Dengiz Arslon operatsiyasi - Operation Sea Lion

Dengiz Arslon operatsiyasi
Qismi G'arbiy front ning Ikkinchi jahon urushi
OperationSealion.svg
Dastlabki nemis rejasi
Operatsion doirasiNormandiya, Belgiya qirg'oq chizig'i, Ingliz kanali va ingliz qirg'oq chizig'i; 1940 yil 25-iyuldagi armiyaning dastlabki takliflari qo'nishni nazarda tutadi Kent ga Dorset, Vayt oroli va qismlari Devon; keyinchalik sharqda to'rtta qo'nish joylaridan iborat cheklangan guruhga o'tdi Sasseks va g'arbiy Kent
Rejalashtirilgan1940 yil sentyabr
RejalashtirilganOKW
MaqsadYo'q qilish Birlashgan Qirollik ga qarshi harbiy operatsiyalar bazasi sifatida Eksa kuchlari[1]
NatijaOxir-oqibat nemis, italyan va boshqa eksa kuchlarini bekor qilish va yo'naltirish Barbarossa operatsiyasi

Dengiz Arslon operatsiyasi, shuningdek yozilgan Sealion operatsiyasi[2][3] (Nemis: Unternehmen Seelöwe), edi Natsistlar Germaniyasi ning bosqini uchun reja uchun kod nomi Birlashgan Qirollik davomida Britaniya jangi ichida Ikkinchi jahon urushi. Keyingi Frantsiyaning qulashi, Adolf Gitler, nemis Fyer va Qurolli kuchlarning oliy qo'mondoni Buyuk Britaniya hukumati uning urushni tugatish haqidagi taklifini qabul qilishiga umid qilib,[4] va u istamaslik bilan istilo qilishni faqat boshqa barcha imkoniyatlar bajarilmasa, so'nggi chora sifatida ko'rib chiqdi.

Old shart sifatida Gitler ikkalasining ham yutug'ini aniqladi havo va dengiz ustunligi ustidan Ingliz kanali va taklif qilingan qo'nish joylari, ammo nemis kuchlari urush paytida biron bir vaqtda va ikkalasiga ham erisha olmadilar nemis oliy qo'mondonligi va Gitlerning o'zi muvaffaqiyat istiqbollari to'g'risida jiddiy shubhalarga ega edi. Shunga qaramay, Germaniya armiyasi ham, dengiz floti ham bosqinga tayyorgarlikning asosiy dasturini o'z zimmasiga oldi: qo'shinlarni o'qitish, maxsus qurol va uskunalarni ishlab chiqarish va transport kemalarini o'zgartirish. Kanal qirg'og'ida ko'plab daryo barjalari va transport kemalari to'plangan, ammo Luftwaffe samolyotlarining Buyuk Britaniyadagi jangida yo'qotishlari ko'paygani va Qirollik harbiy-havo kuchlari mag'lubiyatga uchraganligi belgisi bo'lmaganligi sababli, Gitler dengiz sherini 1940 yil 17 sentyabrda noma'lum muddatga qoldirgan va u hech qachon harakatga keltirilmagan.

Fon

Adolf Gitler Buyuk Britaniya bilan muzokaralar olib borilgan tinchlikka umid qildi va hech qanday tayyorgarlik ko'rmadi amfibiya hujumi Frantsiyaning qulashiga qadar Britaniyada. O'sha paytda bunday qo'nish tajribasi yoki zamonaviy uskunalari bo'lgan yagona kuchlar yaponlar edi Vuxan jangi 1938 yilda.[5]

Polshaning urush boshlanishi va qulashi

1939 yil sentyabrda nemis Polshaga bostirib kirish muvaffaqiyatga erishdi, ammo bu ikkalasini ham buzdi frantsuz va ingliz Polsha va ikkala mamlakat bilan ittifoq Germaniyaga urush e'lon qildi. 9 oktyabrda Gitlerning "Urush o'tkazish uchun 6-sonli yo'riqnoma" ushbu ittifoqchilarni mag'lub etish va "Gollandiyada, Belgiyada va Frantsiyaning shimoliy qismida iloji boricha ko'proq g'alaba qozonish uchun hujumni rejalashtirdi. Angliyaga qarshi havo va dengiz urushi ".[6]

Kanal portlari istiqbollari ostida qolmoqda Kriegsmarine (Germaniya dengiz kuchlari) nazorati, Buyuk Admiral (Grossadmiral ) Erix Raeder (rahbari Kriegsmarine) olib kelishi mumkin bo'lgan aniq qadamni kutishga urinib ko'rdi va operatsiya bo'yicha ofitseriga ko'rsatma berdi, Kapitan Gansyurgen Raynika, "urushning kelajakdagi taraqqiyoti muammo tug'dirsa, Angliyaga qo'shinlarni tushirish ehtimoli" ni tekshiradigan hujjat tuzish. Reinicke ushbu tadqiqot uchun besh kun sarfladi va quyidagi talablarni qo'ydi:

1939 yil 22-noyabrda Luftwaffe (Germaniya havo kuchlari) razvedkasi Jozef "Beppo" Shmid uchun bahslashgan "Havo urushini o'tkazish bo'yicha taklifini" taqdim etdi inglizlarning blokadasiga qarshi va "Buyuk Britaniya savdosini falaj qilish" Buyuk Britaniyaga importni to'sib qo'yish va dengiz portlariga hujum qilish orqali dedi. OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht yoki "Qurolli Kuchlarning Oliy Qo'mondonligi") variantlarni ko'rib chiqdi va Gitlerning 29-noyabrdagi "9-sonli yo'riqnomasi - Dushman iqtisodiyotiga qarshi urush ko'rsatmasi" sohil xavfsizligi ta'minlangandan so'ng, Luftwaffe va Kriegsmarine kerak edi blokada Dengiz minalari bo'lgan Buyuk Britaniyaning portlari, yuk tashish va harbiy kemalarga hujum qiladi va qirg'oq qurilmalari va sanoat ishlab chiqarishlariga havo hujumlarini uyushtiradi. Ushbu ko'rsatma Buyuk Britaniya jangining birinchi bosqichida o'z kuchini saqlab qoldi.[8]

1939 yilda Frantsiyadagi ingliz askarlari

1939 yil dekabrda Germaniya armiyasi o'z o'quv qog'ozini chiqardi (belgilangan Shimoli-g'arbiy) va ikkalasining fikri va fikri so'ralgan Kriegsmarine va Luftwaffe. Gazeta Angliyaning sharqiy qirg'og'iga hujumni tasvirlab berdi Yuvish va Temza daryosi o'tayotgan qo'shinlar tomonidan Shimoliy dengiz portlaridagi Kam mamlakatlar. Havo-desant qo'shinlari hamda dengizga 100 ming piyoda qo'shin tushishni taklif qildi Sharqiy Angliya, tomonidan tashiladi KriegsmarineBu, shuningdek, Qirollik dengiz kuchlari kemalarining Kanal orqali o'tishiga yo'l qo'ymaslik uchun edi Luftwaffe qo'nish joylari ustidan havo maydonini boshqarishi kerak edi. The Kriegsmarine javob Angliyaga bostirib kirish maqsadga muvofiq variant bo'lishi kerak bo'lgan taqdirda ko'plab qiyinchiliklarni bartaraf etishga qaratilgan edi. Qirollik flotini qabul qilishni nazarda tutolmadi Uy floti va qo'shinlar uchun yuk tashishni tashkil qilish uchun bir yil vaqt kerakligini aytdi. Reyxsmarsxol Hermann Göring, boshlig'i Luftwaffe, bitta sahifali maktub bilan javob berib, unda "[A] Angliyaga qo'nishni maqsad qilgan birlashgan operatsiyani rad etish kerak. Bu faqat Angliyaga qarshi allaqachon g'alaba qozongan urushning yakuniy harakati bo'lishi mumkin, aks holda muvaffaqiyatga erishishning dastlabki shartlari bo'lishi mumkin" birlashtirilgan operatsiyani bajarish mumkin emas ".[9][10]

Frantsiyaning qulashi

Germaniya tezkor va muvaffaqiyatli Frantsiya va past mamlakatlarni bosib olish Shmidning 1939 yilgi hisobotida ularning "eng xavfli dushmani" deb nomlangan kanalga qarshi kurash olib borildi. Raider 1940 yil 21-mayda Gitler bilan uchrashdi va bosqinchilik mavzusini ko'tardi, ammo xatarlar haqida ogohlantirdi va afzalligini bildirdi blokada havo, dengiz osti kemalari va bosqinchilar.[11][12]

May oyining oxiriga kelib Kriegsmarine Angliyaning qimmat g'alabasidan keyin bostirib kirishga qarshi edi Norvegiya; keyin Weserübung operatsiyasi, Kriegsmarine operatsiyalar uchun faqat bitta og'ir kreyser, ikkita yengil kreyser va to'rtta esminets mavjud edi.[13] Raeder dengiz sheriga qarshi edi, chunki uning yarmidan ko'pi Kriegsmarine er usti floti cho'kib ketgan yoki jiddiy zarar ko'rgan Weserübung, va uning xizmati umidsiz ravishda Qirollik dengiz floti kemalaridan ustun edi.[14] Hali ham tinchlik muzokaralari uchun bahslashayotgan Britaniya parlamentchilari mag'lubiyatga uchradi 1940 yil may oyida urush kabinetidagi inqiroz, ammo iyul oyi davomida nemislar diplomatik echim topishda davom etishdi.[15]

Bosqinni rejalashtirish

30 iyun kuni taqdim etilgan hisobotda OKW shtabi boshlig'i Alfred Jodl muzokaralar olib borilgan tinchlikka rozi bo'lish uchun Britaniyaga bosimni kuchaytirish variantlarini ko'rib chiqdi. Birinchi ustuvor vazifa bularni yo'q qilish edi Qirollik havo kuchlari va daromad havo ustunligi. Yuk tashish va iqtisodiyotga qarshi kuchaytirilgan havo hujumlari uzoq muddatli istiqbolda oziq-ovqat ta'minoti va fuqarolarning axloqiy holatiga ta'sir qilishi mumkin. Terroristik bombardimonning javob hujumlari tezroq kapitulyatsiyani keltirib chiqarishi mumkin edi, ammo ruhiy holatga ta'siri noaniq edi. Luftvaffe havoni nazorat qilib, Britaniya iqtisodiyoti zaiflashganidan so'ng, bosqinchilik so'nggi chora yoki yakuniy ish tashlash bo'ladi (")Todesstoss") Buyuk Britaniya deyarli mag'lubiyatga uchraganidan keyin, ammo tezda natija berishi mumkin edi.[11][16] O'sha kuni bo'lib o'tgan yig'ilishda OKH Bosh shtabi boshlig'i Frants Xolder davlat kotibidan eshitgan Ernst fon Vaytsekker Gitler e'tiborini Rossiyaga qaratgan. Halder Admiral bilan uchrashdi Otto Shnievind 1 iyul kuni va ular bir-birlarining pozitsiyasini tushunmasdan o'zaro fikr almashdilar. Ikkalasi ham avvalo havo ustunligi kerak va bosqinni keraksiz holga keltirishi mumkin deb o'ylardi. Ular minalashtirilgan maydonlar va U-qayiqlar Qirollik dengiz floti tahdidini cheklashi mumkinligi to'g'risida kelishib oldilar; Shnievind ob-havo sharoitining ahamiyatini ta'kidlab o'tdi.[17]

2-iyul kuni OKW xizmatlardan bosqinni oldindan rejalashtirishni boshlashni iltimos qildi, chunki Gitler istilosi ma'lum sharoitlarda amalga oshiriladi, degan xulosaga keldi, ulardan birinchisi havo qo'mondonligi edi va xususan Luftwaffe bunga qachon erishiladi. 4 iyul kuni Generaldan so'raganidan keyin Erix Marks Rossiyaga hujum qilishni rejalashtirishni boshlash uchun Xolder shunday dedi Luftwaffe Ikkinchi darajali maqsad sifatida dengiz kuchlariga zarar etkazish bilan RAFni yo'q qilish, uning samolyotlarini ishlab chiqarish va etkazib berish tizimlarini yo'q qilishni rejalashtirganliklari. A Luftwaffe 11 iyulda bo'lib o'tgan yig'ilishda OKWga taqdim etilgan hisobotda havo ustunligiga erishish uchun 14 dan 28 kungacha vaqt ketishi kerakligi aytilgan. Uchrashuvda Angliya Rossiya bilan kelishuvni muhokama qilayotgani ham eshitildi. Xuddi shu kuni, Grand Admiral Raeder Gitlerga tashrif buyurdi Berghof uni tinchlik shartnomasida inglizlarga bosim o'tkazishning eng yaxshi usuli havo va dengiz osti hujumlarini birlashtirgan qamal bo'lishiga ishontirish. Gitler u bilan istilo so'nggi chora bo'lishiga rozi bo'ldi.[18]

Jodl taklif qilingan bosqin uchun OKW takliflarini 12 iyulda imzolangan memorandumda bayon qildi, unda Löve (Arslon) operatsiyasini "keng jabhada daryo o'tishi" deb ta'riflab, Kriegsmarine. 13 iyulda Gitler feldmarshal bilan uchrashdi fon Brauchitsch va Halder at Berxtesgaden va ular dengiz kuchlari xavfsiz transportni ta'minlaydi degan taxmin bilan armiya tomonidan tayyorlangan batafsil rejalarni taqdim etdilar.[19] Fon Brauchitsch va Xalderni ajablantirgan va odatdagi amaliyotiga mutlaqo zid bo'lgan Gitler aniq operatsiyalar haqida hech qanday savol bermadi, tafsilotlarga qiziqmadi va rejalarni takomillashtirish bo'yicha hech qanday tavsiyalar bermadi; buning o'rniga u OKWga tayyorgarlikni boshlashini aytdi.[20]

16-sonli ko'rsatma: "Dengiz sher" operatsiyasi

1940 yil 16-iyulda Gitler chiqarildi Fyurer Direktivasi 16-son, Britaniyaga qo'nishga tayyorgarlik ko'rishni boshladi. U buyruqni quyidagicha aytib o'tdi: "Angliya, umidsiz harbiy holatiga qaramay, hali ham murosaga kelishga tayyorligini ko'rsatmayotgani sababli, men unga qarshi qo'nish operatsiyasini tayyorlashga qaror qildim va kerak bo'lsa. Ushbu operatsiyaning maqsadi Angliya Vatanini Germaniyaga qarshi urushni davom ettirish uchun asos sifatida yo'q qilish va agar kerak bo'lsa, mamlakatni to'liq bosib olishdir. " Bosqinning kod nomi edi Seelöwe, "Dengiz sherlari".[21][22]

Gitler ko'rsatmasi bosqinchilik uchun to'rt shartni qo'ydi:[23]

  • RAF "o'zining ruhiy holati va aslida Germaniya o'tishiga qarshi biron bir tajovuzkor kuchni namoyish eta olmasligi uchun mag'lub etilishi" kerak edi.
  • O'tish joylarida Angliya kanali Britaniya minalarini qirib tashlagan bo'lishi kerak edi Dover bo'g'ozi nemis minalari tomonidan ikkala uchida ham bloklanishi kerak.
  • Ishg'ol qilingan Frantsiya va Angliya o'rtasidagi qirg'oq zonasida og'ir artilleriya hukmron bo'lishi kerak.
  • The Qirollik floti bilan etarli darajada shug'ullangan bo'lishi kerak Shimoliy dengiz va O'rta er dengizi o'tish joyiga aralasha olmasligi uchun. Britaniyalik uy eskadrilyalari havo va torpedo hujumlari natijasida zarar ko'rishi yoki yo'q qilinishi kerak.

