, 2-batalyondan M1A1 Abrams tanklariga bostirib kirishda 70-zirh TF 20 ga biriktirilgan. TF 20 ning asosini tashkil etdi Ar'Ar Iroqdagi aerodromlarni egallab olish va uzoq masofali maxsus razvedka bilan birga HVTlarni egallash vazifasi yuklandi. 2003 yil 19 mart oqshomida Ijroiya chegarasidan Ijroiya, Saudiya Arabistoni va Kuvaytdan Task Force 20, Task Force Dagger, Task Force 7 va 64 ning quruqlikdagi elementlari norasmiy ravishda TF 20 va TF 7 va 64 bilan birga bo'lgan. Iroq bir necha hafta davomida. Ga borishdan oldin Hadisa to'g'oni razvedka o'tkazish va natijada uni 3 / 75th, TF 20s Delta Force birligi bilan qo'lga olishda koalitsiya SOFga yordam berish H-3 havo bazasi; 3/75-chi "Reynjers" esa parashyutda sakrab tushdi H-1 havo bazasi, 26 martda, B kompaniyasining Reynjers 20/2-75-sonli ishchi guruhi DEVGRUga yordam berib, ob'ektiv Beaverga hujum qildi - al-Qadisiyah tadqiqot markazi kimyoviy va biologik qurol zaxiralarida gumon qilinmoqda, ammo kimyoviy qurolga oid dalillar yo'q edi. Delta Force shuningdek avtomagistral 1 xavfsizligini ta'minladi; TF 20 rejalashtirilgan va uning birliklari qutqarildi PFC Jessica Linch 2003 yil 1 aprelda.[33]

2003 yil may oyida TF 20 elementlari bosqindan keyin Iroqda qoldi va to'g'ridan-to'g'ri JSOC qo'mondonligi ostida qadimgi Baasistlarni ovlashga o'tdi. 2003 yil iyul oyida 5-sonli ishchi guruh (ilgari 11-sonli ishchi guruh) va 20-sonli ishchi kuchlar birlashib, 21-sonli guruhni tuzdilar va keyinchalik 121-guruh deb nomlandi.[34] 2003 yil sentyabr oyida, General-mayor Stenli A. Makkristal JSOC qo'mondonligini qabul qilish uchun tayinlangan; uning vazifasi zo'ravonlik oqimining ko'tarilishi ortida aynan kim turganligi to'g'risida razvedka ma'lumotlarini to'plash va aniq maqsadli maxsus kuchlarning reydlarini o'tkazish orqali uni maqsadli ravishda bostirish edi;[35] JSOC asosan Iroqdagi xorijiy jangchilar va Pokistondagi al-Qoida rahbariyati o'rtasidagi aloqalarga qiziqish bildirgan. JSOC buyruq berdi Tezkor guruh 121 - buyruq TF 121 Delta Force va JSOCning boshqa elementlarini talab qilinadigan darajada Afg'oniston va Iroq o'rtasida almashtirishga imkon beradigan tarzda o'rnatildi. 2003 yil yozida, Paradoxical operatsiyasi doirasida Britaniyaning SAS Delta Force va JSOC bilan "kestirib qo'shildi", ammo 2003 yil qishda ular Boshliq qo'mondonligiga topshirildi. Nortvuddagi qo'shma operatsiyalar shubha tufayli Whitehall a'zolari Iroqdagi Buyuk Britaniyaning missiyasi haqida - SASning JSOC va Makkristal bilan ishlashini qiyinlashtirmoqda. 2003 yilning so'nggi haftalarida polkovnik Styuart Herrington tekshiruvida bo'lgan Nama lageri (o'sha paytda u TF 121 Iroqdagi asosiy operatsiya markazi edi), xususan, u hibsga olish va so'roq qilish joylarini ko'zdan kechirdi, natijada u bosh razvedka zobitiga xabar berdi Bag'dod TF 121 tomonidan asirga olingan iroqliklarda yomon muomala alomatlari bo'lganligi. Keyingi oylarda bir qator tergov o'tkazildi va Nama lageriga oid jami 29 ta shikoyat tekshirildi, 5 tasi qondirildi, natijada 34 askarga nisbatan intizomiy jazo qo'llanildi. Bir qator voqealar Makkristal JSOC qo'mondonligini olganidan keyin sodir bo'lgan, ammo JSOC operatsiyalarini qamrab olganligi sababli, Iroqda faqat maxfiy operatsiyalarni olib borgan oylarida u vaqti-vaqti bilan bo'lgan. CENTCOM "s operatsiyalar maydoni Shimoliy Afrikadan, Yaqin Sharq orqali Janubiy Osiyoga.[36]

