Yadro sinovlarini qisman taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma - Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Uzoq ism:
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 Sinovlarni qisman taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnomada ishtirok etish
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| Turi | Qurollarni boshqarish | ||
| Imzolangan | 1963 yil 5-avgust | ||
| Manzil | Moskva, Sovet Ittifoqi | ||
| Samarali | 10 oktyabr 1963 yil | ||
| Vaziyat | Tomonidan tasdiqlash Sovet Ittifoqi, Birlashgan Qirollik va Qo'shma Shtatlar | ||
| Tomonlar | 126, plyus 10 imzolangan, ammo tasdiqlanmagan (qarang to'liq ro'yxat ) | ||
| Depozitariylar | Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari, Buyuk Britaniya va Shimoliy Irlandiya Birlashgan Qirolligi va Sovet Sotsialistik Respublikalari Ittifoqi hukumatlari | ||
| Tillar | Ingliz tili va Ruscha | ||
 Sinovlarni qisman taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma da Vikipediya | |||
The Sinovlarni qisman taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma (PTBT) 1963 yil qisqartirilgan nomi Atmosferada, kosmik kosmosda va suv ostida yadro qurolini sinovdan o'tkazishni taqiqlovchi shartnoma, bu barchani taqiqlagan sinovli portlashlar ning yadro qurollari o'tkazilganlar bundan mustasno yer osti. Shuningdek, u qisqartirilgan Cheklangan sinovlarni taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma (LTBT) va Yadro sinovlarini taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma (NTBT), ammo ikkinchisi ham ga murojaat qilishi mumkin Yadro sinovlarini har tomonlama taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma (CTBT), partiyalarni ratifikatsiya qilish uchun PTBTdan keyin muvaffaqiyatli bo'ldi.
Muzokaralar dastlab keng qamrovli taqiqlashga qaratilgan edi, ammo bu er osti sinovlarini aniqlash bilan bog'liq texnik savollar va Sovet tomonidan taklif qilingan tekshirish usullarining intruzivligidan xavotirlanganligi sababli tark etildi. Sinovlarni taqiqlashga turtki bo'lgan omma yadro sinovlari, xususan, yangi sinovlarning kattaligidan xavotirlanishining kuchayishi bilan ta'minlandi termoyadro qurollari (vodorod bombalari) va natijada yadro qulashi. Sinov taqiqlanishi, shuningdek, sekinlashuv vositasi sifatida qaraldi yadroviy tarqalish va yadroviy qurollanish poygasi. Garchi PTBT tarqalishi yoki qurollanish poygasini to'xtatmasa ham, uning kuchga kirishi atmosferadagi radioaktiv zarralar kontsentratsiyasining sezilarli pasayishiga to'g'ri keldi.
PTBT hukumatlari tomonidan imzolangan Sovet Ittifoqi, Birlashgan Qirollik, va Qo'shma Shtatlar yilda Moskva 1963 yil 5 avgustda boshqa mamlakatlar tomonidan imzolanishi uchun ochilgunga qadar. Shartnoma 1963 yil 10 oktyabrda rasmiy ravishda kuchga kirdi. O'shandan beri 123 ta boshqa davlatlar ushbu shartnomaga qo'shilishdi. O'nta davlat shartnomani imzolagan, ammo uni tasdiqlamagan.
Fon
Shartnoma uchun rag'batlantiruvchi omillarning aksariyati yer usti yoki suv osti yadro sinovlari natijasida radioaktiv falokatga nisbatan jamoatchilikning bezovtaligini kuchaytirishi, xususan yadro qurilmalarining kuchayib borayotgan kuchini hisobga olgan holda, shuningdek, sinovlar natijasida atrof-muhitga etkazilgan umumiy zarar haqida xavotirga sabab bo'lgan.[1] 1952-53 yillarda AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqi birinchi marotaba portlatdi termoyadro qurollari (vodorod bombalari), nisbatan ancha kuchli atom bombalari beri sinovdan o'tgan va tarqatilgan 1945.[2][3] 1954 yilda AQSh Bravo qal'asi sinov Bikini Atoll (qismi Qal'a operatsiyasi ) hosildorligi 15 ga teng edi megaton TNT, kutilayotgan hosilni ikki barobardan ko'proq oshirdi. Bravo qal'asi sinovi AQSh tarixidagi eng yomon radiologik hodisaga olib keldi, chunki radioaktiv zarralar 11000 kvadrat kilometrdan (4,200 kvadrat mil) ko'proq tarqalib, aholi yashaydigan joylarga (shu jumladan) Rongelap Atoll va Utirik Atoll ) va kasal bo'lib qolgan yapon baliqchilari Baxtli ajdaho kimga "o'lim kuli" yog'dirdi.[1][4][5][6] Xuddi shu yili Sovet sinovi Yaponiya ustidan radioaktiv zarralarni yubordi.[7] Shu bilan birga, qurbonlar Xirosimani atom bombasi tibbiy yordam uchun AQShga tashrif buyurdi, bu jamoatchilik e'tiborini tortdi.[8] 1961 yilda Sovet Ittifoqi sinovdan o'tkazdi Tsar Bomba 50 megatonni tashkil etgan va tarixdagi eng qudratli texnogen portlash bo'lib qolgan, ammo yuqori samarali portlash tufayli tushish nisbatan cheklangan edi.[9][10][11] 1951-1958 yillarda AQSh 166 ta atmosfera sinovini o'tkazdi, Sovet Ittifoqi 82 ta, Buyuk Britaniya 21 ta; bu davrda atigi 22 ta yer osti sinovlari o'tkazildi (barchasi AQSh tomonidan).[12]
Muzokaralar
Dastlabki harakatlar
1945 yilda Buyuk Britaniya va Kanada atom kuchini boshqarish bo'yicha xalqaro muhokamani erta chaqirdilar. O'sha paytda AQSh yadroviy qurolga nisbatan yaxlit siyosat yoki strategiyani ishlab chiqishi kerak edi. Buning afzalliklaridan foydalanish edi Vannevar Bush, kim tashabbuskor va boshqargan Manxetten loyihasi, ammo shunga qaramay yadroviy qurol ishlab chiqarishni taqiqlash bo'yicha uzoq muddatli siyosat maqsadi bor edi. Ushbu yo'nalishdagi birinchi qadam sifatida Bush yadroviy nazoratga bag'ishlangan xalqaro agentlikni taklif qildi.[13] Bush 1952 yilda AQSh o'zining birinchi termoyadro qurolini sinovdan o'tkazishdan oldin Sovet Ittifoqi bilan sinovlarni taqiqlash to'g'risidagi kelishuvni imzolashini muvaffaqiyatsiz deb ta'kidladi.[5] ammo uning xalqaro nazoratga bo'lgan qiziqishi 1946 yilda takrorlandi Acheson-Lilienthal hisoboti Prezident tomonidan buyurtma qilingan Garri S. Truman AQShning yadro quroli siyosatini qurishda yordam berish. J. Robert Oppengeymer, kim rahbarlik qilgan Los Alamos milliy laboratoriyasi Manxetten loyihasi davomida ushbu hisobotga, xususan ishlab chiqarishni nazorat qiluvchi xalqaro tashkilotning tavsiyasida va dunyodagi ta'minot bo'yicha tadqiqotlarda sezilarli ta'sir ko'rsatdi. uran va torium. Acheson-Lilienthal rejasining versiyasi taqdim etildi Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining Atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiyasi sifatida Barux rejasi 1946 yil iyun oyida. Barux rejasida Atomni rivojlantirish bo'yicha xalqaro idora atom energiyasini ishlab chiqarish bilan bog'liq barcha tadqiqotlarni va materiallar va uskunalarni nazorat qilishni taklif qildi.[14][15] Garchi Duayt D. Eyzenxauer, keyin Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari armiyasining bosh shtabi, Truman ma'muriyatida yadroviy masalalar bo'yicha muhim ko'rsatkich emas edi, u Trumanning yadro nazorati siyosatini, shu jumladan Barux rejasining xalqaro nazorat agentligi to'g'risidagi qoidasini qo'llab-quvvatladi, agar nazorat qilish tizimi "erkin va to'liq tekshiruv tizimi bilan birga bo'lsa". "[16]
Sovet Ittifoqi Barux rejasini AQShning yadro ustunligini ta'minlashga urinishi sifatida rad etdi va AQShni qurol ishlab chiqarishni to'xtatishga va uning dasturi bo'yicha texnik ma'lumotlarni chiqarishga chaqirdi. Acheson-Lilienthal qog'ozi va Barux rejasi AQShning 50-yillarga oid siyosati uchun asos bo'lib xizmat qiladi. 1947-1954 yillarda AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqi Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining An'anaviy qurolsizlanish komissiyasi doirasida o'z talablarini muhokama qildilar. 1954 yilda bir qator voqealar, jumladan Bravo qal'asi sinovi va Sovet Ittifoqining Yaponiyadagi sinovidan kelib chiqadigan yomg'ir tarqalishi, yadro siyosati bo'yicha xalqaro muhokamani yo'naltirdi. Bundan tashqari, 1954 yilga kelib, AQSh ham, Sovet Ittifoqi ham yirik qurol zaxiralarini yig'ib, to'liq qurolsizlanish umidlarini kamaytirdi.[17] Dastlabki yillarda Sovuq urush AQShning yadro nazorati bo'yicha yondashuvi yadroviy qurolni boshqarishga bo'lgan qiziqish bilan yadro maydonida hukmronlik, ayniqsa Sovet odatdagi kuchlarining hajmini hisobga olgan holda AQSh xavfsizligi uchun juda muhim ekanligiga ishonch o'rtasidagi zo'riqishni aks ettirdi. Sovet Ittifoqining yadroviy salohiyati oshgani sayin yadroviy nazoratga qiziqish va boshqa davlatlarga qurol tarqalishini to'xtatish harakatlari kuchaygan.[18]
Bravo qal'asidan keyin: 1954-1958
1954 yilda, Bravo qal'asi sinovidan bir necha hafta o'tgach, Hindiston bosh vaziri Javaharlal Neru Yadro sinovlari bo'yicha "to'xtab turish shartnomasi" ga birinchi chaqiriqni kiritdi, u sinovlarni to'xtatib qo'yishni moratoriyni qurollarni nazorat qilishni yanada keng qamrovli kelishuvlari uchun qadam deb bildi.[4][7] Xuddi shu yili Britaniya Mehnat partiyasi, keyin boshchiligidagi Klement Attlei, BMTni termoyadro qurollarini sinovdan o'tkazishni taqiqlashga chaqirdi.[19] 1955 yilda Sovet rahbari sifatida sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha muzokaralar boshlandi Nikita Xrushchev birinchi marta ushbu mavzu bo'yicha muzokaralarni 1955 yil fevral oyida taklif qilgan.[20][21] 1955 yil 10-mayda Sovet Ittifoqi BMTning qurolsizlanish komissiyasining "Beshlik qo'mitasi" (Buyuk Britaniya, Kanada, Frantsiya, Sovet Ittifoqi va AQSh). Oldingi ingliz-frantsuz taklifini yaqindan aks ettirgan ushbu taklif dastlab qurol-yarog'ni qisqartirish bo'yicha odatiy qurol darajasini pasaytirish va yadro qurolini yo'q qilishga qaratilgan taklifning bir qismi edi. Sovet taklifining avvalgi G'arb takliflari bilan yaqin bo'lishiga qaramay, AQSh ushbu qoidalar bo'yicha o'z pozitsiyasini o'zgartirdi va "umumiy nazorat shartnomalari bo'lmagan taqdirda" Sovet taklifini rad etdi, shu jumladan ishlab chiqarish bo'yicha cheklovlar bo'linadigan material va a dan himoya kutilmagan yadroviy zarba.[2] 1955 yil may oyidagi taklif Xrushyovga G'arb bilan munosabatlarni tuzatmoqchi bo'lganligi sababli, Xrushchevning tashqi siyosatdagi "yangi yondashuvi" ning isboti sifatida qaralmoqda. Ushbu taklif Sovet Ittifoqining 1957 yilgacha bo'lgan muzokaralar pozitsiyasining asosi bo'lib xizmat qiladi.[22]
Eyzenxauer keyin yadro sinovlarini qo'llab-quvvatladi Ikkinchi jahon urushi. 1947 yilda u argumentlarni rad etdi Stafford L. Warren, Manhetten loyihasining bosh shifokori, atmosfera sinovlarining sog'liqqa zararli ta'siri haqida, buning o'rniga rozi bo'ldi Jeyms Brayant Konant, Manxetten loyihasining kimyogari va ishtirokchisi, Uorrenning o'sha paytdagi nazariy da'volariga shubha bilan qaragan.[tushuntirish kerak ] Uorrenning dalillari[qaysi? ] 1954 yildagi Castle Bravo sinovi bilan ilmiy jamoatchilik va jamoatchilikda ishonchga sazovor bo'ldi.[23] Eyzenxauer prezident sifatida birinchi navbatda o'sha yili keng qamrovli sinovlarni taqiqlashga qiziqish bildirgan edi. Milliy xavfsizlik kengashi, "Agar biz moratoriyni qabul qilsak, biz [ruslarni] joyiga qo'yib qo'yishimiz mumkin edi ... Hamma bizni qashshoqlar, shaytonlar va iliqchilar deb o'ylashadi. Biz tinch maqsadlarimizni aniq belgilash uchun hech qanday imkoniyatni boy bermasligimiz kerak."[8] Keyin davlat kotibi Jon Foster Dulles sinovlarni taqiqlash to'g'risidagi taklifi Milliy Xavfsizlik Kengashi tomonidan "amaliy emas" deb rad etilgan Neruning qurollarni cheklash bo'yicha cheklangan taklifiga shubha bilan javob qaytargan edi.[7][24] Garold Stassen, Eyzenxauerning qurolsizlanish bo'yicha maxsus yordamchisi, AQSh qurolsizlanish bo'yicha, Sovet Ittifoqi joyida tekshiruvlarni qabul qilish sharti bilan qurollarni har tomonlama nazorat qilish yo'lidagi birinchi qadam sifatida sinovlarni taqiqlashni birinchi o'ringa qo'yishi kerak, deb ta'kidladi. Stassenning taklifi ma'muriyatdagi boshqa odamlar tomonidan Sovet Ittifoqi maxfiy sinovlarni o'tkazishi mumkinligidan qo'rqib rad etildi.[25] Dulzning maslahati bilan, Atom energiyasi bo'yicha komissiya (AEC) raisi Lyuis Strauss va Mudofaa vaziri Charlz Ervin Uilson, Eyzenxauer qurolsizlanishning umumiy harakatlaridan tashqari sinov taqiqini ko'rib chiqish g'oyasini rad etdi.[26] Davomida 1952 va 1956 Prezident saylovlari, Eyzenxauer raqibini himoya qildi Adlai Stivenson, sinovni taqiqlashni qo'llab-quvvatlashga katta miqdordagi yugurgan.[27]