Bu oxir-oqibat dengiz sheriga yuklangan'muvaffaqiyati Raeder va Gyoringning yelkasida, ularning ikkalasi ham ushbu korxonaga ishtiyoqi yo'q edi va aslida bunga qarshiliklarini yashirmadi.[24] Shuningdek, 16-sonli yo'riqnomada Ittifoqchilarning tuzilishiga o'xshash birlashtirilgan tezkor shtab tashkil etilmagan Oliy shtab Ittifoq ekspeditsiya kuchlari Keyinchalik uchta Normandiya qo'nish uchun (SHAEF), uning ostida uchta xizmat ko'rsatish shoxobchalari (Armiya, Dengiz kuchlari va Harbiy-havo kuchlari) bunday murakkab ishni rejalashtirish, muvofiqlashtirish va amalga oshirish uchun birgalikda ishlashi mumkin edi.[25]

Bosqin atrofdan, keng jabhada bo'lishi kerak edi Ramsgeyt dan tashqari Vayt oroli.Preparatlar, shu jumladan RAFni engib o'tish avgust oyining o'rtalariga qadar amalga oshirilishi kerak edi.[21][18]

Munozara

Grand Admiral Raeder 19 iyul kuni OKWga memorandum yuborib, armiya va havo kuchlari bilan bog'liq holda dengiz flotiga yuklatilgan majburiyatlardan shikoyat qildi va dengiz kuchlari o'z maqsadlariga erisha olmasligini bildirdi.[19]

Taklif qilinayotgan bosqin bo'yicha birinchi qo'shma xizmatlar konferentsiyasi Gitler tomonidan 21 iyul kuni Berlinda, feldmarshal Raeder bilan bo'lib o'tdi. fon Brauchitsch va Luftwaffe Xodimlar boshlig'i Xans Jeshonnek. Gitler ularga inglizlarning tirik qolish umidlari yo'qligini va muzokara olib borishlari kerakligini, ammo Rossiyaning aralashishiga va Germaniyaning neft ta'minotini to'xtatishiga umid qilishlarini aytdi. Bosqin juda xavfli edi va u ulardan havo va suvosti kemalarining to'g'ridan-to'g'ri hujumlari sentyabr oyining o'rtalariga qadar kuchga kirishi mumkinligini so'radi. Javonnek javob beradigan RAF jangchilari urib tushirilishi uchun, Jeshonnek katta bombardimon hujumlarini taklif qildi. Bosqin kutilmagan "daryodan o'tish" bo'lishi mumkin degan g'oyani Raeder rad etdi va dengiz kuchlari avgust o'rtalariga qadar tayyorgarligini yakunlay olmadilar. Gitler havo hujumi avgust oyi boshida boshlanishini istagan va agar u muvaffaqiyatli bo'lsa, bosqin 25-avgust kuni ob-havo yomonlashguncha boshlanishi kerak edi. Gitlerning asosiy qiziqishi Rossiyaning mumkin bo'lgan aralashuviga qarshi kurash masalasi edi. Xolder Rossiya kuchlarini mag'lub etish haqidagi birinchi fikrlarini bayon qildi. Batafsil rejalar tuzilishi kerak edi Sovet Ittifoqiga hujum qiling.[26]

Reder Gitler bilan 25 iyulda dengiz floti taraqqiyoti to'g'risida hisobot berish uchun uchrashdi: ular avgust oyi davomida tayyorgarlik ishlari tugashiga ishonchlari komil emas edi: u rejalarini 31 iyuldagi anjumanda taqdim etishi kerak edi. 28 iyulda u OKWga qo'shinlarning birinchi to'lqinini Kanal bo'ylab o'tishi uchun o'n kun kerak bo'ladi, deb aytdi, hatto juda tor jabhada. Rejalashtirish qayta boshlanishi kerak edi. Uning kundaligida, Halder agar Rederning aytganlari rost bo'lsa, "dengiz flotining avvalgi barcha bayonotlari shunchalik axlat edi va biz bosqinchilik rejasini butunlay tashlab yuborishimiz mumkin". Ertasi kuni Halder dengiz flotining da'volarini rad etdi va yangi rejani talab qildi.[27][28]

The Luftwaffe 29-iyul kuni katta havo hujumini avgust oyining boshida boshlashi mumkinligini e'lon qildi va ularning razvedka ma'lumotlari ularga hal qiluvchi natijaga ishonch bag'ishladi. Ularning bombardimonchilarining yarmi bosqinni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun zaxirada saqlanishi kerak edi. Armiya bilan uchrashuvda dengiz floti yangi jangovar kemalar bo'lgan 1941 yil mayigacha kechiktirishni taklif qildi Bismark va Tirpitz tayyor bo'lar edi. 30 iyulda chiqarilgan harbiy dengiz floti memorandumida bosqin Qirollik dengiz floti uchun xavfli bo'lishi va kuzgi ob-havo materiallarning zarur saqlanishiga to'sqinlik qilishi mumkinligi aytilgan. OKW alternativalarni, jumladan O'rta dengizda inglizlarga hujum qilishni baholadi va Angliyaga qarshi kengaytirilgan operatsiyalarni qo'llab-quvvatladi va Rossiya bilan yaxshi munosabatda bo'ldi.[27]

Berghof konferentsiyasida 31-iyul kuni Luftwaffe vakili bo'lmagan. Rayderning aytishicha, barjadagi konversiyalar 15 sentyabrgacha davom etadi va 1940 yilgi istiloning yagona mumkin bo'lgan kunlari 22-26 sentyabr kunlari bo'lib qoladi, ob-havo mos kelmasligi mumkin edi. Landinglar tor jabhada bo'lishi kerak edi va 1941 yilning bahorida yaxshi bo'lar edi. Gitler britaniyalik qo'shin kuchini kuchaytirayotganligi sababli sentyabr oyida bosqin qilishni xohladi. Rayder ketganidan keyin Gitler fon Brauchich va Xalderga havo hujumi 5 avgustda boshlanishi kerakligini aytdi; sakkiz-o'n to'rt kundan keyin u qo'nish operatsiyasi to'g'risida qaror qabul qiladi. London yangi topilgan optimizmni namoyish qilar edi va bu ularning Rossiyaning aralashuviga bo'lgan umidlari bilan bog'liq edi, chunki Germaniya 1941 yil bahorida hujum qilishi kerak edi.[29]

17-sonli ko'rsatma: Angliyaga qarshi havo va dengiz urushi

1940 yil 1-avgustda Gitler "Angliyani yakuniy zabt etish uchun zarur shart-sharoitlarni yaratish" to'g'risida kuchaytirilgan havo va dengiz urushlariga ko'rsatma berdi. 5-avgustdan ob-havo kechikishi sababli Luftwaffe "eng qisqa vaqt ichida o'z qo'mondonligidagi barcha kuchlar bilan Angliya havo kuchlarini mag'lub etish" edi. Keyinchalik portlar va oziq-ovqat zaxiralariga hujumlar uyushtirilishi kerak edi, bostirib kirish uchun foydalaniladigan portlarni yolg'iz qoldirish va "dushmanning harbiy kemalari va savdo kemalariga havo hujumlari kamayishi mumkin, bundan tashqari, ba'zi bir qulay maqsadlar sodir bo'ladigan holatlar bundan mustasno." The Luftwaffe taklif qilingan bosqin uchun zaxirada etarlicha kuchlarni ushlab turishi va RAF terrorchilik hujumiga javoban Gitlerning to'g'ridan-to'g'ri buyrug'isiz tinch aholini nishonga olmagan. Zudlik bilan hal qiluvchi harakat va qamalni tanlash to'g'risida qaror qabul qilinmagan. Nemislar havodagi harakatlar inglizlarni muzokaralar olib borishga majbur qiladi va bosqinni keraksiz qiladi.[30][31]

Quruqlik kuchlari

1940 yil 25-iyuldagi armiya rejasida bosqinchi kuch ikkiga bo'linishi kerak edi armiya guruhlari dan chizilgan 6-armiya, 9-armiya va 16-armiya. Uchishning birinchi to'lqini o'n bir kishidan iborat bo'lar edi piyoda askarlar va tog bo'linmalar, sakkizinchi ikkinchi to'lqin panzer va motorli piyoda askarlar bo'linishlar va nihoyat, uchinchi to'lqin yana oltita piyoda bo'linmasidan tashkil topdi. Dastlabki hujum ikki kishini ham o'z ichiga olgan bo'lar edi havo bilan bo'linmalar va maxsus kuchlar ning Brandenburg polki.[iqtibos kerak ]

Ushbu dastlabki reja ikkala tomonning qarshiliklari bilan veto qo'ydi Kriegsmarine va Luftwaffe, amfibiya kuchi faqat tor jabhada cheklangan taqdirdagina havo va dengizni himoya qilishni kafolatlashi va qo'nish joylari Qirollik dengiz flotining bazalaridan iloji boricha uzoqroq bo'lishi kerakligi haqida muvaffaqiyatli ta'kidladi. 1940 yil 30-avgustda qabul qilingan jangning aniq tartibi 9 va 16-chi armiyalarning to'qqizta bo'linmasining birinchi to'lqinini to'rtta sohil bo'ylab tushishni nazarda tutgan - "B" plyajidagi ikkita piyoda diviziyasi. Folkestone va Yangi Romni tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlanadigan maxsus kuchlar kompaniyasi Brandenburg polki, "S" plyajidagi ikkita piyoda bo'linmasi Javdar va Xastings suv osti / suzuvchi tanklarning uchta batalyoni, "D" plyajidagi ikkita piyoda bo'linmasi tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi Bexhill va Istburn suv osti / suzuvchi tanklarning bitta batalyoni va Brandenburg polkining ikkinchi kompaniyasi va "E" plyajidagi uchta piyoda bo'linmasi tomonidan qo'llab-quvvatlandi Beachy Head va Brayton.[32] Yagona havodagi bo'linma Kentning shimoliga tushadi Hythe; aerodromni egallab olish maqsadida Limfa va ko'prikdan o'tish joylari Qirollik harbiy kanali va qo'lga olishda quruqlikdagi kuchlarga yordam berishda Folkestone. Folkestone (sharqda) va Nyukaven (g'arbda) istilo kuchlariga kirish imkoni bo'lgan yagona trans-kanalli port inshootlari edi; va bularning barchasi deyarli buzilmagan yoki tezkor ta'mirlash qobiliyatiga ega bo'lishiga bog'liq; bu holda sakkizta bo'linmaning ikkinchi to'lqini (barcha motorli va zirhli bo'linmalarni o'z ichiga olgan holda) to'g'ridan-to'g'ri o'zlarining qirg'oqlariga tushirilishi mumkin. Uchinchi to'lqinga yana oltita piyoda bo'linmasi ajratildi.[33]

30 avgustda belgilangan jang tartibi kelishilgan umumiy reja bo'lib qoldi, ammo har doim vaziyatlar talab qilsa o'zgarishi mumkin deb hisoblanardi.[34] Armiya oliy qo'mondonligi muxolifatga qarshi iloji bo'lsa, yanada kengroq qo'nish maydonini bosishni davom ettirdi Kriegsmarine; avgust oyida ular imtiyozni qo'lga kiritishdi, agar imkoniyat bo'lsa, kuchlar to'g'ridan-to'g'ri kemalardan to'g'ridan-to'g'ri Brighton dengiz qirg'og'iga tushishi mumkin, ehtimol ikkinchi havo kuchlari tomonidan Janubiy Downsga tushish. Aksincha, Kriegsmarine (Portsmutdagi Qirollik dengiz floti kemalarining bosqinchi kuchlariga qarshi mumkin bo'lgan flot harakatlaridan qo'rqib) bo'linmalar qo'shinlardan olindi Cherbourg va Le Havr "E" plyajiga tushish uchun etarli joy mavjud bo'lgan boshqa plyajlardan biriga yo'naltirilishi mumkin.[35]

