Channel Dash - Channel Dash - Wikipedia

Channel Dash
(Unternehmen Zerberus/ Cerberus operatsiyasi)
Qismi Atlantika kampaniyasi ning Ikkinchi jahon urushi
Cerberus-fr.svg operatsiyasi
Cerberus operatsiyasi tomonidan olib borilgan dars diagrammasi (frantsuz tilida)
Sana1942 yil 11-13 fevral
Manzil
Ingliz kanali
50 ° 58′45 ″ N. 1 ° 44′09 ″ E / 50.97917 ° shimoliy 1.73583 ° E / 50.97917; 1.73583
Urushayotganlar
 Natsistlar Germaniyasi Birlashgan Qirollik
Qo'mondonlar va rahbarlar
Natsistlar Germaniyasi Otto CiliaxBirlashgan Qirollik Bertram Ramsay
Kuch
2 ta kemalar
1 og'ir kreyser
6 esminets
14 ta torpedo qayiqlari
26 Elektron qayiqlar
32 bombardimonchi
252 jangchi		6 esminets
3 esminets eskorti
32 ta motorli torpedo qayiqlari
v. 450 samolyot
Yo'qotishlar va yo'qotishlar
2 ta jangovar kemalar shikastlangan
1 ta esminets shikastlangan
1 esminets engil shikastlangan
2 ta torpedo qayig'i engil shikastlangan
22 samolyot yo'q qilindi (7 qiruvchi)
13 dengizchi halok bo'ldi
2 kishi yaralangan
23 ekipaj halok bo'ldi (JG 26 dan 4 kishi)		1 ta esminets jiddiy shikastlangan
bir nechta qurol qayiqlari shikastlangan
42 ta samolyot yo'q qilindi
230-250 o'ldirilgan va yaralangan
Channel Dash
(Unternehmen Zerberus/ Cerberus operatsiyasi)
Qismi Atlantika kampaniyasi ning Ikkinchi jahon urushi
TuriDengiz operatsiyasi
Manzil
Ingliz kanali
Rejalashtirilgan1941 yil oxiri - 1942 yil fevral
RejalashtirilganNatsistlar Germaniyasi Admiral Alfred Saalvaxter (Dengiz-Gruppenkommando G'arbiy)
BuyruqNatsistlar Germaniyasi Vizeadmiral Otto Ciliax
MaqsadJoyini o'zgartirishSharnhorst, Gneysenau va Prinz Evgen Brestdan Germaniya portlariga
Sana1942 yil 11-13 fevral
Tomonidan ijro etilganKriegsmarine
Luftwaffe
NatijaMuvaffaqiyat

The Channel Dash (Nemis: Unternehmen Zerberus [Cerberus operatsiyasi]) - bu Germaniyaning dengiz floti operatsiyasi Ikkinchi jahon urushi.[a] A Kriegsmarine (Germaniya floti) otryad ikkalasini o'z ichiga oladi Sharnhorst- sinf harbiy kemalar, og'ir kreyser Prinz Evgen va ularning hamrohlari evakuatsiya qilindi Brest yilda Bretan Germaniya portlariga. Sharnhorst va Gneysenau muvaffaqiyatiga erishganidan keyin 1941 yil 22 martda Brestga kelgan edi Berlin operatsiyasi Atlantika okeanida. Ko'proq reydlar rejalashtirilgan va kemalar Brestda qayta tiklangan. Kemalar ittifoqdosh trans-atlantika konvoylari uchun tahdid bo'lgan va RAF bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi 1941 yil 30 martdan boshlab ularga hujum qildi. Gneysenau 1941 yil 6 aprelda urilgan va Sharnhorst tarqatilgandan so'ng, 1941 yil 24-iyulda La Pallice. 1941 yil oxirida, Adolf Gitler buyurdi Oberkommando der Marine (OKM German Navy yuqori qo'mondonligi) kemalarni inglizlarning bostirib kirishiga qarshi nemis bazalariga qaytarish operatsiyasini rejalashtirish Norvegiya. Qisqa yo'l Ingliz kanali tomonidan ajablanib va ​​havoning qoplanishi uchun Britaniya orollari atrofida aylanib o'tishdan afzal edi Luftwaffe va 1942 yil 12-yanvarda Gitler operatsiya uchun buyruq berdi.[1]

Inglizlar kod bilan kodlangan nemis radio xabarlarining parollarini ishlatdilar Enigma mashinasi, RAF tomonidan havo razvedkasi Fotografik razvedka bo'limi (PRU) va Frantsiyadagi agentlar kemalarni tomosha qilish va bombardimon natijasida etkazilgan zarar haqida xabar berish. "Fuller" operatsiyasi, qirollik floti-RAFning favqulodda vaziyatlar rejasi, nemis kemalari tomonidan Atlantika konvoylariga qarshi turga qarshi kurashish, Britaniya orollarini aylanib o'tib Germaniya portlariga qaytish yoki Angliya kanalini to'sib qo'yish uchun ishlab chiqilgan. The Qirollik floti kemalarni ushlab turishi kerak edi Skapa oqimi Shotlandiyada, nemis harbiy kemasi tomonidan tartiblangan taqdirda Tirpitz Norvegiyadan. RAF chet elda Bombardimon va qirg'oq qo'mondonligidan eskadronlarni yuborgan va Shotlandiyadagi torpedo-bombardimonchilarni tayyor holatda ushlab turgan. TirpitzBu qishdagi ob-havo kabi ko'rinishni pasaytirgan va aerodromlarni qor bilan to'sib qo'yganligi sababli Kanalga to'sqinlik qiladigan samolyotlar sonini chekladi.

1942 yil 11-fevralda kemalar Brestni tark etishdi 21:14 va o'n ikki soatdan ko'proq vaqt davomida qochib qutulishga yaqinlashdi Dover bo'g'ozi kashfiyotsiz. The Luftwaffe havo qopqog'i bilan ta'minlangan Unternehmen Donnerkeil (Momaqaldiroq operatsiyasi) va kemalar Dovrga yaqinlashganda, inglizlar kech javob berishdi. RAF hujumlari, Fleet Air Arm, Dengiz kuchlari va qirg'oq artilleriyasining bombardimonlari qimmatga tushdi, ammo Sharnhorst va Gneysenau minalar tomonidan shikastlangan Shimoliy dengiz (Sharnhorst bir yil davomida ishdan chiqqan). 13 fevralga qadar kemalar Germaniya portlariga etib bordi; Uinston Cherchill haqida surishtiruv buyurdi débâcle va The Times inglizlarning fiyaskosini qoraladi. The Kriegsmarine operatsiyani taktik muvaffaqiyat va strategik muvaffaqiyatsizlik deb baholadi, chunki Atlantika konvoylariga tahdid Norvegiya uchun faraziy tahdid uchun qurbon qilingan edi. 23 fevralda, Prinz Evgen Norvegiya torpedosida edi va ta'mirlangandan so'ng, urushning qolgan qismini Boltiq bo'yida o'tkazdi. Gneysenau quruq dokga kirib, kechasi bombardimon qilingan 26/27 fevral, boshqa suzib yurmaslik; Sharnhorst da cho'kib ketgan Shimoliy Keypdagi jang 1943 yil 26-dekabrda.

Fon

Brest porti, 1940–1941

La Pallice va Frantsiya kanali portlari

1940 yilda Norvegiya va Frantsiya qo'lga kiritilishi bilan nemis tijoratining Britaniyaning shimoliy Atlantika konvoylariga qarshi reydini engillashtirdi. Admiral Xipper 1940 yil 27 dekabrda Bretan yarim orolining g'arbiy qismida, Brestda tugadi. Besh hafta davom etgan bombardimondan so'ng RAF bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi 1941 yil 1 fevralda kema dengizga qo'yilib, ko'plab kemalarni cho'ktirdi va 14 fevralda Germaniyaga qaytib, aylanma yo'l orqali suzib o'tdi. Daniya bo'g'ozi ertasi kuni, etib boradi Kiel 28 martda.[2] Shimolda tijorat reydlari Atlantika tomonidan 1940-1941 yil qish paytida Sharnhorst- sinf jangovar kemalari Sharnhorst va Gneysenau, og'ir kreyserlar Admiral Scheer va Admiral Xipper 115,622 tonna (117,477 tonna) ingliz kemasini cho'ktirdi, bu urushning qolgan qismida erishilgan nemis dengiz kemalaridan yuqori ko'rsatkichdir. Inglizlar islohot o'tkazdilar 19 guruh uchun Sohil qo'mondonligi Brestdagi nemis kemalarida hushyor turadigan 1941 yil yanvarida; Sharnhorst va Gneysenau Brest portiga 1941 yil 22 martda kelgan.[3]

Britaniya havo hujumi, 1941 yil

1941 yil 10 yanvardan aprel oyining o'rtalariga qadar bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi Brest portidagi kemalarga 829 tonna (842 tonna) bomba yo'naltirdi. Uinston Cherchill tomonidan chiqarilgan Atlantika okeanidagi jang 9 martdagi ko'rsatma, Germaniyaning Atlantika konvoylariga qarshi kampaniyasiga qarshi kurashish uchun vaqtincha Britaniya urush harakatlarining ustuvor yo'nalishini ko'rsatdi.[4] RAFning 1 ta PRU topildi Sharnhorst va Gneysenau portida 28 mart kuni va bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi uchib ketdi 1,161 marshrutlar kelasi ikki oy davomida yomon ob-havo orqali Brestdagi kemalarga qarshi. Gneysenau dvigatel xonasini kapital ta'mirlashni talab qildi va 4 aprel kuni quruq dokga kirdi. Suv chiqarilganda, kema ostidagi zaxiralar orasida portlamagan bomba topilgan. Bomba zararsizlantirilishidan oldin kemani ehtiyotkorlik bilan qaytarish va olib tashlash kerak edi. Gneysenau ichida ochiq holatda bog'lab qo'yilgan yo'l o'rindig'i, u erda 1 PRU tomonidan suratga olingan Spitfire 5 aprelda. Bristol Bofort ertasi kuni tongda torpedo bombardimonchilari hujum qilishdi; bitta samolyot tumanni portlagan va torpedada topgan Gneysenau zaxira qo'mondonlik markaziga jiddiy zarar etkazadigan dengiz sathidan.[5]