1954-58 yillardagi Britaniya hukumatlari (ostida Konservatorlar Uinston Cherchill, Entoni Eden va Garold Makmillan ), shuningdek, Britaniya jamoatchiligi shartnomani ma'qullashiga qaramay, sinov taqiqlanishiga jimgina qarshilik ko'rsatdi AQSh Kongressi 1958 yilda va Buyuk Britaniya sinovdan o'tkazgandan so'ng kengaytirilgan yadroviy hamkorlikni tasdiqladi uning birinchi vodorod bombalari.[27] Ularning fikriga ko'ra, agar Buyuk Britaniyaning yadro dasturi rivojlanishda davom etadigan bo'lsa, sinovlar zarur edi. Ushbu qarama-qarshilik sinov taqiqlanishiga qarshilik AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqini Angliya bu masalada hech qanday fikrga ega bo'lmasdan kelishuvga erishishiga olib kelishi mumkin degan xavotirga tushib qoldi.[28]
Sovet a'zolari harbiy-sanoat kompleksi shuningdek, ba'zi bir olimlar, shu jumladan, sinovlarni taqiqlashga qarshi chiqdilar Igor Kurchatov, yadroga qarshi harakatlarni qo'llab-quvvatladilar.[29] O'zining yadro qurolini ishlab chiqarish bosqichida bo'lgan Frantsiya ham 1950-yillarning oxirida sinovlarni taqiqlashga qat'iy qarshi chiqdi.[30]
Termoyadro qurollarining tarqalishi jamoatchilikning xavotiri kuchaygan paytga to'g'ri keldi yadro qulashi oziq-ovqat manbalarini ifloslantiruvchi axlat, ayniqsa yuqori darajadagi tahdid stronsiy-90 sutda (qarang Bolalar tishlarini o'rganish ). Ushbu so'rovnoma olimlar va fuqarolar tomonidan olib borilgan kampaniya bo'lib, unda "murakkab masalalarni etkazish uchun zamonaviy ommaviy axborot vositalarini targ'ib qilish usullari" ishlatilib, jamoatchilik nutqini xabardor qildi.[31] Uning tadqiqot natijalari chaqaloqlarning suyaklarida stronsiy-90 sezilarli darajada to'planganligini tasdiqladi[32] AQShda atmosfera yadro sinovlarini taqiqlash bo'yicha jamoatchilikning qo'llab-quvvatlashiga yordam berdi.[31] Lyuis Strauss va Edvard Telller, "vodorod bomba otasi" deb nomlangan,[33] ikkalasi ham ushbu qo'rquvni kamaytirishga intilib, [AQShga ta'sir qilishning dozalari darajasida] zararsiz ekanligini ta'kidladilar.[shubhali ] va sinov taqiqlari Sovet Ittifoqiga yadro salohiyati bo'yicha AQShdan oshib ketishiga imkon beradi[shubhali ]. Shuningdek, Telller ozroq zarba beradigan yadro qurolini yaratish uchun sinovlarni o'tkazish zarurligini ta'kidladi[shubhali ]. AQSh jamoatchiligida 1954 yildagi 20% dan 63% gacha o'sishni davom ettirishni taqiqlashni qo'llab-quvvatlash[iqtibos kerak ] 1957 yilga kelib. Bundan tashqari, keng tarqalgan antinuklear namoyishlar ilohiyotshunos va Tinchlik bo'yicha Nobel mukofoti laureat Albert Shvaytser, ularning murojaatlari ma'qullandi Papa Pius XII va Linus Poling Ikkinchisi 43 mamlakatdan 9000 dan ortiq olimlar (shu jumladan zaif va qariyalarni ham o'z ichiga olgan) testga qarshi petitsiya uyushtirdi. Albert Eynshteyn ).[34][35]
AEC oxir-oqibat tan oladi,[iqtibos kerak ] radiatsiyaning past darajasi ham zararli bo'lgan.[25][yaxshiroq manba kerak ] Bu sinovni taqiqlash va 1957 yilgi Sovet shokini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi jamoatchilik qo'llab-quvvatlashining birlashishi edi Sputnik Eyzenxauerni 1958 yilda sinovlarni taqiqlash choralarini ko'rishga undaydigan ishga tushirish.[24][36]
Sovet Ittifoqida ekologik xavotir kuchaygan. 50-yillarning o'rtalarida Sovet olimlari yaqin atrofda muntazam ravishda radiatsion o'qishni boshladilar Leningrad, Moskva va Odessa va stronsiy-90 tarqalishi to'g'risidagi ma'lumotlarni to'pladilar, bu esa Rossiyaning g'arbiy qismida stronsiy-90 darajasi AQShning sharqidagi darajalar bilan deyarli mos kelishini ko'rsatdi. Sovet Ittifoqining ko'tarilayotgan xavotiri 1957 yil sentyabr oyida Kishtim falokati, bu atom zavodidagi portlashdan keyin 10 ming kishini evakuatsiya qilishga majbur qildi. Xuddi shu davrda 219 sovet olimlari Polingning yadroga qarshi arizasini imzoladilar. Sovet siyosiy elitalari Sovet Ittifoqidagi boshqalarning tashvishlariga qo'shilmadilar. Ammo; Kurchatov 1958 yilda Xrushchevni sinovlarni to'xtatishga chaqirgan.[37]
1957 yil 14-iyunda, Eyzenxauerning mavjud bo'lgan aniqlash choralari muvofiqlikni ta'minlash uchun etarli emasligi haqidagi taklifidan so'ng,[38] Sovet Ittifoqi ikki-uch yillik sinov moratoriyining rejasini ishlab chiqdi. Moratoriyni milliy kuzatuv stantsiyalariga bog'liq bo'lgan xalqaro komissiya nazorat qiladi, ammo, eng muhimi, joylarda tekshiruvlar o'tkazilmaydi. Dastlab Eyzenxauer kelishuvni ijobiy deb bilgan, ammo oxir-oqibat boshqacha yo'l tutgan. Xususan, Strauss va Telller, shuningdek Ernest Lourens va Mark Muir Mills, taklifga norozilik bildirdi. Eyzenxauer bilan Oq uyda bo'lib o'tgan uchrashuvda guruh AQSh uchun oxir-oqibat hech qanday yiqilib tushmaydigan ("toza bomba") bomba ishlab chiqarishi uchun sinovlar zarurligini ta'kidladilar. Guruh tez-tez keltirilgan faktni takrorladi, buni qo'llab-quvvatladi Freeman Dyson,[39] Sovet Ittifoqi maxfiy yadro sinovlarini o'tkazishi mumkin.[40] 1958 yilda Igor Kurchatovning iltimosiga binoan Sovet yadroviy fizigi va qurol-yarog 'dizayneri Andrey Saxarov Telller va boshqalarning toza, qulab tushmaydigan yadroviy bomba yaratilishi mumkinligi haqidagi da'vosiga qarshi chiqqan bir nechta keng tarqalgan ilmiy maqolalarni nashr etdi. uglerod-14 yadro qurilmalari havoda portlatilganda. Saxarovning taxminicha bitta megatonli toza bomba 8000 yil davomida 6600 kishining o'limiga sabab bo'ladi, bu raqamlar asosan hisob-kitoblarga asoslanadi. uglerod-14 atmosfera azotidan va o'sha davrdagi zamonaviy xavf modellaridan hosil bo'lgan, shuningdek, dunyo aholisi bir necha ming yil ichida "o'ttiz milliard odam" degan taxmin bilan.[41][42][43] 1961 yilda Saxarov 50 megatonli "toza bomba" ni loyihalash guruhining tarkibiga kirdi va u "taniqli bomba" deb nomlandi. Tsar Bomba, orolida portlatilgan Novaya Zemlya.[43]
1957 yil bahorida AQSh Milliy xavfsizlik kengashi qurolsizlanishning "qisman" rejasiga bir yillik sinov moratoriysi va bo'linadigan materiallar ishlab chiqarishni "to'xtatish" ni kiritishni o'rganib chiqdi. O'shanda Makmillan boshchiligidagi Britaniya hukumati sinovlarga qo'yilgan taqiqni hali to'liq tasdiqlamagan edi. Shunga ko'ra, bu AQShni Sovet Ittifoqi rad etishiga tikish bilan ishlab chiqarishni to'xtatib qo'yishni sinov moratoriyiga yaqin vaqtni talab qilishni talab qildi. London shuningdek, AQShni qurolsizlanish rejasini qisman kechiktirishga undadi, qisman moratoriy boshlanishini 1958 yil noyabrga qaytardi. Shu bilan birga, Makmillan inglizlarning qo'llab-quvvatlanishini sinov taqiqini qayta ko'rib chiqish bilan bog'ladi. 1946 yildagi Atom energiyasi to'g'risidagi qonun (McMahon Act), yadro ma'lumotlarini xorijiy hukumatlar bilan bo'lishishni taqiqlovchi. Eyzenxauer Angliya bilan aloqalarni tiklashga intilib, quyidagilarga amal qiladi Suvaysh inqirozi 1956 yil, Makmillan shartlarini yaxshi qabul qildi, ammo AEC va kongress Atom energiyasi bo'yicha qo'shma qo'mita qat'iy qarshi chiqdilar. Bu keyin emas edi Sputnik 1957 yil oxirida Eyzenxauer tezda Buyuk Britaniya bilan prezidentlik ko'rsatmalari va yadro masalalari bo'yicha ikki tomonlama qo'mitalarni tashkil etish orqali yadroviy hamkorlikni kengaytirishga o'tdi. 1958 yil boshida Eyzenxauer oshkora ravishda McMahon qonuniga tuzatishlar kiritish AQShning majburiyatlari kontekstida siyosat o'zgarishini belgilab beruvchi sinovlarni taqiqlashning zaruriy sharti edi. NATO ittifoqchilar.[44]
1957 yil avgust oyida AQSh Sovet Ittifoqi tomonidan taklif qilingan ikki yillik sinov moratoriyiga rozi bo'ldi, ammo uni harbiy maqsadlarda bo'linadigan materiallar ishlab chiqarishni cheklash bilan bog'lashni talab qildi, bu shart Sovet Ittifoqi rad etdi.[45] Eyzenxauer sinovdan o'tkazilgan taqiqni qurolsizlanish bo'yicha kengroq ish bilan bog'lashni talab qilganda (masalan, ishlab chiqarishni to'xtatish), Moskva sinov taqiqini mustaqil ravishda ko'rib chiqishni talab qildi.[26]
1957 yil 19 sentyabrda AQSh birinchi bo'lib er osti sinovini o'tkazdi Nevada sinov joyi, kod nomi bilan Rainier. The Rainier shot sinovlarni har tomonlama taqiqlash talabini murakkablashtirdi, chunki er osti sinovlarini atmosfera sinovlari singari osonlikcha aniqlash mumkin emas edi.[45]
Eyzenxauer kelishuvga qiziqish bildirganiga qaramay, uning ma'muriyati AQSh olimlari, texniklari va siyosatchilari o'rtasida kelishmovchiliklarga duch keldi. Bir payt Eyzenxauer "davlat qurilishi olimlar asiriga aylanmoqda" deb shikoyat qildi.[24][46] 1957 yilgacha Strauss AEC (shu jumladan Los Alamos va Livermor laboratoriyalar) yadro ishlari bo'yicha ma'muriyatda ustun ovoz edi, chunki Teller Eyzenxauerni aniqlash mexanizmlaridan xavotirda edi.[45][47] AQSh ilmiy jamoatchiligidagi boshqalardan farqli o'laroq, Strauss AQSh muntazam sinovlar o'tkazish yo'li bilan aniq yadro ustunligini saqlab turishi kerakligi va bunday sinovlarning atrof-muhitga salbiy ta'siri haddan tashqari oshirib yuborilganligini ta'kidlab, sinovlarni taqiqlashga qarshi qizg'in targ'ibot qildi. Bundan tashqari, Strauss Sovet Ittifoqi taqiqni buzish xavfi borligini bir necha bor ta'kidlagan edi, deya Eyzenxauer ham qo'rqardi.[48]
1957 yil 7-noyabrda Sputnik va maxsus ilmiy maslahatchini jalb qilish uchun bosim ostida Eyzenxauer yaratdi Prezidentning Ilmiy maslahat qo'mitasi (PSAC), bu AEC monopoliyasini ilmiy tavsiyalar ustidan yo'q qilishga ta'sir qildi.[49] AECdan mutlaqo farqli o'laroq, PSAC sinovlarni taqiqlashni qo'llab-quvvatladi va Straussning strategik oqibatlari va texnik maqsadga muvofiqligi haqidagi da'volariga qarshi chiqdi.[45][50][51] 1957 yil oxirida Sovet Ittifoqi uch yillik moratoriyni tekshiruvlarsiz ikkinchi marta taklif qildi, ammo uning ma'muriyati tomonidan kelishuvga ega bo'lmagan Eyzenxauer buni rad etdi. 1958 yil boshida Amerika doiralari, xususan olimlar o'rtasidagi kelishmovchilik Senatning Yadro qurolsizlanish bo'yicha kichik qo'mitasi tinglovchilarida raislik qilganida aniq bo'ldi. Xubert Xamfri. Tinglovlarda Telller va Linus Poling singari, shuningdek, Garold Stassenning ziddiyatli guvohliklari namoyish etildi, ular sinov taqiqini kengroq qurolsizlanishdan xavfsiz tarzda ajratish mumkinligi va yadro ishlab chiqarishni to'xtatish oldin bo'lishi kerak degan AEC a'zolari. sinovlarni taqiqlash.[52][53]
Xrushchev va moratoriy: 1958–1961
1957 yil yozida Xrushchev hokimiyatni yo'qotish xavfi ostida edi, chunki Partiyaga qarshi guruh avvalgisidan tashkil topgan Stalin ittifoqchilar Lazar Kaganovich, Georgi Malenkov va Vyacheslav Molotov Xrushchev o'rnini egallashga urinishni boshladi Kommunistik partiyaning bosh kotibi (samarali Sovet Ittifoqi rahbari) bilan Nikolay Bulganin, keyin Sovet Ittifoqining Bosh vaziri. Iyun oyida bekor qilingan quvib chiqarishga urinish, Xrushchev tomonidan hokimiyatni mustahkamlash uchun bir qator harakatlar amalga oshirildi. 1957 yil oktyabr oyida Xrushyov partiyadagi hiyla-nayranglardan himoyasizligini his qilib, mudofaa vazirini ishdan bo'shatdi Georgi Jukov, "millatning eng qudratli harbiy kishisi" sifatida keltirilgan. 1958 yil 27 martda Xrushchev Bulganinni iste'foga chiqishga majbur qildi va uning o'rniga Bosh vazir lavozimini egalladi. 1957 yildan 1960 yilgacha Xruishchev hokimiyatni qattiq qo'lga oldi va unchalik haqiqiy qarshiliklarga ega bo'lmagan.[54]
