Pearl Harbor oldindan tuzilgan fitna nazariyasi - Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory

Birinchi sahifa Hawaii Tribune-Herald Yaponiyaning Osiyoda yoki Tinch okeanining janubiy qismida, 1941 yil 30-noyabrda yuz berishi mumkin bo'lgan zarbasi haqida

The Pearl Harbor oldindan tuzilgan fitna nazariyasi degan dalil AQSh hukumati mansabdor shaxslar oldindan ma'lumotga ega edilar Yaponiya 1941 yil 7-dekabr, Perl-Harborga hujum. Yaponlarning hujumidan beri, qanday qilib va ​​nima uchun degan munozaralar bo'lib o'tdi Qo'shma Shtatlar hibsga olingan edi, va Amerika rasmiylari Yaponiya hujum rejalari haqida qachon va qachon bilar edi.^[1][2] 1944 yil sentyabrda, Jon T. Flinn, hammuassisi aralashmaydigan Amerika birinchi qo'mitasi, qirq olti sahifali bukletni nashr etgach, Pearl Harbor qarama-qarshi hikoyasini boshladi Pearl Harbor haqidagi haqiqat.^[3]

Bir nechta yozuvchilar, shu jumladan jurnalist Robert Stinnett,^[4] iste'fodagi AQSh dengiz floti kontr-admirali Robert Alfred Theobald,^[5] va Garri Elmer Barns^[6] Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari va Buyuk Britaniya hukumatidagi yuqori darajadagi partiyalar ushbu hujum haqida oldindan bilishgan va hatto Amerikaning kirishini ta'minlash uchun uni sodir etishga yo'l qo'ygan yoki rag'batlantirgan bo'lishi mumkin. Ikkinchi jahon urushi Evropa teatri Yaponiya-Amerika urushi "orqa eshikda" boshlandi.^[7][8][9] Biroq, Pearl Harborning oldindan bilgan fitnasi bir nechta AQSh tarixchilari tomonidan a chekka nazariya.^[10][11][12]

AQShning o'nta rasmiy so'rovi

AQSh hukumati ushbu hujum yuzasidan 1941-1946 yillarda to'qqizta, 1995 yilda o'ninchi rasmiy so'rov o'tkazdi. Dengiz kuchlari kotibi Frank Noks (1941); The Roberts komissiyasi (1941–42); The Xart bo'yicha so'rov (1944); armiya Pearl Harbor kengashi (1944); The Dengiz tergov sudi (1944); Hewitt tergovi; Klark bo'yicha tergov; Kongress so'rovi^{[eslatma 1]} (Pearl Harbor qo'mitasi; 1945-46); tomonidan juda maxfiy surishtiruv Urush kotibi Genri L. Stimson, Kongress tomonidan vakolatli va tomonidan amalga oshiriladi Genri Klauzen (Klauzen bo'yicha so'rov; 1946); 1995 yil aprel oyida Dorn hisobotini ishlab chiqqan Thurmond-Spence tinglovi.^[13] So'rovlarda Yaponiyaning qobiliyatlari va niyatlarini qobiliyatsizligi, kam baholanganligi va noto'g'ri tushunilganligi haqida xabar berilgan; haddan tashqari maxfiylik natijasida yuzaga keladigan muammolar kriptografiya; armiya va dengiz kuchlari o'rtasida mas'uliyatni taqsimlash (va ular o'rtasida maslahat yo'qligi); va razvedka uchun etarli ishchi kuchining etishmasligi (tahlil qilish, yig'ish, qayta ishlash).^{[14][sahifa kerak ]}

Klauzengacha bo'lgan tergovchilar eng nozik ma'lumotlarni olish uchun xavfsizlikni rasmiylashtira olmaganlar, chunki brigada generali Genri D. Rassel urushgacha parollarning himoyachisi etib tayinlangan va u o'zi bilan kombinatsiyani omborxonada saqlagan.^[15] Klauzenning ta'kidlashicha, kotib Stimson unga guvohlarga o'zlarining hamkorligini talab qilish uchun zarur bo'lgan ruxsatnomalari borligi to'g'risida xabar bergan xatiga qaramay, u juda maxfiy parollarning nusxalarini tayyorlamaguncha bir necha bor yolg'on gapirgan va shu bilan u haqiqatan ham tegishli rasmiylashtirilishini isbotlagan.

Stimsonning Klauzen asari asosida Kongressga bergan hisoboti maxfiyligi sababli cheklangan, asosan kriptografiya bilan bog'liq. To'liq hisob 1980-yillarning o'rtalariga qadar ommaviy ravishda e'lon qilinmadi va 1992 yilgacha nashr etilmadi Pearl Harbor: Yakuniy hukm. 1992 yilgi nashrga munosabat har xil edi. Ba'zilar buni voqealarni tushunish uchun qimmatli qo'shimcha deb bilishadi,^[16] bir tarixchi Klauzen general bilan gaplashmaganligini ta'kidlagan Uolter Qisqa, Hujum paytida Perl-Harbordagi armiya qo'mondoni va Klauzenning tergovini bir necha jihatlar bo'yicha "taniqli ishonchsiz" deb atadi.^[17]

Diplomatik vaziyat

Ba'zi mualliflarning ta'kidlashicha, Prezident Ruzvelt Pearl Harbor hujumidan bir necha hafta oldin Yaponiyani faol ravishda qo'zg'atgan. Ushbu mualliflarning ta'kidlashicha, Ruzvelt yaqinda urushni kutgan va qidirmoqchi bo'lgan, ammo Yaponiya birinchi ochiq tajovuzkor harakatni amalga oshirishni xohlagan.^{[18][19][20][21][22][23][24]}

Yuqori lavozimli amaldorlarning bayonotlari

Bitta nuqtai nazar berilgan Kontr-admiral Frank Edmund Bitti kichik, Pearl Harbor hujum paytida kimning yordamchisi bo'lgan Dengiz kuchlari kotibi Frank Noks va Prezidentga juda yaqin edi Franklin D. Ruzvelt "s ichki doira, buni ta'kidladi:

7-dekabrga qadar, hattoki menga ham ayon edi ... biz Yaponiyani burchakka siqib qo'ygan edik. Men buni Prezident Ruzvelt va Bosh vazirning xohishi deb bilardim Cherchill biz urushga kirishamiz, chunki ular ittifoqchilar bizsiz g'alaba qozona olmasligini his qilishdi va nemislarning bizga urush e'lon qilishiga olib keladigan barcha harakatlarimiz barbod bo'ldi; biz, masalan, Xitoydan chiqib ketish uchun Yaponiyaga qo'ygan shartlarimiz shunchalik og'ir ediki, biz xalq ularni qabul qila olmasligini bilardik. Biz uni shu qadar qattiq majburladikki, uning Qo'shma Shtatlarga nisbatan munosabat bildirishini bilishimiz mumkin edi. Uning barcha tayyorgarliklari harbiy yo'l bilan - va biz ularning juda ko'p import qilinishini bilar edik - buni ko'rsatib berdi.^[25]

Bittiga o'xshash yana bir "ko'z guvohlarining nuqtai nazari" Ruzveltning Perl-Harbor vaqtidagi ma'muriy yordamchisi Jonatan Deniels tomonidan taqdim etilgan; bu FDRning hujumga bo'lgan munosabati to'g'risida "" zarba u kutganidan og'irroq edi ... Ammo xatarlar o'z samarasini berdi; hatto yo'qotish ham qimmatga tushdi. ... "^[26]

"O'n kun oldin Perl-Harborga hujum ", Genri L. Stimson, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining harbiy kotibi o'sha paytda "kundaligiga Yaponiya bilan yaqinlashib kelayotgan harbiy harakatlar dalillarini muhokama qilish uchun prezident Ruzvelt bilan uchrashganligi va ko'plab bahsli bayonotlarni kiritganligi va bu savolga" ularni [yaponlarni] qanday qilib manevr qilishimiz kerak "degan savol tug'ildi. birinchi zarbani o'zimizga katta xavf tug'dirmasdan otish. "^[27] Ammo Stimson urushdan keyingi kundaligini ko'rib chiqib, Perl-Harbor qo'mondonlariga hujum ehtimoli to'g'risida ogohlantirilganini va hujum aniqlangan shafqatsiz tayyorgarlikni u uchun kutilmagan holat ekanligini esladi:

[Shunga qaramay] General Shortga ikkita muhim fakt aytilgan edi: 1) Yaponiya bilan urush tahdid solmoqda, 2) Yaponiya tomonidan har qanday vaqtda dushmanlik harakati mumkin. 27 noyabrdagi xabarda ikkalasi ham so'zsiz aytilgan ushbu ikkita faktni hisobga olgan holda, zastav qo'mondoni jang qilish uchun hushyor turishi kerak ... Favqulodda vaziyatlarda samolyotlarini shunday guruh va pozitsiyalarga to'plash kerak. havoni bir necha soat davomida qabul qilmang va zenit o'q-dorilarini shu qadar zudlik bilan va tezda topib bo'lmaydigan darajada saqlanib turing va o'zining eng yaxshi razvedka tizimidan, radaridan faqat kun va tunning juda oz qismi uchun foydalaning fikr uning haqiqiy burchini noto'g'ri tasavvurga xiyonat qildi, bu deyarli ishonchdan tashqarida edi. ...^[28]