2004 yilning dastlabki oylariga kelib, JSOC qochqinlarni to'plash uchun mavjud bo'lgan eng yaxshi ma'lumotlardan foydalangan Baatist, shu jumladan Saddam Xuseyn, 2004 yil boshida ko'plab etakchilar "kartalar to'plami" raqamlar hisobga olingan edi. 2004 yil bahoriga kelib, Makkristal Iroqni o'zining ustuvor vazifasiga aylantirdi va hibsga olinganlarni suiiste'mol qilish darajasi bilan shug'ullanishni boshladi Nama lageri. Makkristal - "tarmoqni mag'lub qilish uchun siz tarmoq yaratishingiz kerak" deb hisoblagan holda - Camp Nama-ni yopib qo'ydi Bag'dod aeroporti va yangi baza tashkil etdi Balad, u erda yaratgan a san'at darajasi JOC (Birlashgan Operatsiyalar Markazi), bu erda Iroqdagi JSOCs urushi Delta Force qo'mondoni tomonidan kundan-kunga olib boriladigan bo'lib, baza 2004 yil iyul oyigacha ishga tushirilgan edi. Baladda har xil razvedka idoralarining jamoalari ham tashkil etilgan; Ma'lumot to'plangandan so'ng, Makkristal hammasini Afg'onistonda yaratganiga o'xshash JSOC intranetiga qo'shib qo'ydi, bu AQShning terrorizmga qarshi kurashining eng chekkasida turganlarga butun dunyo bo'ylab ma'lumot almashish imkoniyatini berdi, Makkristal shuningdek, o'zaro bog'lanish idoralari tarmog'ini yaratdi. Yaqin Sharq bo'ylab o'z xalqi tomonidan. Terrorizmga qarshi tarmoq shakllanishi uchun 2004 yilning ko'p qismi kerak bo'ldi. 2004 yil 27 martda JSOC kuzatuv guruhi Falluja murosaga kelgan va muammodan qutulish yo'lini tanlashi kerak edi. Britaniya hukumati - javoban Abu Graib qiynoqqa solinishi va mahbuslarga nisbatan zo'ravonlik janjal va Pokistonlik 2 terrorist LeT Aston operatsiyasida SAS tomonidan qo'lga olingan va AQShdagi muassasada so'roq qilish uchun Iroqdan chiqarib yuborilgan. Bagram havo bazasi (inglizlarga noma'lum, Iroqda hibsga olinganlarni skrining qilish uchun lingvistik mahoratga ega bo'lgan biron bir tergovchi yo'q edi) - agar ular boshqa joyga uchib ketmoqchi bo'lsalar, ular endi JSOCga topshirilishi mumkin emas degan qarorga kelishdi. 2004 yil yozida, quyidagilarga amal qilgan Fallujadagi birinchi jang, Fallujadagi birinchi va ikkinchi jang o'rtasidagi vaqt oralig'ida, JSOC shahar ichida bir necha kun ichida bir nishonni ta'qib qilar edi, JSOC Bag'dodda tugagan avtoulov bombalari joylashgan joylarning ba'zi xususiyatlarini aniqlash uchun Fallujani 24/7 qamrab olgan Predator kuzatuvidan foydalangan. kelib chiqqan va havo kuchlarini ushbu joylarga bomba tashlashga yo'naltirgan Qora suv pistirmasi va Nik Bergning o'ldirilishi, Abu Musab az-Zarqaviy, katta jangari islomchi va oxir-oqibat rahbari AQI AQSh jamoatchilik bayonotlarida muhim ahamiyat kasb eta boshladi, uni yo'q qilish JSOC kundalik faoliyatining asosiy yo'nalishiga aylandi. JSOCs Task Force 20 Zarqaviy ovida Fallujada ko'plab operatsiyalarni o'tkazdi. JSOC davomida Fallujaga butun e'tiborini qaratdi Fallujadagi ikkinchi jang, JSOC elementlari 5-SFG, SEALs, Dengiz kuchlarini qayta tiklash va Det One 7-noyabrgacha operatsiyalarni shakllantirishda katta ishtirok etishgan D-KUN koalitsiya kuchlari shaharga kirganda. SOFni shakllantirish, qo'zg'olonchilarni oxirgi hujum yo'nalishi, yaqin maqsadli razvedka va logistika tuguni yoki IED fabrikasi yo'naltirilgan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri harakatlar missiyasi to'g'risida adashtirish uchun murakkab fintlarni o'z ichiga olgan. Jang oldidan sal oldin, MI6 Baladdagi JSOCs OXFga (vaqtincha skrining muassasasi) tashrif buyurib, gumon qilingan iroqlik qo'zg'olonchini so'roq qilish uchun tashrifdan so'ng, hibsga olish sharoitlari to'g'risida xavotirlar ko'tarildi. hujayralar va hibsga olinganlarning ayrimlarining ahvoli. Natijada, Britaniya hukumati JSOCga Buyuk Britaniyaning maxsus kuchlari o'z mahbuslarini Iroqdagi JSOCga topshiradi, agar ularni Baladga jo'natmaslik majburiyati bo'lsa, AQSh-Buyuk Britaniya hamkorligi yanada keskinlashishiga olib keladi. Britaniya maxsus kuchlari /Ishchi guruh qora / ritsar AQSh armiyasining doimiy qismlariga topshirildi. 2004 yil davomida 2005 yil boshida JSOC urushining asosi bo'lgan texnologiyalar, odamlar va g'oyalar birlashdi. Uning markaziy qismi JOC deb nomlanuvchi basketbol maydonchasi o'lchamidagi boshqaruv xonasi bo'lib, uchta katta ekran turli xil operatsiyalardagi jonli rasmlarni, shuningdek operatsiya, razvedka, aviatsiya va tibbiyot xodimlari uchun zarur bo'lgan boshqa ma'lumotlarni uzatdi; a JAG taklif qilingan operatsiyalarning qonuniyligini boshqarish uchun ham u erda bo'lgan. JOCda ishlagan odamlar uni ko'pincha "O'lim yulduzi chunki "siz barmoq bilan qo'l uzatib, kimnidir yo'q qilishingiz mumkin"; dan aloqa jamoasi NSA AQShni tinglash uchun o'z shaxsiy xonasiga ega edi; TF 121 kod nomini Vazifa kuchi 145 ga o'zgartirdi.[37][38]