Xrushyovga yadro qurolining kuchi tufayli shaxsan o'zini qiynagan va keyinchalik bu qurolni hech qachon ishlatib bo'lmaydi, deb hisoblaganini aytadi. 50-yillarning o'rtalarida Xrushchev mudofaa siyosatiga katta qiziqish bilan qaradi va bir davrni ochishga intildi. détente G'arb bilan. Kelishuvga erishish uchun dastlabki harakatlar, masalan 1955 yildagi qurolsizlanish Jeneva sammiti, samarasiz bo'lib chiqdi va Xrushchev sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha muzokaralarni Sovet Ittifoqini "ham kuchli, ham mas'uliyatli" deb taqdim etish imkoniyati sifatida ko'rdi.[55][56] Da Kommunistik partiyaning 20-s'ezdi 1956 yilda Xrushchev yadroviy urushni endi "fatalistik jihatdan muqarrar" deb qarash kerak emasligini e'lon qildi. Shu bilan birga, bir vaqtning o'zida Xrushchev odatdagi Sovet kuchlari xarajatlari evaziga Sovet yadro arsenalini kengaytirdi va rivojlantirdi (masalan, 1960 yil boshlarida Xrushchev 1,2 million qo'shinni demobilizatsiya qilishni e'lon qildi).[57]
1958 yil 31 martda Sovet Ittifoqi Oliy Kengashi yadroviy sinovlarni to'xtatish to'g'risidagi qarorni tasdiqladi, boshqa yadroviy kuchlarning ham xuddi shunday qilishi sharti bilan. Keyin Xrushyov Eyzenxauer va Makmillanni moratoriyga qo'shilishga chaqirdi. Aksiya keng maqtovga sazovor bo'lganiga va Dullesning AQSh o'zaro javob qaytarishi kerakligi haqidagi bahsiga qaramay,[53] Eyzenxauer rejani "hiyla" deb rad etdi; Sovet Ittifoqi endigina sinovlar seriyasini yakunlagan edi va AQSh boshlanish arafasida edi Hardtack I operatsiyasi, bir qator atmosfera, sirt sathi va suv osti yadro sinovlari. Eyzenxauer buning o'rniga har qanday moratoriyni yadro qurollarini ishlab chiqarish hajmini kamaytirish bilan bog'liqligini ta'kidladi. 1958 yil aprel oyida AQSh rejalashtirilganidek Hardtack I operatsiyasini boshladi.[38][58][59] Sovet deklaratsiyasi Buyuk Britaniya hukumatiga tegishli edi, chunki moratoriy o'zining sinov dasturi tugashidan oldin sinovlarni taqiqlashga olib kelishi mumkin edi.[60] Sovet deklaratsiyasidan so'ng, Eyzenxauer tegishli nazorat va tekshirish choralarini belgilash uchun xalqaro ekspertlar yig'ilishini chaqirdi - bu g'oyani birinchi marta inglizlar taklif qilgan Tashqi ishlar vaziri Selvin Lloyd.[2][60]
PSAC, shu jumladan uning raislari advokati Jeyms Reyn Killian va Jorj Kistiakovskiy, 1958 yilda Eyzenxauerning sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha muzokaralarni boshlash to'g'risida qaror qabul qilishida muhim omil bo'lgan.[50][51] 1958 yil bahorida rais Killian va PSAC xodimlari (ya'ni.) Xans Bethe va Isidor Isaak Rabi ) er osti sinovlarini aniqlash uchun muvaffaqiyatli tizim yaratilishi mumkinligini aniqlab, AQShning sinovlarni taqiqlash siyosatini qayta ko'rib chiqdi. Dulzning tavsiyasiga binoan (yaqinda sinov taqiqlanishini qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun kelgan),[45] ko'rib chiqish Eyzenxauerni Sovet Ittifoqi bilan texnik muzokaralarni taklif qilishga undadi, sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha muzokaralarni yadro qurollarini ishlab chiqarishni to'xtatish to'g'risidagi muzokaralardan samarali ravishda ajratib qo'ydi (AQShning bir martalik talabi). Siyosat o'zgarishini tushuntirar ekan, Eyzenxauer xususiy ravishda sinov taqiqiga qarshilikning davom etishi AQShni "axloqiy izolyatsiya" holatida qoldirishini aytdi.[61]
1958 yil 8 aprelda Xrushchevning moratoriy chaqirig'iga qarshilik ko'rsatib, Eyzenxauer Sovet Ittifoqini ushbu texnik muzokaralarga sinov taqiqining texnik jihatlari bo'yicha konferentsiya shaklida, xususan taqiqqa rioya qilinishini ta'minlashning texnik tafsilotlariga qo'shilishga taklif qildi. Ushbu taklif, ma'lum darajada, Sovet Ittifoqiga imtiyoz edi, chunki sinov taqiqlanishi bo'linadigan moddiy ishlab chiqarishda ilgari talab qilingan cheklovdan mustaqil ravishda o'rganib chiqiladi. Dastlab Xrushyovga taklifnomani rad etdi, ammo Eyzenxauer tekshirish bo'yicha texnik kelishuv sinovlarni taqiqlash uchun kashfiyotchi bo'lishini taklif qilgandan keyin "jiddiy shubhalarga qaramay" rozi bo'ldi.[62]
1958 yil 1-iyulda Eyzenxauerning chaqirig'iga binoan yadroviy davlatlar Ekspertlar konferentsiyasini chaqirishdi Jeneva, yadro sinovlarini aniqlash vositalarini o'rganishga qaratilgan.[8][63] Konferentsiyada AQSh, Buyuk Britaniya, Sovet Ittifoqi, Kanada, Chexoslovakiya, Frantsiya, Polsha va Ruminiya olimlari ishtirok etishdi.[64] AQSh delegatsiyasini PSAC a'zosi Jeyms Fisk, Sovetlarni Evgeniy Fedorov,[65] va Britaniya delegatsiyasi tomonidan Uilyam Penni, Manxetten loyihasida Britaniya delegatsiyasini boshqargan. AQSh konferentsiyaga faqat texnik nuqtai nazardan yondoshgan bo'lsa-da, Penneyga siyosiy kelishuvga erishish uchun Makmillan maxsus ko'rsatma bergan.[66] Ushbu yondashuvdagi farq AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya jamoalarining keng tarkibida aks etdi. AQShlik mutaxassislar asosan ilmiy doiralar va sohadan jalb qilingan. Fisk vitse-prezident bo'lgan Qo'ng'iroq telefoni Laboratoriyalar va qo'shildi Robert Baxer va Manhetten loyihasida ishlagan fiziklar Ernest Lourens.[63] Aksincha, ingliz delegatlari asosan hukumat lavozimlarida ishladilar. Sovet delegatsiyasi asosan akademiklardan iborat edi, ammo deyarli barchasi Sovet hukumati bilan bog'liq bo'lgan. Sovetlar inglizlarning konferentsiyada kelishuvga erishish maqsadi bilan o'rtoqlashdilar.[67]
Ayniqsa, sensorlarning er osti sinovlarini zilziladan farqlash qobiliyati xususida so'z yuritildi. To'rtta usul tekshirildi: o'lchov akustik to'lqinlar, seysmik signallar, radio to'lqinlari va radioaktiv chiqindilarni tekshirish. Sovet delegatsiyasi har bir uslubga ishonch bildirdi, G'arb ekspertlari esa yanada keng qamrovli muvofiqlik tizimi zarurligini ta'kidladilar.[63]
Ekspertlar konferentsiyasi "yuqori malakali" va samarali bo'lganligi bilan ajralib turdi.[66][68] 1958 yil avgust oyining oxiriga kelib, mutaxassislar "Jeneva tizimi" deb nomlanuvchi keng ko'lamli nazorat dasturini ishlab chiqdilar, 160-170 quruqlikdagi kuzatuv postlarini, shuningdek, 10 ta qo'shimcha dengiz monitorlarini va shubhali hodisadan so'ng quruqlik ustidan vaqti-vaqti bilan parvozlarni o'z ichiga olgan ( tekshirish samolyoti tekshirilayotgan davlat tomonidan ta'minlanishi va boshqarilishi bilan). Mutaxassislarning ta'kidlashicha, bunday sxema er osti portlashlarining 90 foizini, aniq 5 kilotongacha aniqlanishi va atmosfera sinovlarini minimal rentabelligi 1 kilotonga etkazishi mumkin.[8][47][63] AQSh dastlab Sovetlarning 100–110 yilgi taklifiga nisbatan 650 lavozimni himoya qilgan. Oxirgi tavsiya Britaniya delegatsiyasi tomonidan tuzilgan murosa edi.[69] 1958 yil 21-avgustda e'lon qilingan va keng ommaga ma'qul kelgan kommyunikedagi konferentsiya "mumkin bo'lgan kelishuvning buzilishini aniqlash uchun ... ishlaydigan va samarali boshqaruv tizimini tashkil etish texnik jihatdan mumkin degan xulosaga keldi. yadroviy qurol sinovlarini butun dunyoda to'xtatish. "[63]
1958 yil 30 avgustda Sovet delegatsiyasi tomonidan tuzilgan hisobotda e'lon qilingan texnik natijalar,[63][68] AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya tomonidan sinovlar taqiqlanishi va xalqaro nazorat bo'yicha muzokaralar uchun asos bo'lib xizmat qilishni taklif qilganlar. Biroq, ekspertlarning hisobotida kimlar tomonidan monitoring olib borilishi va qachon joyida tekshiruvlar o'tkazilishi - AQSh talabi va Sovet Ittifoqining tashvishlariga yo'l qo'yilishi aniq belgilanmagan. Mutaxassislar, shuningdek, kosmik-kosmik sinovlarni (er yuzasidan 50 kilometrdan (31 milya) balandlikda) aniqlash aniqlanmagan deb hisobladilar. Bundan tashqari, Jeneva tizimining kattaligi uni amalga oshirishni juda qimmatga keltirgan bo'lishi mumkin. Ushbu cheklovlar tafsilotlarini o'z ichiga olgan 30 avgust hisoboti 21 avgust kommyunikesiga qaraganda jamoatchilik e'tiborini sezilarli darajada kam oldi.[8][47][63][64]
Shunga qaramay, xulosalardan mamnun bo'lgan Eyzenxauer ma'muriyati sinovlarni doimiy ravishda taqiqlash bo'yicha muzokaralarni taklif qildi[70] va Angliya va Sovet Ittifoqi xuddi shunday yo'l tutgan taqdirda, o'zini bir yillik sinov moratoriyini joriy etishini e'lon qildi. Ushbu qaror Jon Foster Dalles, Allen Dulles (keyin Markaziy razvedka direktori ) va Eyzenxauer ma'muriyati tarkibida sinovni taqiqlashni qurolsizlantirishga qaratilgan katta harakatlardan ajratish va bahs uchun mag'lubiyat haqida bahs yuritgan PSAC. Mudofaa vazirligi va aksincha bahs yuritgan AEC.[71]
1958 yil may oyida Buyuk Britaniya AQShga 1958 yil 31 oktyabrda o'tkaziladigan sinov moratoriyiga qo'shilishga tayyorligini ma'lum qildi va shu bilan vodorod bombasi sinovini tugatishi kerak edi. McMahon Act. AQSh Kongressi iyun oyi oxirida keng ko'lamli hamkorlikka ruxsat beruvchi tuzatishlarni ma'qulladi.[72] Sovetlar tomonidan 1958 yil 30 avgustda bir yillik moratoriy qabul qilingandan so'ng, uch mamlakat sentyabr va oktyabr oylarida bir qator sinovlarni o'tkazdilar. Ushbu davrda AQSh tomonidan kamida 54 ta, Sovet Ittifoqi tomonidan 14 ta sinov o'tkazildi. 1958 yil 31 oktyabrda uch mamlakat sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha muzokaralarni boshlashdi (Yadro sinovlarini to'xtatish bo'yicha konferentsiya) va vaqtinchalik moratoriyga rozi bo'lishdi (Sovet Ittifoqi ushbu sanadan ko'p o'tmay moratoriyga qo'shildi).[8][24][64][73] Moratoriy uch yilga yaqin davom etadi.[74]
Yadro sinovlarini to'xtatish bo'yicha konferentsiya Moskvaning iltimosiga binoan Jenevada chaqirildi (G'arb ishtirokchilari taklif qildilar Nyu-York shahri ). AQSh delegatsiyasiga rahbarlik qilindi Jeyms Jeremiah Wadsworth, BMTdagi elchi, inglizlar tomonidan Devid Ormsbi-Gor, Tashqi ishlar bo'yicha davlat vaziri va Sovetlar qurolsizlanish bo'yicha mutaxassis Semyon K. Tsarapkin tomonidan 1946 yilgi Barux rejasidan boshlangan. Jeneva konferentsiyasi Jeneva tizimiga asoslangan Sovet shartnomasi loyihasi bilan boshlandi. Yadro quroliga ega bo'lgan uchta davlat ("asl partiyalar") Jeneva tizimi tomonidan tasdiqlangan sinovlarni taqiqlashga rioya qilishadi va potentsial yadroviy davlatlar (masalan, Frantsiya) tomonidan sinovlarning oldini olish uchun harakat qilishadi. Bu ingliz-amerikalik muzokarachilar tomonidan tekshiruv qoidalari juda noaniq va Jeneva tizimi juda zaifligidan qo'rqib rad etildi.[75]
1958 yilning kuzida Jeneva konferentsiyasi boshlanganidan ko'p o'tmay, Eyzenxauer senator sifatida sinovlarni har tomonlama taqiqlashga qarshi ichki qarshilikka duch keldi. Albert Gore Sr. keng tarqalgan xatda Sovet Ittifoqining kuchli tekshiruv choralariga qarshi bo'lganligi sababli qisman taqiq afzalroq bo'ladi, deb ta'kidladi.[74]
Gore maktubi muzokaralarda biroz yutuqlarga turtki berdi, chunki Sovet Ittifoqi 1958 yil noyabr oyining oxirida aniq nazorat choralarini ishlab chiqilgan shartnoma matniga kiritishga ruxsat berdi. 1959 yil martga kelib, muzokarachilar shartnomaning ettita moddasini kelishib oldilar, ammo ular birinchi navbatda tortishuvsiz masalalarga taalluqli edilar va tekshirish bo'yicha bir qator nizolar davom etmoqda. Birinchidan, Sovet nazorati bo'yicha taklif G'arb tomonidan o'z-o'zini tekshirishga juda ishongan deb hisoblangan, nazorat punktlari asosan mamlakat fuqarolari tomonidan joylashtirilgan va xalqaro nazorat organi rasmiylari uchun minimal rol. G'arb nazorat punkti xodimlarining yarmini boshqa yadroviy davlatdan va yarmini neytral partiyalardan jalb qilishni talab qildi. Ikkinchidan, Sovet Ittifoqi xalqaro nazorat organi - Nazorat komissiyasidan ish boshlashdan oldin bir ovozdan talab qilishni talab qildi; G'arb Moskvaga komissiya ishiga veto qo'yish g'oyasini rad etdi. Nihoyat, Sovet Ittifoqi tekshirilayotgan mamlakat fuqarolaridan tuzilgan vaqtinchalik tekshiruv guruhlarini afzal ko'rdi, G'arb esa Nazorat komissiyasi inspektorlaridan iborat doimiy guruhlarni talab qildi.[75]