Robert Stinnettniki Yolg'on kuni taklif qiladi a memorandum Qo'mondon Makkollum tomonidan tayyorlangan AQShning urushdan oldingi davrdagi siyosatida markaziy o'rinni egallagan. Stinnettning ta'kidlashicha, eslatma faqat AQSh manfaatlariga to'g'ridan-to'g'ri hujum qilish Amerika jamoatchiligini (yoki Kongressni) Evropa urushida, xususan inglizlarni qo'llab-quvvatlashda bevosita ishtirok etishni ma'qullashiga olib keladi. Hujum Yaponiya tomonidan Britaniyaga yordam bermaydi, qila olmaydi. Yodnoma kapitanlar Valter Andersonga va Dadli Noks, 1940 yil 7 oktyabrda Ruzveltning ikki harbiy maslahatchisi, Ruzvelt buni hech qachon ko'rmaganligini isbotlovchi dalillar yo'q, Stinnettning u qilgan dalillari esa umuman yo'q.^[29] Bundan tashqari, garchi Anderson va Noks Yaponiya imperiyasini zabt etish uchun sakkizta aniq rejalarni taklif qilishgan bo'lsa-da, "agar bu yo'l bilan Yaponiya ochiq urush harakatiga olib kelishi mumkin bo'lsa, shuncha yaxshi", deb sakkizta "rejalar" dan (harakatlar olinishi kerak) eslatmada taklif qilingan, aksariyati hammasi ham amalga oshirilmagan, ammo Makkolomning eslatmasi ilhom bergani shubhasiz.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Shunga qaramay, ichida Yolg'on kuni Stinnettning ta'kidlashicha, barcha harakatlar bajarilgan.^[30] Shunga qaramay, Ruzvelt ma'muriyati a'zolarining Yaponiyani qo'zg'atmaslikni talab qilgan holatlari ko'p bo'lgan. Mark Parillo, uning inshoida Tinch okeanidagi Qo'shma Shtatlar, "yozishicha," nazariyalar vaziyat mantig'iga asos soluvchiga moyil. Agar Ruzvelt va uning ma'muriyatining boshqa a'zolari hujum haqida oldindan bilganlarida, ular g'alaba qozonish uchun zarur bo'lgan asosiy vositalardan birini qurbon qilishlari ahmoqlik edi. shunchaki unga Qo'shma Shtatlarni jalb qilish uchun urush. "^[31] Bundan tashqari, 1941 yil 5-noyabrda, qo'shma esdada, Stark, CNO va Marshal, Armiya bosh shtabi boshlig'i, "agar Yaponiya mag'lubiyatga uchrasa va Germaniya mag'lubiyatsiz qolsa, qarorga hali ham erishilmaydi .... Qo'shma Shtatlar va Yaponiya o'rtasidagi urushga yo'l qo'ymaslik kerak ...."^[32] Bundan tashqari, 1941 yil 21-noyabrdagi eslatmada Brigadir Leonard T. Gerov, rahbari Armiya urushi rejalari "bizning asosiy maqsadlarimizdan biri bu Yaponiya bilan urushdan qochishdir ... [va] inglizlarga moddiy yordamni davom ettirishni ta'minlash".^[33] U shunday xulosaga keldi: "Evropadagi urush harakatlarimiz uchun juda muhimdir ..."^[33] Bundan tashqari, Cherchillning o'zi 1940 yil 15-mayda yozgan telegrammasida, "urushning tarqalishini oldini olish" maqsadida AQShning Singapurga xushmuomalalik bilan tashrif buyurishini so'rab, 4-oktabr kuni xabar yuborganidan so'ng, AQShning Britaniyaga yordam berish majburiyatini Yaponiyaga "tinch" bo'lishiga umid qilayotganini aytdi.^[34] Va Starkning o'zi Rejalashtirilgan it "Uzoq Sharqqa yuborishimiz mumkin bo'lgan har qanday kuch ... bizning Germaniyaga qarshi zarbalarimiz kuchini kamaytiradi ..."^[35] Ruzvelt Shtarkning qarashlaridan bexabar bo'lishi mumkin edi va Yaponiya bilan urush Ruzveltning Britaniyaga yordam berish istagiga mutlaqo zid edi.

Oliver Littelton, Buyuk Britaniyaning Urush ishlab chiqarish vaziri "... Yaponiya Perl-Harborda amerikaliklarga qarshi hujum uyushtirdi. Amerika urushga majbur bo'ldi, deb aytish tarixning buzg'unchiligi. Amerika hamdardlari qaerdaligini hamma biladi. Bu Amerika har tomonlama urushga kirishishdan oldin ham Amerika haqiqatan ham betaraf edi, deyish noto'g'ri ".^[36] Bu Yaponiyaga nisbatan qanday qilib nimani namoyish qilishi noma'lum. Aksincha, bu Britaniyaga boshqa yordamni nazarda tutadi. Qarz berish, 1941 yil mart oyida qabul qilingan, ittifoqdosh davlatlarni urush materiallari bilan ta'minlashga rozilik berib, Amerikaning betarafligi ittifoqchilar foydasiga tugaganligini norasmiy ravishda e'lon qildi. Bundan tashqari, Ruzvelt birovga vakolat berdi Neytrallik patrul xizmati bu bir millat savdogarlarini, ya'ni Britaniyani boshqa Germaniya hujumidan himoya qiladi. Bu yukni dengiz osti kemalari tomonidan qonuniy hujumga aylantirdi.^[37] Bundan tashqari, Ruzvelt AQShga buyruq berdi. yo'q qiluvchilar xabar berish U-qayiqlar, keyinroq ularga "ko'z oldida otish" vakolatini berdi. Bu AQShni a amalda urushuvchi. Hech biri manfaatsiz neytral harakat emas edi, ammo barchasi shubhasiz Britaniyaga yordam berishadi.

Bu kabi ma'lumotlarni qarshi yoki qarshi bo'lgan nuqta sifatida ko'rib chiqayotganda, o'quvchi quyidagi savollarni yodda tutishi kerak: ushbu rasmiy AQSh hukumati haqidagi ma'lumotni himoya qilganmi? U prezident Ruzvelt yoki elchi kabi yuqori darajadagi ma'muriyat arboblari bilan aloqada bo'lganmi Jozef Grew ? Bu shunchaki qat'iy shaxsiy fikrmi? Yoki ushbu fikrni oqlaydigan choralar bo'lganmi? Agar Angliya haqiqatan ham bilgan bo'lsa va yashirishni tanlagan bo'lsa, "ushbu muhim razvedkadan voz kechish faqat Amerika ishonchini yo'qotish xavfi tug'dirgan",^[38] va shu bilan har qanday holatda hujumdan keyin kamaytiriladigan Amerikaning yordami.

Avval Tolandning da'vosida da'vo ham bor Sharmandalik, bu ONI yapon tashuvchisi harakatlari haqida bilar edi. Toland Golland dengiz flotining kontr-admiral J. E. Meijer Ranneft kundaligidan 2 dekabr va 6 dekabr kunlari yozuvlarini keltirdi. Ranneft ushbu sanalarda ONIda bo'lib o'tgan brifinglarda qatnashdi. Tolandning so'zlariga ko'ra, Ranneft unga ONI tomonidan Yaponiyaning ikkita aviatashuvchisi Honoluludan shimoli-g'arbda bo'lganligini aytganini yozgan. Biroq, kundalikda Gollandiyalik qisqartma ishlatiladi beW, Tolandning da'vosiga zid bo'lgan "g'arbiy" degan ma'noni anglatadi. Brifingda qatnashgan boshqa shaxslar ham Tolandning versiyasini eshitgani haqida xabar bermadilar. Ularning sharhlarida Sharmandalik, Devid Kan^[39] va Jon C. Zimmerman^[40] Ranneftning ma'lumoti Marshall orollari yaqinidagi transport vositalariga tegishli. Toland Xolokostni rad etuvchi tashkilotdagi ma'ruzalar paytida kundalikka oid boshqa qarama-qarshi va noto'g'ri da'volarni ilgari surdi Tarixiy tadqiqotlar instituti.^{[iqtibos kerak ]}

Kundalik soat 02:00 da (6-12-41) Tyorner Yaponiyaning to'satdan hujumidan qo'rqadi Manila. Soat 14: 00da "ONI-da ishtirok etayotganlarning hammasi men direktor Admiral Uilkinson, kapitan MakKollum, leytenant Kramer bilan gaplashaman ... Ular menga - mening iltimosim bo'yicha - 2 ta yuk tashuvchi joyni ko'rsatib berishdi (qarang 2–12– 41) Honoluluning g'arbiy qismi. Men ushbu transport vositalarining ushbu joyda qanday g'oyasi borligini so'rayman. Javob: "ehtimol Yaponiyaning raportlari bilan bog'liq bo'lib, Amerikaning oxir-oqibat harakatlari to'g'risida". Bizning biron birimiz mumkin bo'lgan narsalar haqida gapirmaydi. Honoluluga havo hujumi. Men o'zim bu haqda o'ylamagan edim, chunki men Honolulidagi har bir kishini 100% ogohlantirishda bo'lishiga ishonardim, chunki ONIda bu erda bo'lganlarning barchasi ONIda ruhiy holat taranglashadi " Ushbu kundalik yozuvlar (golland tilida) Jorj Viktorning fotosurat qismida keltirilgan Pearl Harbor afsonasi: aqlga sig'maydigan narsalarni qayta ko'rib chiqish.^[41]

CBS muxbiri Edvard R. Murrow 7 dekabr kuni Oq uyda kechki ovqatni tayinladi. Hujum tufayli u va uning rafiqasi faqat Ruzvelt xonim bilan ovqatlangan, ammo prezident Murrowdan keyin qolishni so'ragan. Oval ofis oldida kutayotganda, Murrow hukumat va harbiy amaldorlarning kirib-chiqishini kuzatdi. U urushdan keyin shunday yozgan edi:^[42]