Gneysenau yana quruq dokga va kechasi qaytdi 10/11 aprel, u to'rt marta urilgan va yaqinda ikki marta o'tkazib yuborilgan. Xitlardan biri portlamadi, boshqalari esa "B" turretini tiqib qo'ydi va uning yonidagi zirhli kemani buzib tashladi, ekipaj kvartallarining uchdan bir qismini olov va portlash natijasida yashash uchun yaroqsiz holga keltirdi, oshxonalar va novvoyxonalarni vayron qildi va qurol-yarog 'boshqaruvining ba'zi tizimlariga ta'sir qildi.[6] Sharnhorst zarar ko'rmagan, ammo portning bomba zarbalari uni qayta tiklashni kechiktirgan, bu uning texnikasini sezilarli darajada ta'mirlashni o'z ichiga olgan; qozon super isitgich quvurlar butun kemani azoblagan ishlab chiqarish nuqsoniga ega edi Berlin operatsiyasi.[7] Ta'mirlash ishlari o'n hafta davom etishi kutilgandi, ammo Britaniyaning yaqin atrofda minalashi tufayli kechikishlar ularni o'tkazib yubordi Unternehmen Rheinübung (Reyn mashqlari amaliyoti). Tartib bo'yicha Bismark va Prinz Evgen Shimoliy Atlantika ichiga kirib bordi va Bismark cho'kib ketgan; Prinz Evgen 1 iyun kuni Brestga qaytib keldi. Yo'qotish Bismark Germaniya yer usti flotining harakat erkinligini jiddiy ravishda cheklab qo'ydi, chunki Gitler kapital kemalari juda ehtiyotkorlik bilan ishlashni buyurdi.[8]

Yuqori darajadan pastga tushirilgan fotosuratda port ustida ikkita bombardimonchi samolyot tasvirlangan
35 otryad Brest ustidan Halifaks bombardimonchilari, 1941 yil

Yoz davomida to'rtta motorli yangi RAFning kichik shakllanishi og'ir bombardimonchilar hujum qildi Gneysenau, Prinz Evgen va Sharnhorst; Prinz Evgen kechasi urilgan 1/2 iyul va ishdan bo'shatilgan. 21-iyul kuni suzib yurish Sharnhorst chuqur suv porti bo'lgan La Pallice-ga La Rochelle Frantsiya Atlantika okeanining qirg'og'ida, bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining Brestdagi kemalarga ajablanib hujum qilishga urinishlariga barham berildi. Sharnhorst oltita tomonidan hujum qilingan Qisqa Stirling 23 iyul oqshomida bombardimonchilar; oltita germaniyalik qiruvchi aralashdi va bitta bombardimonchi urib tushirildi. Brestga hujum 24 iyul kuni kunduzi sodir bo'ldi, yo'qotish bilan 13 bombardimonchi; La Pallice yana o'n besh tomonidan bombardimon qilindi Xandli sahifasi Galifakslari. Bir bombardimonchi La Pallice-ni topa olmadi, qolganlari esa kutib olishdi 12-18 Bf 109s va zenitga qarshi yong'in (FlaK) va barchasi 14 Galifaks ularning bomba nishoniga ta'sir ko'rsatgan. Besh bombardimonchi urib tushirildi, beshtasi jiddiy zarar ko'rdi va Sharnhorst besh marta urilgan.[9][b] 3000 uzun tonna (3000 tonna) dengiz suvi bo'lgan Brestga qaytib kelayotganda, Sharnhorst Bofort tomonidan hujumga uchradi, ammo uni torpedasini tashlamasdan urib tushirdi.[10]

28 martdan iyul oyi oxirigacha 1942 tonna (993 tonna) bomba tashlandi 1875 ta tur, 1,723 tomonidan Bomber qo'mondoni, u ham yuborilgan 205 minelaying sorties, boshqasi bilan 159 dan Sohil qo'mondonligi, yotqizish 275 minalar Brestdan tashqarida; inglizlar yutqazdi 34 samolyot, uchtasi minelayers. Keyingi ikki oy ichida bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi tez-tez kichik hujumlar uyushtirdi 56 bombardimonchi kechasi hujum qildi 3/4 sentyabr, dan so'ng 120 bombardimonchi kechasida 13/14 sentyabr. Tez-tez bo'lib o'tadigan kichik hujumlar qayta tiklandi 1000 tur iyuldan dekabrgacha qilingan.[11] Oyning boshida Brest guruhi yana bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining ustuvor vazifasiga aylandi va 11-dekabrdan boshlab bombardimon va minalash tunda sodir bo'ldi. Qachon Prinz Evgen 16 dekabrda quruqlikdan topildi, katta tungi reyd rejasi amalga oshirildi va kunlik reyd amalga oshirildi 101-bombardimonchi tunda reyd 17/18 dekabr va kunduzgi reyd 41 og'ir o'ninchi qiruvchi eskadronlar hamrohligida 18-dekabr kuni tushdan keyin bombardimonchilar. Gneysenau ozgina shikastlangan va dok eshiklari sindirib tashlangan Sharnhorst bir oy davomida, oltita bombardimonchi halok bo'lganligi uchun. Og'ir hujumlar butun oy davomida davom etdi va 30-dekabrda Halifaks tomonidan yana bir kunlik reyd o'tkazildi. 1 avgustdan 31 dekabrigacha 1175 tonna (1194 tonna) yuqori portlovchi va 10 uzun tonna (10 tonna) yoqish moslamalari tashlandi, o'n bitta og'ir bombardimonchi urib tushirildi va kemalar va shaharchaga katta zarar etkazildi, ammo ulardan birortasi ham yo'q edi kemalar yana urildi. Gneysenau 6-yanvar kuni kechqurun zarar ko'rgan va 1942-yil 10-dekabrdan 20-yanvargacha bo'lgan bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligining 37 foiz foizi Brestdagi kemalarga qarshi uchirilgan.[12][13][14][c]

Ultra

Shuningdek qarang: Enigma mashinasi va Ultra
217 eskadroni Bristol Beaufort torpedo-bombardimonchilari, RAF qirg'oq qo'mondonligi.

Ultra tomonidan ishlatiladigan kod nomi edi Inglizlar harbiy razvedka, uchun razvedka signallari nemis tilini buzish natijasida olingan radio va teleprinter Enigma tomonidan shifrlangan aloqa, nemis elektr mexanik rotorli shifrlash mashinasi. Shifrni ochish da amalga oshirildi Davlat kodeksi va Cypher School (GC&CS) da Bletchli bog'i va ma'lumotlar tezkor buyruqlarga etkazildi.[16] 1941 yil may oyidan boshlab Bletchli "Enigma" ni o'qishi mumkin edi Uy suvlari quruqlikdagi kemalar tomonidan ishlatiladigan, nosozliklar va uzilishlarsiz, PRU va agentlarning hisobotlari bilan birlashtirilgan, Brestdagi kemalarda hushyor turardi.[17] 1941 yil aprelga kelib, inglizlar uchta kemaning urilganligini, ammo zararning hajmini bilmasligini bildilar va 16-dan 23-dekabrigacha Enigma parollari shuni ko'rsatdiki, kemalar qurollari Boltiqbo'yida bo'lib, qurol-yarog 'tayyorlashni olib borishgan; Ertasi kuni Admiralti hujum qilishga urinish ehtimoli borligi haqida ogohlantirdi.[18] 1942 yil 25-yanvarda kemalar portda suratga tushishdi va ikkita qisqa vaqt ichida quruq kemada ikkita kemada ko'rishdi. Yanvar oyining oxiridan fevral oyining boshigacha katta kemalarga torpedo qayiqlari, minalashtiruvchi kemalar va esminetslar qo'shildi; jangovar kemaning yangiliklari bilan birga Tirpitz Norvegiyada janubga ko'chib ketgan, bu Admiraliyani 2 fevral kuni uchta kemaning kanalni suzib o'tishga urinayotgani va signal yuborganligi to'g'risida minnatdorchilik bildirishiga olib keldi. Ijrochi Fuller.[19] Ertasi kuni Enigma va RAF fotografik razvedkasi (PR) aniqladiki, nemis kemalari Brestdan to to shu kungacha bo'lgan qo'shimchalar soni. Gollandiyalik kanca ettita esminetsga, o'nta torpedo-qayiqqa, ko'proq 30 ta minalashtiruvchi, 25 Elektron qayiqlar va ko'plab kichik hunarmandchilik.[20]

Norvegiya gipotezasi

Xaritasi Daniya bo'g'ozi o'rtasida Grenlandiya va Islandiya

1941 yil davomida Gitler Britaniyaning Norvegiyaga bostirib kirishining oldini olish rejasi doirasida Brest guruhi "Kanal orqali kutilmagan tanaffusda" uy suvlariga qaytishi kerak degan qarorga keldi. OKM Daniya bo'g'ozidan o'tishni Germaniyadan afzal ko'rdi va Grossadmiral (Buyuk Admiral) Erix Raeder La-Mansh bo'ylab sayohatni imkonsiz deb atadi.[21] Gitlerning aytishicha, chiqib ketishni hech qanday mashg'ulotlarsiz rejalashtirish kerak, chunki Britaniya razvedkasi kemalarni bombardimon qilishi va bilishi shart edi. Gitler yomon ob-havo davrini tanlashni buyurdi, qachonki RAFning asosiy qismi erga tushirilsa. Vizeadmiral (vitse-admiral) Kurt Frike (Shtab boshlig'i Seekriegsleitung SKL, Dengiz urushi qo'mondonligi) Gitlerga qarshi chiqdi, ammo siyosatni ko'rib chiqish uchun qisqa vaqt ichida ruxsat berildi. 1942 yil 12-yanvarda Raeder yana kanal yo'nalishiga qarshi chiqdi, ammo Gitler yakuniy qarorni qabul qilishi sharti bilan uni rejalashtirdi.[22]