Bundan tashqari, Jeneva ekspertlarining hisobotiga dastlabki ijobiy javob berilganiga qaramay, 1958 yildagi Hardtack operatsiyalaridan olingan ma'lumotlar (ya'ni er osti) Rainier AQSh olimlari, shu jumladan Xans Bethe (taqiqni qo'llab-quvvatlagan), Jenevadagi topilmalar yer osti sinovlarini aniqlashga nisbatan juda optimistik ekanligiga ishonch hosil qilganligi sababli, tekshirishni yanada murakkablashtirishi mumkin edi, ammo Macmillan ushbu ma'lumotlardan foydalanib, sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha harakatlarni to'xtatish uchun jamoatchilikda siyosiy hiyla sifatida qabul qilinishi mumkin.[76] 1959 yil boshida Uodsort Tsarapkinga AQShning Jeneva tizimiga nisbatan yangi skeptik qarashlari to'g'risida gapirib berdi. Jeneva mutaxassislari tizim yer osti sinovlarini besh kilotongacha aniqlay olishiga ishongan bo'lsalar, AQSh endi 20 kilotonagacha bo'lgan sinovlarni aniqlay olishiga ishongan (taqqoslaganda, Kichkina bola bomba tashlandi Xirosima rasmiy hosildorligi 13 kilotonni tashkil etdi).[77] Natijada, Jenevani aniqlash rejimi va nazorat punktlari sonini, shu jumladan Sovet Ittifoqi tarkibidagi yangi lavozimlarni sezilarli darajada kengaytirish kerak edi. Sovetlar AQShning argumentini hiyla sifatida rad etib, Hardtack ma'lumotlari soxtalashtirilgan deb taxmin qilishdi.[78]
1959 yil boshida kelishuvga to'siq qo'yildi, chunki Makmillan va Eyzenxauer Mudofaa vazirligining qarshiliklari tufayli sinovlarni taqiqlashni qurolsizlanishning keng ko'lamli harakatlaridan alohida ko'rib chiqishga kelishdilar.[2][79]
1959 yil 13 aprelda Sovet Ittifoqining yer osti sinovlarini aniqlash tizimlariga qarshi chiqishlariga duch kelganda, Eyzenxauer yagona, har tomonlama sinov taqiqidan atmosfera sinovlari - balandligi 50 km (31 milya) gacha bo'lgan, Eyzenxauer chegarasi bo'lgan kelishuvga o'tishni taklif qildi. 1959 yil may oyida yuqoriga qarab qayta tiklanadi - avval taqiqlangan bo'lardi, yer osti va kosmik sinovlari bo'yicha muzokaralar davom etar edi. Ushbu taklif 1959 yil 23 aprelda Xrushchev tomonidan rad etilgan va uni "halol bo'lmagan bitim" deb atagan.[78] 1959 yil 26 avgustda AQSh bir yillik sinov moratoriyasini 1959 yil oxiriga qadar uzaytirishi va shu vaqtdan keyin oldindan ogohlantirmasdan sinovlarni o'tkazmasligini e'lon qildi. Sovet Ittifoqi, agar AQSh va Buyuk Britaniya moratoriyga rioya qilishni davom ettirsa, sinovlarni o'tkazmasligini yana bir bor tasdiqladi.[64]
Tekshirish bo'yicha boshi berk ko'chadan chiqish uchun Makmillan 1959 yil fevral oyida murosaga kelishni taklif qildi, bunda dastlabki tomonlarning har biri har yili belgilangan miqdordagi joylarda tekshiruvdan o'tkazilishi kerak edi. 1959 yil may oyida Xrushyovga va Eyzenxauer Makmillanning kvota bo'yicha taklifini o'rganishga kelishib oldilar, ammo Eyzenxauer Sovet Ittifoqi nazorat komissiyasining veto talabini bekor qilishi va identifikatsiyalash bo'yicha texnik muhokamalarda qatnashishi sharti bilan sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha keyingi muzokaralarni olib bordi. balandlikdagi yadro portlashlari. Xruşchev ikkinchisiga rozi bo'ldi va birinchisiga nisbatan noaniq edi.[80] Jenevadagi ishchi guruh oxir-oqibat yerdan kamida 18000 mil (29000 km) atrofida aylanib chiqadigan 5-6 ta sun'iy yo'ldoshlardan iborat qimmatbaho tizimni ishlab chiqadi, ammo bunday tizim balandlikning kelib chiqishini aniqlay oladi deb aniq ayta olmasa ham - kattalik sinovi. AQSh muzokarachilari, shuningdek, balandlikdagi sinovlar orqali aniqlashdan qochib qutulishi mumkinmi degan savol tug'dirdi radiatsiyadan himoya qilish. Concerning Macmillan's compromise, the Soviet Union privately suggested it would accept a quota of three inspections per year. The US argued that the quota should be set according to scientific necessity (i.e., be set according to the frequency of seismic events).[81]
In June 1959, a report of a panel headed by Lloyd Berkner, a physicist, was introduced into discussions by Wadsworth. The report specifically concerned whether the Geneva System could be improved without increasing the number of control posts. Berkner's proposed measures were seen as highly costly and the technical findings themselves were accompanied by a caveat about the panel's high degree of uncertainty given limited data. Around the same time, analysis conducted by the Livermore National Laboratory and RAND korporatsiyasi at Teller's instruction found that the seismic effect of an underground test could be artificially dampened (referred to as "decoupling") to the point that a 300-kiloton detonation would appear in seismic readings as a one-kiloton detonation. These findings were largely affirmed by pro-ban scientists, including Bethe. The third blow to the verification negotiations was provided by a panel chaired by Robert Bacher, which found that even on-site inspections would have serious difficulty determining whether an underground test had been conducted.[82]
In September 1959, Khrushchev visited the US While the test ban was not a focus on conversations, a positive meeting with Eisenhower at Kemp-Devid eventually led Tsarapkin to propose a technical working group in November 1959 that would consider the issues of on-site inspections and seismic decoupling in the "spirit of Camp David." Within the working group, Soviet delegates allowed for the timing of on-site inspections to be grounded in seismic data, but insisted on conditions that were seen as excessively strict. The Soviets also recognized the theory behind decoupling, but dismissed its practical applications. The working group closed in December with no progress and significant hostility. Eisenhower issued a statement blaming "the recent unwillingness of the politically guided Soviet experts to give serious scientific consideration to the effectiveness of seismic techniques for the detection of underground nuclear explosions." Eisenhower simultaneously declared that the US would not be held to its testing moratorium when it expired on 31 December 1959, though pledged to not test if Geneva talks progressed. The Soviet Union followed by reiterating its decision to not test as long as Western states did not test.[83]
In early 1960, Eisenhower indicated his support for a comprehensive test ban conditional on proper monitoring of underground tests.[84] On 11 February 1960, Wadsworth announced a new US proposal by which only tests deemed verifiable by the Geneva System would be banned, including all atmospheric, underwater, and outer-space tests within detection range. Underground tests measuring more than 4.75 on the Rixter shkalasi would also be barred, subject to revision as research on detection continued. Adopting Macmillan's quota compromise, the US proposed each nuclear state be subject to roughly 20 on-site inspections per year (the precise figure based on the frequency of seismic events).[85]
Tsarapkin responded positively to the US proposal, though was wary of the prospect of allowing underground tests registering below magnitude 4.75. In its own proposal offered 19 March 1960 the Soviet Union accepted most US provisions, with certain amendments. First, the Soviet Union asked that underground tests under magnitude 4.75 be banned for a period of four-to-five years, subject to extension. Second, it sought to prohibit all outer-space tests, whether within detection range or not. Finally, the Soviet Union insisted that the inspection quota be determined on a political basis, not a scientific one. The Soviet offer faced a mixed reception. In the US, Senator Hubert Humphrey and the Amerika olimlari federatsiyasi (which was typically seen as supportive of a test ban) saw it as a clear step towards an agreement. Conversely, AEC chairman Jon A. Makkon va senator Klinton Presba Anderson, chair of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, argued that the Soviet system would be unable to prevent secret tests. That year, the AEC published a report arguing that the continuing testing moratorium risked "free world supremacy in nuclear weapons," and that renewed testing was critical for further weapons development. The joint committee also held hearings in April which cast doubt on the technical feasibility and cost of the proposed verification measures.[86] Additionally, Teller continued to warn of the dangerous consequences of a test ban and the Department of Defense (including Neil H. McElroy va Donald A. Quarles, until recently its top two officials) pushed to continue testing and expand missile stockpiles.[84]
Shortly after the Soviet proposal, Macmillan met with Eisenhower at Camp David to devise a response. The Anglo-American counterproposal agreed to ban small underground tests (those under magnitude 4.75) on a temporary basis (a duration of roughly 1 year, versus the Soviet proposal of 4–5 years), but this could only happen after verifiable tests had been banned and a seismic research group (the Seismic Research Program Advisory Group) convened. The Soviet Union responded positively to the counterproposal and the research group convened on 11 May 1960. The Soviet Union also offered to keep an underground ban out of the treaty under negotiation. In May 1960, there were high hopes that an agreement would be reached at an upcoming summit of Eisenhower, Khrushchev, Macmillan, and Sharl de Goll of France in Paris.[87][88]
A test ban seemed particularly close in 1960, with Britain and France in accord with the US (though France conducted its birinchi yadro sinovi in February) and the Soviet Union having largely accepted the Macmillan-Eisenhower proposal. But US-Soviet relations soured after an American U-2 josus samolyoti edi otib tashlandi in Soviet airspace in May 1960.[64] The Paris summit was abruptly cancelled and the Soviet Union withdrew from the seismic research group, which subsequently dissolved. Meetings of the Geneva Conference continued until December, but little progress was made as Western-Soviet relations continued to grow more antagonistic through the summer, punctuated by the Kongo inqirozi in July and angry exchanges at the UN in September.[89] Macmillan would later claim to President Jon F. Kennedi that the failure to achieve a test ban in 1960 "was all the fault of the American 'big hole' obsession and the consequent insistence on a wantonly large number of on-site inspections."[90][91]
Eisenhower would leave office with an agreement out of reach, as Eisenhower's technical advisors, upon whom he relied heavily, became mired in the complex technical questions of a test ban, driven in part by a strong interest among American experts to lower the error rate of seismic test detection technology.[50][51] Some, including Kistiakowsky, would eventually raise concerns about the ability of inspections and monitors to successfully detect tests.[92] The primary product of negotiations under Eisenhower was the testing moratorium without any enforcement mechanism.[93] Ultimately, the goal of a comprehensive test ban would be abandoned in favor of a partial ban due to questions over seismic detection of underground tests.[50]