2005 yil yanvar oyida JSOC mas'ul bomba hujumchisini hibsga olishga hissa qo'shdi Canal mehmonxonasini bombardimon qilish va 2003 yilda transport vositalarida sodir etilgan boshqa portlashlar - politsiya uchastkalariga, yollash idoralari va bozorlarga qaratilgan. 2005 yil 20 fevralda JSOC al-Zarqaviyni o'ldirish imkoniyatini qo'ldan boy berdi: Zarqaviy avtoulovda soqchilar bilan sayohat qilgani to'g'risida ma'lumotga amal qilib. Ramadi Falluja tomon, AQSh maxsus operatsion kuchlari vertolyot bilan cho'l yo'lida tushishdi Anbar viloyati va nazorat punktini o'rnating. Buning ortidan turli xil versiyalar mavjud: biri shundaki, mashina to'siqni ko'rdi va u orqali o'tib ketdi va JSOC jamoasi o'z huquqlari doirasida o'zlarini his qilmadi ROE o't ochish uchun, ikkinchisi - mashinani kuzatib borgan JSOC guruhini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi Predator UAV. Texnik nosozlik yuz berdi va uning ostiga o'rnatilgan kamera nazoratdan chiqib ketdi; pirovardida Zarqaviy qochib qoldi. 2005 yil boshiga kelib, JSOC aniq yo'naltirilgan edi Mudofaa vaziri Donald Ramsfeld, Makkristalning buyrug'i mintaqaviy ish joyini qurdi, bu Zarqaviy yoki uning sheriklarini topish mumkin bo'lgan har qanday joyda razvedkaga tezkor javob berishga imkon berdi. Laydown quyidagilardan iborat edi: DEVRGU at Al Asad aviabazasi qismi sifatida Ishchi guruh G'arbiy / Moviy; yilda Tikrit tarkibida Rangersning tanlangan jamoasi Ishchi guruh Shimoliy / Qizil va MSS Fernandez-da Yashil zona tarkibida Delta eskadrilyasi Vazifa guruhi Markaziy / Yashil. JSOC rahbarlari eng yaxshi razvedka ma'lumotlarini yig'uvchi shaxslarni va Buyuk Britaniyaning resurslar ulushini shu maqsadga bag'ishladilar, ammo Buyuk Britaniya Amerika harakatlaridan xavotirga tushib, AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya o'rtasidagi to'liq hamkorlikni qayta tiklash ushbu vaziyatni yaxshilashga bog'liq edi Baladdagi qamoq kameralaridan. 2005 yil aprel oyida Abu Graib jangi bo'lib o'tdi; 13 aprelda 100 nafargacha qo'zg'olonchilar, shu jumladan uchta transport vositasining o'z joniga qasd qilish hujumlari Suriya chegarasi yaqinidagi dengiz piyoda bazasiga doimiy hujum uyushtirdi. al-Husayba, hujum havo hujumlari va vertolyotlar yordamida yengildi, hujum al-Qoida bilan bog'liq edi; va 29 aprelda al-Qoida bir kunda 14 ta avtomashinaga hujum uyushtirdi (ularning aksariyati Bag'dodda). Ushbu voqealar bezovta bo'ldi Umumiy Jorj Keysi Ushbu hujumlarda ko'rsatilgan qobiliyat tufayli u AQIni koalitsiyaning Iroqdagi asosiy dushmani sifatida rasmiy ravishda oshirdi. Baladdan ishlaydigan JSOC ishchi guruhi ularning katta qismini muvaffaqiyatli qo'lga kiritdi ISR (razvedka, kuzatuv va razvedka) Zarqaviyni ov qilishda platformalar, bu nafaqat Predator UAV-larini boshqarish, balki boshqa texnik vositalar, masalan, sun'iy yo'ldoshlar va uyali telefonlarni topish va topish uchun foydalaniladigan samolyotlar, bu katta manbalardan foydalanish Keysi bilan va oddiy qo'mondonlar bilan keskinlikni keltirib chiqardi. batalyonlar va brigadalar hali ham ko'p sonli qurbonlarni olib ketishmoqda. Keysi va boshqa qo'mondonlar natijalar uchun JSOC-ga bosimni kuchaytirdilar, Makkristal Iroqdagi operatsiyalarining ahamiyatini o'zgartira boshladi, endi AQI butun koalitsiya kuchlarining maqsadi bo'lganligi sababli, u o'ldirayotgan mahalliy jangarilar tarmog'iga kirish uchun ko'proq harakat qilish kerak edi. va ko'plab AQSh qo'shinlarini yarador qildi. Makkristal dronlar va uyali telefonlardan tobora ortib borayotgan axborot oqimidan foydalanib, al-Qoida tarmog'ini yuqoridan pastga yo'naltirishga qaratilgan. JSOCs qo'mondoni bu harakatni "Ilon ko'zlari" operatsiyasini qayta nomladi: bu DEVGRU yoki Delta Force tomonidan reydlarni Furot vodiysidagi quruqlikdagi armiya va dengiz piyoda qismlariga sinxronlashtirishni o'z ichiga olgan. 2005 yilning birinchi yarmiga kelib JSOCs qo'mondoni "Snake Eyes" operatsiyasida markaziy bo'lgan uchta taktik tushunchani ilgari surdi, ular quyidagilarni qo'llab-quvvatladilar: Ko'zni ochmaslik - 24/7 kuzatuv yoki ba'zi muhim maqsadlar; qora operatsiyalar tempda yoki chastotada keskin o'sishi kerak edi; va "F3EA" da bajarilgan operatsiyalar - topish-tuzatish-tugatish-ekspluatatsiya-tahlil qilish. 2005 yil may oyidan oktyabr oyigacha AQSh quruqlikdagi qo'shinlari kamida 14 ta yirik operatsiyalarni olib bordilar, ularning har biri mingdan ziyod askarni o'z ichiga olgan bo'lib, jang maydoni uzoq fermer xo'jaliklaridan tortib, shahar chegaralariga qadar Suriya chegaralariga qadar davom etdi. al-Qaim pastga qarab Hadisa va Ht, Ramadi va Falluja orqali Abu Graib. AQSh bu joylarni xorijiy jangarilarning Iordaniya yoki Suriyadan poytaxtga yo'naltirilgan suqilib kirishini to'xtatish sifatida tavsifladi; ushbu jamoalarning ko'pchiligida muntazam qo'shinlar qurollangan qurollardan tortib minomyotgacha yoki "yer-havo" raketalariga qadar qurollangan uyushgan harbiylashtirilgan guruhlarga qarshi chiqishdi. Ushbu operatsiyalar 2005 yil yozida davom etar ekan, JSOC partizanlik tashkilotidagi gumon qilingan mahalliy jangarilar va o'rta menejerlarga qarshi o'nlab vayronagarchiliklarni amalga oshirdi - bu Makkristal odamlarini klassik partizanlik uslubida chekinishdan ko'ra turgan va kurashgan qat'iy qurollangan muxolifatga duchor qildi. Delta Force 2005 yil yozida qurbon bo'lganidan so'ng, Makkristal o'sha paytdagi Buyuk Britaniyadan so'radi Maxsus kuchlar direktori ammo yordam uchun u hibsga olinganlar bilan muomala va Baladdagi JSOC hibsxonasi sharoitlari va boshqa operatsion masalalarni, masalan, ishtirok etish qoidalarini aytib, rad etdi, shuning uchun ikkinchi Delta Force eskadrilyasi uchib keldi va Delta o'z faoliyati bilan bosim o'tkazdi. Bu DSF va 22-SAS polkining yangi tayinlangan qo'mondoni o'rtasidagi munosabatlarni yomonlashtirdi, Podpolkovnik Richard Uilyams - JSOC-ni qo'llab-quvvatlashning kuchli advokati bo'lgan, ayniqsa AQIga qarshi, o'sha paytda AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya munosabatlari o'rtasidagi ziddiyatlar sababli, Task Force Black JSOC-dan yarim mustaqil ish olib borgan va ularga sobiq Ba ' AQI o'rniga, ateistik partiya rejimi elementlari. JSOC-ning Ishchi guruhi juda yuqori temp va xavfli tabiat tufayli, odatda, uch oylik rotatsiyalarga xizmat qildi. 2005 yil 23-iyulda JSOC Bag'dod janubidagi uydan bir nechta xudkushlik hujumi uyushtirilishini ko'rsatgan razvedka ma'lumotlarini ishlab chiqdi, bu ma'lumot shoshilinch edi, shuning uchun JSOC missiyani Ishchi guruh qora G Squadron SAS a'zolari va "Task Force Red" dan AQSh armiyasi Reynjerlari bo'linmasi tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan M Squadron SBS. Marlboro operatsiyasi. Makkristal Vashingtonda Buyuk Britaniyaning DSF jamoasi bilan uchrashdi va operatsiya tempini belgilash orqali nimaga erishmoqchi ekanligini tushuntirdi, ammo DSF munosabatlarni keskinlashtirishda davom etdi, buning o'rniga Makkristal 22 SAS qo'mondoni bilan maslahatlashdi, Uilyams bilan yaxshi aloqalar mavjud edi va ular ishladilar birgalikda qanday qilib SASni JSOCga ko'proq qo'shilishlari mumkinligi haqida, natijada Baladdagi JSOC OXF Britaniyaning tasdiqlagan standartlariga javob beradigan darajada yaxshilandi; DSF bilan ziddiyatlarga qaramay, JSOC hali ham SASni qo'llab-quvvatlashga tayyor edi. Davomida Basra qamoqxonasidagi voqea Iroqdagi JSOC operatsiyasini boshqargan o'sha paytdagi Delta Force qo'mondoni bo'lgan polkovnik Delta eskadroni xizmatini taklif qildi va yordam berish uchun Bog'doddan kelgan Yirtqich hayvonni urib yubordi, voqea oxir-oqibat ingliz kuchlari tomonidan hal qilindi. 2005 yil noyabrdan 2006 yil boshigacha, Buyuk Britaniyaning DSF o'zgarganidan keyin - bu davr JSOC-ga Task Force Black / Knights integratsiyasi amalga oshdi (TF Black o'z nomini matbuotda e'lon qilinganidan keyin TF Knight nomini o'zgartirdi. Basra qamoqxonasidagi voqea); yaqinroq integratsiya degani, JSOC razvedka oqimlari oshdi. 2005 yil oxiri va 2006 yil boshlarida Bog'dod chekkasidagi qabilalar va kichik shaharlarning sodiqligini o'zgartirish jangarilarni Jihodchilar guruhiga JSOC tushira olgandan tezroq qo'shdi.[39][40]