Janob Stimson, polkovnik Noks va boshqalarning xulq-atvori va ifodasini yaqin masofadan kuzatish uchun keng imkoniyat bor edi Kotib Xull. Agar ular bo'lsa emas Perl-Harborning yangiliklaridan hayratga tushganida, o'sha keksa odamlar guruhi har qanday tajribali aktyorning hayratini uyg'otadigan spektaklni namoyish etayotgan edi. ... Balki ularni ofat darajasi qo'rqitgan va ular bir muncha vaqtdan beri bilgan bo'lishi mumkin .... Ammo men o'shanda bunga ishonolmasdim va hozir ham bunga qodir emasman. Ko'p yuzlarda hayrat va g'azab katta yozilgan edi.^[42]

Ammo bir tarixchi Murrow Ruzvelt bilan uchrashganida yozgan Uilyam J. Donovan ning OSS o'sha kecha, Perl-Harborda vayronagarchilikning kuchi prezidentni dahshatga solgan bo'lsa, Ruzvelt boshqa odamlarga qaraganda hujumdan ozgina ajablanib tuyuldi. Murrouning so'zlariga ko'ra, prezident unga: "Balki siz [hujum] bizni ajablantirmadi deb o'ylaysiz!" Keyinroq u: "Men unga ishondim", dedi va guvoh sifatida qolishni iltimos qilishgan deb o'ylardi. Urushdan keyin Ruzveltning oldindan bilganligi haqidagi da'volar paydo bo'lganda, Jon Gunther Murrowdan uchrashuv haqida so'radi. Xabarlarga ko'ra, Murrou o'g'lining kollejdagi ta'limi uchun to'liq voqeani to'laydi va "agar men buni sizga beraman deb o'ylasangiz, aqldan ozgansiz". Murrow bu voqeani o'limidan oldin yozmagan.^[42]

Makkollumning eslatmasi

The Makkollumning eslatmasi

1940 yil 7 oktyabrda, Leytenant komandir Artur H. Makkollum ning Dengiz razvedkasi idorasi harbiy-dengiz kapitanlariga eslatma taqdim etdi Valter S. Anderson va Dadli Noks Yaponiyani AQShga hujum qilishga undashi mumkin bo'lgan sakkizta harakat batafsil bayon etilgan. Yodnoma qoldi tasniflangan 1994 yilgacha va "Agar bu yo'l bilan Yaponiya ochiq urush harakatiga olib kelishi mumkin bo'lsa, shuncha yaxshi bo'ladi" degan muhim satr mavjud.

Yodnomaning 9 va 10-bo'limlari aytilgan Gor Vidal^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Stinnettning kitobida keltirilgan "chekuvchi qurol" bo'lib, u yaponlarni hujumga jalb qilish uchun yuqori darajadagi rejada asosiy o'rinni egallagan. Prezident Ruzveltga, ma'muriyatning yuqori lavozimli mulozimlariga yoki AQSh dengiz kuchlarining yuqori darajadagi qo'mondonligiga etib kelgan esdalik yoki derivativ asarlarning dalillari, eng yaxshi holatda, bema'ni.

Ruzveltning Germaniya bilan urush istagi

Pearl Harbor hujumi uchun qasos olishga chaqirgan AQSh tashviqot plakati.

Nazarshunoslar, Perl-Harborni ajablantiradigan bir necha bor ta'kidlaganidek, Ruzvelt AQShning Germaniyaga qarshi urushga aralashishini xohlagan, biroq u buni rasman aytmagan. 1941 yildagi siyosiy vaziyat haqida asosiy tushunchalar jamoatchilik tomonidan qidirilayotgan har qanday imkoniyatni istisno qiladi. Tomas Fleming Prezident Ruzvelt Germaniya yoki Yaponiya birinchi zarbani berishini xohlardi, ammo AQSh Perl-Harborga qilingan hujumda bo'lgani kabi qattiq zarba berishini kutmagan edi.^[43]

Yaponiyaning AQShga hujumi AQShning Germaniyaga qarshi urush e'lon qilishiga kafolat bera olmadi.^{[44][sahifa kerak ]} Bunday hujumdan keyin Amerika jamoatchiligi g'azabi xuddi sodir bo'lganidek Germaniyaga emas, Yaponiyaga qaratilgan bo'lar edi. The Uch tomonlama pakt (Germaniya, Italiya, Yaponiya) har kimni mudofaada boshqasiga yordam berishga chaqirdi; Yaponiya, agar u birinchi bo'lib zarba bergan bo'lsa, Amerika Yaponiyaga hujum qildi, deb da'vo qila olmaydi.^[45] Masalan, Germaniya 1939 yildan buyon Buyuk Britaniya bilan, 1941 yil iyunidan boshlab SSSR bilan Yaponiyaning yordamisiz urush olib borgan. 1941 yil yozidan beri ham Atlantika okeanida Germaniya va AQSh o'rtasida jiddiy, agar past darajadagi dengiz urushi davom etmoqda.^[46] Shunga qaramay, bu faqat Gitler edi 11 dekabrda urush e'lon qilinishi, AQShni Evropa urushiga olib keladigan shartnoma asosida bajarilmagan.

Klauzen va Li Pearl Harbor: Yakuniy hukm Yaponiyaning Berlindagi Tokiodagi elchisining 1941 yil 29 noyabrda yozilgan Binafsha xabarini takrorlaydi. Yakunlovchi xatboshida shunday deyilgan: "... U (Ribbentrop), shuningdek, agar Yaponiya Amerika bilan urushga kirsa, Germaniya, albatta, darhol qo'shiladi va Gitlerning niyati shuki, Germaniya haqida hech qanday gap bo'lmasligi kerak. Angliya bilan alohida tinchlik. ... "^[47]

Hujum kutilmagan hodisadir, degan odatiy qarashga qarshi chiqqan nazariyotchilar buni Yaponiyaning hujumidan keyin qo'shilish kafolati sifatida ko'rib chiqsalar ham, Germaniya Italiya uchun qilganidek, uni ham Yaponiyaga yordam berish kafolati sifatida qabul qilish mumkin. Liviya.

Yaponiya kodlari allaqachon buzilganligi haqidagi da'volar

BIZ. razvedka signallari 1941 yilda ham ta'sirchan rivojlangan, ham notekis edi. Ilgari AQSh MI-8 Nyu-York shahridagi kriptografik operatsiya yopildi Genri Stimson (Guverning yangi tayinlangan davlat kotibi), hozirgi axloqsiz holatga tushib qolgan sobiq direktorni ilhomlantirgan "axloqiy fikrlarni" keltirib, Herbert Yardli, 1931 yil kitob yozish uchun, Amerika qora palatasi, boshqa xalqlarning kripto trafigini buzishdagi muvaffaqiyatlari haqida. Ko'pgina mamlakatlar zudlik bilan o'zlarining shifrlari va kodlarini o'zgartirib (va umuman takomillashtirib) javob berishdi va boshqa xalqlarni o'z signallarini o'qishni boshlashga majbur qilishdi. Yaponlar ham bundan mustasno emas edi.

Shunga qaramay, AQSh kriptanalitik ishlari Stimsonning harakatlaridan keyin ikki xil harakat bilan davom etdi: armiya Signal razvedka xizmati (SIS) va dengiz floti idorasi (ONI) kripto guruhi, OP-20-G. Kriptanalitik ish shu darajada sir tutilgan edi, ammo Pearl Harbordagi 14-dengiz okrugi kabi buyruqlarga Admiral tomonidan kod buzilishi ustida ishlash taqiqlangan edi. Kelli Tyorner Vashingtondagi byurokratik ziddiyatlar natijasida.

1941 yil oxiriga kelib, ushbu tashkilotlar J19 va PA-K2 deb nomlangan bir nechta yapon shifrlarini buzdilar Tsu va Oite navbati bilan yaponlar tomonidan.^[48] Xavfsizlikning eng yuqori darajadagi diplomatik kodi Siyohrang AQSh tomonidan buzilgan edi, ammo amerikalik kriptanalizatorlar IJN oqimiga qarshi ozgina yutuqlarga erishdilar Kaigun Ango Sho D^[49] (AQSh tomonidan AN-1 deb nomlangan D dengiz kodi;^[50] 1942 yil martidan keyin JN-25).