Birinchi to'lqinli qo'nish kuchlarining har biri uchta eshelonga bo'lingan. Kanal bo'ylab barjalarda, qirg'oqlarda va kichik motorli raketalarda olib o'tilgan birinchi eshelon asosiy piyoda hujum kuchidan iborat bo'ladi. Kanal bo'ylab katta transport kemalarida olib o'tilgan ikkinchi eshelon asosan artilleriya, zirhli texnika va boshqa og'ir texnikalardan iborat bo'ladi. Kanal bo'ylab barjalarda olib o'tilgan uchinchi eshelon transport vositalaridan, otlardan, do'konlardan va bo'linma darajasidagi qo'llab-quvvatlash xizmatlarining xodimlaridan iborat bo'ladi. Barjalar va transport vositalarini og'ir texnika, transport vositalari va do'konlarga yuklash minus to'qqizta S-yorlig'i bilan boshlanadi (Antverpendagi); va Dyunkerkda S minus sakkiz, otlar S minus ikkitagacha yuklanmagan. Barcha qo'shinlar o'zlarining barjalariga Frantsiya yoki Belgiya portlaridan S minus ikkitasida yoki S minus birida yuklanadilar. Birinchi eshelon S-yorlig'idagi plyajlarga tushar edi, yaxshisi tong otishi bilan to'lqin ko'tarilgandan ikki soat o'tgach. Birinchi eshelon uchun ishlatilgan barjalar S-tagdan keyin tushdan keyin tortish vositalarida olinishi kerak edi va hali ham ish holatida bo'lganlar transport vositalarining yonida bir kecha-kunduzda ikkinchi eshelonni trans-jo'natish uchun tuzilishi kerak edi, shuning uchun ikkinchi eshelonning katta qismi va uchinchi эшелон S plyusga, qolgan qismi S plyusga ikkiga tushishi mumkin. Dengiz kuchlari Angliyaning janubiy qirg'og'ida uchta to'liq kun davomida bog'lanib, to'rtinchi bosqinchilik flotining S va ikkitasi tunda Kanal bo'ylab qaytib kelishini niyat qilgan. Armiya, erkaklar va otlarning barjalarida to'rt kun va tun kutishlariga to'g'ri kelmaslik uchun, keyinchalik alohida konvoylarda uchinchi eshelondan o'tishga intilgan edi, ammo Kriegsmarine barcha kemalar birgalikda Kanaldan o'tib ketishgan taqdirdagina, to'rtta flotni qirollik floti hujumidan himoya qila olishlarini talab qilishdi.[36]

1940 yil yozida Buyuk Britaniya Uy kuchlari qo'mondonligi o'ylashga moyil Sharqiy Angliya va Sharqiy qirg'oq nemis bosqinchisi kuchlarining qo'nish joylari bo'lishi mumkin edi, chunki bu portlar va tabiiy portlarni egallab olish uchun juda katta imkoniyatlar yaratgan bo'lar edi va dengiz kuchlaridan Portsmut. Ammo keyinchalik 1940 yil avgust oyining oxiridan boshlab Frantsiya portlarida bosqinchi barjalari to'planishi aksincha Janubiy sohilga tushganligini ko'rsatdi. Binobarin, asosiy uy kuchlarining harakatlanuvchi zaxira kuchlari poytaxtni Kent yoki Esseksga himoya qilish uchun oldinga siljish uchun London atrofida ushlab turildi. Demak, Kent va Sasseksga dengiz sherlari tushishiga dastlab qarshilik ko'rsatilishi mumkin edi XII korpus ning Sharq qo'mondonligi uchta piyoda diviziyasi va ikkita mustaqil brigadasi bilan va V korpus ning Janubiy qo'mondonlik uchta piyoda bo'linmasi bilan. Zaxirada yana ikkita korpus bor edi GHQ uy kuchlari; Londonning janubida joylashgan VII korpus bilan 1-Kanada piyoda diviziyasi, zirhli diviziya va mustaqil zirhli brigada, Londonning shimolida esa IV korpus zirhli diviziya, piyoda diviziyasi va mustaqil piyoda brigadasi bilan.[37]Qarang Britaniya armiyasi bosqinchilikka qarshi tayyorgarlik.

Havo quvvati

Havo-desant kuchlari

Nemisning muvaffaqiyati Daniya va Norvegiya bosqini, 1940 yil 9-aprelda, parashyut va planer shaklidagi formatsiyalardan foydalanishga juda ishongan (Fallschirmjäger ) asosiy bosqin kuchlaridan oldin muhim mudofaa nuqtalarini egallash. Xuddi shu havodagi taktikalar ham bosqinlarni qo'llab-quvvatlashda ishlatilgan Belgiya va Gollandiya 1940 yil 10-mayda. Biroq, havo hujumida ajoyib muvaffaqiyatlarga erishilgan edi Eben-Emael Fort Belgiyada Germaniya havo-desant kuchlari Gollandiya hukumati va poytaxtini egallab olishga urinishlarida falokatga yaqinlashdilar Gaaga. 1300 atrofida 22-havo qo'nish bo'limi qo'lga olingan (keyinchalik Buyuk Britaniyaga jo'natildi) harbiy asirlar ), 250 atrofida Yunkers Ju 52 transport samolyotlari yo'qolgan, bir necha yuz elita parashyuti va desant piyodalari halok bo'lgan yoki yaralangan. Binobarin, 1940 yil sentyabrda ham Luftvaffe "Dengiz Arslon" operatsiyasining birinchi to'lqinida qatnashish uchun atigi 3000 ga yaqin havo-desant qo'shinlarini ta'minlash imkoniyatiga ega edi.

Britaniya jangi

Uinston Cherchill bomba bilan zararlangan hududlarga tashrif buyurish East End London, 1940 yil 8 sentyabr

Buyuk Britaniya jangi 1940 yil iyul oyining boshlarida dengiz kemalari va portlarga hujumlar bilan boshlandi Kanalkampf majbur qilgan RAF qiruvchi qo'mondoni mudofaa harakatiga o'tish. Bundan tashqari, kengroq reydlar ekipajlarga kecha-kunduz navigatsiya tajribasini berdi va mudofaani sinovdan o'tkazdi.[38][iqtibos kerak ] 13 avgustda nemis Luftwaffe bir qator konsentratsiyali havo hujumlarini boshladi (belgilangan Unternehmen Adlerangriff yoki Eagle Attack operatsiyasi ) RAFni yo'q qilish va havoda ustunlikni o'rnatish uchun Buyuk Britaniyadagi maqsadlar bo'yicha Buyuk Britaniya. Bomba urg'usining o'zgarishi RAF bazalari ga Londonni bombardimon qilish Biroq, o'girildi Adlerangriff qisqa masofaga strategik bombardimon operatsiya.

Kommutatsiyaning strategiyadagi ta'siri bahsli. Ba'zi tarixchilar strategiyaning o'zgarishi Luftvafening havo jangida g'alaba qozonish imkoniyatini yoki havoda ustunlikni yo'qotganligini ta'kidlaydilar.[39] Boshqalar esa Luftwaffe havo jangida kam yutuqlarga erishdi va RAF tez-tez da'vo qilganidek qulash arafasida emas edi.[40] Boshqa bir istiqbol ham ilgari surildi, bu nemislar ob-havo oynasi yopilishidan oldin havoda ustunlikka erisha olmasliklarini taxmin qilmoqda.[41] Boshqalari buni ehtimoldan yiroq deyishdi Luftwaffe hech qachon yo'q qilishga qodir bo'lar edi RAF qiruvchi qo'mondoni. Agar inglizlarning yo'qotishlari jiddiylashib ketsa, RAF shunchaki shimolga qarab orqaga qaytishi mumkin edi. Keyinchalik nemislar bosqinchilik boshlaganida yoki agar boshlasa. Ko'pgina tarixchilar, Germaniya dengiz kuchlarining zaif tomonlari tufayli dengiz sherining qirollik floti bilan taqqoslaganda muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchragan bo'lishiga rozi.[42]

Cheklovlari Luftwaffe

Ning yozuvi Luftwaffe urushga qadar dengiz kemalariga qarshi kambag'al edi. In Norvegiya kampaniyasi, sakkiz hafta davom etgan doimiy havo ustunligiga qaramay, Luftwaffe faqat ikkita ingliz harbiy kemasini cho'ktirdi. Nemis ekipajlari tez harakatlanadigan dengiz maqsadlariga, ayniqsa tezkor dengiz qirg'inchilariga yoki ularga hujum qilish uchun tayyorlanmagan yoki jihozlanmagan. Motorli "Torpedo" qayiqlari (MTB). Luftwaffe-da zirh teshadigan bombalar ham yo'q edi[43] va ularning yagona havo torpedasi katta harbiy kemalarni mag'lub etish uchun zarur bo'lgan qobiliyat ozgina sekin va zaif odamlardan iborat edi Heinkel He 115 suzuvchi samolyotlar. The Luftwaffe Buyuk Britaniyadagi jang paytida kichik torpedo qayiqlariga 21 ta qasddan hujum qildi va hech birini cho'ktirmadi. Inglizlar 700 dan 800 gacha kichik dengiz qirg'oqlari (MTB), Dvigatel qurolli qayiqlar va kichikroq kemalar), agar ular juda muhim tahdidga aylansa Luftwaffe kuch bilan muomala qila olmadi. Havo hujumi natijasida atigi to'qqizta MTB yo'qolgan, ulardan 115tasi turli yo'llar bilan cho'kib ketgan Ikkinchi jahon urushi. O'sha paytda Britaniya suvlarida ishlaydigan 100 dan ortiq kuchdan 1940 yilda atigi to'qqizta esminets havo hujumi bilan halok bo'lgan. Faqat beshtasi cho'kib ketgan Dyunkerkni evakuatsiya qilish, Germaniyaning havoda katta ustunlikka ega bo'lishiga qaramay, minglab parvozlar amalga oshirildi va yuzlab tonna bomba tashlandi. The NilufarSavdo kemalariga qarshi rekord ham taassurot qoldirmadi: u 1940 yilda Britaniya suvlari orqali o'tayotgan har 100 ingliz kemasida bittasini cho'ktirdi va ularning aksariyati minalar yordamida erishildi.[44]

Luftwaffe Maxsus uskunalar

Agar istilo qilingan bo'lsa, Bf 110 jihozlangan Erprobungsgruppe 210 tushib ketgan bo'lar edi Seilbomben qo'nish oldidan. Bu Angliyaning janubi-sharqidagi elektr tarmog'ini o'chirish uchun ishlatilgan maxfiy qurol edi. Simlarni tushirish uchun uskunalar o'rnatildi Bf 110 samolyotlar va sinovdan o'tgan. Bunda simlarni yuqori voltli simlarga tushirish nazarda tutilgan va, ehtimol, britaniyaliklar singari samolyot ekipajlari uchun ham xavfli bo'lgan.[45] Biroq, hozirgi paytda Buyuk Britaniyada milliy elektr tarmog'i mavjud emas edi, faqat har bir shahar / shahar va uning atrofidagi hududlar uchun elektr energiyasini mahalliy ishlab chiqarish.[iqtibos kerak ]

Italiya havo kuchlari

Gitlerning niyatlarini eshitgan italiyalik diktator Benito Mussolini, uning tashqi ishlar vaziri Count orqali Galeazzo Ciano, taklif qilingan bosqin uchun tezda o'nta diviziya va italiyalik samolyotlarning o'ttizta eskadrilyasini taklif qildi.[46] Gitler dastlab bunday yordamni rad etdi, ammo oxir-oqibat italiyalik qiruvchi va bombardimonchi samolyotlarning kichik tarkibiga, Italiya havo korpusiga ruxsat berdi (Corpo Aereo Italiano yoki CAI), ga yordam berish uchun Luftwaffe'1940 yil oktyabr va noyabr oylarida Buyuk Britaniya ustidan aviatsiya kampaniyasi.[47]

Dengiz kuchlari

Kanal (Der Kanal), D.66 Kriegsmarine dengiz xaritasi, 1943 yil

Bosqin flotini himoya qilishda Germaniya uchun eng dahshatli muammo bu dengiz flotining kichikligi edi. The KriegsmarineBuyuk Britaniyaning Qirollik flotidan sanoqli darajada kam bo'lgan, 1940 yil aprel oyida o'zining zamonaviy sirt uskuna qismlarining katta qismini yo'qotgan edi. Norvegiya kampaniyasi yoki to'liq yo'qotish sifatida yoki jangda etkazilgan zarar tufayli. Xususan, ikkita yengil kreyser va o'nta esminetsning yo'qolishi nogiron bo'lib qoldi, chunki ular bu ishg'ol sodir bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan tor kanalda ishlashga eng mos bo'lgan harbiy kemalar edi.[48] Ko'pchilik U-qayiqlar, eng kuchli qo'li Kriegsmarine, bosqinni qo'llab-quvvatlamaslik uchun, kemalarni yo'q qilish uchun mo'ljallangan edi.

Garchi Qirollik dengiz floti o'zining dengiz kuchidagi ustunligini ko'tarolmasa ham, chunki flotning aksariyati Atlantika va O'rta er dengizi va qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun ularning katta qismi ajratilgan edi Operation Menace qarshi Dakar - inglizlar Uy floti hali ham son jihatdan juda katta ustunlikka ega edi. Angliya kemalari nemislar umid qilganidek dushmanning havo hujumiga qarshi himoyasizmi yoki yo'qmi, munozarali edi. Davomida Dunkirkni evakuatsiya qilish, Harbiy kemalar statsionar nishon bo'lishiga qaramay, aslida cho'kib ketgan. Qarama-qarshi dengiz kuchlarining umumiy nomutanosibligi amfibiya bosqini rejasini, havodagi natijalaridan qat'i nazar, juda xavfli qildi. Bundan tashqari, Kriegsmarine qolgan bir qancha yirik va zamonaviy kemalarni ajratish operatsiyalariga ajratgan edi Shimoliy dengiz.