Siyosatshunos Robert Gilpin later argued that Eisenhower faced three camps in the push for a test ban.[94] The first was the "control" camp, led by figures like Linus Pauling and astronomer Xarlou Shapli, which believed that both testing and possession of nuclear weapons was dangerous. Second, there was the "finite containment" camp, populated by scientists like Hans Bethe, which was concerned by perceived Soviet aggression but still believed that a test ban would be workable with adequate verification measures. Third, the "infinite containment" camp, of which Strauss, Teller, and members of the defense establishment were members, believed that any test ban would grant the Soviet Union the ability to conduct secret tests and move ahead in the arms race.[95]
The degree of Eisenhower's interest in a test ban is a matter of some historical dispute.[96] Stiven E. Ambruz writes that by early 1960, a test ban had become "the major goal of his President, indeed of his entire career," and would be "his final and most lasting gift to his country."[97] Aksincha, Jon Lyuis Gaddis characterizes negotiations of the 1950s as "an embarrassing series of American reversals," suggesting a lack of real US commitment to arms control efforts.[98] The historian Robert Divine also attributed the failure to achieve a deal to Eisenhower's "lack of leadership," evidenced by his inability to overcome paralyzing differences among US diplomats, military leaders, national security experts, and scientists on the subject. Pol Nitze would similarly suggest that Eisenhower never formulated a cohesive test ban policy, noting his ability to "believe in two mutually contradictory and inconsistent propositions at the same time."[99]
Renewed efforts
Upon assuming the presidency in January 1961, John F. Kennedy was committed to pursuing a comprehensive test ban and ordered a review of the American negotiating position in an effort to accelerate languishing talks, believing Eisenhower's approach to have been "insufficient."[25][100][101] In making his case for a test ban, Kennedy drew a direct link between continued testing and nuclear proliferation, calling it the "'Nth-country' problem." While a candidate, Kennedy had argued, "For once Xitoy, or France, or Shvetsiya, or half a dozen other nations successfully test an atomic bomb, the security of both Russians and Americans is dangerously weakened." He had also claimed that renewed testing would be "damaging to the American image" and might threaten the "existence of human life." On the campaign trail, Kennedy's test-ban proposal consisted of a continued US testing moratorium, expanded efforts to reach a comprehensive agreement, limit any future tests to those minimizing fallout, and expand research on fallout.[102][103] Notably, early in his term, Kennedy also presided over a significant increase in defense spending, which was reciprocated by the Soviet Union shortly thereafter, thus placing the test-ban negotiations in the context of an accelerating arms race.[104]
On 21 March 1961, test-ban negotiations resumed in Geneva and Arthur Dean, a lead US envoy,[105] offered a new proposal in an attempt to bridge the gap between the two sides. The early Kennedy proposal largely grew out of later Eisenhower efforts, with a ban on all tests but low-yield underground ones (below magnitude 4.75), which would be subject to a three-year moratorium.[88] The US and UK proposed 20 on-site inspections per annum, while the Soviet Union proposed three. The verification procedures included in the Anglo-American plan were unacceptable to Tsarapkin, who responded with separate proposals rejected by the Western powers.[64] Specifically, the Soviet Union proposed a "troika" mechanism: a monitoring board composed of representatives of the West, the Soviet Union, and nonaligned states that would require unanimity before acting (effectively giving the Soviet Union veto authority).[88][106] In May 1961, Kennedy attempted via secret contact between Attorney General Robert F. Kennedi and a Soviet intelligence officer to settle on 15 inspections per year. This was rejected by Khrushchev.[65]
Ahead of the June 1961 Vena sammiti between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Robert F. Kennedy spoke with the Soviet ambassador to the US, who suggested that progress on a test ban was possible in a direct meeting between the leaders.[107] President Kennedy subsequently announced to the press that he had "strong hopes" for progress on a test ban.[108] In Vienna, Khrushchev suggested that three inspections per year would have to be the limit, as anything more frequent would constitute josuslik. Khrushchev privately believed allowing three inspections to be a significant concession to the West, as other Soviet officials preferred an even less intrusive system, and was angered by US resistance. Khrushchev later told his son, "hold out a finger to them—they chop off your whole hand."[109]
Additionally, the Soviet Union had once been ready to support an control commission under the aegis of the UN, Khrushchev explained, but it could not longer do so given perceived bias in recent UN action in the Congo.[110] Instead, Khrushchev reiterated the troika proposal.[106] Furthermore, Khrushchev insisted that the test ban be considered in the context of "general and complete disarmament," arguing that a test ban on its own was unimportant; Kennedy said the US could only agree with a guarantee that a disarmament agreement would be reached quickly (the Vienna demands thus amounted to a reversal of both sides' earlier positions).[88] Kennedy also disagreed that a test ban was itself insignificant; the world could expect many more countries in the coming years to cross the nuclear threshold without a test ban. Ultimately, the two leaders left Vienna without clear progress on the subject.[111] The Soviet Union would drop the general-disarmament demand in November 1961.[2]
Lifting the moratorium: 1961–1962
Following the setback in Vienna and 1961 yilgi Berlin inqirozi, as well as the Soviet decision to resume testing in August (attributed by Moscow to a changed international situation and French nuclear tests), Kennedy faced mounting pressure from the Department of Defense and nuclear laboratories to set aside the dream of a test ban. In June 1961, following stalled talks in Geneva, Kennedy had argued that Soviet negotiating behavior raised "a serious question about how long we can safely continue on a voluntary basis a refusal to undertake tests in this country without any assurance that the Russians are not testing." Whether or not the Soviet Union had actually conducted secret tests was a matter of debate within the Kennedy administration. A team led by physicist Volfgang K. X. Panofskiy reported that while the Soviet Union could have secretly tested weapons, there was no evidence indicating that it actually had. Panofsky's findings were dismissed by the Birlashgan shtab boshliqlari as "assertive, ambiguous, semiliterate and generally unimpressive."[112][113]
Two weeks after the lifting of the Soviet moratorium in August 1961, and after another failed Anglo-American attempt to have the Soviet Union agree to an atmospheric-test ban, the US restarted testing on 15 September 1961. Kennedy specifically limited such testing to underground and laboratory tests, but under mounting pressure as Soviet tests continued — during the time period of the Soviet Tsar Bomba 50 Mt+ test detonation on 30 October over Novaya Zemlya — Kennedy announced and dedicated funds to a renewed atmospheric testing program in November 1961.[112][114]
A report on the 1961 Soviet tests, published by a group of American scientists led by Hans Bethe, determined "that [Soviet] laboratories had probably been working full speed during the whole moratorium on the assumption that tests would at some time be resume," with preparations likely having begun prior to the resumption of talks in Geneva in March 1961. In January 1962, Bethe, who had once supported a test ban, publicly argued that a ban was "no longer a desirable goal" and the US should test weapons developed by its laboratories. In contrast to Soviet laboratories, US laboratories had been relatively inactive on nuclear weapons issues during the moratorium.[115]
In December 1961, Macmillan met with Kennedy in Bermud, appealing for a final and permanent halt to tests. Kennedy, conversely, used the meeting to request permission to test on Rojdestvo oroli, with US testing grounds in the Pacific having largely been exhausted. Macmillan agreed to seek to give US permission "if the situation did not change." Christmas Island was ultimately opened to US use by February 1962.[116]
On this matter of resumed atmospheric tests, Kennedy lacked the full backing of his administration and allies. In particularly, Macmillan, Adlai Stevenson (then the UN ambassador ), the Davlat departamenti, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Axborot agentligi va Jerom Vizner, the PSAC chairman, opposed resuming atmospheric tests. On the side advocating resumption were the AEC, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Joint Chiefs of Staff (which had called for renewed atmospheric tests in October 1961), and Department of Defense, though then-Secretary of Defense Robert Maknamara privately acknowledged that such tests were "not really necessary." Teller continued to advocate for atmospheric tests, as well, arguing in early 1962 that nuclear fallout was nothing be concerned about. Teller also argued that testing was necessary to continued advancement of US nuclear capabilities, particularly in terms of the mobility of its weapons and, accordingly, its ikkinchi zarba berish qobiliyati.[117]
Despite Teller's reassurances, Kennedy himself "hated the idea of reopening the race" and was uneasy with continued production of fallout,[118] a negative consequence of resumed testing that its opponents within the administration stressed. Opponents of the tests also argued that renewed atmospheric tests would come at a significant moral cost to the US, given broad public opposition to the plan, and claimed that further tests were largely unnecessary, with the US already having an adequate nuclear arsenal.[119] Arthur Dean believed that public opposition to atmospheric testing was so great that the US would have to halt such tests within four years even without an agreement.[120] Jon Kennet Galbraith, keyin ambassador to India, had advised Kennedy in June 1961 that resumed testing "would cause us the gravest difficulties in Asia, Africa and elsewhere." Similarly, Hubert Humphrey described the moratorium as "a ray of hope to millions of worried people." Its termination, Humphrey warned, "might very well turn the political tides in the world in behalf of the Soviets."[118]
Ultimately, Kennedy sided with those arguing for resumed testing. In particular, an argument by William C. Foster, the head of the Qurol nazorati va qurolsizlanish agentligi, swayed Kennedy. Foster argued that if the US failed to respond to the Soviet test series, Moscow could order a second test series, which could give the Soviet Union a significant advantage. Furthermore, a second test series, without US reciprocation, could damage the push for a test ban and make Senat ratification of any agreement less likely.[121] On 2 March 1962, building on the November 1961 announcement, Kennedy promised to resume atmospheric testing by the end of April 1962 if Moscow continued to resist the Anglo-American test-ban proposal.[64] To an extent, the announcement was a compromise, as Kennedy restricted atmospheric tests to those tests which were "absolutely necessary," not feasible underground, and minimized fallout. The condition that testing would resume only if the Soviet Union continued to oppose the Anglo-American proposal also served as a concession to dissenting voices within his administration and to Macmillan.[121]