Gitlerning ta'kidlashicha, Brestdagi kemalar Buyuk Britaniyaning bombardimonini Germaniyadan uzoqlashtirgan, ammo kemalar etarlicha zarar ko'rishi bilanoq ustunlik tugaydi. Vitse-admiral Otto Ciliax kutilmagan hayratga tushish va o'tib ketish uchun tunda boshlanadigan rejani bayon qildi Dover bo'g'ozi (Xilma-xilligi 21 km (34 km) va Kanalning eng tor qismi) kun davomida, xavfli nuqtada qiruvchi qopqoqdan foydalanish. The Luftwaffe kafolat berishdan bosh tortdi 250 jangchi mavjud bo'lgan kemalarni himoya qilishi mumkin edi, ammo Gitler rejani qabul qildi.[22] Gitler harbiy kemani buyurdi Tirpitz, allaqachon Norvegiyada, janubga ko'chirilishi kerak edi Trondxaym. 22 yanvar kuni bo'lib o'tgan konferentsiyada Gitler barcha kemalar va qayiqchalar Norvegiyani himoya qilish uchun yig'ilishi kerakligini va 25 yanvarda, Vizeadmiral Karl Dönitz (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, BdU, dengiz osti kemalari qo'mondoni) patrul qilish uchun sakkizta suvosti kemasini olib chiqib ketishga buyruq berildi Islandiya, Farer orollari va Shotlandiya. Dönitzning noroziligiga qaramay, yana o'n ikki U-qayiq Norvegiya uchun ajratilgan edi, shuningdek, dengiz kemalari Norvegiya suvlarida to'plangan edi.[23]

Prelude

Cerberus operatsiyasi

Norvegiya

Gitler Kanal yo'lini afzal ko'rdi va mas'uliyat o'z zimmasiga yuklandi Dengiz-Gruppenkommando G'arbiy (Dengiz qo'mondonligi G'arbiy, Admiral Alfred Saalvaxter ) rejalashtirish va ekspluatatsiya yo'nalishlari uchun; Ciliax, Brest guruhining qo'mondoni edi (flagman, Sharnhorst).[21] Eng yaxshi marshrutni tanlash, Britaniyaning minalashtirilgan maydonlaridan qochish va yuqori tezlikda bug'lashga e'tibor berildi. Minalar tozalash kemalari ingliz minalari orqali kanallarni tozalashdi va shamshiralar bilan belgilashdi (3-9 fevral kunlari Bomber qo'mondonligi kanallarga 98 minani qo'ydi). U-qayiqlar meteorologik kuzatuvlarga jo'natildi va eskort ekranini kuchaytirish uchun bir necha esminets kanaldan Brestgacha g'arbiy tomon bug'langandi.[24] Qorong'ulikning eng uzoq vaqtini o'tkazish uchun jo'nab ketish to'rt kun oldin bo'lishi kerak edi Yangi oy va da 19:30, foyda olish bahor fasllari tezlikni oshiradigan va ehtimol kemalarni minalar ustiga ko'taradigan Kanal bo'ylab oqayotgan.[25]

Havo qopqog'i tomonidan ta'minlanishi kerak edi Luftwaffe va oltita esminets birinchi oyog'ida Brest guruhini kuzatib borar edi, unga o'nta E-qayiqlar va E-qayiqlarning aralashmasi qo'shiladi; R-qayiqlar va kichik hunarmandlar qo'shilishadi Kep Gris Nez. Yanvar oyi davomida Kriegsmarine va Luftwaffe operatsiyani takrorladi, ammo kemalar dengizga chiqishga yaroqsizligini yo'qotdi va ko'plab texnik va mutaxassislar Brestdan muhim vazifalarga o'tkazildi. 9-fevralga kelib, kemalar Brest yo'llarida sinovlarni yakunladilar va 11-fevralga belgilangan.[25] Ekipajlarning ruhiy holati yuqori bo'lgan, Brestda hech qanday sabotaj sodir bo'lmagan va ekipajlar qirg'oqqa erkin chiqib ketishgan. Mahalliy aholi o'rtasida kemalar jo'nab ketishga tayyorlanayotganiga shubha yo'q edi va aldov sifatida tropik dubulg'a bortiga olib kirildi, frantsuz dok ishchilari "Tropikda foydalanish uchun" belgisi bilan neft bochkalarini yukladilar va shahar atrofida yolg'on mish-mishlar tarqaldi.[26]

Unternehmen Donnerkeil

Shuningdek qarang: "Donnerkeil" operatsiyasi

Xans Jeshonnek, Luftwaffe shtab boshlig'i, Cerberus muvaffaqiyatiga kafolat berishdan yoki g'arbdagi qiruvchi kuchlarni kuchaytirishdan bosh tortdi. Adolf Galland chaqirilishi kerak bo'lgan havo operatsiyasi buyrug'i berildi Unternehmen Donnerkeil (Thunderbolt operatsiyasi).[27] Reja tafsilotlari bilan kelishilgan Oberst (Polkovnik ) Karl Koller, shtab boshlig'i Luftflot 3 (Havo floti 3 Generalfeldmarschall Ugo Sperrle ).[28] Ba'zi o'quv bo'limlari asosiy qismini to'ldirish uchun safarbar qilindi Jagdwaffe yo'qligi Sovet Ittifoqi. The Funkxorxdienst (razvedka xizmati signallari, general Volfgang Martini ) ingliz qirg'oq radiolokatorlari ishini kamaytirish uchun atmosfera aralashuvini kuchaytirish texnikasi yordamida Britaniyaning radio-telefon chastotalarini siqib chiqarishga urindi. Dornier 217 yoshda ning Kampfgeschwader 2 (Bomber Wing 2) ingliz samolyotlarini yo'naltirish uchun g'arbiy kanal orqali elektron aldash turlarini uchirishi kerak edi. Fliegerkorps IX (General der Flieger [Havo kuchlari generali] Yoaxim Koeler ) Angliyaning janubi-g'arbiy qismida joylashgan RAF bazalarini bombardimon qilishga va Brest guruhini ushlab olishga urinayotgan ingliz dengiz kuchlariga hujum qilishga tayyor. Fernaufklärungsgruppe 123 (Uzoq muddatli razvedka guruhi 123) Kanalning har ikki uchida ham kuzatuvni ta'minlashi kerak edi Fliegerkorps IX.[29]

Karnay yo'nalishi uchta sektorga bo'lingan Jafü (Fighter Sector) chegaralari, lekin mahalliy nazoratni ta'minlash uchun Maks Ibel, ning sobiq qo'mondoni Jagdgeschwader 27 (Fighter Wing 27) tayinlandi Jagdfliegerführer Shiff (Jafu Shiff, Fighter Controller: Ship) va yo'lga chiqdilar Sharnhorst bilan aloqa qilish uchun signal xodimi sifatida Luftwaffe operatsiya davomida birliklar. Sakkizta mashq, atrofni o'z ichiga olgan 450 tur, 22 yanvar - 10 fevral kunlari amalga oshirildi. The Jagdgeschwader (kunduzgi qiruvchi qanotlar) va tungi jangchilar Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 (Night Fighter Group 1), tezda samolyotlarni o'ttiz daqiqada yoki undan kam vaqt ichida qayta qurollantirish va yonilg'i quyish orqali navbatdagi turga tayyorlashga tayyor bo'lishdi.[29] Galland, samolyot Britaniyaning qirg'oq radarlari ostida uchadigan past guruhlarga, yuqori va past qopqoqlarga uchishi kerak degan qarorga keldi. Hech bo'lmaganda doimiy patrul 16 jangchi Sakkizta samolyotdan iborat ikkita guruh o'zlarining patrul balandliklari uchun saqlanishi kerak edi, ularning har biri ikkitadan Shvarme to'rtta samolyot. Bittasi Shvarm zigzagda dengizga, bittasi quruqlikka uchishi kerak edi Shvarme kemalar qatori bo'ylab oldinga va orqaga sakkiz kishilik keng figuralarda, radio sukunatida uchib o'tishlari kerak edi. Har bir jangovar jangchilarga ruxsat berish uchun vaqt ajratildi 30 daqiqa kemalar ustida, bo'shatilgan birliklarga yonilg'i quyish va qayta qurollantirish va qaytish uchun etarli vaqt. Davomida Donnerkeil, yengillashtiradigan sortie atigi 20 daqiqadan so'ng yetib keldi, bu esa yarim tirnoq uchun qiruvchi qopqoq bo'lishini anglatadi 32 jangchi.[30]

To'liq operatsiya

G'arbiy Angliya janubi-g'arbiy Angliya va shimoliy-g'arbiy Frantsiya o'rtasidagi sun'iy yo'ldosh fotosurati