Dunyoning eng qudratli va zamonaviylaridan biri bo'lgan mag'lubiyatga uchragan Frantsiya floti, agar u nemislar tomonidan qo'lga kiritilgan bo'lsa, Angliyaga nisbatan muvozanatni buzishi mumkin edi. Biroq, inglizlar tomonidan frantsuz flotining katta qismini oldindan yo'q qilish Mers-el-Kébirda, va ikki yil o'tib, Tulonda frantsuzlarning o'zlari tomonidan qolgan qismini buzish, bu sodir bo'lishi mumkin emasligini ta'minladi.

Germaniyaliklarning havo jangida g'alaba qozonishidan qat'i nazar, Dengiz Arslon hali ham muvaffaqiyatga erisha olmaydi, deb ishonganlarning fikri Germaniya Bosh shtabining bir qator a'zolarini o'z ichiga olgan. Urushdan so'ng, Admiral Karl Dönitz u havo ustunligi "etarli emas" deb ishonishini aytdi. Dönitz, "[W] na havoni va na dengizni boshqarish huquqiga ega edi, na biz uni qo'lga kiritishimiz mumkin edi" dedi.[49] Uning xotiralarida Erix Raeder, bosh qo'mondoni Kriegsmarine 1940 yilda:

..... shu paytgacha inglizlar hech qachon o'z parklarining to'liq kuchini harakatga tashlamaganliklari haqida eslatish. Biroq, Germaniyaning Angliyaga bostirib kirishi inglizlar uchun hayot-mamot masalasi bo'lar edi va ular ikkilanmasdan o'z dengiz kuchlarini so'nggi kemaga va oxirgi odamga qadar yashash uchun har tomonlama kurashga topshirishdi. Bizning harbiy havo kuchlarimiz bizning transportlarimizni Britaniya flotidan qo'riqlashga ishonib bo'lmas edi, chunki ularning ishlashi ob-havoga bog'liq bo'ladi, agar boshqa sababsiz. Hatto qisqa vaqt ichida bizning harbiy havo kuchlarimiz dengiz ustunligimiz etishmasligini qoplashi mumkin deb kutish mumkin emas edi.[50]

1940 yil 13-avgustda, Alfred Jodl, Operatsiyalar boshlig'i OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) o'zining "Angliyaga qo'nish to'g'risida armiya va dengiz floti qarashlaridan kelib chiqadigan vaziyatni baholash" ni yozgan. Uning birinchi fikri "Qo'nish operatsiyasi hech qanday holatda muvaffaqiyatsiz bo'lmasligi kerak. Muvaffaqiyatsizlik siyosiy oqibatlarni keltirib chiqarishi mumkin. U ishongan Luftwaffe uning muhim maqsadlariga javob berishi mumkin, ammo agar Kriegsmarine to'rt kun ichida ikkita diviziya tushgan holda keng jabhada hujum qilish uchun armiyaning operativ talablarini bajara olmadi, so'ngra ob-havodan qat'i nazar, yana uchta bo'linma tomonidan ta'qib qilindi ", keyin men qo'nishni umidsizlik harakati deb bilaman umidsiz vaziyatga tushib qolishimiz mumkin, ammo biz hozirda buni qilishga hech qanday sabab yo'q. "[51]

Yolg'on

The Kriegsmarine kuchlarni rejalashtirish va yig'ish uchun katta kuch sarfladi aldash reja chaqirdi Herbstreise operatsiyasi yoki "Kuzgi sayohat". Ushbu g'oya birinchi bo'lib paydo bo'ldi General-admiral Rolf Karls 1 avgust kuni a fint Shimoliy dengizga ekspeditsiya, inglizlarni jalb qilish maqsadida Shotlandiyaga qarab ketayotgan qo'shin konvoyiga o'xshaydi Uy floti mo'ljallangan bosqinchilik yo'llaridan uzoqda. Dastlab konvoy o'nga yaqin kichik kishidan iborat bo'lishi kerak edi yuk kemalari ularni kattaroq va ikkitasini kichikroq qilib ko'rsatish uchun soxta voronkalar o'rnatilgan shifoxona kemalari. Reja tezlashganda, katta okean kemalari Evropa, Bremen, Gneysenau va Potsdam ro'yxatiga qo'shildi. Ular engil kreyserlar, torpedo qayiqlari va minalar tashuvchi kemalar hamrohligida to'rtta alohida konvoyga bo'linishgan, ularning ba'zilari harbiy-dengiz bazalari foydalanadigan eskirgan kemalar bo'lgan. Reja shundan iboratki, haqiqiy bosqindan uch kun oldin harbiylar Norvegiya va Germaniyaning yirik portlaridagi to'rtta bo'linma odamlari va jihozlarini yuklaydi va dengizga tashlaydi, shu kuni ularni yana tinchroq joylarga tushirishdan oldin. Dengizga qaytib, karvonlar ertasi kuni soat 21:00 atrofida burilishdan oldin G'arbga Shotlandiya tomon yo'l olishdi. Bundan tashqari, mavjud bo'lgan yagona og'ir harbiy kemalar Kriegsmarine, og'ir kreyserlar Admiral Scheer va Admiral Xipper, inglizlarga hujum qiladi qurollangan savdo kreyserlari ning Shimoliy patrul va Kanadadan kelgan konvoylar; ammo Scheer 's ta'mirlash overran va agar bosqinchi sentyabr oyida sodir bo'lgan bo'lsa, tark etgan bo'lar edi Hipper yolg'iz ishlash.[52]

Minalar maydonlari

Qirollik dengiz flotining uy flotini ochiq jangda kutib olishga qodir quruqlik dengiz kuchlarining etishmasligi, birinchi to'lqin bosqinchiligi flotlari uchun asosiy dengiz mudofaasi S minus to'qqizdan boshlab yotqizish uchun mo'ljallangan to'rtta katta minalar maydoniga aylanadi. ANTON minalashtirilgan maydon (yopiq) Selsi Bill ) va BRUNO minalashtirilgan maydon (o'chirilgan) Beachy Head ), ularning har biri to'rt qatorda 3000 dan ortiq minalarni tashkil etib, Portsmutdan dengiz kuchlariga qarshi bosqinchi plyajlarini to'sib qo'yishi mumkin edi, hamkasbi CAESAR minalashtirilgan maydon esa Doverdan 'B' plyajini to'sib qo'ydi. To'rtinchi minalashtirilgan DORA koni ishdan bo'shatilishi kerak edi Lyme Bay dan dengiz kuchlarini inhibe qilish Plimut. 1940 yil kuziga kelib Kriegsmarine faol operatsiyalarni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun minalar maydonlarini yotqizishda katta yutuqlarga erishgan edi, ayniqsa kechasi 1940 yil 31-avgust Gollandiyalik qirg'oq yaqinida yangi yotqizilgan Germaniya minalash maydoniga yugurishda 20-chi Destroyer flotiliyasi katta yo'qotishlarga duch kelganda Texel; ammo minalarning inglizlarning katta kuchi bilan tozalanishini oldini olish uchun hech qanday rejalar tuzilmadi minalar tozalash kemalari hududda joylashgan. Vizeadmiral Fridrix Ruge, tog'-kon ishlariga mas'ul bo'lgan, urushdan keyin, agar minalar maydonlari nisbatan to'liq bo'lganida, ular "kuchli to'siq" bo'lar edi, ammo "hatto kuchli to'siq ham mutlaq to'siq emas" deb yozgan edi.[53]

Landing hunarmandchiligi

Germaniyaning portida yig'ilgan bosqinchilik barjalari Wilhelmshaven.

1940 yilda Germaniya dengiz floti "Dengiz sherlari" operatsiyasining kattaligida amfibiya hujumini uyushtirishga tayyorlanmagan. Maqsadli qo'nish texnikasi va amfibiya urushi bilan bog'liq ta'limot va amaliy tajribaning etishmasligi Kriegsmarine asosan noldan boshlangan edi. Some efforts had been made during the inter-war years to investigate landing military forces by sea, but inadequate funding severely limited any useful progress.[54]

Muvaffaqiyatli uchun Germaniyaning Norvegiyaga bosqini, German naval forces (assisted in places by thick fog) had simply forced an entry into key Norwegian harbours with motor launches and Elektron qayiqlar against stiff resistance from the outgunned Norwegian army and navy, and then unloaded troops from destroyers and troop transports directly onto the dockfronts at Bergen, Egersund, Trondxaym, Kristiansand, Arendal and Horten.[55] Da Stavanger va Oslo capture of the port was preceded by landing airborne forces. No beach landings were attempted.

The Kriegsmarine had taken some small steps in remedying the landing craft situation with construction of the Pionierlandungsboot 39 (Engineer Landing Boat 39), a self-propelled shallow-draft vessel which could carry 45 infantrymen, two light vehicles or 20 tons of cargo and land on an open beach, unloading via a pair of clamshell doors at the bow. But by late September 1940 only two prototypes had been delivered.[56]

Recognising the need for an even larger craft capable of landing both tanks and infantry onto a hostile shore, the Kriegsmarine began development of the 220-ton Marinefährprahm (MFP) but these too were unavailable in time for a landing on British soil in 1940, the first of them not being commissioned until April 1941.

Given barely two months to assemble a large seagoing invasion fleet, the Kriegsmarine opted to convert inland river barges into makeshift landing craft. Approximately 2,400 barges were collected from throughout Europe (860 from Germany, 1,200 from the Netherlands and Belgium and 350 from France). Of these, only about 800 were powered albeit insufficiently to cross the Channel under their own power. All barges would be towed across by tugs, with two barges to a tug in line abreast, preferably one being powered and one unpowered. On reaching the English coast, the powered barges would be cast-off, to beach themselves under their own power; the unpowered barges would be taken inshore as far as possible by the tugs and anchored, so as to settle on the falling tide, their troops unloading some hours later than those on the powered barges.[57] Accordingly, the Sea Lion plans were prepared on the basis that the landings would take place shortly after high tide and on a date when this coincided with sunrise. Towards evening, on the following rising tide, the empty barges would have been retrieved by their tugs to receive the second echelon forces, stores and heavy equipment in the awaiting transport vessels. These transport vessels would have remained moored off the beach throughout the day. By contrast, the Allied D day landings in 1944 were timed to happen at low tide; with all troops and equipment transhipped from their transport vessels to landing craft off-shore overnight.

All the troops intended to land at beach 'E', the westernmost of the four beaches, would cross the channel in larger transport vessels - the barges being towed loaded with equipment but empty of troops - and would then be transferred onto their barges a short distance from the beach. For the landings on the other three beaches, the first echelon of the invasion forces (and their equipment) would be loaded onto their barges in French or Belgian ports, while the second echelon force crossed the channel in associated transport vessels. Once the first echelon had been unloaded onto the beach, the barges would return to the transport vessels to transport the second echelon. The same procedure was envisaged for the second wave (unless the first wave had captured a usable port). Trials showed that this process of trans-shipment in open sea, in any circumstances other than flat calm, would likely take at least 14 hours,[58] such that the disembarkation of the first wave might extend over several tides and several days, with barges and invasion fleet subsequently needing to be escorted together back across the Channel for repairs and reloading. Since loading of the tanks, vehicles and stores of the second wave onto the returned barges and transport ships would take at least a week, the second wave could not be expected to land much less than ten days after the first wave, and more likely longer still.[59]

Barge types

Two types of inland river barge were generally available in Europe for use in Sea Lion: the peniche, which was 38.5 meters long and carried 360 tons of cargo, and the Kampine, which was 50 meters long and carried 620 tons of cargo. Of the barges collected for the invasion, 1,336 were classified as peniches and 982 as Kampinen. For simplicity's sake, the Germans designated any barge up to the size of a standard peniche as Type A1 and anything larger as Type A2.[60]

A turi

Converting the assembled barges into landing craft involved cutting an opening in the bow for off-loading troops and vehicles, welding longitudinal I-beams and transverse braces to the hull to improve seaworthiness, adding a wooden internal ramp and pouring a concrete floor in the hold to allow for tank transport. As modified, the Type A1 barge could accommodate three medium tanks while the Type A2 could carry four.[61] Tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery were envisaged as crossing the Channel in one of around 170 transport ships, which would be anchored off the landing beaches while the barges disembarked the first echelon of assault troops; those in powered barges disembarking soonest. The empty barges would then have been retrieved by tugs on the following rising tide, so as to have the second echelon (including tanks and other heavy equipment) loaded onto them using ship's derriklar. Barges would consequently have shuttled between ships and beaches over at least two days before being assembled together for the escorted night-time return voyage across the Channel.