Bundan tashqari, bir tomondan penury, ikkinchidan aql-idrokni past martabali martaba yo'li sifatida qabul qilish tufayli ishchi kuchining ko'p yillik tanqisligi mavjud edi. Tarjimonlar haddan tashqari ko'p ishladilar, kriptanalizatorlar kam edi va shtatlar odatda stressga duch keldi. 1942 yilda Har bir kriptogramma dekodlanmagan. Yapon trafigi boshqariladigan jangovar razvedka bo'limi uchun juda og'ir edi.^[51] Bundan tashqari, yaxshi razvedka xodimlari va o'qitilgan tilshunoslarni ushlab qolish qiyin kechdi; ko'pchilik haqiqiy professional bo'lish uchun zarur bo'lgan uzoq vaqt davomida ish joyida qolmadi. Ishga qabul qilish sabablariga ko'ra deyarli barchasi odatdagi topshiriqlarga qaytishni xohlashdi. Biroq, ish haqi darajasi to'g'risida "... oldinroq Ikkinchi jahon urushi, [AQSh] bu harakatga 700 ga yaqin odam jalb qilingan va, albatta, ba'zi yutuqlarga erishgan. "^[52] Ulardan 85 foiziga parolni ochish, 50 foiziga IJN kodlariga qarshi tarjima ishlari topshirilgan.^[53] Ushbu muvaffaqiyatlarning mohiyati va darajasi mutaxassis bo'lmaganlar o'rtasida katta chalkashliklarni keltirib chiqardi. Bundan tashqari, OP-20-GY "tahlilchilar xulosa qilingan xabarlarga qaraganda qisqacha hisobotlarga tayanishdi."^[54]

Shuningdek, AQShga Gollandiya (NEI) razvedkasi tomonidan ingliz-golland-amerika boshqalari singari shifrlangan xabarlar berildi. kriptografik yukni taqsimlash to'g'risidagi kelishuv, ittifoqdoshlar bilan birgalikda ma'lumot. Biroq, AQSh ham buni rad etdi.^[55] Bunga hech bo'lmaganda qisman murosaga kelish qo'rquvi sabab bo'lgan; hatto AQSh dengiz kuchlari va armiyasi o'rtasida ham bo'lishish taqiqlangan (masalan, qarang Markaziy byuro ).^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Oxir-oqibat ushlangan va parol hal qilingan ma'lumotlarning oqimi qattiq va injiqlik bilan boshqarilardi. Ba'zida hatto Prezident Ruzvelt ham kod buzish harakatlaridan barcha ma'lumotlarni ololmagan.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Yodda tutilganidan so'ng xavfsizlik darajasi pastligi sababli murosaga kelish qo'rquvi bor edi Sehr Brigada generalining stolida topilgan Edvin M. (Pa) Uotson, Prezidentning harbiy yordamchisi.^[56]

Siyohrang

Yapon kodi "deb nomlangan"Siyohrang ", Tashqi ishlar vazirligi tomonidan ishlatilgan va faqat diplomatik (ammo harbiy bo'lmagan) xabarlar uchun 1940 yilda armiya kriptograflari tomonidan buzilgan. Yaponiyadan Vashingtondagi elchixonasiga yuborilgan ushbu koddan foydalangan 14 qismli xabar dekodlangan. Vashington 6 va 7 dekabr kunlari Yaponiyaning Qo'shma Shtatlar bilan diplomatik munosabatlarni buzish niyatida ekanligi haqidagi xabarni Vashington vaqti bilan soat 13.00da (Tinch okeanida tong otgan) Yaponiya elchisi etkazishi kerak edi. Rufus S. Bratton, keyin Marshallning yordamchisi bo'lib xizmat qilgan va buni yaponlar Tinch okeanining biron bir joyida tong otishida hujum qilishni niyat qilganligini anglatardi. Marshall ushbu hududdagi Amerika bazalariga, shu jumladan Gavayiga ogohlantirish xabarini yuborishni buyurdi. Atmosfera uzatish sharoitlari tufayli xabar odatdagi signal kanallari orqali emas, balki Western Union orqali yuborilgan va hujum boshlangunga qadar qabul qilinmagan.^[57]

Hujumdan oldin IJN xabarida aniq aytilgan Perl-Harbor haqidagi da'vo, ehtimol haqiqatdir. Pearl Harborga ishora qilgan Binafsharang transport vositalarining da'volari ham haqiqat bo'lishi mumkin, chunki tashqi ishlar idorasi harbiylar tomonidan yaxshi o'ylanmagan va shu davrda urushni rejalashtirish, shu jumladan sezgir yoki yashirin materiallardan muntazam ravishda chiqarib tashlangan. Hujumdan keyin yoki haqiqatan ham urush tugaguniga qadar har qanday bunday tutish tarjima qilinmagan bo'lishi mumkin; ba'zi xabarlar yo'q edi.^[58] Ikkala holatda ham, ushbu hujumga qadar bo'lgan barcha trafiklar hali maxfiylashtirilmagan va jamoat domeniga chiqarilmagan. Shunday qilib, har qanday bunday da'volar hozirda aniqlanmagan bo'lib, to'liqroq hisobga olinishini kutmoqda.

Bundan tashqari, Perl-Harborga qadar hech qanday razvedka qiymati bilan JN-25B trafigi bo'yicha hech qanday parol hal qilinmadi va albatta aniqlanmagan. Mualliflar V. J. Xolms va Kley Bler Jr tomonidan qayd etilgan bunday tanaffuslar qo'shimcha jadvallarga kiritildi, bu uch kishining talab qilingan ikkinchi bosqichi edi (yuqoriga qarang). Tarjimaning sana / vaqt tartibida barcha manbalardan olingan birinchi 100 JN-25 parollari nashr etildi va ular Milliy arxivlar. Birinchi JN-25B parolini aslida HYPO (Gavayi) 1942 yil 8-yanvarda (№1 up JN-25B RG38 CNSG Library, 22-quti, 3222/82 NA CP). Dastlabki 25 parol juda qisqa xabarlar yoki marginal razvedka qiymatining qisman parollari edi. Uitlok aytganidek: "Perl-Harborgacha tuzilgan bitta JN-25 parolining hech qachon topilmagani yoki maxfiylashtirilmaganligi har qanday hiyla-nayrang bilan bog'liq emas ... bu shunchaki bunday parol yo'qligi bilan bog'liq. Hech qachon mavjud bo'lgan. Bu bizning ma'lum bir davrda foydalanishga yaroqli parolni ishlab chiqarish bizning umumiy kriptologik qobiliyatimiz doirasiga kirmagan. "^[59]

JN-25

The JN-25 superkriptlangan kod va uning AQSh tomonidan kriptanalizi, Pearl Harbor ilm-fanining eng munozarali qismlaridan biridir. JN-25 - AQSh dengiz kuchlarining so'nggi nomlari kriptotizim ning Yaponiya imperatorlik floti, ba'zida D dengiz kodeksi deb nomlanadi.^[60] Buning uchun ishlatiladigan boshqa nomlarga besh raqamli, 5Num, besh xonali, besh raqamli, AN (JN-25 Able) va AN-1 (JN-25 Baker) va boshqalar kiradi.^[61]

Ushbu turdagi superkiphered kodlar keng qo'llanilgan va o'sha paytdagi amaliy kriptografiyada eng zamonaviy bo'lgan. JN-25 printsipial jihatdan Buyuk Britaniyaning Ikkinchi Jahon urushi paytida Germaniya tomonidan buzilganligi ma'lum bo'lgan "Dengiz Kiperi № 3" ga juda o'xshash edi.^[62]

JN-25 qanday kriptosistema ekanligi aniqlangandan so'ng, uni qanday buzishga urinish kerakligi ma'lum bo'ldi. Stinnett OP-20-G tomonidan ishlab chiqarilgan bunday tizimga hujumlar uchun USN qo'llanmasi mavjudligini ta'kidlaydi.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Shunga qaramay, bunday kodni buzish amalda oson bo'lmagan. IJN radio trafigi keskin va sezilarli darajada ko'payganida, jangovar harakatlar boshlanishidan oldin ushlab turilgan xabarlarda etarli darajada "kriptanalitik chuqurlik" to'plash uchun ko'p kuch va vaqt talab qilindi; 1941 yil 7-dekabrgacha IJN radio trafigi cheklangan edi, chunki IJN bu borada juda oz rol o'ynagan Xitoyga qarshi urush va shuning uchun eng yuqori darajadagi kripto tizimidan qat'i nazar, radio xabarlarini yuborish juda kamdan-kam hollarda talab qilinardi. (Shuningdek, Xitoydan tashqarida IJN trafigini to'xtatish eng yaxshi nuqtaga aylangan bo'lar edi.) Aksincha, GYP-1 rasmiy tarixida 1941 yil 1 iyundan 1941 yil 4 dekabrigacha 45000 ga yaqin IJN xabarlari ko'rsatilgan.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} Shunday qilib, Yaponiyaning shifrlangan radioeshittirishlarining aksariyati Xitoyda quruqlik operatsiyalari bilan bog'liq armiya harakati bo'lib, ularning hech birida IJN kriptografiyasi qo'llanilmagan. ^[63]

JN-25 singari o'ta shifrlangan shifrni buzish uch bosqichli jarayon edi: (a) qo'shimcha shifr ichida boshlang'ich nuqtasini o'rnatish uchun "indikator" usulini aniqlash, (b) yalang'och kodni ochish uchun superkriptatsiyani olib tashlash va keyin ( c) kodni o'zi buzish. JN-25 birinchi marta aniqlanganda va aniqlanganda, tutib olinadigan bunday xabarlar to'planib (dengiz kuchlari tomonidan Tinch okeani atrofidagi turli xil tutib turadigan stantsiyalarda) superkripsiyani echib olishga urinish uchun etarli chuqurlik to'plashga harakat qilindi. Bunda muvaffaqiyat kriptograflar tomonidan tizimdagi "tanaffus" deb nomlangan. Bunday tanaffus har doim ham ushlangan xabarning aqlli matnli versiyasini ishlab chiqarmagan; buni faqat uchinchi bosqichdagi tanaffus qilishi mumkin edi. Faqatgina asosiy kodni buzgandan so'ng (yana bir qiyin jarayon) xabar mavjud bo'lishi mumkin edi, va hattoki uning ma'nosi aqlli ma'noda to'liq aniqroq bo'lmasligi mumkin.