2006 yil yanvar oyining o'rtalarida Britaniya SAS Traction operatsiyasini boshladi: uning JSOC-ga to'liq maxfiy yangilanishi / integratsiyasi, ular TGHG-ni (Vazifa guruhining shtab-kvartirasi guruhi) joylashtirdilar: tarkibiga 22 ta SASning yuqori lavozimli ofitserlari va boshqa yuqori martabali a'zolari - Baladdagi JSOCs bazasiga kirdilar. Ushbu yangilanish endi SASni JSOC bilan "kestirib qo'shilganligini" anglatadi va bu SASga sunniy jangari guruhlarga, xususan AQIga qarshi hal qiluvchi rol o'ynadi. Tasodifga ko'ra 6 sunniy qo'zg'olonchilar guruhi tuzildi Mujohidlar Shura Kengashi, ular hujayralarni o'z ichiga olgan hujayralar edi Salafiylik mafkurasi AQI - zulmkor sunniyni e'lon qilishni xohlash xalifalik Iroqning g'arbiy qismida shia, koalitsiya va hattoki sunniylarga qarshi zo'ravonlikni kuchaytirishni talab qilishiga ishongan. Bunga javoban JSOC "Dahir" operatsiyasini boshladi: JSOC AQI rahbariyatiga qarshi olib tashlanishni kengaytiradi va quruqlikdagi bo'linmalar tomonidan aniqlangan o'rta darajadagi terrorchilarga qarshi ko'proq vazifalarni bajaradi va AQSh armiyasi va dengiz kuchlariga uchuvchisiz uchish vositalari kabi qimmatbaho aktivlarga kirish huquqini beradi. . JSOC beshinchi ishchi guruhni qo'shdi, Task Force Sharq o'z qo'mondonligiga va JSOC a kabi qo'shimcha qo'llab-quvvatlovchi qismlarga ega bo'ldi Milliy gvardiya ko'payib borayotgan mahbuslarni jo'natish uchun Black Hawk vertolyotlari bilan jihozlangan otryad, oxir-oqibat JSOC butun mintaqada CENTCOM tomonidan nazorat qilinadigan 5000 dan ortiq odamga ega edi. Hal qilgandan so'ng Christian tinchlikparvar garov inqirozi, mamlakatdagi SAS eskadrilyasi AQIni nishonga ola boshladi; JSOCdagi Delta Force va McChrystalning o'sha paytdagi mas'ul polkovnigi ham SAS, ham Delta Force otryadlariga AQIni "pastdan yuqoriga" nishonga olish bo'yicha o'z rejalarini ishlab chiqish uchun JOC resurslari bilan qo'llab-quvvatlashdi. 2006 yil 8 aprelda va 13 aprelda yaqin shaharlarda o'tkazilgan reydlarda Yusufiya, B Squadron SAS va B Squadron Delta Force operatorlari razvedka idoralari xorijiy jihodchilar deb da'vo qilgan 7 qo'zg'olonchini (2006 yil 8 aprelda 5 va 2006 yil 13 aprelda) o'ldirishdi, ushbu reydlarda to'plangan ma'lumot JSOCga guruhning aniq razvedka rasmini berdi. Bag'dod atrofidagi Al-Qoida hujayralari, ularning taktikasi rivojlanganligini ko'rsatmoqda. Ushbu rivojlanish natijasida AQSh kuchlari tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan B eskadroni SAS amalga oshirildi Larchvud 4 operatsiyasi, yig'ilgan ma'lumot JSOC tomonidan tahlil qilindi va NSA mutaxassislari bebaho edilar, xususan, 20-may kuni reydda qo'lga olingan AQIning yuqori lavozimli a'zosi JSOC so'roqchilariga u o'zini al-Zarqaviyning diniy maslahatchisi deb atagan. Shayx Raham. AQSh general-mayori Rik Linchning ta'kidlashicha, JSOC bo'linmalari Larchvud 4 dan oldingi haftalarda taxminan beshta operatsiyani boshlagan va 31 xorijiy jangchini o'ldirgan (ularning 90% o'z joniga qasd qilganlar), bu operatsiyadan keyingi oylarda AQIning javob hujumlarini uyushtirish qobiliyatini pasaytirgan. "Larchvud 4" operatsiyasi juda ko'p sonli operatsiyalarning bir qismi edi O'lim uchburchagi, ularning aksariyati Delta Force va AQShning boshqa kuchlari tomonidan amalga oshirildi, har bir topshiriq bilan AQI tarmoqlaridagi razvedka tasviri yanada oydinlashdi. 2006 yil 13 mayda JSOC AQI ning Abu Mustafo tarmog'i tomonidan foydalanilgan to'rtta uyga reyd o'tkazdi Latifiya Hujumda gumon qilingan 15 nafar terrorchi va Abu Mustafoni o'ldirib, reyddan olingan ma'lumotlardan foydalanib, yana 3 ta joyni nishonga olishni rejalashtirgan. 14-may kuni JSOCs Task Force Brown tarkibiga kirgan 160-chi SOAR-dan Black Hawk vertolyotlari operatorlarni B eskadroni Delta Force-dan, SAS bilan aloqador ofitser bilan birga (ular boshqa JSOC birliklari tomonidan zaxira qilingan) Yusufiyadan boshqa yoki Abu Mustafo AQIga qarshi. tarmoq. Missiya kundan-kunga amalga oshirildi, chunki Delta Force eskadroni qo'mondoni "tajovuzkorlik bilan unga eng yaxshisini olishiga yo'l qo'ydi", shiddatli otishma boshlandi, 5 amerikalik yaralandi va 2 nafari o'zlarining AH-6 kichkina qushini urib tushirishdi, shu bilan birga 25 terrorchi o'ldirilgan va 4 kishi qo'lga olingan, bir qator tinch aholi ham yaralangan; B eskadroni komandiri buyruqdan ozod qilindi. 2006 yil 7 iyunda, Larchwood 4 operatsiyasidan olingan ma'lumotlardan so'ng, Amerika va Britaniyaning JSOC operatorlari Shayx Raham mashinasini MQ-1 yirtqichi uni Bog'dodda kuzatib, JOCdan ularning mashinasini kuzatib Baquba tashqarisidagi Hibhib qishlog'i tashqarisidagi ferma uyiga borganini va Zarqaviy bilan salomlashishini kuzatib turdi. JOC fermer xo'jaligining uyiga 500 funtlik bomba tashlagan ikkita F-16C samolyotini chaqirdi, yaqin atrofdagi oddiy qismdagi AQSh qo'shinlari xarobalardan qattiq yaralangan Zarqaviyni tikladilar, tez orada u jarohatiga berilib ketdi; Prezident Jorj Bush Makkristalga qo'ng'iroq qilib, uni tabriklaganini aytdi - bu JSOC Iroq bilan shug'ullanganligi haqidagi birinchi rasmiy e'tirof. That night 14 high-priority targets were added to the already-scheduled raids—each target that had been uncovered as part of Zarqawi's and al Raham's network Operations continued throughout summer 2006, with the aim of dismantling al-Qaeda faster than it could regenerate, which meant sacrificing some targeted development in the interest of getting raids themselves to produce intelligence and were also willing to launch raids on a single 'trigger' or piece of intelligence. The Coalition mounted 450 raids in little more than a week—operations on a scale that was beyond the resources of JSOC and its Task Forces.[41][42]