B turi

This barge was a Type A altered to carry and rapidly off-load the submersible tanks (Tauchpanzer) developed for use in Sea Lion. They had the advantage of being able to unload their tanks directly into water up to 15 metres (49 ft) in depth, several hundred yards from shore, whereas the unmodified Type A had to be firmly grounded on the beach, making it more vulnerable to enemy fire. The Type B required a longer external ramp (11 meters) with a float attached to the front of it. Once the barge anchored, the crew would extend the internally stowed ramp using block and tackle sets until it was resting on the water's surface. As the first tank rolled forward onto the ramp, its weight would tilt the forward end of the ramp into the water and push it down onto the seabed. Once the tank rolled off, the ramp would bob back up to a horizontal position, ready for the next one to exit. If a barge was securely grounded along its full length, the longer ramp could also be used to discharge submersible tanks directly onto the beach, and beachmasters were given the option of landing tanks by this method, if the risk of loss in submersible running appeared to be too high. The Navy High Command increased its initial order for 60 of these vessels to 70 in order to compensate for expected losses. A further five were ordered on 30 September as a reserve.[62]

C turi

The Type C barge was specifically converted to carry the Panzer II amphibious tank (Schwimmpanzer). Because of the extra width of the floats attached to this tank, cutting a broad exit ramp into the bow of the barge was not considered advisable as it would have compromised the vessel's seaworthiness to an unacceptable degree. Instead, a large hatch was cut into the stern, thereby allowing the tanks to drive directly into deep water before turning under their own motive power and heading towards shore. The Type C barge could accommodate up to four Schwimmpanzern in its hold. Approximately 14 of these craft were available by the end of September.[63]

Type AS

During the planning stages of Sea Lion, it was deemed desirable to provide the advanced infantry detachments (making the initial landings) with greater protection from small-arms and light artillery fire by lining the sides of a powered Type A barge with concrete. Wooden slides were also installed along the barge's hull to accommodate ten assault boats (Sturmboote), each capable of carrying six infantrymen and powered by a 30 hp outboard motor. The extra weight of this additional armour and equipment reduced the barge's load capacity to 40 tons. By mid-August, 18 of these craft, designated Type AS, had been converted, and another five were ordered on 30 September.[61]

Type AF

The Luftwaffe had formed its own special command (Sonderkommando) under Major Fritz Siebel to investigate the production of landing craft for Sea Lion. Major Siebel proposed giving the unpowered Type A barges their own motive power by installing a pair of surplus 600 hp (610 PS; 450 kW) BMW aircraft engines, driving propellers. The Kriegsmarine was highly sceptical of this venture, but the Her (Army) high command enthusiastically embraced the concept and Siebel proceeded with the conversions.[64]

The aircraft engines were mounted on a platform supported by iron scaffolding at the aft end of the vessel. Cooling water was stored in tanks mounted above-deck. As completed, the Type AF had a speed of six knots, and a range of 60 nautical miles unless auxiliary fuel tanks were fitted. Disadvantages of this set-up included an inability to back the vessel astern, limited manoeuvrability and the deafening noise of the engines which would have made voice commands problematic.[64]

By 1 October 128 Type A barges had been converted to airscrew propulsion and, by the end of the month, this figure had risen to over 200.[65]

The Kriegsmarine later used some of the motorised Sea Lion barges for landings on the Russian-held Baltic islands in 1941 and, though most of them were eventually returned to the inland rivers they originally plied, a reserve was kept for military transport duties and for filling out amphibious flotillas.[66]

Eskort

As a consequence of employing all of their available cruisers in the North Sea deception operation, there would have been only light forces available to protect the vulnerable transport fleets. The plan revised on 14 September 1940 by Admiral Gyunter Lyutjens called for three groups of five U-qayiqlar, all seven destroyers, and seventeen torpedo qayiqlari to operate to the west of the mine barrier in the Channel, while two groups of three U-boats and all the available Elektron qayiqlar to operate north of it.[67] Lütjens suggested the inclusion of the old battleships SMSShlezen va SMSShlezvig-Golshteyn which were used for training. They were considered too vulnerable to send into action without improvement, especially considering the fate of their sister ship, SMSPommern, which had blown up at the Yutland jangi. The Blohm und Voss shipyard considered that it would take six weeks for a minimal upgrade of armour and armament and the idea was dropped, as was a suggestion that they be used as troopships.[68] To'rt qirg'oqchilar were converted to auxiliary qurolli qayiqlar by the addition of a single 15 cm naval gun and another was fitted with two 10.5 cm guns, while a further twenty-seven smaller vessels were converted into light gunboats by attaching a single ex-French 75 mm field gun to an improvised platform; these were expected to provide dengiz qurollarini qo'llab-quvvatlash as well as fleet defence against modern British cruisers and destroyers.[69]

Armiya

Panzers ashore

Providing armour support for the initial wave of assault troops was a critical concern for Sea Lion planners, and much effort was devoted to finding practical ways of rapidly getting tanks onto the invasion beaches in support of the first echelon. Though the Type A barges could disembark several medium tanks onto an open beach, this could be accomplished only once the tide had fallen further and the barges were firmly grounded along their full length; otherwise a leading tank might topple off an unsteady ramp and block those behind from deployment. The time needed for assembling the external ramps also meant that both the tanks and the ramp assembly crews would be exposed to close-quarter enemy fire for a considerable time. A safer and faster method was needed and the Germans eventually settled on providing some tanks with floats and making others fully submersible. It was nevertheless recognised that a high proportion of these specialised tanks might be expected not to make it off the beach.

Schwimmpanzer

The Schwimmpanzer II Panzer II, at 8.9 tons, was light enough to float with the attachment of long rectangular buoyancy boxes on each side of the tank's hull. The boxes were machined from aluminium stock and filled with Kapok sacks for added buoyancy. Harakatlantiruvchi quvvat tankning o'z izlaridan kelib chiqqan bo'lib, ular tayoqchalar yordamida har bir suzuvchi bo'ylab harakatlanadigan pervanel o'qiga ulangan. The Schwimmpanzer II could make 5.7 km/h in the water. Taret halqasi atrofida shishiriladigan rezina shlang korpus va turret o'rtasida suv o'tkazmaydigan muhr yaratdi. The tank's 2 cm gun and coaxial machinegun were kept operational and could be fired while the tank was still making its way ashore. Because of the great width of the pontoons, Schwimmpanzer IIs were to be deployed from specially-modified Type C landing barges, from which they could be launched directly into open water from a large hatch cut into the stern. The Germans converted 52 of these tanks to amphibious use prior to Sea Lion's cancellation.[70]

Tauchpanzer

A Panzer III Tauchpanzer under test (1940)

The Tauchpanzer yoki deep-wading tank (also referred to as the U-Panzer yoki Unterwasser Panzer) standart edi Panzer III yoki Panzer IV medium tank with its hull made completely waterproof by sealing all sighting ports, hatches and air intakes with tape or caulk. The gap between the turret and hull was sealed with an inflatable hose while the main gun mantlet, commander's cupola and radio operator's machine gun were given special rubber coverings. Once the tank reached the shore, all covers and seals could be blown off via explosive cables, enabling normal combat operation.[71]

Fresh air for both the crew and engine was drawn into the tank via an 18 m long rubber hose to which a float was attached to keep one end above the water's surface. A radio antenna was also attached to the float to provide communication between the tank crew and the transport barge. The tank's engine was converted to be cooled with seawater, and the exhaust pipes were fitted with overpressure valves. Any water seeping into the tank's hull could be expelled by an internal bilge pump. Navigation underwater was accomplished using a directional gyrokompas or by following instructions radioed from the transport barge.[71]

Experiments conducted at the end of June and early July at Schilling, near Wilhelmshaven, showed that the submersible tanks functioned best when they were kept moving along the seabed as, if halted for any reason, they tended to sink into the seabed and remain stuck there. Obstacles such as underwater trenches or large rocks tended to stop the tanks in their tracks, and it was decided for this reason that they should be landed at high tide so that any mired tanks could be retrieved at low tide. Submersible tanks could operate in water up to a depth of 15 metres (49 ft).[72]

The Kriegsmarine initially expected to use 50 specially-converted motor coasters to transport the submersible tanks, but testing with the coaster Germaniya showed this to be impractical. This was due to the ballast needed to offset the weight of the tanks, and the requirement that the coasters be grounded to prevent them from capsizing as the tanks were transferred by crane onto the vessel's wooden side ramps. These difficulties led to development of the Type B barge.[72]

By the end of August the Germans had converted 160 Panzer IIIs, 42 Panzer IVs, and 52 Panzer IIs to amphibious use. This gave them a paper strength of 254 machines, about an equivalent number to those that would otherwise have been allocated to an armoured division. The tanks were divided into four battalions or detachments labelled Panzer-Abteilung A, B, C and D. They were to carry sufficient fuel and ammunition for a combat radius of 200 km.[73]

Specialised landing equipment

A qismi sifatida Kriegsmarine competition, prototypes for a prefabricated "heavy landing bridge" or iskala (similar in function to later Allied Mulberry portlari ) were designed and built by Krupp Stahlbau and Dortmunder Union and successfully overwintered in the North Sea in 1941–42.[74] Krupp's design won out, as it only required one day to install, as opposed to twenty-eight days for the Dortmunder Union bridge. The Krupp bridge consisted of a series of 32m-long connecting platforms, each supported on the seabed by four steel columns. The platforms could be raised or lowered by heavy-duty winches in order to accommodate the tide. The German Navy initially ordered eight complete Krupp units composed of six platforms each. This was reduced to six units by the autumn of 1941, and eventually cancelled altogether when it became apparent that Sea Lion would never take place.[75]

In mid-1942, both the Krupp and Dortmunder prototypes were shipped to the Kanal orollari and installed together off Alderney, where they were used for unloading materials needed to fortify the island. Referred to as the "German jetty" by local inhabitants, they remained standing for the next thirty-six years until demolition crews finally removed them in 1978–79, a testament to their durability.[75]

The Germaniya armiyasi developed a portable landing bridge of its own nicknamed Seeschlange (Sea Snake). This "floating roadway" was formed from a series of joined modules that could be towed into place to act as a temporary jetty. Moored ships could then either unload their cargo directly onto the roadbed or lower it down onto waiting vehicles via their heavy-duty booms. The Seeschlange was successfully tested by the Army Training Unit at Le Havr in France in the autumn of 1941 and later chosen for use in Herkules operatsiyasi, the proposed Italo-German invasion of Maltada. It was easily transportable by rail.[75]

A specialised vehicle intended for Sea Lion was the Landwasserschlepper (LWS), an amphibious tractor under development since 1935. It was originally intended for use by Army engineers to assist with river crossings. Three of them were assigned to Tank Detachment 100 as part of the invasion; it was intended to use them for pulling ashore unpowered assault barges and towing vehicles across the beaches. They would also have been used to carry supplies directly ashore during the six hours of falling tide when the barges were grounded. This involved towing a Kessbohrer amphibious trailer capable of transporting 10–20 tons of freight behind the LWS.[76] The LWS was demonstrated to General Halder on 2 August 1940 by the Reinhardt Trials Staff on the island of Silt and, though he was critical of its high silhouette on land, he recognised the overall usefulness of the design. It was proposed to build enough tractors that one or two could be assigned to each invasion barge, but the late date and difficulties in mass-producing the vehicle prevented this.[76]

Other equipment to be used for the first time

Operation Sea Lion would have been the first ever amphibious invasion by a mechanised army, and the largest amphibious invasion since Gallipoli. The Germans had to invent and improvise a lot of equipment. They also proposed to use some new weapons and use upgrades of their existing equipment for the first time. Bunga quyidagilar kiradi:

  1. Yangi tankga qarshi qurol va o'q-dorilar. The standard German antitank gun, the 37 mm Pak 36, was capable of penetrating the armour of all 1940 British tanks except the Matilda va Sevishganlar. Armour-piercing ballistic capped (tungsten-cored) ammunition (Pzgr. 40) for 37 mm Pak 36 had become available in time for the invasion.[77][iqtibos kerak ][asl tadqiqotmi? ][ishonchli manba? ] The 37 mm Pzgr.40 would still have had trouble penetrating the Matilda II's armour[78] so the first echelon units replaced theirs with French or Czechoslovak 47 mm guns (which weren't much better).[79] The Pak 36 began to be replaced by the 50 mm Pak 38 1940 yil o'rtalarida. The Pak 38, which could penetrate a Matilda's armour, would probably have seen action first with Sea Lion as it would have been issued initially to the Vaffen-SS va Heer's elite units, and all those units were in the Sea Lion force.[iqtibos kerak ] Ular orasida SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler polk, Grossdeutschland regiment, 2 mountain, 2 Jäger, 2 Fallschirmjäger, 4 panzer, and 2 motorised divisions. In addition, the 7th Infantry division was considered one of the best in the Her, and the 35th almost as good.[iqtibos kerak ]
  2. Captured French armoured tractors.[80] The use of these tractors by the first wave units was intended to reduce their dependence upon horses and probably would have reduced the problems of getting supplies off the beaches. In addition to their proposed use on the beaches, the Germans later used them as tractors for antitank guns and munitions carriers, as self-propelled guns, and as armoured personnel carriers. There were two main types. The Renault UE Chenillette (Nemis nomi: Infanterie Schlepper UE 630 (f)) was a light tracked armoured carrier and prime mover produced by France between 1932 and 1940. Five to six thousand were built, and about 3,000 were captured and overhauled by the Germans.[81] They had a storage compartment that could carry 350 kg, pull a trailer weighing 775 kg for a total of about 1000 kg, and could climb a 50% slope. The armour was 5–9 mm, enough to stop shell fragments and bullets. Shuningdek, bor edi Lotaringiya 37L, which was larger, of which 360 fell into German hands. In that vehicle a load of 810 kilograms could be carried, plus a 690 kg trailer pulled for a total of 1.5 tonnes. The use of such captured equipment meant that the first wave divisions were largely motorised,[82] with the first wave using 9.3% (4,200) of the 45,000 horses normally required.[83]
  3. 48× III shtug Ausf B Assault Guns- 7.5 cm StuK 37 L/24, 50 mm armour and improved suspension. Some were to be landed with the first wave.[84]
  4. Panzer III F/G upgraded with more armour on the mantlet and progressively from 3.7 cm KwK 36 L/46.5 to 5 cm KwK 38 L/42.[iqtibos kerak ]
  5. 72 Nebelwerfer, to be landed with the second and third waves.[85]
  6. 36× Flammpanzer II otashin tanklar, 20 to land with the first wave.[85]
  7. 4 yoki undan ko'p 75 mm Leichtgeschütz 40 recoilless guns, for use by paratroopers. The LG 40 could be split into four parts with each part being dropped on a single parachute.[86]

Broad versus narrow front

The German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, Yaxshi) originally planned an invasion on a vast scale by landing over forty divisions from Dorset ga Kent. This was far in excess of what the Kriegsmarine could supply, and final plans were more modest, calling for nine bo'linmalar qilish amfibiya hujumi kuni Sasseks and Kent with around 67,000 men in the first eshelon va bitta havo bilan division of 3,000 men to support them.[87] The chosen invasion sites ran from Rottingdean g'arbda to Hythe sharqda.