Yangi nashr chiqarilganda, kriptograflar yana boshlashga majbur bo'ldilar. Asl JN-25A tizimi "Moviy" kodni almashtirdi (amerikaliklar shunday deb atashgan) va har biri uchga bo'linadigan besh xonali raqamlardan foydalangan (va tezkor va bir oz ishonchli, xatolarni tekshirishda va shu bilan bir qatorda kriptanalizatorlar uchun "beshik"), jami 33 334 huquqiy kod qiymatini beradi. Kod qiymatini buzishni qiyinlashtirish uchun har besh xonali shifr elementiga arifmetik ravishda ma'nosiz qo'shimchalar (katta jadval yoki besh xonali raqamlar kitobidan) qo'shilgan. JN-25B JN-25 ning birinchi chiqarilishini 1940 yil dekabr oyining boshida bekor qildi. JN-25B ning 55000 ta so'zi bor edi va dastlab bir xil qo'shimchalar ro'yxatidan foydalangan bo'lsa-da, bu tez orada o'zgartirildi va kriptanalizatorlar o'zlarini butunlay yopiq deb topdilar.

Ko'p yillar davomida ushbu tizimning parolini hal qilishda erishilgan yutuqlar va uni o'qish mumkin bo'lgan (to'liq yoki qisman) argumentlar to'g'risida turli xil da'volar qilingan. Leytenant "halol Jon" Leytviler,^[64] Qo'mondoni CAST bekat, Filippinlar, 1941 yil noyabr oyida uning xodimlari kodlangan xabarlarning raqam ustunlari bo'ylab "o'ng bo'ylab yurishlari" mumkinligini aytdi.^{[iqtibos kerak ]} U tez-tez JN-25 da'volarini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun tez-tez keltirilgan, keyin asosan o'qish mumkin edi. Biroq, bu izoh xabarning o'ziga emas, balki supero'tkazuvchi qo'shimchalarga taalluqlidir va qo'shimcha qiymatlarni aniqlashning yangi usuli yordamida kodga hujum qilish qulayligini anglatadi.

1941 yil 16-noyabrdagi xat^[65] L.W.ga Leytviler tomonidan yuborilgan bog'larda (OP-20-GY) "Biz 1 fevraldan 31 iyulgacha bo'lgan davrda ishlashni to'xtatdik, chunki hozirgi davrga mos kelish uchun qo'limizdan kelganicha harakat qilamiz. Ikkala yo'lni ushlab turish uchun yetarli miqdordagi trafikni o'qiyapmiz. tarjimonlar juda band. " Boshqa bir hujjat, Hewitt so'rovidan 151-sonli ko'rgazma (kapitan L. F. Saffordning yodgorliklari).^[66] AQSh harbiy-dengiz kuchlarining OPNAV-242239 "1941 yil 26-noyabrdagi xabarlarni baholash" xabarining nusxasi bor, unda qisman: '1. Ma'lumotnoma (a) Com 16-ni ushlab turish eng ishonchli deb hisoblanganligini va Com 16-dan Yaponiya dengiz harakatlari to'g'risidagi hisobotlarni baholashini va OPNAV-ga yuborilishini, CINCPAC ma'lumotlarini yuborishini so'radi. Com 16-ning hisob-kitoblari Com 14-ga qaraganda ancha ishonchli edi, bu nafaqat radioeshittirishni yaxshi tinglashi, balki Com 16 hozirda Yaponiya flotining kriptografik tizimida ("5 raqamli kod" yoki "JN25") xabarlarni o'qiyotganligi va texnik ma'lumotlar almashinuvi va Yapon-ingliz tilidan tarjimalar^[67] ingliz birligi bilan (The Uzoq Sharq birlashgan byurosi ) keyin Singapurda. Podpolkovnik. Artur H. Makkollum bundan xabardor edi va bu uning fikrini yozganida bo'lishi mumkin edi Makkollumning eslatmasi. Dyuan L. Uitlok, trafik bo'yicha tahlilchi CAST,^[68] Hujumdan oldin IJN harakati trafik kodi o'qilayotganidan xabardor emas edi. Ushbu kontekstda "o'qish" degani, xabarlarni foydalanishga yaroqli emas, balki asosiy kod guruhlarini ko'rishni bilishdir Oddiy matn.^[69] Hewitt Inquiry hujjatida, shuningdek, "" 5 raqamli tizim "(JN-25B) Pearl Harbor reydidan oldin ham, keyin ham shubha uyg'otadigan hech qanday ma'lumot bermadi" deyilgan.

Har oy bo'yicha batafsil hisobotlar urush boshlanishidan oldin har qanday JN-25B xabarlari to'liq shifrlangan deb ishonish uchun hech qanday sabab yo'q. Sentyabr, oktyabr va noyabr oylarida o'tkazilgan natijalar taxminan 3800 kod guruhini (55000 dan 7%) Perl-Harborga hujum paytida tiklanganligini aniqladi. Umuman olganda, AQSh dengiz yoki tegishli tizimlarda 26 581 ta xabarni hisobga oldi SIYOHRANG, faqat 1941 yil sentyabr va dekabr oylari orasida.^[70]

Shunday qilib, AQSh dengiz kuchlarini rejalashtiruvchilari Yaponiya bir vaqtning o'zida faqat bitta operatsiyani amalga oshirishi mumkinligiga ishonishdi,^[71] Ikki haftadan ko'proq vaqt davomida (1-noyabrdan 17-noyabrgacha) Niderlandiyaning Sharqiy Hindistondagi operatsiyalari uchun Yaponiyaning to'planishini ko'rsatgandan so'ng, ushbu kutilgan operatsiyaga aloqador bo'lmagan JN-25 xabarlari hatto razvedka qiymati bo'yicha tekshirilmagan.^[72]

Yaponiya razvedkasi

Yaponiyaning Pearl Harborga qarshi josusligi kamida ikkitasini jalb qildi Abver agentlar. Ulardan biri, Otto Kun, edi a shpal agenti oilasi bilan Gavayida yashaydi. Kuh qobiliyatsiz edi va u qimmatbaho ma'lumotni taqdim etgan biron bir dalil yo'q. Boshqa, Yugoslaviya Tadbirkor Dushko Popov, uchun ishlaydigan ikki tomonlama agent edi XX qo'mita ning MI5. 1941 yil avgust oyida u tomonidan yuborilgan Abver Oaxudagi harbiy ob'ektlar, shu jumladan Perl-Harbor haqidagi aniq savollarni o'z ichiga olgan topshiriqlar ro'yxati bilan AQShga.^[73] Garchi Britaniya xavfsizlik koordinatsiyasi Popovni Federal qidiruv byurosiga tanishtirdi, amerikaliklar unchalik ahamiyat bermaganga o'xshaydi. Ehtimol, ilgari targ'ibot va soxta yoki ishonchsiz razvedka o'z hissasini qo'shgan bo'lishi mumkin J. Edgar Guvver Popovning Pearl Harborga bo'lgan qiziqishini ahamiyatsiz deb rad etish.^[74] Uning topshiriqlari ro'yxatini harbiy razvedka ma'lumotlariga etkazish uchun hech narsa yo'q, shuningdek unga Gavayiga borishga ruxsat berilmagan. Keyinchalik Popov o'z ro'yxatini hujumni aniq ogohlantirish deb ta'kidladi, bu esa FBI tomonidan e'tiborsiz qoldirildi. Uning ro'yxatidagi savollar shov-shuvli va umumiy edi va hech qanday tarzda Perl-Harborga havo hujumini ko'rsatmadi. Prange Popovning da'vosini haddan tashqari oshirib yuborgan deb hisobladi va taniqli anketa mahsuloti ekanligini ta'kidladi Abver puxtalik.

Bundan tashqari, yaponlarga kerak emas edi Abver uning tarkibida IJN razvedkasining yashirin xodimi bo'lgan Gavayida konsulligi bo'lgan yordam, Takeo Yoshikava.^[75] Konsullik yillar davomida IJN Intelligence-ga hisobot berib kelgan va Yoshikava u kelganidan keyin hisobotlar tezligini oshirgan. (Ba'zan uni "usta josus" deb atashardi, aslida u juda yosh edi va uning hisobotlarida kamdan-kam xatolar mavjud emas edi.) Pearl Harbor bazasi xavfsizligi shunchalik sust ediki, Yoshikava kirish huquqini olishda hech qanday qiyinchiliklarga duch kelmadi, hatto dengiz flotining o'z turistik kemasini ham olib o'tirdi. (Hatto u bo'lmasa ham, Makonga qaragan tepaliklar kuzatish yoki suratga olish uchun mukammal bo'lgan va erkin foydalanish imkoniga ega bo'lgan.) Uning ba'zi ma'lumotlari va, ehtimol, konsullikdan olingan boshqa materiallar, IJN razvedka xizmatiga Yaponiya savdo kemalarida qo'lda etkazib berildi. Urushgacha Gavayi; yozda kamida bittasi shu maqsadda Gavayiga ataylab yuborilganligi ma'lum. Biroq, aksariyati, deyarli aniq, Tokioga uzatilgan ko'rinadi orqali kabel (Tokio bilan odatdagi aloqa usuli). Ushbu xabarlarning aksariyati AQSh tomonidan ushlangan va parol hal qilingan; aksariyati faol hujum rejasining dalillaridan ko'ra, barcha davlatlarning potentsial raqiblari to'g'risida olib boradigan muntazam razvedka ma'lumotlari sifatida baholandi. Hozircha ma'lum bo'lganlarning birortasi, shu jumladan hujumdan keyin parolini ochib berganlar, nihoyat shifrlanmaganlarga qaytish vaqti bo'lganida, Perl-Harborga qilingan hujum haqida aniq bir narsa aytilmagan.