In November 2006, a new secret directive sanctioned by President Bush had allowed US forces in Iraq to kill or capture Iranian nationals if they were engaged in targeting Coalition forces due to Hezbollah success in the 2006 yil Livan urushi and Iran's defiance on its nuclear issue; the new mission was known by its acronym CII (Counter Iranian Influence). Since 2004, there had been growing human intelligence about the training of Iraqi insurgents in Iran as well as financial backing for attacks on Coalition forces; finds of mortars rounds or rockets with recent Iranian markings had multiplied. It was essential to maintain the pressure of nightly raids on al-Qaeda, Pentagon 's solution was to keep Delta Force's commander working through the JOC against Sunni extremists (changing its name from TF 145 to Task Force 16); whilst a new command-based around the headquarters of an Army Special Forces group was formed, codenamed: Task Force 17, they were given the CII missions. TF 17 early operations netted an intelligence treasure trove, analysts used the same networking mapping and phone record techniques that they were employing against the jihadists; in December 2006 a Quds Force officer had been found in the compound of the leader of SCIRI whom it was long believed that they and its armed militia, the Badr brigadasi were agents of Iranian influence. Just after 11:30am on 11 January 2007, Delta Force supported by helicopters from JSOCs Task Force Brown raided the Iranian Liaison Office in Irbil, to find compelling evidence of Iranian involvement in the insurgency, in particular, looking for the head of Iran's SNSC and head of intelligence in the IRGC that human intelligence suggested was there. As they cleared the building they found its staff trying to destroy records and change their appearance, the 6 men that were captured had fake ID cards and one would test positive for handling explosives, they didn't find the two men they were looking for. Analysis of papers and phones from the raid and the arrest of the Quds Force officer by TF 17 revealed that the Iranians were assisting a much wider variety of insurgent groups including evidence of connections with Ansor al-sunna as well as elements within the Mahdi armiyasi.[43]