1941 yil aprel oyida Qirollik floti va RAF "Fuller" operatsiyasini ishlab chiqdi, ular Brestdagi kemalarga qarshi birgalikda operatsiyalarni o'tkazish rejasini tuzishlari kerak edi. Vitse-admiral Bertram Ramsay Dover qo'mondonligi, qirg'oq qo'mondonligi, dengiz floti va RAF tomonidan doimiy ravishda muvofiqlashtirilgan hujumlar bilan Kanalda suzib yurgan nemis eskadroniga qarshi operatsiyalar uchun javobgar bo'lishi kerak edi.[31] Buyuk Britaniyaning qirg'oq radarlari taxminan 80 nmi (92 milya; 150 km) masofaga ega edi va beshta doimiy havo patrullari bilan, rejalashtiruvchilar, hatto tunda yoki yomon ob-havo sharoitida ham Kanalning osongina ochilishini kutishdi. Budilnik ko'tarilishi bilanoq Fullerning tajovuzkor qoidalari boshlanadi. The 32 Motorli "Torpedo" qayiqlari ning Dover va Ramsgeyt flotillalar, a Dvigatel qurolli qayiq (MGB) eskorti 4000 yd (2,3 milya; 3,7 km) dan torpedo hujumlarini amalga oshirishi mumkin edi.[32] Qayiqlar orqasidan ergashib borar edi Fairey qilichbozi qiruvchi eskortlar bilan va Bofort tomonidan amalga oshirilgan torpedo-bombardimonchilar; The Doverda qirg'oq qurollari kemalar yaqin masofada bo'lgan vaqtgacha olov yoqardi; Bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi sekinlashishi yoki to'xtab qolishi uchun yetarlicha shikastlangan kemalarga hujum qilishadi.[33]

Nemis kemalari Dver bo'g'ozidan nariga o'tayotganda oltita Xarvich - asosini yo'q qiluvchilar Nore buyrug'i torpedo hujumlarini uyushtiradi va RAF bombardimon qilishni davom ettiradi, shuningdek kemalar yo'llariga minalar qo'yadi. Bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi niyat qilgan 100 samolyot to'rt soat oldin (taxminan.)1⁄3 uning ishlash kuchini), atrofga zaxiralash orqali 20 ta samolyot har bir guruhdan. Boshqa tomondan 200 samolyot, yarmi Germaniyaga qarshi operatsiyalarni davom ettirar, qolganlari esa ertasi kuni operatsiyalarga tayyorgarlik ko'rishgan. Fuller uchun ajratilgan samolyot aylantirildi va ob-havo sharoitida, 20-25 bo'ladi bomba Brest. Fighter qo'mondonligi torpedo-bombardimonchilarni jangchilar bilan kuzatib borardi 10 guruh janubi-g'arbiy va 16 qiruvchi janubi-sharqdagi 11-guruh otryadlari.[33] Har bir xizmat qo'mondoni shtab va operatsiya xonalarida aloqa xodimlari bilan almashgan, ammo umumiy aloqa tizimidan foydalanmagan.[31]

Tayyorlik

Brest yo'llari (Rade de Brest)

Nemis manevrasining dastlabki bosqichlari, xususan Kanaldagi minalarni tozalash va Brestga esminetslarni tranzit qilish, Admiralni Atlantika okeaniga parvoz qilish mumkin emasligi va boshpana suvlariga ko'chib o'tish o'rniga kanalni to'sib qo'yish yo'li bilan prognoz qilishiga olib keldi. Daniya bo'g'ozi orqali yoki O'rta er dengizi orqali Italiya portlariga kutilmoqda edi. Ertasi kuni Nore qo'mondonligiga chaqiruvda oltita esminetsni saqlash buyurildi Temza va Doverda bo'lganlarni kuchaytirish uchun oltita torpedo qayig'ini yuborishga tayyor bo'ling. Ro'za Abdiel- sinf minelayers HMSManxman va HMSUelslik Brestga yaqinlashishni Plymouth qo'mondonligidan va kanalning sharqiy chiqish yo'lini minib olish uchun Doverdan ajratilgan. Dengiz osti kemalarining aksariyati O'rta dengizda edi, ammo ikkita o'quv qayiqlari bortga yuborildi Biskay ko'rfazi. 6 fevral kuni, HMSSealion uy suvlarida yagona zamonaviy suvosti kemasi, minalar maydonlarida, supurilgan kanallarda va mashg'ulotlar o'tkaziladigan maydonlarda Ultra orqali berilgan ma'lumotlardan foydalangan holda qo'mondoni Brest Yo'llariga suzishga ruxsat berildi. Oltita operatsion qilichboqi torpedo-bombardimonchilari 825 otryad Fleet Air Arm [FAA] (leytenant-qo'mondon) Evgeniy Esmonde ) dan ko'chirildi RNAS Li-on-Solent ga RAF Manston yilda Kent, Doverga yaqinroq.[34]

RAF "Fuller" operatsiyasida ishtirok etgan kuchlarini muddatsiz tayyorligi to'g'risida ogohlantirdi va 19-fevral, 3-fevral kuni Sohil qo'mondonligi Surface Mk II (ASV) kemasi bilan jihozlangan havo yo'li bilan tungi razvedka patrullarini boshladi. Lockheed Hudsons, taxminan 30 nmi (35 mil; 56 km) oralig'idagi kemalarni aniqlay oladi.[35] Patrul liniyasi To'xtatuvchi allaqachon Brestdan uchib ketayotgan edi va Janubi-sharqiy yo'nalish dan Ushant Brehat oroliga va Xabo Le-Gevrdan Bulonga yo'l boshlandi. Sohil qo'mondonligining Britaniyada uchta Bofort torpedo-bombardimonchi eskadrilyasi bor edi, 42 otryad da RAF Leuchars Shotlandiyada, 12 Beauforts ning 86 otryad va 217 otryad Kornuolda va Torney orolida (Portsmut) 217 ​​ta Squadron samolyoti.[36][37] Ikki kundan keyin Enigma Ciliax qo'shilganligini ko'rsatdi Sharnhorst va yaqinda o'tkazilgan mashqlar bilan Admiraltining yaqinlashib kelayotgan ketishni bashorat qilishiga olib keldi. 8 fevral kuni ob-havoning tanaffusida PR kemalar hali ham bandargohda ekanligini aniqladi Sharnhorst Dock-da bo'lgan va yana ikkita esminets kelgan.[38]

Havo bosh marshali Filipp Jubert de la Ferte, Havo ofitseri qo'mondonligi (AOC) Sohil qo'mondonligi, Fighter va Bomber komandalariga minnatdorchilik bildirdi, 10 fevraldan keyin istalgan vaqtda kutish mumkin edi. Sohil qo'mondonligi guruhlari ogohlantirildi va 42 otryadga uchish buyurildi 14 Beauforts janubdan Norfolk (harakat ertangi kungacha aerodromlarda qor bilan kechiktirildi Sharqiy Angliya ). Havo vitse-marshali J. E. A. Boldvin, AOC bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi, bombardimonchilarning yarmida turib, boshqasini kamaytirdi 100 samolyot Admiraltiga xabar bermasdan, to'rt soatdan ikki soatgacha ogohlantirish.[38] 11 fevralda, Sealion tushdan keyin Brest tomon harakatlanib, hech narsa topolmadi va qaytib keldi 20:35. batareyalarni qayta zaryad qilish uchun, ertasi kuni yana bir marta sinab ko'rishga tayyor. Nemis kemalari Brestdan jo'nab ketishi kerak edi 19:30 ammo bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi reydi tomonidan kechiktirildi, bu fotosurat kashfiyoti kemalarni hanuzgacha portda topgandan keyin buyurilgan edi. torpedo portlashlari joylashtirilgan 16:15 O'tgan hafta davomida Enigma nemislar Kanalni aniq ko'rsatib beradigan marshrutda minalar tozalayotgani va qo'lga kiritilgan jadvallarga ishora qilib Admirallik tomonidan o'tkazilgan Germaniya marshrutini berganligi haqida ma'lumot bergan edi. 12:29. 12 fevralda. (Enigma Home Waters kunlik dengiz sozlamalari 10-12 fevral Bletchley Parkni 15 fevralgacha sindirish uchun oldi.)[39]

Jang

Kecha, 11/12 fevral

Shlachtschiff (jangovar kema) Sharnhorst 1939 yilda (Bundesarchiv DVM 10 Bild-23-63-46)

Brestdagi ingliz agent Brest guruhi Germaniyaning simsiz tiqilishi sababli ketayotgani to'g'risida signal berolmadi; Sealion, port tashqarisida patrullik qilayotgan, batareyalarini zaryad qilish uchun orqaga qaytgan.[40][d] Patrul To'xtatuvchi, Brest yaqinida, ASV Hudson tomonidan uchib ketayotgan edi 224 otryad Brest guruhi portdan tashqarida yig'ilganda 10:45. Patrulning balandligi 1000–2000 fut (300–610 m) balandlikda ASV taxminan 13 nmi (15 mil; 24 km) masofaga ega edi, ammo Gudzon janubi-g'arbiy tomon uchib ketayotgan edi, chunki kemalar Ushant tomon burilib, hech qanday aloqaga ega bo'lmagan. Keyingi sakkiz daqiqa To'xtatuvchi sortie kemalardan taxminan 9 nmi (10 milya; 17 km) uzoqlikda joylashgan, ammo radar bilan aloqa qilmagan.[42]

Janubi-sharqiy yo'nalish yaqinidagi Ushantdan yugurib o'tdi Jersi, Kanalni ochgan Brestdan kelishuvni topish. Brest guruhi kesib o'tdi Janubi-sharqiy yo'nalish da Soat 0:50, 12-fevral kuni erta, lekin Gudson patrul u erda yo'q edi, chunki ASV ishlamay qolganda qaytib kelishni buyurdilar. Jubertga samolyot yetishmayotgan edi va uning o'rniga hech kimni jo'natmadi To'xtatuvchi hech qanday noto'g'ri narsa haqida xabar bermagan va agar Brest guruhi ilgari suzib ketgan bo'lsa To'xtatuvchi boshlandi, u allaqachon o'tgan bo'lar edi Janubi-sharqiy yo'nalish. Xabo, uchinchi patrul liniyasi, dan Cherbourg ga Bulon odatdagidek, Britaniya aerodromlari ustida tong tushishi va samolyot qayta chaqirilishigacha o'tkazildi Soat 6:30, Brest guruhi hali ham chiziqdan g'arbda bo'lganida.[42][e]