In November 1941, advertisements for a new o'yin called "The Deadly Double" appeared in American magazines. These ads later drew suspicion for possibly containing coded messages, for unknown agents, giving advance notice of the Pearl Harbor attack. The ads were headlined "Achtung, Warning, Alerte!" and showed an havo reydidan boshpana and a pair of white and black zar which, despite being six-sided, carried the figures 12, 24, and XX, and 5, 7, and 0, respectively. It was suggested that these could possibly be interpreted as giving warning of an air raid on day "7" of month "12" at approximate latitude coordinate "20" (Rim raqami "XX").^[76][77]

Detection of Japanese radio transmissions en route

Alleged detection by SS Lurline

There are claims that, as the Kido Butai (the Striking Force) steamed toward Hawaii, radio signals were detected that alerted U.S. intelligence to the imminent attack. Masalan, Matson layner SSLurline, sarlavha San-Fransisko to Hawaii on its regular route, is said to have heard and plotted, via "nisbiy rulmanlar ", unusual radio traffic in a telegraphic code very different from International Morse^[78] which persisted for several days, and came from signal source(s) moving in an easterly direction, not from shore stations—possibly the approaching Japanese fleet. Ularning soni juda ko'p Mors kodeksi standards including those for Japanese, Korean, Arabic, Hebrew, Russian, and Greek. To the experienced radio operator, each has a unique and identifiable pattern. Masalan, kana, International Morse, and "Continental" Morse all have a specific rhythmic sound to the "dit" and "dah" combinations. Bu qanday Lurline's radiomen, Leslie Grogan, a U.S. Navy reserve officer in naval communications, and with decades of maritime service in the Pacific^[79] identified the mooted signal source as Japanese and not, say, Russian.

There are several problems with this analysis. Surviving officers from the Japanese ships state there was no radio traffic to have been overheard by anyone: their radio operators had been left in Japan to send fake traffic, and all radio transmitters aboard the ships (even those in the airplanes)^{[iqtibos kerak ]} were physically disabled to prevent any inadvertent or unauthorized broadcast.^[80]

The Kido Butai was constantly receiving intelligence and diplomatic updates.^[81] Regardless of whether the Kido Butai broke radio silence and transmitted, there was a great deal of radio traffic picked up by its antennas. In that time period, it was known for a radio signal to reflect from the ionosfera (an atmospheric layer); ionospheric skip could result in its reception hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Receiving antennas were sometimes detected passively 'rebroadcasting' signals that reached them (at much lower amplitudes, sufficiently low that the phenomenon was not of practical importance, nor even of much significance. Some have argued that, since the Kido Butai contained a large number of possible receiving antennas, it is conceivable the task force did not break radio silence but was detected anyway.^{[iqtibos kerak ]}

Such detection would not have helped the Americans track the Japanese fleet. Radio direction finder (DF or RDF) from that time period reported compass direction without reference to distance. (Moreover, it was common for the receiving stations to report erroneous reciprocal bearings.)^{[82][sahifa kerak ]} To locate the source, a plotter needed two such detections taken from two separate stations to triangulate and find the target. If the target was moving, the detections must be close to one another in time. To plot the task force's course with certainty, at least four such detections must have been made in proper time-pairs, and the information analyzed in light of further information received by other means. This complex set of requirements did not occur; agar Kido Butai was detected, it was not tracked.^{[iqtibos kerak ]}

The original records of Lurline surrendered to Lt. Cmdr. George W. Pease, 14th Naval District in Honolulu, have disappeared. Ham Lurline's log, nor the reports to the Navy or Coast Guard by Grogan in Hawaii have been found. Thus no contemporaneously written evidence of what was recorded aboard Lurline endi mavjud. Grogan commented on a signal source "moving" eastward in the North Pacific over several days as shown via "relative bearings" which then "bunched up" and stopped moving.^[83][84] However, the directions given by Grogan in a recreation of the logbook for the Matson Line were 18 and 44° off from known strike force positions and instead pointed towards Japan. According to author Jacobsen, Japanese commercial shipping vessels are the likely source. A re-discovered personal report written by Grogan after the radio log had been passed to the 13th Naval District, dated 10 December 1941 and titled "Record for Posterity", also does not support claims of Kido Butai eshittirish.^[85]

Other alleged detections

The contention that "low-powered" radio (such as VHF or what the U.S. Navy called TBS, or talk between ships), might have been used, and detected, is contradicted as impossible due to the tremendous distances involved^[86] and when contact was lost, it was routinely presumed it was because low-powered radio and land line were being used.^[87] Axborot erkinligi to'g'risidagi qonun (FOIA) requests for specific RDF reports remain wanting.^[88] "A more critical analysis of the source documentation shows that not one single radio direction finder bearing, much less any locating "fix," was obtained on any Kido Butai unit or command during its transit from Saeki Bay, Kyushu to Hitokappu Bay and thence on to Hawaii. By removing this fallacious lynchpin propping up such claims of Kido Butai radio transmissions, the attendant suspected conspiracy tumbles down like a house of cards."^[89]

One suggested example of a Kido Butai transmission is the November 30, 1941, COMSUM14 report in which Rochefort mentioned a "tactical" circuit heard calling "marus ".^[90] (a term often used for commercial vessels or non-combat units). Further, the perspective of U.S. naval intelligence at the time was, "... The significance of the term, 'tactical circuit' is that the vessel itself, that is Akagi, was using its own radio to call up the other vessels directly rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the Akagi with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a maru."^[91]

Japanese radio silence

According to a 1942 Japanese harakatlar to'g'risida hisobot,^[92] "In order to keep strict radio silence, steps such as taking off fuses in the circuit, and holding and sealing the keys were taken. During the operation, the strict radio silence was perfectly carried out... The Kido Butai used the radio instruments for the first time on the day of the attack since they had been fixed at the base approximately twenty days before and proved they worked well. Paper flaps had been inserted between key points of some transmitters on board Akagi to keep the strictest radio silence..." Commander Genda, who helped plan the attack, stated, "We kept absolute Radio Silence." For two weeks before the attack, the ships of Kido Butai used flag and light signals (semafora and blinker), which were sufficient since task force members remained in line of sight for the entire transit time. Kazuiyoshi Koichi, the Communications Officer for Salom, dismantled vital transmitter parts and kept them in a box that he used as a pillow to prevent Salom from making any radio transmissions until the attack commenced.^[93] Lieutenant Commander Chuichi Yoshoka, communications officer of the flagship, Akagi, said he did not recall any ship sending a radio message before the attack.^[94] Furthermore, Captain Kijiro, in charge of the Kido Butai's three screening submarines, stated nothing of interest happened on the way to Hawaii, presumably including signals received from the supposedly radio silent Kido Butai.^[95] Vitse-admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka stated, "It is needless to say that the strictest radio silence was ordered to be maintained in every ship of the Task Force. To keep radio silence was easy to say, but not so easy to maintain." There is nothing in the Japanese logs or after action report indicating that radio sukunati was broken until after the attack. Kusaka worried about this when it was briefly broken on the way home.^[96]

The appendix to the war-initiating operational order is also often debated. The message of 25 November 1941 from CinC Combined Fleet (Yamamoto) to All Flagships stated, "Ships of the Combined Fleet will observe radio communications procedure as follows: 1. Except in extreme emergency the Main Force and its attached force will cease communicating. 2. Other forces are at the discretion of their respective commanders. 3. Supply ships, repair ships, hospital ships, etc., will report directly to parties concerned." Furthermore, "In accordance with this Imperial Operational Order, the CinC of the Combined Fleet issued his operational order ... The Task Force then drew up its own operational order, which was given for the first time to the whole force at Hitokappu Bay... In paragraph four of the appendix to that document, the especially secret Strike Force was specifically directed to 'maintain strict radio silence from the time of their departure from the Inland Sea. Their communications will be handled entirely on the general broadcast communications net.'"^[97][98] In addition, Genda recalled, in a 1947 interview, Kido Butai's communications officer issuing this order, with the task force to rely (as might be expected) on flag and blinker.^[99]

Radio deception measures

The Japanese practiced radio aldash. Susumu Ishiguru, intelligence and communications officer for Ikkinchi tashuvchi bo'lim, stated, "Every day false communications emanated from Kyushu at the same time and same wavelength as during the training period." Because of this, Commander Jozef Rochefort ning Hawaii Signals Intelligence concluded that the First Air Fleet remained in home waters for routine training. The ships left their own regular wireless operators behind to carry on "routine" radio traffic. Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka stated, "The main force in the Inland Sea and the land-based air units carried out deceptive communications to indicate the carriers were training in the Kyushu area." The main Japanese naval bases (Yokosuka, Kure, and Sasebo) all engaged in considerable radio deception. Analysis of the bearings from Navy DF stations account for claimed breaks of radio silence, and when plotted, the bearings point to Japanese naval bases, not where the Kido Butai actually was.^[100] 26-noyabr kuni, CAST reported all Japan's aircraft carriers were at their home bases.^[101]Rochefort,^[102] with Huckins and Williams,^[103] states there were no dummy messages used at any time throughout 1941 and no effort by the Japanese to use serious deception.