On 11 January 2007, President Bush pledged in a major speech to "seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq."[44] The next day, in a meeting of the AQSh Senatining Xalqaro aloqalar qo'mitasi, Chairman Senator Jozef Bayden (Delaware), informed AQSh davlat kotibi Kondoliza Rays that the Bush Administration did not have the authority to send U.S. troops on cross-border raids. Biden said, "I believe the present authorization granted the president to use force in Iraq does not cover that, and he does need congressional authority to do that. I just want to set that marker."[45] Keyingi Karbala attack, TF 17 were infused with a stronger sense of purpose, the competition for resources between TF 16 and 17, creating an uncomfortable relationship between the two, McChrystal replaced the Green Beret Colonel with a Podpolkovnik; TF 17 occasionally supported TF 16 fight against al-Qaeda and its associates. On 20 March 2007, G squadron SAS captured Qais Xazali, a senior Shia militant and Iranian proxy in Basra and his brother, Laith al-Khazali and his Ali Mussa Daqduq a Hezbollah adviser. They also found critical documents: one was a report on the Karbala bosqini aniqlangan Azhar al-Dulaimi as being responsible for it, he was eventually killed by US forces; the Karbala memo also indicated that Iran's Quds Force was approved the attack. There were Memos to about attacks on British forces in Basra and large financial payments based on performance against the Coalition, Daqduq revealed that he had been brought into Iraq by Quds Force leadership to be a sort-of insurgent management consultant. He also revealed that the Shia Maxsus guruhlar gave reports of IED attacks and indirect fire to the Iranians as well as said Iraqi's for training in Iran. The mission made a strategic impact, Task Force 17 stepped up its raids against Iranian targets. Davomida 2007 yil Eron qirollik floti xodimlarini hibsga olishi, JSOC responded by scrambling a Predator UAV to assist the British. By early 2007 JSOC estimated that it had killed 2,000 members of the Sunni jihadist groups as well as detaining many more; TF 16 was mounting 6 raids per night. Over 2 years JSOCs intelligence database had grown with each terrorist network it eliminated, agent networks within the al-Qaeda cells were providing good information, millions of Iraqi's had mobile phones that JSOC could monitor and a steady increase in the number of drones available for surveillance increased the operational. In summer and fall of 2007 JSOC continued to eliminate insurgent groups against the 'anvil ' of conventional forces; the CII missions succeeded in forcing Muqtada as-Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, to flee to Iran, where in August he declared a ceasefire with the coalition.[46] Sometime in 2007, JSOC started conducting cross-border operations into Iran from southern Iraq with the CIA. These operations included seizing members of Al-Quds, the commando arm of the Eron inqilobiy gvardiyasi, and taking them to Iraq for interrogation, as well as the pursuit, capture or killing of yuqori qiymatli maqsadlar terrorizmga qarshi urushda. The Bush administration allegedly combined the CIA's intelligence operations and yashirin harakat with JSOC clandestine military operations so that Congress would only partially see how the money was spent.[47]

By March 2008, the climate for mounting aggressive special force operations was changing due to the Sunni insurgency waning rapidly, a hundred thousand defectors from Sunni militants were enrolled in the Iroqning o'g'illari. Boshlanishi bilan Kuchlar to'g'risidagi shartnoma (SOFA) in January 2009, JSOC operations were further curtailed, with Iraqi judicial permission now having to be required for each mission. By May 2009, of around 11,000 to 12,000 insurgents that JSOC removed, around 3,000 had been killed, JSOC had captured or killed al-Qaeda members faster than they could recruit new ones—breaking al-Qaeda and its associates in Iraq. The covert offensive against both al-Qaeda and Iranian influence had played an important role in bringing the country back from the brink of anarchy. Although the wider JSOC and CII campaign against Shia militants demonstrated that Iran could be deterred from further escalation of its covert activities and the militias checked. But since Iran was Iraq's neighbouring country and the Shia would form a majority of Iraq's population, these efforts could only achieve containment rather than the 'knockdown punch' JSOC inflicted on al-Qaeda.[48][49]