12 fevral

Tong

La-Mansh kanalining sun'iy yo'ldosh tasviri, 2002 y

Kanal ustidagi yagona patrul xizmati Fighter qo'mondonligi tomonidan odatdagi tong otishgan Ostend, janubdan og'ziga Somme, Brest guruhi o'tgan Soat 10:00 Kimdan 8: 25-9: 59 Squad Leader boshchiligidagi RAF radar operatorlari Bill Igoe tiqilib qolmagan radar chastotasidan foydalangan holda, shimoliy joylarda aylanib yurgan nemis samolyotlarining to'rtta uchastkasini payqadi Le Havr, dastlab havo-dengiz qutqarish operatsiyalari deb taxmin qilingan.[43][44] Da Soat 10:00 11 guruh RAF qiruvchi qo'mondoni er uchastkalari 20-25 kn (23-29 milya; 37-46 km / soat) tezlikda shimoliy-sharqqa qarab harakatlanayotganini anglab etdi va ikkita Spitfire-ni razvedka qilish uchun jo'natdi. Soat 10:20, Fighter qo'mondonligi shtab-kvartirasiga radarlarni siqib chiqarish boshlangani haqida xabar kelgan vaqt haqida 9:20 va stantsiya Beachy Head yer usti kemalarini aniqlagan. Kentdagi radiolokatsion stansiyalar Le Touquet-dan ikki yirik kema haqida xabar berishdi Soat 10:52 va Spitfire patrul qo'nish paytida Soat 10:50, saqlagan radio sukunati, uchuvchilar flotilya haqida xabar berishdi Le Touquet (Bulon yaqinida), ammo poytaxt kemalari emas.[45]

Ko'rilganligi haqidagi xabar shoshilinch ravishda 11-guruhga va Dovordagi dengiz flotiga etkazildi 11:05 (Keyin bitta uchuvchi katta kemani eslatib o'tdi va u mavjud bo'lganida ma'lum bir manzara qabul qilindi qisqacha bayon qilingan.) Tasodif bilan, ikkita katta qiruvchi uchuvchi RAF Kenley Frantsiya qirg'og'iga tajovuzkorlar missiyasini uchishga qaror qilgan edi Soat 10:10, boshqa uchuvchilar esa ob-havo sharoiti tufayli erga tushirilgan. Juftlik ikkitasini ko'rdi Messerschmitt Bf 109s (Bf 109) hujum qilib, keyin ikkita katta kemadan iborat nemis flotiliyasi, esminets ekrani va E-qayiqlarining tashqi halqasi ustidan o'zlarini topdilar. Spitfiresga taxminan sho'ng'idi 12 nemis jangchilar va kemalardan zenit otishidan qochib qutulishgan, tuzilgan E-qayiq va eng baland balandlikda uchib ketgan. Ular qo'ngandan keyin 11:09, uchuvchilar nemis kemalari Le Touquet da 16 nmi (18 milya; 30 km) masofada bo'lganligini xabar qilishdi 10:42 tomonidan 11:25, Brest guruhi havo qopqog'i bilan Dover bo'g'oziga kirib kelayotgani to'g'risida signal berildi.[43][46]

Da 11:27 Bombardimonchilar qo'mondonligi Brest guruhi Dover yaqinida ekanligi to'g'risida ogohlantirilgan va guruhlarni tayyor bo'lishlari haqida ogohlantirgan. Oldingi kecha uchgan samolyotlar va to'rt soat oldin bo'lgan samolyotlar, shu jumladan, Air Marshal Richard Pirs haqida edi 250 samolyot lekin 100 bombardimonchi ikki soatdan keyin 2100 metrdan yoki undan balandroqqa tushganda samarali bo'lgan yarim zirhli teshikli bomba yuklangan edi. Yomg'ir yog'ishi bilan ko'rinadigan joy yomon edi 8/10-lar ga 10/10-chi bulutli qopqoqni, 210 metrgacha va agar bulutda faqat tanaffuslar bo'lmaganda, vazifani bajarish imkonsiz edi. Peirse, hujumlar Sohil qo'mondonligi va Dengiz kuchlari torpedo hujumlarini uyushtirganligi sababli Brest guruhini chalg'itadi degan umidda, faqat yuqori darajadagi portlashlarga va past balandlikdagi hujumlarga olib kelishi mumkin bo'lgan umumiy maqsadli bombalarni yuklashni buyurdi.[47]

Tush

Shuningdek qarang: Dover qurollari
Dover bo'g'ozining sun'iy yo'ldosh fotosurati (NASA Terra Sun'iy yo'ldosh tasviri, 2001 yil mart)

1940 yilda Doverda 12000 yd (11000 m) masofada to'rtta 6 dyuymli qurol bor edi, ikkitasi 9,2 dyuymli qurol 18000 yd (16000 m) oralig'ida, 25000 yd (23000 m) oralig'idagi ikkita zamonaviy 6 dyuymli batareyalar va 31.600 yd (28.900 m) va undan keyin 36.300 yd (3400 yd) oralig'idagi yangi o'rnatmalarda yana 9.2-dyuymli qurol. 33,200 m) yuqori quvvat bilan. (Frantsiya qulagandan so'ng, Axis kemalari Frantsiya qirg'og'iga yaqin suzib borib, Dover minasi to'sig'idan qochib qutulishi mumkin edi.) Dengiz kuchi 14 dyuymli qurol 48000 yd (44000 m) dan o'q uzishi mumkin edi, ammo harakatlanayotgan nishonlarga qarshi foydalanish qiyin edi.[48] The Janubiy Foreland Dover qurollarining akkumulyatori, yangi K tipidagi radarlar to'plami bilan Brest guruhining kemalarini Kanaldan Cap Gris Nez tomonga qarab kuzatib bordi.[49]

Da Soat 12:19, Dover qurollari birinchi zarbasini o'qqa tutdi, ammo ko'rish imkoniyati 5 nmi (5,8 milya; 9,3 km) ga teng edi kuzatuv ning otish. Qurolchilar radar qobiq chayqashlarini aniqlaydi va tuzatishlarni amalga oshirishga imkon beradi deb umid qilishdi, garchi bu usul ilgari sinab ko'rilmagan bo'lsa ham. K to'plamidagi "kliplar" kemalarning zig-zagini aniq ko'rsatdi, ammo snaryadlar qaerga tushayotganini ko'rsatmadi.[49] To'liq batareyani o'qqa tutish boshlandi va 9,2 dyuymli to'rtta qurol otildi 33 tur 30 yoshdan uzoqlashayotgan nemis kemalaridakn (35 milya; 56 km / soat) va barchasi o'tkazib yuborilgan. Nemis manbalarida ta'kidlanishicha, qirg'oq artilleriyasi o'q uzganida va snaryadlar Germaniyaning asosiy bo'linmalariga yaxshi tushgan.[50] Yengil dengiz kuchlari va torpedo-bombardimonchilar hujum qila boshlagach, qirg'oq qurollari o'q uzishni to'xtatdi 13:21 nemis kemalari ingliz radarining samarali doirasidan o'tib ketdi.[51]

Peshindan keyin

825 Squadron FAA ning oltita qilichbozi torpedo-bombardimonchilari Manstondan uchib ketishdi Soat 12:20, Esmonde Spitfire eskortlari bilan uchrashib, endi kutib o'tirmaslikka qaror qilganidan keyin 72 otryad da 12:28 da, barchasi Kale shahridan shimolga 10 nmi (12 milya; 19 km) nuqtaga qarab yo'l oladi. 121 eskadron va 401 otryad eskortlari kechikib, kemalar tomon yo'lda uchrashishga harakat qilishdi, lekin ularni o'tkazib yuborishdi va Manstonda qilich baliqlarini qidirish uchun orqaga qaytishdi. Yaqindagina eskort bilan uchayotgan 72 eskadronning Spitfireslari Germaniya kemalarini ko'rdilar 12:40. ammo Bf 109s va FW 190s tomonidan sakrab tushishdi va qilich baliqlari bilan aloqani uzdilar. Uchta torpedo-bombardimonchi samolyotning birinchi qismi esmond ekrani orqali bosib o'tilgan va Esmondening samolyoti u torpedasini ishga tushirishidan oldin urib tushirilgan. Qolgan ikkita samolyot nemis zenit bombasi orqali davom etdi, torpedalarni tashladi va keyin zarbaga uchragan samolyotlarini qazib oldi. Uchta Qilichchiqning ikkinchi qismi qirg'in ekranidan o'tib, bulut va tutun ichida g'oyib bo'lishgan.[52][f] Nemis qiruvchi eskortlari yo'q bo'lganda, ikkita bo'lim (sakkizta samolyot) 452 otryad RAAF bir nechta nemis kemalarini ishg'ol qildi va bitta Spitfire-ga yorilgan perspekt qopqog'i uchun esminetsning qaytadigan olovini o'chirdi.[54][g]

nemis harbiy kemasining fotosurati
Shlachtschiff (jangovar kema) Gneysenau 1939 yilda