When asked after the attack just how he knew where Akagi was, Rochefort^[104] (who commanded HYPO at the time) said he recognized her "same ham-fisted" radio operators. (The Japanese contend that radio operators were left behind as part of the deception operation.) The critical DF-tracked radio transmissions show bearings that could have not come from the strike force. Emissions monitored from CAST,^[105] yoki CASThisobot Akagi was off Okinawa on 8 December 1941, are examples, though some transmissions continue to be debated.^[106]

U.S. contact with Japanese submarines

Additionally, Japanese submarines were sighted and attacked (by the destroyer Palata ) outside the harbor entrance a few hours before the attack commenced, and at least one was sunk—all before the planes began launching. This might have provided enough notice to disperse aircraft and fly off reconnaissance, except, yet again, reactions of the duty officers were tardy. It has been argued that failure to follow up on DF bearings saved Korxona. If she had been correctly directed, she might have run into the six carrier Japanese strike force.

After the attack, the search for the attack force was concentrated south of Pearl Harbor, continuing the confusion and ineffectiveness of the American response.

Ittifoqdosh razvedka

Locally, Naval Intelligence in Hawaii had been tapping telephones at the Japanese Consulate before the 7th. Among much routine traffic was overheard a most peculiar discussion of flowers in a call to Tokyo (the significance of which is still publicly opaque and which was discounted in Hawaii at the time), but the Navy's tap was discovered and removed in the first week of December. The local FBI field office was informed of neither the tap nor its removal; the local FBI Agent in charge later claimed he would have had installed one of his own had he known the Navy's had been disconnected.

Throughout 1941, the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands collected considerable evidence suggesting Japan was planning some new military adventure. The Japanese attack on the U.S. in December was essentially a side operation to the main Japanese thrust to the South against Malaya va Filippinlar —many more resources, especially Imperial Army resources, were devoted to these attacks as compared to Pearl Harbor. Many in the Japanese military (both Army and Navy) had disagreed with Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 's idea of attacking the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor when it was first proposed in early 1941, and remained reluctant after the Navy approved planning and training for an attack beginning in spring 1941, and through the highest level Imperial Conferences in September and November which first approved it as policy (allocation of resources, preparation for execution), and then authorized the attack. The Japanese focus on Southeast Asia was quite accurately reflected in U.S. intelligence assessments; there were warnings of attacks against Tailand (the Kra Peninsula), Malaya, Frantsuz Hind-Xitoy, Gollandiyalik Sharqiy Hindiston (Davao-Weigo Line), the Philippines, even Rossiya. Pearl Harbor was not mentioned. In fact, when the final part of the "14-Part Message" (also called the "one o'clock message") crossed Kramer's desk, he cross-referenced the time (per usual practice, not the brainwave often portrayed) and tried to connect the timing to a Japanese convoy (the Thai invasion force) recently detected by Admiral Xart Filippinda.^[107]

The U.S. Navy was aware of the traditional planning of the Imperial Japanese Navy for war with the U.S., as maintained throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. The Japanese made no secret of it, and in the 1930s American radio intelligence gave U.S. war planners considerable insight in Japanese naval exercises.^[108] These plans presumed there would be a large hal qiluvchi jang between Japanese and U.S. battleships, but this would be fought near Japan, after the numerical superiority of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (assured by the Vashington dengiz shartnomasi, and still taken as given) was whittled down by primarily night attacks by light forces, such as destroyers and submarines.^[109] This strategy expected the Japanese fleet to take a defensive posture, awaiting U.S. attack, and it was confirmed by the Japanese Navy staff only three weeks before Pearl Harbor.^[110] In the 1920s, the decisive battle was supposed to happen near the Ryukyu islands; in 1940 it was expected to occur in the central Pacific, near the Marshall islands. Urush rejasi to'q sariq reflected this in its own planning for an advance across the Pacific.^[111] Yamamoto's decision to shift the focus of the confrontation with the U.S. as far east as Pearl Harbor, and to use his aircraft carriers to cripple the American battleships, was a radical enough departure from previous doctrine to leave analysts in the dark.

There had been a specific claim of a plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor from the Peru Ambassador to Japan in early 1941. (The source of this intelligence was traced to the Ambassador's Japanese cook.^[112] It was treated with skepticism, and properly so, given the nascent state of planning for the attack at the time and the unreliability of the source.) Since Yamamoto had not yet decided to even argue for an attack on Pearl Harbor, discounting Ambassador Grew's report to Washington in early 1941 was quite sensible. Later reports from a Korean labor organization also seem to have been regarded as unlikely, though they may have had better grounding in actual IJN actions. In August 1941, British Intelligence, MI6, dispatched its agent Duško Popov, code name Tricycle, to Washington to alert the FBI about German requests for detailed intelligence about defenses at Pearl Harbor, indicating that the request had come from Japan. Popov^[113] further revealed that the Japanese had requested detailed information about the British attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto. For whatever reason, the FBI took no action.

British advance knowledge and withholding claims

Several authors have controversially claimed that Uinston Cherchill had significant advance knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor but intentionally chose not to share this information with the Americans in order to secure their participation in the war. These authors allege that Churchill knew that the Japanese were planning an imminent attack against the United States by mid-November 1941. They furthermore claim that Churchill knew that the Japanese fleet was leaving port on November 26, 1941 to an unknown destination. Finally, they claim that on December 2, British intelligence intercepted Admiral Yamamoto's signal indicating December 7 as the day of an attack.^{[114][115][116]}

One story from author Konstantin Fitsgibbon claimed that a letter received from Viktor Kavendish-Bentink stated that Britain's JIC met and discussed at length the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. From a Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee session of 5 December 1941^[117] it was stated "We knew that they changed course. I remember presiding over a J.I.C. meeting and being told that a Japanese fleet was sailing in the direction of Hawaii, asking 'Have we informed our transatlantic brethren?' and receiving an affirmative reply." However the author was incorrect. There was no session on 5 December nor was Pearl Harbor discussed when they did meet on 3 December.^{[118][119][120]}

Official U.S. war warnings

In late November 1941, both the U.S. Navy and Army sent explicit warnings of war with Japan to all Pacific commands. Although these plainly stated the high probability of imminent war with Japan, and instructed recipients to be accordingly on alert for war, they did not mention the likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor itself, instead focusing on the Far East. Washington forwarded none of the raw intelligence it had, and little of its intelligence estimates (after analysis), to Hawaiian commanders, Admiral Eri E. Kimmel va umumiy Uolter C. Qisqa. Washington did not solicit their views about likelihood of war or Hawaiian special concerns. Washington's war warning messages have also been criticised by some (e.g., the U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board – "Do/Don't Messages") as containing "conflicting and imprecise" language.

Since the Army was officially responsible for the security of the Pearl Harbor facilities and Hawaiian defense generally, and so of the Navy's ships while in port, Army actions are of particular interest. Short reported to Washington he had increased his alert level (but his earlier change in meaning for those levels was not understood in Washington and led to misunderstanding there about what he was really doing). In addition, Short's main concern was sabotage from beshinchi kolonnistlar (expected to precede the outbreak of war for decades preceding the attack),^[121] which accounts for his orders that Army Air Corps planes be parked close together near the center of the airfields. There seems to have been no increased Army urgency about getting its existing radar equipment properly integrated with the local command and control in the year it had been available and operational in Hawaii before the attack. Leisurely radar training continued and the recently organized early warning center was left minimally staffed. Anti-aircraft guns remained in a state of low readiness, with ammunition in secured lockers. Neither Army long-range bombers nor Navy PBYs were used effectively, remaining on a peacetime maintenance and use schedule. Short evidently failed to understand he had the responsibility to defend the fleet.^[122] In Short's defense, it should be noted he had training responsibilities to meet, and the best patrol aircraft, B-17s and B-24s, were in demand in the Philippines and Britain, both of which had higher priority (he wanted at least 180 heavy bombers, but already had 35 B-17s, and was getting 12 more).^[123]

Little was done to prepare for air attack. Inter-service rivalries between Kimmel and Short did not improve the situation. Particularly, most intelligence information was sent to Kimmel, assuming he would relay it to Short, and aksincha; this assumption was honored mostly in the breach. Hawaii did not have a Purple cipher machine (although, by agreement at the highest levels between U.S. and UK cryptographic establishments, four had been delivered to the British by October 1941), so Hawaii remained dependent on Washington for intelligence from that (militarily limited) source. However, since Short had no liaison with Kimmel's intelligence staff, he was usually left out of the loop. Genri Klauzen reported the war warnings could not be more precise because Washington could not risk Japan guessing the U.S. was reading important parts of their traffic (most importantly Purple), as well as because neither was cleared to receive Purple.

Clausen does not answer why Washington could not have said "an exceptionally reliable source" was involved, with very strong instructions to pay attention. Additionally, Clausen claims military men of Kimmel and Short's seniority and background should have understood the significance of the warnings, and should have been more vigilant than they were, as for instance in scouting plane flights from Hawaii, which were partial at best in the period just before the attack. All other Pacific commands took appropriate measures^{[iqtibos kerak ]} for their situations.

Like most commentators, Clausen ignores what the "war warnings" (and their context) explicitly warn, though indistinctly, against. Washington, with more complete intelligence than any field command, expected an attack anywhere on a list of possible locations (Pearl Harbor not among them), and since the Japanese were already committed to Thailand, it seems to have been expected another major operation by them was impossible. Clausen, like most, also ignores what actions Kimmel, Short, and Admiral Klod C. Bloch (Commander, Fourteenth Naval District, responsible for naval facilities in Hawaii) actually took. They took precautions against sabotage, widely expected as a precursor to war, and reported their preparations. The Hawaii commanders did not anticipate an air attack; no one did so explicitly. Indeed, the prevailing view at the time was Japan could not execute two major naval operations at once, so with the Thailand invasion convoy known to be at sea, the Hawaii commanders had good reason to feel safe.