Kennedy portrayed resumed testing as a necessary for the image of US resolve. If the US failed to respond to the Soviet test series, Kennedy explained, Moscow would "chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a failure of will—not to our confidence in Western superiority, but to our fear of world opinion." Keeping the US in a position of strength, Kennedy argued, would be necessary for a test ban to ever come about.[122]
The US suspension of atmospheric tests was lifted on 25 April 1962.[64][123]
By March 1962, the trilateral talks in Geneva had shifted to 18-party talks at the UN Disarmament Conference.[124] On 27 August 1962, within that conference, the US and UK offered two draft treaties to the Soviet Union. The primary proposal included a comprehensive ban verified by control posts under national command, but international supervision, and required on-site inspections. This was rejected by the Soviet Union due to the inspection requirement. The alternative proposal included a partial test ban—underground tests would be excluded—to be verified by national detection mechanisms, without supervision by a supranational body.[64][125]
Cuban Missile Crisis and beyond: 1962–1963
In October 1962, the US and Soviet Union experienced the Kuba raketa inqirozi, which brought the two superpowers to the edge of nuclear war and prompted both Kennedy and Khrushchev to seek accelerated yaqinlashish.[1][112][126][127][128][129] After years of dormant or lethargic negotiations, American and British negotiators subsequently forged a strong working relationship and with Soviet negotiators found common ground on test restrictions later in 1962.[130] After years of pursuing a comprehensive ban, Khrushchev was convinced to accept a partial ban, partly due to the efforts of Soviet nuclear scientists, including Kurchatov, Sakharov, and Yulii Khariton, who argued that atmospheric testing had severe consequences for human health.[112][131] Khrushchev had been concerned by a partial ban due to the greater US experience in underground tests; by 1962, the US had conducted 89 such tests and the Soviet Union just two (the Soviet focus had been on cheaper, larger-yield atmospheric tests). For this reason, many in the Soviet weapons industry argued that a partial ban would give the US the advantage in nuclear capabilities.[132] Khrushchev would later recount that he saw test-ban negotiations as a prime venue for ameliorating tensions after the crisis in Cuba.[133]
Shocked by how close the world had come to thermonuclear war, Khrushchev proposed easing of tensions with the US.[134] In a letter to President Kennedy dated 30 October 1962, Kurshchev outlined a range of bold initiatives to forestall the possibility of nuclear war, including proposing a non-aggression treaty between the Shimoliy Atlantika Shartnomasi Tashkiloti (NATO) va Varshava shartnomasi or even the disbanding these military blocs, a treaty to cease all nuclear weapons testing and even the elimination of all nuclear weapons, resolution of the hot-button issue of Germany by both East and West formally accepting the existence of G'arbiy Germaniya va Sharqiy Germaniya va AQSh materik Xitoy hukumati tomonidan tan olinishi. Maktubda qarshi takliflar va ushbu va boshqa masalalarni tinch muzokaralar orqali yanada chuqurroq o'rganish taklif qilingan. Khrushschev invited Norman amakivachchalari AQShning yirik davriy nashrining muharriri va yadro quroliga qarshi kurashchi prezident Kennedi bilan aloqa qilish uchun xizmat qildi va Kousins 1962 yil dekabr oyida Xrushchev bilan to'rt soat davomida uchrashdi.[135] Kennedining Xrushyovga bergan takliflariga javobi iliq edi, ammo Kennedi Kousinsga AQSh milliy xavfsizlik apparatidagi qattiqqo'llar bosimi tufayli bu masalalarni o'rganishda cheklanganligini bildirdi. However Kennedy pursued negotiations for a partial nuclear test ban.[136]
On 13 November 1962, Tsarapkin indicated that the Soviet Union would accept a proposal drafted by US and Soviet experts involving automated test detection stations ("black boxes") and a limited number of on-site inspections. The two sides disagreed over the number of black boxes, however, as the US sought 12–20 such stations and the Soviet Union rejected any more than three.[125] On 28 December 1962, Kennedy lowered the US demand to 8–10 stations. On 19 February 1963, the number was lowered further to seven, as Khrushchev continued to insist on no more than three.[123] Kennedy was willing to reduce the number to six, though this was not clearly communicated to the Soviet Union.[137] On 20 April 1963, Khrushchev withdrew support for three inspections entirely.[138]
Progress was further complicated in early 1963, as a group in the US Congress called for the Soviet proposal to be discarded in favor of the Geneva System.[125] On 27 May 1963, 34 US Senators, led by Humphrey and Tomas J. Dodd, kiritilgan qaror calling for Kennedy to propose another partial ban to the Soviet Union involving national monitoring and no on-site inspections. Absent Soviet agreement, the resolution called for Kennedy to continue to "pursue it with vigor, seeking the widest possible international support" while suspending all atmospheric and underwater tests. The effect of the resolution was to bolster the general push for a test ban, though Kennedy initially was concerned that it would damage attempts to secure a comprehensive ban, and had administration figures (including the Joint Chiefs of Staff) reiterate a call for a comprehensive ban.[123][139][140] That same spring of 1963, however, Kennedy had sent antinuclear activist Norman amakivachchalari to Moscow to meet with Khrushchev, where he explained that the political situation in the US made it very difficult for Kennedy agree to a comprehensive ban with Khrushchev's required terms. Cousins also assured Khrushchev that though Kennedy had rejected Khrushchev's offer of three yearly inspections, he still was set on achieving a test ban.[141] In March 1963, Kennedy had also held a press conference in which he re-committed to negotiations with the Soviet Union as a means of preventing rapid nuclear proliferation, which he characterized as "the greatest possible danger and hazard."[142]
One of Kennedy's advisors, Uolt Uitmen Rostou, advised the President to make a test ban conditional on the Soviet Union withdrawing troops from Kuba and abiding by a 1962 agreement on Laos, but Kennedy opted instead for test-ban negotiations without preconditions.[143] On 10 June 1963, in an effort to reinvigorate and recontextualize a test ban, President Kennedy dedicated his commencement address at American University to "the most important topic on earth: world peace" and proceeded to make his case for the treaty.[144] Kennedy first called on Americans to dispel the idea that peace is unattainable. "Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace," Kennedy said, "based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned." Second, Kennedy appealed for a new attitude towards the Soviet Union, calling Americans to not "see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodations as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats."[145] Finally, Kennedy argued for a reduction in Cold War tensions, with a test ban serving as a first step towards complete disarmament:
... where a fresh start is badly needed—is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty—so near and yet so far—would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms. It would increase our security—it would decrease the prospects of war. Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.[145]
Kennedy proceeded to announce an agreement with Khrushchev and Macmillan to promptly resume comprehensive test-ban negotiations in Moscow and a US decision to unilaterally halt atmospheric tests.[145] The speech was well received by Khrushchev, who later called it "the greatest speech by any American President since Ruzvelt,"[146] though was met with some skepticism within the US. The speech was endorsed by Humphrey and other Democrats, but labeled a "dreadful mistake" by Republican Senator Barri Goldwater and "another case of concession" by Everett Dirksen, the leader of the Senate Republicans. Dirksen and Charlz A. Xallek, the second-ranking Uy Republican, warned that the renewed negotiations might end in "virtual surrender."[123]
Due to prior experience in arms control and his personal relationship with Khrushchev, former Harbiy kotibning yordamchisi Jon J. Makkloy was first considered the likely choice for chief US negotiator in Moscow, but his name was withdrawn after he turned out to be unavailable over the summer. W. Averell Harriman, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union well respected in Moscow, was chosen instead.[147] The US delegation would also include Adrian S. Fisher, Karl Kaysen, John McNaughton va Uilyam R. Tayler. In Britain, Macmillan initially wanted David Ormsby-Gore, who had just completed a term as foreign minister, to lead his delegation, but there were concerns that Ormsby-Gore would appear to be a US "stooge" (Kennedy described him as "the brightest man he ever knew").[74] Instead, Macmillan chose Kvintin Xogg. Artur M. Shlezinger kichik., a special advisor to Kennedy, believed that Hogg was "ill prepared on the technicalities of the problem and was consumed by a desire to get a treaty at almost any cost."[148] Andrey Gromyko, Sovet Tashqi ishlar vaziri, served as Moscow's emissary.[149]
Heading into the negotiations, there was still no resolution within the Kennedy Administration of the question of whether to pursue a comprehensive or partial ban. In an effort to achieve the former, Britain proposed reducing the number of mandated inspections to allay Soviet concerns, but Harriman believed such a reduction would have to be paired with other concessions that Khrushchev would be able to show off within the Soviet Union and to China. Withdrawing PGM-19 Yupiter raketalar Italiya va kurka would have been an option, had they not already been removed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In meetings prior to the negotiations, Kennedy informed Harriman that he would be willing to make concessions on the Berlin savol.[150]
On 2 July 1963, Khrushchev proposed a partial ban on tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater, which would avoid the contentious issue of detecting underground tests. Notably, Khrushchev did not link this proposal to a moratorium on underground tests (as had been proposed earlier), but said it should be followed by a hujum qilmaslik to'g'risidagi bitim o'rtasida NATO va Varshava shartnomasi.[146] "A test ban agreement combined with the signing of a non-aggression pact between the two groups of state will create a fresh international climate more favorable for a solution of the major problems of our time, including disarmament," Khrushchev said.[151]