The Kriegsmarine wanted a front as short as possible, as it regarded this as more defensible. Admiral Raeder wanted a front stretching from Dover ga Istburn and stressed that shipping between Cherbourg /Le Havre and Dorset would be exposed to attacks from the Royal Navy based in Portsmut va Plimut. General Halder rejected this: "From the army's point of view I regard it as complete suicide, I might just as well put the troops that have landed straight through the sausage machine".[88]

One complication was the tidal flow in the Ingliz kanali, where high water moves from west to east, with high water at Lyme Regis occurring around six hours before it reaches Dover. If all the landings were to be made at high water across a broad front, they would have to be made at different times along different parts of the coast, with the landings in Dover being made six hours after any landings in Dorset and thus losing the element of surprise. If the landings were to be made at the same time, methods would have to be devised to disembark men, vehicles and supplies at all states of the tide. That was another reason to favour landing craft.

German coastal guns

With Germany's occupation of the Pas-de-Kale mintaqa Shimoliy Frantsiya, the possibility of closing the Dover bo'g'ozi to Royal Navy warships and merchant convoys by the use of land-based heavy artillery became readily apparent, both to the German High Command and to Hitler. Hatto Kriegsmarine 's Naval Operations Office deemed this a plausible and desirable goal, especially given the relatively short distance, 34 km (21 mi), between the French and English coasts. Orders were therefore issued to assemble and begin emplacing every Army and Navy heavy artillery piece available along the French coast, primarily at Pas-de-Calais. This work was assigned to the Todt tashkiloti and commenced on 22 July 1940.[89]

Katta 21 cm K12 railway gun was only suitable for bombarding targets on land.

By early August, four 28 cm (11 in) traversing turrets were fully operational as were all of the Army's railway guns. Seven of these weapons, six 28 cm K5 pieces and a single 21 cm (8.3 in) K12 gun with a range of 115 km (71 mi), could only be used against land targets. The remainder, thirteen 28 cm and five 24 cm (9.4 in) pieces, plus additional motorised batteries comprising twelve 24 cm guns and ten 21 cm weapons, could be fired at shipping but were of limited effectiveness due to their slow traverse speed, long loading time and ammunition types.[90]

Better suited for use against naval targets were the four heavy naval batteries installed by mid-September: Fridrix Avgust uchtasi bilan 30.5 cm (12.0 in) barrels; Prinz Geynrix ikkitasi bilan 28 sm qurol; Oldenburg with two 24 cm weapons and, largest of all, Zigfrid (keyinchalik qayta nomlandi Batteri Todt) with a pair of 38 cm (15 in) guns. Fire control for these weapons was provided by both spotter aircraft and by DeTeGerät radar sets installed at Blan Nez and Cap d’Alprech. These units were capable of detecting targets out to a range of 40 km (25 mi), including small British patrol craft inshore of the English coast. Two additional radar sites were added by mid-September: a DeTeGerät at Cap de la Hague and a FernDeTeGerät long-range radar at Cap d’Antifer near Le Havre.[91]

To strengthen German control of the Channel narrows, the Army planned to quickly establish mobile artillery batteries along the English shoreline once a beachhead had been firmly established. Towards that end, 16th Army's Artillerie Kommand 106 was slated to land with the second wave to provide fire protection for the transport fleet as early as possible. This unit consisted of twenty-four 15 cm (5.9 in) and seventy-two 10 cm (3.9 in) guns. About one third of them were to be deployed on English soil by the end of Sea Lion's first week.[92]

The presence of these batteries was expected to greatly reduce the threat posed by British destroyers and smaller craft along the eastern approaches as the guns would be sited to cover the main transport routes from Dover to Calais and Xastings Bulonga. They could not entirely protect the western approaches, but a large area of those invasion zones would still be within effective range.[92]

The British military was well aware of the dangers posed by German artillery dominating the Dover Strait and on 4 September 1940 the Chief of Naval Staff issued a memo stating that if the Germans "…could get possession of the Dover defile and capture its gun defences from us, then, holding these points on both sides of the Straits, they would be in a position largely to deny those waters to our naval forces". Should the Dover defile be lost, he concluded, the Royal Navy could do little to interrupt the flow of German supplies and reinforcements across the Channel, at least by day, and he further warned that "…there might really be a chance that they (the Germans) might be able to bring a serious weight of attack to bear on this country". The very next day the Chiefs of Staff, after discussing the importance of the defile, decided to reinforce the Dover coast with more ground troops.[93]

The guns started to fire in the second week of August 1940 and were not silenced until 1944, when the batteries were overrun by Allied ground forces. They caused 3,059 alerts, 216 civilian deaths, and damage to 10,056 premises in the Dover area. However, despite firing on frequent slow moving coastal convoys, often in broad daylight, for almost the whole of that period (there was an interlude in 1943), there is no record of any vessel being hit by them, although one seaman was killed and others were injured by shell splinters from near misses.[94] Whatever the perceived risk, this lack of ability to hit any moving ship does not support the contention that the German coastal batteries would have been a serious threat to fast destroyers or smaller warships.[95]

Indefinite postponement

During the summer of 1940, both the British public and the Americans believed that a German invasion was imminent, and they studied the forthcoming yuqori to'lqinlar of 5–9 August, 2–7 September, 1–6 October, and 30 October – 4 November as likely dates.[96] Inglizlar prepared extensive defences, and, in Churchill's view, "the great invasion scare" was "serving a most useful purpose" by "keeping every man and woman tuned to a high pitch of readiness".[97][98] He did not think the threat credible. On 10 July, he advised the War Cabinet that the possibility of invasion could be ignored, as it "would be a most hazardous and suicidal operation"; and on 13 August that "now that we were so much stronger", he thought "we could spare an armoured brigade from this country". Over-riding General Dill, Churchill initiated Operation Apology by which a series of troop convoys, including three tank regiments and eventually the entire 2nd Armoured Division, were sent around the Yaxshi umid burni mustahkamlamoq General Wavell in the Middle East in support of operations against Italyancha colonial forces (Italy had declared war on 10 June).[99] Furthermore, on Churchill's urging, on 5 August the War Cabinet approved Operation Menace, in which a substantial proportion of the Home Fleet - two battleships, an aircraft carrier, five cruisers, and twelve destroyers, together with five out of six battalions of Qirol dengiz piyodalari, were dispatched to Dakar on 30 August in an attempt to neutralise the battleship Richelieu and detach Frantsiya G'arbiy Afrika dan Vichi Frantsiya nazoratiga Bepul frantsuzcha. Overall, these actions in the summer of 1940 demonstrated Churchill's confidence in August 1940; that the immediate danger of a German invasion was now over, that the Home Forces were fully adequate to defend Great Britain if the Germans did come, and that the interests of the British Empire were, for the present, better served by attacking the colonial forces of Germany's allies, rather than by confronting the German Army directly.[100]

The Germans were confident enough to film a simulation of the intended invasion in advance. A crew turned up at the Belgian port of Antverpen in early September 1940 and, for two days, they filmed tanks and troops landing from barges on a nearby beach under simulated fire. It was explained that, as the invasion would happen at night, Hitler wanted the German people to see all the details.[101]

Avgust oyining boshlarida Germaniya qo'mondonligi bosqinchilik 15 sentyabrda boshlanishi kerakligi to'g'risida kelishib olgan edi, ammo dengiz flotining o'z jadvaliga o'zgartishlar kiritilishi bilan 20 sentyabr kuni sanani belgilab qo'ydi. 14 sentyabr kuni bo'lib o'tgan konferentsiyada Gitler har xil tayyorgarlikni yuqori baholadi, ammo xizmat boshliqlariga hali ham havo ustunligiga erishilmaganligi sababli, bosqinni davom ettirishni ko'rib chiqishini aytdi. Ushbu konferentsiyada u Luftvaffega boshqa xizmatlardan mustaqil ravishda harakat qilish imkoniyatini berdi, britaniyaliklarning qarshiliklarini engib o'tish uchun doimiy havo hujumlari kuchaytirildi; 16 sentyabrda Gyoring havo hujumining ushbu yangi bosqichi uchun buyruqlar chiqardi.[102] 1940 yil 17 sentyabrda Gitler bilan uchrashuv o'tkazdi Reyxsmarsxol Hermann Göring va Generalfeldmarschall Gerd fon Rundstedt davomida u operatsiya yaroqsiz ekanligiga amin bo'ldi. Osmon nazorati hali ham etishmayotgan edi va qurolli kuchlarning uchta tarmog'i o'rtasida muvofiqlashtirish haqida gap bo'lishi mumkin emas edi. O'sha kuni Gitler operatsiyani keyinga qoldirishni buyurdi. U Britaniya havo va dengiz hujumlari oqibatida kelgusi zararni oldini olish uchun bosqinchilik flotini tarqatib yuborishni buyurdi.[103]

Kechiktirish, taxminan 7 sentyabr kuni Buyuk Britaniyaning qirg'oqlariga tushishga urinish bo'lganligi haqidagi mish-mishlar bilan bir vaqtga to'g'ri keldi, bu Germaniyaning katta talafotlari bilan qaytarildi. Keyinchalik bu voqea inglizlar olovli moydan foydalanib dengizni yoqib yuborganligi to'g'risida yolg'on xabarlar bilan kengaytirildi. Ikkala versiya ham Amerika matbuotida va Uilyam L. Shirer "s Berlin kundaligi, ammo ikkalasini ham rasmiy ravishda Angliya va Germaniya rad etdi. Muallif Jeyms Xeyvord "muvaffaqiyatsiz bosqin" atrofidagi pichirlash kampaniyasi inglizlarning muvaffaqiyatli namunasi bo'lgan deb taxmin qilmoqda qora tashviqot uyda va ichkarida ruhiy holatni kuchaytirish Evropani bosib oldi va Amerikani Britaniyaning yo'qolgan sabab emasligiga ishontirish.[104]

1940 yil 12-oktabrda Gitler boshqa jabhalar uchun kuchlarni ozod qilish bo'yicha ko'rsatma chiqardi. Dengiz Arsloniga tayyorgarlikning ko'rinishi Britaniyaga siyosiy bosimni davom ettirishda davom etishi kerak edi va agar 1941 yil bahorida bosqinchi qayta ko'rib chiqilishi to'g'risida qaror qabul qilinsa, yangi yo'riqnoma chiqarilishi kerak edi.[105][106] 1940 yil 12-noyabrda Gitler 18-sonli yo'riqnomani chiqardi va bosqinchilik rejasini yanada takomillashtirishni talab qildi. 1941 yil 1-mayda yangi bosqinchi buyruqlari kod nomi ostida chiqarildi Haifische (akula), Angliyaning janubi-g'arbiy va shimoli-sharqiy sohillariga qo'shimcha qo'nish bilan kodlangan Harpune Nord va Harpune Süd (Harpun shimol va janub), garchi dengiz stantsiyalari qo'mondonlari bu aldash rejalari ekanligi haqida xabardor bo'lishgan. Keyinchalik Boltiqbo'yi operatsiyalarida ishlatilgan maxsus qo'nish kemalari kabi turli xil amfibik urushlar ustida ish olib borildi.[107]

Paytida Britaniyani bombardimon qilish kuchaygan Blits, Gitler 1940 yil 18-dekabrda o'zining 21-sonli yo'riqnomasini chiqargan edi. Vermaxtga uzoq vaqtdan beri rejalashtirilgan hujumni boshlash uchun tezkor hujumga tayyor bo'lishni buyurdi. Sovet Ittifoqiga bostirib kirish.[108] Seelöwe bekor qilindi, hech qachon qayta tiklanmaydi.[109] 1941 yil 23 sentyabrda Gitler Dengiz sherining barcha tayyorgarligini to'xtatishni buyurdi, ammo 1942 yil Antverpendagi barjalarning oxirgisi savdoga qaytarilgunga qadar bo'lgan. Gitlerning dengiz sheriga tegishli so'nggi yozma buyrug'i 1944 yil 24-yanvarda bosqinchilik uchun zaxirada bo'lgan uskunani qayta ishlatgan va uning qayta tiklanishi to'g'risida o'n ikki oylik ogohlantirish berilishini bildirgan.[110]