One major point often omitted from the debate (though Costello covers it thoroughly)^[124] is the Philippines, where MacArthur, unlike Kimmel or Short, had complete access to all decrypted Purple and JN-25 traffic CAST could provide (indeed, Stinnet quotes Whitlock to that effect),^[125] and was nonetheless caught unprepared and with all planes on the ground nevertheless, nine hours after the Pearl Harbor attack. Caidin and Blair also raise the issue.

Although it has been argued that there was sufficient intelligence at the time to give commanders at Pearl Harbor a greater level of alert, some factors may take on unambiguous meaning not clear at the time, lost in what Roberta Volstetter in her masterful examination of the situation called "noise",^[126] "scattered amid the dross of many thousands of other intelligence bits, some of which just as convincingly pointed to a Japanese attack on the Panama Canal."^[38]

Role of American carriers

None of the three U.S. Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers were in Pearl Harbor when the attack came. This has been alleged by some to be evidence of advance knowledge of the attack by those in charge of their disposition; the carriers were supposedly away so as to save them (the most valuable ships) from attack.

In fact, the two carriers then operating with the Pacific Fleet, Korxona va Leksington, were on missions to deliver fighters to Wake and Midway Islands, which were intended in part to protect the route used by planes (including B-17s) bound for the Philippines (the third, Saratoga, was in routine qayta tiklash yilda Puget ovozi, at the Bremerton shipyard). At the time of the attack, Korxona was about 200 mi (170 nmi; 320 km) west of Pearl Harbor, heading back. Aslini olib qaraganda, Korxona had been scheduled to be back on December 6, but was delayed by weather. A new arrival estimate put her arrival at Pearl around 07:00, almost an hour before the attack, but she was also unable to make that schedule.

Furthermore, at the time, aircraft carriers were classified as fleet scouting elements, and hence relatively expendable.^[127] Ular yo'q edi kapital kemalar. The most important vessels in naval planning even as late as Pearl Harbor were battleships (per The Mahan ta'limot followed by both the U.S. and Japanese navies at the time).^[128] Carriers became the Navy's most important ships only following the attack.

At the time, naval establishments all over the world regarded battleships, not carriers, as the most powerful and significant elements of naval power. Had the U.S. wanted to preserve its key assets from attack, it would almost certainly have focused on protecting battleships. It was the attack on Pearl Harbor itself that first helped vault the carrier ahead of the battleship in importance. The attack demonstrated the carrier's unprecedented ability to attack the enemy at a great distance, with great force and surprise. The U.S. would turn this ability against Japan. Elimination of battleships from the Pacific Fleet forced the Americans to rely on carriers for offensive operations.

Lack of court-martial

Another issue in the debate is the fact neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short ever faced court martial. It is alleged this was to avoid disclosing information showing the U.S. had advanced knowledge of the attack. When asked, "Will historians know more later?", Kimmel replied, "' ... I'll tell you what I believe. I think that most of the incriminating records have been destroyed. ... I doubt if the truth will ever emerge.' ... "^[129] From Vice Admiral Libby, "I will go to my grave convinced that FDR ordered Pearl Harbor to let happen.He must have known."^[130] It is equally likely this was done to avoid disclosing the fact that Japanese codes were being read, given that there was a war on.

Unreleased classified information

Part of the controversy of the debate centers on the state of documents pertaining to the attack. There are some related to Pearl Harbor which have not yet^{[qachon? ]} been made public. Some may no longer exist, as many documents were destroyed early during the war due to fears of an impending Japanese invasion of Hawaii. Still others are partial and mutilated.^[131]

Information that is still^{[qachon? ]} currently classified includes key reports in Churchill's records, including the PREM 3 file in the UK's Public Records Office, which contains Churchill's most secret wartime intelligence briefs. In it, the 252 group dealing with the Japanese situation in 1941 is open, save for the omission of Section 5, dealing with events from November 1941 through March 1942, and is marked with official finality as "closed for 75 years."^[132] Unlike the Magic intelligence files released by the United States, none of the Ultra intelligence files pertaining to Japan have been released by the British government.^[133]

Conflicting stories regarding FOIA (Axborot erkinligi to'g'risidagi qonun ) requests for the source materials used, e.g., Sheet Number 94644, or materials available at the National Archives are also common among the debate. However, much information has been said to have been automatically destroyed under a destruction of classified information policy during the war itself. Various authors have nevertheless continued to bring classified Pearl Harbor materials to light via FOIA.

For instance, Sheet No. 94644 derives from its reference in the FOIA-released Japanese Navy Movement Reports of Station H in November 1941. Entries for 28 November 1941 have several more items of interest, each being a "movement code" message (indicating ship movements or movement orders), with specific details given by associated Sheet Numbers. Examples are: Sheet No. 94069 has information on "KASUGA MARU" – this being hand-written (Kasuga Maru was later converted to CVE Taiyo ); Sheet No. 94630 is associated with IJN oiler Shiriya (detailed to the Midway Neutralization Force, with destroyers Ushio va Sazanami, emas Kido Butai);^[134] and finally for Sheet No. 94644 there is another hand-written remark "FAF using Akagi xtmr" (First Air Fleet using Akagi's transmitter). It is known that the movement reports were largely readable at the time.^[135]

These three documents (Sheet Numbers 94069, 94630, and 94644) are examples of materials which yet, even after decades and numerous specific FOIA requests, have not been declassified fully and made available to the public. Sheet Number 94644, for example, noted as coming from Akagi's transmitter and as being a "movement code" report, would have likely contained a reported position.^[136]

Soxta ishlar

A purported transcript of a conversation between Roosevelt and Churchill in late November 1941 was analyzed and determined to be fake.^[137] There are claims about these conversations; much of this is based on fictional documents, often cited as "Roll T-175" at the National Archives. There is no Roll T-175; NARA does not use that terminology.^[138]

Shuningdek qarang

• 11-sentyabr, oldindan bililgan fitna nazariyalariga hujum qiladi
• Coventry Blitz#Coventry and Ultra
• Tinch okeanidagi urush
• Port-Artur jangi
• Battle between HMAS Sidney and German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran
• Winds Code

Izohlar

Adabiyotlar

Qo'shimcha o'qish

Tashqi havolalar

• Pearl Harbor: Genri Stimsonning ko'rinishi. Time jurnali, 1946 yil 1-aprel
• Ruzvelt Perl-Harborga qilingan hujum haqida oldindan biladimi, hali hech narsa demadimi? - To'g'ri Dope, Straight Dope Ilmiy maslahat kengashi, 2001 yil 28 fevral
• Mustaqil institut: Pearl Harbor arxivi - Ko'pincha Stinnett sayti, shuningdek, Pearl Harbor maqolalari, munozaralari, intervyular, transkriptlar, kitoblarga sharhlar, kitoblar va Pearl Harbor hujjatlari mavjud.
• Milliy mudofaani avtorizatsiya qilish to'g'risidagi qonun (bu erda yaqinlashib kelayotgan hujumga oid mavjud razvedka ma'lumotlari Perl-Harbordagi Amerika qo'mondonlariga etkazilmaganligi qayd etilgan; 121-bet, 546-bo'lim).
• Pearl Harbor-dagi kitobni yopish - Stiven Budianskiy OP-20-G ning JN-25 ni 1939 yilda paydo bo'lishidan 12.7.41 gacha buzganligi to'g'risida. Qisman Stinnettning (va boshqalarning) hujumdan oldin JN-25 ning katta tanaffuslari haqidagi da'volariga javob.
• Perl-Harborda kommunizm: kommunistlar Perl-Harborni olib kelishda va Osiyoni kommunikatsiya uchun ochishda qanday yordam berishdi - Entoni Kubekning maqolasida ruslar AQShni urushga aylantirishni taklif qilishadi.
• Yolg'onchilik kuni - Pearl Harbor haqidagi haqiqat. Robert Stinnett va Ikkinchi Jahon Urushi Vetasi O'Kelly Makkluski bilan intervyu.
• Pearl Harborni oldindan bilishmi? Yo'q !: U. S. Navy-ning JN-25B-dagi harakatlari haqida hikoya - Stinnet va Uilfordning JN-25 bilan bog'liq da'volari bilan bog'liq muammolarni tasvirlaydigan juda yaxshi maqola.
• Robert Stinnettning "Yolg'onchining kuni" ning kontr-admiral Richard E. Young, USN (Ret) tomonidan keng va yangilangan iqtiboslari bilan rad etilishi.
• Pearl Harbor haqidagi afsonalar - Hujum haqida oldindan ma'lumotga ega bo'lgan da'volarni keng qamrab oluvchi sayt.
• Yaponiya zarbalari: 1941 yil. By Uilyam Xonan. Amerika merosi, 1970 yil dekabr, 22-jild, 1-son. 1925 yilda (Pearl Harbordan o'n olti yil oldin) ingliz dengiz eksperti Ektor Charlz Byoter o'z kitobida Tinch okeanidagi urushni beixtiyor bashorat qilgan Buyuk Tinch okeani urushi.
• Pearl Harbor kirish joyi: Payg'ambar uyg'otishida. Frenk Pirs Yangning Byuoter haqidagi maqolasi va uning kitobi.
• Pearl Harbor: Qarama-qarshilik davom etmoqda. Sheldon Richman tomonidan. Ozodlik kelajagi jamg'armasi, 1991 yil dekabr. Oldindan bilish to'g'risidagi maqola hamda Yaponiyani qo'zg'atishi mumkin bo'lgan qadamlar