As the nuclear powers pursued a test ban agreement, they also sought to contend with a rising communist China, which at the time was pursuing its own yadro dasturi. 1955 yilda, Mao Szedun expressed to the Soviet Union his belief that China could withstand a first nuclear strike and more than 100 million casualties. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union assisted the Chinese nuclear program, but stopped short of providing China with an actual nuclear bomb, which was followed by increasingly tense relations 50-yillarning oxiri va 60-yillarning boshlarida. Khrushchev began the test-ban talks of 1958 with minimal prior discussion with China, and the two countries' agreement on military-technology cooperation was terminated in June 1959.[152] Prior to the Moscow negotiations of the summer of 1963, Kennedy granted Harriman significant latitude in reaching a "Soviet-American understanding" vis-à-vis China.[146] Secret Sino-Soviet talks in July 1963 revealed further discord between the two communist powers, as the Soviet Union released a statement that it did not "share the views of the Chinese leadership about creating 'a thousand times higher civilization' on the corpses of hundreds of millions of people." The Soviet Union also issued an ideological critique of China's nuclear policy, declaring that China's apparent openness to nuclear war was "in crying contradiction to the idea of Marksizm-leninizm," as a nuclear war would "not distinguish between imperialists and working people."[148]
The negotiations were inaugurated on 15 July 1963 at the Kreml with Khrushchev in attendance. Khrushchev reiterated that the Anglo-American inspection plan would amount to espionage, effectively dismissing the possibility of a comprehensive ban. Following the script of his 3 July 1963 speech, Khrushchev did not demand a simultaneous moratorium on underground testing and instead proposed a non-aggression pact. Under instruction from Washington, Harriman replied that the US would explore the possibility of a non-aggression pact in good faith, but indicated that while a test ban could be quickly completed, a non-aggression pact would require lengthy discussions. Additionally, such a pact would complicate the issue of Western access to G'arbiy Berlin. Harriman also took the opportunity to propose a non-proliferation agreement with would bar the transfer of nuclear weapons between countries. Khrushchev said that such an agreement should be considered in the future, but in the interim, a test ban would have the same effect on limiting proliferation.[153]
Following initial discussions, Gromyko and Harriman began examining drafts of a test-ban agreement. First, language in the drafted preamble appeared to Harriman to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in self-defense, which Harriman insisted be clarified. Harriman additionally demanded that an explicit clause concerning withdrawal from the agreement be added to the treaty; Khrushchev believed that each state had a sovereign right to withdraw, which should simply be assumed. Harriman informed Gromyko that without a clause governing withdrawal, which he believed the US Senate would demand, the US could not assent.[154] Ultimately, the two sides settled upon compromise language:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.[155]
Gromyko and Harriman debated how states not universally recognized (e.g., Sharqiy Germaniya and China) could join the agreement. The US proposed asserting that accession to the treaty would not indicate international recognition. This was rejected by the Soviet Union. Eventually, with Kennedy's approval, US envoys Fisher and McNaughton devised a system whereby multiple government would serve as depositaries for the treaty, allowing individual states to sign only the agreement held by the government of their choice in association with other like-minded states. This solution, which overcame one of the more challenging roadblocks in the negotiations, also served to allay mounting concerns from Macmillan, which were relayed to Washington, that an agreement would once again be derailed.[156] Finally, in an original Soviet draft, the signature of France would have been required for the treaty to come into effect. At Harriman's insistence, this requirement was removed.[138]
The agreement was initialed on 25 July 1963, just 10 days after negotiations commenced. The following day, Kennedy delivered a 26-minute televised address on the agreement, declaring that since the invention of nuclear weapons, "all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth ... Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness." Kennedy expressed hope that the test ban would be the first step towards broader rapprochement, limit nuclear fallout, restrict nuclear proliferation, and slow the arms race in such a way that fortifies US security. Kennedy concluded his address in reference to a Chinese maqol that he had used with Khrushchev in Vienna two years prior. "'A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step,'" Kennedy said. "And if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step."[157][158]
In a speech in Moscow following the agreement, Khrushchev declared that the treaty would not end the arms race and by itself could not "avert the danger of war," and reiterated his proposal of a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression accord.[123] For Khrushchev, the test ban negotiations had long been a means of improving the Soviet Union's global image and reducing strain in relations with the West.[133] There are also some indications that military experts within the Soviet Union saw a test ban as a way to restrict US development of taktik yadro qurollari, which could have increased US willingness to deploy small nuclear weapons on battlefields while circumventing the Soviet nuclear to'xtatuvchi.[159] Concern that a comprehensive ban would retard modernization of the Soviet arsenal may have pushed Khrushchev towards a partial ban.[160] Counteracting the move towards a partial ban was Khrushchev's interest in reducing spending on testing, as underground testing was more expensive than the atmospheric tests the Soviet Union had been conducting; Khrushchev preferred a comprehensive ban as it would have eliminated the cost of testing entirely.[161] Furthermore, there was internal concern about nuclear proliferation, particularly regarding the prospect of France and China crossing the threshold and the possibility of a multilateral NATO nuclear force, which was seen as a step towards West Germany acquiring nuclear weapons (the first Soviet test ban proposal in 1955 was made in the same month than West Germany joined NATO).[162]
It was not until after the agreement was reached that the negotiators broached the question of France and China joining the treaty. Harriman proposed to Khrushchev that the US lobby France while the Soviet Union pursued a Chinese signature. "That's your problem," Khrushchev said in reply.[163] Earlier, the Soviet ambassador to the US, Mikhail A. Menshikov, reportedly asked whether the US could "deliver the French."[164] Both Kennedy and Macmillan personally called on de Gaulle to join, offering assistance to the French nuclear program in return.[165] Nevertheless, on 29 July 1963, France announced it would not join the treaty. It was followed by China two days later.[123]
On 5 August 1963, British Foreign Secretary Alec Duglas-Home, Soviet foreign minister Gromyko, and US Secretary of State Din Rask signed the final agreement.[2][64]
After the Moscow agreement
Between 8 and 27 August 1963, the Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari Senatining Xalqaro aloqalar qo'mitasi held hearings on the treaty. The Kennedy administration largely presented a united front in favor of the deal. Leaders of the once-opposed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and AEC acknowledged that the treaty would be of net benefit, though Teller, former members of the JCS and AEC, and the commander of the Strategik havo qo'mondonligi made clear their firm opposition.[140] The opponents' argument centered on four themes. First, banning atmospheric tests would prevent the US from ensuring the qattiqlik uning LGM-30 minuteman missile silos and, second, from developing a capable raketaga qarshi mudofaa tizim. Third, it was argued that the Soviet Union led the US in high-yield weapons (recall the Soviet Tsar Bomba test of 1961), which required atmospheric testing banned by the treaty, while the US led the Soviet Union in low-yield weapons, which were tested underground and would be permitted by the treaty. Fourth, the ban would prevent peaceful, civilian uses of nuclear detonations. Teller declared that the treaty would be a "step away from safety and possibly ... toward war."[123]
Administration testimony sought to counteract these arguments. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced his "unequivocal support" for the treaty before the Foreign Relations Committee, arguing that US nuclear forces were secure and clearly superior to those of the Soviet Union, and that any major Soviet tests would be detected. Glenn T. Seaborg, the chairman of the AEC, also gave his support to the treaty in testimony, as did Xarold Braun, the Department of Defense's lead scientist, and Norris Bredberi, the longtime director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Maksvell D. Teylor, Shtab boshliqlarining birlashgan raisi, also testified in favor of the deal. Taylor and other members of the JCS, including Kertis LeMay, had made their support for the treaty conditional on four "safeguards": (1) a continued, aggressive underground testing program, (2) continued nuclear research programs, (3) continued readiness to resume atmospheric tests, and (4) improved verification equipment. Kennedy emphasized that the US would retain the ability to use nuclear weapons in war, would not be bound by the treaty if the Soviets violated it, and would continue an aggressive underground testing program. Kennedi, shuningdek, taqiq yadroviy urushning oldini olishda muhim qadam bo'lishini ta'kidladi.[123]
Qo'shma boshliqlarning guvohliklari, ayniqsa, Kuba raketa inqirozidan keyin Sovet Ittifoqiga qarshi qat'iyatlilik obro'siga ega bo'lgan Kennedi tomonidan berilgan ishonchlar kabi tashvishlarni bartaraf etishda samarali deb topildi. Bundan tashqari, bir qator taniqli shaxslar Respublikachilar kelishuvni qo'llab-quvvatlash uchun chiqdi, shu jumladan Eyzenxauer vitse-prezidenti Eyzenxauer Richard Nikson Dastlab shartnomaga shubha bilan qaragan senator Everett Dirksen. Eyzenxauerning ilmiy maslahatchisi va PSACning sobiq rahbari Jorj Kistiakovskiy ushbu shartnomani ma'qulladi. Sobiq prezident Garri S. Truman ham qo'llab-quvvatladi. Bitimni qo'llab-quvvatlovchilar bir qator fuqarolik guruhlari, shu jumladan, faol lobbichilik bilan muhim bosim kampaniyasini olib borishdi Birlashgan avtomobilsozlar /AFL-CIO, Aql-idrok yadro siyosati bo'yicha milliy qo'mita, Ayollar tinchlik uchun kurashmoqda va Metodist, Unitar universalist va Yahudiyni isloh qiling tashkilotlar. Keyinchalik PSAC raisi Jerom Viznerning ta'kidlashicha, ushbu ommaviy targ'ibot Kennedining sinovlarni taqiqlash uchun asosiy turtki bo'lgan.[161] Shartnomaga fuqarolik muxolifati unchalik ko'zga tashlanmadi, ammo Xorijiy urushlar faxriylari bilan birga bitimga qarshi chiqishini e'lon qildi Xalqaro xristian cherkovlari kengashi, "bilan tuzilgan ahdni rad etgan xudosiz kuch. "1963 yil avgust oyi oxirida o'tkazilgan so'rovnoma shuni ko'rsatdiki, 60 foizdan ko'proq amerikaliklar shartnomani qo'llab-quvvatlagan, 20 foizdan kamrog'i esa qarshi chiqqan.[123][166]