Beshta operatsion Motorli "Torpedo" qayiqlari Doverda joylashgan (MTBlar) chap port 11:55 va nemis harbiy kemalarini ko'rdi 12:23. Ushbu hujum uchun RAF qiruvchi samolyoti o'z vaqtida havoga ko'tarilmadi, bitta MTB dvigatelda nosozlik yuzaga keldi, qolganlari ikkita qatorda o'n ikkita E-qayiq bilan to'sib qo'yildi. Nosoz MTB Dverga qaytishdan oldin 4000 yd (3,7 km) nihoyatda uzoq masofada torpedalarni otib tashlagan; qolganlari yaqinlasha olmadilar va E-qayiq liniyalari orasidagi bo'shliqdan torpedoedlar, yanglishib zarba berishdi Prinz Evgen. Ikki avtomat qayiqlar (MGB) o'z vaqtida Dovrdan so'nggi MTBni nemisdan himoya qilish uchun kelgan Narvik sinfidagi qiruvchi. Yana ikkita MTB Ramsgeytni tark etdi Soat 12:25. ammo nemislar eskadrilyasi olisidan yaqinlashib, ob-havo yomonlashishi va dvigatel muammolari ularni orqaga burilishga majbur qilishdan oldin hujum qila oladigan vaziyatga tusha olmadi.[55]

Bir nechta Bo'ron odatdagi patrulda bo'lgan jangchilarni qiruvchi ekran tomonidan ushlab qolishdi 14:00[50] Torni orolidagi ettita Beaufort Brest guruhi ko'rilgan paytda unga eng yaqin bo'lgan. Qolgan to'rttasi havoga ko'tarilishidan oldin ikkita Bofort portlatildi va bittasi yaroqsiz bo'lib qoldi 13:25 To'rt Bofort o'zlarining qiruvchi eskortlarini Manstonda kutib olish uchun kechikishdi va torpedo-bombardimonchilar va qiruvchilar mustaqil ravishda nemis kemalariga buyurtma berishdi. Brest guruhining mavqei, yo'nalishi va tezligi ovoz bilan berilgan (R / T Spitfires va Morsega (W / T ) Beaufortsga. Torpedo-bombardimonchilar buyurtmalarni ololmadilar, chunki 16 guruh Fuller operatsiyasi uchun ularga R / T o'rnatilganligini unutib qo'ydi. Beauforts Manstonga etib borganida, ular o'zlarini e'tiborsiz qoldirganday tuyulgan ko'plab jangchilar bilan aylanishdi. Ikki Bofort Frantsiya qirg'og'iga uchib ketdi, hech narsa topolmadi va chalkashliklar hal qilingan Manstonga tushdi. Qolgan ikkita samolyot allaqachon Manstonga qo'ngan edi, u erda ekipaj nima bo'layotganini bilib, Belgiya qirg'og'iga yo'l oldi. 15:40 (Nore qo'mondonligi esminetslari hujum qilganda). Ikkala bombardimonchi ham nemis flakonidan o'tib, hujumga o'tdi Prinz Evgen, torpedalarini 1000 yd (910 m) ga tashlab, hech qanday ta'sir ko'rsatmadi.[56]

Shotlandiyadan kelgan 42 ta eskadriya Bofortlari yo'nalishi kerak edi RAF Coltishall qor tufayli Norfolkda, lekin yuklanadigan torpedalar 100 mildan oshiqroq masofada joylashgan RAF North Coates Linkolnshirda va juda kech yo'l bilan kelgan. Samolyotlarning to'qqiztasi torpedalar bilan janubga uchib ketgan va uchib ketgan Soat 14:25, qolgan to'rttasini o'zlarining qiruvchi eskortlari va boshqa Xudsonlar bilan uchrashuvga qoldirishdi. Bofortlar Manstonga etib borishdi Soat 14:50. and tried to formate behind the Hudsons, which did the same thing; attempts to get the fighters to join the formation also failed. The Beaufort crews had been briefed that they would be escorted all the way, the fighters that they were to cover the Dover Strait in general and the aircraft circled Manston for thirty minutes, each formation under the impression that another one was leading. The Beaufort commander then set off, using the position of the Brest Group given at Coltishall and six Hudsons followed, the other five circling and waiting for the fighters, before giving up and landing at 16:00[47]

The Beauforts and Hudsons flew towards the Dutch coast and lost touch in the cloud and rain but the Hudsons made ASV contact and attacked the ships, two being shot down for no result. Six of the Beauforts then attacked through the flak and released their torpedoes, also with no effect. (The other three Beauforts had already attacked, possibly against British destroyers.) The two 217 Squadron Beauforts that had flown earlier had reached Manston, set off again independently and made ASV contact, attacking Sharnhorst da 5:10 and 6:00 p.m. The remaining Beauforts at St Eval in Cornwall had been sent to Thorney Island, arriving at 14:30. to refuel and be briefed to link with fighters at Coltishall in East Anglia, where they arrived at 17:00 to find no escorts waiting. The Beauforts pressed on to a position sent by wireless and at 6:05 p.m., as dark fell, with visibility down to 1,000 yd (910 m) and the cloud base at only 600 ft (180 m) saw four German minesweepers. One bomber attacked a "big ship" but flak damage jammed the torpedo and as night fell around 18:30, the rest turned for Coltishall; two Beauforts were lost to flak or the weather.[57][h]

Oqshom

Southern North Sea

The first wave of 73 Avro Manchester, Halifax and Stirling heavy bombers took off from 2:20 p.m. and most found the target area from 2:55 to 3:58 p.m. Thick low cloud and intermittent rain hid the view and only ten crews could see the German ships for long enough to bomb. The 134 bombers of the second wave took off from Soat 14:37. and reached the vicinity of the ships from 4:00 to 5:06 p.m. va hech bo'lmaganda 20 bombed. The last wave of 35 aircraft began at 4:15 p.m. and reached the Brest Group from 5:50 to 6:15 p.m. and nine were able to drop their bombs. Faqat 39 ning the aircraft that returned managed to attack the ships and 15 bombers were shot down by flak or lost after flying into the sea; twenty bombers were damaged and no hits were achieved.[47]

Yo'q qiluvchilar HMSKempbell, Jonli ning 21st Flotilla va HMSMakkay, Whithed, Walpole va Vester of the 16th Flotilla (Captain Charlz Pizi ), from Nore Command were First World War-vintage and usually escorted east coast convoys. The ships were practising gunnery off Orford Ness in the North Sea when alerted at 11:56 a.m. The destroyers sailed south to intercept the Brest Group but it steamed much faster than expected and to catch up, Pizey took the destroyers over a German minefield. Da 2:31 p.m., just before the destroyers attacked, north of the Sheldt Estuary, Sharnhorst had hit a mine and was stopped for a short time, before resuming at about 25 kn (29 mph; 46 km/h). Da 3:17 p.m. the destroyers made radar contact at 9 nmi (10 mi; 17 km) and visual contact at 4 nmi (4.6 mi; 7.4 km) at 3:43 p.m. Walpole had already dropped out with engine trouble; as the other five emerged from the murk, they were immediately engaged by the German ships. The destroyers pressed on to 3,000 yd (1.5 nmi; 1.7 mi; 2.7 km) and two destroyers fired torpedoes; Vester closed further and was hit by return fire from Gneysenau va Prinz Evgen, then the last two destroyers attacked but all their torpedoes missed.[59][men]

Night 12/13 and 13 February

Prinz Evgen (May 1945)

Sharnhorst had fallen behind after hitting a mine and at 7:55 p.m. Gneysenau hit a magnetic mine off Terschelling. The mine exploded some distance from the ship, making a small hole on the starboard side and temporarily knocking a turbine out of action.[60] After about thirty minutes, the ship continued at about 25 kn (29 mph; 46 km/h) and as Sharnhorst sailed through the same area, it hit another mine at 9:34 p.m., both main engines stopped, steering was lost and fire control was damaged. The ship got under way with the starboard engines at 10:23 p.m., making 12 kn (14 mph; 22 km/h) and carrying about 1,000 long tons (1,016 t) of seawater.[62][58] Sharnhorst yetib keldi Wilhelmshaven da Soat 10:00 on 13 February, with damage that took three months to repair. Gneysenau va Prinz Evgen ga yetdi Elbe da 7:00 and tied up at Brunsbüttel North Locks at 9:30[62] After receiving Ultra intelligence about German minesweeping in the Germaniyalik jang, Bomber Command had laid 69 magnetic mines along the swept channel on 6 February and 25 mines Ertasiga; ertangi kun. When the route of the channel was more accurately plotted on 11 February, four mines were laid, then more on 12 February when the Channel Dash was on. Enigma decrypts revealed the mining of the German ships but the news was kept secret by the British to protect the source.[63]

Natijada

Tahlil

Ciliax sent a signal to Admiral Saalwächter in Paris on 13 February,

It is my duty to inform you that Cerberus operatsiyasi has been successfully completed. Lists of damage and casualties follow.

— Ciliax (13 February 1942)[64]

OKM called Cerberus a tactical victory and a strategic defeat. In 2012, Ken Ford wrote that the German ships had exchanged one prison for another and that Bomber Command raids from 25–27 February, terminally damaged Gneysenau.[65] Operation Fuller had failed, a British destroyer had been severely damaged and 42 aircraft had been lost in 398 RAF qiruvchi, 242 bomber va 35 Coastal Command sorties.[66] British public opinion was appalled and British prestige suffered at home and abroad. A leading article in The Times read,

Vice Admiral Ciliax has succeeded where the Medina Sidoniya gersogi muvaffaqiyatsiz tugadi. Nothing more mortifying to the pride of our sea-power has happened since the seventeenth century. [...] It spelled the end of the Royal Navy legend that in wartime no enemy battle fleet could pass through what we proudly call the English Channel.