Operations in Pakistan

Ga binoan Washington Post, JSOC's commander Lieutenant General Stenli Makkristal operated in 2006 on the understanding with Pakistan that US units will not enter Pakistan except under extreme circumstances, and that Pakistan will deny giving them permission if exposed.[50]

That scenario happened according to the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), in January 2006, JSOC troops clandestinely entered the village of Saidgai, Pakistan, to hunt for Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan refused entry.[51]

According to a November 2009 report in Millat, JSOC, in tandem with Blackwater/Xe, has an ongoing drone program, along with snatch/grab/assassination operations, based in Karachi and conducted both in and outside of Pakistan.[52][53]

In an October 2009 leak published on the WikiLeaks website, U.S. embassy communication cables from the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne W. Patterson, states the Pakistani Army approved the embedding of U.S. Special Operations Forces, including elements from the Joint Special Operations Command, with the Pakistani military to provide support for operations in the country. This goes beyond the original claims of the U.S. that the only role of the Special Forces was in training the Pakistani military. The leak further revealed that JSOC elements involved in intelligence gathering and surveillance and use of drone PUA texnologiya.[54]

JSOC is credited with coordination of Operation Neptune Spear that resulted in the Usama bin Ladinning o'limi 2011 yil 1 mayda.[29][55]

Operations Juniper Shield

Special operations carried out in North Africa are under the codename: Operation Juniper Shield.[56]

Vaqtida 2012 yil Bingazi hujumi, small teams from CIA Maxsus faoliyat bo'limi and JSOC were both conducting operations in Liviya —most probably advance work on the later 'snatch' missions conducted by Delta Force. In 2014, southern Libya remained a 'melting pot' of armed militias and jihadists. Ta'siriga qarshi turish uchun AQIM, JSOC teams, US Army Special Forces, French COS and Algerian special forces have deployed to the region to hunt down AQIM elements.[57]

Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa and Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen

In a separate compound in Lemonnier lageri yilda Jibuti —a US Naval Expeditionary Base assigned to CJTF-HOA that became the hub for black and white SOF operations into nations such as Somali va Yaman —there are an estimated 300 JSOC personnel: special operators, intelligence and imagery analysts and a dedicated UAV cell. The UAV cell is commanded by a JSOC Major and tasks a flight of 8 MQ-1 Predators conducting operations over Somalia, Mali, and Yemen, the Predators have been carrying out strikes and surveillance missions from Camp Lemmonnier since late 2010. Prior to that, both CIA and JSOC had used the base as a temporary forward location for Predator and Reaper sorties into the region. Special operations carried out in Somalia are conducted under the codename: Operation Octave Dune and in Yemen they are known as Operation Copper Dune.[58]

The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia provided JSOC and the CIA with the opportunity to conduct covert offensive actions against al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab targets, alongside Ethiopian troops, JSOC operators disguised as civilians called in airstrikes from AC-130 gunships.[59]

In Yemen, a joint CIA and JSOC team, including a signals intelligence element from ISA, had been allowed to operate in Yemen as the country battled both Shia separatists and an influx of foreign fighters from al-Qaeda.[60]

In 2009, CIA and JSOC planners presented four plans for Samoviy muvozanat operatsiyasi: a Tomahawk qanotli raketasi strike, an airstrike, an attack by Little Bird helicopter gunships or attempt to capture the target by a helicopter assault force of SEALs. The President chose the second option, but as the USMC AV-8B Harrier approached its release point it reported a malfunction in its targeting system, so 8 helicopters flown by members of the 160th SOAR launched from a US Navy ship carrying a team of DEVGRU operators and took down the target. In Yemen, Admiral McRaven at JSOC argued for an "Iraq-style Task Force" to be deployed to hunt al-Qaeda cells in the country, but his requests was denied by both the Pentagon and the Yemenis, instead, airstrikes were the preferred option. However, JSOC and the CIA were permitted to establish a small command centre in the capital.[61]

By September 2011 in Yemen, with a secret CIA Predator base built-in Saudiya Arabistoni becoming operational, the CIA and JSOC negotiated their way back into Yemen, covert UAV and conventional airstrikes (by the F-15Es at Camp Lemonnier) would be permitted under the guise of them being conducted by the Yemenis in an exercise of plausible deniability for the Yemeni people. A priority target was al-Qaeda cleric Anvar al-Avlaki,[62] a Yemeni-American U.S. citizen, was killed on 30 September 2011, by an air attack carried out by the Joint Special Operations Command. After several days of surveillance of Awlaki by the Central Intelligence Agency, armed dronlar took off from a new, secret American base in the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into northern Yemen and unleashed a barrage of Hellfire raketalari at al-Awlaki's vehicle. Samir Xon, a Pakistani-American al-Qaeda member and editor of the jihadist Ilhom bering magazine, also reportedly died in the attack. The combined CIA/JSOC drone strike was the first in Yemen since 2002—there have been others by the military's Special Operations forces—and was part of an effort by the spy agency to duplicate in Yemen the covert war which has been running in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[63][64] 2011 yil oktyabr oyida USAF eskadrilyasi F-15E was deployed to Camp Lemonnier and have flown numerous combat missions into Yemen in support of both Yemeni government forces and unilateral strikes directed by JSOC and the CIA targeting cells. In Yemen, before a pair of CIA Predators killed al-Awlaki, a JSOC strike involving both Predators and F-15E's had narrowly missed killing him. Weeks later, al-Awlaki son, also American born, was mistakenly killed by a JSOC Predator strike as they targeted other AQAP rahbarlar.[65]