Muvaffaqiyat ehtimoli

Reyxsmarsxol Hermann Göring, Bosh qo'mondon ning Luftwaffe, bosqinchilik muvaffaqiyatga erisha olmasligiga ishongan va nemis havo kuchlari osmonni bemalol boshqarishni qo'lga kirita olishiga shubha qilgan; baribir u Britaniya urushidagi dastlabki g'alaba Buyuk Britaniya hukumatini bosqinga hojat qoldirmasdan muzokaralarga majbur qiladi deb umid qilgan.[111] Adolf Galland, komandiri Luftwaffe o'sha paytda jangchilar, bosqinchilik rejalari jiddiy emasligini va bu erda sezilarli darajada yengillik borligini da'vo qilishgan Vermaxt nihoyat bekor qilinganida.[112] Generalfeldmarschall Gerd fon Rundstedt Gitler hech qachon Britaniyani bosib olishni jiddiy o'ylamagan deb o'ylardi; u hamma narsa Britaniya hukumatiga bosim o'tkazib, quyidagilardan so'ng murosaga kelishiga bosim o'tkazish uchun ishonch hosil qilganiga amin edi Frantsiyaning qulashi.[113] U buni kuzatdi Napoleon bor edi bosib olmadi va uni chalg'itgan qiyinchiliklarni Sea Lion rejalashtiruvchilari hal qilmaganga o'xshaydi. Darhaqiqat, 1939 yil noyabrda Germaniya dengiz kuchlari shtabi Britaniyaga bostirib kirish ehtimoli to'g'risida tadqiqot o'tkazdi va buning uchun ikkita old shart, ya'ni havo va dengiz ustunligi kerak, degan xulosaga keldi, bu Germaniyada hech qachon bo'lmagan.[114] Buyuk Admiral Karl Dönitz havo ustunligi etarli emasligiga ishongan va "Biz na havoni va na dengizni boshqarish huquqiga egamiz, na biz uni qo'lga kirita olamiz", deb tan oldi.[115] Buyuk Admiral Erix Raeder 1941 yil bahorigacha Germaniya bosqinchilik harakatini amalga oshirish mumkin emas deb o'ylardi;[116] u buning o'rniga chaqirdi Maltada va Suvaysh kanali Germaniya qo'shinlari Yaponiyaning qo'shinlari bilan bog'lanishlari uchun ularni bosib olish kerak edi Hind okeani ning qulashi haqida Britaniya imperiyasi Uzoq Sharqda va agar Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari urushga kirsa, amerikaliklarning Britaniya bazalaridan foydalana olishlariga yo'l qo'ymaslik.[117]

1940 yil 14-avgustda Gitler o'z generallariga, agar bu vazifa juda xavfli bo'lib tuyulsa, u Britaniyaga bostirib kirishga urinmasligini aytgan, bundan oldin Buyuk Britaniyani mag'lub etishning bosqindan boshqa usullari ham bor.[118]

Yilda Ikkinchi Jahon Urushi haqida xotiralarCherchill shunday dedi: "Agar nemislar 1940 yilda yaxshi o'qitilgan [va jihozlangan] amfibiya kuchlariga ega bo'lsalar, ularning vazifasi bizning dengiz va havo kuchlarimiz oldida umidsizlikka aylangan bo'lar edi. Aslida ularning qurollari ham, mashqlari ham yo'q edi".[119] U qo'shimcha qildi: "Haqiqatan ham ba'zilar bor edi, ular faqat texnik asoslarda va uning ekspeditsiyasining to'liq mag'lubiyati umumiy urushga olib kelishi mumkin edi, uni sinab ko'rishdan mamnun edilar."[120]

Garchi "Dengiz Arslon" operatsiyasi hech qachon amalga oshirilmagan bo'lsa-da, uning taxminiy natijasi haqida ko'plab taxminlar mavjud. Harbiy tarixchilarning katta qismi, shu jumladan Piter Fleming, Derek Robinson va Stiven Bungay, muvaffaqiyatga erishish uchun ozgina imkoniyat bor edi va, ehtimol, nemislar uchun falokatga olib kelishi mumkin edi. Flemingning ta'kidlashicha, tarix g'olibning yaxshiroq namunasini taqdim etadimi, shuning uchun mag'lub bo'lgan dushmaniga unga ajoyib mag'lubiyatni taqdim etish imkoniyatini taqdim etadi.[121] Len Deyton va boshqa ba'zi yozuvchilar nemis amfibiya rejalarini "Dunkirk teskari ".[122] Robinzon qirollik flotining harbiy ustunligidan katta ustunligini ta'kidlaydi Kriegsmarine dengiz sherini falokatga aylantirgan bo'lar edi. Doktor Endryu Gordon uchun maqolada Royal United Services Institute jurnali[123] bu bilan rozi va o'z xulosasida aniqki, Germaniya dengiz kuchlari Angliya urushining haqiqiy natijalaridan qat'i nazar, Sealionni o'rnatishga qodir emaslar. Uning xayoliy asarida muqobil tarix Bosqin: Germaniyaning Angliyaga bosqini, 1940 yil iyul, Kennet Macksey agar Dunkirkni evakuatsiya qilishdan oldin ham tayyorgarlikni tez va qat'iyat bilan boshlaganida va Qirollik dengiz floti negadir keng ko'lamli aralashuvdan tiyilgan bo'lsa, nemislar muvaffaqiyatga erishishi mumkin edi.[124] garchi amalda nemislar o'zlarining hujumlarini tezda boshlashga tayyor emas edilar.[125] Germaniyaning rasmiy dengiz urushi tarixchisi, Vitse-admiral Kurt Assmann, 1958 yilda yozgan edi: "Agar Germaniya havo kuchlari bir necha oy oldin Frantsiya harbiy havo kuchlarini mag'lubiyatga uchratgandek qirollik harbiy havo kuchlarini mag'lubiyatga uchratgan bo'lsa, men ishonamanki, Gitler istilo boshlanishiga buyruq bergan bo'lar edi - va bosqin ehtimol katta ehtimol bilan barbod bo'lgan ".[126]

2016 yilga kelib muqobil istiqbolga erishildi Robert Forchik yilda Biz Angliyaga qarshi yurish qilamiz. Forczyk Germaniya va Buyuk Britaniya kuchlarining nisbatan kuchli va zaif tomonlarini ancha aniqroq baholashni talab qilmoqda va avvalgi yozuvchilar tomonidan Qirollik floti birinchi to'lqin bosqini flotini himoya qiladigan Germaniya dengiz kuchlarini osongina bosib olgan bo'lishi mumkin degan qarashlarga qarshi. Uning baholashi 1974 yilda paydo bo'lgan bilan mos keladi Sandhurst Sea Lion jangovar o'yini (quyida qarang), birinchi to'lqin, ehtimol Kanaldan o'tib, Kent va Sharqiy Sasseksdagi qo'nish plyajlari atrofida katta yo'qotishsiz turar joy tashkil qilgan bo'lar edi va mudofaa qilinayotgan ingliz kuchlari ularni qirg'oqqa bir marta ko'chirib yuborishi ehtimoldan yiroq emas edi. U "E" plyajiga Germaniyaning eng g'arbiy qo'nishini Britaniya hujumi, dengiz va havo kuchlariga qarshi hujumga qarshi uzoq vaqt davomida saqlab turolmasligini va shunga muvofiq bu nemis birliklari sharq tomon o'zlarining har qanday intilishlaridan voz kechib, jang qilishlari kerakligini aytdi. tutmoq Nyukaven. Katta portga kirish imkoni bo'lmaganida va nemis qo'shinlari transport kemalarining dengiz osti hujumidan davomli yo'qotishlar bilan, Forczyk, ikkinchi to'lqinni plyajlarga tushirish bo'yicha taklif qilingan tadbirlar kuzda va qishki ob-havo Kanalga o'rnatilgandan so'ng, umuman foydasiz bo'lar edi, deb ta'kidlaydi. shuning uchun birinchi to'lqin Kentda katta zirhsiz, transportsiz yoki og'ir artilleriyasiz "plyajli kit" sifatida qolib ketishi mumkin edi - chiqish va tahdid qila olmaydi. London. Shunga qaramay, Forchik ular taslim bo'lishlarini qabul qilmaydilar va atrofdagi nemis kuchlarining qat'iy qarshiligiga ishora qildilar. Stalingrad va Demyansk. Uning so'zlariga ko'ra, ular 1941 yilga qadar davom etishi mumkin edi, bunda kichik kema tezda tunda zaxira qilish operatsiyasi bilan ta'minlangan. Folkestone (va ehtimol Dover ) Britaniya hukumati bilan kelishilgan sulh asosida 1941 yil bahorida ularni olib chiqish to'g'risida muzokaralar olib borish imkoniyatiga ega.[127]

Logistika

To'rt yil o'tib, Ittifoqchilar Kun qo'nish amfibiya istilosini davom ettirish uchun doimiy ravishda qancha materiya tushishi kerakligini ko'rsatdi. Nemislar uchun muammo yanada og'irroq edi, chunki nemis armiyasi asosan otlar edi. Uning bosh og'rig'idan biri kanal bo'ylab minglab otlarni tashish edi.[128] Britaniyalik razvedka hisob-kitoblariga ko'ra, 10 ta bo'linmaning birinchi to'lqini (shu jumladan havo-desantiysi) kuniga o'rtacha 3300 tonna ta'minotni talab qiladi.[129] Darhaqiqat, Rossiyada 1941 yilda og'ir janglar paytida (juda uzoq etkazib berish liniyasining oxirida) bitta nemis piyoda diviziyasi kuniga 1100 tonnagacha material talab qilar edi,[130] odatdagi ko'rsatkich kuniga 212-425 tonnani tashkil etadi.[131] Kichikroq ko'rsatkich, etkazib berish materiallari bosib o'tishi kerak bo'lgan juda qisqa masofalar tufayli yuzaga keladi. Birinchi to'lqinning nemis qo'shinlariga ikki hafta davomida ratsion berilishi kerak edi, chunki qo'shinlar jangning dastlabki bosqichida kanal bo'ylab etkazib berishni minimallashtirish uchun iloji boricha quruqlikda yashashni buyurdilar.[132] Britaniyalik razvedka bundan keyin ham Germaniyaning rejalashtirilgan qo'nish zonalariga kiradigan eng katta port bo'lgan Folkestonening istiloning birinchi haftasida kuniga 150 tonna yuk ko'tarishi mumkinligini hisoblab chiqdilar (barcha dengiz bo'yidagi uskunalar muvaffaqiyatli buzilgan va RAFning muntazam bombardimon qilingan hujumlari imkoniyatlarni 50% ga kamaytirgan) . Etti kun ichida Germaniyaning qirg'oq tomonlari qirg'oqlarni ta'mirlab, portni to'siqlardan va boshqa to'siqlardan tozalagandan so'ng, maksimal quvvat kuniga 600 tonnaga ko'tarilishi kutilgan edi. Bu shuni anglatadiki, birinchi to'lqinga tushgan eng yaxshi to'qqiz nemis piyoda qo'shini va bitta havo-desant diviziyasi har kuni port orqali talab qilinadigan 3300 tonna yukning 20 foizidan kamrog'ini oladi va bo'lishi mumkin bo'lgan narsalarga qattiq ishonishi kerak edi. to'g'ridan-to'g'ri plyajlar orqali olib kelingan yoki qo'lga kiritilgan aerodromlarga havo ko'tarilgan.[133]

Muvaffaqiyatli ushlash Dover va uning port imkoniyatlari kuniga yana 800 tonna qo'shib, portlar orqali olib kiriladigan materiallarning 40% gacha ko'tarilishini kutish mumkin edi. Biroq, bu Qirollik dengiz floti va RAF tomonidan Germaniya ta'minot konvoylariga qit'a o'rtasida asta-sekinlik bilan harakatlanayotganda kuchsiz (yoki kuchsiz, ya'ni tortib olingan) kemalardan iborat bo'lar edi. bosqin plyajlariga va qo'lga kiritilgan har qanday portlarga.[133]

Ob-havo

1940 yil 19-dan 26-sentyabrgacha dengiz va shamol sharoitlari va undan ortiq Kanal bostirib kirishi kerak bo'lgan joyda umuman yaxshi edi va hatto daryo barjalaridan foydalangan holda ham o'tish mumkin edi. dengiz davlati 4-dan kam bo'lib qoldi, bu ko'pincha buni amalga oshirdi. Oyning qolgan qismida shamollar "mo''tadil" deb baholandi va nemis bosqinchiligi flotining birinchi to'lqin qo'shinlarini qirg'oqqa muvaffaqiyatli joylashtirilishi uchun zarur bo'lgan o'n kun ichida bu sohilga muvaffaqiyatli joylashishiga to'sqinlik qilmagan bo'lar edi.[134] 27 sentyabr tunidan boshlab shimoldan kuchli shamollar hukmron bo'lib, o'tishni yanada xavfli qildi, ammo tinch sharoit 11-12 oktyabrda va yana 16-20 oktyabrda qaytdi. Shundan so'ng, qit'adan istilo plyajlari tomon harakatlanadigan har qanday bosqinchi kemalarga yordam beradigan engil sharqiy shamollar ustun keldi. Ammo oktyabr oyi oxiriga kelib, Britaniya havo vazirligi yozuvlariga ko'ra, juda kuchli janubi-g'arbiy shamollar (8-kuch) dengizga chiqmaydigan har qanday kemaning Kanal orqali o'tishiga xavf tug'dirishini taqiqlagan bo'lar edi.[135]

Germaniya razvedkasi

Kamida 20 ta ayg'oqchilar "Operatsiya Lena" nomi ostida Angliyaning qirg'oq mudofaasi to'g'risida ma'lumot to'plash uchun qayiqda yoki parashyutda Angliyaga yuborilgan; agentlarning ko'pi cheklangan ingliz tilida gaplashar edi. Barcha agentlar tezda qo'lga olindi va ko'pchilik xatolarga yo'l qo'yganiga amin bo'lishdi MI5 "s Ikki tomonlama tizim, o'zlarining nemis boshliqlariga dezinformatsiya berish. Aytishlaricha, "havaskor" josuslik harakatlari Gamburgdagi armiya razvedka byurosi boshlig'i tomonidan ataylab qilingan sabotaj natijasida qilingan, Herbert Vichmann, halokatli va qimmatbaho amfibiya bosqinining oldini olish maqsadida; Vichmann fashistlar rejimini tanqid qilgan va u bilan yaqin aloqada bo'lgan Vilgelm Kanaris, boshlig'i Abver keyinchalik xiyonat qilgani uchun fashistlar tomonidan qatl etilgan.[136]

Ba'zi xatolar muammolarni keltirib chiqarmagan bo'lsa, boshqalari, masalan, endi mavjud bo'lmagan ko'priklarni kiritish[137] va ingliz tilidagi kichik yo'llarning foydaliligini tushunmaslik,[137] Germaniya operatsiyalari uchun zararli bo'lar edi va Buyuk Britaniyaning shaharlari (tor yo'llar va xiyobonlar labirintlari bilan) joylashuvi natijasida yuzaga kelgan chalkashliklarni kuchaytirgan bo'lar edi.[tushuntirish kerak ] va yo'l belgilarini olib tashlash.[138]