— The Times (14 February 1942)[67]

In 1955, Hans Dieter Berenbrok, a former Kriegsmarine officer, writing under the pseudonym Cajus Bekker, judged the operation a necessity and a success. He quoted Raeder "…we are all convinced we cannot leave the ships in Brest any longer". Raeder wrote that the operation was necessary because of a lack of training opportunities for the crews, lack of battle experience and the general situation made raiding operations in the "old pattern out of the question". According to Bekker, Hitler and Raeder shared the conviction that if the ships remained in Brest that they would eventually be disabled by British air raids.[68]

Stiven Roskill, the British naval official historian, wrote in 1956 that the German verdict was accurate. Hitler had exchanged the threat to British Atlantic convoys for a defensive deployment near Norway against a threat that never materialised. Roskill wrote that the British had misjudged the time of day when the German ships would sail but this mistake was less influential than the circumstantial failures of Coastal Command reconnaissance to detect the ships which had been at sea for 12 hours, four of them after dawn had broken, before the alarm was raised. Churchill ordered a Board of Enquiry (under Sir Alfred Bucknill ), which criticised Coastal Command for failing to ensure that a dawn reconnaissance was flown to compensate for the problems of the night patrols off Brest and from Ushant to the Isle de Bréhat. The inquiry also held that there should have been more suspicion of the German radar jamming on the morning of 12 February and that involving Bomber Command in an operation for which it was untrained was a mistake.[69]

The board found that the delay in detecting the German ships led to the British attacks being made piecemeal, against formidable German defensive arrangements and that the few aircraft and ships that found the group were "cut to pieces".[70] In 2012, Ken Ford wrote that the inquiry was, perforce, a whitewash, blaming instrument failures rather than incompetence but the report was still kept secret until 1946.[71] 1991 yilda, Jon Bakli wrote that the ASV Hudsons had been forbidden to use flares off Brest, because of the presence of Sealion and that one of the technical faults to an ASV could have been repaired, had the operator carried out a fuze check properly. Joubert was criticised for complacency, in not sending replacement sorties, despite his earlier warning that the Brest Group was about to sail, because of the assumption in Operation Fuller since 6 April 1941, that a day sailing was certain,

...a classic example of befuddled tactical thinking, poor co-operation and almost non-existent co-ordination.

— Robertson[72]

The dash exposed many failings in RAF planning, that only three torpedo-bomber squadrons with 31 Beauforts were in Britain, that training had been limited by the lack of torpedoes and the example of Japanese tactics had been ignored. The effectiveness of Bomber Command against moving ships was shown to be negligible and the failure to ensure unity of command before Operation Fuller began, led to piecemeal attacks using unsuitable tactics.[73]

R. V. Jons, Assistant Director of Intelligence (Science) at the Havo vazirligi during the war, wrote in his memoir, that for several days, army radar stations on the south coast had been jammed. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, a member of the army Radar Interception Unit, had reported this through the chain of command. On 11 February, Wallace had called for Jones to assist him in bringing attention to the German radar jamming. A gradual increase in the jamming had misled most operators to its intensity.[74] Wolfgang Martini, General der Luftnachrichtentruppe (General of Air Force Intelligence Units) had unobtrusively made the British radar cover "almost useless". Jones quoted Frensis Bekon,

Nay, it were better, to meet some Dangers halfe way, though they come nothing neare, than to keepe too long a watch, upon their Approaches: For if a Man watch too long, it is odds that he will fall asleepe.

— Of Delayes[41]

and included an anecdote of the chain of command breaking down under the shock of the Brest Group sailing so far up the Channel undiscovered. Havo marshallari were said to have sat on each other's desks, thinking of pilots they could telephone to find the ships; even after the Brest Group had been found, contact was lost several times. In 1955, Jones met Captain Giessler, the Navigating Officer on Sharnhorst, who said that the worst time in the operation was the thirty minutes that Sharnhorst was stationary, after hitting a mine just beyond Dover; in the low cloud none of the British aircraft found them.[41][j] In the Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (1994) Brereton Greenhous et al. wrote that the Canadian 401 Squadron had been sent "to intervene in an battle between German E-boats and British MTBs"; 404 Squadron was ordered

...to maintain air superiority between 1430 and 1500 hrs whilst the main attack by Coastal and Bomber aircraft was taking place.[76]

and 411 Squadron had been ordered on an "E-boat search". "The 'Channel block' had failed ignominiously".[76]

In the German semi-official history Germany in the Second World War (2001), Werner Rahn wrote that the operation was a tactical success but that this could not disguise the fact of a strategic withdrawal. Brest was a location from which the Kriegsmarine had anticipated much success, especially after the Japanese entry into the war had diverted Allied resources to the Pacific, creating new opportunities for offensive action in the Atlantic.[77]

In 2018, Craig Symonds wrote of the futility of keeping heavy units in Brest, "Those three ships had sat uselessly in Brest since the previous May, when Raeder’s grand scheme of concentrating a large surface force in the Atlantic had sunk along with the Bismarck. Since then, they had been bombed regularly and had made no contribution to the war beyond keeping the attention of the Royal Navy and the RAF."[78] Sharnhorst keyinchalik qo'shildi Tirpitz in Norwegian waters as a threat to Allied convoys supplying the USSR.[79]

Zarar ko'rgan narsalar

British aircraft losses to the Luftwaffe ikki edi Blenxeyms, four Whirlwinds, four Vellingtonlar, six Hurricanes, nine Xempdens and ten Spitfires. Kriegsmarine gunners shot down all six Swordfish and a Hampden bomber.[50] Vester yo'qolgan 23 men killed, four died of wounds and 45 wounded of the complement of 130; The ship was out of action for 14 weeks.[61] In 2014, Steve Brew recorded 230–250 killed and wounded.[80] The Kriegsmarine torpedo qayiqlari Yaguar va T. 13 edi damaged by bombing, two sailors were killed and several men were badly wounded by bomb splinters and small-arms fire; The Luftwaffe lost 17 aircraft and eleven pilots.[81][50] In 1996, Donald Caldwell gave 23 aircrew killed, four being fighter pilots from JG 26 and that 22 Luftwaffe aircraft were shot down, of which seven were fighters.[82]

Keyingi operatsiyalar

Shuningdek qarang: Sent-Nazer reydi
Germaniyalik jang and Baltic coast (1990 German borders)

Gneysenau entered a suzuvchi quruq dok at Kiel and was hit twice by RAF bombers, on the night of 26/27 February.[83] One bomb hit the battleship on her forecastle and penetrated the armoured deck.[84] The explosion ignited a fire in the foremost magazine, which detonated, throwing the forward turret off its mount.[85] The damage prompted the German Naval Staff to rebuild Gneysenau to mount the six 38 cm (15 in) guns originally planned, rather than repair the ship and the damaged bow section was removed to attach a longer one.[86] By early 1943, the ship had been sufficiently repaired to begin the conversion but after the failure of German surface forces at the Barents dengizidagi jang in December 1942, Hitler ordered the work to stop.[87] On 23 February, Prinz Evgen was torpedoed by a British submarine off Norway and put out of action until October; then spent the rest of the war in the Baltic. On 28 March, the British raided St Nazaire in "Chavandoz" operatsiyasi va yo'q qildi Normandiya dock, the only one in France capable of accommodating the largest German warships. Sharnhorst ishtirok etdi Zitronella operatsiyasi qarshi Shpitsbergen on 8 September 1943 and was sunk at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December.[88]

Memorial and commemorations

A granite memorial to all those Britons involved in Operation Fuller was erected in Marine Parade Gardens in Dover, to mark the 70th Anniversary Remembrance of the event in 2012.[89] Sailors from HMSKent provided a Guard of Honour as part of the parade held to mark the unveiling.[90]

On 10 February 2017, at the Fleet Air Arm memorial church at RNAS Yovilton (HMS Heron), a ceremony and flypast by four Wildcat HMA2 helicopters of the current 825 Naval Air Squadron was conducted, marking the 75th anniversary of Lieutenant-Commander Esmonde and 825 Naval Air Squadron's attack.[91]

Shuningdek qarang

Izohlar

  1. ^ Nemis: Zerberus (Cerberus ), a three-headed dog of Yunon mifologiyasi who guards the gate to Hades.
  2. ^ The plan had been to make a surprise attack on the ships at Brest in daylight, escorted by five long-range Spitfire squadrons, which by then had been fitted with external fuel tanks. Faqat 30 single-engined and nine twin-engined German day fighters were thought to be based near Brest, with another 60 da Cherbourg and the Channel Islands. Bomber Command planners thought that 140–150 bombers would be needed but the bomber pilots were inexperienced in formation flying and the number of long-range Spitfires was insufficient to escort a loose formation. Unescorted Fortress Is were to attack first at height, followed 15 daqiqa later by 18 Xendli Peyj Xempden medium bombers with three Spitfire squadron escorts, to attract German fighters and leave them short of fuel and ammunition. The main force of 120 Vikers Vellington medium bombers and heavy bombers were to attack for 45 minutes, with the last two Spitfire squadrons in the vicinity for any German fighters that managed to make second sorties. The fighters near Cherbourg were to be diverted by Bristol Blenxaym bombers covered by normal Spitfires of 11 guruh. The Hampden crews trained for a month but the plan was upset when Sharnhorst was found to have sailed to La Pallice, beyond the reach of the long-range Spitfires. The heavy bombers were taken out of the Brest attack and Avro Manchester bombers were withdrawn due to mechanical defects, reducing the main force to 78 bombers. The rest of the bombers attacked Brest on 24 July; the Fortress crews saw a few German fighters and the Hampdens reported about 24 more but the main force was too small to swamp the German ground defences and 11 bombers were shot down by fighters and flak; two more bombers crashed on their return flights.[9]
  3. ^ A Directorate of Bomber Operations paper of 5 April 1941 concluded that achieving one hit on each ship took from 2,200 to 5,000 bombs dropped.[15]
  4. ^ Reginald Jons wrote that the signal from Brest had been received on the night of 11/12 February but that the duty officer neglected to pass this information on because he claimed he had already read it in a London evening paper and assumed that the Admiralty already knew of it.[41]
  5. ^ To'xtatuvchi was usually conducted by four consecutive flights but this night, the ASV on the first Hudson broke down and the crew flew back to change to a spare, putting back the 19:30 start until 10:38 p.m. The Board of Enquiry found that the German ships had sailed through the To'xtatuvchi patrol line before it was re-established but this was later found to be untrue, the delayed patrol had begun before the Brest Group sailed.[37]
  6. ^ Five of the six crew were rescued by small craft but the second section, with 13 aircrew was lost with all hands. The Spitfires of 121 Squadron and 401 Squadron found no Swordfish at Manston and flew back out to sea. Arriving a few minutes after the Swordfish attack, they encountered the covering German fighters and were engaged in an air battle. Esmonde, had flown in the sinking of Bismark and had been killed in the attack, for which he received a Viktoriya xochi o'limdan keyin. Ramsay later wrote, "In my opinion the gallant sortie of these six Swordfish aircraft constitutes one of the finest exhibitions of self-sacrifice and devotion to duty the war had ever witnessed", while Ciliax remarked on "...the mothball attack of a handful of ancient planes, piloted by men whose bravery surpasses any other action by either side that day".[53]
  7. ^ Bluey Truscott was awarded a Bar to his DFC for this action.[54]
  8. ^ Coastal Command aircraft with ASV independently shadowed the Brest Group from 16:00, gained two sightings, then several ASV contacts after dark, one at 1:55 a.m. on 13 February, showing that the Brest Group had split up but the information was too late to use.[58]
  9. ^ Several salvoes from Gneysenau urish Vester, destroyed the starboard side of the bridge and No.1 and No.2 boiler rooms. Prinz Evgen hit the destroyer a four times, setting it on fire, then Captain Fein, aboard Gneysenau, ordered firing to cease, believing the destroyer to be sinking; Vester limped to Harwich at 6.5 kn (7.5 mph; 12.0 km/h).[60][61]
  10. ^ In 2013, Goodchild wrote that although Operation Fuller was a scientific and technological failure, Jones exaggerated for effect in his memoir. Too much had been expected of radar and German countermeasures had been underestimated, given earlier attempts to jam British radar in 1940 and British research into Oyna.[75]