1963 yil 3 sentyabrda Xalqaro aloqalar qo'mitasi ushbu shartnomani 16-1 ovoz bilan ma'qulladi. 1963 yil 24 sentyabrda AQSh Senati 80–14 ovoz bilan shartnomani ratifikatsiya qilishni ma'qulladi va zarur ovozlarning uchdan ikki qismidan 14 ovoz bilan oshib ketdi. Sovet Ittifoqi shartnomani ertasi kuni bir ovozdan qabul qildi Oliy Kengash Prezidiumi.[167] 1963 yil 10 oktyabrda shartnoma kuchga kirdi.[123][168][169]
Amalga oshirish
Qoidalar
Shartnoma o'zining "asosiy maqsadi qat'iy xalqaro nazorat ostida umumiy va to'liq qurolsizlanish to'g'risida kelishuvga erishish uchun eng tezkor maqsad" deb e'lon qiladi va sinovlarning keng qamrovli taqiqlanishiga erishish maqsadini (yer osti sinovlarini taqiqlovchi) aniq ko'rsatib beradi. Shartnoma shartnoma taraflariga atmosfera, kosmik fazo yoki suv ostidagi har qanday yadroviy portlashni hamda boshqa davlat hududiga yadro qoldiqlarini yuborish bilan tahdid qiladigan "boshqa har qanday yadroviy portlashni" o'tkazish, ruxsat berish yoki rag'batlantirishni doimiy ravishda taqiqlaydi.[169] "Boshqa har qanday yadroviy portlash" iborasi tinch sinovli yadroviy portlashni taqiqladi, chunki kengaytirilgan tekshiruv choralarisiz ularni harbiy sinovlardan farqlash qiyin edi.[2]
Moskvada AQSh delegatlari Adrian S. Fisher va Jon Maknauton tomonidan tuzilgan murosaga binoan, ushbu shartnomaning 3-moddasi davlatlarga ratifikatsiya yoki qo'shilish to'g'risidagi hujjatlarni Buyuk Britaniya, Sovet Ittifoqi yoki Qo'shma Shtatlar hukumatiga topshirishga imkon beradi va shu bilan umumiy e'tirofga ega bo'lmagan hukumatlarni qonuniylashtiradigan shartnoma masalasi.[156] 4-moddada Moskvada Gromiko va Garriman tomonidan shartnomadan chiqish bo'yicha kelishuvga erishilganligi aks ettirilgan. Bu Xrushchev ta'kidlaganidek, davlatlarning shartnomalardan chiqish suveren huquqini tan oladi, ammo AQShning talabiga binoan, "favqulodda hodisalar ... o'z mamlakatining oliy manfaatlarini xavf ostiga qo'ygan bo'lsa", tomonlarga chekinish huquqini aniq beradi.[154][169]
Imzolovchilar
1964 yil 15 aprelga qadar, PTBT kuchga kirganidan olti oy o'tgach, 100 dan ortiq davlatlar shartnomaga imzo chekkan davlatlar sifatida qo'shilishdi va 39 davlat uni ratifikatsiya qildi yoki qo'shildi.[123] PTBTning eng so'nggi partiyasi Chernogoriya, 2006 yilda shartnomaga erishdi.[169] 2015 yildan boshlab[yangilash], 126 davlat shartnomaning ishtirokchisi bo'lgan, 10 ta boshqa davlat imzolagan, ammo saqlanmagan ratifikatsiya hujjatlarini imzolagan. PTBTga imzo chekmagan 60 ta davlat, shu jumladan Xitoy, Frantsiya va Shimoliy Koreya.[170] Albaniya, PTBT kuchga kirishi paytida Xitoyning mafkuraviy ittifoqchisi ham imzolamagan.[167][170]
Samaradorlik
PTBTni ratifikatsiya qilish atmosferadagi radioaktiv zarralar miqdorining keskin pasayishi boshlanishiga to'g'ri keldi ("bomba boshoq "1960-yillarning boshlarida), ammo u yadroviy tarqalishni to'xtatmadi.[1][171][172][173][174] PTBT kuchga kirgandan bir yil o'tib, notijorat Xitoy uni o'tkazdi 596 sinov va dunyodagi beshinchi atom kuchiga aylandi.[175] Xitoydan beri, yana to'rtta shtat yadro quroliga ega bo'lganligi ma'lum yoki ishoniladi. Shu bilan birga, PTBT er osti sinovlari bilan bog'liq katta xarajatlar tufayli tarqalishning sekinlashishi hisoblangan.[20] Kennedi 1963 yilda sinov taqiqisiz 1970 yilgacha 10 ta, 1975 yilgacha esa 15 dan 20 gacha yadro davlatlari bo'lishi mumkinligi haqida ogohlantirgan edi.[176]
PTBT (1963-1972) ratifikatsiya qilinganidan keyingi o'n yil ichida (1953-1962) o'n yilga qaraganda ko'proq AQSh yadro sinovlari o'tkazildi. Keyingi o'n yillikda AQSh avvalgi o'n yillikda 268 ta sinov va uchta PNEga qarshi bo'lganidek, 385 ta yadroviy sinov va 23 ta tinch yadroviy portlashni (PNE) o'tkazdi. Aksincha, Sovet Ittifoqi portlashlari soni o'tgan o'n yil ichida 218 tadan, keyingi o'n yillikda 157 taga kamaydi, chunki Sovet Ittifoqi hech qachon AQShning er osti portlashlari tezligini bajara olmagan.[177] Ikki notijorat tashkilot - Xitoy va Frantsiya 1963 yildan 1973 yilgacha 53 ta sinov o'tkazdilar. Hammasi bo'lib PTBT imzolanishi bilan 1973 yil 1 iyul orasida 436 ta sinov o'tkazildi, 1945 yil 16 iyul bilan PTBT imzolanishi o'rtasidagi 499 ta sinov.[178] 1960-70-yillarda Xitoy 22 ta, Frantsiya 50 ta atmosfera sinovini o'tkazdi.[8] So'nggi atmosfera sinovi Xitoy tomonidan 1980 yilda, Frantsiya atmosfera sinovlari 1974 yilda to'xtaganidan keyin o'tkazilgan.[64][179] Shartnoma qabul qilinganidan keyin ham yadro sinovlariga qarshi ommaviy qarshilik davom etdi. Greenpeace 1971 yilda rejalashtirilgan yer osti sinovlariga qarshi tashkil etilgan Alyaska oroli Amchitka. 1982 yilda Greenpeace kemasi to'xtadi Leningrad Sovet Ittifoqidan sinovlarni to'xtatishni talab qilish uchun ruxsatisiz.[180]
PTBT 20-asrning ikkinchi yarmida yadro qurollarini nazorat qilish bo'yicha bir qator shartnomalarning birinchisi edi. PTBT pog'onali qadam deb hisoblanadi Yadro qurolini tarqatmaslik to'g'risidagi shartnoma (NPT) 1968 yil, bu PTBT tomonidan taqdim etilgan taraqqiyotga aniq ishora qiladi.[64] NPTga qo'shimcha ravishda, PTBT o'n yil ichida kuzatilgan Kosmik kosmik kelishuv va Tlatelolco shartnomasi 1967 yilda Dengiz tubi qurollarini nazorat qilish to'g'risidagi shartnoma 1971 yilda va Balistik raketalarga qarshi shartnoma 1972 yilda.[181] 1974 yilda Chegara sinovlarini taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma rentabelligi 150 kilotondan yuqori bo'lgan taqiqlangan er osti sinovlari.[179][182]
1977 yil oktyabr oyida PTBTning dastlabki taraflari Jenevada sinovlarni to'liq taqiqlash masalasini qayta muhokama qildilar. 1970-yillarning oxiriga kelib, AQSh, Buyuk Britaniya va Sovet Ittifoqi barcha sinovlarni taqiqlash, PNE-larni vaqtincha taqiqlash va tekshirish tizimini, shu jumladan joyida tekshirishni taqiqlovchi qoidalar loyihalari bo'yicha kelishuvga erishdilar. Ammo tomonlar tekshiruvning aniq tafsilotlari bo'yicha kelishmovchiliklarni saqlab qolishdi va Prezidentning ketishi bilan muzokaralar butunlay tarqalib ketdi. Jimmi Karter 1981 yilda.[64]
Keng qamrovli taqiqqa qarshi momentum qayta paydo bo'ldi Mixail Gorbachyov va Prezident Ronald Reygan Gorbachyov 1985 yilda sinov moratoriyini boshlash bilan. 1986 yil dekabrda AQSh "uzoq muddatli maqsad" ni har tomonlama taqiqlashni qo'llab-quvvatlaganligini ko'rsatdi, so'ngra 1987 yil noyabrda AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqi o'rtasida sinov muzokaralari boshlandi. Dekabrda 1987 yilda AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqi er osti sinovlarini aniqlash bo'yicha qo'shma eksperimentlar dasturiga kelishib oldilar.[64][183] 1988 yil avgustda, Indoneziya, Meksika, Peru, Shri-Lanka, Venesuela va Yugoslaviya shartnomani yer osti sinovlariga qadar kengaytirish orqali PTBTni keng qamrovli taqiqqa aylantirish to'g'risida iltimos qildi. 1991 yil yanvar oyida rejaga bag'ishlangan konferentsiyada AQSh PTBTga tuzatishlar kiritish bilan konsensus asosida keng qamrovli taqiqqa erishish uchun harakatlarga yo'l qo'ymasligini ta'kidladi.[2]
1990-yillar davomida sinovlarni taqiqlash bo'yicha keng qamrovli shartnoma (CTBT) bo'yicha taraqqiyot tezlashdi. Ushbu mavzu bo'yicha bir qator xalqaro uchrashuvlardan so'ng, BMT Bosh assambleyasi davlatlarni PTBTga ergashishni va CTBT muzokaralarini yakunlashni talab qiladigan 50/64 Qarorni ma'qulladi. 1996 yil sentyabr oyida Yadro sinovlarini har tomonlama taqiqlash to'g'risidagi shartnoma imzolangan va PTBT o'rnini bosgan, ammo PTBT hali ham CTBTga a'zo bo'lmagan davlatlar uchun amal qiladi.[73] CTBT hali kuchga kirmadi, chunki talab qilinadigan 8 ta davlat shartnomani ratifikatsiya qilmagan, shu jumladan AQSh va Xitoy. Frantsiya, Rossiya va Buyuk Britaniya CTBTni ratifikatsiya qildi.[184] Er osti sinovlarini aniqlash texnologiyasi 1950 va 1960-yillarda sezilarli darajada yaxshilandi, monitorlar yuqori ishonch bilan 1 kilotongacha bo'lgan sinovlarni aniqladilar.[8]
Qoidabuzarliklar va baxtsiz hodisalar
PTBTga erta rioya qilish yaxshi deb hisoblangan,[185] ammo shartnoma ishtirokchilari tomonidan atmosferaga yadro chiqindilarining bir qator tasodifiy chiqarilishi sodir bo'lgan. Bundan tashqari, AQSh va Sovet Ittifoqi tomonidan o'tkazilgan er osti sinovlaridan "shamollatish" ham radioaktiv chiqindilarni atmosferaga chiqarishda davom etdi.[179] To'liq qamrab olingan er osti sinovlari ham to'liq "toza" emas edi. Er osti sinovlari sabab bo'lgan xavfni kamaytirdi radionuklidlar qisqa bilan yarim umr, kabi yod-131, va odatda boshqa sinov shakllariga qaraganda xavfsizroq. Shu bilan birga, er osti sinovlari, shu jumladan, uzoq umr ko'rgan radionuklidlarni keltirib chiqarishi mumkin seziy-135, yod-129 va plutonyum, erga singib ketish.[186][187]
Sovet Ittifoqidan keyin radioaktiv gazning atmosferada ajralib chiqishi Chagan testi 1965 yil 15-yanvar kuni Qozog'iston. 140 kilotonlik portlash natijasida hosil bo'lgan radioaktiv chiqindilarning taxminan 20 foizi atmosferaga tarqaldi, ba'zi yiqilishlar Yaponiya ustidan sodir bo'ldi.[188] AQSh Moskvaga shikoyat qildi, ammo keyingi choralar ko'rilmadi.[iqtibos kerak ] 1966 yil 25 aprelda Pin Stripe Nevadadagi yer osti sinovi (qismi Flintlock operatsiyasi ) shamollatish nosozligini boshdan kechirgan va radioaktiv shlyuzni tomon yo'nalgan AQShning o'rta g'arbiy qismi; AEC ushbu sinov inson salomatligiga tahdid solmasligini aniqladi.[179]
Keyingi tasodifiy ozod qilish sodir bo'ldi Yong'oq 1970 yil 18-dekabrda Nevada sinov maydonchasida otilgan (qismi "Emery" operatsiyasi ). 10 kilotonlik er osti portlashi natijasida tuproqda yoriqlar paydo bo'ldi va bu radioaktiv gazning atmosferaga chiqib ketishiga imkon berdi.[189] Yoriq bilan chiqarilgan radioaktiv material 3000 metr balandlikka ko'tarilib, 86 ishchini radiatsiya ta'siriga duchor qildi, ammo hech kim haddan tashqari darajada.[190] O'shandan beri bu hodisa "dunyodagi eng dahshatli yadro falokatlari" deb ta'riflangan.[191]
Yashirilgan AQSh hujjatlari shuni ko'rsatadiki, Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlarining ko'rsatmasiga binoan 1972 yilda PTBT tomonidan atmosfera sinovlarini o'tkazishga qo'yilgan taqiqni buzgan bo'lishi mumkin. Genri Kissincer, frantsuz dasturi bilan hamkorlik qilishi mumkin bo'lgan Tinch okeanidagi frantsuz atmosfera sinovlari bo'yicha ma'lumotlarni kuzatish va yig'ish. Yashirilgan hujjatlar, shuningdek, AQSh va Buyuk Britaniyaning 1964–65 yillarda bir qator qo'shimcha nazorat punktlarini tashkil etish orqali belgilangan tekshirish tizimini chetlab o'tganligini ko'rsatmoqda. Avstraliya, Fidji, Mavrikiy, Pokiston va Janubiy Afrika.[179]
1979 yil Vela hodisasi Atlantika janubida PTBT tomonidan aksincha atmosfera yadro sinovi bo'lishi mumkin Isroil va Janubiy Afrika, ikkalasi ham shartnoma ishtirokchilari edi.[192][193]
Shuningdek qarang
- Havo kuchlarining texnik qo'llanmalar markazi - AQShning yadroviy shartnomaning bajarilishini nazorat qilishga bag'ishlangan tashkiloti
- Boeing WC-135 doimiy Feniks - yadroviy portlashni aniqlash uchun foydalaniladigan AQSh samolyotlari
- Milliy texnik tekshirish vositalari
- Orion loyihasi (yadroviy harakat) - PTBT ratifikatsiya qilinganidan ko'p o'tmay tugagan AQSh loyihasi
Adabiyotlar
Iqtiboslar
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Nashrlar
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- Shartnoma da Birlashgan Millatlar Tashkilotining qurolsizlanish masalalari bo'yicha boshqarmasi
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