Urushdan keyingi rejaning urush dasturi

A 1974 yilgi urush o'yini o'tkazildi Sandhurst Qirollik harbiy akademiyasi.[139] O'yin nazoratchilari buni Luftwaffe 1940 yil 7 sentyabrda Londonni bombardimon qilish uchun kunduzgi operatsiyalarini yo'naltirmagan, ammo Janubiy Sharqda RAF aviabazalariga qarshi hujumini davom ettirgan. Binobarin, Germaniya Oliy qo'mondonligi, otib tashlangan RAF jangchilarining haddan tashqari oshirib yuborilgan da'volariga tayanib, 19 sentyabrga qadar RAFning oldingi safidagi jangchilarning kuchi 140 ga tushib qolganligi haqidagi noto'g'ri taassurot ostida edi (700 dan oshiq haqiqiy raqamga nisbatan); va shuning uchun qisqa vaqt ichida Germaniyaning samarali havo ustunligiga erishish mumkin.[140] O'yinda nemislar 1940 yil 22-sentyabrda deyarli barcha birinchi eshelon kuchlarini qo'ya oldilar va Angliyaning janubi-sharqida plyaj boshini o'rnatdilar va Folkestonni egallab oldilar va Nyukaven, inglizlar ikkala portning ob'ektlarini buzgan bo'lishiga qaramay. Londonning janubidagi temir yo'l tarmog'iga bomba etkazilishi natijasida Sharqiy Angliyadan Janubiy-Sharqqa bo'linmalarini ko'chirishni kechiktirgan ingliz armiyasi kuchlari, baribir, ular ichida va atrofida pozitsiyalarni ushlab tura olishdi. Nyukaven va Dover, Germaniya kuchlari tomonidan ulardan foydalanishni rad etish uchun etarli. Ham RAF, ham Luftwaffe birinchi kuni o'zlarining mavjud kuchlarining to'rtdan bir qismini yo'qotdilar, shundan so'ng Germaniya qo'mondonligi uchun ingliz aviatsiyasi, oxir-oqibat, qulash nuqtasida emasligi aniq bo'ldi. Ikkinchi kuni Qirollik floti kuchlari kreyserlar va yo'q qiluvchilar ga erisha oldi Kanal dan Rozit, Germaniyaning amfibiya qo'nishining ikkinchi va uchinchi eshelonlarini olib ketayotgan barjalarning ko'pini ushlab qolish va yo'q qilish vaqtida (o'yin uchun ushbu kuzatuv eshonlari Kanalni S minus birida birinchi eshelon bilan kesib o'tib, suzib yurish o'rniga ushlab turilgan edi). S plyus birida kechasi bo'ylab). Ikkinchi va uchinchi eshelonsiz qirg'oqdagi kuchlar artilleriya, transport vositalari, yoqilg'i va o'q-dorilar zaxiralaridan uzilib qoldi; va qo'shimcha mustahkamlashdan to'sib qo'yilgan. Izolyatsiya qilingan va qurol-yarog 'va artilleriya bilan yangi muntazam qo'shinlarga duch kelgan bosqinchi kuch majbur bo'ldi taslim bo'lish olti kundan keyin.[141]

Britaniyani rejalashtirilgan ishg'oli

Britaniyaning kelajakdagi roli

1930 yillar davomida Germaniyaning asosiy tashqi siyosatining maqsadi Buyuk Britaniya bilan harbiy ittifoq tuzish edi va Angliyaga qarshi siyosat olib borilganiga qaramay, bu imkonsiz ekanligiga qaramay, Buyuk Britaniya o'z vaqtida hali ham ishonchli nemisga aylanadi degan umid saqlanib qoldi. ittifoqchi.[142] Gitler bu narsaga qoyil qolganini bildirdi Britaniya imperiyasi va uni dunyo kuchi sifatida saqlanib qolganini ko'rishni ma'qul ko'rdi, asosan sindirish; ayrilish; to'xtatish boshqa mamlakatlarga Germaniyadan ko'ra ko'proq foyda keltirishi mumkin, xususan Qo'shma Shtatlar va Yaponiya.[142][143] Britaniyaning ahvoli tarixiy vaziyatga o'xshatilgan Avstriya imperiyasi mag'lubiyatidan keyin Prussiya qirolligi 1866 yilda shundan keyin Avstriya rasmiy ravishda Germaniya ishlaridan chetlashtirildi, ammo uning sodiq ittifoqchisiga aylandi Germaniya imperiyasi oldindaBirinchi jahon urushi quvvatni tekislash Evropada. Mag'lubiyatga uchragan Angliya shu kabi rolni bajaradi, degan umidda edi qit'a ishlari, ammo imperiyasini saqlab qolish va nemislarning ittifoqdosh dengiz sherigi bo'lish.[144][142]

Frantsiya qulaganidan keyin Buyuk Britaniyaga qarshi davom etayotgan harbiy harakatlar strategik maqsad sifatida Buyuk Britaniyani "nurni ko'rishga" va uni o'tkazishga majbur qildi sulh bilan Eksa kuchlari, 1940 yil 1-iyul jangovar harakatlarni to'xtatish uchun "taxminiy sana" deb nomlandi.[145] 1940 yil 21 mayda, Armiya shtabining boshlig'i Frants Xolder, Gitler bilan urush maqsadlari bo'yicha Buyuk Britaniyaga qarshi maslahatlashgandan so'ng, uning kundaligiga shunday yozgan edi: "Biz dunyoni taqsimlash asosida Angliya bilan aloqa o'rnatishga intilyapmiz".[146] Urush davom etayotgan paytda ham Gitler 1941 yil avgustida "Angliya va Germaniya birgalikda Amerikaga qarshi yurish" kunini kutar edi va 1942 yil yanvarida u hali ham Britaniyaning urushni tugatishi va unga qo'shilishi "imkonsiz emas" deb xayol qildi. eksa tomoni.[147] Natsist mafkurachi Alfred Rozenberg SSSRga qarshi urush g'alaba qozonganidan so'ng, Inglizlar bosib olingan sharqiy hududlarni mustamlaka qilishda nemis ko'chmanchilariga qo'shiladigan german millatlari orasida bo'lar edi.[148]

Uilyam L. Shirer Biroq, 17 dan 45 yoshgacha bo'lgan ingliz erkak aholisi qit'aga sanoat sifatida foydalanish uchun majburan ko'chirilgan bo'lar edi. qul mehnati, ehtimol, Sharqiy Evropadan shunga o'xshash majburiy mehnatga qaraganda yaxshiroq davolanish.[149] Qolgan aholi dahshatga tushgan bo'lar edi, shu jumladan oddiy garovga olinganlar va hatto eng ahamiyatsiz qarshilik ko'rsatganliklari uchun darhol o'lim jazosi tayinlandi, Buyuk Britaniya moliyaviy, harbiy, sanoat yoki madaniy ahamiyatga ega bo'lgan har qanday narsa uchun talon-taroj qilindi.[150]

Ma'muriyat

Bosqindan keyingi tezkor ma'muriyat uchun yaratilgan eng batafsil rejalarga ko'ra, Buyuk Britaniya va Irlandiya Bosh qarorgohi Londonda bo'lib, oltita harbiy-iqtisodiy qo'mondonlikka bo'linishi kerak edi. Birmingem, Nyukasl, "Liverpul", Glazgo va Dublin.[151] Gitler shunday qaror chiqardi Blenxaym saroyi, ajdodlar uyi Uinston Cherchill, Germaniya okkupatsion harbiy hukumatining bosh shtabi bo'lib xizmat qilishi kerak edi.[152] OKW, RSHA va Tashqi ishlar vazirligi Germaniya bilan do'stona hukumatni tuzishda ishonchli deb hisoblaganlarning ro'yxatlarini tuzdi. Norvegiyani bosib oldi. Ro'yxatni Angliya fashistlari etakchisi boshqargan Osvald Mozli. RSHA ham buni sezdi Garold Nikolson ushbu rolda foydali bo'lishi mumkin.[153] Germaniya politsiyasining rejalariga asoslanib, ishg'ol vaqtinchalik bo'lishi kerak, chunki ishg'oldan keyingi davr uchun batafsil qoidalar aytib o'tilgan.[154]

Ba'zi manbalarda nemislar faqat Angliyaning janubini egallashni maqsad qilganliklari va britaniyalik tinch aholining bosib olingan va ishg'ol qilinmagan hududlar orasidan oldinga va orqaga o'tishini tartibga solish bo'yicha hujjatlar loyihalari mavjudligi ko'rsatilgan.[155] Boshqalarning ta'kidlashicha, natsistlar rejalashtiruvchilari G'arbiy Evropada Germaniya gegemonligini ta'minlash uchun millatlar siyosati institutini nazarda tutgan, bu esa turli mintaqalarga mustaqillik berilishini talab qilgan. Bu ajralishni o'z ichiga olgan Shotlandiya Buyuk Britaniyadan, a ning yaratilishi Birlashgan Irlandiya va G'arbiy Angliya uchun avtonom maqom.[156]

Urushdan keyin tanlov haqida ham mish-mishlar paydo bo'ldi Yoaxim fon Ribbentrop yoki Ernst Vilgelm Bohl, uchun "vitseregal "ofisi Reyxskomissar für Großbritannien ("Buyuk Britaniyaning imperatorlik komissari").[157] Biroq, urush paytida bu nom bilan biron bir muassasa hech qachon Gitler yoki fashistlar hukumati tomonidan ma'qullanmagan va g'olib ittifoqchilar tomonidan so'roq qilinganida Bohl ham rad etgan (fon Ribbentrop bu masalada so'roq qilinmagan). Keyin Compiègne-dagi ikkinchi sulh Gitler yaqinda Angliya taslim bo'lishini kutganida, Frantsiya bilan Bohlni Germaniyaning navbatdagi elchisi bo'lishiga ishontirdi. Sent-Jeyms sudi "agar inglizlar o'zlarini oqilona tutsalar".[157]

Edvard, Vindzor gersogi ko'rib chiqish SS soqchilar bilan Robert Ley, 1937

Germaniya hukumati Jeyms Vinsent Merfining Mein Kampfning qo'pol tarjimasi loyihasining 90% dan foydalanib, "Dengiz sherlari" operatsiyasi tugagandan so'ng Buyuk Britaniyada tarqatiladigan nashrni tanasini shakllantirishda foydalangan. Ushbu "Dengiz sherlari operatsiyasi" 1940 yil yozida tugatilgan va nashr etilgan. Adolf Gitler tomonidan bosqinchilik to'xtatilgandan so'ng, ularning aksariyati ingliz tilida so'zlashuvchi lagerlarga tarqatilgan. Asl nusxalari juda kam uchraydi va harbiy tarixga qiziqqan jiddiy kitob yig'uvchilar tomonidan juda izlanadi.

Britaniya monarxiyasi

2009 yil 16 iyulda namoyish etilgan "5-kanal" hujjatli filmi nemislar tiklash niyatida ekanligini takrorladi Edvard VIII Germaniya istilo qilingan taqdirda taxtga.[158][159] Ko'plab nemis amaldorlari Vindzor gersogi fashistlar hukumatiga juda xayrixoh, deb his qilishdi, bu tuyg'u uning va Uollis Simpson "s 1937 yil Germaniyaga tashrif. Ammo, shunga qaramay Nemis yondashuvlari, "Dyuk hech qachon urush paytida Buyuk Britaniyaga sodiqligidan qaytmadi", deyiladi Buyuk Britaniya tashqi ishlar vazirligi bayonotida.[160]

Frants Six 1940 yilda. Keyinchalik u sudlangan edi Nürnberg sudlari.

Qora kitob

Agar "Sea Lion" operatsiyasi muvaffaqiyatga erishgan bo'lsa, Frants Six ga aylanish uchun mo'ljallangan edi Sicherheitsdienst Bosh shtab-kvartirasi Londonda joylashgan mintaqaviy tezkor guruhlar bilan mamlakatdagi qo'mondon Birmingem, "Liverpul", "Manchester" va Edinburg.[151] Uning bevosita vazifasi 2820 kishini ov qilish va hibsga olish edi Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. ("Buyuk Britaniyaning maxsus qidiruv ro'yxati"). Urushdan keyingi ushbu hujjat "Qora kitob "tomonidan tuzilgan maxfiy ro'yxat edi Valter Schellenberg muvaffaqiyatli bostirib kirgandan so'ng darhol hibsga olinadigan taniqli britaniyaliklarning ismlarini o'z ichiga olgan.[161] Oltitasi 300 mingdan ortiq aholini boshqarish bilan shug'ullangan bo'lar edi Britaniya yahudiylari.[161]

Oltitaga "aerotexnologik tadqiqotlar natijalari va muhim uskunalar" hamda "germaniyalik san'at asarlari" ni ta'minlash vazifasi topshirilgan edi. Shuningdek, u harakatlanish g'oyasini o'ynatgan degan taklif bor Nelson ustuni Berlingacha.[162] RSHA o'z tasarrufiga olishni rejalashtirgan Axborot vazirligi, yirik axborot agentliklarini yopish va barcha gazetalarni o'z nazoratiga olish. Germaniyaga qarshi gazetalar yopilishi kerak edi.[163]

Ommaviy madaniyatda

An-da o'rnatilgan katta korpus mavjud muqobil tarix bu erda fashistlarning Buyuk Britaniyaga hujumi amalga oshirilgan yoki muvaffaqiyatli amalga oshirilgan.

Shuningdek qarang

Adabiyotlar

Izohlar
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Bibliografiya
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