Izohlar

  1. ^ Koop & Schmolke 2014, p. 111.
  2. ^ Roskill 1957, 372-373-betlar.
  3. ^ Richards 1974, 223-224-betlar.
  4. ^ Webster & Frankland 2006, pp. 167, 234.
  5. ^ Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 143; Xinsli 1994 yil, pp. 54–57; Richards 1974, pp. 223–225, 233, 236–237.
  6. ^ Koop & Schmolke 2014, p. 51.
  7. ^ Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 159.
  8. ^ Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 246; Xinsli 1994 yil, pp. 54–57; Richards 1974, pp. 223–225, 233, 236–237.
  9. ^ a b Webster & Frankland 2006, 240-241 betlar.
  10. ^ Webster & Frankland 2006, pp. 167, 240–241; Richards 1974, p. 361.
  11. ^ Roskill 1957, pp. 487, 491.
  12. ^ Roskill 1957, p. 491.
  13. ^ Richards 1974, pp. 349, 361–363.
  14. ^ Webster & Frankland 2006, p. 320.
  15. ^ Webster & Frankland 1961, p. 458.
  16. ^ Hinsley 1979, p. 346.
  17. ^ Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 124.
  18. ^ Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 134.
  19. ^ Richards 1974, p. 363.
  20. ^ Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 132.
  21. ^ a b Martienssen 1949, 121-122 betlar.
  22. ^ a b Richards 1974, pp. 358–360.
  23. ^ Roskill 1962, pp. 149, 100, 149–150.
  24. ^ Martienssen 1949, 122–123 betlar.
  25. ^ a b Roskill 1962, p. 150.
  26. ^ Ruge 1957, p. 264.
  27. ^ Hooton 1994, p. 114.
  28. ^ Hooton 2010, p. 121 2.
  29. ^ a b Hooton 1994, 114-115 betlar.
  30. ^ Weal 1996, p. 16.
  31. ^ a b Ford 2012 yil, p. 28.
  32. ^ Kemp 1957, p. 196.
  33. ^ a b Ford 2012 yil, p. 27.
  34. ^ Roskill 1962, 150-153 betlar.
  35. ^ Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 135.
  36. ^ Roskill 1962, p. 153.
  37. ^ a b Richards 1974, p. 366.
  38. ^ a b Xinsli 1994 yil, 135-136-betlar.
  39. ^ Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 136.
  40. ^ Hendrie 2010, 166–167-betlar.
  41. ^ a b v Jons 1998 yil, p. 235.
  42. ^ a b Richards 1974, pp. 365–366.
  43. ^ a b Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 137.
  44. ^ Kemp 1957, 197-199 betlar.
  45. ^ Richards 1974, pp. 366–367.
  46. ^ Richards 1974, p. 367.
  47. ^ a b v Richards 1974, p. 371.
  48. ^ Collier 2004, 131-132-betlar.
  49. ^ a b Ford 2012 yil, 44-45 betlar.
  50. ^ a b v d FC 2013, pp. 44–51.
  51. ^ Richards 1974, p. 370.
  52. ^ Richards 1974, pp. 368–369.
  53. ^ Kemp 1957, 199-200 betlar.
  54. ^ a b Southall 1958, 128–129 betlar.
  55. ^ Ford 2012 yil, 47-48 betlar.
  56. ^ Richards 1974, p. 270.
  57. ^ Richards 1974, 372-373-betlar.
  58. ^ a b Richards 1974, p. 373.
  59. ^ Roskill 1962, 157-158 betlar.
  60. ^ a b Macintyre 1971, 144-145-betlar.
  61. ^ a b DNC 1952, p. 189.
  62. ^ a b Roskill 1962, p. 158.
  63. ^ Xinsli 1994 yil, p. 138.
  64. ^ Potter 1970, p. 188.
  65. ^ Ford 2012 yil, 75-77 betlar.
  66. ^ Kemp 1957, p. 201.
  67. ^ Martienssen 1949, p. 123.
  68. ^ Bekker 1955, 48-49 betlar.
  69. ^ Roskill 1962, 159-160-betlar.
  70. ^ Roskill 1962, p. 160.
  71. ^ Ford 2012 yil, p. 75.
  72. ^ Buckley 1991, p. 359.
  73. ^ Buckley 1991, pp. 356–365.
  74. ^ Jons 1998 yil, 233–235 betlar.
  75. ^ Goodchild 2013, pp. 295–308.
  76. ^ a b Greenhous et al. 1994 yil, p. 215.
  77. ^ Rahn 2001, p. 435.
  78. ^ Symonds 2018, p. 259.
  79. ^ Teylor 1966 yil, pp. 13-16.
  80. ^ Brew 2014, p. 587.
  81. ^ Potter 1970, pp. 184, 189.
  82. ^ Caldwell 1996, p. 218.
  83. ^ Roskill 2004, p. 161.
  84. ^ Williamson 2003, p. 18.
  85. ^ Breyer 1990, p. 34.
  86. ^ Garzke & Dulin 1985, 150-151 betlar.
  87. ^ Garzke & Dulin 1985, p. 153.
  88. ^ Roskill 1960, 80-89 betlar.
  89. ^ "70th Anniversary Remembrance Events". The Channel Dash Association. Olingan 12 oktyabr 2016.
  90. ^ Kent Provides Guard of Honour for Channel Dash Memorial Parade, UK: Royal Navy, 2012, archived from asl nusxasi 2012 yil 7 oktyabrda.
  91. ^ SW 2017.

Adabiyotlar

Kitoblar

Tezislar

Veb-saytlar

Qo'shimcha o'qish

Kitoblar

  • Bekon, F. (1985) [1625]. "21: kechikishlar". Insholar. London: Pingvin klassiklari. pp.125. ISBN  978-0-14-043216-9.
  • Cherchill, Uinston (1950). Taqdir menteşesi. IV. Boston: Xyuton Mifflin. OCLC  396148.
  • Kay, Antoniy; Smit, Jon Richard (2002). Ikkinchi jahon urushidagi nemis samolyoti. Annapolis, tibbiyot fanlari: Naval Institute Press. ISBN  978-1-55750-010-6.
  • Kup, Gerxard; va boshq. (2001). Admiral Hipper sinfining og'ir kruizchilari: Admiral Gipper, Blyuxer, knyaz Eugen, Seydlitz va Lutzov. Annapolis, tibbiyot fanlari: Naval Institute Press. ISBN  978-1-55750-332-9.
  • Levy, J. (2001). Chiziqni ushlab turish: Ikkinchi Jahon Urushida Qirollik floti uy floti (Doktorlik dissertatsiyasi). Uels universiteti. OCLC  502551844. EThOS  uk.bl.ethos.493885. Olingan 23 oktyabr 2016.
  • Lewin, Ronald (1977). Ultra urushga boradi. London: Xattinsons. ISBN  978-0-09-134420-7.
  • 1942 yil 12 fevralda Germaniya jangovar avtoulovlari Sharnxorst va Gnayzenau hamda "Prins Ejen" kreyseri Brestdan Germaniyaga yo'l olgan vaziyatlarni o'rganish uchun tayinlangan tergov kengashining hisoboti va ushbu harakatni oldini olish bo'yicha olib borilgan operatsiyalar to'g'risida.. Smd. (Buyuk Britaniya. Parlament) 6775. London: Admiraltining tergov kengashi uchun HMSO; Havo vazirligi. 1946 yil. OCLC  62419923.
  • Vebster, C .; Frankland, N. (2006) [1961]. Tayyorgarlik. Germaniyaga qarshi strategik havo hujumi. Men. 1, 2 va 3 qismlar (repr. Naval & Military Press, Uckfield tahr.). London: HMSO. ISBN  978-1-84574-347-5.
  • Vinton, Jon; Beyli, Kris (2000). Qirollik dengiz flotining tasvirlangan tarixi. San-Diego, Kaliforniya: Thunder Bay Press. ISBN  978-1-57145-290-0.

Tezislar

Tashqi havolalar