In 2013, the UAV's operating out of the base were moved to a remote desert airstrip—which increased operational security and allayed local fears after a UAV and its Hellfire raketasi crashed in a Djibouti suburb; JSOCs predators supported the French during the Bulo Marer garovga olinganlarni qutqarishga urinish.[66] On 28 October 2013 a dron strike by JSOC on a vehicle near the town of Jilib yilda Quyi Shabelle killed two senior Somali members of Ash-Shabab. Preliminary evidence suggested that one of them was Ibrahim Ali (also known as Anta), an explosives specialist known for his skill in building and using homemade bombs and suicide vests.[67][68] The US administration has been reluctant to use drone strikes in Somalia. The reluctance partly centered on questions of whether Al-Shabaab—which has not tried to carry out an attack on American soil—could legally be the target of lethal operations by the military or the CIA. In May 2013, the White House announced that it would carry out maqsadli o'ldirish operatsiyalar faqat against those who posed a "continuing and imminent threat to the American people." The strike on 28 Oct. was the first known American operation resulting in death since that policy was announced and is considered evidence by some observers that views have changed in Washington and that the Obama administration has decided to escalate operations against Al-Shabaab in the aftermath of the group's Westgate savdo markaziga hujum in Nairobi, Kenya, that took place from 21–24 September 2013 and which left some 70 people dead.[iqtibos kerak ] Ga binoan The New York Times the Yemen government banned military drone operations after a series of botched drone strikes by JSOC, the last of which was a December 2013 drone strike that killed numerous civilians at a wedding ceremony. Despite a ban on military drone operations the Yemen government allowed CIA drone operations to continue.[69]

In April 2014, a JSOC Lieutenant Colonel and a senior CIA SAD officer were off-duty and having a haircut in the expatriate area of Sano, when a group of gunmen attempted to kidnap them, the two officers responded with their sidearms, shooting dead two of their attackers and sending others fleeing. Davomida Yamanda garovga olinganlarni qutqarish bo'yicha 2014 yil, a JSOC medical unit inserted with the DEVGRU assault team and went to work stabilising the wounded hostages while the assault team secured the site to allow them to be extracted.[70]

Amaliy echim

On 4 July 2014, a JSOC force of "several dozen" SOF operators qutqarishga harakat qildi several American hostages held by IShID, however none of the hostages JSOC hoped to rescue were there.[71]

On 25 March 2016, Special Operations Forces in Suriya killed ISIL commander Abu Ala al-Afri.[72]

Kayla Myuller operatsiyasi

Asosiy maqola: Barisha reydi

On 26 October 2019 U.S. Joint Special Operations Command's (JSOC) Delta Force conducted a raid into the Idlib province of Syria on the border with Turkey that resulted in the death of brahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai also known as Abu Bakr al-Bag'dodiy.[73] Reyd reyd a Markaziy razvedka boshqarmasi Maxsus tadbirlar markazi intelligence collection and close target reconnaissance effort that located the leader of ISIS. Launched after midnight local time, the eight helicopters carrying the teams along with support aircraft crossed hundreds of miles of airspace controlled by Iraq, Turkey and Russia. Upon arrival, efforts were made for Baghdadi to surrender, with those efforts unsuccessful U.S. forces responded by blowing a large hole into the side of the compound. After entering, the compound was cleared, with people either surrendering or being shot and killed. The two-hour raid culminated with Baghdadi fleeing from U.S. forces into a dead-end tunnel and detonating a suicide vest, killing himself along with three of his children.[74][75] The complex operation was conducted during the withdrawal of U.S. forces northeast Syria, adding to the complexity.[76][77]

List of JSOC commanders

Yo'qPortretDaraja va ismMuddat boshlanishiMuddat tugashi
1MGEN Richard A Scholtes.JPEGMG Richard Scholtes1980 yil dekabr1984 yil avgust
2Carl W Stiner.jpgMG Karl Stiner1984 yil avgust1987 yil yanvar
3General Gari Edvard Luck.JPEGMG Gari E. omad1987 yil yanvar1989 yil dekabr
4Ueyn A. Downing MG 1988.jpgMG Ueyn A. Dauning1989 yil dekabr1991 yil avgust
5Portret kulrang.pngMG Uilyam F. Garrison19921994 yil iyul
6Piter Schoomaker.jpgMG Piter J. Skomaker1994 yil iyul1996 yil avgust
7Portret kulrang.pngMG Maykl Kanavan1996 yil 1-avgust1998 yil 1-avgust
8GEN Bryan Braun rasmiy portrait.jpgLTG Bryan D. Braun19982000[78]
9MGEN Richard A Scholtes.JPEGLTG Dell L. Deyli20012003 yil mart
10Stenli Makkristal BG 1999.jpgLTG Stenli Makkristal2003 yil sentyabr[50]2008 yil iyun
11Uilyam H McRaven.JPGVADM Uilyam H. Makreven2008 yil iyun[79][80]2011 yil iyun
12Votel2014.jpgLTG Jozef Votel2011 yil iyun[81]2014 yil 29 iyul
13General Raymond A. Tomas III.jpgLTG Raymond A. Thomas III2014 yil 29 iyul[82]2016 yil 30 mart
14LTG Ostin Miller rasmiy DA Photo.jpgLTG Ostin S. Miller2016 yil 30 mart2 sentyabr 2018 yil
15Lt Gen Howell.pngGeneral-leytenant Scott A. Howell2 sentyabr 2018 yil7 iyun 2020 yil

Shuningdek qarang

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